Roe vs.

Wade
410 US 113 (1973)
FACTS:
This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which
granted the declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the
constitutionality of the Texas Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an
injunction against enforcement of such statutes.

In 1970, Norma L McCorvey( Jane Roe ), a pregnant single woman

(allegedly a result of rape), filed a suit against the defendant, District
Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State Laws which proscribe procuring
or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of
saving the mothers life. She argues that said laws are unconstitutionally
vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed
and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or sue on behalf of herself
and all other women similarly situated; thereby becoming a class suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a womans right to privacy as protected by the
constitution includes the right to abort her child.

HELD:
Yes. The right of privacy x x x is broad enough to encompass a
womans decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. We therefore
conclude that the right of personal privacy includes abortion decision, but
that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation.

A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that

exempts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother,
without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the interests
involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
 PEOPLE vs. RAMOS
39 SCRA 236
FACTS:
Feliciano M. Ramos filed a petition through the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 50, of Villasis, Pangasinan for the automatic review of the death
penalty imposed upon him by the 11thMunicipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Villasis Sto. Tomas at Villasis, Pangasinan. On October 16, 1995, Elizabeth T.
Ramos filed a criminal complaint for rape against him. It was alleged therein
that appellant was able to perpetrate the felony against the minor
complainant through the use of force and intimidation in its execution. After
considering the evidence presented during the trial and the arguments
presented by appellant, the MCTC found out that the appellant was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt .The court a quo condemned appellant to death,
the penalty prescribe for the crime of rape because the complainant is not
only a minor (14 yrs. old) but the very own child of the appellant. It is stated
under the amendatory provisions introduced $# Republic Act No. 7659 to
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court further ordered
appellant to indemnify his victim in the amount of P50, 000.00 and to pay her
moral damages of P45, 000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of P45,
000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, death penalty should $e imposed against Feliciano M.
Ramos.

HELD:
No. The court a quo arrived at this conclusion under the notion that the
particular rape involved is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Then,
taking the relationship of appellant and complainant as a generic
aggravating circumstance, the MCTC imposed the higher of the two
indivisible penalties which is the capital punishment. Treating relationship as a
generic aggravating circumstance, MCTC considered the relationship of
appellant and complainant as attendant in the case despite the absence of
any allegation thereof in the information. Appellant takes issue in this point, by
asserting that since the fact of relationship was not alleged in the information,
only the penalty prescribe for simple rape can be imposed upon him. This is
"here the RTC depart from the conclusions of the lower court and agree with
appellants position. A rape by a father of his minor daughter is punishable by
the single indivisible penalty of death and not by reclusion perpetua to death,
as the lower court erroneously believed.
 PEOPLE vs. GALIT
135 SCRA 465
FACTS:
Francisco Galit was arrested for killing Natividad Fernando on the
occasion of a robbery. He was detained and interrogated almost
continuously for 5 days. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was
no evidence to link him to the crime. The interrogating officers began to maul
him and to torture him physically. They covered his face with a rag and
pushed his face into a toilet bowl of human waste. The prisoner then admitted
what the investigating officers wanted him to admit. He then signed the
confession they prepared. The trial court convicted him of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of Death,
hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the confession admissible in evidence.

HELD:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engage by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not

satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights
under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and
clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or
language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar
and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time
of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he
had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks
after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see
him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and
yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-
enactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitute grave violations of his rights.

The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment

are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner
contrary to law.
 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. SECRETARY OF DAR
G.R. No. 78742 (175 SCRA 343), July 14, 1989

FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also
known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988".

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O
Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to
provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, they also
allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for
violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process
and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated
in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders violate the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their
tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police
power or Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of
eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or
intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such
property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in
Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of
just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.
 ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL 155

FACTS:
The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the
retail trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business, prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in our
country. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by its provisions
filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional
contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2)
the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.

HELD:
No, the equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen
in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out
its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems
not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that
the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from
no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered
into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered
by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
 MIRANDA vs. ARIZONA
384 US 436

FACTS:
The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v. Arizona consolidated four
separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained
during police interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was
questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room
in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the
defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the
interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions
and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at trial.

ISSUES:
Whether statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to
custodial police interrogation are admissible against him in a criminal trial
and whether procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his
privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled
to incriminate himself are necessary.

HELD:
The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to
protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. As
such, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.

The Court further held that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely.
Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of

Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals
in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in
Stewart.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BOLANOS
211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808

FACTS:
Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan.
According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was
with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who
had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the
accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the
accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay,
other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station.
While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC
convicted him hence the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional
right to counsel.

HELD:
Yes, being already under custodial investigation while on board the
police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation
may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his
Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more
particularly par. 1 and par. 3 which explicitly provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense

shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this
section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices and their families.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BASAY
G.R. No. 86941

FACTS:
Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder
with Arson in a criminal complaint 1 filed on 24 March 1986 with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose in the Province of
Negros Oriental for having;

1. Allegedly killed spouses Zosimo Toting, Sr. and Beatrice Toting and
their six-year old daughter Bombie Toting; they were stabbed and
hacked before their house was burned. Zosimo and Beatrice died
immediately while Bombie lived for a few days.

2. As a result of this fire, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting suffered

burns which caused the death of the former; the latter, however,
survived due to timely medical attention.

3. Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao that on March 4, 1986 at 7:00

o'clock in the evening, appellant and TeodoroBasay killed her parents
and burned their house RTC DCN: Basay not guilty of Multiple Murder,
Frustrated Murder with Arson, but finding Ramirez guilty of Multiple
Murder, Frustrated Murder with Arson.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellant Ramirezs should be convicted?

HELD:
NO. Appellants constitutional right was violated.

RATIO:
The court harbor very serious doubts about the alleged statement given
by Bombie Toting to Sgt. Tabanao and Jaime Saguban identifying the
appellant and TeodoroBasay as the perpetrators of the heinous crime. In the
first place, the trial court itself ruled that Bombie was not a competent witness.
We agree with such a conclusion, not necessarily because she was only six (6)
years old, but because her condition at the time she supposedly gave her
statement made it impossible for her to have communicated effectively. The
doctor who attended to her before she died, Dr. Edgar Cantalao, testified
that when he last saw Bombie alive, she could not talk.

There is no evidence to show that Bombie Toting told the doctor as to

who were the perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own brother,
Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused, Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez
who killed her parents and her brother and sisters and burned their house.

In the second place, as a result of the foregoing observations, the trial

court completely disregarded Bombie Toting's so-called statement as against
Teodoro Basay. We therefore see neither rhyme nor reason for the trial court's
admission of the same as against the appellant.

Hence, the appellant's guilt was not established with moral certainty.
He should be acquitted.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMOS
(122 SCRA 312)
FACTS:

The police officers, placed Malcon Olevere under arrest after they
found in his possession dried marijuana leaves, which the suspect declared
that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS.
Mr. Ramos was arrested and place under custodial investigation by the Drug
Enforcement Section of the WPD. Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn
statement implicating the accused as the source of the marijuana leaves. The
accused, allegedly, verbally admitted for the commission of the offense
charged. The court of First Instance of Manila now the Regional Trial Court
found the accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in view of the verbal admission given by the appellant himself
and the evidence offered and admitted in court.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused Ramos should be adjudged guilty of violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

HELD:

The prosecution failed to present necessary evidence to establish

Ramos guilt. The accused was denied due process of law when a sworn
statement was admitted as evidence but the witness was not presented in
the court. The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution
prove nothing material and culpable against the accused.

The accused constitutional right to silence and to counsel was denied

when an extrajudicial admission was taken. The guilt of the accused has not
been established beyond reasonable doubt and he is, therefore, entitled to
acquittal.
 CHAVEZ vs. COURT OF APPEAL
24 SCRA 663 (1968)
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged of qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one
Thunder bird car, with accessories amounting to P22, 000.00.

That this theft was committed when the petitioner with the help of one,
Asistio have completed a deed of sale of Thunderbird which belongs to
Johnson Lee. Chavez telephoned Lee and made an appointment for the sale
of Thunderbird with Sumilang as an introduced buyer.

As payment was made to Eugenes restaurant in Quezon City, all of

them then drove to the place. Chavez and Sumilang, pretending to get the
money for the perfection of sale of the Thunderbird car, left the two Chinese
alone, Johnson Lee and his brother.

When the two Chinese went outside to look for Chavez and Sumilang,
they could no longer locate the former and the Thunderbird car was also
from the parking lot.

Nevertheless the Thunderbird was impounded however, it was already

been repainted.

During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia presented Chavez as a witness. And
despite of Chavezs objection being aware that the latter would be self
incriminated, the Court sustained the stand of the Fiscal saying.

What he will testify to, does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act
as witness on the witness stand including the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners statement against himself can be used
to convict him.

HELD:
No. It is in the context that we sat that the constitutional guarantee
may not be treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory: it secures to
every defendant a valuable and substantive right.

The court may not extract from a defendants own lips and against his
will an admission of his guilt.

In reality, the purpose calling an accused as a witness for the People

would be to incriminate him.

In the case at bar, the petitioner did not volunteer to take the witness
stand in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the
contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify.

There is not even a valid waiver of the privilege. To be valid and

effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently,
understandably and willingly made.

Wherefore the accused is acquitted.

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO ALE Y CAMPESENIO
145 SCRA 50 (1986)
FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
Branch III in Tagbilaran City, finding appellant ROGELIO ALE Y CAMPESENIO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay fine of P20,000.00.

The judgment that guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt was
justified by the lower court thru the testimony by witnesses Alejandro Binan
and Teodosio Rosaroso. However, Rosaroso testified on two occasions.

If the sale of prohibited drugs was actually seen by Sgt. Bian and Sgt.
Rosaroso, there would have been no need for them to wait for a signal from
the poseur-buyer to indicate that the transaction had been completed,
before closing in and arresting the appellant. (See People v. Nicandro, 141
SCRA 289).

We note, however that the police informant was not presented as a

witness, prompting the appellant to invoke with reason another disputable
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced
(Rule 131, Sec. 5 (e) (See People v. Nicandro, supra). As a matter of fact, the
presumption that official duty is regularly performed cannot, by itself, prevail
against the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded an accused
person.

ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of Sunga et al. has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

HELD:
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The
Constitution and the law are clear that in case of reasonable doubt, the
accused must be acquitted. Our jurisprudence is built around the concept
that it is preferable for the guilty to remain unpunished than for an innocent
person to suffer a long prison term unjustly.

All considered, we hold that the guilt of appellant Ale has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside, and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO AUSTRIA
195 SCRA 700 (1991)

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision* dated March 18, 1980 of the
Judicial District, Bacolod City, finding accused-appellants Eduardo Austria,
Pablo Austria and Jaime Dela Torre guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Tomas Azuelo in the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

It appears in the record that on August 10, 1975 the police dug-out of
the ground in Negros Occidental, the lifeless body of Tomas Azuelo. Post
mortem examination showed that Tomas Azuelos skull was fractured and his
body sustained (18) stab wounds, fifteen (15) of which were fatal. The payroll
together with the sum of P771.40 was missing.

The decision made from the testimony of prosecution witnesses and

Iluminada Azuelo, wife of the deceased, declared that: before the death of
Tomas, only Pablo Austria was working in the hacienda as her late husband
dismissed Jaime de la Torre and Eduardo Austria
During the pendency of the appeal, Pablo Austria and Jaime de la Torre died
of undetermined cause and hypertension, respectively, at the New Bilibid
Prisons Hospital.

ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of Eduardo Austria has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

HELD:
After a review of the records, the Court finds that the evidence
presented by the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant
Eduardo Austria beyond reasonable doubt.

In the first place, as stated in the appealed decision, the evidence of

the prosecution against appellant Eduardo Austria is merely circumstantial.
There is neither direct evidence nor actual witness to the commission of the
crime. This is not to say, however, that conviction cannot be had simply
because the evidence is circumstantial. To sustain a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 133, there must. be (a) more than
one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The series of circumstances proved must be consistent with each other

and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the guilt of
the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. To warrant conviction in
criminal cases based upon circumstantial evidence, it must constitute an
unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a conviction that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the circumstantial
evidence do not prove an unbroken link of events that could give rise to a
reasonable and fair conclusion that appellant committed the imputed
offense.
 As regards appellant Eduardo Austria, the only evidence against him is
that he was seen at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 9, 1975
along the road going to Hda Austria. This evidence even if tied up with the
testimony of Iluminada Azuelo that Austria harboured ill-feelings against the
deceased because he was dismissed from the hacienda by the deceased
does not establish or support an inference, much less a conclusion, that he
participated in the commission of the offense charged. The conviction of
appellant Eduardo Austria on an inference based on another inference
cannot be maintained.

It is axiomatic that conviction should be made on the basis of strong,

clear and compelling evidence. Thus, "if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the tests of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction" To overcome the presumption of
innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed.

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with

guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need
for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on
trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It
is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken
into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED and the

accused/appellant Eduardo Austria is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REY SUNGA, ET AL.
123 SCRA 327 (1983)

FACTS:

Upon the discovery of the mutilated body of a high-school girl at a coffee

plantation, information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
Rape with Homicide against several suspects including Rey Sunga,
RamilLansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil
Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.
Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition for bail underscoring the
weakness of the prosecutions evidence, there being no direct evidence
against them. In the same proceeding, a motion was granted to discharge
Locil to become a state witness while deferring the resolution of the bail
petition.
Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC reached to a decision
convicting Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of death, and Pascua as
principal in the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of Sunga et al. has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

HELD:
The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator
imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and
without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the
latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The
testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by
unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an
extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.
As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of
corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned
state witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as
when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in
a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not
have been the result of deliberate afterthought.
Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but should also be credible in it such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.
The observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice
with which Locil gave her testimony, the improbability with which she was
precisely made by appellants to be a witness to their crime, and the failure of
her description of Pascuas eyes to match the latters actual physical feature
cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her testimony
against all appellants. The Court thus finds her uncorroborated account to
have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and
sufficiency, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to
warrant appellants conviction.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DRAMAYO
42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971

FACTS:

Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he

could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was for
Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The
others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were
convicted in the RTC for murder, hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accuseds criminal liability proved beyond

reasonable doubt.

HELD:

Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of

innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right
safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then
to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be
shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty.
"By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is
doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability,
after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal
charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to
every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense."

The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise

on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the
fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The
presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more
than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution.
The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated
likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases
where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being
acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did
hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime
charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OBSANIA
23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968

FACTS:

The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the
Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel
moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the
info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution
appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double

Jeopardy.

HELD:

In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint,
b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge,
d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial
Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double
jeopardy as enunciated in PP vs. Salico applies to wit when the case
is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not
be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in
having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional
right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction
against him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with

the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel
there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment
against him is revived by the fiscal.
 GERRY TOYOTO vs. HON. FIDEL RAMOS
G.R. No. L-69270 October 15, 1985

FACTS:

Gerry Toyoto, Eddie Gonzales and Dominador Gabiana belong to a

group called the "Urban Poor" which conducted a march, demonstration and
rally along Northbay Boulevard in Navotas, Metro Manila, on October 23,
1983.

Subsequently, Toyoto, Gonzales and Gabiana (among others) were

accused of violating Presidential Decree No. 1835 (Codifying the Various Laws
on Anti-Subversion and Increasing the Penalties for Membership in Subversive
Organizations [January 16, 1981]) in Criminal Case No. 1496-MN of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon. No bail was recommended for their
provisional liberty.

There was an order of dismissal and when the petition for habeas
corpus was filed, the respondents had not released and they refused to
release the petitioners on the ground that a Preventive Detention Action had
been issued against them. It is to be noted that the petitioners had been in
detention for over one year.

ISSUE:

Whether the State can "reserve" the power to re-arrest the petitioners
even after they had been acquitted by a court of competent jurisdiction for
the offense for which they had been previously arrested.

HELD:

Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic

when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or
permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant case
presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State
can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of
competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer
is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the
petitioners being merely "temporary" it follows that they can be re-arrested at
anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold
that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of
men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a
criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same
offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the release of the petitioners is

hereby declared to be permanent. No costs.
 GUANZON vs. DE VILLA
181 SCRA 316; G.R. No. 80508; January 30, 1990
FACTS:

The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target

zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be
search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of
the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the
point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip
down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents
complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables
had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of
mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also
suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies.
Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power
to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in
the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and
criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were
conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned
months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media
joined the operation to witness and record such event.

Issue:
Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of
human rights.

Held:
It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is
the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened
sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been
no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is
no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning"
could not be achieved even as the rights of the squatters and low income
families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a
taxpayer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly
charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier
or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear
facts no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were

committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are
shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:

Sec. 2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The provision is intended to protect the individual from official (and

officious) intrusions, no matter how humble his abode and however lowly his
station in life. Against the mighty forces of the government, the person's house
is his castle, his inviolate refuge and exclusive domain where he is the
monarch of all he surveys.

Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's door and
command him at gunpoint to come out so he and his neighbors, who have
also been rounded up, can all be placed on public examination, as in a slave
market. This is followed by the arrest and detention of those suspected of
villainy, usually on the basis only of the tattoos on their bodies or the informer's
accusing finger.
 RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
248 SCRA 590; G.R. No. 93833
FACTS:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the
Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners
dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the

event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based
was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later
on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the
petitioners MR, hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of

the parties in the conversation.

HELD:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized

Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and
Other Purposes, provides:

Sec.1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictograph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The afore stated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
 A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the

statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person
should be professed.

Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to
share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by which
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,

written or expressive communications of meanings or thoughts which are
likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latters
office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase
private communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the
terms conversation and communication were interchangeably used by
Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.
 OPLE vs. TORRES
G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308

entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of
the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on

January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation
of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining its implementation.

ISSUE:
The implementation of A.O. NO. 308 insidiously lay the groundwork for a
system which will violate the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution.

HELD:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

RATIO:

Unlike the dissenters, we prescient from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2)
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No.
308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness; the over
breadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.
 VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN
3 Phil 778 (1919)

FACTS:

One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then
at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with
friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that
the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by
the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was
deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of
night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to
refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

ISSUE:
Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD:

Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to
a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his
action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his
residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines,
entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other
citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It
may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize
anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the
human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being
exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao.

For this, Lukban must be severely punished.

 MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from presidency
via the non-violent people power revolution and forced into exile. Corazon
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power has not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of
Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with
the support of Marcos loyalists and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos
spouse to return from Hawaii awakened the nation to the capacity of the
Marcoss to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanatics and blind loyalty of
their followers in the country. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. President Aquino, considering the dire
consequence to the nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision to
bar the turn of Marcos and his family.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoss from returning to the
Philippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcoss to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

RULING:
No to both issues, petition dismissed.

RATIO:
The rights Marcoss are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible
depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoss to be allowed
to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel,
subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoss to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance the national interest. Residual powers, according to
Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not
forbidden in the Constitution, inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the
President and that the president has to maintain peace during times of
emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
 For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or
not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the
national interest to bar the return of the Marcoss in the Philippines. It is proven
that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The President must take pre-
emptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the
people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
 MEJOFF vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
490 Phil 70

FACTS:

Boris Mejoff, a Russian, was captured as a Japanese spy by the US Army

Counter Intelligence Corps on March 18, 1948. He was turned over to the Phil
Commonwealth Government for appropriate disposition. His case was
decided on by the Board of Commissioners of Immigration who declared him
as an illegal alien. The Board ordered his immediate deportation. In the
meantime, we was placed in prison awaiting the ship that will take him back
home to Russia. Two Russian boats have been requested to bring him back to
Russia but the masters refused as they had no authority to do so. Two years
passed and Mejoff is still under detention awaiting the ship that will take him
home.

This case is a petition for habeas corpus. However, the respondent held
that the Mejoff should stay in temporary detention as it is a necessary step in
the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens. It further states that
is has the right to do so for a reasonable length of time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison awaiting his

deportation.

RULING:

The Supreme Court decided that Mejoff be released from custody but
be placed under reasonable surveillance of the immigration authorities to
insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready
to deport him. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines in its
constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of Nations. Also, the Philippines has joined the United Nations in
its Resolution entitled Universal Declaration of Human Rights in proclaiming
that life and liberty and all other fundamental rights shall be applied to all
human beings. The contention that he remains a threat of to the security of
the country is unfounded as Japan and the US or the Phils are no longer at
war.
 THE PROVINCE OF TAYABAS vs. SIMEON PEREZ
66 PHIL 467 (1931)

FACTS:

Among the various property owners against whom the plaintiff filed its
complaint for expropriation in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, were
Florentino Sa Gil, who died in the course of the trial and was substituted by
Josefa R. Oppus, Jose Cabrera, Josefa Villareal de Meric, Hilario Castor,
Rafaela Martinez, Enrica Malubag and Bernardino Maano. After it had been
proven that the plaintiff had a perfect right to the expropriation sought by it,
the lower court rendered judgment granting it said expropriation and
ordering it to pay to the above-named defendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the above-named defendants, in addition to

recovering the price of their respective houses, are entitled to the additional
compensation granted them in said judgment, for the transfer and
reconstruction of said houses in other places.

HELD:

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the

property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been
understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.

In this case, it appears clearly unjust to compel the appellant to defray

the expenses incurred in their transfer and reconstruction in another place by
the owners of said houses, who, strictly speaking, already cease to be so from
the time they are paid the price thereof. To do so would mean double
compensation, or in other words, it would be equivalent to giving the
appellees, for their expropriated houses, more than the money value thereof.
The appellees have no right to collect at the same time the just prices of their
houses and the cost of their transfer and reconstruction in another place. At
most, they are entitled to either one or the other, and nothing more.

For the foregoing consideration, the judgment appealed from is

modified, by eliminating there from that part granting the appellees the right
to collect from the appellant the expenses for the transfer and reconstruction
of their respective houses, and it is affirmed in all other respects, without
special pronouncement as to costs.
 US vs. BUSTOS
G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918

FACTS:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary (privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and
O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against
the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who
have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused
published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and
libelous against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue
of his right to free speech and free press.

HELD:
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right
to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the
duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of

republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of

government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable
and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the
doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the
peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance
or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of
these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be
venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
 ESPUELAS vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-2990, December 17, 1951

FACTS:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of
Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it
to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope
suspended from the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely
standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of
general circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but
also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a
suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a
fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed
wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of
President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and
directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US
and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many
Hitlers and Mussolinis.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC
against the Government of the Philippines?

HELD:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there
being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the
decision will be affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article

written by the accused, cannot fail to impress thinking people that it seeks to
sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere
effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to
martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use of irritating
language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating
disturbances, the rationale of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or
writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire

governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that
article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels
against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in
the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the
majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were
naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies

or riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to
provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer, which is
the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to

stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to
induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
 EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) vs. HON. JOSE P. DANS
137 SCRA 628

FACTS:

1. The radio station DYRE was closed on the allegation that their station
was used to incite people to rebellion, a crime against national security.

2. The station claimed that there was no substantial proof that there
was an attempt to incite rebellion, no hearing to settle the issue, and no prior
notice about the charges against them were sent to the station. Thus they
filed a complaint as they were not given due process, and the closing of the
station violates freedom of expression.

3. The station was sold to a new owner and the case was moot and
academic, but the court decided on it for future reference and as a means
of guidance for the courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the closing of the station violated the freedom of

expression.

HELD:

YES. The court stressed that all forms of media, whether print or
broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government
still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners
to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is
the clear and present danger' rule. (If in the circumstances that the media is
used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then
the law has the right to prevent it. Without proof of any danger to the
government and country, the closing of the station was a violation of the
constitution. The people have a right to be informed. Radio and television
would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland,
obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most
convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public
issues, they also deserve special protection.

Petition is GRANTED.
 JOSE BURGOS vs. CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. No L-64261

FACTS:

Respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano issued 2 search warrants to search

the premises of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum. Various equipments
paraphernalia and written documents were searched. Written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos Jr.
publisher-editor of We Forum newspaper were seized.

The validity of these warrants were questioned through a petition for

certiorari and so that the articles and equipment may be returned to the
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid to justify the seizure of the
items.

HELD:

The law provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall

issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances

which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In the case, the reason
for the seizure must be well stated, as well as the specifications and the
particularities of the alleged subversive material that the petitioner has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus,
the broad statement in Col. Abadillas application is a mere conclusion of law
and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. The warrant is
constitutionally objectionable because they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants were declared null and void.
 SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529 (1989)
FACTS:
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS
REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the
power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881),
said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No.
2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein
petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper
circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.
During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void
and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is
unconstitutional.
HELD:
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted
to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information
to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to
mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their
freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no
statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's
freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where
he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify
such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a
restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision
would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues,
including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where
the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec
radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full
dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or
television times
 AYER PRODUCTIONS vs. JUDGE CAPULONG
160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988

FACTS:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production
company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The
Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government
agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor
McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian has
developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member
of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation. Petitioners acceded to this demand
and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was
filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of
the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family
and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless
is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence, the
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the freedom of expression was violated.

HELD:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film
and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or
to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and
of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not
exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent
trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was,
in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to
privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus
relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was
a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at
least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation
of events.
 VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE
170 SCRA 256

FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano
Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting to be furnished with the list
of names of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa including
the ten (10) opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2
million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not possible, an
access to those said documents. Apart from Valmontes letter, he is stressing
the premise of the request on the present provision of the Freedom
constitution at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware
that such request contains serious legal implication seeks the help of Mr.
Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In Mr. Tiros reply letter, a
confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow
from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to
preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to
breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts. On June 26, 1986,
apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General
Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to
receive a reply, they are now considering themselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue their desired objective in
pursuance of public interest. Separate comments were filed by respondent
Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated
reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file
their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed
submitted for decision. In his comment, respondent raise procedural
objection to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that
petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims
that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However, did not seek relief from the GSIS
Board of Trustees, It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies
were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, is
entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to
information.

RULING:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation
of power by the people to the state. Governmental agencies and institutions
operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Yet, like all
constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. Peoples
right to information is limited to matters of public concern and is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.The GSIS is a trustee
of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b)
and46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance
act of 1977 provide for annual appropriations for to pay for contributions,
premiums , interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government,
as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines
assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is
expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed
properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the
insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated
funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that
the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its
transactions were above board. Respondent maintains that a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a
policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information. He further contends that in view of the right to privacy, which is
equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents,
evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit
of the right to information. There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is
constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, speaking
through then Mr. Justice Fernando stated that ultimate and pervasive control
of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state.
In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
which the state can control. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of
the court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, and not to public and the government agencies like the
GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.
A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the
right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a
corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS
through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked
only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. Respondent next
asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions are private in
nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern which guarantees access to official records
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions only. Further, they argued that GSIS is a governmental corporation
performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the peoples
right to access to official records. This Dichotomy characterizing government
function has long been repudiated in ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and
Government Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government
WHETHER carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business,
discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to the people. Consequently, that
the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary function would NOT
justify the exclusion of transactions from the coverage and scope of right to
information. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the
respondent General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is
ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing
loans granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners
may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to time and manner of
inspection, not incompatible with the decision, as the GSIS may deem
necessary. SO ORDERED.
 BALDOZA vs. DIMAANO
71 SCRA 529

FACTS:
Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge
Dimaano with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the
Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the
Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated
report on peace and order conditions of the municipality.
Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse
access to official court records but that the same is always subject to
reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be
inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an
improper use or inspection of its records and furnishing copies may be
refuse when the motivation is not serious and legitimate interest, out of
whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or promote
public scandal.
In his answer, respondent observed;
Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the
exercise of the right.
There has been recent tampering of padlocks of the door of the Court
and with this, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the
right to free access, might do more harm than good.
Request of such a magnitude cannot b immediately granted without
adequate deliberation and advisement
Authority should first be secured from the Supreme Court
Case was referred to Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At
the preliminary hearing, Taal Mayor Corazon Caniza filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation among
officers. This motion was denied by Investigating Judge but he
recommended the exoneration of respondent.
Investigating Judges report avers that complainant was aware of the
motion to dismiss and he was in conformity with it. Communications
between complainant and respondent reveal that respondent allowed
the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent
under certain conditions and under his control and supervision.
Under the conditions, the Court found that the respondent has not
committed any abuse of authority
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted arbitrarily in the premises (when he
allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent).

HELD:
No. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the
docket books of respondent under certain conditions and under his control
and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and condition imposed
by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is
predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on public
concern.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby dismissed.
 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. PCGG
299 SCRA 244

FACTS:

PCGG and Marcos siblings agreed to General and Supplemental

Agreements with regards to the ill-gotten wealth cases against their family.
The same was filed with Sandigan Bayan. Chavez then filed petition with SC
to enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine whether
the latter has been acting within the bounds of its authority. SC decided the
case on 09 December 1998. However, the siblings did not file motion for
reconsideration until the deadline for such lapsed. They instead filed 1) a
Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion for Leave to File the Attached
Partial Motion for Reconsideration . . . and (2) Partial Motion for
Reconsideration, contending that their exclusion from the case violated their
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Movants pray that
the proceedings before the anti-graft court be allowed to take their due
course, consistent with the principle of the hierarchical administration of
justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not equal protection was observed in the (principle of

hierarchical) administration of justice?

HELD:

Motion denied. The movants are merely incidental parties to the instant
case. Being contractors to the General and Supplemental Agreements
involving their supposed properties, they claim that their interests are affected
by the petition. However, the Agreements undeniably contain terms an
condition that are clearly contrary to the Constitution and the laws and are
not subject to compromise. Such terms and conditions cannot be granted by
the PCGG to anyone. The principle of the hierarchy of the courts generally
applies to cases involving factual question. The oft-repeated justification for
invoking it is that such cases do not only impose upon the precious time of the
Court but, more important, inevitably result in their delayed adjudication.
Often, such cases have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum or as better equipped to resolve to the issues, since the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Inasmuch as the petition at bar involves
only constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the Court
resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.
 REYES vs. BAGATSING
125 SCRA 563 (1983)

FACTS:

Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases

Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the
US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied
by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have
been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by
lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the
staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing
pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy
from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution, we adhere to
generally accepted principles of international law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution.

Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.

HELD:

I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign
diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the
same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the
Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free
speech and peaceable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance
issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof
would collide with constitutionally guaranteed rights.

II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present
danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief
assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful
rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no
showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, theres
also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally but, as
noted by the SC, that has not been raised an issue in this case)
 VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS
59 SCRA 54 (1974)

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesiani Cristo (INC) member, has been an

employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a
member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers Union). Under the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop
agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the factory
relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in
the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano
tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an
exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of
the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a
member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the
Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved
to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and
ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement because
RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members
of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWUs
and ERFs legal/contractual rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such,
an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that
there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his
employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the
majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a
union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions
and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it
recognizes the workers right to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as
well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.