1 Valerie Anne Lopez

P.O. Box 291133

2 Phelan, California [92329]

3 619-343-9729

8 Superior Court of the State of California

9 For the County of Orange

Central Justice Center
10

11

12 Oak Tree Investments, Inc. ) Case No. 30-2015-00806367

)
Plaintiff, )
13
)
vs. ) MOTION TO BE RESTORED TO POSSESSION
14
) OF PREMISES
Valerie A. Lopez, )
15
) (Code of Civil Procedure § 916 and Code of
Defendants. ) Civil Procedure §908)
16 )
) DATE:
17 ) TIME:
) DEPT:
18 )
)
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22

23
TO Oak Tree Investments, Inc. AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
24

25 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Valerie A. Lopez hereby moves pursuant to Code of Civil

26 Procedure § 916 and Code of Civil Procedure §908. Once a judgment is reversed, the Appellant is
27

28

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1 entitled to restitution of possession for enforcement of mandate. The hearing will be conducted at

2 ______________am/pm on _________________, 2020 in Dept________.

3
This motion is based on the declaration of Valerie A. Lopez, Judicial Notice, the supporting
4
memorandum served and filed with this motion, the records and file in this matter, and supplemental
5
declarations and memoranda that may be filed subsequently in this matter, and on such further oral
6

7 and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing of this motion. The parties will be

8 referred to by their designations in the unlawful detainer action.

9
Judgment was issued to Plaintiff in error on October 23, 2015. Defendant filed Appeal on
10
November 23, 2015. Valerie Lopez was forcibly evicted from her home in “error” on December 30,
11
2015 and made homeless with six pets.
12

13 Similar to Supreme Court case Black v. Knight (1917), 176 Cal. 722, the Plaintiff decided to

14 risk "making themselves liable for the damages resulting from this deprival of possession, in the
15
event of a reversal of the judgment."
16
The Appellate Court reversed the judgement on February 21, 2018 because the judge erred in
17
granting the summary judgment. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
18

19 The trial court was ordered to issue an order vacating the summary judgment and costs awarded in

20 relation to the summary judgment and to set a trial date.

21 The trial court reversed the judgment on May 24, 2018 and set the trial for June 2018.
22
On May 29, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the action with the clerk, pursuant to
23
Section 581 of the Code of Civil Procedure and a request to dismiss and a dismissal was entered in
24

25 the register of actions.

26 The defendant now files a motion to be restored to possession of the premises basing her
27 request on the reversal of the judgment and on basis that Plaintiff never held title, right of possession
28

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1 or ownership pursuant to Civ. Code Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) and Section 2888 states that the deed of

2 trust is just a lien that “transfers no title to the property.” This statute was enacted in 1872 so it has
3
been California’s law for a long time and definitely applies to every residential loan made this
4
century.
5
The trial court can invoke and exercise the power to enforce the defendant’s right to
6

7 restoration because the defendant lost possession through compulsion as by forcible eviction under

8 execution process. [30 Cal. 2d 791].

9
If you dispute Defendant’s claim for possession of property, you may state your reasons at
10
the hearing.
11

12

13 Dated________________ _______________________________________________
Valerie Anne Lopez
14

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17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

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1

3
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
4
I. INTRODUCTION
5
Defendant contends that the court should grant this motion for possession of
6

7 restitution on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Plaintiff's

8 burden of proof on the issue that the Plaintiff and its officers of Oaktree Investments Inc. lacked
9
standing to sue and never stated a valid cause of action for the unlawful detainer case :
10
1.) On August 25, 2015, the plaintiffs procured from Clear Recon Corp. a purchase of an “unproven”
11
lien stated clearly on the Notice of Trustee’s Sale filed in County of Orange Land records
12

13 2015000379632 on 7/22/2015.

14 NOTICE TO POTENTIAL BIDDERS: If you are considering bidding on this property lien, you should

15 understand that there are risks involved in bidding at a trustee auction. You will be bidding on a lien not on the

16 property itself. Placing the highest bid at a trustee at a trustee sale does not automatically entitle you to free and

17 clear ownership of the property. California’s lienholder law drives the result of Civ. Code Section

18 2924f(b)(8)(A). “Notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, a lien, or a contract for a lien, transfers no title

19 to the property subject to the lien.” CA Civ. Section 2888. Regardless the terms of the deed of trust, Section

20 2888 states that the deed of trust is just a lien that “transfers no title to the property.” This statute was enacted in

21 1872 so it has been California’s law for a long time and definitely applies to every residential loan made this

22 century.

23 2.) Judgment was issued to Plaintiff in error on October 23, 2015.

24 3.) Defendant filed Appeal on November 23, 2015. Valerie Lopez was forcibly evicted from her home in “error” on

25 December 30, 2015 and made homeless with six pets.

26 4.) On 12/31/2015, Doan-Tran Thi Dang (“Dang”), Officer of Oaktree Investments, Inc. told Defendant that Dang

27 did not want Plaintiff’s home. Dang wanted only the funds which she gave to the interloper Trustee Clear Recon Corp. on

28 8/18/2015.

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1 5.) On 1/10/2016, Defendant obtained an appraisal by Lamarr Curtis Banks 714-292-5363 and Defendant was able to

2 secure funds to pay Defendant required amount paid to interloper Trustee Clear Recon Corp. When Defendant notified

3 Dang of success in securing a lender to give Dang amount given to interloper Trustee Clear Recon Corp. , Dang

4 demanded Defendant pay Dang an additional $30,000 over and above the amount which Dang gave to interloper Trustee

5 Clear Recon. Dang explained the $30,000 was to be given to Dang’s attorney Steve Silverstein.

6 6.) The lender for defendant declined Dang’s threat due to the extensive fraud on the court executed by Dang, her

7 husband Hao Pham both officers of Oak Tree Investments, Inc. , Steve Silverstein attorney of Plaintiff and the court who

8 lacked jurisdiction. The court lacked jurisdiction due to Judge Stafford and Supervising Judge for Unlawful Detainer

9 Courts both receiving illegal payments from County of Orange. Payments deemed illegal by California Constitution

10 Article 6 Sections 19 and 17, Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E2 and 3E1, 18 U.S.C. 1346 Intangible Right To Honest

11 Services and Constitution of the United States of America Article 6 Clause 2 – Judge Stafford and Judge Moss are

12 required to follow federal law. Most important, everyone including Plaintiff, Clear Recon Corp. Plaintiff’s attorney,

13 Stewart Title Company knew the documents filed in the public land records were VOID – a Deed of Trust cannot be valid

14 if it presents a lender which never existed or was never licensed in California. Defendant’s lender obtained on January 10,

15 2016 was not going to aid and abet in the publicly display of extortion and embezzlement against Defendant.

16 7.) Similar to Supreme Court case Black v. Knight (1917), 176 Cal. 722, the Plaintiff decided to risk "making themselves

17 liable for the damages resulting from this deprival of possession, in the event of a reversal of the judgment."

18 8.) The Appellate Court reversed the judgement on February 21, 2018 because the judge erred in granting the summary

19 judgment. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court was ordered to issue an order

20 vacating the summary judgment and costs awarded in relation to the summary judgment and to set a trial date. An order,

21 following the reversal of a judgment and remanding for new trial, would be reviewable on appeal from a final judgment

22 on retrial. (In re King, 48 Cal. App. 739 [192 P. 453]. But compare [30 Cal. 2d 789] Pico v. Cuyas, 48 Cal. 639; Bank of

23 America v. McLaughlin, 37 Cal. App. 2d 415 [99 P.2d 548]; First-Trust etc. Bank v. Meredith, 19 Cal. App. 2d 103, 105

24 [64 P.2d 977]; Hansen v. d'Artenay, 13 Cal. App. 2d 293 [57 P.2d 202],

25 9.) The trial court reversed the judgment on May 24, 2018 and set the trial for June 18, 2018.

26 10.) On May 29, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the action with the clerk, pursuant to Section 581 of the Code of

27 Civil Procedure and a request to dismiss and a dismissal was entered in the register of actions.

28

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1 11.) The defendant now files a motion to be restored to possession of the premises basing her request on the reversal of

2 the judgment and on basis that Plaintiff never held title, right of possession or ownership pursuant to Civ. Code Section

3 2924f(b)(8)(A) and CA Civ. Section 2888 states that the deed of trust is just a lien that “transfers no title to the property.”

4 This statute was enacted in 1872 so it has been California’s law for a long time and definitely applies to every residential

5 loan made this century.

6 12.) The trial court can invoke and exercise the power to enforce the defendant’s right to restoration because the

7 defendant lost possession through compulsion as by forcible eviction under execution process. [30 Cal. 2d 791].

8 13.) Richards v. Bradley, 129 Cal.670 [62 P. 316] indicates reversal of a judgment the parties are restored to their original

9 rights, including the right of the plaintiff to dismiss the action pursuant to section 581, subdivision 1, Code of Civil

10 Procedure, if its exercise would not interfere with the right of the defendant to any appropriate affirmative relief; also that

11 the right to dismiss pursuant to that section may be exercised with the same affect either by request filed with the clerk or

12 by motion addressed to the court (See, also, McDonald v. California Timber Co., 2 Cal. App. 165, 166 [83 P. 172]; cf

13 Huntington Park Co. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 692 [121 P. 701].) The subsequent filing of a cross-complaint or

14 answer requesting affirmative relief will not defeat the right (Hinkel v. Donohue, 90 Cal. 389 [27 P. 301]), nor will the

15 right be impaired or lost by the refusal of the clerk to perform his duty (Kaufman v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. 152 [46 P.

16 904]).

17 14.) The power of the appellate courts to restore benefits lost pursuant to a judgment modified or reversed exists by virtue

18 of sections 957 and 988f of the Code of Civil Procedure. [3] But the power of a court whose order or judgment has been

19 reversed to order restoration after reversal is inherent in that court. (Reynolds v. Harris, 14 Cal. 667, 680-681 [76

20 Am.Dec. 459]; Polack v. Shafer, 46 Cal. 270, 276; Hewitt v. Dean, 91 Cal. 617, 620 [28 P. 93, 27 Am.St.Rep. 227];

21 Heydenfeldt v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 348 [49 P. 210]; Kenney v. Parks, 120 Cal. 22, 24 [52 P. 40]; Levy v. Drew, 4

22 Cal.2d 456, 459 [50 P.2d 435, 101 A.L.R. 1144]; Oldfield v. Bank of America etc. Assn., 6 Cal.2d 103, 107, 112 [56 P.2d

23 1235]; Hansen v. d'Artenay, supra, 13 Cal.App.2d 293, 297; Bank of America v. McLaughlin, supra, 37 Cal.App.2d 415,

24 417; see, also, cases collected in Seavey and Scott's Notes to Restatement of the Law of Restitution, p. 84.) Thus, that

25 power of the court and the right of the party prevailing on the appeal to have it exercised exist independently of the

26 request for its exercise. [4] Therefore, the plaintiffs' requested dismissal, if otherwise proper pursuant to section 581,

27 subdivision 1, Code of Civil Procedure, would not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to grant the appropriate relief to

28 which the defendant is entitled after reversal of its judgment in the unlawful detainer action. In other words, while the

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1 plaintiff has the right to dismiss the action before trial, where no counterclaim or request for affirmative relief has been

2 filed, that right, after a trial and reversal of the judgment, [30 Cal.2d 790] is subject to the right of the defendant to

3 restoration of benefits lost by virtue of the erroneous judgment. The court has inherent power to enforce that right,

4 unaffected by the right of the plaintiff to dismiss the action. The existence of the power to restore benefits after reversal

5 flows from the rule that upon reversal the action is as though it had never been tried, and the court will, where justice

6 requires it, place the parties as nearly as may be in the condition in which they stood previously. (Cowdery v. London etc.

7 Bank, 139 Cal. 298, 304-305 [73 P. 196, 96 Am.St.Rep. 115].)

8 15.) While the rule again opens up the plaintiffs' opportunity to dismiss, it is likewise applicable to prevent the dismissal

9 from depriving the defendant of any relief to which she may be entitled by virtue of the reversal. Its application has been

10 so limited to guard a defendant's right to statutory costs. (Hopkins v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. 552 [69 P. 299]; Matson v.

11 Fortuna High School Dist., 54 Cal. App. 586 [202 P. 167]; Spinks v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 793 [148 P. 798].) A

12 similar result should obtain in the present case, wherein a dismissal by the plaintiff may not be deemed to divest

13 the court of jurisdiction to enforce upon reversal the defendant's right to restoration of benefits lost pursuant to

14 the erroneous judgment. The trial court is to correctly view the continuance of its jurisdiction for the purpose of

15 considering the defendant's right to restoration. The trial court is proper to grant this motion of restitution and invoke

16 because the defendant had lost possession through compulsion, as by forcible eviction under execution process.

17 16.) The question is whether, as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to determine the merits of the defendant's motion

18 for restoration, there must have been a forcible ouster pursuant to execution process. [30 Cal. 2d 791]. In this case,

19 Defendant was removed from her home forcibly by parties who held no interest, ownership or right of possession, but

20 only by virtue of an erroneous judgment.[30 Cal. 2d 791] and pursuant to Civ. Code Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) and CA Civ.

21 Section 2888 states that the deed of trust is just a lien that “transfers no title to the property.” This statute was enacted in

22 1872 so it has been California’s law for a long time and definitely applies to every residential loan made this century.

23 17. ) In Bank of America v. McLaughlin, supra, (37 Cal. App. 2d 415, at 417), it was indicated that "a party is ordinarily

24 entitled to restitution after a reversal of a judgment if he has been deprived of property by virtue of said judgment or by

25 virtue of process issued upon said judgment." The rule is stated as follows in Restatement of the Law of Restitution,

26 section 74: "A person who has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment, or whose property has

27 been taken thereunder, is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside, unless restitution would be

28 inequitable or the parties contract that payment is to be final; if the judgment is modified, there is a right to restitution of

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1 the excess." Under comment b., the rule is stated to be applicable although no execution was issued and although a stay of

2 execution was obtainable; the statement being added that coercion exists only in the sense that performance was a legal

3 duty at the time. Cases in support of the rule and the statement of its application are collected in Seavey and Scott's Notes

4 to Restatement of the Law of Restitution at page 86. In this state, in Ashton v. Heydenfeldt, 124 Cal. 14, 17 [56 P. 624], it

5 was recognized that delivery of personal property by executors pursuant to a decree of distribution was not a voluntary or

6 gratuitous act which would preclude their right to restitution when the decree was reversed. In Ward v. Sherman, 155 Cal.

7 287, 291 [100 P. 864], the rule was also recognized and, though the balancing of accounts showed nothing due, must be

8 deemed to have been applied where possession of real and personal property had been relinquished pursuant to a

9 judgment subsequently reversed, without any showing that the relinquishment was pursuant to execution process. In Fritz

10 v. Mills, 170 Cal. 449, 455 [150 [30 Cal. 2d 792] P. 375], the court expressed the opinion that the plaintiff's payment

11 pursuant to judgment, without more, was not voluntary and that it would be inequitable for the defendant after reversal on

12 appeal to profit by the payment which the plaintiff was, otherwise than by the judgment, under no obligation to make. In

13 similar vein are the case of Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 131 Cal. 639 [63 P. 1017, 82 Am.St.Rep. 400]; Mortgage

14 Securities Co. v. Pfaffman, 47 Cal. App. 383 [190 P. 641]; and Erickson v. Boothe, 79 Cal. App. 2d 266 [179 P.2d 611],

15 holding that payment of money pursuant to decree, or surrender of possession of property pursuant to an adjudication of

16 unlawful possession, although no execution issued, are not voluntary acts depriving the parties of rights relative to appeal

17 or for restoration upon reversal of the judgment. The fact that in some cases benefits had been lost under the erroneous

18 judgment pursuant to execution process, does not render futile the exercise of the power in cases where the only coercion

19 was that of a judgment declaring the parties' rights and duties.

20 18.) Referring to Appellate Court Transcripts Vol. and 2: The Court in Erickson v Bohne (1955) 130 Cal .App.2d 553

21 held at page 556: "And in Corpus Juris Secundum, page 307 and 308 it stated: "A void deed passes no title and cannot be

22 Made the foundation of a good title even under the equitable of doctrine of bona fide purchase. In the recent 2012 case of

23 La Jolla Group v. Bruce (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 461 the Court held at head note 11 on page 477: "[11 ] ....Although the

24 law protects innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, 'that protection extends only to those who obtained good legal

25 title.... [A] forged document is void ab initio and constitutes a nullity. In closing Good Title Cannot be Based on Fraud,

26 even as to a BFP. (Bona Fide Purchaser). Defendant warned the Plaintiff on 8/15/2015 about validated title issues

27 (transcript 398-402). Respondent chose to participate in unlawful auction to purchase an unproven lien regardless of the

28 warning ( court transcript 515-518).

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1 19.) Referring to Appellate Court Transcripts Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 : On (VOL -1- CT -33) - Defendant brought to

2 Plaintiff’s attention (court transcript 515-518) and to the appellate court’s attention that Defendant’s Deed of Trust was

3 VOID due to a nonexistent Lender. AMERICA’S WHOLESALE LENDER. In Defendant’s Deed of Trust (VOL 2 – CT -

4 301) shows under its Definition (C) AMERICA’S WHOLESALE is the LENDER a Corporation organized under New

5 York law. The Deed of Trust was created on October 26, 2005. This was a misrepresentation of a material fact, because

6 Defendant checked with the Secretary of the State of New York and discovered that AMERICA’S WHOLESALE

7 LENDER did not come into existence until December 16, 2008. See (VOL-2 – CT – 324). Defendant then checked with

8 the Secretary of the State of California and Franchise Tax Board and discovered that AMERICA’S WHOLESALE

9 LENDER never registered to conduct any business in California. (Vol 2 Transcript 379) (Misrepresenting a DBA as a

10 Corporation is prohibited CA Business & Professional Code 17900B3). Defendant did find a Nevada Corporation named

11 AMERICA’S WHOLESALE LENDER, but it did not come into existence until November 9, 2011. Vol 2 (CT 323). Any

12 attempt to Assign or Transfer any rights, title and interest in Defendant’s property would be VOID. Appellant further

13 brought this issue to the appellate court’s attention in (VOL -1 – CT 279) starting a Line 23 starting again on CT- 280 to

14 281 ending at line 14). My home was involved with a sophisticated patent process of mortgages in trademarks unrelated

15 to UCC3 which was never disclosed to Defendant and affirmed by the US Patent and Trademark office- a

16 misrepresentation of fraud (CT 280 Line 9-10) (CT332-337) BofA had me believe it was investigating this undisclosed

17 trademark process for a final commerce resolution. BofA refused to respond to demand from Defendant pursuant to

18 uniform commercial code – California Commercial Code Section 3-501(b)(2) which states that the person making a

19 presentment must upon Defendant’s demand give reasonable identification, and if presentment is made on behalf of

20 another person, provide reasonable evidence of authority to do so. In other words, BofA was required to identify itself,

21 prove its right to enforce a note which shows a nonexistent lender America’s Wholesale Lender or else its authority to act

22 on behalf of someone else who has that right. If BofA claimed to be the servant to the alleged owner of the note,

23 Defendant is entitled to see proof that the company that BofA identities as the owner of the note really has that status

24 under Uniform Commercial Code. BofA and Residential Credit Solutions, Inc.( predecessor to BofA), was required to

25 prove that it is doing that alleged Note owner’s bidding regarding Defendant’s note and show how BofA and Residential

26 Credit Solutions can execute a VOID contract that does not meet the four corners of a Congressional Mandate document

27 due to not disclosing the sophisticated patent and trademark leasing contract and inserting the name AMERICA”S

28 WHOLESALE LENDER - the lender that never existed. The demanded accounting would have disclosed that Defendant

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1 was never a debtor but a creditor. Defendant made the accounting demands under Uniform Commercial Codes Sect 3-

2 501(b)(2) and Section 3-602(b) on June 30, 2011 to BofA. Until Defendant received all the accounting information and

3 power attorney documentation from BofA, Defendant never dishonored or breached the Note by not paying the demanded

4 money to a company that refused to cooperate with mandates of Uniform Commercial Codes and a company making a

5 demand on a Note that shows a nonexistent lender. The law does not require Defendant to pay money to a company that

6 makes demands and refuses to or cannot, prove it is owed money based on a Deed of Trust and Note that reflects a

7 nonexistent company – America’s Wholesale Lender. If anything, BofA owes Defendant all monies paid on a VOID

8 contract that violated the four corners of the Congressional protected Fannie Mae document the Deed of Trust which

9 required BofA to disclose the lease agreement under the US Patent and Trademark office and fact America’s Wholesale

10 Lender was not a New York Corporation as presented to Defendant. The amount owed to Defendant by Bof A $158,000 –

11 monies paid on a VOID contract. Presentment is not effective until the presenter has reasonably satisfied all proper

12 counter demands of the person to whom presentment has been made. BofA and Residential Credit Solutions chose to

13 violate its duties under Uniform Commecial Code and show the accounting proof they had a right to enforce a note with a

14 nonexistent lender America’s Wholesale Lender, therefore the notice of delinquency or default is meritless. The Notice of

15 Trustee’s Sale was clear and warned the officers of Oaktree Investments that they were purchasing an unproven lien

16 which was in dispute pursuant to Uniform Commercial Codes Sect 3-501(b)(2) and Section 3-602(b) and the ownership,

17 title and right of possession remains with Defendant Civ. Code Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) and . Section 2888. Regardless the

18 terms of the deed of trust, Section 2888 states that the deed of trust is just a lien that “transfers no title to the property.”

19 The Court in Trout v Taylor (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at page 656 made that plain long ago holding: “Numerous authorities

20 have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in

21 blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.133.

22 20.) Appellate Court Transcript ( Pages 478-506), State of California Los Angeles Court

23 Handwriting Expert and Document Examiner, Investigator Russell Bradford examined the
24
Verification of Complaint and confirmed that Doan-Tran Thi Dang officer of Oaktree Investment Inc.
25
never signed the complaint’s verification. Doan-Tran Thi Dang’s signature is a “cut and paste” which
26
is not in compliance with 1161a requirements. California Penal Code Section 470 PC: Forgery under
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28 California

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1
Penal Code Section 470 PC is a white-collar crime that involves falsifying a signature or seal or
2
counterfeiting documents as part of a fraud scheme. forgery offense can be committed in the
3

4 following ways:

5 By counterfeiting or forging another person’s handwriting or seal on a document (California Penal

6
Code Section 470(b) PC); by altering, corrupting or falsifying legal documents (wills, property
7
conveyances, court records or any other legal writing that can be used as evidence in a court of law)
8
(California Penal Code Section 470(c) PC)
9

10 21.) Appellate Court Transcript ( Pages 441-476) Court Expert Handwriting Investigator Victoria

11 Peterson and State of California Los Angeles Court Handwriting Expert and Document Examiner,
12
Investigator Russell Bradford’s Declaration and Report presented in Judicial Notice Dated May 24,
13
2016 confirmed that the Proof of Service(s) and Declaration of Zac Paszko the process server are
14
forged. Perjury is defined as the willful assertion as a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge of
15

16 a material issue, known to be wrong, in a court or by affidavit. Defendant was illegally removed from

17 her home when the Plaintiff, her attorney and the trial court were noticed the facts in the forged
18
documents. The Plaintiff prepared False Documentary Evidence, a violation of PC § 134 by forging
19
the signature of the process server, under penalty of perjury, with the intent to produce it, and to
20
allow it to be produced for a fraudulent and deceitful purposes, as genuine and true, and allowing it to
21

22 be filed with the court. The Plaintiff committed False Personation and violated PC § 539(2) when he

23 unlawfully and falsely personated the process server in a private and official capacity and in such
24 assumed the character and “verified, published, acknowledged and proved in the name” of the
25
process server, a written instrument, with the intent that the same be recorded, delivered and used as
26
true as proof of service that was to be filed. The Plaintiff committed Forgery, a violation of California
27

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Penal Code (PC) 470(d), by its willfully and unlawfully making, altering, forging, counterfeiting, and

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1 signing the name of another, namely the process server, and did utter, publish, pass, and attempt to

2 pass as true and genuine the document, knowing that the document was false.
3

4
22.) Doan- Tran Thi Dang and Hao Pham are not a Bona Fide Buyer. Consequently, the corporate
5
veil can be pierced and hold them personally liable. Regardless of the appeal, Plaintiff officer Doan-
6

7 Tran Thi Dang destroyed the restored historical home and then sold Defendant’s home to an attorney

8 John Leldon Gray who is Dang’s client. Neither John Leldon Gray nor Plaintiff are bona fide
9
buyers. Depriving Defendant of her home and business is wrong and must be made right or the
10
County of Orange will be liable for further monetary liabilities under jurisdiction of Federal
11
Arbitration for allowing the abuse.
12

13 California courts can pierce the corporate veil when both of the following two requirements are met:

14 Unity of Interests – The shareholders in question have treated the corporation as their “alter ego,”
15
rather than as a separate entity; and Inequitable Result – Upholding the corporate entity and allowing
16
for the shareholders to dodge personal liability for its debts would “sanction a fraud or promote an
17
injustice.” Automotriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick (1957). In California, courts apply a factor-
18

19 by-factor test to determine whether “alter-ego” liability is appropriate. These factors are laid out in

20 the case of Associated Vendors Inc. v. Oakland Meat Packing, Co. (1962).
21 Did the individual Defendant(s) act in bad faith?
22 Did the individuals contract with another with the intent to avoid performance by using a corporate entity as a

23 shield against personal liability?

24 Did the individuals divert assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity to the

25 detriment of creditors?

26 Domination of the corporation by a few key individuals?

27 Did the individuals and corporation use the same office or business location?

28 Did the individuals and the corporation employ the same attorney?

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1 Did the individuals use the entity to procure labor, services and merchandise for another person or entity?

2 Did the individuals fail to adequately capitalize the corporation?

3 Did the individuals fail to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records?

4 Will there be an inequitable result if the court fails to pierce?

5 The burden of establishing alter-ego liability is on the defendant in an arbitration. Absent factors

6 supporting individual liability, courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil because “alter-ego
7
liability is fundamentally at odds with the general rule that dejure (ie. as a matter of law) corporation
8
is a legal entity separate from its founders and owners; and the law specifically permits owners to
9
incorporate a business for the very purpose of shielding them from its liabilities.” Las Palmas
10

11 Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates; Rutter Guide. However, California courts have

12 “followed a liberal policy of applying the alter-ego doctrine where the equities and justice of the
13
situation appear to call for it.” First Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Bookasta (1968). In practice, the
14
alter-ego doctrine is usually applied “where there are only a few shareholders and they have not
15
respected their corporation’s separate identity.” When evaluating alter-ego liability, courts do not
16

17 make a distinction between forms of corporations, and the doctrine applies equally to non-profit

18 corporations and for-profit corporations. Case References: Associated Vendors Inc. v. Oakland Meat
19
Packing, Co. (1962); Automotiz del Golfo de California v. Resnick; Las Palmas Associates v. Las
20
Palmas Center Associates; First Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Bookasta.
21
The Plaintiffs knew they were harming Defendant. On August 21, 2015, Doan-Tran Thi Dang
22

23 officer of Oaktree Investments Inc. called Defendant’s attorney Charles Marshall and requested Mr.

24 Marshall to assist Dang to get her funds back from interloper trustee Clear Recon Corp. Dang
25 discussed with Marshall VOID deed of trust which inserted a non-existent company America’s
26
Wholesale Lender. When Marshall asked Dang why she chose to participate in a wrongful
27
foreclosure Dang had no response. Dang on behalf of her corporation owned with her husband Hao
28

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1 Pham chose to knowingly open a fraud eviction case. Then, chose to illegally liquidate Defendant’s

2 home and ruin the 100-year-old restored home of Defendant – 158 North Center Street Orange
3
California [92866].
4
23.) SCOCAL, Schubert v. Bates , 30 Cal.2d 785 available at:
5
(https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/schubert-v-bates-26062) [L. A. No. 20018. In Bank. Oct. 24,
6

7 1947.] EDWARD F. SCHUBERT et al., Appellants, v. LUCILLE BATES et al., Respondents.

8 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Edward T. Bishop, Hartley
9
Shaw and Clarence L. Kincaid, Judges. Affirmed.
10
Proceeding in certiorari to review municipal court's action in issuing an order of restitution in an
11
unlawful detainer action. Judgment denying petition affirmed.
12

13 24.) Defendant now moves pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 916. Once a judgment is reversed,

14 the Appellant is entitled to restitution of possession for enforcement of mandate

15
25.) . It is clear here that the fact respondent and County of Orange Sheriff had filed a satisfaction of
16
judgment/possession does not terminate the Appellant’s right to appeal absent a compromise or an
17
agreement not to pursue its appellate rights. No such compromise or agreement exists in this case. In
18

19 Rogers v. Bill and Vince’s, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 322, 324, 33 Cal. Rptr. 129, 131 (1963), the court

20 stated:
21 It is still law that restitution after removal us not governed exclusively by statute Code
22
of Civ. Proc. §§ 957, 988(f), and that the trial court has inherent power to afford such
23
relief which is normally is the right of the party who secured the reversal. (Schubert v.
24

25 Bates, 30 Cal. 2d 785, 789, 185, 793). From this it follows that the motion is addressed

26 to the sound legal discretion of the court (Schubert v. Bates, supra, 30 Cal. 2d at Page
27 79, 185 P.2d at page 796.
28

- 14 -
1 26.) Holmes v. Williams, 127 Cal. App. 2d 377, 379, 273 P. 2d 931 “ To permit one has collected

2 money upon a judgment after a judgment later is reversed to retain the same would be in most cases
3
result in enrichment.
4
II.
5
LEGAL ARGUMENT
6

7 A. THIS COURT HAS THE POWER TO GRANT THIS MOTION TO BE

RESTORED TO POSSESSION OF PREMISES PURSUANT TO CODE OF
8 CIVIL PROCEDURE §916
9

10 Code of Civil Procedure § 916 states that,

11 “(a) Once a judgment is reversed, the appellant is entitled to restitution, which would include
12
restoration of possession of her home whereby she was removed forcibly by parties who never had
13
right of possession, title or ownership. This requires a Noticed Motion to enforce the mandate.
14
(b) The plaintiffs' requested dismissal dated May 29, 2018, if otherwise proper pursuant to
15

16 section 581, subdivision 1, Code of Civil Procedure, would not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction

17 to grant the appropriate relief to which the defendant is entitled after reversal of its judgment in the
18
unlawful detainer action. In other words, while the plaintiff has the right to dismiss the action before
19
trial, where no counterclaim or request for affirmative relief has been filed, that right, after a trial and
20
reversal of the judgment, [30 Cal.2d 790] is subject to the right of the defendant to restoration of
21

22 benefits lost by virtue of the erroneous judgment.

23 (c ) The court has inherent power to enforce that right of restoration of benefits, unaffected by
24 the right of the plaintiff to dismiss the action. The existence of the power to restore benefits after
25
reversal flows from the rule that upon reversal the action is as though it had never been tried, and the
26
court will, where justice requires it, place the parties as nearly as may be in the condition in which
27

28

- 15 -
1 they stood previously. (Cowdery v. London etc. Bank, 139 Cal. 298, 304-305 [73 P. 196, 96

2 Am.St.Rep. 115].)
3
(d) While the rule again opens up the plaintiffs' opportunity to dismiss, it is likewise
4
applicable to prevent the dismissal from depriving the defendant of any relief to which she may be
5
entitled by virtue of the reversal. Its application has been so limited to guard a defendant's right to
6

7 statutory costs. (Hopkins v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. 552 [69 P. 299]; Matson v. Fortuna High School

8 Dist., 54 Cal.App. 586 [202 P. 167]; Spinks v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.App. 793 [148 P. 798].)
9
(e) If the motion is granted, unless the court in its order for judgment otherwise specifies, such
10
judgment operates as an adjudication upon the merits. The Plaintiff made the adjudication clear when
11
Plaintiff dismissed the case on May 29, 2018.
12

13 Thus this court has the power to grant this motion for judgment and should do so on

14 the grounds that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Plaintiff's burden of proof on the issue that the
15
Plaintiff lacked standing to sue, never stated a valid cause of action for the unlawful detainer.
16
Plaintiff’s never held right of possession, ownership or title pursuant to 2924f(b)(8)(A).
17
“Notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, a lien, or a contract for a lien, transfers no title
18

19 to the property subject to the lien.” CA Civ. Section 2888 and the court never held subject matter

20 jurisdiction due to the illegal payments which Judge Stafford and Judge Moss is receiving from the
21 County of Orange pursuant to the California Constitution Article 6 Sections 19 and 17, Code of
22
Judicial Ethics Canon 3E2 and 3E1, 18 U.S.C. 1346 Intangible Right To Honest Services and
23
Constitution of the United States of America Article 6 Clause 2 – Judge Stafford and Judge Moss are
24

25 required to follow federal law

26 Based on the plain language Code of Civil Procedure § 908, it is clear that if the judgment is
27 reversed appellant would be entitled to restitution of the sum previously paid by it to respondent.
28

- 16 -
1 B. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF CLEARLY SHOWS A

2 LACK OF STANDING TO SUE THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THIS MOTION FOR
3
JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
4
SUSTAIN PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN OF PROOF
5
As plaintiff cannot show standing to sue pursuant to 2924f(b)(8)(A) “Notwithstanding an
6

7 agreement to the contrary, a lien, or a contract for a lien, transfers no title to the property subject to

8 the lien.” CA Civ. Section 2888, this Motion to be Restored to Possession should be granted.
9
Both Judge Stafford and Supervising Judge of Unlawful Detainer courts lacked personal and
10
subject matter jurisdiction due to their illegal acceptance of illegal payments from the County of
11
Orange a violation pursuant to the California Constitution Article 6 Sections 19 and 17, Code of
12

13 Judicial Ethics Canon 3E2 and 3E1, 18 U.S.C. 1346 Intangible Right To Honest Services and

14 Constitution of the United States of America Article 6 Clause 2 – Judge Stafford and Judge Moss are
15
required to follow federal law and had a duty to disclose the conflict of interest. The County of
16
Orange and its varied agencies are profiting from the foreclosures and including the Certificate
17
of Participation. Judge Stafford and Judge Moss must disclose anything that might be relevant to this\
18

19 case whether they thought it is relevant or not.

20
The California Supreme Court has held that the issue of lack of standing are not waived and
21

22 can be raised at any time.

23 Plaintiff's lack of standing to sue on the claim is treated as a “jurisdictional” defect and is not
24 waived by defendant's failure to raise it by demurrer or answer: “(C)ontentions based on a lack of
25
standing involve jurisdictional challenges and may be raised at any time in the proceeding.” Common
26
Cause of Calif. v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 432, 438; see also Associated Builders &
27

28
Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Comm'n (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 352,

- 17 -
1 If this court does not grant this motion to be Restored to Possession, defendant may continue

2 to suffer financially from the results of the erroneous judgment granted to people who had no
3
standing to take possession of Defendant’s historical home and destroy it.
4
And plaintiff has the burden of proof as to each fact which is essential to their claim for relief
5
against defendant.
6

7 Evidence Code § 500 states that, “Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden

8 of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or
9
defense that he is asserting.”
10
Lack of standing is a fatal defect which the moving party contends cannot be remedied. Thus,
11
this court should grant this motion to be Restored to Possession should be granted and rule that
12

13 nonsuit operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

14 And even assuming arguendo that plaintiff had standing to sue this motion for nonsuit should
15
still be granted as plaintiff has failed to state a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer in that:
16
A California Court of Appeal has held that judgment should be granted if facts stated show a
17
lack of standing to sue. Rokos v. Peck (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d 604, 611.
18

19

20

21

22
III.
23
CONCLUSION
24

25 Based on the foregoing, Defendant requests that the court grant this Motion to be Restored to

26 Possession of Premises and rule that judgment operates as an adjudication upon the merits, and
27 requests that the Order of Possession order the Sheriff of County of Orange to accompany Defendant
28

- 18 -
1 in repossession of the following property now in possession of Plaintiff’s client and wrongfully kept

2 by Defendant and her client who is an attorney: 158 North Center Street Orange California.
3
The declaration and Request for Judicial Notice supports Defendants request for return of her home.
4
Economic and punitive damages will be addressed in Federal Arbitration.
5
WHERFORE, the Defendant’s prayer is that the court restore the Defendant back into possession of
6

7 to her home the real property in favor of Plaintiff based on her true valid status of title, right of

8 possession and ownership pursuant to 2924f(b)(8)(A) effective April 1, 2012., and Section 2888.
9
This latter statute was enacted in 1872 so it has been California’s law for a long time and definitely
10
applies to every residential loan made this century.
11
WHEREFORE, the Defendant’s prayer is that the court order that the County of Orange Sheriff to
12

13 accompany Defendant in repossession of the property located at 158 North Center Street Orange

14 California on April 14, 2020, and for such relief the Court deems just and fair. It will cost Defendant
15
$250,000 to restore the property to its condition prior to the erroneous judgment. Defendant asks the
16
court to require the Plaintiff to be required to pay this amount to Defendant for restoration.
17

18
Dated February 17, 2020 _______________________________________________
19 Valerie Lopez Sui Juris All Rights Reserved UCC1-308

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -
1 Valerie Lopez
P.O. Box 291133
2 Phelan California [92329]

3 619-343-9729

4 Sui Juris

6 Superior Court of the State of California

7 For the County of Orange

9 Oaktree Investments, Inc., ) Case No. 30-2015-0080637

)
10 Plaintiff, ) DECLARATION OF Valerie Lopez IN SUPPORT
) OF MOTION TO BE RESTORED TO
11 vs. ) POSSESSION OF PREMISES
)
12 Valerie Lopez )
) DATE:
13 Defendant. ) TIME:
) DEPT:
14 )
)
15 )
)
16 )
)
17

18

19 DECLARATION OFVALERIE LOPEZ

20
I, Valerie Lopez, declare as follows:
21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -
1 1. I have personal knowledge of the foregoing, and if called upon to testify as a

2 witness, could and would competently testify to the facts set forth in this declaration.
3
2. I am a defendant in “error “ in the above case above-captioned action entitled
4
Oaktree Investments, Inc. vs. Valerie Lopez, filed in this above-captioned Court as Case Number 30-
5
2015-00822162.
6

7 3. I make this declaration in support of the foregoing Motion to be Restored to

8 possession of premises located at 158 North Center Street Orange California [92866].
9
4. This motion is made on the grounds that as a matter of law, the evidence is sufficient
10
to sustain Plaintiff's burden of proof on the issue that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue due to the
11
pursuant to California law - California’s lienholder law drives the result of Civ. Code Section
12

13 2924f(b)(8)(A) effective April 1, 2012. “Notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, a lien, or a

14 contract for a lien, transfers no title to the property subject to the lien.” CA Civ. Regardless the terms
15
of the deed of trust, Section 2888 states that the deed of trust is just a lien that “transfers no title to the
16
property.” This statute was enacted in 1872 so it has been California’s law for a long time and
17
definitely applies to every residential loan made this century.
18

19 5. Plaintiff was noticed by a Notice of Trustee’s Sale filed in County of Orange Land records

20 2015000379632 on 7/22/2015. its officers Doan-Tran Thi Dang and Hao Pham were purchasing an
21 “unproven” lien. RJN #1 (Notice of Trustee’s Sale)
22
6. Plaintiff lacked standing to sue as they did not have right to possession, ownership or valid
23
title to my home pursuant to CCP Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) and CC Section 2888 are consistent. The
24

25 non-judicial foreclosure sale is not a sale of title or ownership of the house and does not eliminate

26 the homeowner’s right to possess the house. Nor does the 2924 Scheme creates a presumption that
27 the non judicial foreclosure (“NJF”) process is a statement as to the merit or validity of the mortgage
28

- 21 -
1 lien or the right of the person pulling the NJF strings10 to enforce that lien. With a better

2 understanding of the unique substance of the 2924 Scheme, the foreclosure defense bar and its clients
3
can find more and better options for homeowners facing unsupported claims under threat of
4
foreclosure.
5
Civ. Code § 2924f(b)(8)(A) requires publication of a formal notice of a trustee’s sale and
6

7 defines what California authorizes to be sold at the NJF sale:

8 (8) (A) On and after April 1, 2012, if the deed of trust or mortgage containing a power of sale
9
is secured by real property containing from one to four single-family residences, the notice of sale
10
shall contain substantially the following language, in addition to the language required pursuant to
11
paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive:
12

13 NOTICE TO POTENTIAL BIDDERS: If you are considering bidding on

14 this property lien, you should understand that there are risks
15
involved in bidding at a trustee auction. You will be bidding on a
16
lien, not on the property itself. Placing the highest bid at a
17
trustee auction does not automatically entitle you to free and clear
18

19 ownership of the property.

20 This statutory law defines what the trustee is selling and thereby defines what is conveyed by
21 the trustee’s deed to the high bidder at the sale. It makes clear that the only thing being sold and
22
bought at the non judicial foreclosure sale was a lien.
23
The non-judicial foreclosure sale is a sale of an alleged and unproven mortgage lien.
24

25 California’s notice to bidders is as clear as it can be: BUYER BEWARE, because this sale is not a

26 sale of title or ownership of the house. This alert is confirmed by the 2924 Scheme which is also
27

28

- 22 -
1 devoid of any representation or warranty that the mortgage lien is legally valid or being sold by a

2 person who has authority by law to sell it.

3
7. At an August 18, 2015 illegal auction administered by, Clear Recon Corp., a stranger and
4
interloper to Defendant’s Deed of Trust dated October 26, 2005 (containing a nonexistent Lender
5
called America’s Wholesale Lender), Plaintiff and its officers Doan-Tran Thi Dang and Hao Pham
6

7 were handed a “Notice of Invalid Instrument(s), Notice of False Credit Reporting 15 U.S.C.

8 §1681 (FCRA) and Notice to Cease and Desist; Notice to Agent Is Notice to Principal RE: Loan
9
No. 2001237048”. This Notice is a YELLOW which was handed to Plaintiff at the auction. The
10
person representing the Plaintiff at the illegal auction is Steve Pham, a relative of Dang and Pham. On
11
December 31, 2015, Doan-Tran Thi Dang, admitted that Dang was on the phone with Steve Pham.
12

13 Steve Pham read the Notice to Dang while Steve Pham was at the unlawful auction of August 18,

14 2015. A video stream will be released at the Federal Arbitration hearing as will other evidence
15
proving that Dang confirmed on 12/31/18 that she was aware of the Cease and Desist Order pursuant
16
to uniform commercial code – California Commercial Code Section 3-501(b)(2) and Congressional
17
law 15 U.S.C. §1681 ( Federal Credit Reporting Act). RJN #2 (Notice of Invalid Instrument(s)
18

19 8. Regardless knowing the auction was illegal, Doan-Tran Thi Dang made the decision to

20 purchase not the home of Defendant, but of a “unproven” lien from interloper Clear Recon Corp.
21 Defendant warned Plaintiff verbally and described detail by detail why the auction was illegal to
22
Steve Pham and Doan-Tran Thi Dang at the August 18, 2015 lien auction. Pham and Dang made the
23
decision to give Clear Recon Corp. an interloper trustee funds for the unproven lien related to my
24

25 home. RJN# 2

26 7. Prior to opening the subject unlawful detainer case, Doan-Tran Thi Dang officer of Oaktree
27 Investments, Inc. called my attorney Charles Marshall on August 21, 2018 to request that my attorney
28

- 23 -
1 Mr. Marshall assist Dang get her funds back from interloper trustee Clear Recon Corp. Dang talked

2 to Marshall’s paralegal, James Macklin and Mr. Marshall on 8/21/15. Dang discussed with Macklin
3
and Marshall that Dang understood that the Deed of Trust was VOID due to the nonexistent lender.
4
Marshall declined to help Dang because Mr. Marshall required a contract from Dang. When
5
Marshall and Macklin asked Dang why Dang chose to make the “error” of giving Clear Recon funds,
6

7 Dang had no response. Mr. Marshall testify at the Federal Arbitration hearing to confirm the phone

8 call made by Dang to Mr. Marshall on August 21, 2015 and the topics discussed with Dang on
9
August 21, 2015 by phone. Phone records are available to support testimony.
10
8. Although Dang knew her business Oaktree Investments, Inc. lacked standing to open an
11
Unlawful Detainer Case against me, Dang asked Steve Silverstein to open an illegal eviction case on
12

13 August 25, 2015.

14 9. Dang never signed the complaint. Doan-Tran Pham and Hao Pham permitted Steve
15
Silverstein to “cut and paste” Dang’s signature onto the complaint. Dang told me on 12/31/2015,
16
Dang lets her attorney Steve Silverstein to handle everything. I hired a well-respected investigator
17
and handwriting expert for the State of California Courts Russell Bradford to verify that Dang and
18

19 Pham presented to the court a forgery of Doan-Tran Thi Dang’s signature on the initial complaint.

20 Dang never “verified” the complaint. RJN #3 Appellate Court Transcript (Pages 478-506), State of
21 California Los Angeles Court Handwriting Expert and Document Examiner, Investigator Russell
22
Bradford examined the Verification of Complaint and confirmed that Doan-Tran Thi Dang officer of
23
Oaktree Investment Inc. never signed the complaint’s verification. Doan-Tran Thi Dang’s signature is
24

25 a “cut and paste” which is not in compliance with 1161d, but a forgery under California Penal Code

26 Section 470 PC. Forgery under California Penal Code Section 470 PC is a white-collar crime that
27 involves falsifying a signature or seal or counterfeiting documents as part of a fraud scheme.
28

- 24 -
1 10.) Also, Dang and Pham permitted their attorney Steve Silverstein to present to the court forgeries

2 of the signature of Plaintiff’s Process Server Zac Paszco. Paszco’s forgeries were presented on the
3
Proof of Service of the complaint and also the Paszco Declaration which was used in the Motion to
4
Quash hearing. Paszco lied while on the stand claiming the proof of service and declaration
5
signatures were his. RJN #4Appellate Court Transcript (Pages 441-476) Court Expert
6

7 Handwriting Investigator Victoria Peterson and State of California Los Angeles Court Handwriting

8 Expert and Document Examiner, Investigator Russell Bradford’s Declaration and Report presented in
9
RJN#5 Judicial Notice Dated May 24, 2016 confirmed that the Proof of Service(s) and Declaration
10
of ZacPaszko, the process server is forged. Perjury is defined as the willful assertion as a matter of
11
fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge of a material issue, known to be wrong, in a court or by affidavit. I
12

13 was illegally removed from my home when the Plaintiff, her attorney and the trial court were noticed

14 about facts and status of the forged documents.

15
11.) On December 30, 2018 at approx. 11 a.m., Dang stood in front of my home knowing she
16
lacked standing to open the unlawful detainer case; knowing Dang never verified the complaint;
17
knowing her attorney had committed forgeries of the process server’s signature on the proof of
18

19 service and Declaration ( Forgeries of Dang and Paszco were reviewed by Russell Bradford and

20 Victoria Peterson court handwriting investigators), and watched me getting removed from my home
21 and business by gun point by the County of Orange Sheriff. RJN # 3, RJN # 4, RJN #5 I was made
22
homeless with no place to go with three dogs and my three cats on 12/30/2018. Dang changed the
23
locks on my historical home all based on fraud on the court by both Judge Stafford, Supervising
24

25 Judge of Unlawful Detainer Courts -Judge Moss, Plaintiff, Oaktree Investments, Inc. and Plaintiff’s

26 attorney Steve Silverstein.

27

28

- 25 -
1 12.) During the court proceedings, I found out that Judge Stafford and Supervising Judge of

2 the Unlawful detainer Courts, Robert Moss are receiving illegal payments from the County of
3
Orange. RJN # 6 I did not know at the time that based on these illegal payments; the judgment issued
4
to Oaktree Investments was VOID. There existed a conflict of interest due to the profits made from
5
all foreclosures by the County of Orange and not to mention the Certificate of Participations. Both
6

7 Judge Stafford and Judge Robert Moss were on the “take” receiving illegal payments from the

8 County of Orange. Payments are deemed illegal by California Constitution Article 6 Sections 19 and
9
17, Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E2 and 3E1, 18 U.S.C. 1346 Intangible Right To Honest Services
10
and Constitution of the United States of America Article 6 Clause 2 – Judge Stafford and Judge Moss
11
are required to follow federal law. Most important, everyone including Plaintiff, Clear Recon Corp.
12

13 Plaintiff’s attorney, Stewart Title Company knew the documents filed in the public land records were

14 VOID – a Deed of Trust cannot be valid if it presents a lender which never existed or never licensed
15
in California. All the parties who harmed me and my home should have followed the uniform
16
commercial code request from me which demanded proof of standing and accounting. Failure to
17
respond to my request under uniform commercial code deemed any alleged foreclosure meritless.
18

19 13.) I was subjected to extensive legal abuse in this case. Example, Carmen Luege refused to

20 release herself from the case from the start. I told her clerk that I did not want to stipulate to a
21 commissioner. Luege refused to abide to my request. This was first time facing off with Luege.
22
Luege ordered me to write an answer when she held no jurisdiction. Luege chose to deny my right to
23
submit a demurrer. Judge Stafford refused to honor my right to a demurrer with my solid good reason
24

25 for a demurrer. Then Judge Stafford ignored the law related to my opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for

26 summary judgment. I wrote the Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment so a 3rd grader
27 could understand. Now that I know about the illegal payments that Judge Stafford is receiving from
28

- 26 -
1 the County of Orange, I understand why Judge Stafford, Carmen Luege and Judge Moss could not

2 hold any objectivity in this matter. RJN #6 (COUNTY OF ORANGE AUDITOR’S OFFICE –
3
Proof of illegal payments to Judge Moss and Judge Stafford)
4
14.) December 31, 2015, Dang talked to me on the phone with witness Sheri Moody present.
5
Dang made it clear to me that Dang did not want my home. Dang just wanted her money back that
6

7 she in error gave to interloper Clear Recon Corp. Dang stated that if I could get Dang the money

8 which Dang gave to Clear Recon Corp. that I could have my home back. I was able to secure an
9
appraisal from Lemarr Banks and a lender by January 10, 2016. After I secured a loan, Dang changed
10
the terms and told me that in addition to the funds given to Clear Recon Corp.the interloper trustee,
11
Dang now wanted me to give her an additional $30,000 to give to her attorney Steve Silverstein. My
12

13 lender obtained in January 2016 refused to participate in the public crimes by all involved: Oaktree

14 Investments, Inc., the court that clearly lacked jurisdiction due to the illegal payments, Dang’s
15
attorney, people at Stewart Title Company who agreed to insure the VOID documents filed on my
16
home. My lender was not going to participate in the embezzlement and extortion scheme which was
17
desired by Dang.
18

19 15.) My business and my home were taken away from me due to illegal acts of Dang and

20 Pham on December 30, 2015. Dang destroyed my restored historical home by inserting a Home
21 Depot Flooring over the original 100-year-old floors, removing 100-year-old parlor doors, cover the
22
100-yr. old fireplace with a cheap granite and painting the original wood all white. It will cost me
23
over $250,000 to restore to the original beauty.
24

25 16.) On 2/21/2018, I won my appeal case proving that Judge Stafford did not follow the law

26 and issued the judgment to Dang and Pham in error. The judgment was reversed and remanded back
27 to the trial court. Dang and Pham dismissed the Case on May 29, 2018. RJN # 7
28

- 27 -
1 17.) I also need to address fact that Dang gave possession of my home to John Leldon Gray,

2 Esquire – a real estate client of Dang’s. John Leldon Gray, Esquire is in the legal profession and
3
knows well my home was involved in an illegal foreclosure. Gray knew to look at the docket. Dang
4
was required to disclose on the Supplement CAR form - any litigation. Gray knows well the home
5
was involved in an Appeal and chose to turn a blind eye to the massive lack of standing issues.
6

7 Neither Gray- Doan-Tran Thi Dang’s client or Pham and Dang are Bona fide buyers. Gray, Pham and

8 Dang feel their connections within the court will cover their theft of my home, but the law and
9
Constitution is on my side. Their decisions were motivated by greed. All evidence will be presented
10
to the Federal Arbitration panel for financial restitution. I want my home back as it belongs to me.
11
Title, right of possession, and ownership cannot be based on fraudulent acts, bullying, gang stalking
12

13 and fraudulent documents created by people who had no contract with me. Pursuant to CCP Section

14 2924f(b)(8)(A) effective April 1, 2012 and CC Section 2888 are consistent, Doan-Tran Thi Dang and
15
Hao Pham under the umbrella of their corporation of Oaktree Investments, Inc. bought an unproven
16
lien and not my home. Both Dang, Pham and John Leledon Gray, Esquire (in possession of my
17
home) knew they behaved illegally; all knew they were taking a big risk acting unlawfully while the
18

19 case was on appeal. Dang knew that it was impossible for there to be perfected title with a VOID

20 Deed of Trust with a nonexistent lender showing. I want my house back. I do not need to fight
21 trespassers who chose to ignore the law. RJN #7 (Remittitur).
22
18. The legal abuse which I have endured by the Plaintiff and its officers, her attorney the
23
court and all other parties involved are under investigation with Homeland Security Case No.
24

25 499636 under umbrella of Big Sister 501 (c ) (3) Lori Lowling Affidavit and accompaniment of Big

26 Sister documents for Federal Human Trafficking – Master Case Advocate Lori Lowling #312496.
27 Valerie Anne Lopez (First Step Advocate) Human Trafficking Case # 499636.
28

- 28 -
1 19. I, Valerie Lopez, a Californian woman seeking remedy for the Financial Crimes against

2 Humanity hereby state that I am an Interested Party for Criminal Joinder in Orange County California
3
case of Powers vs. Bank of New York Mellon et al. The case number is No. 8:17-cv-01386-DOC and
4
California Federal Appeal Case # 19-55013. I referenced this case 30-2015-00806367.
5
20. I hired a licensed process server to properly serve John Leldon Gray and possible tenants a
6

7 60 day notice on February 15, 2020 and noticed John Leldon Gray and any possible tenants of fact

8 that Oaktree Investments, Inc. never held title, right of possession or ownership to pass any title. In
9
addition, I noticed in 60-day notice that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to give Oaktree
10
Investments, Inc. any judgment to evict because Judge Stafford and the Supervising Judge of the
11
unlawful detainer court were receiving illegal payments from the County of Orange.
12

13

14

15
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true
16
and correct, and that this declaration is executed on February 17, 2020.
17

18

19

20 ___________________________________________
Valerie Lopez, Sui Juris All Rights Reserved UCC 1-308
21

22

23

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Valerie Lopez

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1 P.O. Box 291133
Phelan, California 92329
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619-343-9729
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5 Superior Court of the State of California

For the County of Orange
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8 , ) Case No. 30-2015-00806367

)
9 Oaktree Investments, Inc. ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO BE RESTORED
) TO POSSESSION OF PREMISES
Plaintiff, )
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) TRIAL DATE:
vs. ) TIME:
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) DEPT:
Valerie Lopez )
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)
Defendant. )
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)
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The Motion to be Restored to Possession of the Premises 158 North Center Street Orange
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California [92866]belonging to Defendant Valerie Lopez pursuant to Civ. Code Section 2924f(b)(8)
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(A) and Section 2888 was heard on _______________, 2020. Based on the Motion and the evidence
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21 presented for an order to be restored of possession of 158 North Center Street Orange California

22 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 916, it is ordered and adjudged and decreed that the motion of
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Defendant is granted. Once a judgment is reversed, the Appellant is entitled to restitution of
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possession for enforcement of mandate.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the County of Orange
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27 Sheriff is to accompany Defendant in repossession of the property located at 158 North Center

28 Street Orange California on April 14, 2020 which is wrongfully in possession by John Leldon Gray,

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1 Esquire, and real estate client of Doan- Tran Thi Dang. Oaktree Investments, Inc. never held title,

2 right of possession or ownership of the property to pass any good title to John Leldon Gray pursuant
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to Civ. Code Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) and Section 2888.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the court makes the
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following statement of decision: THE COURT FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF LACKED STANDING
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7 TO SUE pursuant to Civ. Code Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) and Section 2888. The Plaintiff never held

8 ownership, title and right of possession. THUS, PLAINTIFF COULD NEVER STATE ANY VALID
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CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER AGAINST DEFENDANT.
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13 Dated:________________ ___________________________________________________

14 JUDGE/COMMISSIONER OF THE SUPERIOR

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