Geopolitical Trends and The Future of Warfare

T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E
Geopolitical Trends
and the Future of
Warfare
The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force
RAPHAEL S. COHEN, EUGENIU HAN, AND ASHLEY L. RHOADES
C O R P O R AT I O N
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Preface
Where will the next war occur? Who will fight in it? Why will it occur?
How will it be fought? Researchers with RAND Project AIR FORCE’s
Strategy and Doctrine Program attempted to answer these questions
about the future of warfare—specifically, those conflicts that will drive
a U.S. and U.S. Air Force response—by examining the key geopolitical,
economic, environmental, geographic, legal, informational, and military
trends that will shape the contours of conflict between now and 2030.
This report on geopolitical trends and the future of warfare is one of a
series that grew out of this effort. The other reports in the series are
• Raphael S. Cohen et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project

Overview and Conclusions (RR-2849/1-AF)
• Forrest E. Morgan and Raphael S. Cohen, Military Trends and
the Future of Warfare: The Changing Global Environment and Its
Implications for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/3-AF)
• Howard J. Shatz and Nathan Chandler, Global Economic Trends
and the Future of Warfare: The Changing Global Environment and
Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/4-AF)
• Shira Efron, Kurt Klein, and Raphael S. Cohen, Environment,
Geography, and the Future of Warfare: The Changing Global Envi-
ronment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/5-AF)
• Bryan Frederick and Nathan Chandler, Restraint and the Future
of Warfare: The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications
for the U.S. Air Force (RR-2849/6-AF).
This volume examines six geopolitical trends by asking four key

questions for each trend. First, what does research say about how this
iii
iv Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare
variable shapes the conduct of warfare? Second, how has this variable
historically shaped the conduct of warfare, especially in the post–Cold
War era? Third, how might this variable be expected to change through
2030? And finally, but perhaps most importantly, how might this vari-
able affect the future of warfare in this time frame, especially as it relates
to the U.S. armed forces and the U.S. Air Force in particular? By answer-
ing these questions, it is hoped that this report will paint a picture of how
geopolitics will shape conflict over the next decade and beyond.
This research was sponsored by the Director of Strategy, Con-
cepts and Assessments, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and
Requirements (AF/A5S). It is part of a larger study, entitled The Future
of Warfare, that assists the Air Force in assessing trends in the future
strategic environment for the next Air Force strategy. This report should
be of value to the national security community and interested members
of the general public, especially those with an interest in how global
trends will affect the conduct of warfare. Comments are welcome and
should be sent to the authors, Raphael S. Cohen, Eugeniu Han, and
Ashley L. Rhoades. Research was completed in October 2018.
RAND Project AIR FORCE
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corpo-

ration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and develop-
ment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with
independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development,
employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air,
space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force
Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Train-
ing; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The research
reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000.
Additional information about PAF is available on our website:
www.rand.org/paf.
This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air
Force on September 7, 2018. The draft report, issued in September
2018, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. Air Force subject-
matter experts.
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
CHAPTER ONE
Global Political Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Trend Selection and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CHAPTER TWO
Trend 1: U.S. Polarization and Retrenchment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Context: U.S. Centrality in Geopolitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Historical Trend: Increasing U.S. Polarization of Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Future Projection: Gridlock, Disillusionment, and Isolationism . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Implications for the U.S. Air Force and the Future of Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CHAPTER THREE
Trend 2: China’s Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Context: China’s Priorities Include Growing Military Ambition . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Historical Trend: Not So Peaceful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Future Projection: Increasing Domestic Pressure; Expanding Strategic
Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Implications for the U.S. Air Force and the Future of Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
v
vi Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare
CHAPTER FOUR
Trend 3: Asia’s Reassessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Context: Ripe for Rivalry? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Historical Trend: Balancing, Hedging, and Rising Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Future Projection: A 19th-Century Powder Keg? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
CHAPTER FIVE
Trend 4: The Emergence of a Revanchist Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Context: Russia’s Priorities Include Pursuing a Polycentric World . . . . . . . . . 43
Historical Trend: Russia’s Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Future Projection: The Return of a More Assertive Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
CHAPTER SIX
Trend 5: Upheaval in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Context: An Uncertain Future for Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Historical Trend: Migration, Terrorism, Political Turmoil, and Russia . . . . 57
Future Projection: Increasingly Destabilized, Divided, and Inward-Looking
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
CHAPTER SEVEN
Trend 6: Turmoil in the Islamic World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Context: Sectarian and Ethnic Conflict Occurs After Authoritarian
Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Historical Trend: Descent into Chaos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Future Projection: Terrorism, Instability, and Regional Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . 75
CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Figures and Tables
Figures
2.1. Growing Polarization of the U.S. Electorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Percentage of Americans Expressing “Very Little” or “No”
Faith in Government Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3. Percentage of Americans Expressing Satisfaction with U.S.
Role in the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Tables
S.1. Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
6.1. Indicators of Alliance Strength. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
8.1. Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
vii
Summary
Carl von Clausewitz famously argued that “war is the continuation

of politics by other means,” and that aphorism remains as true in the
21st century as it was in the 19th: The future of warfare will depend on
geopolitics.1 In this report, we focus on six key geopolitical trends that
will shape who, how, where, when, and why the United States will fight
in the next conflict (see Table S.1): U.S. polarization and retrenchment,
China’s rise, Asia’s reassessment, the emergence of a revanchist Russia,
upheaval in Europe, and turmoil in the Islamic world.
First, the United States emerged as one of the primary actors (per-
haps the primary actor) on the world stage during a period of rela-
tive political unity about foreign policy matters—particularly about
the need to contain communism and uphold liberal internationalism,
which coupled U.S. military power with a belief in multilateral com-
promises. This consensus, however, has gradually eroded over the past
several decades; today, Americans are becoming increasingly polarized
and uncertain about the U.S. role in the world. The United States’
retreat from its global position (whether because of political gridlock
or policy choice) could affect everything from its defense budgets to its
willingness to commit forces abroad.
Second, and at the same time, China is rising both economically
and militarily. China, historically, has challenged even more-powerful
adversaries to advance domestic priorities and to defend and expand its
strategic periphery. In the future, as Chinese President Xi Jinping faces
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 87.
ix
x
Table S.1
Summary of Findings
Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare

How They Might Where They Might When They Might Why They Might
Trend Who Will Fight Fight Fight Fight Fight
U.S. United States Airpower and special Overconfidence in

polarization operations forces rather the military combined
and than conventional with distrust of other
retrenchment ground forces tools of national
power
China’s rise China and its High-end conflict but Taiwan, South China If China’s economy Domestic pressure;
immediate neighbors also measures short of Sea, Senkaku Islands slows; potentially expanding strategic
war as President Xi periphery
Jinping’s tenure
comes to a close
Asia’s More new partners More maritime conflicts Nationalism; fear of

reassessment and allies (air-sea cooperation) rising China
(e.g., Vietnam/India);
less others
(e.g., the Philippines)
A revanchist Russia and its High-end threat but Russia’s near abroad Combination of
Russia neighbors also measures short of (with second-order Russian insecurity and
war effects for Asia and the desire for a greater
Middle East) sphere of influence
Upheaval in More Poland and Eastern Europe (in Counterterrorism;

Europe France; less Germany; response to Russian Response to Russian
more-restrained United aggression) aggression
Kingdom
Turmoil in the Terrorist groups, Arab Sustained low- Middle East, North Now ongoing Counterterrorism/
Islamic world States, Iran, Israel level conflict/ Africa, Central Asia alliance entrapment
counterterrorism
Summary xi
domestic pressure at home and as China’s strategic periphery expands

throughout the Indo-Pacific, it might be more likely to fight for those
same reasons.
Third, as China rises, the rest of Asia faces a stark strategic
choice: to balance or bandwagon with Beijing. The paths these coun-
tries choose will, in turn, have profound implications for the U.S.
alliance architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Some states, such as India
and Vietnam, will likely develop closer bonds with the United States,
while other relationships—notably the Philippines and, perhaps,
South Korea—will likely become more precarious.
Fourth, although China’s rise threatens to upend the dynamic
in Asia (and, perhaps, globally), the United States also confronts the
reemergence of its old nemesis, Russia. After several decades of rela-
tive quiet after the Cold War, Russia has become increasingly aggres-
sive, especially in its near abroad. Conceiving of itself as a leading
international power, albeit a frustrated one, Russia has been increas-
ingly willing to use military force—and coercion below the threshold
of war—to block expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and the European Union into its near abroad, protect ethnic
Russians and Russian speakers, and promote its interests as a great
power.
Fifth, just as Russia has reemerged as a threat, Europe risks
becoming increasingly fragmented and absorbed with its own chal-
lenges. Europe confronts a series of challenges—migration, terrorism,
and populism, as well as a resurgent Russia—that threaten to under-
mine the European Union’s ability to respond effectively to these
threats, which could alter U.S. alliances.
Finally, although China and Russia arguably pose a greater strate-
gic threat, U.S. wars since at least the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, have focused on three interconnected challenges emanating
from the Islamic world—specifically, terrorism, weak states, and
growing proxy wars. Looking ahead to 2030, these three challenges
will likely continue to shape the future of warfare and drive U.S. mili-
tary commitments.
Together, these six trends point to three overarching findings.
First, many of the underlying geopolitical assumptions in the U.S.
xii Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare
National Defense Strategy2 —about the centrality of great-power com-

petition and the risk of aggression in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and
the Middle East—are correct. Second, although U.S. adversaries will
likely remain relatively stable over the next decade, U.S. allies will
likely change, especially as Europe becomes increasingly preoccupied
with its own problems and Asia realigns as a result of the rise of China.
Finally, and most importantly, U.S. strategists will face a deepening
series of strategic dilemmas as the possibility of conflict in the Indo-
Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East pull limited U.S. resources in
different directions.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States: Sharpening American Military’s Competitive Edge, Washington, D.C., January 2018.
Acknowledgments
This study would not have been possible without the help of many
people. First and foremost, we thank Brig Gen David Hicks,
Col Linc Bonner, and Scott Wheeler of the Air Force A5S for spon-
soring this project and guiding it along the way. We would also like
to thank Paula Thornhill, the Project AIR FORCE strategy doctrine
program director, for her guidance and mentorship of this study. This
report also benefited from the thoughtful reviews of Amb. James Dob-
bins and Hal Brands. Finally, the research team owes a special debt of
gratitude to more than a hundred experts across the globe who volun-
teered their time to give their perspectives on the future of warfare both
within their regions and globally. Human subjects protocol prevents
us from thanking individuals by name, but we would like to thank
the following institutions for hosting our research visits: United King-
dom (UK) Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts, and Doc-
trine Centre; UK Parliament; Royal Institute of International Affairs
(Chatham House); Control Risks; Royal United Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies; London School of Economics and Polit-
ical Science IDEAS; International Institute of Strategic Studies; North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters; European Commission;
Centre for European Policy Studies; European Centre for International
Political Economy; German Federal Ministry of Defence; German
Institute for International and Security Affairs; German Federal Par-
liament; German Federal Foreign Office; European Council on For-
eign Relations; Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Polish Ministry of
National Defence; Polish Institute of International Affairs; Centre
xiii
xiv Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare
for Eastern Studies; Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya; University of

Jordan; Jordanian Army Forces; Royal Jordanian Air Force; Strategic
Intelligence Solutions; Middle East Media and Policy Studies Insti-
tute–Centre for Strategic and International Studies; Strategic Intelli-
gence Solutions; U.S. Embassy, Amman, Jordan; U.S. Embassy, Abu
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Peking University Institute for Interna-
tional and Strategic Studies; Institute for China–U.S. People to People
Exchange; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; China Institute for
Contemporary International Relations; University of International
Relations; China Institute for International Studies; China Institute
for International Strategic Studies; China Foundation for International
Strategic Studies; Carnegie Endowment/Tsinghua University; Agence
France Presse; New York Times; Wall Street Journal; China Policy;
Japanese Ministry of Defense; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Sasakawa Peace Foundation; and Hosei University.
Abbreviations
EU European Union
GDP gross domestic product
ISIS Islamic States of Iraq and Syria
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLA People’s Liberation Army
UK United Kingdom
USAF U.S. Air Force
V4 the Visegrád Group (Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, and
the Czech Republic)
xv
CHAPTER ONE
Global Political Trends
Carl von Clausewitz famously argued that “war is the continuation of

politics by other means,” and that aphorism remains as true in the 21st
century as it was in the 19th: The future of warfare will depend on geo-
politics.1 What that future looks like, however, remains far from clear.
As the U.S. National Defense Strategy claims, “We are facing increased
global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-
based international order—creating a security environment more com-
plex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory.”2
Although this could very well be true, we need to unpack such terms
as increased global disorder and more complex and volatile to understand
what this characterization means for the future of warfare, particularly
because a significant body of scholarly literature comes to the oppo-
site conclusion. Many scholars note that conflict—particularly great-
power interstate war—has been on the decline for decades.3
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 87.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States: Sharpening American Military’s Competitive Edge, Washington, D.C., January 2018, p. 1.
3 For variations on this argument, see John Mueller, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist:
An Assessment,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No. 2, 2009; Steven Pinker, The Better
Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, New York: Penguin Books, 2012; and
Thomas S. Szayna, Angela O’Mahony, Jennifer Kavanagh, Stephen Watts, Bryan Frederick,
Tova C. Norlen, and Phoenix Voorhies, Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers: An Empiri-
cal Assessment of Historical Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1063-A, 2017.
1
2 Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare
Consequently, after briefly explaining this report’s methodology,

we focus on six key trends that stand to reshape geopolitics: U.S. polar-
ization and retrenchment, China’s rise, Asia’s reassessment, the emer-
gence of a revanchist Russia, upheaval in Europe, and turmoil in the
Islamic world. Together, these six trends point to three overarching
findings. First, many of the underlying geopolitical assumptions in the
National Defense Strategy—particularly about the centrality of great-
power competition and risk of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, Europe,
and the Middle East—are correct. Second, although U.S. adversar-
ies will remain relatively stable over the next decade, U.S. allies will
change, especially as Europe becomes increasingly preoccupied with its
own problems and Asia realigns as a result of the rise of China. Finally,
and most importantly, U.S. strategists will face a deepening series of
strategic dilemmas as the possibility of conflict in the Indo-Pacific,
Europe, and the Middle East pulls limited U.S. resources in different
directions. Ultimately, interstate great-power war might remain a rare
phenomenon—especially when viewed in the grander sweep of human
history—but, compared with the recent past, the United States might
be entering a time that is more strategically precarious and geopoliti-
cally unstable.
Trend Selection and Methodology
To begin with the obvious, this report is not, nor does it claim to be,
a comprehensive analysis of all future geopolitical trends. A myriad of
local, regional, and international dynamics will shape how states inter-
act on the global stage, and no single volume could hope to explore
all of them. Rather, in consultation with the sponsor of this work, the
United States Air Force (USAF), this report focuses on the six geopo-
litical trends that will be the most important to U.S. defense strategy
over the next decade. Three of the trends focus on the foreign policy
preferences of the hegemon (United States), its only plausible chal-
lenger (China), and its old archenemy (Russia). Especially given the
National Defense Strategy’s focus on great-power competition and the
general importance that these three countries play—and will continue
Global Political Trends 3
to play—in shaping global affairs, these countries deserve individual

attention.4 In contrast, the other three trends look at regional dynam-
ics where the National Defense Strategy argues that the joint force will
need to be able to “deter aggression” in the future—specifically, the
Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.5
Of course, this selection comes with trade-offs. For reasons of time
and resources, this report did not look at potential drivers of conflict
in the Americas or in Africa, on the assumption that these areas would
be either peaceful, subordinated to other great-power competitions
(e.g., between the United States and China over natural resources), or
peripheral to U.S. defense policy. Even Iran and North Korea, which
are identified as likely adversaries in U.S. strategy, are discussed here
only within the broader regional context, rather than with the same
country-level focus given to Russia and China. Although some of these
other regions are discussed in other recent work by the RAND Cor-
poration and in the accompanying volumes in this series, this is one
limitation of this work and implicitly, if inadvertently, reinforces the
bias of current U.S. defense to focus on certain regions at the expense
of others.6
Beyond the geographical constraints, this analysis focuses its dis-
cussion on political and foreign-policy trends. Of course, other fac-
tors will have second-order effects on future geopolitics. Many of them
are explored in depth in the sister volumes of this series, which focus
on cross-cutting, global military, economic, environmental, and legal
trends.7 Consequently, to avoid duplication across the series and to
4 Department of Defense, 2018, p. 1.

6 For another complementary approach to looking at the future of competition, see Michael J.
Mazarr, Jonathan Blake, Abigail Casey, Tim McDonald, Stephanie Pezard, and Michael
Spirtas, Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and His-
torical Perspectives, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2726-AF, 2018.
7 The other volumes in this series are Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Shira Efron,
Bryan Frederick, Eugeniu Han, Kurt Klein, Forrest E. Morgan, Ashley L. Rhoades, Howard J.
Shatz, and Yuliya Shokh, The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Overview and Conclusions,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2849/1-AF, 20; Forrest E. Morgan and
Raphael S. Cohen, Military Trends and the Future of Warfare: The Changing Global Environ-
keep this volume shorter and more accessible, they are discussed here
only in passing.
To study the political and foreign-policy trends, we relied on three
sources of information: official policy announcements and documents,
other scholarly work, and an extensive set of interviews. Over the course
of the project, the research team interviewed more than 120 different
government, military, academic, and policy experts from more than
50 different institutions in Belgium, China, Germany, Israel, Japan,
Jordan, Poland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom
(UK) for their perspectives on regional and global trends that might
shape the future of conflict between now and 2030.
For the most part in this volume, we assume linear projections
in each of the trends while noting what events could derail such pro-
jections. In practice, the future of warfare will be determined by the
interaction of several trends in different areas. Analysis of this interac-
tion can be found in the summary volume of the series, but before this
aggregation can be done, we need to parse the individual components,
starting with the six geopolitical trends presented in this volume.8
ment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
RR-2849/3-AF, 20; Howard J. Shatz and Nathan Chandler, Global Economic Trends and
the Future of Warfare: The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S.
Air Force, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2849/4-AF, 20; Shira Efron,
Kurt Klein, and Raphael S. Cohen, Environment, Geography, and the Future of Warfare:
The Changing Global Environment and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2849/5-AF, 20; and Bryan Frederick and Nathan Chan-
dler, Restraint and the Future of Warfare: The Changing Global Environment and Its Implica-
tions for the U.S. Air Force, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2849/6-AF, 20.
8 See Cohen et al., 20.
CHAPTER TWO
Trend 1: U.S. Polarization and Retrenchment
In the spring of 1948, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee and presidential candidate, Arthur Vandenberg,
crossed party lines to work with the man he sought to unseat in the
White House, President Harry S. Truman, to pass the so-called Vanden-
berg Resolution. The resolution did little to help Vandenberg’s presiden-
tial prospects, but it profoundly shaped future of U.S. foreign policy.1 It
affirmed the concept of collective defense, paving the way for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and cementing the role of the
United States as a global security provider.2 Vandenberg’s actions under-
scored his most notable line: “We must stop politics at the water’s edge.”3
Today, Americans are shifting away from Vandenberg in both sentiment
and substance and becoming increasingly polarized and uncertain about
the role of the United States in the world. Whether because of political
gridlock or policy choice, if the United States backs away from its global
position, there will be profound effects on the future of warfare.
Context: U.S. Centrality in Geopolitics
Emerging as the strongest great power after World War II, the United
States crafted the institutions and norms that define the international
1 U.S. Senate, Resolution 239, 90th Congress, 2nd session, June 11, 1948.
2 Greg Myre, “Taking U.S. Politics Beyond ‘The Water’s Edge,’” NPR, March 10, 2015.
3 Myre, 2015.
5
order. After the Soviet Union’s collapse and the dawning of the “unipolar
moment,” it also became the de facto enforcer of that order and served, if
somewhat unwillingly, as the “global policeman.”4 Although some schol-
ars question whether these actions have contributed to or detracted from
world peace, few doubt the centrality of the U.S. role in shaping world
events.5 As a result, if the United States chooses to retreat from its role of
global superpower, it will have far-reaching consequences.
Historical Trend: Increasing U.S. Polarization of Foreign

Policy
For the two and a half centuries that the United States has existed,
Americans have never been wholly of one mind about any policy issue,
and the nation has gone through cycles of political unity and division.
Still, it has emerged as one of the primary actors—perhaps the primary
actor—on the world stage during a period of relative political unity
that has gradually eroded over the past several decades.
During the Second World War, partisanship ebbed. In 1950, the
American Political Science Association published a report, Toward a
More Responsible Two-Party System, bemoaning the lack of clear ideo-
logical cleavages. It argued that “popular government in a nation of
more than 150 million people requires political parties which provide
the electorate with a proper range of choice between alternatives of
action.”6 Similarly, University of California, Berkeley, political scien-
tist Herbert McClosky found that, compared with the overall popula-
tion, “influentials” (defined as those who attended the 1956 presiden-
4 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/1991.
5 Perhaps, the dominant view is that U.S. hegemony has helped maintain relative peace in
the post–Cold War period. See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out
of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2008. For the counterargument that U.S. hegemony has, in fact,
led to a more violent world, see Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not
Peaceful,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3, Winter 2011/2012.
6 Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, Menesha,
Wisc.: American Political Science Association, 1950, p. 15.
Trend 1: U.S. Polarization and Retrenchment 7
tial conventions) displayed “greater faith in the capacity of the mass of

men to govern themselves . . . believe more firmly in political equal-
ity, and . . . more often disdain the ‘extreme’ beliefs embodied in the
Right Wing, Left Wing, totalitarian, elitist, and authoritarian scales.”7
Finally, quantitative analyses show that roughly a quarter of U.S. Con-
gressmen in the mid-20th century were centrists.8
Americans proved particularly united on foreign policy. Noting
that between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Tet
Offensive in Vietnam in 1968, roughly three-quarters of congressional
foreign policy votes were taken on a bipartisan basis,9 political scien-
tists Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz remark:
To be sure, partisan politics did not always stop at the water’s

edge; Republicans and Democrats often clashed over foreign aid
and trade matters. Partisan divisions, however, were sporadic and
transitory. On the basic elements of grand strategy—when mili-
tary force should be used, the importance of international sup-
port, and the role of multilateral institutions—consensus was the
norm.10
Even during this period of relative unity, there were still vicious
partisan debates over the Chinese civil war, McCarthyism, the Korean
War, and other issues. Nonetheless, compared with other periods, there
was a bipartisan consensus that favored liberal internationalism—
coupling U.S. military power with belief in multilateral compromises.11
During the Vietnam War, this consensus began to break down.12
Although most Americans still believed that communism needed to be
7 Herbert McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” American Political

Science Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, June 1964, p. 366.
8 See Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “Dead Center and the Demise of Lib-
eral Internationalism,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, Fall 2007, p. 21, Figure 2.
9 Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007, p. 11.
12 Admittedly, some scholars dispute this finding. See Stephen Chaudon, Helen V. Milner,
and Dustin H. Tingley, “The Center Still Holds,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1,
contained, many also believed that “the United States had fallen prey
to errant leadership, exaggerated threats, and the excessive use of U.S.
power.”13 Additionally, as conservative southern Democrats and lib-
eral northern Republicans disappeared, ideological lines between the
parties grew starker.14 The disintegration of the unifying threat of the
Soviet Union and the start of a series of wars of choice—first during
the humanitarian interventions in the 1990s and particularly in Iraq in
the 2000s—only exacerbated this divide.15
Foreign policy views mirrored broader trends in the U.S. elector-
ate. Pew survey data indicate that median Republican and Democratic
voters moved farther apart on a range of issues. More troubling, the
divide grew starker among voters who were more politically engaged
(Figure 2.1).16
Political polarization extends to such issues as defense spending.17
In 2017, a full 62 percent of Republicans believed the United States
spent too little on defense, compared with 34 percent of independents
and 15 percent of Democrats.18 And the partisan gap is growing. In
2012, there was only a 32-percent difference between Republicans and
Summer 2010. That said, the weight of scholarly opinion is on the other side. See Kupchan
and Trubowitz, 2007; Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “The Illusion of Lib-
eral Internationalism’s Revival,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1, Summer 2010; and
Gyung-Ho Jeong and Paul J. Quirk, “Division at the Water’s Edge: The Polarization of For-
eign Policy,” American Politics Research, July 2017.
14 Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007, pp. 31–39; Jeong and Quirk, 2017, p. 25.
15 Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007, pp. 27–31; Jeong and Quirk, 2017, p. 25.
16 For an alternate finding, see Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, “Political Polariza-
tion in the American Public,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11, 2008. Importantly,
while Fiorina and Abrams doubt mass polarization, they still acknowledge and accept that
U.S. elites have polarized.
17 For earlier historical data confirming this same trend, see Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007,
p. 38, Figure 6.
18 Art Swift, “1 in 3 Americans Say U.S. Spends Too Little on Defense,” Gallup, March 2,
2017.
Figure 2.1
Growing Polarization of the U.S. Electorate
NOTES: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions.

Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include
Democratic-leaning independents. Politically engaged are defined as those who are
registered to vote, follow government and public affairs most of the time, and say
they vote always or nearly always.
SOURCE: “Political Polarization in the American Public,” webpage, Pew Research
Center, June 12, 2014.
Democrats on this issue, compared with the 47-percent gap today.19

Unsurprisingly, the Defense Department’s budget is increasingly
caught up in the broader partisan battles over the national budget.
19 In 2012, 42 percent of Republicans, 22 percent of independents, and 10 percent of Demo-

crats thought that the United States spent too little on defense. Swift, 2017.
At the same time, Americans are increasingly divided about

enforcing international order. Because war resolutions are unpopular,
Congress has not officially declared war since the Second World War.
Although lawmakers authorized the use of military against those con-
nected to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and to “prevent
any future acts of international terrorism,” they have avoided pass-
ing another authorization since—despite new engagements in Libya
against the Moammar Qaddafi regime and later against the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—partly because there was no consensus
about what such an authorization should contain.20 Similarly, although
Congress authorized the Iraq War in 2003, lawmakers proved unable
to curtail that conflict as that war became increasingly unpopular.
Polling similarly suggests that Americans are increasingly dubious
about using force—especially ground troops—to enforce the interna-
tional order. For example, even well into the Libya campaign in 2011,
Americans were evenly split about the intervention in Libya and over-
whelmingly (61 percent) disagreed (38 percent of them strongly) with
sending in ground troops.21 In 2017, some 57 percent of Americans
approved when the Trump administration launched a series of punitive
strikes in Syria against Bashar Assad’s regime in retaliation for its use of
chemical weapons, but a mere 18 percent were willing to commit ground
troops to the task.22 Most recently, as nuclear tensions on the Korean
Peninsula rose, only half of Americans backed military action against the
regime and about a third supported sending ground troops.23
20 Public Law 107-40, Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists,
September 18, 2001.
21 YouGov, “61% Oppose Sending U.S. Ground Troops to Libya,” Economist/YouGov Poll,
June 10, 2011.
22 Jennifer De Pinto, Fred Backus, Kabir Khanna, and Anthony Salvanto, “What Ameri-
cans Think About U.S. Strike on Syria,” CBS News, April 10, 2017.
23 Steven Shepard, “Poll: No Increase in Support for Military Action in North Korea,” Polit-
ico, August 16, 2017.
Future Projection: Gridlock, Disillusionment, and

Isolationism
Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that the growing polar-

ization of the U.S. electorate will reverse any time soon. On a structural
level, despite the periodic calls for a third party, the two major parties
will continue to hold power. Since the mid-19th century, the presi-
dency has always been occupied by either a Republican or Democrat,
and although independents have done better at state and local levels,
they still make up only a small minority of office-holders. On a sub-
stantive level, the geographic, socioeconomic, racial, and cultural cleav-
ages driving polarization—coastal versus heartland, blue-collar versus
white-collar, minority race versus white—do not seem any closer to
resolution.
Two predictions follow from this trend. First, barring a cataclys-
mic event (e.g., another September 11 terrorist attack), partisan grid-
lock will likely continue. This, in turn, will limit political leaders’ abil-
ity to push major new initiatives through Congress—including those
related to foreign and defense policy.
Second, U.S. disillusionment with global engagement could
continue to grow. In Gallup polling, the percentage of Americans
expressing “very little” or “no” faith in the presidency and Congress
has increased dramatically since 2002 (Figure 2.2). Indeed, the only
U.S. governmental institution in which most Americans consistently
express a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence is the military—
since 2001, the military has consistently polled above 70 percent.24 If
these trends continue, future policymakers might more readily turn to
military solutions.
As for whether Americans will back away from liberal internation-
alism, the trend is somewhat more ambiguous. Gallup polling dating
back to the turn of the millennium suggests that Americans are increas-
ingly dissatisfied with their role in the world order (Figure 2.3). Simi-
larly, a 2016 Pew survey found that 57 percent of Americans believed
that the United States should “deal with its own problems and let other
24 Gallup, undated-a.
Figure 2.2
Percentage of Americans Expressing “Very Little” or “No” Faith in
Government Institutions
60
Supreme Court Presidency
50 Congress Military
40
Percentage
30
20
10
0
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
SOURCE: Gallup, “Confidence in Institutions,” webpage, undated-a.
countries deal with their own problems as best they can.”25 Previous
surveys similarly suggested that Americans increasingly believe that the
United States should “mind its own business” and “should not think so
much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national
problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home.”26
These sentiments, however, have not always translated into U.S.
foreign policy. President Barack Obama promised “that [it is] time to
focus on nation building here at home,” but he still ordered a troop
surge in Afghanistan and a military intervention in Libya.27 Likewise,
President Donald Trump promised an “America first” strategy, but less
25 Bruce Drake and Carroll Doherty, “Key Findings on How Americans View the U.S. Role
in the World,” Washington, D.C., Pew Research Center, May 5, 2016.
26“Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips,” webpage,
Pew Research Center, December 3, 2013.
27
Katelyn Sabochik, “President Obama on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” Obama
White House Archives, June 22, 2011.
Figure 2.3
Percentage of Americans Expressing Satisfaction with U.S. Role in the
World
80
70 Dissatisfied
60
50
Percentage
40
30 Satisfied
20
10
0
May 18–21, 2000
Feb. 1–4, 2001
Feb. 4–6, 2002
Apr. 14–16, 2002
Feb. 3–6, 2003
Feb. 17–19, 2003
Mar. 22–23, 2003
Feb. 9–12, 2004
Oct. 9–10, 2004
Feb. 7–10, 2005
Feb. 6–9, 2006
Feb. 1–4, 2007
Feb. 11–14, 2008
Feb. 9–12, 2009
Feb. 1–3, 2010
Feb. 2–5, 2011
Feb. 2–5, 2012
Feb. 7–10, 2013
Feb. 6–9, 2014
Feb. 8–11, 2015
Feb. 3–7, 2016
Feb. 1–5, 2017
SOURCE: Gallup, “U.S. Position in the World,” webpage, undated-b.
than three months after taking office, he ordered airstrikes against the
Assad regime for using chemical weapons, both for humanitarian rea-
sons and to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention and United
Nations Security Council resolutions.28
Whether future leaders will continue to buck popular sentiment
remains an open question. As political leaders of the Cold War gen-
eration gradually retire from public life, there might be fewer vocal
advocates for U.S. internationalism. A study by the libertarian Cato
Institute suggests that the millennial generation sees the world as less
threatening, is more skeptical about military intervention, and is more
28Donald J. Trump, “Inaugural Address,” White House website, January 2017a. For
Trump’s justification of the airstrikes, see Donald J. Trump, “Full Transcript: Trump State-
ment on Syria Strikes,” via Politico, April 6, 2017b.
likely to support “a more restrained grand strategy.”29 Moreover, as the

United States faces budgetary pressure with mounting deficits, grow-
ing entitlement obligations, and competing domestic spending prior-
ities, the political pressure to avoid costly foreign interventions will
likely grow.
Implications for the U.S. Air Force and the Future of

Warfare
America’s growing polarization, disillusionment, and isolationism will

probably have at least three major effects on the future of warfare. First,
partisan gridlock and disillusionment preventing the United States from
acting as a global superpower could create a power vacuum, allowing
other powers (particularly China and Russia) to try to fill the void.
Second, and more specifically, U.S. political dynamics could
make the USAF an increasingly attractive policy tool. Some scholars
also suggest that, in a polarized environment, politicians might use
force to galvanize their base.30 In this case, though, the overhang of
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could limit Americans’ appetite for use
of conventional ground troops. The net effect of these countervail-
ing trends might then push policymakers to employ the less politi-
cally risky options of air power and special operations forces whenever
possible.
Third, these trends within U.S. society could affect military
recruiting, although it is less clear to what effect. On the one hand,
Americans becoming more disillusioned with overseas military com-
mitments and more broadly unsure about the role of the United States
in the world could dampen recruiting efforts. On the other hand,
enlistment decisions are also based on economic and personal variables,
29 A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, Millennials and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Next Genera-
tion’s Attitudes Towards Foreign Policy and War (and Why They Matter), Washington, D.C.:
Cato Institute, 2017, p. 1.
30 See Jack Snyder, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, “Free Hand Abroad, Divide
and Rule at Home,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1, January 2009.
and, given that the military as an institution remains popular, there

might not be much of a net effect.
Finally, congressional gridlock might affect what tools are avail-
able to the USAF to fight future wars. Because “the troops” remain
uniformly popular even if the wars they fight are not, Congress will
continue to spend on pay and benefits for military personnel. Even
during the recent budget battles, uniformed personnel were largely
spared the pay freezes and government shutdowns affecting the other
parts of the federal government. Instead, the Department of Defense’s
procurement and readiness accounts likely will take center stage in the
budget battles over the next decade or so. Because the USAF depends
as a service on advanced technology and high-end weapon systems
for its lifeblood, continued partisan gridlock could reduce the USAF’s
competitive edge, particularly over near-peer adversaries.
CHAPTER THREE
Trend 2: China’s Rise
The United States remains mired in its own problems, but the rest of
the world is not standing still. As the 2017 National Security Strategy
argues, China is “seeking to displace the United States in the Indo-
Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model,
and reorder the region in its favor.”1 Historically, China has challenged
adversaries that were even more powerful than the United States is now
to advance China’s domestic priorities and to defend and expand its
strategic periphery. In the future, as Chinese President Xi Jinping faces
domestic pressure at home and as China’s strategic periphery expands
throughout the Indo-Pacific, China might be more likely to fight for
those same reasons.
Context: China’s Priorities Include Growing Military

Ambition
According to its diplomatic statements, China’s security interests are

mostly focused on domestic issues—maintaining the stability of the
political system and the Communist party rule, promoting economic
development, and preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity.2
China also seeks to pacify resistant populations in Xinjiang and Tibet,
1 Executive Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C., 2017,
p. 25.
2 Chinese leaders often emphasize “national sovereignty, national security, and (economic)
development” [㔤ᣔഭᇦѫᵳǃᆹ‫ޘ‬ǃਁኅ࡙⳺] as top interests. See, for example, “Xi Jin-
17
regain control over Taiwan, and assert its maritime claims in the East
and South China Seas.3
Chinese military documents, however, take a more expansive view
of Chinese security. The 2013 Defense White Paper states that China
should build a “strong national defense and powerful armed forces
which are commensurate with China’s international standing.”4 The
2015 Defense White Paper, similarly, argues that “for the foreseeable
future a world war is unlikely,” but recognizes that China has “impor-
tant strategic opportunity” to realize the “great national rejuvenation.”5
The paper calls for the development of a global military power capable
of “protecting distant sea lanes” and emphasizes “preparation for mili-
tary struggle,” as well as building an ability to “fight and win wars”
and uphold the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.6
More troubling, the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—
Xi’s signature notion—requires building a strong military “now more
than any time in history.”7 Xi’s vision of the future focuses on return-
ing China to the predominance in Asia that it enjoyed prior to Western
intrusion; reestablishing control over “Greater China,” including Xin-
jiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; recovering its historical sphere
ping Attends PLA Delegation Plenary Meeting” [“Ґ䘁ᒣࠪᑝ䀓᭮ߋԓ㺘ഒ‫ޘ‬փՊ䇞”],

People’s Daily [Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ], March 11, 2014.
3 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “ഭ䱢䜘˖བྷ
䱶ሩਠ⒮ߋһ䜘㖢ᱟ੖䈳ᮤሶ㿶ᛵߥ㘼ᇊ” [“Ministry of Defense: Adjustments to Main-
land Military Disposition Toward Taiwan Will Depend on the Situation”], Washington,
D.C., 2008.
4 State Council Information Office, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,
Beijing, April 2013.
5 State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy, Beijing, May 2015, pp. 4–9.
6 In his speech at the 90th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Xi Jinping
said: “The most important thing, I think, is that when the party and the people need it, can
our army always adhere to the absolute leadership of the party, is it able to start and win a
war . . . ?” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “㜌ᡈѻ䰞”
[“The Issue of Successful War”], August 2, 2017.
7 “China Focus: ‘Be Ready to Win Wars,’ China’s Xi Orders Reshaped PLA,” Xinhua
News, August 1, 2017.
Trend 2: China’s Rise 19
of influence along its borders, as well as in the adjacent seas; and com-
manding the respect of other great powers.8
Historical Trend: Not So Peaceful
Despite China’s official emphasis on “peaceful development,”9 modern

China has never been entirely peaceful.10 Chinese leaders historically
used force to preempt a direct attack or encroachment of Chinese
territory, recover lost territories, and enhance its regional and global
stature.11 Although Beijing claims that force was a measure of last
resort, China repeatedly used force to protect its sphere of influence
and support its domestic political aims—even against more-powerful
adversaries.12
China’s first and most significant large-scale military interven-
tion occurred during the Korean War (1950–1953), shortly after the
foundation of communist China in 1949.13 Mao Zedong worried that
8 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.
9 State Council Information Office, “China’s Peaceful Development,” Beijing, government
white paper, 2011.
10 For a discussion of China’s traditional politics of power, see Yuan-Kang Wang, Harmony
and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics, New York: Columbia University
Press, 2010. After reviewing Chinese military history over the past six centuries, Wang con-
cludes that, despite the dominance of the antimilitarist Confucian culture, China has regu-
larly practiced realpolitik and expansive grand strategies.
11 John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 9, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993, pp. 253–254. Also see Michael D. Swaine, Sara A. Daly,
and Peter W. Greenwood, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1121-AF, 2000, p. 21.
12Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 193.
13 For a detailed account of China’s participation in the Korean War, see Allen Suess
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, Palo Alto, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1968; Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the
Korean War: History Revisited,” China Quarterly, Vol. 121, 1990; Chen Jian, China’s Road
to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation, New York: Columbia
the communist revolution was losing momentum and needed external

threats to consolidate his position at home.14 Beijing was also alarmed
by a U.S. rapid advance toward the border with China and feared that
U.S. troops could be permanently stationed in North Korea.15 China
was also disturbed by U.S. Seventh Fleet movement into the Taiwan
Strait and continuing U.S. support of the Kuomintang regime.16
Whatever the true motivation, China entered into a war against a
stronger, nuclear-capable adversary, despite being relatively unprepared
and unsure about Soviet aid.17 China deployed more than 2.3 million
troops—including more than 66 percent of the entire field army, all
its tank divisions, and more than 70 percent of its air force, suffering
total casualties of 360,000.18 Nevertheless, Mao considered the Korean
War a success.19
Although Mao postponed his promise to “liberate” Taiwan after
the beginning of the Korean War, China never abandoned that goal of
reunification and used force to prevent that goal from slipping away.
In 1953, the United States increased fighter aircraft deliveries, signed
the Agreement on Mutual Military Understanding, and discussed a
possible formal alliance with Taiwan. In response, the PLA shelled
the Kuomintang-controlled Jinmen island in September 1954 during
the First Taiwan Strait Crisis.20 A few years later, during the Second
University Press, 1995b; and William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. This discussion of China’s intervention
mainly relies on Jian’s account; his work is largely based on verifiable Chinese sources, but it
is important to recognize that there is no academic consensus about Mao’s motives.
14 Jian, 1995b, pp. 213–215.
15 Thomas J. Christensen, “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force,”
in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s
Foreign Policy, Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006.
16 Jian, 1995b, p. 216.
17 Jian, 1995b, pp. 199–200.
18 Yufan and Zhihai, 1990, p. 114.
19 Jian, 1995b, pp. 220–222.
20 M. Taylor Fravel, “Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Ter-
ritorial Disputes,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2008.
Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, the PLA shelled the Kinmen (Quemoy)
and Matsu islands in response to the November 1957 U.S.-Taiwanese
joint military exercises and the creation of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense
Command in March 1958; the bombing additionally served to deter
a potential U.S. commitment to defend Kinmen and other coastal
islands.21 Mao also saw the shelling as a chance to send a larger mes-
sage to the West and to the Soviet Union about China’s independence
and to consolidate support at home.22 Importantly, both the First and
Second Taiwan Strait Crises were intentionally limited uses of force to
send political messages.23
During the Vietnam War (1964–1969), Mao wanted to drive
the United States out of Vietnam, compete with the Soviet Union for
global influence, and still avoid a direct war with the United States.24
As a result, China sent significant amounts of military and civilian aid,
engineering troops to build and maintain defense works and railways,
and anti-aircraft artillery troops to protect critical strategic assets in
North Vietnam.25 China’s military forces reached 170,000 at one point
during 1967–1968.26
Simultaneously, the relationship between China and the Soviet
Union deteriorated. The Soviet Union signed a pact with Outer Mon-
golia in 1967 and gradually increased its forces there to between eight
21 Fravel, 2008, p. 62.

22 Mao quoted in Wu Lengxi, “Inside Story of the Decision Making During the Shelling of
Jinmen,” Zhuanji wenxue [Biographical Literature], No. 1, 1994, p. 11; Henry Kissinger and
Nicholas Hormann, On China, New York: Penguin Press, 2011, p. 173.
23 During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Mao’s field commander, Ye Fei, reported that
Mao never gave orders to prepare for seizing the islands. Chinese military leader Lin Biao
even entertained the idea of warning the United States in advance to ensure that no U.S.
advisers got hurt, and Mao restricted air activity to avoid engaging U.S. aircraft. Cited in
Christensen, 2006, pp. 62–63.
24 Christensen, 2006, pp. 66–68.
25 Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–69,” China Quarterly,
Vol. 142, 1995a.
26 Christensen, 2006, p. 66.
and ten divisions by 1969.27 Mao decided to use force to deter further
Soviet advances.28 Chinese forces attacked a Soviet outpost on Zhen-
bao (or Damanski) Island on March 2, 1969, killing several dozen sol-
diers and setting the stage for a larger battle two weeks later. Mili-
tary action was accompanied by large-scale demonstrations against
the Soviet Union involving, according to Beijing’s claims, more than
400 million people.29 Mao planned to shock the Soviet leadership into
backing down in accordance with China’s “offensive deterrence” strat-
egy.30 Instead, the war ended inconclusively, ultimately getting resolved
in negotiations several decades later.
After two decades of calm following the opening up of China, a
visit of the Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui to the United States in
June 1995 triggered the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.31 Fearing a Tai-
wanese declaration of independence, China launched six short-range
ballistic tactical missiles targeting an area 90 miles away from Taiwan
and conducted several live-fire tests in the coastal area of Fujian in
July and August 1995. A few months later, China fired missiles less
than 50 miles away from Taiwan’s busiest ports. At the same time,
China also tried to avoid escalation. All military exercises were defined
in terms of duration, location, and scope, and were communicated in
advance to Taipei and Washington to minimize the risk of a direct
confrontation.32 After the crisis, Beijing introduced new language in its
2000 White Paper on Taiwan, stating that China could resort to force
27 Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development,

and the March 1969 Clashes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1972.
28William Burr, “Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps
Towards Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001.
29 Robinson, 1972, p. 1201.
30 Kissinger and Hormann, 2011, p. 217.
31 For a detailed discussion of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, see Robert S. Ross, “The
1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000; and Scobell, 2003, pp. 171–191.
32 Scobell, 2003, pp. 176–177.
if Taipei authorities “refuse . . . the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits

reunification through negotiations.”33
Today, China contests its maritime borders in the East and South
China Seas and its land border with India. These disputes have occa-
sionally led to direct military conflict, such as the Chinese attack on
Vietnamese forces near the Paracel Islands in 1974 and Fiery Cross
Reef in 1988 and China’s military ouster of Philippine forces from Mis-
chief Reef in 1995.34 More often, China has relied on measures short of
war, such as economic coercion,35 building on and militarizing islands
in the South China Sea,36 increasing its long-range bomber flights,37
introducing air-defense identification zones,38 and using its coast guard
and maritime militia to coerce its regional neighbors.39 These actions
increase China’s de facto control over regional waters and occasionally
result in aircraft and naval incidents involving U.S. forces.40
In the past several years, modern China has used force less fre-
quently than some other great powers, including the United States.
That said, modern China has not been entirely peaceful either and has
used force even against more-powerful adversaries—albeit usually in
limited ways—to assert control over its strategic periphery and to con-
33 State Council Information Office, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,”
Beijing, government white paper, 2000.
34 Peter Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives—China and the South China
Sea,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 2011.
35 Dan Blumenthal, “Economic Coercion as a Tool in China’s Grand Strategy,” statement
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 24, 2018.
36For a list of recent incidents, see Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Actions in South and East
China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests—Background and Issues for Congress, Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R42784, August 1, 2018, pp. 9–11.
37 Mark R. Cozad and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, People’s Liberation Army Air Force
Operations over Water: Maintaining Relevance in China’s Changing Security Environment,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2057-AF, 2017.
38 Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R43894, January 30, 2015.
39U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Develop-
ments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Washington, D.C., 2017, p. 56.
40 O’Rourke, 2018, pp. 12–15.
solidate domestic objectives. Consequently, a far stronger China might

be even more likely to use force for similar reasons in the future.
Future Projection: Increasing Domestic Pressure;

Expanding Strategic Periphery
By 2030, China could become increasingly willing to use force. Domes-

tically, Xi has consolidated his power and lifted the presidential term
limits, allowing him to remain in power indefinitely.41 The formal shift
in power also comes with a change in elite attitudes. Although mea-
suring public opinion in China remains difficult, Chinese government
officials we interviewed often spoke about Xi in glowing, if idolizing,
terms, placing him on a pedestal next to Mao Zedong.42
This adoration of and centralization of power around Xi has
several implications for China’s willingness to use force. First, Xi has
tightened his grip over the PLA, once thought be to growing indepen-
dent of the party, possibly eliminating some of the checks on China’s
use of force.43 Of perhaps more concern, as Chinese expectations for
Xi’s performance rise, so does the bar for Xi’s success, meaning he
might feel pressured to wage a “diversionary” conflict if the Chinese
economy slows and the regime cannot justify its legitimacy-based eco-
nomic growth.44 There is a sense that the Chinese economy is slowing,
41 Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping,” Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 3, May–June 2018, p. 60.
42 Interviews with multiple Chinese government-affiliated think tanks, Beijing, June 12–15,
2018.
43 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Charles Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jin-
ping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 2017; Scobell, 2003, p. 195.
44 Erin Baggott Carter argues that when elite support declines because of economic shocks,
the autocrat can inoculate himself against elite leadership challenges by courting popu-
lar support through diversionary aggression. Erin Baggott Carter, Elite Welfare Shocks and
Diversionary Foreign Policy: Evidence from China, Los Angeles: University of Southern Cali-
fornia, 2017.
although by how much is hard to tell.45 As one Chinese think tank

official warned, outsiders often underestimate the economic pressure
on the regime.46
Simultaneously, China is advancing its claims in the East and
South China seas. In recent years, Beijing built numerous military
installations on artificial islands (including jamming equipment and
ballistic missiles on the Spratly Islands) and airfields capable of receiv-
ing long-range bombers.47 These bases could eventually enable China
to declare an air defense identification zone similar to what China
attempted in the East China Sea in 2014.48 Similarly, China increased
patrols by military aircraft and by coast guard and “civilian” fishing
ships in the close proximity of Japanese territorial waters near the dis-
puted Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; these patrols will prob-
ably continue.49
Outside of the maritime domain, China’s Belt and Road Initia-
tive incorporates more than 60 countries and, in time, could increase
China’s global military presence. China already established a military
base in Djibouti, and China might be considering a second facility in
the Southern Pacific.50 China’s massive investments in port facilities
45 Interview with journalist, Beijing, June 16, 2018.

46 Interview with Chinese think tank official, Beijing, June 12, 2018.
47 U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Annual Reports,” webpage,
undated; Michael Gordon and Jeremy Page, “China Installed Military Jamming Equipment
on Spratly Islands, U.S. Says,” Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2018; Reuters, “China Deploys
Cruise Missiles on South China Sea Outposts—Reports,” The Guardian, May 3, 2018;
Bethlehem Feleke, “China Tests Bombers on South China Sea Island,” CNN, May 21, 2018.
For a year-by-year review of Chinese military developments, see the U.S.–China Economic
and Security Review Commission annual reports from 2002 on.
48 O’Rourke, 2018, p. 2.
49 Japan scrambled a record number of fighter jets—1,168—between March 2016 and
March 2017, with 851 incidents prompted by Chinese aircraft. Robert Harding, “Japan
Scrambles Record Number of Jets as Tensions Rise with China,” Financial Times, April 13,
2017; interview with senior Japanese Ministry of Defense official, Tokyo, June 18, 2018.
50 John Fei, “China’s Overseas Military Base in Djibouti: Features, Motivations, and Policy
Implications,” China Brief, Vol. 17, No. 17, December 22, 2017; “China Is Reportedly Pro-
posing a Permanent Military Base in the South Pacific,” CNBC.com, April 9, 2018.
could pave the way for other overseas naval facilities, extending China’s
global reach.51 Although not an immediate threat to the United States,
Chinese expansion in the relative vicinity of U.S. military bases could
produce additional tensions.52
Above all, Taiwan will remain one of the most plausible locations
for an armed conflict. Chinese officials regard Taiwan as their fore-
most geopolitical objective.53 Indeed, Xi sees “China’s full reunifica-
tion as essential to realizing national rejuvenation,” and “resolving the
Taiwan question” remains a key element of China’s long-term strat-
egy.54 Consequently, Xi might view resolving the Taiwan issue before
he leaves office as central to his legacy. And the repeated Taiwan Strait
Crises show how a Taiwan crisis could lead to war.
In general, China will probably be careful about challenging the
United States. As political scientist Graham Allison writes, “Chinese
are strategically patient: As long as trends are moving in their favor,
they are comfortable waiting out a problem” because a premature clash
could derail China’s economic development.55 That said, if domes-
tic pressures or international ambitions dictate otherwise, China has
proven in the past that it will risk war. It will likely be more risk-
tolerant in the future, especially if the perceived balance of power tilts
in its favor.56
51 Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, Harbored Ambitions: How China’s Port Investments Are
Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific, Washington, D.C.: C4ADS, April 17, 2018.
52 For example, according to media reports, Chinese personnel at China’s military base in
Djibouti used lasers to interfere with U.S. military aircraft. Ryan Browne, “Chinese Lasers
Injure US Military Pilots in Africa, Pentagon Says,” CNN, May 4, 2018.
53 Interviews with multiple Chinese government-affiliated think tanks, Beijing, June 12–15,
2018.
54 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in
All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for
a New Era,” speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, October 18, 2017.
55 Allison, 2017, p. 146.
56 See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chi-
nese History, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Warfare
China’s rise will pose many challenges to the USAF. First, although
different analyses offer different predictions on how and where a U.S.-
Chinese conflict might occur, China’s emphasis on building a blue-
water navy and a multitude of maritime disputes mean that most con-
flicts in Asia are likely to occur in the maritime domain.57 As a result,
the USAF will need to develop the capabilities to operate at long range
(given the expansive geography of Asia, as well as Chinese anti-access/
area denial technology) against naval targets (based on the assumption
that many of the conflicts will feature contested islands). At the same
time, the U.S. military generally and the USAF in particular will also
need to think about how to most effectively provide military assistance
if the United States were to decide to respond to aggression by send-
ing aid to military partners and allies rather than becoming directly
involved in the conflict.
Second, China’s economic expansion and large-scale infrastruc-
ture investment around the world might create the opportunity for
China to establish new military bases and navy access points around
the world. China is unlikely to limit itself to one overseas base in Dji-
bouti, and it is important to monitor these attempts to transform eco-
nomic influence into political leverage.
Third, as the risks of a large-scale, high-end conflict with China
increase, so does the value of strategic deterrence. Particularly because
it is responsible for two out of three legs of the nuclear triad, the USAF
will play a leading role in modernizing and maintaining U.S. deter-
rence in this new age of great-power competition.
57 See James Dobbins, David C. Gompert, David A. Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell, Conflict with
China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Arroyo
Center, OP-344-A, 2011; David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola,
War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
RR-1140-A, 2016; Allison, 2017; James Dobbins, Andrew Scobell, Edmund J. Burke, David
C. Gompert, Derek Grossman, Eric Heginbotham, and Howard J. Shatz, Conflict with China
Revisited: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, PE-248-A, 2017.
Finally, China will remain the main U.S. competitor in the

medium and long terms, so the USAF needs to develop expertise on
China. Especially as China becomes a more formidable global actor,
there will be a continuous need for understanding Chinese capabilities,
strategies, and operations.
CHAPTER FOUR
Trend 3: Asia’s Reassessment
As China becomes increasingly assertive in the region, Asia faces a

stark strategic choice: to balance or bandwagon with Beijing. This, in
turn, has profound implications for the U.S. alliance architecture and
for the future of conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
Context: Ripe for Rivalry?
Scholars offer split predictions about how Asia will react to China’s
rise. In his classic essay “Ripe for Rivalry,” political scientist Aaron
Friedberg argues that “in the long run, it is Asia that seems far more
likely [than other regions] to be the cockpit of great-power conflict.”1
Friedberg notes that, compared with Europe, Asia has more authori-
tarian regimes (China, Russia, North Korea, and Vietnam), more ter-
ritorial disputes, more historical differences, less economic integration,
and fewer international institutions—all making Asia more susceptible
to future crises.2 In a sense, Thucydides’ aphorism about the causes of
war—that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in
Sparta that made the war inevitable”—applies as much to modern Asia
reacting to rising China as it did to ancient Greek states.3
1 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” Interna-
tional Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993/1994, p. 7.
2 Friedberg, 1993/1994, pp. 15–16, 18, 20, 22.
3 Allison, 2017.
29
Other scholars are more optimistic. Political scientist David Kang,

for example, argues that Asia typically has seen more bandwagoning
behavior than balancing behavior, where states preferred accommo-
dating dominant powers to fighting them. Kang observes that “when
China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved. East Asian
relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more
stable than those in the West.”4 Others, such as Amitav Acharya, pre-
dict a peaceful future for Asia because of growing regional economic
interdependence and increasing numbers of multilateral institutions.5
For a time, this view seemed to better describe the trajectory of geo-
politics in Asia, but Friedberg’s pessimism increasingly captures recent
dynamics in Asia, as we shall see.
Historical Trend: Balancing, Hedging, and Rising Tensions
Across the region, with the notable exceptions of the Philippines and, to
a lesser extent, South Korea, much of Asia seems increasingly inclined
to push back against Chinese ambitions.
Japan
With an ethnically homogeneous population of 127 million, an esti-
mated gross domestic product (GDP) of $4.8 trillion, and a literacy
rate approaching 100 percent, Japan plays a central role in shaping the
future of East Asia and faces an increasingly precarious strategic situ-
ation.6 Japan is locked in territorial disputes with Russia over the Kuril
Islands, with South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks, and with China
over the Senkakus—and none of these disputes shows any sign of being
4 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Spring 2003, p. 66.
5 Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3,
Winter 2003/2004.
6 Michael Auslin, Japanese Internationalism in the 21st Century: Reshaping Foreign Policy in
an Era of Upheaval, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2017a, pp. 5, 7.
Trend 3: Asia’s Reassessment 31
resolved any time soon.7 So far, Japan seems disinclined to back down.
To the contrary, observers often describe Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzō Abe as an ardent nationalist. According to Kindai University
Professor Carlos Ramirez, “The first two years of this administration,
like his first term, focused on returning Japan to a position of leader-
ship in Asia, not only as an economic power, but also as a political and
military one.”8
Despite the “fresh start of relations between Japan and China,”
the Sino-Japanese rivalry shows no sign of abating.9 Not only is the ter-
ritorial dispute between the countries real and the historical animosity
deep-seated, but the domestic politics also favor conflict. According
to a 2016 Pew study, 86 percent of Japanese and 81 percent of Chi-
nese citizens viewed each other unfavorably.10 Similarly, Japanese think
tank Genron NPO found that in 2016, 71 percent of Japanese and
78 percent of Chinese citizens reported that “relations between their
two countries were either bad or relatively bad,” and 46.3 percent of
Japanese and 71.6 percent of Chinese citizens believed this tension ulti-
mately could lead to conflict.11
Japan is already bracing itself for this possibility. Its 2013 National
Security Strategy noted that Japan “needs to pay careful attention” to
China’s rise.12 Japan’s 2014 National Defense Program Guidance, simi-
larly, called for a “comprehensive defense architecture” for its outly-
7 Auslin, 2017a, p. 45; interviews with Japanese government officials, academics, and think
tank analysts, Tokyo, June 18–19, 2018.
8 Carlos Ramirez, “Abe’s Trump Challenge and Japan’s Foreign Policy Choices,” The Dip-
lomat, March 7, 2017.
9 J. Berkshire Miller, “Japan Warms to China,” Foreign Affairs, July 17, 2017; Takako Hiko-
tani, “Trump’s Gift to Japan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 5, September/October 2017;
Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Abe Hails ‘Fresh Start’ to Japan-China Ties After Xi Meeting,” Reuters,
November 11, 2017.
10 Auslin, 2017a, p. 108.
11 Auslin, 2017a, p. 108.
12 Cabinet Public Relations Office, National Security Strategy, Tokyo, December 17, 2013,
p. 13.
ing islands.13 Japanese defense intellectuals likewise argue that Japan

“should develop deterrent capabilities of its own,” boost defense spend-
ing beyond its current 1 percent of GDP, and expand its coast guard to
defend its claims in the South and East China seas.14
A Sino-Japanese conflict would almost certainly affect the United
States. Despite periodic flare-ups over U.S. basing in the country, Jap-
anese foreign elites and the public recognize that “the U.S.-Japanese
alliance is the only viable means of guaranteeing Japan’s security.”15 In
fact, one of the three key objectives in Japan’s 2013 National Security
Strategy is to strengthen the Japanese-U.S. alliance.16 Consequently, as
long as U.S. forces continue to be based in Japan, the security of the
two countries will remain intertwined.
India
In theory, India could be the natural counterweight to China. India cer-
tainly has a lot of untapped potential—the world’s largest population,
third largest military, fifth largest defense budget by purchasing power,
and seventh largest economy.17 India also fears growing Chinese influ-
ence, sharing a 2,000-mile contested border with China, and has quar-
reled with China over everything from designating certain Pakistani
groups as “global terrorists” in the United Nations Security Council to
blocking India’s bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group.18 As Hoover
13 Auslin, 2017a, p. 27.

14 Japan-US Alliance Study Group, The Trump Administration and Japan: Challenges and
Visions for Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era, Tokyo: Institute for Interna-
tional Policy Studies, 2017, pp. 12–14; interviews with Japanese government officials, aca-
demics, and think tank analysts, Tokyo, June 18–19, 2018.
15 Hikotani, 2017; interviews with Japanese government officials, academics, and think
tank analysts, Tokyo, June 18–19, 2018.
16 Cabinet Public Relations Office, 2013, p. 5.
17 Alyssa Ayres, “Will India Start Acting Like a Global Power? New Delhi’s New Role,” For-
eign Affairs, October 16, 2017.
18 K. Alan Kronstad and Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R44876, June 19, 2017, p. 13; Michael Auslin,
“Can the Doklam Dispute Be Resolved? The Dangers of China and India’s Border Standoff,”
Foreign Affairs, August 1, 2017b.
Institution Asia scholar Michael Auslin notes, “From New Delhi’s per-
spective, China continues to try to encircle it from the north, not only
in Bhutan but also through the Sino-Pakistan alliance, which links a
growing and aggressive power to India’s deadliest enemy.”19
American-Indian relations have warmed over the years. In 2017,
then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called India “an indispensable
partner and trusted friend,” and in 2016, former Pacific Command
Commander Admiral Harry Harris had labeled India “the defining
partnership for America in the 21st century.”20 To a degree, India has
reciprocated these overtures. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
skipped the Non-Aligned Summit in Margarita, Venezuela, in Sep-
tember 2016 because Modi recognized it had “outlived its mission and
usefulness.”21 India also edged militarily closer to the United States—
conducting joint exercises with the United States and, more recently,
with Japan.22 In 2015, India and the United States even issued a “Joint
Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region,” which
included a thinly veiled warning to China and “affirm[ed] the impor-
tance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navi-
gation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South
China Sea.”23 And in 2018, in the “2 + 2” dialogue, the United States
and India reaffirmed India’s status as a Major Defense Partner of the
United States, signed a Communications Compatibility and Security
Agreement to allow for closer integrations of defense communications,
and committed to enhancing defense ties in the future.24
19 Auslin, 2017b.
20Shane Mason, “India’s Achilles’ Heel: New Delhi Lags on Defense,” Foreign Affairs,
March 22, 2016; Kronstadt and Akhtar, 2017, p. 1.
21 Sumit Ganguly, “India After Nonalignment: Why Modi Skipped the Summit,” Foreign
Affairs, September 19, 2016.
22 Kronstadt and Akhtar, 2017, pp. i, 14, 17.
23 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region,” Washington, D.C., January 25, 2015.
24U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Joint Statement on the Inaugural
U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” Washington, D.C., September 6, 2018.
And yet, India still lags behind China in multiple ways: 270 mil-
lion Indians live in extreme poverty and the country needs an esti-
mated $1.5 trillion in infrastructure upgrades—limiting India’s ability
to invest in military power.25 Despite its size, much of India’s military
is relatively poorly equipped.26 India is also new to power projection,
acquiring its first overseas base in the Seychelles only in 2015.27 More-
over, Washington and New Delhi still differ over Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, and terrorism—and, although India has shed some of its tradi-
tional neutrality, it remains wary of too close a relationship with the
United States and formal alliances in general.28 India also maintains
close relations with U.S. adversaries, most notably Russia, and often
purchases Russian military equipment—including the S-400 air
defense missile system—in defiance of U.S.-led sanctions.29 In sum,
although circumstances might create more opportunities for closer
U.S.-Indian military cooperation in the future, India might not be the
counterbalance to China that the United States might hope.30
Vietnam
Despite being one of only a few notionally communist regimes left in
Asia, Vietnam provides a similar case to India, greeting China’s rise
with apprehension and moving closer to the United States as a result.31
25 Ayres, 2017.
26 Ayres, 2017; Mason, 2016.
27 Ayres, 2017.
28 Alyssa Ayres, Elizabeth Economy, and Daniel Markey, “Rebalance the Rebalance: China,
India, and the United States,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2016; Ayres, 2017. For an exploration
of how the USAF should approach Pakistan, see Jonah Blank, Richard S. Girven, Arzan
Tarapore, Julia A. Thompson, and Arthur Chan, Vector Check Prospects for U.S. and Pakistan
Air Power Engagement, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2107-AF, 2018.
29 Rajat Pandit, “India to Go Ahead with S-400 Missile Deal with Russia Despite US Pres-
sure,” Times of India, July 13, 2018.
30 For a similar assessment, see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, undated, p. 91.
31 As Vietnam National University lecturer Le Hong Hiep notes, “Should the CCP fall, the
VCP would face enormous challenges in maintaining its power in Vietnam.” Le Hong Hiep,
“Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory: From Internal Development to External Engagement,”
Strategic Insights, No. 59, June 2012, pp. 2–3, 6.
As Brookings analyst Hunter Marston notes, “For nearly a thousand

years, the Chinese forcibly occupied and controlled their less power-
ful neighbor, throughout which time the Vietnamese fought to expel
them.”32 Strategically, control of the disputed Paracel and Spratly
islands in the South China Sea is key to Vietnam’s ability to defend its
3,260 miles of coastline.33
Vietnam also feels Chinese economic pressure. During an annual
border exchange in July 2017, the deputy chairman of China’s Cen-
tral Military Commission, General Fan Changlong, threatened to use
force against Vietnam if it did not cease oil exploration in the disputed
areas of the South China Sea.34 Hanoi ultimately backed down, but
Vietnam cannot afford to abandon its claims in the South China Sea.35
In 2017, Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group (or PetroVietnam)—
the state-run oil company—provided some 10 percent of Vietnam’s
GDP, much of it from offshore drilling in the South China Sea.36 As
a result, Vietnam is in the midst of a military buildup, both to deter
China and to make itself a more attractive regional ally, including with
its onetime foe, the United States.37
South Korea
South Korea seems to be headed in the opposite direction from Japan,
India, and Vietnam. A longtime U.S. ally, South Korea remains
ground zero for dealing with its volatile neighbor North Korea, home
to some 28,500 U.S. troops and a past troop contributor to the wars in
32 Hunter Marston, “Why Tensions Are Rising Between Vietnam and China,” Foreign
Affairs, August 15, 2017; also see Hong Hiep, 2012, p. 6.
33 Hong Hiep, 2012, p. 9.
34 Marston, 2017.
35 Marston, 2017.
36 “PetroVietnam Targets 13.28 Million Tonnes of Crude Oil in 2017,” Saigon Online,
July 14, 2017.
37 Wu Shang-su, “Is Vietnam in Denial on Military Strategy?” East Asia Forum, Octo-
ber 30, 2014.
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.38 And yet, South Korea has hedged
against China’s rise—pursuing warmer ties with China while main-
taining a relationship with the United States. China, after all, accounts
for 20 percent of South Korea’s total trade—more than that of the
United States and Japan combined—and has the most economic lever-
age over North Korea.39 Indeed, China has wielded this economic stick
over South Korea in the past. After South Korea agreed to host a U.S.
missile defense system in 2016, Chinese retaliatory sanctions in 2017
cost South Korea $7.5 billion, more than eight and a half times its esti-
mated effect on the Chinese economy.40
Political developments could push South Korea further away
from the United States, although not necessarily toward China. In
May 2017, South Korea elected the left-leaning Minjoo (Democratic)
Party’s Moon Jae-in as president.41 Moon argued for a “balanced diplo-
macy” and rejected the idea of a U.S.–Japanese–South Korean mili-
tary alliance.42 Simultaneously, the Trump administration seemingly
waffled on U.S. commitment to missile defense in South Korea and
renegotiated the five-year-old U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement .43 As
a Congressional Research Service report concluded, “[C]hanges result-
ing from the elections of Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in in 2016 and
2017, respectively, could cause strains that have been relatively dormant
for years to reappear.”44 Any ruptures in South Korean alliances could
have profound consequences for how the United States handles North
38 Troop figures are as of 2016. Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth D.
Nikitin, Brock R. Williams, and Jonathan R. Corrado, U.S.-South Korea Relations, Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R41481, May 23, 2017, pp. 11, 18–19, 23.
39 Manyin et al., 2017, p. 30.
40Bonnie S. Glaser and Lisa Collins, “China’s Rapprochement with South Korea: Who
Won the THAAD Dispute?” Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2017.
41 Manyin et al., 2017, p. 2.
42 Glaser and Collins, 2017.
43Adam Mount, “How to Put the U.S.–South Korean Alliance Back on Track and What to
Expect from the Trump-Moon Summit,” Foreign Affairs, June 28, 2017.
44 Manyin et al., 2017, p. 1.
Korea, but also for using U.S. bases in South Korea to respond to other
threats in Asia.
The Philippines
A former U.S. colony and treaty ally, the Philippines provides an even
more extreme example of hedging. In an October 2016 trip to China,
Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte proclaimed that “I’ve realigned
myself in your ideological flow,” and supposedly offered a three-way
alliance with China and Russia.45 Duterte also threatened to suspend
joint military exercises and expel U.S. military personnel from the
country.46
Behind Duterte’s rhetoric are concrete economic considerations.
Filipino-Chinese bilateral trade almost doubled between the two coun-
tries between 2011 and 2016 (from $12.32 billion to $21.6 billion), and
the number of Chinese tourists visiting the Philippines almost tripled
over the same period (from 243,137 to 675,663).47 Above all, Duterte’s
overtures to China also helped him secure $24 billion in loans from
China and the Chinese-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank.48 Even if Duterte were to be replaced by a leader more supportive
of the United States, that leader would still face major economic incen-
tives to maintain a good working relationship with Beijing.
And yet, Duterte’s rapprochement with China faces serious head-
winds. According to polling in 2015, 91 percent of Filipinos worried
about territorial disputes with China.49 Similarly, according to polling
from September 2016, 76 percent of Filipinos trusted the United States,
45Emily Rauhala, “Duterte Renounces U.S., Declares Philippines Will Embrace China,”
Washington Post, October 20, 2016.
46 Michael Auslin, “Duterte’s Defiance: His Threat to Upend Washington’s Pivot to Asia,”
Foreign Affairs, November 2, 2016.
47Mayvelin U. Caraballo, “China to Become PH’s Principle Trade Partner,” Manila Times,
October 4, 2017.
48 Jessica C. Liao, “The Filipino Fox: There’s a Method to Duterte’s Madness,” Foreign
Affairs, January 18, 2017.
49 Auslin, 2016.
while only 22 percent trusted China.50 Among business, defense, and

political elites, that affinity is even stronger.51
Perhaps because of the power of this constituency, the Philippines
sued China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Seas for its actions in the South China Sea—and in July 2016, the tri-
bunal ruled in favor of the Philippines.52 Although the court case pre-
dated his time in office, Duterte still promised to “personally plant the
Filipino flag” on the disputed island of Thitu and ordered the military
to fortify its positions on the Spratly Islands.53 In sum, although the
Philippines seems to shun U.S. involvement and to prefer economic
cooperation with China today, it might choose to fight Chinese expan-
sion tomorrow.
Future Projection: A 19th-Century Powder Keg?
In predicting the future for Asia, Auslin draws the following analogy:
“Current territorial disputes in Asia resemble nineteenth-century Euro-
pean conflicts.”54 Auslin’s analogy, if correct, paints a dark portrait of
what could lie ahead. There are key differences between the regions
(e.g., land-based conflicts versus maritime-centric ones) and the histor-
ical periods (e.g., the stabilizing presence of nuclear weapons). None-
theless, there is enough to the analogy to suggest that Asia faces greater
chances of large-scale interstate war in the future.
First, despite Asia’s historical aversion to formal alliances, Asian
countries are developing nascent military partnerships. Perhaps, the
best example is the so-called quad—among the United States, Japan,
50 Liao, 2017.
51Richard Javad Heydarian, “Duterte’s Dance with China: Why the Philippines Won’t
Abandon Washington,” Foreign Affairs, April 26, 2016.
52 Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes
Involving China: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42784, September 15,
2017, p. 21.
53 Heydarian, 2016.
54 Auslin, 2017b.
Australia, and India.55 Japan also sold patrol vessels and airplanes to
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, and is trying to sell equipment
to other countries, including India and Australia.56 Similarly, Vietnam
is expanding its cooperation not only with the United States but with
other regional states, such as the Philippines.57 These relationships stop
short of formal alliances, however. Should one country tangle with
China, there is no guarantee that others will come to its aid. Ulti-
mately, this could mean that Asia could suffer the worst of both worlds:
Without specified security guarantees, these partnerships might not
be explicit enough to avoid miscalculation and deter aggression, but,
at the same time, they still constitute a sufficient bond to increase the
chances that future local wars might spark regional ones.
Second, although many Asian countries concentrated on internal
economic development rather than jockeying for regional influence for
the past several decades, this might be changing. During the 1980s and
1990s, China focused on internal development rather than on the pro-
jection of its power abroad.58 Similarly, Japan stuck by its pacifist con-
stitution, eschewing military power for political and economic influ-
ence.59 Aside from periodic border clashes with Pakistan, India also
mostly concentrated on economic development. In the 1980s, Vietnam
adopted the Doi Moi foreign policy, focusing on “developing a multi-
sector market-based economy, renovating the economic structure, sta-
bilizing the socioeconomic environment, promoting science and tech-
nology, and opening up the country’s foreign relations.”60
In the future, expansion might once again pay. Always an impor-
tant trade hub, the East and South China seas are increasingly eco-
55 Interviews with Japanese government officials, academic and think tank analysts, Tokyo,
June 18–19, 2018.
56 Auslin, 2017a, p. 116.
57 Patrick M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, Zachary M. Hosford, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Ely
Ratner, and Alexander Sullivan, The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-
Asian Security Ties, Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2013, p. 24.
58 Kang, 2003, p. 68.
59 Kang, 2003, p. 69.
60 Hong Hiep, 2012, p. 4.
nomically valuable resources to exploit. Approximately 10 percent of

global fish production comes from the South China Sea, and some
$3.4 trillion worth of shipping transits these waters.61 An equally valu-
able resource might lie beneath the ocean floor. In a region needing
energy, the Energy Information Administration estimates there are
some 200 million barrels of oil and one to two trillion cubic feet of
natural gas reserves in the East China Sea.62 The South China Sea
might hold even greater riches—with an estimated 11 billion barrels of
oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in reserves.63
Finally, like Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, local debates
over sovereignty could spark a regional conflagration. As mentioned,
Xi will likely face increasing pressure to reunify with Taiwan in the
future, but Taiwan has other ideas. According to Taiwan’s National
Chengchi University’s Election Study Center, Taiwan residents increas-
ingly identify themselves as “Taiwanese” (60.4 percent in 2014 up from
17.6 percent in 1992), and fewer identify as both “Chinese and Taiwan-
ese” (32.7 percent down from 46.4 percent over the same 1992–2014
period).64 Moreover, those Taiwanese citizens who visited China are
more likely to view themselves as a separate nationality.65 Above all,
support for the unification polls in the single digits, and younger Tai-
wanese are even less enthused about the idea than the older genera-
tion.66 This portends a dark future for cross-strait relations because, as
61 Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes
Involving China: Issues for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
R42784, September 15, 2017, pp. 2–3.
62 O’Rourke, 2017, p. 3.
63 O’Rourke, 2017, p. 3.
64Michael Mazza, “Chinese Check: Forging New Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan,”
The American, October 14, 2014.
65 Roselyn Hsueh, “Taiwan’s Treaty Trouble: The Backlash Against Taipei’s China Deal,”
Foreign Affairs, June 3, 2014.
66 Mazza, 2014; Salvatore Babones, “Taipei’s Name Game: It’s Time to Let Taiwan Be
Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, December 11, 2016.
political scientist Daniel Lynch remarks, “Beijing is unlikely to tolerate

Taiwan’s de facto independence indefinitely.”67
A Taiwan conflict, however, would involve more than just Taiwan.
Aside from the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires that the United
States retain the capacity—though not the obligation—to intervene on
behalf of Taiwan, Taiwan’s proximity to Japan’s southern islands, for
example, makes it central to Japanese security as well. As one Japanese
academic and adviser to the Japanese government remarked, a Chinese
takeover of Taiwan would be “game over for Japan.”68

Warfare
On a strategic level, the chances that the USAF will end up fighting
in Asia will probably increase over coming years, and the region—
which has spent more on defense than Europe has since 2012—seems
to agree with this generally gloomy prognosis.69 Several of the afore-
mentioned countries could end up in a conflict with China; given that
many of them also enjoy security relationships with the United States,
these conflicts could end up involving the United States.
On a political level, the United States’ military alliances in Asia
will change: Some nations, such as India and Vietnam, will likely
develop closer bonds with the United States while others—notably the
Philippines and, perhaps, South Korea—could end up in a more pre-
carious relationship. These changes will affect the USAF and the joint
force at large in a variety of ways, such as basing and servicing agree-
ments. For example, Vietnam opened its Cam Ranh port to better
allow for U.S. naval cooperation, while Duterte’s actions jeopardized
67 Daniel Lynch, “Why Ma Won the Elections and What’s Next for Taiwan and China,”
Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2012.
68 Interview with Japanese academic, Tokyo, June 18, 2018. Other Japanese officials agreed
with the sentiment, although in more measured terms. Interviews with Japanese government
officials, academics, and think tank analysts, Tokyo, June 18–19, 2018.
69 Cronin et al., 2013, p. 25; Auslin, 2017a, p. 31.
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement that allowed for greater

U.S. access to bases in the Philippines.70 In the future, then, the United
States will need to adjust to these shifting dynamics.
70 Hong Hiep, 2012, p. 11; Auslin, 2016.

CHAPTER FIVE
Trend 4: The Emergence of a Revanchist Russia
While China’s rise threatens to upend the dynamic in Asia (and per-
haps globally), the United States is also confronting the reemergence
of its old nemesis, Russia. After several decades of relative quiet after
the Cold War, Russia has become increasingly active, especially in its
near abroad.
Context: Russia’s Priorities Include Pursuing a Polycentric

World
Russia’s foreign and defense policies are rooted in the belief that it is
a leading international power, albeit a frustrated one. Its most recent
set of strategic documents—its Military Doctrine in 2014,1 National
Security Strategy in 2015,2 and Foreign Policy Concept in 20163 —
emphasize Russia’s great-power status, its “special responsibility” as one
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation, No. Pr.-2976, December 25, 2014.
2 Strategiya natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii [National Security Strategy of the
Russian Federation], Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 683, Decem-
ber 31, 2015.
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Ros-
siiskoi Federatsii [Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation], approved by President of
the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016, December 1, 2016.
43
of the major nuclear powers, and its determination to “increase its role
in the polycentric world.”4 These core beliefs have several implications.
First, Russia remains acutely sensitive to U.S. and NATO threats.5
Russia consistently lists capabilities that threaten its nuclear capability—
such as the U.S. missile defense system in Europe and the Prompt Global
Strike Concept—as key threats to not only Russia’s security, but also its
great-power status, which is bound up in its nuclear capability.6 Unsur-
prisingly, in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled
several new nuclear strike systems that “can penetrate any existing and
future missile defense systems.”7
Second, Russia views democratic revolutions as Western-sponsored
attempts to undermine legitimate regimes. Russia views the color revo-
lutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005); the
Arab Spring; and the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity (2014) as foreign-
inspired attempts to install pro-West regimes. Russia similarly viewed the
2011–2013 protests in its own country as supported by the United States
and the West.8 Importantly, the Kremlin often links revolutions in its
neighborhood to the threat of color revolutions at home.9
Third, Russia wants to expand its economic and political influ-
ence, particularly in its near abroad, through the Eurasian Economic
Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Com-

Russian Federation], 2015, Chapter Two, paragraph 7.
Russian Federation], 2015.
6 Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu” [“President’s Message to
the Federal Assembly”], Kremlin.ru, December 4, 2014.
7 Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu” [“President’s Message to
the Federal Assembly”], Kremlin.ru, March 1, 2018.
8 Ivan Egorov, “Patrushev: Popytki ustroit’ “tsvetnye revolyutsii” v Rossii besperspektivny”
[“Patrushev: Attempts to Incite ‘Color Revolutions’ in Russia Are Useless”], Rossiskaya
Gazeta, May 18, 2017.
9 Valerii Gerasimov, Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii” [“The Value of Science Is in Fore-
sight’], Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurer [Military Industrial Courier], February 27, 2013.
Trend 4: The Emergence of a Revanchist Russia 45
monwealth of Independent States.10 From an economic perspective,

Russia appears to believe that Eurasian integration is its only chance
to become an “independent center of global development.”11 From a
security perspective, regional integration allows Russia to keep hostile
powers farther away from its borders, maintain the Commonwealth of
Independent States’ Joint Air Defense, combat such threats as terror-
ism and transnational crime, and prevent “color revolutions” in its near
abroad.12
Finally, Russia sees itself as the protector of Russians abroad.
Russia offered citizenship to the Russophile inhabitants of Crimea,
Donetsk, Luhansk, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria and
committed to protecting “compatriots”—not only Russian citizens,
but also ethnic Russians or just Russian speakers—sometimes with
military force, if necessary.13
Historical Trend: Russia’s Use of Force

These priorities have shaped where and how Russia uses force in the
post–Cold War period. In Russia’s first large-scale use of military
force after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia tried to crush
an independence movement in Chechnya in December 1994, spark-
ing the First Chechen War.14 The Russia intervention turned into a
debacle, and, in 1997, Russia gave the separatists de facto control over
10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016.

11Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie na zasedanii kluba “Valdai’’” [“Speech at the Valdai Club
Meeting”], September 19, 2013.
12 Vladimir Zakharov, “Sostoyanie i perspektivy razvitiya Organizatsii Dogovora o kolle-
ktivnoi bezopasnosti” [“The State and Development Prospects of the Collective Secu-
rity Treaty Organization”], PROBLEMY NATSIONAL’NOI STRATEGII [Problems and
National Strategies], Vol. 3, No. 12, 2012.
13 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire, New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2016. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the origins and the devel-
opment of Russia’s compatriot policies.
14 For an in-depth discussion of the Chechen Wars, see John Russell, Chechnya-Russia’s ‘War
on Terror,’ London: Routledge, 2007; Anna Politkovskaya, A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches
the region. In 1999, then–Prime Minister Vladimir Putin accused

Chechen secessionists of terrorist attacks in Moscow, prompting the
Second Chechen War.15 Putin also believed that the United States pro-
vided significant political, financial, and operational aid to Chechen
terrorists to weaken Russia.16 After a brutal early campaign followed
by a protracted counterinsurgency, Putin declared the conflict termi-
nated in 2009.17 The Chechen wars defined Putin’s first two terms as
president, helping him consolidate his power at home. The conflicts
also underscore that Russia will use force if it perceives a threat to the
regime’s stability.
Russia’s first major contested deployment of armed force outside
the borders of the Russian Federation occurred during the 1999 Kosovo
War.18 Russia had long-standing cultural ties with Serbia and saw
NATO’s intervention as an attempt to expand its geopolitical sphere
of influence farther east, not as a humanitarian operation.19 Nonethe-
less, Russia initially limited its involvement to mediating the conflict to
guarantee Yugoslavia’s sovereignty,20 until events drove Russia to recon-
sider. After a brief but intense air campaign by NATO, Serbian leader
from Chechnya, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007; and Mark Galeotti, Russia’s
Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009, Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2014.
15 Chechen involvement in the attacks was never proven, while there is abundant evidence
that Russian authorities were complicit in the attacks. For details, see John Dunlop, The
Moscow Bombings of September 1999: Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of
Vladimir Putin’s Rule, Vol. 110, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
16“Putin rasskazal, kak SShA podderzhivali terroristov v Chechne” [“Putin Told How U.S.
Were Supporting Chechen Terrorists”], Ria Novosti, June 13, 2017.
17Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Ends Operations in Chechnya,” New York Times, April 16,
2009.
18 Russia also conducted various smaller interventions in the civil conflicts in Georgia,
Transnistria, and Tajikistan in the early 1990s without a direct possibility of a clash with the
West.
19Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity,
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, p. 112.
20 Robert Brannon, Russian Civil-Military Relations, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009,
pp. 73–99.
Slobodan Milosevic accepted an international peace plan.21 Russia did

not receive an independent sector for peacekeeping and sent a column
of several dozen armored vehicles to occupy the Slatina airport to block
the arrival of the NATO peacekeeping force. Ultimately, NATO and
Russia reached a diplomatic solution, but the Kosovo intervention
highlights Russia’s willingness to gamble on a possible military con-
frontation with NATO if it perceives its national interests are at stake.22
In August 2008, Russia fought a brief but intense war with
Georgia.23 Russia viewed Georgia’s pro-American, pro-NATO, and
European Union (EU)–oriented government as a Western proxy.24
Before the conflict, Russian leadership repeatedly declared that
Russia “will do everything” to prevent the accession of Georgia into
NATO.25 Russia was also concerned with the fate of pro-Russia minor-
ities in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.26 After
Georgia and South Ossetian separatists exchanged artillery fire,
Russian forces occupied South Ossetia and several Georgian cities. To
21NATO, Statement by NATO Secretary General Dr. Javier Solana on Suspension of Air
Operations, press release 093, June 10, 1999.
22 A. Krechetnikov, “Brosok na Prishtinu: na grani voiny” [“March to Pristina: At the Brink
of War”], Russkaya Sluzhba BBC, June 11, 2014.
23 For a detailed overview of the conflict, see Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr,
eds., The Guns of August 2008, Armonk, N.Y.: ME Sharpe, 2009; Ronald Asmus, A Little
War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West, New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Press, 2010; and Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, The Russian Military and the
Georgia War: Lessons and Implications, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011.
24 When asked during a 2004 press conference about visits of high-ranking Russian offi-
cials to Abkhazia, Vladimir Putin replied: “[Y]ou linked Georgian leadership with the
West. Is it because they [Georgian leadership] are receiving their salaries from Soros?”
“Press-konferentsiya Vladimira Putina dlya rossiiskikh i inostrannykh zhurnalistov”
[“Vladimir Putin’s Press Conference for Russian and Foreign Journalists”], Kremlin.ru,
December 23, 2004.
25 Foreign minister Lavrov quoted in “RF sdelaet vse, chtoby ne dopustit’ prinjatija Ukrainy
i Gruzii v NATO” [“Russian Federation Will Do Everything to Prevent Accession of Ukraine
and Georgia to NATO”], Ria Novosti, April 8, 2008.
26 Jim Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S.
Interests, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, RL34618, August 29, 2008.
further cement its regional foothold, Russia signed a joint force agree-
ment with Abkhazia in 2016 and with Armenia in 2017.27
Ultimately, the Georgia war foreshadowed the Ukraine con-
flict, in which Russia, again, intervened to prevent perceived West-
ern encroachment and protect Russian populations. When protesters
ousted President Viktor Yanukovych after he rejected an EU association
agreement in 2014, Russia viewed it as a U.S.-sponsored coup meant
to deprive Russia of its “legitimate” sphere of influence.28 In response,
Russian troops seized Crimea, citing concern for Russian citizens and
Russian speakers in the region, and formally annexed it after a hastily
conducted referendum. Russia also deployed significant military forces
in Ilovaisk in 2014 and Debaltseve in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine. Unlike
in the Crimea, however, the war in the Donbass bogged down in a
stalemate. As of 2017, Russia planned to station a considerable number
of troops along the border with Ukraine and had not ruled out the pos-
sibility of escalating the conflict.29
In 2015, Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war—its most sig-
nificant intervention in the Middle East in decades. Russia claimed
it wanted to fight terrorism, but other motives were also apparent.30
According to Russia’s defense minister, the military intervention solved
27 Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov, head of the State Duma Defense Committee,
quoted in Dmitri Sergeev, “Koshmarnyi son Tbilisi: kak otreagiruet Rossiya v sluchae agres-
sii protiv Abkhazii” [“Tbilisi’s Nightmare: How Russia Will React in Case of Aggression
Against Abkhazia”], tvzvezda.ru, March 11, 2016; “Putin ratifitsiroval soglashenie RF i
Abkhazii ob ob”edinennoi gruppirovke voisk” [“Putin Ratified the Agreement Between RF
and Abkhazia on ‘Joint Force’”], Interfax.ru, November 22, 2016; “Armeniya ratifitsirovala
soglashenie s RF ob ob”edinennoi gruppirovke voisk” [“Armenia Ratified the Agreement
with RF on Joint Force”], Interfax.ru, October 5, 2017.
28 Elena Chernenko, “«Za destabilizatsiei Ukrainy skryvaetsya popytka radikal’nogo
oslableniya Rossii». Sekretar’ Sovbeza RF Nikolai Patrushev o glavnykh ugrozakh dlya bezo-
pasnosti Rossii” [“‘The Destabilization of Ukraine Hides an Attempt to Radically Weaken
Russia”: Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev on the Main Threats
to Russia’s Security”], Kommersant.ru, June 22, 2015.
29 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, London: Febru-
ary 2017, pp. 184–185.
30 R. Batyrshin, “Interv’yu Vladimira Putina teleradiokompanii «Mir»” [“Interview of
Vladimir Putin on the Mir TV and Radio Company”], Kremlin.ru, April 12, 2017.
“the geopolitical task of interrupting the chain of ‘color revolutions’

in the Middle East and Africa.”31 Russia also wanted to protect and
expand its military bases in in Tartus and Hmeimim.32 Economically,
the intervention showcased Russian military hardware and boosted its
arms sales to the region and potentially increased Russia’s influence in
the Middle East and sway over global energy prices.33 Finally, Moscow
felt that intervening could divert international attention away from
Ukraine, giving Russia additional leverage against the United States
and its allies.34
Russia’s intervention in Syria featured one of the few direct mil-
itary engagements between U.S. and Russian personnel. On Febru-
ary 7, 2017, a group of forces allied with Assad combined with a large
number of Russian mercenaries working for the Wagner private mil-
itary company with suspected links to the Russian state—although
the Kremlin denied knowledge of this operation—attacked U.S.and
31 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Ministr oborony Rossii vystupil s lektsiei
na otkrytii II Vserossiiskogo molodezhnogo foruma v MGIMO,” [“Russian Defense Minis-
ter Gave a Lecture at the Opening of the II All-Russian Youth Forum at MGIMO”], Febru-
ary 21, 2017a.
32Shoigue quoted by Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Twitter, 3 a.m.,
December 26, 2017b.
33 The head of Russia’s largest defense conglomerate and a close associate of Putin, Sergei
Chemezov, said, “As for the conflict situation in the Middle East, I do not hide it and every-
one understands that the more conflicts there are in the region, the more they buy our
weapons. Volumes of arms exports in our country continue to grow, regardless of sanc-
tions. Basically, it is Latin America and the Middle East.” “Glava ‘Rostekha’ soobshchil o
roste prodazh: ‘Chem bol’she konfliktov, tem bol’she u nas pokupayut vooruzheniya’” [“The
Head of Rostech on Growing Arms Sales: ‘The More Conflicts There Are, the More They
Buy Our Weapons’”], News.ru, February 23, 2015; Dmitrii Trenin, “Rossija na Blizhnem
Vostoke: zadachi, prioritety, politicheskie stimuly” [“Russia in the Middle East: Tasks, Pri-
orities, Political Incentives”], Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, April 21, 2016; Mehul
Srivastava and Erika Solomon, “Israel Launches Air Strikes Deep Within Syria,” Financial
Times, February 10, 2018.
34Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017, p. 183; “Shojgu: rasshirenie prisutstvija RF v Miro-
vom okeane trebuetsja iz-za nestabil’noj obstanovki” [“Shoigu: Russia Should Expand Its
Military Presence in the World Ocean Due to the Unstable (Security) Situation”], Tass.ru,
October 27, 2017.
Kurdish forces near an oil field in Syria, resulting in a firefight that left
hundreds dead.35
Russia also has employed a wide range of tools that fall below the
conventional threshold of conflict, ranging from influence operations
to cyberattacks.36 Some of these operations have been quite brazen, such
as interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election or the attempted
assassination of a former Russian spy in March 2018 in the UK.37
As this brief history suggests, Russia will use force when the regime
is threatened, when the West encroaches on its sphere of influence, or
when its compatriots are ostensibly threatened. Moreover, Russia has
repeatedly shown a willingness to gamble on conflict with the West.
The Russia political system, however, arguably favors risk-taking and
allows for secretive and swift action.38
Future Projection: The Return of a More Assertive Russia
Russia will almost certainly continue on its current strategic

course, especially after Putin’s reelection in March 2018 for another
six-year term. Economic circumstances, however, will constrain Rus-
sia’s actions. The Russian economy is growing despite lower oil prices
and Western sanctions, but the International Monetary Fund reported
in 2018 that “Russia’s convergence to advanced economy income levels
35 For a detailed discussion of the attack and links to original sources see Neil Hauer, “Rus-
sia’s Mercenary Debacle in Syria: Is the Kremlin Losing Control?” Foreign Affairs, Febru-
ary 26, 2018.
36 Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin,
Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva, Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and
Possible Responses, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1772-A, 2017; Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
US Elections,” Washington, D.C., Intelligence Community Assessment, January 6, 2017.
37“Russian Spy: Highly Likely Moscow Behind Attack, Says Theresa May,” BBC News,
March 13, 2018.
38Dmitrii Trenin, Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation During the Hybrid War, Moscow:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2018.
has stalled and its weight in the global economy is shrinking.”39 The
net result, therefore, might be the return of a more assertive Russia, but
not an all-powerful one.
Russia’s efforts will probably revolve around the post-Soviet
space. Given Russia’s fears of “color revolutions,” it could intervene
in the affairs of any of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
members—Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajiki-
stan—if popular unrest ever threatens pro-Russian regimes in these
countries. For similar reasons, Russia will likely maintain strong eco-
nomic, political, and military support for the breakaway regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
Georgia, and (to a lesser extent) Transnistria in Moldova.
Russia’s development of long-range strike, air defense, and rap-
idly deployable forces—as well as its integration with local proxies and
private military companies—will also open the possibility of limited
expeditionary operations.40 Although there are no immediate indi-
cations that Russia will conduct another expeditionary operation, it
might do so if it sees a suitable opening. After all, Russian leadership
and military theorists emphasize offensive capabilities, swift action,
and deception as essential elements of the future wars.41
Above all, Russia will probably emphasize “active measures,” such
as cyber operations and influence campaigns, to influence domestic
developments in the United States and other Western democracies as
a way to change their foreign policy priorities and cause rifts in the
NATO alliance. Despite the economic and military power asymme-
try between Russia and the United States, Russia believes that it can
39 International Monetary Fund, European Department, Russian Federation: 2018

Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report, Paris, September 12, 2018.
40 Andrew Radin, Lynn E. Davis, Edward Geist, Eugeniu Han, Dara Massicot, Matthew
Povlock, Clint Reach, Scott Boston, Samuel Charap, William Mackenzie, Katya Migacheva,
Trevor Johnston, and Austin Long, The Future of the Russian Military: Russia’s Ground
Combat Capabilities and Implications for U.S.-Russia Competition, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, RR-3099-A, 2019.
41 I. Popov and M. Khamzatov, Voina budushchego. Kontseptual’nye osnovy i prakticheskie
vyvody [The War of the Future: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Considerations], Moscow:
Kuchkovo Pole, 2016.
eventually win the competition with the United States through these
measures, without the costs of direct military intervention.42

Warfare
Russia’s resurgence has important implications for the USAF and the
joint force. First, given the size and capabilities of Russian military
forces on NATO’s eastern borders, the USAF will need to reassess its
posture in Europe for both reassurance and deterrence. Russia might
respond to these actions by using hybrid measures ranging from incit-
ing local protests around military bases to more-direct measures, such
as cyber-attacks.43 Consequently, although the USAF needs to prepare
for high-end conventional combat against Russia, the USAF and the
joint force will need to further explore their roles in countering these
unconventional tactics specifically and gray-zone operations in general.
Second, perhaps to an even greater extent than China, the emer-
gence of revanchist Russia—with its emphasis on nuclear weapons—
will require, in turn, that the United States as a whole and the USAF in
particular place a renewed emphasis on modernizing and maintaining
a nuclear arsenal.
Third, as demonstrated by the events in Ukraine and Georgia, the
United States has responded to Russian aggression by sending aid to
its regional allies and partners rather than by getting directly involved
militarily with a nuclear armed adversary. Consequently, it is incum-
bent on the U.S. military to ensure such assistance to its allies.
Fourth, managing a resurgent Russia will require personnel
with a good understanding of that country. During the Cold War,
the USAF developed and maintained a cadre of officers with compre-
42 In a recent interview, Putin expressed confidence that Russia will prevail in the com-
petition with the West in the long run. V. Solov’ev, “Miroporyadok 2018” [“World Order
2018”], True TV, March 22, 2018.
43 Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda
Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpora-
tion, PE-198-OSD, 2016.
hensive regional expertise and understanding of the Soviet Union as a

military opponent. Given the risks of conflict with Russia, the USAF
will need officers with similar expertise regarding Russia and its near
abroad to inform decisionmakers and avoid miscalculation.44
Finally, Russia’s reemergence will pose a host of operational chal-
lenges. Russian weaponry, particularly air defense systems, will pose
challenges for the USAF in the event of conflict in Europe and, poten-
tially, in the Middle East.45 Even when Russian forces are not directly
involved, Russia’s willingness to sell these systems to other actors,
including Iran, could affect the USAF’s ability to project power against
other adversaries.46
44Risky maneuvers of Russian military aircraft around U.S./NATO aircraft have been doc-
umented on numerous occasions. Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Seeks Better Deterrence in Europe
Against Russian Aircraft,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2016.
45“S-400, Pantsir Air Defense Systems Protect Russian Air Group in Syria 24/7,” Sputnik,
April 7, 2017.
46 F. Gady, “Iran Deploys New Russian Air Defense System Around Nuclear Site,” The Dip-
lomat, August 31, 2016.
CHAPTER SIX
Trend 5: Upheaval in Europe
As Russia reemerges as a threat to Europe—and, potentially, to interna-

tional security—Europe risks becoming increasingly fragmented and
absorbed with its own challenges. Security in Europe depends on unity
within NATO—the primary alliance framework between the United
States and Europe, which operates based on consensus—and within
the EU. After all, the EU handles crises within its borders, not NATO.
For instance, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Fron-
tex) is the main agency dealing with the migrant crisis; the European
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation’s European Counter
Terrorism Center leads domestic counterterrorism operations and facil-
itates intelligence-gathering and intelligence-sharing across European
borders.1 The EU also enables a coordinated response to many Rus-
sian gray-zone tactics, such as disinformation campaigns and interfer-
ence in electoral processes. Although recent EU initiatives, such as the
European Defence Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation in
Defence, have yet to yield positive results, they still might be Europe’s
best chance to maximize its limited defense spending.2 By contrast,
a fragmented EU might draw European attention inward and sap
1 European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, “European Counter Ter-
rorism Centre—ECTC,” webpage, undated; Council of the European Union, “EU Fight
Against Terrorism,” webpage, March 20, 2018.
2 Interviews with German government officials, Berlin, April 20, 2018; interview with
Polish think tank, Warsaw, April 23, 2018.
55
defense resources.3 Europe confronts a series of political challenges—

migration, terrorism, political turmoil, and a resurgent Russia—on top
of the economic challenges of the Euro crisis, all of which threaten to
undermine the EU’s ability to respond effectively to these threats and
which could alter the U.S. alliance.4
Context: An Uncertain Future for Europe
Scholars predict several possible scenarios for the future of the EU, such
as “muddling through”;5 a “two-speed” or “multispeed” EU;6 an EU
divided into balanced, opposing blocs;7 a more-integrated EU;8 a less
integrated but possibly enlarged EU;9 and a disintegrated EU.10 Most,
however, envision a future that falls somewhere between the two most
extreme scenarios, in which the EU remains divided but still muddles
through. There is no question, however, that the EU faces severe chal-
lenges today.
3 Maria Carmen Martin Palacios, “What Would Happen to Security in Europe If the Euro-
pean Union Broke Up?” Sigma Iota Rho Journal of International Relations, September 27, 2017.
4 Rem Korteweg, “The EU and Transatlantic Relations,” Centre for European Reform,
February 20, 2013.
5 Kristin Archick, The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects, Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R44249, February 27, 2017, p. 17; Thomas
Raines, Matthew Goodwin, and David Cutts, The Future of Europe: Comparing Public and
Elite Attitudes, London: Chatham House, June 2017, p. 35.
6 Archick, 2017, p. 18; John Peet, “Creaking at 60: The Future of the European Union,”
The Economist, March 25, 2017.
7 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2045,
London, April 30, 2014, p. 119.
8 Archick, 2017, p. 18; Jan Techau, “Four Predictions on the Future of Europe,” Judy Dempsey’s
Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe blog, January 12, 2016.
9 Ministry of Defence, 2014, p. 118; Archick, 2017, p. 18.
10 Ian Morris, “Why Europe’s Great Experiment Is Failing,” Stratfor, January 27, 2016;
John Gillingham and Marian L. Tupy, “The EU Will Likely Implode,” The National Inter-
est, February 25, 2016; Gwythian Prins, “The EU Is at Clear Risk of Collapse—And the
‘Remainiacs’ Just Don’t See It,” Briefings for Brexit, April 2018.
Trend 5: Upheaval in Europe 57
Historical Trend: Migration, Terrorism, Political Turmoil,

and Russia
Over the past decade, public dissatisfaction with the EU has increased
among Europeans.11 A recent report by Chatham House found that
while 71 percent of European elites felt the EU benefited them, there is
“simmering discontent within the public, large sections of whom view
the EU in negative terms, want to see it return some powers to member
states, and feel anxious over the effects of immigration.”12 Only 34 per-
cent of the public across EU member states felt they benefited from EU
membership, and 54 percent felt their countries were better places to live
20 years ago.13 This decline of faith is largely attributable to one major
economic issue—the continued economic fallout from the Eurozone
Crisis and the subsequent austerity measures that were incorporated in
an attempt to control rising public debt that hit such countries as Greece,
Portugal, Italy, and Spain particularly hard—and four geopolitical fac-
tors: migration, terrorism, political turmoil, and a revanchist Russia.14
Migrant Crisis
Beginning with a sudden spike in immigration in 2015—primarily in
the number of economic migrants from Africa and the Middle East—
the migration crisis presents the most severe political and security threat
to the future of Europe.15 In 2015 and 2016, 2.5 million people applied
for asylum in EU countries, with an additional 2.2 million people found
11Interviews with British government officials, London, April 16, 2018; interviews with
NATO officials, London, April 18, 2018.
12 Raines, Goodwin, and Cutts, 2017, p. 2.
13 Raines, Goodwin, and Cutts, 2017, p. 2.
14 For a summary, see Kristin Archick, The European Union: Questions and Answers, Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, RS21372, September 7, 2018, pp. 4–5.
15 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mixed Migration Trends
in Libya: Changing Dynamics and Protection Challenges, Geneva: July 2017, p. 59; Rebecca
Flood, “Shock Figures: Seven Out of 10 Migrants Crossing to Europe Are Not Refugees,
UN Reveals,” Daily Express, July 4, 2017; interview with London think tank, April 17, 2018;
interviews with EU officials, Brussels, April 19, 2018; interviews with German government
officials, Berlin, April 20, 2018; interview with Polish think tank, Warsaw, April 23, 2018.
to be illegally present in 2015.16 The latest EU data indicate that “the

number of people residing in an EU Member State with citizenship of a
non-member country on 1 January 2017 was 21.6 million, representing
4.2 percent of the EU-28 population.”17
Although the flow of migrants has subsided somewhat, the divi-
sions caused by the influx linger on. This migrant crisis pitted EU offi-
cials and pro-migration powers, such as Germany, against the Visegrád
Group (V4), consisting of Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, and the Czech
Republic; Italy; and Austria.18 Although Germany stated it would
accept an unlimited number of migrants, the V4 countries refused to
comply with the EU’s mandatory quotas.19 In response, the European
Parliament proposed fining countries €250,000 for each migrant they
refused to accept.20 Although the EU never imposed these fines, the
EU Commission is suing Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic
in the European Court of Justice for failing to comply with migrant
quotas and relocation plans.21
Attempts to discuss solutions to the crisis have only deepened
these rifts. For instance, the EU Commission convened an “emergency
summit on migration” on June 24, 2018, but declined to invite the
V4 countries.22 Countries that did attend the summit were frustrated
by the outcome, with Italy’s interior minister Matteo Salvini even
16 European Parliament, “EU Migrant Crisis: Facts and Figures,” news blog, June 30, 2017.
17 Eurostat, “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics,” webpage, undated.
18 Steven Erlanger, “Migration to Europe Is Slowing, but the Political Issue Is as Toxic as
Ever,” New York Times, June 22, 2018; “Where Do EU Countries Stand on Migration?”
Deutsche Welle, June 22, 2018.
19 Alistair Walsh, “Chancellor Angela Merkel Rejects Refugee Limit for Germany in TV
Interview,” Deutsche Welle, July 16, 2017.
20Stefano M. Torelli, “Ideology First: Italy’s Troubled Approach to Migration,” European
Council on Foreign Relations, June 11, 2018.
21 “EU to Sue Poland, Hungary, and Czechs for Refusing Refugee Quotas,” BBC, Decem-
ber 7, 2017.
22Lili Bayer and Jacopo Barigazzi, “Central Europeans to Boycott Migration Summit They
Weren’t Invited to,” Politico, June 21, 2018.
“threaten[ing] to stop Rome’s contributions to the EU budget if he [is]

unable to secure a favourable shift in migration policy.”23
The lack of an effective response to the migrant crisis has fueled
political turmoil within many EU states. Notably, the latest elections
in Italy brought into power two anti-immigration, euroskeptic parties,
the League and the 5 Star Movement.24 Clashing stances on migration
have even threatened to disband German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
ruling coalition.25
Terrorism
Terrorism—which is often, if inaccurately, linked to the migrant
crisis—has also exacerbated political tensions across Europe. Although
the terrorist threat comes primarily from homegrown jihadists, a
median 59 percent of European publics express the belief that the
migrant crisis will increase the terrorism threat in their countries.26
In fairness, asylum-seekers allegedly perpetrated at least four terror-
ist attacks between January 2016 and April 2017.27 Moreover, at least
1,500 ISIS-linked foreign fighters have returned to their European
countries of origin, sometimes without government knowledge, and
can operate largely unencumbered across national borders within the
Schengen Area.28 For example, foreign fighter returnees used Molen-
23 Alex Barker and James Politi, “Brussels Draws Fire from Rome over Migration Propos-
als,” Financial Times, June 20, 2018.
24 James Politi, “Five Star and League Take Power in Italy,” Financial Times, June 1, 2018.
25 Guy Chazan, “CDU-CSU Spat Shakes Europe’s Most Successful Electoral Alliance,”
Financial Times, June 18, 2018.
26 Aaron Williams, “How Two Brussels Neighborhoods Became ‘a Breeding Ground’ for
Terror,” Washington Post, April 1, 2016; Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons,
“Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs,” Pew Global
Research Center, July 11, 2016.
27 Manni Crone, Maja Felicia Falkentoft, and Teemu Tammikko, European Citizens, Not
Refugees, Behind Most Terrorist Attacks in Europe, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Interna-
tional Studies, June 21, 2017.
28 Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Alyssa Sims, and Albert Ford, ISIS in the West: The West-
ern Militant Flow to Syria and Iraq, Washington, D.C.: New America, policy paper, March
2016; Crone, Falkentoft, and Tammikko, 2017; Thomas Renard and Rik Coolsaet, eds.,
beek, Belgium, as a hub to plan the November 2015 and March 2016
attacks in Paris and Brussels, respectively.29
Terrorism has also undermined publics’ faith in their govern-
ments and further divided European states.30 Several polls show that
up to 82 percent of EU publics feel their governments are not han-
dling terrorism adequately.31 After the Paris attacks, French officials
reprimanded the Belgian government for failing to address radicaliza-
tion activity within its borders.32 France also turned to the EU rather
than NATO for assistance because “an appeal to NATO would have
required a level of cooperation that French officials felt Washington was
unlikely to offer quickly, and with Paris bleeding, the French weren’t
prepared to wait.”33 Indeed, some NATO officials believe that respond-
ing to domestic terrorism does not even fall under NATO’s mandate.34
Political Turmoil
Although German and EU officials view nationalism as dangerous
and favor a pan-European identity, nationalism is on the rise across
Returnees: Who Are They, Why Are They (Not) Coming Back and How Should We Deal with
Them? Brussels: Egmont Institute, February 2018, p. 71. The Schengen Area encompasses
26 European states (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland) that have officially abolished all types of border control.
29 “Unraveling the Connections Among the Paris Attackers,” New York Times, March 18,
2016.
30 Interview with British think tank, London, April 17, 2018; interviews with EU officials,
Brussels, April 19, 2018; interviews with German government officials, Berlin, April 20,
2018; interview with Polish think tank, Warsaw, April 23, 2018.
31 European Parliament, “Survey: People Reveal Their Priorities for the EU,” news blog,
January 7, 2016; “France’s Response to Terrorism: Loss of Faith,” The Economist, July 30,
2016.
32Peter Spiegel, “Paris Attacks: Belgium Cries Foul over French Blame Game,” Financial
Times, November 18, 2015.
33 Ian Bremmer, “The Hollow Alliance,” Time, June 16, 2016.
34 Interviews with NATO officials, Brussels, April 18, 2018.
Europe.35 The Polish, Hungarian, Austrian, and Italian governments,

for instance, stress national sovereignty and rail against EU encroach-
ment on their domestic affairs.36 Eastern European countries also claim
they are stigmatized by the EU as “backward-looking, autocratic, neo-
Fascist, and nationalistic.”37
Capitalizing on EU resentment, nationalist and populist parties
won elections across Europe. On the right, the Alternative for Germany
party won 94 seats in the Bundestag in September 2017; the Freedom
Party of Austria joined the governing coalition in October 2017; and
conservative, nationalist parties have assumed office in Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary.38 Europe has also seen a resurgence of
the far left. In Greece, the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) took
power in September 2015; in Portugal, the Left Bloc and Communist
party formed an alliance with the Socialist government in November
2015; and in the UK, far-left socialist Jeremy Corbyn took leadership
of the UK Labour Party in September 2015.39 Although the agendas
of these parties differ, they share a dislike of the EU and favor a return
of state power.
These parties have had significant impact on European politics.
Most visibly, the far-right UK Independence Party pushed a popular
referendum that resulted in 2016 in the UK exiting the EU, colloqui-
35 Interviews with German government officials and German think tank, Berlin, April 20,
2018.
36Krisztina Than and Gabriela Baczynska, “Eastern EU States Tell Brussels to Back Off,”
Reuters, January 26, 2018; David Herszenhorn and Maia de la Baume, “Juncker and Sel-
mayr Fight Timmermans on Behalf of Poland,” Politico, June 8, 2018.
37 Interview with Polish think tank, Warsaw, April 23, 2018.
38 William A. Galston, “The Rise of European Populism and the Collapse of the Center-
Left,” Brookings, news blog, March 8, 2018.
39 Luke March, “2016: The Ebbing of Europe’s Radical Left Tide?” European Futures, blog
post, Edinburgh Europa Institute, November 7, 2016; Axel Bugge, “As Europe Left Strug-
gles, Portugal’s Alliance Wins Over Voters and Brussels,” Reuters, March 31, 2017; Sheri
Berman, “Populism Is a Problem. Elitist Technocrats Aren’t the Solution,” Foreign Policy,
December 20, 2017; Antonis Samaras, “Syriza Is Undermining Democracy in Greece,”
Financial Times, March 8, 2018.
ally termed Brexit. Despite suffering in the polls and from internal dis-
putes after the referendum, the party is once again gaining support.40
Revanchist Russia
Finally, Europe is divided on how to deal with a revanchist Russia.
Although Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states have reduced their
dependency on Russian energy, Germany plans to construct the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline that will transport natural gas directly from Russia
to Germany.41 France relies on Russia for defense contracts, and the
British economy is flush with Russian capital.42 Ideologically, the Baltic
states and Poland are diametrically opposed to Putin’s Russia while
such countries as Italy, Austria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have
pro-Russian factions within their populations and governments.43
Consequently, the EU remains conflicted on how to handle
Russia. For example, the UK levied several diplomatic punitive mea-
sures against Russia in response to the nerve agent attack on Russian
spy Sergei Skripal but did not call for additional economic sanctions.44
For her part, Merkel maintained a tough rhetorical stance on Putin
and decided to expel four Russian diplomats from Germany after the
40 Matthew Goodwin, “Ukip Is Back Thanks to the Chequers Backlash,” Spectator, July 28,
2018.
41 Chi-Kong Chyong, Louisa Slavkova, and Vessela Tcherneva, “EU Alternatives to Rus-
sian Gas,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 9, 2015; Judy Dempsey, “Ger-
many, Dump Nord Stream 2,” Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe blog,
January 25, 2016; Maciej Martewicz, “Poland Waves Goodbye to Russian Gas After 74
Years,” Bloomberg, February 8, 2018; Andrew Rettman, “Germany Starts to Build Nord
Stream 2,” EU Observer, May 4, 2018b.
42 Bremmer, 2016; interview with British firm, London, April 17, 2018.
43 Piotr Buras and Adam Balcer, “An Unpredictable Russia: The Impact on Poland,” Euro-
pean Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2016; Lili Bayer, “Poland and Hungary Stand
United (Except on Russia),” Politico, September 22, 2017; Gustav Gressel, “Austria: Russia’s
Trojan Horse?” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 21, 2017; interview with
German think tank, Berlin, April 20, 2018.
44 Emile Simpson, “Theresa May Should Go After Putin’s Debt,” Foreign Policy, March 21,
2018.
Skripal poisoning, yet the Nord Stream 2 project was approved.45 And
ten EU countries—including Austria, Belgium, and Greece—declined
to expel any Russian diplomats in response to the attack, illustrating
the reluctance of some EU members to poke the proverbial bear.46
Future Projection: Increasingly Destabilized, Divided, and

Inward-Looking Europe
Looking to 2030, Europe will likely become increasingly divided and

grow more inward-looking. Despite the recent decline in migration,
migrants will continue to be drawn to Europe, and human smugglers—
who have profited from the crisis—will be there to facilitate their travel.47
Moreover, even if illegal migration were to stop, the EU still needs to
contend with the millions of migrants already within its borders, ensur-
ing that the crisis will continue for years to come.
Additionally, Europe remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Sev-
eral studies predict that terrorism will probably increase over the next
five to ten years as ISIS’s so-called “caliphate” collapses, fighters return
home to Europe, and individuals currently imprisoned on material
support charges are released between 2019 and 2023.48 Furthermore,
as long as the Schengen Area exists, Europe will continue to face chal-
lenges monitoring cross-border terrorist movements.
45Richard Fuchs, “Germany’s Russian Energy Dilemma,” Deutsche Welle, March 29, 2014;
Anca Gurzu, “Germany’s Double Gas Game with Russia,” Politico, March 28, 2018; Andrew
Rettman, “Merkel: Nord Stream 2 Is ‘Political,’” EU Observer, April 11, 2018a.
46 Leonid Bershidsky, “Europe’s Anti-Kremlin Roll Call Was Weak,” Bloomberg, March 27,
2018a.
47 European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, European Union Serious and
Organised Crime Assessment 2017, The Hague, 2017, p. 11; Gabriela Baczynska, “Pressure on
EU’s Southern Borders from African Migrants Seen Persisting in 2018,” Reuters, February 20,
2018.
48 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Paradox of Progress, Near Future: Ten-
sions Are Rising, Growing Terrorism Threat,” Global Trends Main Report, undated; Jane’s
IHS Markit, “Terror Risks in Europe to Increase in 2018 as Islamic State’s Foreign Fighters
Return,” press release, February 13, 2018.
Since the rise of identity politics is closely intertwined with the

migration crisis and terrorism, support for nationalist and populist par-
ties will likely continue and possibly grow, exploiting the EU’s failure
to respond to these crises.49 Such movements could prompt more coun-
tries to leave the EU, especially in the aftermath of Brexit. Although
Brexit has yet to spur a domino effect across Europe, other countries
still might follow Britain’s lead. For example, growing tension between
the Polish government and the EU Commission has prompted discus-
sion of a referendum on whether Poland should leave the EU, though
popular support for this idea is currently very low.50
Finally, as mentioned earlier, Russia seems poised to grow more
aggressive, not less so, in the years to come. The net result is that causes
for schisms within Europe seem poised to persist and possibly intensify
over the next decade.

Warfare
The trend toward an increasingly divided and inward-looking Europe

holds several implications for the future of warfare and for the joint
force. Although NATO will likely continue to remain the cornerstone
of European security, if for no other reason than Europe lacks a viable
alternative to the U.S.-led alliance, the divisions within Europe provide
Russia with an opportunity to constrain the EU and NATO’s ability to
respond in emergencies, create further instability in Europe, and strain
the transatlantic alliance.51
49Lilly Bilyana and Jeremy Shapiro, “Sovereignty’s Revenge: The Power of Populism in the
European Union,” Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, April 30, 2015.
50 David M. Herszenhorn, “Warsaw to Trump: Let’s Make a Military Deal (Without
NATO),” Politico, May 30, 2018; “Flirting with Polexit? Poland’s President Wants a Refer-
endum on the EU: Most Poles Are Keen to Stay,” The Economist, June 20, 2018; Jonathan
Eyal, “The Other Europe? How Central Europe Views the Continent’s Security Concerns
and Aspirations,” RUSI Newsbrief, Vol. 38, No. 5, June 25, 2018.
51“In Austria, Russia Hopes to Exploit Europe’s Divisions,” Stratfor, June 23, 2014; Fiona
Hill, “This Is What Putin Really Wants,” Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, Feb-
Europe likely also will become more selective about participating

in future expeditionary missions, instead allocating its limited defense
resources to more-immediate problems, such as combating terrorism
within its borders or defending against Russia.52 Europe as a whole
does not view China as a security threat, so NATO might be unlikely
to support any contingency in Asia.53 Additionally, many European
defense experts suggested that NATO’s appetite for out-of-area coun-
terterrorism operations might decrease.54 In the event of another con-
flict in the Middle East or Asia, the United States might have to call
upon an ad hoc coalition of individual allies rather than relying on
its usual European allies or the support of NATO as a whole. In this
sense, NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan, far from Europe’s borders,
might be the anomaly and the alliance might be likely to return to its
more continental focus.
At the national level, the U.S. core European allies will likely
remain the same although there will be relative shifts in the strength
of each alliance. Table 6.1 lists all the NATO allies with militaries that
have more than than 100,000 active personnel. Of all the countries
examined, Greece spends the highest percentage of its GDP on defense
but is also among the hardest hit by the Eurozone and migrant crises,
and it has the lowest opinion of NATO. Italy and Spain face similar
economic and migration-related problems and fall far short of meeting
ruary 24, 2015; Mark Galeotti, Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages Its Political War
in Europe, London: European Council on Foreign Relations, September 1, 2017; Witold
Rodkiewicz, “The Russian Attack on the United Kingdom: The Aims and Consequences,”
Warsaw, OSW Centre for Easter Studies, March 14, 2018; interview with British firm,
London, April 16, 2018; interviews with Polish government officials, Warsaw, April 23,
2018; interview with Polish think tank, Warsaw, April 23, 2018.
52 Claudia Major and Christian Molling, “The Framework Nations Concept,” SWP Com-
ments, No. 52, December 2014, p. 1; NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries
(2010–2017),” press release 111, June 29, 2017, p. 3.
53 Interview with British think tank, London, April 17, 2018; interviews with NATO officials,
Brussels, April 18, 2018; interviews with German government officials, Berlin, April 20, 2018;
interviews with Polish government officials, Warsaw, April 23, 2018.
54 Interview with British think tank, London, April 17, 2018; interviews with NATO offi-
cials, Brussels, April 18, 2018; interviews with German government officials, Berlin, April
20, 2018; interviews with Polish government officials, Warsaw, April 23, 2018.
NATO’s guideline of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense—a target

they have indicated they still will not meet by 2024.55
Of the four remaining countries, Poland could become the stron-
gest, most dependable European ally, at least regarding Russia. The
Polish public overwhelmingly supports defending a NATO ally against
Russia, and Poland is one of the top five contributors to NATO in
terms of defense expenditure as a share of GDP and becoming increas-
ingly militarily capable.56 Finally, Poland has the most favorable views
of the United States and NATO out of any country in Europe and
even offered to finance the construction of a permanent U.S. base in
Poland.57
Depending on the mission, France also could become a more
important ally for the United States. Despite its opposition to the Iraq
War, France fought in Afghanistan and Libya and has a vested inter-
est in the global counterterrorism campaign, particularly against ISIS
in the Middle East and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Africa.58
Although falling below NATO’s defense spending benchmark of 2 per-
cent of GDP, France by many estimates retains one of the largest and
best equipped militaries in Europe.59
55DPA and Reuters, “NATO Says More Members Plan to Reach Spending Goal by 2024,”
Radio Free Europe, February 14, 2018.
56 “Poland About to Increase Its Defence Expenditure up to the Level of 2.5% of GDP: A
New Bill Introduced,” Defence24.com, April 24, 2017; NATO, June 29, 2017, p. 3; “Poland
Will Increase the Size of Its Military by over 50%,” Global Security Review, November 16,
2017.
57 Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Poland Offers up to $2 Billion for a Permanent US Military Pres-
ence,” Defense News, May 29, 2018; Charlie Gao, “Poland Wants Lots of U.S. Military Gear;
The Reason: Russia,” National Interest, June 30, 2018.
58 Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer and Olivier Schmitt, “Frogs of War: Explaining the New
French Military Interventionism,” War on the Rocks, October 4, 2015.
59 Geoffroy Clavel, “France Supports Decision to Stay out of Iraq, but Doesn’t Rule Out
Future Conflicts,” Huffington Post, March 19, 2013; Vilmer and Schmitt, 2015; NATO,
June 29, 2017, pp. 3, 6.
Table 6.1
Indicators of Alliance Strength
Percentage Percentage of Percentage of

of Population Population Population in Favor Percentage Defense Defense
with Favorable That Would of Defending NATO of Population Expenditure Expenditure in Number of
Opinion of the Fight to Defend Allies Against with Favorable as Percentage Millions of U.S. Active Military
Country United States Their Country Russia Opinion of NATO of GDP Dollars Personnel
Poland 73 47 62 79 1.99 10,654 111,000
Germany 35 18 40 67 1.24 47,458 180,000
UK 50 27 45 62 2.12 56,993 161,000
France 46 29 53 60 1.79 47,933 209,000
Italy 61 20 Unavailable 57 1.12 24,390 181,000
Spain 31 21 46 45 0.92 12,600 121,000
Trend 5: Upheaval in Europe

Greece 43 54 Unavailable 33 2.36 4,943 106,000
SOURCE: Worldwide Independent Network/Gallup International, “WIN/Gallup International’s Global Survey Shows Three in Five
Willing to Fight for Their Country,” webpage, 2015; Pew Research Center, “Global Indicators Database: Opinion of the United
States—Do You Have a Favorable or Unfavorable View of the U.S.?” webpage, Spring 2017; “Germans Least Supportive of Defending
Allies Against Russia,” webpage, Pew Research Center, May 22, 2017.
NOTE: Defense expenditure figures were converted from national currency units to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate as of July 10,
2018, and rounded to the nearest whole number.
67
Going forward, the UK might show less willingness to engage

in expeditionary operations.60 As a House of Commons report noted,
“The sensitivity of public opinion to military casualties incurred
in wars perceived to have no clear purpose or definition of victory,
together with constraints on public spending, mean the threshold for
future interventions will be high.”61 Nonetheless, the UK still sup-
ported the United States in the April 2018 Syria strikes in suggesting,
despite public backlash, that it will remain a close, if more restrained,
U.S. ally.62 Post-Brexit, the UK could even increase its commitment to
NATO as that becomes the UK’s primary format for security coopera-
tion with European allies.63
Finally, Germany will likely become a more reluctant and less reli-
able partner for the United States.64 In theory, Germany has resources
to be the cornerstone of European security and the transatlantic alli-
ance, but in practice, this remains unlikely. Although Germans are
supportive of NATO in the abstract, they are among the least support-
60 Worldwide Independent Network/Gallup International, 2015; Rachael Gribble, Simon

Wessley, Susan Klein, David A. Alexander, Christopher Dandeker, and Nicola T. Fear, “Brit-
ish Public Opinion After a Decade of War: Attitudes to Iraq and Afghanistan,” Politics:
2014, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2015; interviews with British government officials, London, April 16,
2018; interview with British think tank, London, April 17, 2018.
61 Gavin Thompson, Oliver Hawkins, Aliyah Dar, Mark Taylor, Nick Battley, Adam
Mellows-Facer, Chris Rhodes, Daniel Harari, Dominic Webb, Feargal McGuinness, Gavin
Berman, Grahame Allen, Lorna Booth, Lucinda Maer, Matthew Keep, Nida Broughton,
Paul Bolton, Rachael Harker, Richard Cracknell, Roderick McInnes, and Tom Ruther-
ford, Olympic Britain: Social and Economic Change Since the 1908 and 1948 London Games,
London: House of Commons Publications, 2012, pp. 155–156.
62 Pierre Tran and Andrew Chuter, “Domestic Response to Syria Strikes: Cheers in France,
Lashing in UK,” Defense News, April 16, 2018.
63 James Black, Alexandra Hall, Kate Cox, Marta Kepe, and Erik Silfversten, Defence and
Security After Brexit: Understanding the Possible Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the
EU—Overview Report, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1786/1-RC, 2017,
p. 11.
64 Interview with German think tank, Berlin, April 20, 2018. See Christopher Alessi, “How
Afghanistan Changed the German Military,” Spiegel Online, October 15, 2013; and Rick
Noack, “Afraid of a Major Conflict? The German Military Is Currently Unavailable,” Wash-
ington Post, January 24, 2018.
ive of defending a NATO ally against Russia.65 Even if the will to fight
existed, Germany’s Bundeswehr faces serious equipment shortages and
German defense spending will remain far below NATO guidelines for
the foreseeable future.66 All that aside, Germany’s historical past and its
present-day tension with other European countries over immigration,
economic policy, and other issues pose obstacles to the idea of it leading
Europe on the security front.
65 “Germans Least Supportive of Defending Allies Against Russia,” 2017.

66 Konstantin von Hammerstein and Peter Muller, “U.S. Pressures Germany to Increase
Defense Spending,” Spiegel Online, February 17, 2017; Elisabeth Braw, “Germany Is Quietly
Building a European Army Under Its Command,” Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2017a; NATO,
June 29, 2017, p. 3; Elisabeth Braw, “Europe’s Readiness Problem,” Foreign Affairs, Novem-
ber 30, 2017b; Andrea Shalal, “Equipment Shortages Impair German Military Ahead of Key
NATO Mission,” Reuters, February 19, 2018; Leonid Bershidsky, “The U.S. Should Move
Troops from Germany to Poland,” Bloomberg, May 30, 2018b.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Trend 6: Turmoil in the Islamic World
Although China and Russia arguably pose a greater strategic threat,

U.S. wars since at least the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have
focused on three interconnected challenges emanating from the Islamic
world—terrorism, instability, and simmering interstate tension.1 Look-
ing out to 2030, these three challenges will continue to shape the future
of warfare and drive U.S. military commitments.
Context: Sectarian and Ethnic Conflict Occurs After

Authoritarian Collapse
Scholarship points to at least two fundamental insights in understand-
ing the turmoil afflicting the Islamic world. First, although scholars are
divided about drivers of Islamic terrorism, few say they believe that any
of these underlying causes—whether they are economic opportunity,
social mobility, political inclusiveness, or simple religious fervor—have
been addressed.2 Second, democratic transitions after authoritarian
collapse—such as occurred during the Arab Spring—often go awry
1 This report defines the Islamic world as the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan.
2 For a sample of the debate over the causes of terrorism, see Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promot-
ing Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2003;
James A. Piazza, “Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and Terrorism
in 19 Middle Eastern Countries,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2007; and
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 4th ed.,
Oakland, Calif.: University of California Press, 2017.
71
and can produce protracted domestic conflict, particularly if they

occur suddenly and threaten to upend social and political order.3
Taken together, both findings suggest that turmoil in the Middle East
will likely continue for some time to come.
Historical Trend: Descent into Chaos
For decades, powerful, if brutal, strongmen ruled much of the Islamic

world. Former military officers governed Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Iraq,
and Tunisia. In some countries—such as Syria, Jordan, and Saudi
Arabia—power became institutionalized under a monarchy or hered-
itary authoritarian rule. The exception was the Islamic Republic of
Iran, which had a severely limited democracy under tight control of
the clerics. Despite a series of interstate wars (the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf
War, or the multiple Arab-Israeli conflicts), the countries themselves
remained internally stable.
A series of events caused this fragile stability to unravel, however.
In 2001, al Qaeda successfully carried out the September 11 terrorist
attacks, prompting the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the start of
the Global War on Terrorism. Two years later, in 2003, the United
States invaded Iraq and toppled the first of the region’s longtime
strongmen, Saddam Hussein, thereby removing the greatest regional
counterweight to Iran. Arguably, a far greater blow to regional stabil-
ity came during the 2011 Arab Spring, when popular protests toppled
other strongmen in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, and sparked
violence in Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere.
Even in 2018, chaos still consumes much of the region. According
to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, the
3 For the classic argument about democratic revolutions and war, see Edward D. Mansfield
and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2005. For some attempts to explain this in the context of Arab world, see Jason
Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, “Why the Modest Harvest?” Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 24, No. 4, October 2013; and Nathan Brown, “Egypt’s Failed Transition,”
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 24, No. 4, October 2013.
Trend 6: Turmoil in the Islamic World 73
Afghanistan war remains “roughly a stalemate.”4 In Syria and Yemen,

civil wars continue and there is little prospect for returning to a stable,
centralized government in either country.5 In Libya, rival militias vie for
power.6 Outside the active war zones, experts argue that popular discon-
tent is often simmering just below the surface and ready to erupt even in
such seemingly peaceful places as Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.7
Over the past decade and a half, internal instability allowed
Islamic terrorism to thrive. In the unrest that followed the inva-
sion, Iraq became a breeding ground for local insurgents unhappy
with changes in power and later a magnet for foreign Islamic terror-
ists as well, including members of al Qaeda. Islamic terrorist groups
also found homes in other weak states, such as Afghanistan, Somalia,
Yemen, or Libya after Qaddafi’s regime toppled. More recently, ISIS
capitalized on the chaos left by the Arab Spring and seized vast swathes
of Syria and Iraq. Although many of these territorial gains have since
been reversed, ISIS and radical Islamic terrorism more broadly contin-
ues to exist.
The regional chaos also exacerbated a sectarian-infused inter-
state competition, primarily between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for
who will control the Middle East. Instability in primarily Sunni-led
regimes presented an opportunity for Iran to expand what it sees
as its rightful sphere of regional influence, including into its former
4 Kenneth Katzman and Clayton Thomas, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security

and U.S. Policy, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, RL30588, Novem-
ber 7, 2017, pp. 26, 53.
5 Carla E. Humud, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Armed Conflict
in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
RL33487, October 13, 2017, p. 40.
6 Elissa Miller and Kevin Truitte, “Filling the Vacuum in Libya,” Foreign Affairs, July 18,
2017.
7 Francisco Serrano, “Algeria on the Brink? Five Years After the Arab Spring,” Foreign
Affairs, May 27, 2017; Sarah E. Yerkes, “Democracy Derailed? Tunisia’s Transition Veers
Off Course,” Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2017; Alexia Underwood, “Sisi Won Egypt’s Elec-
tion. That Doesn’t Mean He’s Safe,” Vox.com, April 3, 2018; interview with Jordanian think
tank, Amman, May 12–13, 2018.
adversaries, such as Iraq.8 In the zero-sum politics of the Middle East,

what Iran saw as an opportunity, Saudi Arabia saw a mortal threat.
As Professor F. Gregory Gause notes, “The Arab Spring only height-
ened Riyadh’s sense of encirclement,” as primarily Sunni-led, Saudi-
allied regimes fell.9
The simmering conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia has taken
on many forms. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia forced the resignation of
Prime Minister Saad Hariri in November 2017 after he did not crack
down on Iran’s premier proxy force, Hezbollah.10 In other cases, the
competition has turned violent. In Syria, the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps provided military assistance and funding—estimated
at between $6 billion and $20 billion annually—to the Assad regime
while Saudi Arabia reportedly funded the opposition.11 The sides are
also locked in an increasingly bloody proxy war in Yemen between
the Saudi Arabia–backed Yemeni government and the Iranian-backed
Shiite Houthi rebels.12 The Iran-Saudi conflict reaches beyond the Per-
sian Gulf and threatens to engulf much of the Islamic world: States
from Morocco to Afghanistan have needed to pick sides.13
8 Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, R44017, November 7, 2017, p. 2.
9 F. Gregory Gause III, “The Future of U.S. Saudi Relations: The Kingdom and the Power,”
Foreign Affairs, June 13, 2016.
10Bilal Y. Saab, “Don’t Let the Saudis Destabilize Lebanon: Why Washington Should
Restrain Riyadh,” Foreign Affairs, November 20, 2017.
11 Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, “U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support
Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, January 23, 2016; Katzman, 2017, p. 34; Alex Vatanka,
“Iran and Russia, Growing Apart: Rising Dissent over the IRGC’s Militias,” Foreign Affairs,
November 29, 2017.
12David D. Kirkpatrick, “Saudi Arabia Charges Iran with ‘Act of War,’ Raising Threat of
Military Clash,” New York Times, November 6, 2017.
13Payam Mohseni and Hussein Kalout, “Iran’s Axis of Resistance Rises: How It’s Forging a
New Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, October 23, 2017.
Future Projection: Terrorism, Instability, and Regional

Conflict
There is little evidence to suggest that the turmoil roiling the Islamic
world will resolve itself over the next ten to 15 years. To the contrary,
there are several good reasons to believe that these challenges will
continue and perhaps even intensify over the next decade. Thus, the
U.S. military should expect similar, or perhaps increased, demand for
resources to address these problems.
Continued Radical Islamic Terrorism

Despite recent successes in the war on terrorism, there are three reasons
that the United States will probably still face an ongoing threat for the
next decade from radical Islamic terrorist groups in the Islamic world.
First, as terrorism expert Seth Jones remarks, Islamic terrorist groups’
strength have “never been linear, but [have] waxed and waned based
on such factors as the collapse of governments in countries such as
Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.”14 Jones further notes that any number of fac-
tors could lead to rebirth of the movement, such as withdrawal of U.S.
military presence, another Arab Spring, or a new charismatic leader.15
Moreover, although the United States notched victories against
ISIS, Shiite terrorist groups have grown increasingly capable. Lebanese
Hezbollah now numbers some 40,000 troops, many of whom have
recent combat experience in Syria.16 Thanks to an estimated $100–
$200 million in Iranian funding, the group has amassed an arsenal
of 150,000 rockets, Russian-made SA-22 missiles, drones, and other
advanced military capabilities.17 Although perhaps less capable, Iraq’s
Shiite militias are more numerous, with between 110,000 and 120,000
14 Seth G. Jones, “Will al Qaeda Make a Comeback? The Factors That Will Determine Its
Success,” Foreign Affairs, August 7, 2017.
15 Jones, 2017.
16 Jonathan Schanzer, “The Iran Deal’s Bigger Loser: Hezbollah’s Uncertain Future,” For-
eign Affairs, March 20, 2016.
17 Schanzer, 2016.
troops.18 These groups—such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the

Family of the Righteous) or Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battal-
ions)—are also allegedly backed by Iran and have attacked U.S. forces
in the past.19
Finally, even if the United States successfully eliminated both Sunni
and Shiite Islamic terrorism in the Middle East, that still might not put
an end to the threat. Radical Islamic terrorist groups now span the globe
from Libya to Nigeria; Mali to Somalia; across Central Asia; through
Afghanistan and Pakistan; and into Southeast Asia, particularly the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia—not to mention offshoots operat-
ing in the West.20 Consequently, it is unlikely that the United States and
its allies will decisively eliminate radical Islamic terrorism by 2030.
Ongoing Internal Instability

Rooting out terrorism will be made more complex by the ongoing
problem of internal instability that will almost certainly plague the
region through 2030. As already noted, few of the Islamic world’s cur-
rent conflicts appear to be nearing a permanent resolution. Even in the
handful of countries where the violence has subsided, such as Iraq, bit-
terness and distrust between the factions remains largely unaddressed
and could easily slide into open conflict.21
Furthermore, if the ongoing conflicts in the Islamic world were
to end tomorrow, the sheer scale of existing damage would leave these
countries prone to instability for some time to come. For example,
Afghanistan’s decades of conflict have left 2 million dead and millions
more wounded or displaced.22 Similarly, Syria’s prewar population was
18Kenneth Katzman and Carla E. Humud, Iraq: Politics and Governance, Washington,
D.C., Congressional Research Service, RS21960, March 9, 2016, p. 17.
19 Katzman and Humud, 2016, p. 18.
20 The UK, for example, announced that it was tracking 23,000 “subjects of interest” alone.
“23,000 People Have Been ‘Subjects of Interest’ as Scale of Terror Threat Emerges After
Manchester Attack,” Telegraph, May 27, 2017.
21 Emma Sky, “Mission Still Not Accomplished in Iraq: Why the United States Should Not
Leave,” Foreign Affairs, October 16, 2017.
22 Katzman and Thomas, 2017, pp. 26, 53.
22 million; hundreds of thousands are now dead, many more wounded,

and almost half that prewar number is believed to be internally dis-
placed or living abroad as refugees.23 Unsurprisingly, experts predict
that restoring regional stability will take years—perhaps decades.24
In addition, the ongoing instability might yet spread to other
neighboring countries, any of which could erupt in violence between
now and 2030. Jordan, for example, is home to Palestinian, Iraqi, and
now Syrian refugees—the Syrian population alone numbers 1.4 mil-
lion in a country of 7.5 million—contributing to an unemployment
rate of 22 percent and increasing pressure on the ruling monarchy.25
Similar to Jordan, Lebanon shelters some 1.5 million Syrian refugees
and is still dealing with the effects of its own civil war and wars with
Israel, most recently in 2006.26
Finally, the region’s other strongmen might still fall. Saudi Ara-
bia’s young Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is trying to con-
solidate power to reform the conservative Saudi state, earning plaudits
from abroad but risking a backlash from the powerful conservative
elements within Saudi society and elsewhere in the royal family.27 Sim-
ilarly, although military leader Abed Fattah el-Sisi has consolidated
his control over Egypt for the moment, the country still faces a host
of economic and terrorism problems, and the popular discontent that
resulted in the overthrow of his predecessor remains.28 Turkish Presi-
dent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime already faced one failed military
coup in July 2016; the response was to arrest 60,000 people and fire
23 Humud, Blanchard, and Nikitin, 2017, p. i.

24 Interviews with Jordanian academics and think tank officials, Amman, May 12–13,
2018.
25 Rana F. Sweis, “Jordan Struggles Under a Wave of Syrian Refugees,” New York Times,
February 13, 2016; Interviews with Jordanian academics and think tank officials, Amman,
May 12–13, 2018.
26 Saab, 2017.
27 Interviews with Israeli academics, Tel Aviv, May 8–10, 2018; interviews with Jordanian
officials, Amman, May 12–13, 2018; interviews with U.S. government officials, Abu Dhabi,
May 15, 2018.
28 Underwood, 2018.
150,000 government employees to try to consolidate power.29 Given

the size and importance of these countries, instability in any of them
would have regional consequences.
Intensifying Regional Conflict

It is possible that the greatest concern for the United States and the
factor most likely to drive a significant increase in U.S. military pres-
ence over the next decade will be neither terrorism nor internal insta-
bility but a large-scale regional conflict. Looking to 2030, multiple
states in the region will have reasons to escalate the already simmering
interstate conflict in the region.
First, with a friendly regime in Iraq, less U.S. conventional pres-
ence in the region, and an Assad regime with a firmer grip over Syria,
Iran will enjoy a comparatively benign strategic environment and be
better positioned than in the past to fulfill its ambitions for regional
hegemony.30 It will likely be able to capitalize on its extensive network
of terrorist and militia groups throughout the region that it developed
over the past several decades.31 Iran enjoys an alliance of convenience
with Russia, giving it additional great-power cover for its actions. At
the same time, Iran will face increasing economic troubles. Despite
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the sanctions relief after
the nuclear deal, Iran’s economy never fully bounced back, creating
popular discontent toward the regime.32 If the United States success-
fully reimposes sanctions, this might only increase the pain, poten-
tially strengthening Iran’s hard-line political factions and increasing
the chances that Iran might use international conflict to divert public
attention away from its domestic problems.33
29 Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R44000, November 9, 2017, pp. 12–14.
30 Katzman, 2017, p. 21.
31 Katzman, 2017, pp. 4, 12–13; Vatanka, 2017.
32 Ladane Nasseri, Golnar Motevalli, and Arsalan Shahla, “After Sanctions, Iran’s Economy
Is Nearing a Crisis,” Bloomberg, August 9, 2018.
33 Nasseri, Motevalli, and Shahla, 2018.
Second, Saudi Arabia will likely feel increasingly insecure. Given

its growing internal problems—such as low oil prices, radicalization,
and terrorism—Saudi Arabia might become increasingly sensitive to
any real or perceived Iranian threats to its stability or its fellow Sunni
regimes.34 Moreover, aggressive pushback against expanding Iranian
interests could also serve the royal family’s domestic political interests,
helping bin Salman consolidate his power and advance his domestic
agenda.
Third, other Sunni Arab states will view growing Iranian influ-
ence with apprehension and might become increasingly concerned that
Iran will provoke unrest in their Shiite minorities.35 Although these
states might not want war per se, they have already demonstrated that
they will follow Saudi Arabia’s lead. In 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a
coalition that included support from not only the Gulf States but also
Egypt, Jordan, and even Sudan to intervene against Iranian-backed
rebels in the Yemeni civil war.36 Years later, many of these states con-
tinue to fight in Yemen, even if they privately doubt the wisdom of
such actions.37 More recently, Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab
Emirates joined the Saudi Arabia–led boycott of Qatar in June 2017
that was ostensibly for supporting terrorist groups (such as Hamas) but
was also in retaliation for Qatar’s close relationship with Iran. 38
Israel has its own reasons to fight. Like the Sunni Arab states,
Israel has expressed alarm at Tehran’s growing regional influence and
views Iranian military presence in Syria as a redline.39 Israel also views
34Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, Washington,

D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CL33533, November 22, 2017, pp. 1, 9, 14–15.
35 Interviews with Jordanian officials, Amman, May 12–13, 2018; interviews with U.S. offi-
cials, Abu Dhabi, May 15, 2018.
36Reuters, “Which Countries Are Part of Saudi Arabia’s Coalition Against Yemen’s
Houthis?” Huffington Post, March 26, 2015.
37 Interviews with Jordanian officials, Amman, May 12–13, 2018; interviews with U.S. offi-
cials, Abu Dhabi, May 15, 2018.
38Bassima Alghussein and Jeffrey A. Stacey, “How Saudi Arabia Botched Its Campaign
Against Qatar: The Cost of the Pressure on Doha,” Foreign Affairs, July 12, 2017.
39 Interviews with Israeli academics, Tel Aviv, May 8–10, 2018.
Iranian nuclear weapons as an existential threat and has always doubted

Iran’s promises to denuclearize;40 it already has struck Iranian targets in
Syria, but Iran seems unlikely to abandon its military foothold there.41
Moreover, with the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, Iran could restart its nuclear program. Even if Iran
remained in compliance for a short time to avoid angering the other
signatories, many of the restrictions on its nuclear program that were
included in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action were set to expire
by 2030, meaning that Iran could resume some nuclear-related activi-
ties.42 Were that to happen, the chances of a large scale Israeli-Iranian
confrontation by 2030 would increase substantially.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, with its intervention in Syria, Russia
also has increased its military presence in the Middle East. With other
great powers—notably China—dependent on the region for energy,
the Middle East could very well be at the epicenter of future great-
power competition.43

Warfare
The real question might not be whether the Islamic world will remain
afflicted by terrorism, instability, and intensifying conflict through
2030. Rather the question might be to what extent the United States
will choose to fight these wars, particularly as it becomes less reliant on
40 Isabel Kershner and Thomas Erdbrink, “As Deadline on Nuclear Deal Nears, Israel and
Iran Issue Warnings,” New York Times, May 6, 2018.
41Amos Harel, “Israel Signals Lull in Syria Strikes Is Over, Resuming Military Action
Against Iran,” Ha’aretz, September 5, 2018.
42 China, France, Germany, European Union, Iran, Russia, United Kingdom, and United
States, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, July 14, 2015.
43 In 2017, China imported 56 percent of its oil from the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries, including sizable quantities from Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other Middle
Eastern members of the cartel. Holly Ellyatt, “China’s Slowing Demand for Oil Is a Serious
Concern for the Middle East,” CNBC, September 3, 2018.
the region for energy.44 As mentioned in Chapter Two, popular opinion

likely will not support a large-scale military intervention (especially in
the Middle East). But the United States has already learned that extricat-
ing itself from the region is easier said than done. At the very least, the
United States will likely be forced to maintain a robust counterterrorism
force to check the global jihadist movement and prevent future attacks
on Americans and U.S. soil.
Still, it is possible that U.S. involvement might need to go beyond
counterterrorism. As already discussed, the problems of internal insta-
bility, regional conflict, and international terrorism are intertwined.
If the United States wants to get at these underlying problems, it will
need to expand its involvement. Moreover, if the turmoil affecting
much of the Islamic world spirals from being a “local” problem into a
broader regional war, the United States might find itself forced to act
both to stabilize the region and to protect its key allies there. Finally,
the United States could find itself in the Middle East for reasons quite
apart from regional dynamics altogether: as part of the broader great-
power competition with Russia and China.
From the USAF-specific perspective, this analysis has impor-
tant implications for force planning and budgetary considerations.
The service currently remains at the forefront of the counterterror-
ism effort—providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
and strike support—and these missions will probably continue going
forward. This, in turn, will make it difficult for civilian policymak-
ers and the USAF to swing resources away from the Middle East
to Europe or Asia without incurring additional risk on the counter-
terrorism front.
44 Overall U.S. oil imports already were expected to fall in 2018 to their lowest levels in
60 years, and Persian Gulf countries supplied only 17 percent of what the United States did
import. Alan Neuhauser, “EIA: U.S. Net Oil Imports to Drop to Lowest Levels in 60 Years,”
US News, July 18, 2018; U.S. Energy Information Agency, “How Much Petroleum Does the
United States Import and Export?” webpage, October 3, 2018.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusions
In the final analysis, all six trends—U.S. polarization and retrenchment,

China’s rise, Asia’s reassessment, a revanchist Russia, upheaval in Europe,
and turmoil in the Islamic world—will each shape who, how, where,
when, and why the United States will fight through 2030 (Table 8.1).
First, at the very least, U.S. polarization and disillusionment will disrupt
long-term defense budgeting efforts and could make the use of force an
increasingly attractive option for U.S. policymakers, but these factors
also could create a vacuum that U.S. adversaries will be able to exploit.
Second, China’s growing ambitions, rising power, and increasing domes-
tic political pressure could combine to make it more inclined to use force.
Third, Asia’s strategic reassessment seems poised to change who might
join future U.S. military coalitions while also potentially increasing the
overall chances of war in Asia, most notably if U.S. allies choose to push
back against perceived Chinese encroachment—especially in such dis-
puted areas as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands.
Fourth, Russia is increasingly aggressive, especially in its near abroad,
both in asserting its own sphere of influence and in defending against
perceived Western threats to the regime. Fifth, Europe’s attention by
contrast is increasingly focused inward on such problems as the migrant
crisis, terrorism, and a revanchist Russia, which is sapping Europe’s over-
all will to engage in expeditionary operations and, to some extent, shift-
ing which states are the most militarily dependable U.S. allies. Finally,
the turmoil in the Islamic world that has prompted the United States to
engage in a sustained counterterrorism effort over the past decade and a
83
84
Table 8.1
Summary of Findings
Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare

How They Might Where They Might When They Might
Trend Who Will Fight Fight Fight Fight Why They Might Fight
U.S. United States Airpower and special Overconfidence in

polarization operations forces rather the military combined
and than conventional with distrust of other
retrenchment ground forces tools of national
power
China’s rise China and its High-end conflict but Taiwan, South China If China’s economy Domestic pressure;
immediate neighbors also measures short of Sea, Senkaku Islands slows; potentially expanding strategic
war as Xi’s tenure periphery
comes to a close
Asia’s More new partners More maritime conflicts Nationalism; fear of

reassessment and allies (air-sea cooperation) rising China
(e.g., Vietnam/India);
less others
(e.g., the Philippines)
A revanchist Russia and its High-end threat but Russia’s near abroad Combination of
Russia neighbors also measures short of (but with second-order Russian insecurity and
war effects for Asia and the desire for a greater
Middle East) sphere of influence
Upheaval in More Poland and Eastern Europe (in Counterterrorism;

Europe France; less Germany; response to Russian response to Russian
more-restrained UK aggression) aggression
Turmoil in the Terrorist groups, Arab Sustained low- Middle East, North Now ongoing Counterterrorism /
Islamic world States, Iran, Israel level conflict/ Africa, Central Asia alliance entrapment
counterterrorism
Conclusions 85
half will likely continue for the next decade and could prompt additional
involvement.
Taken together, these trends suggest three overarching implications
for the USAF specifically and for the U.S. defense strategy more broadly.
First, this analysis validates many of the underlying assumptions in the
U.S. National Defense Strategy. Great-power competition—specifically
with China and Russia—will increasingly define the geopolitical land-
scape looking forward to 2030.1 That said, the United States also will
need to worry about the other problems posed by Iran, North Korea,
and terrorism.2 As the National Defense Strategy implies, the chances of
high-end war could increase in the future as the U.S. military advantage
shrinks; on the other hand, U.S. adversaries also prefer to achieve their
aims short of armed conflict if possible.3 Finally, as the National Defense
Strategy indicates, the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East will prob-
ably remain areas where the United States will need to deter aggression.4
Second, and on a perhaps deeper level, U.S. alliances will slowly
and subtly change. As Asia reassesses its strategic position in response
to the rise of China and as Europe combats its own internal challenges,
there will be new strategic openings—such as those with Vietnam or
India. In other cases, old allies—such as the Philippines—will try to
hedge. In still other cases, current allies—such as many of the European
partners—will remain firmly pro-American but might lose the will to
fight much beyond their own immediate interests. In sum, although it
remains unlikely that any one country will terminate its security rela-
tionship with the United States, the United States will almost certainly
go to war with a very different set of coalition partners in the next war
than it has over the past several decades.
Taken together, these geopolitical trends suggest that the United
States will face a deepening strategic dilemma regarding how to invest
its limited strategic resources in the coming years. Few of the trends

examined here are in the United States’ favor; as already noted, there
are multiple potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the
Middle East that could involve the United States. And this is not
an exhaustive list: There are other potential black swans not exam-
ined here—such as a conflict in Latin America or Africa—that could
drive U.S. force commitments. Even if these conflicts do not occur,
the United States might be increasingly pressed to extend a credible
conventional deterrent to its allies around the globe while avoiding
potentially destabilizing vertical or horizontal escalation, particularly
if China continues to grow at its current rate.
There is no obvious way to prioritize potential conflicts. A war
in the Indo-Pacific with China—the only power that could rival U.S.
military capability in 2030—is probably the most dangerous scenario
that the United States faces. But it is most likely that the next conflict
will be in the Middle East, given that the United States is fighting there
currently and the causes of that conflict are unlikely to be resolved any
time soon. Ideally, the USAF and the joint force would receive clear,
sustained direction from the political leadership about where to place
its limited resources, but the polarization of the U.S. electorate sug-
gests that such definitive guidance will not be forthcoming. As a result,
defense strategists could find themselves mired in a deepening strate-
gic quandary—with growing threats, limited resources, and little clear
guidance about when and where to accept risk.
To be clear, this is not a harbinger of the inevitability of war in
2030. As mentioned in the introduction, war in general has been on
the decline when viewed in the grand sweep of history. These trends
notwithstanding, there are many reasons—nuclear weapons, trade,
and international institutions, to name a few—to believe that great-
power conflict will remain a rare occurrence. Nonetheless, if “war is
the continuation of politics by other means,” as von Clausewitz postu-
lated, then the geopolitical trends do point to darker times ahead.
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C
arl von Clausewitz famously argued that “war is the continuation of
politics by other means,” and that aphorism remains as true in the
21st century as it was in the 19th: "e future of warfare wi# depend
on geopolitics. In this volume of the Future of Warfare series, RAND
researchers examined six trends—U.S. polarization and retrenchment,
China’s rise, Asia’s reassessment, the emergence of a revanchist
Russia, upheaval in Europe, and turmoil in the Islamic world—to determine
the drivers of conflict between now and 2030. Drawing on official strategy
statements, secondary sources, and an extensive set of interviews across eight
countries, this report explains how each of these trends has shaped conflict in
the past and wi# likely continue to do so over the next decade. Together, these
six trends point to three overarching findings. First, many of the underlying
geopolitical assumptions in the U.S. National Defense Strategy for 2018—about
the centrality of great-power competition and likelihood of aggression in the
Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East—are correct. Second, although U.S.
adversaries wi# likely remain relatively stable over the next decade, U.S. a#ies
wi# likely change, especia#y as Europe becomes increasingly preoccupied
with its own problems and as Asia reacts to the rise of China. Fina#y, and most
importantly, U.S. strategists wi# face a deepening series of strategic dilemmas
as the possibility of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East pu#
limited U.S. resources in diff erent directions.
PROJECT A IR FORCE
$21.50
ISBN-10 1-9774-0296-8
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-0296-7
52150
9 781977 402967
RR-2849/2-AF

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What are the six geopolitical trends examined in the report?

What are the six geopolitical trends examined in the report?

What are the three overarching findings of the report?

What are the three overarching findings of the report?

T HE F U T UR E O F W A R F A R E

RAPHAEL S. COHEN, EUGENIU HAN, AND ASHLEY L. RHOADES

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

Cover: derrrek/Getty Images

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public

• Raphael S. Cohen et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project

This volume examines six geopolitical trends by asking four key

RAND Project AIR FORCE

RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corpo-

Carl von Clausewitz famously argued that “war is the continuation

Geopolitical Trends and the Future of Warfare

U.S. United States Airpower and special Overconfidence in

Asia’s More new partners More maritime conflicts Nationalism; fear of

Upheaval in More Poland and Eastern Europe (in Counterterrorism;

domestic pressure at home and as China’s strategic periphery expands

National Defense Strategy2 —about the centrality of great-power com-

for Eastern Studies; Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya; University of

Global Political Trends

Carl von Clausewitz famously argued that “war is the continuation of

Consequently, after briefly explaining this report’s methodology,

Trend Selection and Methodology

to play—in shaping global affairs, these countries deserve individual

4 Department of Defense, 2018, p. 1.

Trend 1: U.S. Polarization and Retrenchment

In the spring of 1948, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign

Context: U.S. Centrality in Geopolitics

Historical Trend: Increasing U.S. Polarization of Foreign

tial conventions) displayed “greater faith in the capacity of the mass of

To be sure, partisan politics did not always stop at the water’s

7 Herbert McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” American Political

NOTES: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions.

Democrats on this issue, compared with the 47-percent gap today.19

19 In 2012, 42 percent of Republicans, 22 percent of independents, and 10 percent of Demo-

At the same time, Americans are increasingly divided about

Future Projection: Gridlock, Disillusionment, and

Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that the growing polar-

likely to support “a more restrained grand strategy.”29 Moreover, as the

Implications for the U.S. Air Force and the Future of

America’s growing polarization, disillusionment, and isolationism will

and, given that the military as an institution remains popular, there

Trend 2: China’s Rise

Context: China’s Priorities Include Growing Military

According to its diplomatic statements, China’s security interests are

ping Attends PLA Delegation Plenary Meeting” [“Ґ䘁ᒣࠪᑝ䀓᭮ߋԓ㺘ഒ‫ޘ‬փՊ䇞”],

Historical Trend: Not So Peaceful

Despite China’s official emphasis on “peaceful development,”9 modern

the communist revolution was losing momentum and needed external

21 Fravel, 2008, p. 62.

27 Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development,

if Taipei authorities “refuse . . . the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits

solidate domestic objectives. Consequently, a far stronger China might

Future Projection: Increasing Domestic Pressure;

By 2030, China could become increasingly willing to use force. Domes-