Consti 2 Case Digest Guillen PDF

CHARLOTTE CRIZTEL Y.
PARCIA | Constitutional Law II

Page 1 of 59
White Light Corporation et al. v. City of Manila

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist &
Development Corporation
Respondent: City of Manila
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled ―An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.‖ On December 15, 1992,
the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim
with the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC
issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City
alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993,
the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review
on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is
based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself
and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions
by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging
sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review
when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it
away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of
validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
CHARLOTTE CRIZTEL Y. PARCIA | Constitutional Law II
Page 2 of 59
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail Transit

Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.
G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009
Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

Respondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.
Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and

Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro
Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate
and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that
MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would
transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising,
Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services
with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other
advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested
Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to
MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and
display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road,
sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the
request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of
advertisement.
Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards,
signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior
structures of the MRT3.
Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other
advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop
commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no
longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years,
upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the
Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to
this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with
Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.,
this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and
other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be
respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of
Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power
on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising
media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the
Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards,
signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private
property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one
of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.
Page 3 of 59
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000
Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.

Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals
Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit.
After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local
optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the
following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic
but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar
optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell
reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an
independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the
public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot
advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and
frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent
optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI
lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions
set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such
permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and
Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3)
months to wind up its affairs.
Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid
exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits
Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue
licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising
purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant
licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses
or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to
petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the
Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such
special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public
respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said
special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police
power.
The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially
regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or
grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State
within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the
business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the
practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's
business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to
produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in
Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and
the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a
profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency
specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
Page 4 of 59
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of

Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines

Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No.
228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia
of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that
no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310

This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They
contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated
in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision
that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742

Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on
the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished
for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of
public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise
not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain
Page 5 of 59
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No.119694 May 22, 1995
Petitioner: Philippine Press Institute, Inc.

Respondent: Commission on Elections
Facts: On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which reads in part
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than
one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city
for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and
from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec
Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and
void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.
Issue: Whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitute a valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain
Ruling: The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And
apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is
sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper
publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or
perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No.
2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine
publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes
contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however,
provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of
factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2
does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
Page 6 of 59
Forfom Development Corporation vs. Philippine National Railways

G.R. No.124795 December 10, 2008
Petitioner: Forfom Development Corporation

Respondent: Philippine National Railways
Facts: Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro,
Laguna. Said parcels of land were originally registered in the name of Felix Limcaoco,
predecessor-in-interest of Forfom.
In a cabinet meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project, more commonly known as the
Carmona Project of the President. Per Resolution No. 751 dated 2 November 1972 of the
PNR Board of Directors, its General Manager was authorized to implement the project. The
San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of
railroad facilities and appurtenances.
During the construction of said commuter line, several properties owned by private
individuals/corporations were traversed as right-of-way. Among the properties through
which the commuter line passed was a 100,128 square-meter portion owned by Forfom
Issue: Whether the petitioner Forfom can recover possession of its property because
respondent PNR failed to file any expropriation case and to pay just compensation.
Ruling: The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State.
Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the
Constitution. Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just
compensation
The fundamental power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. It may be
delegated by Congress to the local governments, other public entities and public utilities. In
the case at bar, PNR, under its charter, has the power of expropriation.
A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of
eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into
private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property
should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a
public purpose or otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
It can be gathered from the records that Forfom accepted the fact of the taking of its land
when it negotiated with PNR for just compensation, knowing fully well that there was no
expropriation case filed at all. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to question
the absence of expropriation proceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how much
petitioner shall be paid for its land preclude it from questioning the PNR's power to
expropriate or the public purpose for which the power was exercised. In other words, it has
waived its right and is estopped from assailing the takeover of its land on the ground that
there was no case for expropriation that was commenced by PNR.
Page 7 of 59
Republic v. Cancio
G.R. No.170147 January 30, 2009
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio
Facts: Petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority is a government-owned and controlled

corporation. It is vested with governmental functions, including the power of eminent
domain, thus enabling it to acquire private land within or adjacent to the ecozone for
consolidation with land for zone development purposes.
Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811 which reserved certain
parcels of land of the public domain in favor of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone
Authority or EPZA) for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However,
some of the parcels covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses
Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land.
Petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot. The letter containing the offer further
instructed respondents "to consider and accept, otherwise we will initiate expropriation
proceedings in the proper court." Instead of accepting the offer, respondents filed an
unlawful detainer case against Maitland. Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation
proceedings for respondents’ property. Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the
property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount with the Land Bank
of the Philippines in accordance with Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 50. Respondents,
however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974, which requires that,
upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current
zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession. The trial court
granted respondents’ motion. Petitioner moved for its reconsideration arguing that RA 8974
was inapplicable as the payment required under the law applied only to instances where the
property was still in the owner’s possession and had yet to be transferred to the
government. It could not be validly invoked when the property was already in the
government’s possession, as in this case. It also averred that it should be made to pay only
the price of the land at the time of its taking. Corollarily, if it was ordered to pay the amount
required under RA 8974, it would be unjustly penalized for its own improvements to the
property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of
the writ of possession.
Ruling: A perusal of RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when the national
government expropriates property for national government infrastructure
projects. Undeniably, the economic zone is a national government project. Also, the
complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one year after the
law was approved. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this case.
The inapplicability of R. A. No. 8974 is further highlighted by the fact that it requires a
deposit based on the current zonal valuation of the property. To apply such valuation
to the instant case would be to violate the cardinal principle in eminent domain
proceedings that the just compensation for the property should be its fair market
value at the time of taking. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking
is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner (National Power
Corporation vs. Henson, 300 SCRA 751 [1998]). Clearly, there was a confusion regarding
the nature of the amount to be paid for the issuance of a writ of possession. In Capitol Steel
Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, we clarified that the payment of the
provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different from the
payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is
based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing
fair market value of the property.
Page 8 of 59
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Martinez

G.R. No. 169008 July 31, 2008
Petitioner: Land Bank of the Philippines

Respondent: Raymunda Martinez
Facts: After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of

respondent Martinez’s land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL),
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation.
Convinced that the offered amount was unjust and confiscatory, respondent rejected it.
Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with
Section 16 (d) of the CARL.
On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, finding some marked inconsistencies in
the figures and factors made as bases by LBP in its computation, rendered
judgment ordering the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay landowner-protestant Raymunda
Martniez
A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP’s counsel before the
Special Agrarian Court (SAC). After filing her answer to the said petition, respondent,
contending that the orders, rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final after the lapse
of 15 days from their receipt, moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of
time. Petitioner opposed the motion. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet
unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. LBP primarily contended
that the Office of the PARAD gravely abused its discretion when it issued the writ of
execution despite the pendency with the SAC of a petition for the fixing of just
compensation.
Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) has jurisdiction
to issue the writ of execution due to the pending petition for determination of just
compensation with Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Ruling: The Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s
decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the
DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the
law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. This conclusion,
as already explained in the assailed decision, is based on the doctrines laid down in
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board v. Lubrica.
In Lubrica, the Court, citing Philippine Veterans Bank, ruled that the adjudicator’s decision
had already attained finality because LBP filed the petition for just compensation beyond the
15-day reglementary period.
This ruling, however, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, runs counter to the Court’s
recent decision in Suntay in which the Court ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing the
petition for determination of just compensation on the ground that it was filed out of time.
The Court in that case stressed that the petition was not an appeal from the adjudicator’s
final decision but an original action for the determination of just compensation.
To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of
the bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank,
reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition
for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform
adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day
period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality.
This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles
of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, after the land valuation of
the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as
to the true value of his property.
Page 9 of 59
Eusebio v. Luis
G.R. No. 162474 October 13, 2009
Petitioner: Hon. Vicente Eusebio et al.

Respondent: Jovito M. Luis et al. .
Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. Said parcel of land was
taken by the City of Pasig and used as a municipal
road. The Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to
respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee assessed the value
of the land only at P150.00 per square meter. Respondents requested the Appraisal
Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land. One of the
respondents also wrote a letter to Mayor Eusebio calling the latter’s attention to the fact
that a property in the same area, as the land subject of this case, had been paid for by
petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter when said property was expropriated
in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road. Subsequently, respondents’ counsel
sent a demand letter to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount of P5,000.00 per square
meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents’ property. In
response, Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter informing respondents that the City of Pasig cannot
pay them more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee. Thus, respondents filed a
Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages. Respondents prayed that the property be
returned to them with payment of reasonable rental or in the event that said property can
no longer be returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount
of P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use. In addition, respondents prayed for
payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. RTC ruled that the
taking of the properties are unjust and illegal and ordered the return of the same.
Petitioners then appealed the case to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC judgment
Issue: Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by
the city government in the 1980’s and, in the event that said property can no longer be
returned, how should just compensation to respondents be determined
Ruling: These issues had been squarely addressed in Forfom Development Corporation v.
Philippine National Railways, which is closely analogous to the present case. Just like in
the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a
long period of time and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property
was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that ―when we have an
occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for compensation.‖ It is likewise
undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents’ property was
a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom,
herein respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are
entitled to just compensation.
The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation is that set forth
in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled that even if there are no expropriation proceedings
instituted to determine just compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act in
accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the subject
property. The Court reiterated its ruling in National Power Corporation v. Dela Cruz that
―trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all.‖ It was also emphasized therein that although
ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners’ findings
may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court’s own estimation of the
property’s value only if the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or
where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
Page 10 of 59
National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011
Petitioner: National Power Corporation

Respondent: Cebu Macabangkit et.al.
Facts: On November 21, 1997, the respondents, as the owners of land sued NPC in the RTC
for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the
payment of just compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of
the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the
operation of the Hydroelectric Project traversed their land; that their discovery had occurred
in 1995 after President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had rejected their offer
to sell the land because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed
Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development Center; that such
rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource
Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as
collateral because of the presence of the underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel
had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of the tunnel
deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land;
and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud
sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground,
forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section
3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was
established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already
prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the
tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such easement
prescribed in five years.
Issue: Whether the Heirs of Macabangkit’s right to claim just compensation had
prescribed.
Ruling: The liability of NPC for payment of just compensation was upheld. The court ruled
that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is
applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just
compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of
Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land. The action to recover just
compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for
damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover
the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just
compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is
used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample. The latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be
actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. The action to recover just
compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on
statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power
of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the
transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the
former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the
suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property
without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the
Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public
use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
Page 11 of 59
Vda. De Ouna v. Republic

G.R. No. 168770 February 9, 2011
Petitioner: Anunciacion Vda. De Ouna et al

Respondent: The Republic of the Philippines et al.
Facts: Petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo
Ouano Martinez (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the Decision dated September 3, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the Order dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), a suit to compel the Republic of the Philippines and/or the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey to the Ouanos a parcel of land.
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers
entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the
Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to repurchase
the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the
Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA
for reconveyance.
Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no longer have enforceable
rights whatsoever over the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881
has not found any reversionary condition.
Issue: Whether or not under the ruling of this Honorable Court in the heirs of Moreno
Case, and pursuant to the principles enunciated therein, petitioners herein are entitled to
recover their litigated property.
Ruling: In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really
without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other
words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal,
the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state
must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private
property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the
complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to
include any use that is of ―usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit [of the public].‖ If the genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it
were—allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or
disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government’s retention of the
expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the
property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the
declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by
the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to
another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive
to our laws.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any
manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in
keeping with the idea of fair play,
Page 12 of 59
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

G.R. No. 139465 October 17, 2000
Petitioner: Secretary of Justice

Respondent: Hon. Ralph C. Lantion
Facts: Respondent is charged before the district court of Florida with conspiracy to defraud,
attempted tax evasion, fraud through the use of radio – television, false statements, and
unlawful election contributions. The United States Government sent to the Philippine
Government documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez. Jimenez sought and
was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO
was, however, assailed by the Secretary of Justice in a Petition before the SC. The Court
dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The petitioner timely filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration
A 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing
petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Ruling: As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in
an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due process
is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure."
To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious consideration
involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides
with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of
the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach
which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." The approach requires that we
"take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by an
individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s promotion of
fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.
In the case at bar, on one end is the private respondent’s claim to due process predicated
on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of
doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which
accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it
deserves.
Petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight to our national commitment under
the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of persons
charged with violation of some of its laws.
The Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due
process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural
due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree
of what is due. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of
notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him
of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the
United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured
a party.
Page 13 of 59
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan

G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
Petitioner: Government of the United States of America

Respondent: Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan
Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government
sent to the Philippine Government documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order by the RTC which prohibited the Department of Justice from
filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however,
assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before the SC. Initially, the Court dismissed the Petition.
The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment
and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration the Court issued a resolution which reconsidered
and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for
Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The
warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud
the United States; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud; (4) false statements; and (5) illegal
campaign contributions. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the
issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest".
Jimenez prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused
in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned Order, directing the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he
had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty.
Issue: Whether Jimenez is deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due
process.
Ruling: Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the
familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the
same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it,
a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate
deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be
arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its
supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the
requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent
prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s
custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
Page 14 of 59
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v.

Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
Petitioner: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an

organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a
franchise granted by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due
process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the
power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.
Issue: Whether Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 deny radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws
Ruling: Petitioners' argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by

television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated
as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in
accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . .
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires."
It is noteworthy that §40 of R.A. No. 6388, from which §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 was taken,
expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should "be considered as part of the public
service time said stations are required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of
public information and education under their respective franchises or permits." There is no
reason to suppose that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC Time therein provided
to be otherwise than as a public service which petitioner is required to render under §4 of
its charter (R.A. No. 7252).
In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the
enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of
privilege.
Petitioners' assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal protection of
the law has no basis.
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time
and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their
qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving their qualifications
and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads,
the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would
clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art III, §7 of the Constitution provides that
"the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized,"
while Art. XII, §6 states that "the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to
own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to
promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands."
Page 15 of 59
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
Petitioner: Louis ―Barok‖ C. Biraogo

Respondent: The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
Facts: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 entitled
"Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo
(Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer.
The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May
2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this
noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30,
2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
Issue: Whether E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause
Ruling: According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.‖ It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities."
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace
all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if
all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent
and manifest. Specifically, these are *** In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Page 16 of 59
Commission on Election v. Cruz

G.R. No. 192935 November 20, 2009
Petitioner: Commission on Elections

Respondent: Conrado Cruz
Facts: Before the October 29, 2007

Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then
incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for
declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the highlighted portion of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 9164 (entitled ―An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended:
Sec. 2. Term of Office.–The term of office of

all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this
Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position: Provided, however, that the term of office
shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
The petition is based on the following arguments:

I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of
the equal protection of the law.
The RTC agreed with the respondents’ contention that the challenged
proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit for barangay officials and declared this
retroactive application unconstitutional. It explained that the Congress has violated not only
the principle of prospective application of statutes but also the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether the implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a

violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the law
Ruling: The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2,
Article III, which provides: “Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.” Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity
of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial
distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts
or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the
conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge. The
law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the
Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with
respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the
Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-
term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the
three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through
legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it
recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal
protection violation can exist under these conditions.
We see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged
proviso did not result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other
elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the
challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application.
Page 17 of 59
Manalili v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
Petitioner: Alain Manalili y Dizon

Respondent: Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
Facts: Policemen were conducting surveillance along A. Mabini Street, Kalookan City, in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The surveillance was being made because of
information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the cemetery. They then
chanced upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When he tried to
avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police
officers. The policemen then asked Manalili what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried
to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu, one of the policemen, asked him if he could see what he had
in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the
same. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its
marijuana contents. Manalili was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and was turned
over for investigation. The confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents were
also turned over.
Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal search
Ruling: The court disagrees with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin
to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as
the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is
that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. The recent
case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against
warrantless search and seizure, viz.: ―(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of
moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.‖ In these cases,
the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan
City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug
addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, such suspicious
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were ―high.‖ The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During
such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner’s possession.
Page 18 of 59
People v. Tangliben
G.R. No. 63630 April 6, 1990
Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Medel Tangliben y Bernardino
Facts: Late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan, together with
Barangay Tanod Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner
Terminal compound. The surveillance was aimed not only against persons who may commit
misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. Said Patrolmen noticed a
person carrying a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The
person was requested to open the red traveling bag but refused, only to accede later on
when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. The person was asked of
his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel
Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the
marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police headquarters for further
investigation. The following morning, a field test on the marijuana leaves was conducted
and found positive result for marijuana.
Issue: Whether the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an
unlawful search without a warrant.
Ruling: One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides: Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)
provides: . . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest.
This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident
to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
Page 19 of 59
People v. Chua Ho San

G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999

Respondent: Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San
Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Cid,
as Chief of Police, began patrolling the coastline with his officers. While monitoring the
coastal area, he intercepted a radio call requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat. When the speedboat landed, Chua alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored straw bag. He then walked towards the road. Officers became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing
the approaching officers. A policeman prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his
arm. Cid requested Chua to open his bag. He tried speaking English, Tagalog, then Ilocano,
but Chua seem not to understand. Cid then resorted to ―sign language.‖ The man
apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several
transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. A qualitative
examination established the contents of the plastic packets to be positive of shabu, a
regulated drug.
Issue: Whether the search was lawfully conducted despite the absence of search and
seizure warrants
Ruling: The Court finds that there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. There was no warrant of arrest
and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
After introducing themselves, the police officers immediately inquired about the contents of
the bag. What else could have impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate interest
in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been committed by
CHUA -- in effect to "retroactively establish probable cause and validate an illegal search
and seizure." It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated
substance. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if
tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of felonious activity
is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the
fruit of a poisonous tree how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any
initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case - because the police admitted that they
never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the
remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s
conviction.
Page 20 of 59
People v. Malmstedt
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
Petitioner: The People of the Philippines

Respondent: Mikael Malmstedt
Facts: Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. On 11 May 1989, Vasco, the Commanding Officer of NARCOM
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. During the inspection, CIC
Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. The officer required him to bring out whatever it
was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag with
four (4) wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative
of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. Accused
stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. The officers got the bags
and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. At the investigation room, the
officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. It was
established that the objects examined were hashish, a prohibited drug which is a derivative
of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
Issue: Whether the facts in the case at bar make out a legitimate instance of a warrantless
search and seizure
Ruling: Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish).
A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1)
of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe
that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Page 21 of 59
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
Petitioner: Social Justice Society (SJS)

Respondent: Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
Facts: The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers
and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
Issue: Whether paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 violate the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection
clause
Ruling: The Court holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. It is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable
school rules and regulations and policies. The mandatory but random drug test for officers
and employees of public and private offices is also justifiable. Petitioner SJS, other than
saying that ―subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,‖ has failed to
show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d)
of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. But the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionlessxv 4r drug testing for
students emanates from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. The situation is
entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office. The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are ―randomness‖ and ―suspicionless.‖ In
the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Page 22 of 59
People v. Johnson
G.R. No. 138881 December 18, 2000

Respondent: Leila Johnson y Reyes
Facts: Accused-appellant Johnson was a resident of California, U.S.A. She arrived in the
Philippines to visit her son’s family. She was due to fly back to the United States. Olivia
Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk
departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited
drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, she felt something
hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to
wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior.
She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women’s room for inspection. Inside the
women’s room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her
stomach was and gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her
―to bring out the thing under her girdle.‖ Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs.
The confiscated packs contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or ―shabu.‖
Issue: Whether Johnson was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional
rights
Ruling: What is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid
search made on her person. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
Travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search are
admissible. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of ―shabu‖ in her person in
flagrante delicto. There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-
appellant’s passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. Accordingly, the
above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.
Page 23 of 59
People v. Valdez
G.R. No. 129296 September 25, 2000

Respondent: Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz
Facts: At around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, SPO3 Tipay received a tip from an
unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by
appellant. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. A team was
formed to verify the report. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot
said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same.‖ Said police team, accompanied by
their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After
a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at
the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa
hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw
seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters
from appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven
marijuana plants. Appellant was then arrested. Qualitative examination conducted and gave
positive result to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug."
Issue: Whether the search and seizure of the marijuana plants is lawful
Ruling: In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to
search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where
the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession,
they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused
on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. The right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes
his residence, his papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to "the right of
personal security" of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be
protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. The Court holds
that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. The
Court also finds that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be
used as evidence against appellant.
Page 24 of 59
The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo

G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
Petitioner: The Secretary of National Defense et al. .

Respondent: Raymond et al. .
Facts: The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for
a Writ of Amparo filed before this Court. Respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were
abducted from their houses on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained for
eighteen (18) months until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The respondents initially filed
an action for ―Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order‖ to stop petitioners
and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and
other basic rights on August 23, 2007, prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. When
the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition
treated as an amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the
circumstances of the Manalo brothers’ enforced disappearance. The Court granted their
motion.
Issue: Whether the petition for a Writ of Amparo be granted
Ruling: The Court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were
abducted from their houses and were detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The
abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent
Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless
candid details of respondents’ harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured
through his different senses and etched in his memory. While respondents admit that they
are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not ―free in
every sense of the word‖ as their ―movements continue to be restricted for fear that people
they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified are still at large and have not been
held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents’ rights to life, liberty and
security.‖ Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept
captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.
The right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are
under threat. There is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a
violation of respondents’ right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
Page 25 of 59
Reyes v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009
Petitioner: Reverend Father Robert Reyes

Respondent: Court of Appeals et al. .
Facts: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 30, 2007. Petitioner was brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings.
Respondent DOJ Secretary issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) ordering respondent
Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List the name of petitioner in
the interest of national security and public safety. After finding probable cause against
petitioner, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the accused. Upon Recognizance
asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific
participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of
probable cause must be made personally by a judge. The RTC dismissed the charge for
Rebellion for lack of probable cause. Petitioner requested the lifting of HDO in view of the
dismissal of criminal case. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the
Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on
petitioner’s right to travel is illegal. CA dismissed the petition and denied the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo.
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with
violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
Ruling: The petition must fail. The Court, in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, made
a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these
two instances of ―extralegal killings‖ and ―enforced disappearances,‖ or to threats thereof.
Petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his
right to travel. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo are:
(1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. The restriction on petitioner’s
right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was
not unlawful. Petitioner failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the
manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty
and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. Petitioner
is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny
his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he
has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for
a writ of amparo.
Page 26 of 59
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011
Petitioner: In the matter of the petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of
Noriel Rodriguez
Respondent: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo et al. .
Facts: Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan

(Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the
Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. On 6 September 2009, Rodriguez, four men forcibly took him and forced
him into a car. Rodriguez was ordered to confess to his membership in the NPA, was
detained inside a room and asked to identify the location of the NPA camp. He was subject
to beating, torture and electrocution. Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that
he was neither abducted nor tortured. He was advised not to file a case against his
abductors because they had already freed him. On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before
this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and
Personal Properties. The petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data was granted but
the prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order was denied.
Issue: Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs
of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor
Ruling: The Court held in Yano v. Sanchez that ―these provisional reliefs are intended to
assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition.‖ Being
interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In
any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted,
necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the
privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order
independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is
subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
Page 27 of 59
Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Dy

G.R. No. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009
Petitioner: Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. et al. .

Respondent: Hon. Ceasar Dy et al. .
Facts: Newsounds run Bombo Radyo which operates several radio stations. It was issued a
building permit authorizing the construction of a commercial establishment. HLURB certified
the property as commercial. The stations successfully secured all necessary operating
documents, including mayor’s permits from 1997 to 2001. In 2002, when petitioners applied
for the renewal of the mayor’s permit, they were required to submit "either an approved
land conversion papers from DAR, or an approved resolution from the local sanggunian."
Petitioners filed their applications, attaching the DAR Order but was claimed spurious or
void. The deadline for application for the mayor’s permit lapsed. Respondents closed the
radio stations. Through the intervention of the COMELEC, petitioners were able to resume
operation of the stations until 10 June 2004, when respondents again closed the radio
stations. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with an application for the issuance of
TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, both denied by the RTC. Petitioners
appealed but lost both of their cases with the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether there was a violation of the freedom of expression of the petitioner
Ruling: It is clear enough that respondents’ acts constitute a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of
invalidity. Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity." Newsound’s only rival station is owned by Dy. The closure of
radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing
the election irregularities in 2001 elections that favored Dy. It was only after then that the
Mayor’s Office started questioning petitioners’ applications for renewal. Dy said he will
"disenfranchise the radio station." It manifests and confirms that denial of the renewal
applications on the ground that the property is commercial is merely a pretext and their real
agenda is to remove and suppress the petitioner’s voice. This is a blatant violation of the
constitutional right to press freedom. Petitioners had duly complied with the requirements
for the issuance of the mayor’s permit they had obtained without issue in years prior. There
was no basis for respondents to have withheld the zoning clearances, and the mayor’s
permit, depriving petitioners of the right to broadcast as certified by the Constitution and
their particular legislative franchise. The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Page 28 of 59
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council

G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
Petitioner: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.

Respondent: Anti-Terrorism Council et al. .
Facts: This is a case of six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9372 (RA 9372), ―An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,‖
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6,
2007. Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. Five other similar petitions were filed impleading as respondents in the
various petitions the Anti-Terrorism Council.
Issue: Whether RA 9372 regulates speech
Ruling: The crime of terrorism under RA 9372 has the following elements: (1) the offender
commits an act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, or special penal laws; (2) the
commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the
desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. Petitioners contend that
the element of ―unlawful demand‖ in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be
transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The
argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of
the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an ―unlawful
demand.‖ Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech. Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of
message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the
crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of
the offender like in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a
deceitful transaction. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the
criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor
the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the
present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the
element of coercion perceptible. Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected
conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.
Page 29 of 59
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza

G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010
Petitioner: Integrated Bar of the Philippines et al. .

Respondent: Hon. Manila Mayor Jose ―Lito‖ Atienza
Facts: IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit
to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law
students and multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent issued a permit allowing the IBP to
stage a rally but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge.
The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. Petitioners allege that the participants
voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. The MPD thereupon
instituted a criminal action against Cadiz, National President of IBP for violating the Public
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
Issue: Whether the partial grant of the application for a permit to rally violates their
constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.
Ruling: Yes. In Reyes v. Bagatsing, the Court explained: The public official concerned shall
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but
at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that
the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants
must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must
be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority. In modifying the permit outright, respondent
gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have
been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the
action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action
on the permit. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of
the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating,
is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to
an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
judicial scrutiny thereof. The Court ruled that respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in modifying the rally permit issued.
Page 30 of 59
Estrada v. Escritor
A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006
Petitioner: Alejandro Estrada

Respondent: Soledad Escritor
Facts: Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent Soledad

Escritor, court interpreter, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act
that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was
charged with committing ―disgraceful and immoral conduct‖. Escritor was already a widow
when she entered the judiciary. But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that
their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval
of her congregation.
Issue: Whether Escritor is exempted from the law based on her fundamental right to
freedom of religion
Ruling: The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights — ―the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,‖ in the words
of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important,
because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must
articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which
must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit
the fundamental right to religious freedom. In the application of the compelling interest
test, the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to
outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. In the case at bar,
the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus amounts only
to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Our Constitution adheres to
the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. Respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she
has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom
of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms
- including religious freedom - may be enjoyed.
Page 31 of 59
People v. Galit
No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

Respondent: Francisco Galit
Facts: Mrs. Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house. Galit was
arrested for killing the victim on the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his
innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. A confession was absolutely
necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically.
Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and
pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any
more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had
to suffer. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed
the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
Issue: Whether the extra judicial confession extracted from Galit be admissible.
Ruling: The Court finds that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a
conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the
accused are not supported by competent evidence. This Court laid down the correct
procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial
investigation. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no
state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The
only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. There should be several short
and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing
that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted
to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. His statement does not even contain
any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one.
At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice.
These constitute gross violations of his rights. The alleged confession and the pictures of the
supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a
manner contrary to law. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been
maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must
be rejected in toto. Accused Francisco Galit is acquitted for the crime charged.
Page 32 of 59
People v. Ordoño
G.R. No. 132154 June 29, 2000

Respondent: Pacito Ordoño and Apolinario Medina
Facts: The decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes. The girl was
15 years old who 3 days before was reported missing. Acting on a lead, the police invited
the 2 suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning but were allowed to
go home for lack of evidence directly linking them to the crime. Ordoño and Medina
returned to the police station and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime.
The police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. The
investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the 2 accused
in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the remote
town. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own dialect of their
constitutional rights. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they understood their
rights and did not require the services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the
Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers in attendance
to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who
admitted their participation in the crime. On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the 2
accused pleaded not guilty.
Issue: Whether their extrajudicial confessions are admissible despite the lack of counsel to
assist them during custodial investigation.
Ruling: The extrajudicial confession of the accused is rendered inadmissible in evidence. In

this case, custodial investigation began when the accused voluntarily went to the police
station to confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information
and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel
automatically attached to them. RA 7438 does not propose that the accused's parents, older
brothers and sisters. etc. appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any
condition. RA 7438 does not eliminate the necessity of counsel but underscores its. Hence,
in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of
the accused, the Chief of Police could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent
consent of the 2 accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver
to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently,
any admission obtained from the 2 accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation
would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Page 33 of 59
People v. Lugod
G.R. No. 136253 February 21, 2001

Respondent: Clemente John Lugod
Facts: Helen Ramos was asleep in her house together with her husband and children,
Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up
because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube
was no longer in the place where she was sleeping. She went downstairs to check and found
that Nairube is missing. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for
help. Then, in the morning of September 16, 1997, she went to the police station to report
the loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers, not belonging
to any member of the family. She then went home while the police began their search for
Nairube. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of
Nairube. They continued the search and found a black collared T-shirt. Veloria identified a
black collared T-shirt in court as the one he saw the accused wearing that night and on two
other occasions, aw well as the slippers found in Helen’s house. Vice-Mayor of Cavinti
testified the accused confessed to the commission of the offense, when he visited his sell.
Issue: Whether the appellant’s confession and pointing of the location of the victim’s body
are admissible
Ruling: Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be
provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive
these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver
must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accused-
appellant’s act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the
assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-
appellant’s rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which
cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In
the same vein, the accused-appellant’s act in pointing out the location of the body of
Nairube was also elicited in violation of the appellant’s right to remain silent. The same was
an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous
tree. Also, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by the appellant to the
Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the
alleged confession is not conclusive. Clemente John Lugod is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Page 34 of 59
People v. Baloloy
G.R. No. 140740 April 12, 2002

Respondent: Juanito Baloloy
Facts: At the waterfalls the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn was found. Her father
asked her to borrow some rice from their neighbor. She left but never returned. Juanito
arrived at Ernesto’s house, trembling and apparently weak. Juanito was then bringing a sack
and a kerosene lamp. He said that he would catch frogs. After thirty minutes, Juanito
returned and told Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. It was
Genelyn’s body. A black rope was recovered at the waterfalls where the body was found.
When asked, Juanito claimed it was his. Barangay Captain Ceniza asked him why his rope
was found at the place where Genelyn’s body was discovered. He answered that his
intention was only to frighten her, not to molest and kill her. Judge Dicon, the presiding
judge, after reading the affidavit, asked him whether the charge against him was true.
Juanito responded that he was demonized, and he spontaneously narrated that after he
struck her head with a stone he dropped her.
Issue: Whether the alleged confession of the accused to Barangay Captain Ceniza and the
presiding judge were admissible
Ruling: It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities
but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the
crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the
commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars
is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, after
he admitted ownership of the black rope. He voluntarily narrated that he raped
Genelyn. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an
ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. However, Juanito’s
constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated when Judge Dicon
propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional
rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested
by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could
not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of
counsel. The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already under the custody of the
police authorities. Even if JUANITO’s confession or admission is disregarded, there is more
than enough evidence to support his conviction. The decision of the RTC is affirmed.
Page 35 of 59
People v. Taboga
G.R. No. 144086-87 February 6, 2002
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Facts: At 2:00 in morning, woke up to the sound of loud explosions. He went out of the
house to fetch water, and he saw the house of Francisca Tubon on fire. Ceria was also
awakened by the explosions. She rushed to her aunt’s house and, seeing it on fire, shouted
for help. She called out the name of her aunt but there was no response.
Barangay Captain Pagao and other barangay officials and residents helped in dousing out
the fire using a water pump. When they entered the burned house, they discovered the
charred remains of Francisca Tubon. They examined the body and found stab wounds on
the chest of the deceased. Pagao reported the incident to the police authorities. SPO1
Panod went to the scene of the crime to investigate and gather physical evidence. He
confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed
Francisca Tubon. SPO1 Panod prepared a written extra-judicial confession
for Taboga. During the inquest, however, Taboga refused to sign the confession upon the
advice of his lawyer. The following day, a radio announcer of DZNS, interviewed the
suspect. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.
Accused-appellant claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the
crime.
Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confession made by the accused to a radio reporter is
admissible in evidence
Ruling: There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the
police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there
anything on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed
by the police to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the
reporter even asked permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-
appellant. Nor was the information obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was
very much aware of what was going on. He was informed at the outset by the radio
announcer that he was a reporter who will be interviewing him to get his side of the
incident. The court did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellant’s taped
confession. Such confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given
to police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record
even discloses that accused-appellant admitted to that he clubbed and stabbed the victim
even before the police started investigating him at the police station. Accused-
appellant Edralin Taboga is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
Page 36 of 59
People v. Bato
G.R. No. 113804 January 16, 1998

Respondent: Abraham Bato
Facts: On May 9, 1988 at about three o’clock in the afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr. together
with his father Ernesto Flores, Sr., were called by the two appellants, Abraham and Sergio
Bato, to join them in a drinking spree, which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. Ernesto, Jr. sat about
two (2) meters away from his father while the latter joined appellants for two hours drinking
tuba. When his father was already drunk, appellants tied his father with his hands placed at
the back. Later, he saw appellants bring his father to somewhere else. Seeing his father
being held, he ran away, as he was afraid he would also be taken by appellants. It was only
the following morning that they found his father already dead at the Binaha-an River, five
kilometers away from the place where he last saw him in the previous afternoon.
Issue: Whether the prosecution evidence met the quantum of proof required to overturn
the constitutional presumption of innocence
Ruling: The conviction of Appellant Abraham Bato is based on circumstantial evidence

gleaned from the sole testimony of the son of the deceased. In the absence of direct proof,
a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, with the following
requisites: (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the
defendants are guilty, to the exclusion of any other conclusion. The circumstances proved
must be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of guilt. As a
corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and
every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. In the instant case, the totality of the
prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable
doubt to the guilt of the accused. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State
fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his
defense. In acquitting the herein appellant, this Court is not decreeing that he did not
participate in the killing. It is merely ruling that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Page 37 of 59
People v. Alcanzado
G.R. No. 138335 May 20, 2004

Respondent: Oscar Alcanzado
Facts: On June 17, 1998, the Barangay Tanods of Bel-Air, while on duty, which is adjacent
to TGIF American Bar, heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead body
of the victim with two (2) gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of TGIF being guarded by
the accused. The accused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his service
firearm to the policeman. The ballistic report states that the two (2) spent shells were fired
from the gun surrendered by the accused. The accused opted to file demurrer to evidence
which was denied by the Court, instead of testifying and could have explained what really
happened and why he surrendered his service firearm. There was no eye-witness to the
shooting incident. The RTC relied principally on the admission of appellant to the police
officer that he shot the unknown victim when he surrendered his service firearm.
Issue: Whether the constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been
violated.
Ruling: Contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was
denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying
appellant’s demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently,
the trial court violated the aforequoted provisions of Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had
filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and
therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have
given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. In effect, appellant has not been
accorded due process. Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice
in the handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of defense
evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense
has been violated. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly convicting
appellant of the crime of murder when appellant has not been given the opportunity to
adduce evidence in his defense.
Page 38 of 59
People v. Bayya
G.R. No. 127845 March 10, 2000

Respondent: Lodrigo Bayya
Facts: Sometime in 1994 when Rosie Bayya was still 12 years old, her father, the accused,
forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with her in the family house.
Her father repeated this bestial act in their house about twice a week when her mother was
not at home. Appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter
twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind". Appellant does not dispute the trial
court’s finding of guilt. However, appellant questions the penalty imposed contending that
since the information made no reference to Republic Act No. 7659, it was a reversible error
to convict thereunder. And because the only penal provision relied upon by the prosecution
is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, he could only be sentenced to the maximum
penalty of reclusion perpetua
Issue: Whether there was a transgression of the accused’s right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him
Ruling: The purpose of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. The objectives of right to be informed are: (1) To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the
defense; (2) To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and (3) To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction. It is thus imperative
that the Information filed with the trial court be complete - to the end that the accused may
suitably prepare his defense. Corollary to this, an indictment must fully state the elements
of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of
a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the accused. In the
case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim. The omission
is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more
than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of
guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the
Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right
to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on
trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or
information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.
Page 39 of 59
People v. Manlansing
G.R. No. 131736-37 March 11, 2002

Respondent: Joey Manlansing and Mario Manlansing
Facts: Appellants are brothers. For four years they were tenants of the spouses Magin and
Jorja Soriano. A concerned citizen informed the police of an alleged killing. A team of police
officer spotted bloodstains on the ceiling. In the stockroom on the first floor, they found the
lifeless body of Magin in a pool of blood. Upstairs, they found the corpse of his spouse,
Jorja, on the floor, her throat slit and her neck hacked. Mario claimed he alone was
responsible for the deaths and insisted that his brother had nothing to do with the deaths.
In an amended information, appellants were charged with the murder of Jorja Soriano In an
amended information, and similarly worded except for the victim’s name appellants Joey
and Mario Manlansing were likewise charged with the murder of Magin Soriano. On
arraignment, Joey Manlansing pleaded not guilty to both charges, while Mario Manlansing
pleaded guilty to two counts of murder. After they waived pre-trial, both cases were heard
on the merits.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and further erred in imposing death penalty upon accused-appellants.
Ruling: A review of the informations filed against appellants, in relation to prevailing law
and jurisprudence as well as the newly adopted revisions of the Rules of Court favorable to
the accused will show that the crimes of the brothers could not be qualified as murder. Only
recently in People vs. Gario Alba the Court ruled that pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the information should state not only the
designation of the offense and the acts and omissions constituting it but shall also specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Although the circumstance of treachery was
stated in the information, it was not alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to
murder. Since the information ailed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the
killing to murder, treachery was considered only a generic aggravating circumstance. So is
it with the present case. None of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
informations nor in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance
elevating either killing to murder. Thus, the offenses committed by appellants only
constitute two counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for homicide under
249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence both
appellants to death. Appellants are each declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of homicide.
Page 40 of 59
People v. Bohol
G.R. No. 171729 July 28, 2008

Respondent: Ricardo Bohol
Facts: On August 2, 2002, at around 8:30 p.m., a confidential informant came to the police
station and tipped P/Sr. Insp. Nitullano that a certain Ricardo Bohol is engaged in illegal
drug trade. He formed a team of six police operatives to verify the informant’s tip, and, if
found positive, to launch then and there a buy-bust entrapment of Bohol. PO2 Ferdinand
Estrada was assigned to act as poseur buyer. That same day, the team proceeded to the
site of their operation. Guided by the informant, PO2 Estrada proceeded to the house of
Bohol. Following a short introduction, PO2 Estrada and the informant told Bohol of their
purpose. Bohol handed to the former the marked P100-bill. In turn, Bohol gave PO2 Estrada
a plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules. The illicit transaction having been
consummated, PO2 Estrada gave to his companions their pre-arranged signal. Emerging
from their hiding places, PO2 Luisito Gutierrez and his companions arrested Bohol. PO2
Gutierrez frisked Bohol and recovered from him the buy-bust money and three plastic
sachets containing similar white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu.
Issue: Whether there was a violation of the right of the accused to confront witness directly
Ruling: As ruled by the appellate court, Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the
informant. During trial, the informant’s presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug
cases. The appellate court held that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of
confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their
usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is material to
the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Both
requirements were sufficiently proven in this case. The police officers were able to testify
positively and categorically that the transaction or sale actually took place. The subject
shabu was likewise positively identified by the prosecution when presented in court. Hence,
we agree that Bohol’s guilt has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt. The appeal is denied.
Page 41 of 59
People v. Chua
G.R. No. 128280 April 4, 2001

Respondent: Alicia A. Chua
Facts: Chua received a facsimile message from Harmony Electronics Company in Taiwan
asking her to call up To-ong and Tercenio and tell them that they were needed in Taiwan.
Accused Chua contacted To-ong and told him the message. Both went to the office of
accused Chua, and the latter told them that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment
of a placement fee of P15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI clearances and
medical certificates. They went back to the office of accused Chua and submitted the
requirements. They paid P15,000.00 each for which they were issued a receipt bearing the
name Man Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chua’s signature. Accused Chua
assured them that they would be able to leave for Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but
they were not deployed. Tercenio became apprehensive and told accused Chua that he
would withdraw his application and ask for refund of the placement fee. Chua repeatedly
promised that she would give back the money to him, but she never did. After a few more
months, Chua could not anymore be located.
Issue: Whether accused was denied her constitutional right to compulsory process
Ruling: The Court finds it to be without merit. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded
the right to compulsory process which now includes the right to secure the production of
evidence in one’s behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down the requisites for
compelling the attendance of witnesses may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the
movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of
neglect in previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be
available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained. In the
case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellant’s motion for the production of the
records which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification dated February 3, 1994, as
the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a
license until then.
Page 42 of 59
People v. Malimit
G.R. No. 109775, November 14, 1996

Respondent: Jose Encarnacion Malimit alias ―Manolo‖
Facts: On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Malaki was attending to his
store. Batin, Malaki's houseboy was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen. Rondon,
a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Batin had just finished cooking and from the
kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be
prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant
coming out of the store with a bolo while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled
on the floor "struggling for his life". Rondon also saw appellant rushing out through the front
door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo. Batin immediately went out of the store to
seek help. Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood
and readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of
Malaki was missing from his pocket
Issue: Whether the admission as evidence of Malaki’s wallet violates appellant’s right
against self-incrimination.
Ruling: The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no
application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United
States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to
the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement
but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on
evidence, thus, said: ―If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his
[physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever
form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house,
with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in
evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and
compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In
other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege . . .
but testimonial compulsion‖
Page 43 of 59
People v. Rondero
G.R. No. 125687, December 9, 1999

Respondent: Delfin Rondero
Facts: On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta.
He noticed that his sister, Mylene, was not around. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their
father sought the help of the neighbors, a barangay kagawad and a barangay captain to
search for Mylene. The group began searching at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of
March 26, 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in
vain. They even returned to the school and inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired
and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. Maximo, who was then carrying a
flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well. Accused-
appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands.
Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied
hands. Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw
without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latter’s own son. The group
returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylene’s lifeless body lying on a
cemented pavement near the canteen. Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene’s
body, he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting
on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested accused-appellant.
Issue: Whether the hair strands taken from appellant without his consent and submitted to
the NBI for investigation was a violation of his right against self-incrimination
Ruling: What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused
may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced
out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently,
although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Page 44 of 59
People v. Gallarde
G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000

Respondent: Radel Gallarde
Facts: At the house of the Talan spouses their neighbors converged. Among them were
appellant Gallarde. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. As they
partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime stepped out of the kitchen and chanced
upon appellant and Editha talking. Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding him,
the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house. Editha said she would look for
appellant. By 10:00 o’clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed. Later, Roger
arrived and informed the group that Editha was missing. When Jaime mentioned that
appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the
house of appellant. The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants. His hands
and knees were covered with soil. When asked where he came from because he was not in
the toilet earlier, appellant said he was at Kiko’s house sleeping which is unbelievable
because Kiko was drinking with one of the searchers. After the confrontation at the toilet,
appellant was brought to the barangay captain. Later, the body of Editha was found buried
in a loose soil.
Issue: Whether photographs taken of Gallarde immediately after the incident was a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Ruling: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being
a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against
self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may
be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken
from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea
which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline
of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done.
Page 45 of 59
COMELEC v. Tagle
G.R. No. 148948 & 148951-60, February 17, 2003
Petitioner: Commission on Elections

Respondent: Hon. Lucenito N. Tagle
Facts: Bautista ran for the position of mayor. He filed with the COMELEC a complaint
against then incumbent mayor and ten (10) others for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b)
of the Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was supported by the separate affidavits of
forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities. The Law Department of
COMELEC filed the corresponding information against the respondents before the RTC.
Before the trial began, Rodelas and Macapagal filed a complaint against the witnesses for
violation of Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. The witnesses appealed before
the COMELEC the Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor to file separate information for
vote selling against them. The COMELEC declared such resolution as null and void. It held
that witnesses are exempt from criminal prosecution. The Law Department filed a motion to
dismiss the cases. The judge denied the motion stating that it is necessary that the
witnesses have already performed an overt act of voluntarily giving information or testifying
for one to be exempt from prosecution.
Issue: Whether the witnesses should be exempted from criminal prosecution
Ruling: One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of
prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of
the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the recipient or
acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure the
successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter. Congress saw the wisdom of
this proposition, and so Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying and
Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph: The giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the
solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any person,
otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly
testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt
from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information
and testimony were given: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person
from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony. Petitioner COMELEC found that
witnesses voluntarily admitted that they were the acceptors or recipients in the vote-buying
done by the accused in said case. It was precisely because of such voluntary admission and
willingness to testify that the COMELEC en banc held that the respondents therein are
exempt from criminal prosecution.
Page 46 of 59
Almario v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127772, March 22, 2001
Petitioner: Roberto P. Almario

Facts: Petitioner is one of the accused for estafa thru falsification of public document, and
another for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases. After re-
setting and postponements, counsel for accused moved that the case against the latter be
dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial.
The case was dismissed. Upon motion of the private prosecutor, respondent court
reconsidered the Order dismissing the case. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order
but was denied. Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction against the presiding judge but was also denied and
dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether, in petitioner’s cases, double jeopardy had set in so that petitioner’s
constitutional right against such jeopardy had been violated
Ruling: Jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant
was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused. In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a
violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before
the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with
his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made
with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused
in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions: insufficiency of evidence
and denial of the right to speedy trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings
have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. As
observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond
the control of the parties and of the trial court. There was no unreasonable delay of the
proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the hearings with the reasons for their
postponements or transfers. It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right
against double jeopardy when that order was reconsidered seasonably. The Court have held
that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. However, these
dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases
are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private
respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Page 47 of 59
Manantan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001
Petitioner: George Manantan

Facts: Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through
reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of
the judgment the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to
indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas. In finding petitioner
civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in
a state of intoxication. It found that petitioner’s act of driving while intoxicated was a clear
violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136) and
pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It
held that petitioner’s act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself ―because the
mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation.‖
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24,
1992 denied the motion.
Issue: Whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy
Ruling: Petitioner’s claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed
him in double jeopardy is misplaced. When a person is charged with an offense and the case
is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of
the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This is
double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established:
(a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In
the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case
No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal
became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals
by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not
charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first
offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to
petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court’s judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case
against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy
to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Page 48 of 59
Merciales v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002
Petitioner: Leticia R. Merciales

Facts: Criminal cases for rape with homicide were filed against the private respondents.
During the trial, prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of one accused to be a state
witness. The respondent judge denied the motion for discharge. The prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari before the SC, questioning the respondent judge's denial of the motion
to discharge the accused. The trial judge did not set the case for further hearing so as to
give the prosecution time to secure such temporary restraining order from the SC. Private
respondents filed a motion to set the case for hearing, invoking their constitutional right to
speedy trial. The respondent judge granted the motion. The respondent Judge reset the
hearing after a motion for reconsideration. Again the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, invoking its pending petition for certiorari with the SC. The defense then
moved that the cases be deemed submitted for decision, and asked leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence. The Court dismissed the case. Petitioner Merciales filed before the
respondent CA a petition to annul the Order of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the reopening of the criminal case will violate the accused’s right against
double jeopardy
Ruling: It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not only
the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal
cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without
regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at
all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. By contending that the
challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following
elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient
in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the
accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or
the case is dismissed without their consent. Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is
granted, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued
without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.
Page 49 of 59
Potot v. People
G.R. No. 143547, June 26, 2002
Petitioner: Joey Potot y Surio

Respondent: People of the Philippines et al. .
Facts: Potot was charged with homicide. He pleaded guilty to the charge. He invoked not
only the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, but also the circumstance of voluntary
surrender, He was convicted for homicide. He filed a manifestation with motion informing
the trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision, wife of the victim), filed a motion
for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard
again because ―there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused
miscarriage of justice.
Issue: Whether the trial court’s order for re-evaluation of evidence would place the accused
in double jeopardy
Ruling: The Court agrees with the petitioner that the assailed orders would violate his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such right prohibits any subsequent
prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or
convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a
second charge against him for the same offense. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy,
the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court
has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. These requisites have been established. Records show that
petitioner was charged with homicide under a valid information before the trial court which
has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of
his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has
been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the
same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
offense charged.
Page 50 of 59
People v. Astudillo
G.R. No. 141518, April 29, 2003

Respondent: Clarence Astudillo et al. .
Facts: Respondents were charged with the crime of murder. The trial court rendered a
decision convicting appellants of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not having been alleged in the information,
cannot be appreciated against them. Appellants’ motion for reconsideration was denied.
However, an Amended Decision was rendered where the phrase ―abuse of superior
strength‖ was replaced with treachery.
Issue: Whether the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction should be limited only to
the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration
Ruling: A motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the

accused, or initiated by the court, with the consent of the accused. The requisite consent of
the accused to such motion for reconsideration or modification is intended to protect the
latter from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the
prosecution or the court may have overlooked. Accordingly, once the judgment has been
validly promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial
error, even if unwittingly committed by the trial court through oversight or an initially
erroneous comprehension, can be made only with the consent or upon the instance of the
accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or
himself moves for reconsideration of or appeals from, the decision. The protection against
double jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be waived by the accused. Thus, when the
accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration or modification,
double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed
therein by filing such motion. His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors
or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable
with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. The raison
d’etre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary
appeals from being taken. In effect, a motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or
with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for the review of the trial
court without, however, conducting further proceedings. Having filed a timely motion for
reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or convict them of the lesser offense of homicide,
appellants waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken
at the trial open for the review of the trial court.
Page 51 of 59
Cordora v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009
Petitioner: Gaudencio M. Cordora

Respondent: Commission on Elections and Gustavo S. Tambunting
Facts: In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC, Cordora asserted that
Tambunting made false assertions in his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections
and Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not
eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and
residency requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship Tambunting presented a copy of
his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government merely confirmed
Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Issue: Whether Tambunting’s met the citizenship requirements.
Ruling: Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth,
it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved only served to confirm the American citizenship
which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he
is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate
of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did
not disqualify him from running for public office. Dual citizenship is not a ground for
disqualification from running for any elective local position. Dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with
dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the
oath of allegiance contained therein. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to
be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
Page 52 of 59
De Guzman v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009
Petitioner: Roseller De Guzman

Respondent: Commission on Elections and Gustavo S. Tambunting
Facts: De Guzman and Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor. Private respondent filed
against petitioner a petition for disqualification alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of
the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America. Petitioner
admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, he applied for dual citizenship.
Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. Private respondent won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on
grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. COMELEC First Division rendered Resolution
disqualifying petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed for
having been rendered moot in view of private respondent’s victory. Later, the trial court in
Election Protest declared petitioner as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position.
Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure
to renounce his American citizenship.
Ruling: R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign
country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Petitioner falls under the first
category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his
naturalization as an American citizen. There is no question that petitioner re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance. However, R.A. No. 9225 imposes an
additional requirement ―Those seeking elective public office shall xxx make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a
renunciation of his foreign citizenship. R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements of
swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. In
the instant case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply
with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified
from running for vice-mayor.
Page 53 of 59
Republic v. Lim
G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: Chule Y. Lim
Facts: A petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was filed by
respondent Chule Y. Lim with the RTC. During the hearing, first, she claims that her
surname ―Yu‖ was misspelled as ―Yo‖. Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth
record was written as ―Yo Diu To‖ when it should have been ―Yu Dio To.‖ Third, her
nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her
mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she
is a Filipino citizen. Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was
a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her
parents were never married.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of
Chule Y. Lim from ―Chinese‖ to ―Filipino‖
Ruling: Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement
of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise,
the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing
such intention ―in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.‖ Plainly, the above constitutional and
statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never
married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a
Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority.
Page 54 of 59
Bengson III v. HRET

G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004
Petitioner: Antonio Bengson III

Respondent: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro Cruz
Facts: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in Tarlac of Filipino parents. However, respondent Cruz enlisted in
the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Whatever doubt that remained
regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative. He won over petitioner Bengson III. Petitioner filed a case with respondent
HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen
Issue: Whether HRET erred when it ruled that Cruz is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
Ruling: CA No. 63 enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct
act of Congress. Repatriation may be had by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; (2) services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage
of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. Repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In Cruz's case,
he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship. Having thus taken the
required oath of allegiance and having registered in the Civil Registry, Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Page 55 of 59
Tabasa v. CA
G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006
Petitioner: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa

Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals et al. .
Facts: Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. when petitioner was seven
years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By
derivative naturalization petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner arrived in
the Philippines and was admitted as a ―balikbayan‖ for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was
arrested and detained. Consul of the US informed the BID that Tabasa’s passport has been
revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest or violation of
Section 1073, ―Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution.‖ The BID ordered petitioner’s
deportation to his country of origin, the United States. Petitioner filed before the CA a
Petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had
acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he
cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.
Issue: Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
Ruling: The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born

Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to
the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. If a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate, his
repatriation will also benefit his minor children. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time
of his ―repatriation‖. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor
age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a
natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he
lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic
exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political
reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not
his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born
Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political
and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of
repatriation. In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA
8171. Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country,
became an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent
―repatriation‖ cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and
valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Page 56 of 59
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006
Petitioner: Loida Nicolas-Lewis et al. .

Facts: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before
the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification
as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United
States that, per a COMELEC letter they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to
their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under
R.A. 9189.
Ruling: Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution prescribes residency requirement as a

general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes
Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident
may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to
vote. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
―duals‖ are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized
that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary
conditions, are qualified to vote. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A.
9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the
irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru
the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. The Court rules and so holds
that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote
under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003.
Page 57 of 59
Valles v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
Petitioner: Cirilo R. Valles

Respondent: Commission on Elections et al.
Facts: Lopez, private respondent, was born in Australia to a Filipino father and Australian
mother. At the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. She
was married to a Filipino citizen. Since then, she has continuously participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. Her election was contested
by her opponent, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However,
finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. The citizenship of private respondent was once
again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor. Her candidacy was
questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles but the petition was dismissed.
Issue: Whether private respondent Lopez is a Filipino citizen and qualified to run for
governor
Ruling: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born to a
Filipino citizen father and an Australian mother. Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same
laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. So also,
the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. Further,
in order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration and her Australian passport is bereft of merit. Lopez is adjudged
qualified to run for governor.
Page 58 of 59
Tecson v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Petitioner: Ma. Jeanette C Tecson

Respondent: Commission on Elections et al.
Facts: FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. A petition was filed to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject.
Issue: Whether Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino
Ruling: The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or
not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the ―en masse Filipinization‖ that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
Page 59 of 59
Cabiling Ma v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010
Petitioner: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma et.al.

Respondent: Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez
Facts: Petitioners are the children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipina mother. Records
reveal that Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935
Constitution. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for
almost sixty (60) years. Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed
Philippine citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens,
petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry
as required. A complaint was received alleging that Felix Ma and his seven (7) children are
undesirable and overstaying aliens.
Issue: Whether petitioners are citizens of the Philippines despite failure to immediately file
the documents of election of Philippine citizenship with the civil registry
Ruling: The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are the following: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the
oath with the nearest civil registry. Petitioners complied with the first and second
requirements upon reaching the age of majority. However, registration of the documents of
election with the civil registry was done belatedly. Under the facts peculiar to the
petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Their exercise of
suffrage, being elected to public office, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines,
and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship do not on their own take the
place of election of citizenship. The election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, registration of the
documents of election beyond the timeframe should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive
acts of citizenship have been done publicly, consistently and continuously. These acts
constitute constructive registration. In other words, the actual exercise of Philippine
citizenship for over half a century by the petitioners is actual notice to the Philippine public,
which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. It is not
the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under C.A. No. 625 that
will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact
that citizenship has been claimed. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of
the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine
citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat that election and negate the permanent fact that petitioners have a
Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.

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CHARLOTTE CRIZTEL Y.

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