Republic of the Philippines SITUATED ALONG DR.

JOSE FERNANDEZ STREET, BARANGAY MAUWAY, CITY

SUPREME COURT OF MANDALUYONG, OWNED BY MR. ANTONIO YUSAY
Baguio City
WHEREAS, there is a parcel of land situated along Dr. Jose Fernandez Street, Barangay
THIRD DIVISION Mauway, City of Mandaluyong, owned and registered in the name of MR. ANTONIO YUSAY;

G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011 WHEREAS, this piece of land have been occupied for about ten (10) years by many financially
hard-up families which the City Government of Mandaluyong desires, among other things, to
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners, provide modest and decent dwelling;
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG WHEREAS, the said families have already negotiated to acquire this land but was refused by
CITY, Respondents. the above-named owner in total disregard to the City Government’s effort of providing land for
the landless;
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the expropriation of said land would certainly benefit public interest, let alone, a
BERSAMIN, J.: step towards the implementation of social justice and urban land reform in this City;

The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 1 and resolution WHEREAS, under the present situation, the City Council deems it necessary to authorize Hon.
promulgated on January 17, 2003,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside Mayor BENJAMIN S. ABALOS to institute expropriation proceedings to achieve the noble
the order issued in their favor on February 19, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in purpose of the City Government of Mandaluyong.
Mandaluyong City (RTC).3 Thereby, the CA upheld Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997,
adopted by the City of Mandaluyong (City) authorizing its then City Mayor to take the NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion duly seconded, the City Council of Mandaluyong, in
necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the parcel of land registered in the names of the session assembled, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to authorize, as it is hereby
petitioners. authorizing, Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, to institute expropriation proceedings
against the above-named registered owner of that parcel of land situated along Dr. Jose
We affirm the CA. Fernandez Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong, (f)or the purpose of developing it
to a low-cost housing project for the less privileged but deserving constituents of this City.
Antecedents
ADOPTED on this 2nd day of October 1997 at the City of Mandaluyong.
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between
Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half Sgd. Adventor R. Delos Santos
of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Acting Sanggunian Secretary
Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income.

On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution Attested: Approved:
No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the
necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of
developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The Sgd. Roberto J. Francisco Sgd. Benjamin S. Abalos
resolution reads as follows: City Councilor & Acting City Mayor Presiding Officer

RESOLUTION NO. 552, S-19974

Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING HON. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS TO TAKE THE exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government
NECESSARY LEGAL STEPS FOR THE EXPROPRIATION OF A PARCEL OF LAND Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition

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in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, SO ORDERED.5
confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion. Thus, they appeal to
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor the Court, posing the following issues, namely:
to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to
purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature. 1. Can the validity of Resolution No. 552 be assailed even before its implementation?

On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of 2. Must a citizen await the takeover and possession of his property by the local
merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government, government before he can go to court to nullify an unjust expropriation?
because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasi-
judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil action of prohibition did not Before resolving these issues, however, the Court considers it necessary to first determine
also lie under the circumstances considering that the act of passing the resolution was not a whether or not the action for certiorari and prohibition commenced by the petitioners in the
judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of Resolution RTC was a proper recourse of the petitioners.
No. 552, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or had yet to
act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or in Ruling
excess of jurisdiction.
We deny the petition for review, and find that certiorari and prohibition were not available to
However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners’ motion for the petitioners under the circumstances. Thus, we sustain, albeit upon different grounds, the
reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. result announced by the CA, and declare that the RTC gravely erred in giving due course to the
The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage of Resolution No. 552 petition for certiorari and prohibition.
would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only
property; that there was no due process in the passage of Resolution No. 552 because the 1.
petitioners had not been invited to the subsequent hearings on the resolution to enable them to
ventilate their opposition; and that the purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and
the expropriation would not benefit the greater number of inhabitants. Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of
a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod
Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA.
The special civil action for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, whose Section 1 provides:
In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA concluded that the reversal of the
January 31, 2001 decision by the RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 552 deserved to
be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity absent any sufficient Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
showing to the contrary; that notice to the petitioners (Spouses Yusay) of the succeeding quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
hearings conducted by the City was not a part of due process, for it was enough that their views abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
had been consulted and that they had been given the full opportunity to voice their protest; that plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
to rule otherwise would be to give every affected resident effective veto powers in law-making may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
by a local government unit; and that a public hearing, although necessary at times, was not judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
indispensable and merely aided in law-making. and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The CA disposed as follows: xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must allege and establish the concurrence of
214, Mandaluyong City dated February 19, 2002 in SCA Case No. 15-MD, which declared the following requisites, namely:
Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997 of the City of Mandaluyong null and void, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. (a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;

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 (b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary value at the time of the taking of the property.
course of law.6
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang
It is further emphasized that a petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed,
jurisdiction,7 and does not correct just any error or mistake committed by a court, board, or in Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 12 a case in which the Municipality of
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board, or officer thereby Parañaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court
acts without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion ruled so:
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.8
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal, board, or officer must be exercising judicial or delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may
quasi-judicial functions. Judicial function, according to Bouvier,9 is the exercise of the judicial therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
faculty or office; it also means the capacity to act in a specific way which appertains to the and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power
judicial power, as one of the powers of government. "The term," Bouvier continues, 10 "is used or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the
to describe generally those modes of action which appertain to the judiciary as a department of power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:
organized government, and through and by means of which it accomplishes its purpose and
exercises its peculiar powers." "Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite
body declaring its sentiment or opinion. offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon
the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of
Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552. To at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a resolution declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for
and an ordinance. The first is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while the latter is a the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
law that is permanent in character.11 No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a value at the time of the taking of the property." (Emphasis supplied)
resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the
light of attendant circumstances. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the
resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right. eminent domain:

Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) required the City to pass an 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. In executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
this regard, Section 19 of The Local Government Code clearly provides, viz: expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

Section 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief executive and 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite the Constitution and other pertinent laws.
offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
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In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain respondent, and only in passing. In any event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first of petitioner’s Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. that:
Court of Appeals to show that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent
domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at that time " x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
was BP 337, the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution action, the question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point,
Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be
explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?"

We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary no reversible error in affirming the trial court’s Decision which dismissed the expropriation
in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an suit.13 (Emphasis supplied)
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the
expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it action.
would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19
of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. 2.
Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express Prohibition does not lie against expropriation
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." In the instant case, there is no reason to The special civil action for prohibition is governed also by Section 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997
depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
unjust.

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language – from without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
"resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 – demands a strict construction. "No lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
interpretation."

xxx
xxx

The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. 14 The writ of prohibition is
an ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
and ratified all the acts of its mayor regarding the subject expropriation. abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.15 For grave abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the existence of petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person,
such an ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. In the second place, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has exercised its or his
petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private
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power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must
be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.16 On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction
signifies that the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such
jurisdiction or acted without any authority.17

The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any other
existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.18 A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the
tribunal or inferior court.191avvphi1

The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the petitioners
as a remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by
such adoption, was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only
expressing its collective sentiment or opinion.

Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of
the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is
made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. 20 This
bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating
the taking of private land intended for public use,21 and the interest of the affected landowner is
thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of
eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be
left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected
landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of
their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may
the remedy of prohibition become available.

Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution
expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ property
was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for
the

power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified
complaint in the proper court.22 Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such
verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the
petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of
eminent domain.23

WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
70618.

Costs to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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 Republic of the Philippines 3. This Resolution shall become executory within 72 hours upon receipt hereof by the
SUPREME COURT Association or any of its members.4
Manila
The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its
FIRST DIVISION President, Marita Cortez, filed a Petition5 for a "Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO" with the Regional
G.R. No. 156686 July 27, 2011 Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0420.
NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096
would "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected homeowners
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, acquired their properties for strictly residential purposes";6 that the subdivision is a
vs. place that the homeowners envisioned would provide them privacy and "a peaceful
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, Barangay Sun Valley, Parañaque City, Roberto neighborhood, free from the hassles of public places";7 and that the passage of the
Guevarra IN HIS CAPACITY AS Punong Barangay and MEMBERS OF THE Resolution would destroy the character of the subdivision. NSVHAI averred that
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, Respondents. contrary to what was stated in the BSV Resolution, the opening of the gates of the
subdivision would not in any manner ease the traffic congestion in the area, and that
DECISION there were alternative routes available. According to NSVHAI, the opening of the
proposed route to all kinds of vehicles would result in contributing to the traffic build-
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: up on Doña Soledad Avenue, and that instead of easing the traffic flow, it would
generate a heavier volume of vehicles in an already congested choke point. NSVHAI
went on to state that a deterioration of the peace and order condition inside the
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the subdivision would be inevitable; that the maintenance of peace and order in the
Decision1 dated October 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65559 and the Resolution2 dated January residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit to the subdivision was
17, 2003, both of the Court of Appeals. regulated by the Association and why the passing through of vehicles was controlled
and limited; and that criminal elements would take advantage of the opening to public
The facts are as follows: use of the roads in question.8

The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang Barangay") issued NSVHAI further contested the BSV Resolution by submitting the following
BSV Resolution No. 98-0963 on October 13, 1998, entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley arguments to the RTC:
Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian
Traffic," the pertinent portions of which read as follows: 12. The road network inside the subdivision and drainage system is not designed to
withstand the entry of a heavy volume of vehicles especially delivery vans and trucks.
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved by the Sangguniang Barangay in Thus, destruction of the roads and drainage system will result. The safety, health and
session assembled that – well-being of the residents will face continuous danger to their detriment and
prejudice;
1. Pursuant to its power and authority under the Local Government Code of 1991
(Rep. Act No. 7160), the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association (NSVHA) is 13. When the residents bought their residential properties, they also paid
hereby directed to open Rosemallow and Aster Sts. to vehicular (private cars only) proportionately for the roads and the park in then subdivision. They have therefore an
and pedestrian traffic at all hours daily except from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. at which time existing equity on these roads. To open the roads to public use is a violation of the
the said streets may be closed for the sake of the security of the residents therein. rights and interests to a secure, peaceful and healthful environment;

2. The Barangay government take steps to address the security concerns of the 14. Aside from the availability of a better route to be opened, there are other ways to
residents of the area concerned, including the possible assignment of a barangay ease traffic flow. The continuous presence of traffic enforcers on all identified traffic
tanod or traffic enforcer therein, within the limits of the authority and financial choke points will prevent snarls which impede smooth travel. The strict enforcement
capability of the Barangay. of traffic rules and regulations should be done;

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 15. There are a lot of undisciplined drivers of tricycles, jeepneys, trucks and delivery Barangay Roberto Guevarra from implementing Resolution no. 98-096 until further orders from
[vans], which contribute to the traffic congestion. The barangay should require these this Court.
drivers to observe road courtesy and obedience to traffic rules[.]9
Petitioner is directed to file a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining (₱100,000.00) PESOS (sic) to answer for damages to defendants in the event the Court finds
Order10 (TRO) in Civil Case No. 98-0420 on October 30, 1998. Said Order provides: petitioner is not entitled to said injunction.

Acting on the Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/ Permanent Injunction with Prayer The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed on December 4, 1998 a Motion for Reconsideration and
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, filed by plaintiff and considering that there is to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction (with Memorandum of Authorities). 19
extreme urgency, such that unless the same is issued, plaintiff would suffer grave injustice
and/or irreparable injury, let a Temporary Restraining Order issue directing the Sangguniang NSVHAI then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge on December 10, 1998, moving to
Barangay as represented by Punong Barangay Roberto Guevarra to cease and desist from the declare the above motion of the BSV Sangguniang Barangay as a mere scrap of paper for being
implementation of Resolution No. 98-096 or otherwise maintain the status quo until further filed out of time and for failure to serve a copy thereof to the counsel of petitioner.
Orders of this Court.

The RTC subsequently dismissed the case in an Order20 dated August 17, 1999, stating as
This Temporary Restraining Order shall be effective for seventy two (72) hours from issuance follows:
hereof, unless extended by another Order of this Court.

Defendant Barangay Sun Valley moves to dismiss the instant case on the grounds that the
Let this case be set for special raffle and conference on November 3, 1998 at 10:30 in the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In
morning. summary, defendant alleges that the subject streets Aster and Rosemallow inside Sun Valley
Subdivision are owned by the local government. Such streets have long been part of the public
On November 3, 1998, the RTC issued another Order11 stating that, by agreement of the parties, domain and beyond the commerce of man. In support of this, defendant cited the case of White
the status quo shall be maintained for seventeen (17) more days, and that the case was set for Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765 wherein it was held that road lots of
hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on November 20, 1998 subdivisions constitute a part of the mandatory open space reserved for public use; ownership
at 8:30 a.m. of which is automatically vested in the Republic of the Philippines although it is still registered
in the name of the developer/owner, its donation to the government is a mere formality." The
NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition12 on November 13, 1998, at about 11:10 a.m., power or authority to close or open the said streets is vested in the local government units and
wherein it claimed that the BSV Sangguniang Barangay had no jurisdiction over the opening of not on homeowner’s associations, pursuant to Section 21 of the local Government Code (RA
Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the "subject roads"). NSVHAI likewise attached to its Amended 7160) quoted as follows: "Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government
Petition its Position Paper13 dated July 21, 1998, which set forth its objection to the opening of unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road,
the subject roads for public use and argued that a Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause the alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction x x x." In view thereof, Resolution No. 98-
opening of the subject roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to effect such an 096 was passed by the Sangguniang Barangay. Hence there is no right whatsoever on the part of
act.14 Plaintiff NSVHA entitled to the protection of the law. Further, defendant contends that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as ordained in Sections 32 and 57 of the
Local Government Code giving the city mayor the supervisory power, and the power of review
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed its Motion to Dismiss15 likewise on November 13, 1998. by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, respectively.
The copy provided by petitioner to the Court indicates the time of receipt by NSVHAI as 11:00
a.m.16
No opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the Plaintiff.
The RTC heard the case on November 20, 1998, as scheduled, and thereafter submitted the
matter for decision.17 On the same date, the RTC issued the following Order18: Same defendant seeks to reconsider the order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction alleging that there is a pending motion to dismiss and Plaintiff has not been able to
establish an actually existing right.
Acting on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner, it
appearing that petitioner may suffer grave injustice or irreparable injury, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue prohibiting the Sangguniang Barangay represented by Punong Plaintiff has not filed an opposition thereto, instead it filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
expunge the motion for reconsideration on the ground that its counsel has not been furnished

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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
with a copy of the motion for reconsideration, but the record shows that Maria Cortez A DIRECTIVE OF AN LGU TO A DEFIANT PRIVATE ORGANIZATION
(plaintiff’s representative) has received a copy of said motion. WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION, IS JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE SOLE
COMPETENCE AND WISE DISCRETION OF THE BARANGAY OVER A
After considering the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings, this court hereby LOCAL TRAFFIC PROBLEM.
resolves as follows:
III
1. The "Motion for Reconsideration" and the "Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Expunge
(motion for reconsideration)" are Denied being devoid of merit; and THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SERIOUS ERROR,
PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE, AS FOUND BY THE COURT A QUO. IT IS
2. The "Motion to Dismiss" is hereby Granted for failure of the plaintiff to exhaust APPELLANT THAT HAS COMMITTED THE ERROR OF NOT EXHAUSTING
the administrative remedies under Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government Code. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. HENCE, NO GRAVE OR IRREPARABLE
INJURY CAN BE CAUSED TO APPELLANT FOR IT HAS NO RIGHT TO
PROTECT.26
WHEREFORE, let this case be as it is hereby ordered Dismissed. The writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby lifted.21
Respondents claimed that Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 was simply a directive to petitioner,
"a private aggrupation of some self-seeking homeowners,"27 and was just a measure of internal
NSVHAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 of the above-quoted Order but this was denied policy among residents; that the opening of roads for traffic reasons was "within the sole
by the RTC for lack of merit in an Order23 dated September 21, 1999. competence of the barangay to determine";28 and the Mayor could have chosen, as it was within
his power to do so, to cause the demolition of the gates, which were illegally built by petitioner
NSVHAI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals and the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV and therefore were obstructions on the road, even without a Barangay resolution. Respondents
No. 65559. NSVHAI alleged that "despite the lack of the required hearing" 24 and without any likewise claimed that the BSV’s action could be considered a political question, which should
order requiring it to submit its Comment/Opposition to the BSV Sangguniang Barangay’s be essentially withdrawn from judicial cognizance, and constitutional law doctrine provides that
Motion to Dismiss or that of submitting said Motion for resolution, Judge Bautista-Ricafort the courts would not interfere with political issues unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, of
issued an Order which, to NSVHAI’s complete surprise, granted the Motion. NSVHAI argued which there was none on the part of the Barangay. Respondents argued that petitioner did not
that the RTC gravely erred in taking cognizance of, and thereafter ruling on, said Motion and have any actual legal right entitled to the protection of the law.29
refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 98-0420. Petitioner
likewise argued that the RTC committed serious errors which, if not corrected, would cause Respondents attached to their Appellees’ Brief six documents, labeled as Annexes "2" to "7,"
grave or irreparable injury to petitioner and cause a violation of law. 25 all stamped "Certified True Copy" by a certain Roman E. Loreto, Legal Officer II of Legal
Department.30 The detailed information contained in each of the documents that comprise
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay, Roberto Guevarra in his capacity as Punong Barangay, and respondents’ Annexes "2" to "7" is copied below:
members of the Sangguniang Barangay (hereinafter, "respondents"), in their Appellees’ Brief,
argued as follows: 1. 1st Indorsement31 from the Office of the Mayor of Parañaque dated May 20, 1988, signed by
Luzviminda A. Concepcion, Administrative Officer II, stating as follows:
I
Respectfully indorsed to Atty. Antonio G. Cruz, Municipal Attorney, of this municipality the
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS- herein attached "Original Copies of Transfer Certificate of Title for Sun Valley Open Space and
APPELLEES’ MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION Road Lots" with TCT Nos. 133552, 119836, and 122443 for your appropriate actions.
AND JURISPRUDENCE OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLANT’S
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. AS NOTED BY THE 2. Letter32 dated December 27, 1990 from Francisco B. Jose, Jr., Municipal Attorney of
COURT, NO OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS EVER FILED Parañaque, addressed to the Municipal Council Secretary, which reads:
BY APPELLANT.
This has reference to your request dated December 18, 1990 relative to the letter of inquiry of
II the Barangay Captain of Barangay Sun Valley dated December 13, 1990.

THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION ASSAILING ITS

SUBJECT-MATTER, BARANGAY RESOLUTION NO. 98-096, CONSISTING OF
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
We wish to inform you that based on the available records of our office the open space and road This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, road lots of Sun Valley
lots of Sun Valley Subdivision is already owned by the Municipal Government of Parañaque as Subdivision have already been donated to the Municipality of Paranaque as evidenced by TCT
evidenced by TCT NOS. 133552, 119836, and 122443. Copies of which are hereto attached for NO. 133552, 119836, and 122443.
your ready reference.
This certification is being issued upon the request of MR. WILLIAM UY.
Considering that the Municipality of Parañaque is the registered owner of the road lots of Sun
Valley Subdivision, we are of the opinion that the roads become public in use and ownership, The Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated October 16, 2002 denying the appeal and
and therefore, use of the roads by persons other than residents of the Subdivision can no longer affirming the Orders of the RTC dated August 17, 1999 and September 21, 1999. The Court of
be curtailed. However, should the Municipal Government decides to delegate its right to Appeals likewise denied NSVHAI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its Resolution
regulate the use of the said roads to the Sun Valley Homeowner’s Association or Sun Valley promulgated on January 17, 2003, stating that after a thorough study of the Motion for
Barangay Council, such right may be exercise[d] by said association or council. Reconsideration, it found no sufficient reason to deviate from its findings and conclusion
reached in its decision.
3. Certification33 dated October 8, 1990 issued by Francisco B. Jose, Jr. under the letterhead of
the Office of the Municipal Attorney of Parañaque, which reads: Thus, NSVHAI (hereinafter, "petitioner") went to this Court.

This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the open space and road lots Arguments of Petitioner
of Sun Valley Subdivision has been donated and now owned by the Municipality of Paranaque,
as evidenced by TCT Nos. 133552, 119836, and 122443 copies of which are hereto attached.
Petitioner alleges that the decision of the Court of Appeals was based on "facts that [were]
outside of the original Petition and Amended Petition and on supposed findings of facts that are
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Mario Cortez, President of Sun Valley not even evidence offered before the court a quo."37 Petitioner likewise alleges that the facts
Homeowners Association. used by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the case were contrary to the records of Civil Case
No. 98-0420.
4. Certification34 dated June 13, 1994, again signed by Francisco B. Jose, Jr., of the Office of
the Municipal Attorney, providing as follows: Petitioner lists the following as its Questions of Law:

This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the only road lots in Sun A
Valley Subdivision titled in the name of the Municipality of Parañaque are those covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 133552 and 122443.
In sustaining the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420, the Honorable Court of Appeals
sanctioned the departure of the Regional Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of
This certification is being issued upon the request of Coun. Manuel T. De Guia. judicial proceedings

5. Certification35 dated March 2, 1995 issued by Rodolfo O. Alora, OIC, Asst. Municipal Legal B
Officer, which reads:
Whether or not the issuance of the Resolution promulgated January 17, 2003 and the Decision
This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the open space within Sun promulgated October 16, 2002 by the Former 4th Division and the 4th Division of the Court of
Valley Subdivision has already been donated to the Municipality as evidenced by Transfer Appeals sustaining the validity of dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420 is not in accord with law
Certificate of Title No. 119836, copy of which is hereto attached. or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court

This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Rex G. Rico. C

6. Certification36 dated October 26, 1998 issued by Ma. Riza Pureza Manalese, Legal Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, departed from the accepted
Researcher, Office of the Municipal Attorney, Parañaque City, which reads: and usual course of judicial proceedings by making findings of fact not supported by evidence
of record38

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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Petitioner avers that the hearing for the respondents’ Motion to Dismiss was set on November the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and had the effect of superseding the original petition dated
20, 1998, without indication as to time and that during the hearing on such date, counsel for October 28, 1998. Petitioner concludes that the Motion to Dismiss was therefore directed
respondents moved that their Motion to Dismiss be heard over the objection of counsel for against a non-existing Petition.43
petitioner, who explained that there was an urgency in ruling on the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction in view of the expiration of the temporary restraining order Petitioner argues that the RTC’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss is contrary to procedural law
(TRO).39 because no hearing was conducted on said Motion to Dismiss; that said motion violated Section
5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to set the time of hearing thereof;
Petitioner quotes the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) from the November 20, 1998 and that instead of being resolved, said motion should have been declared as a mere scrap of
hearing before the RTC in the following manner: worthless paper.44

Atty. Herrera: Petitioner claims that during the proceedings before the RTC on November 20, 1998, both
parties manifested that the Motion to Dismiss was never set for hearing, and that when Judge
Then, Your Honor, I files [sic] a motion petitioning to dismiss this instant case, which should Bautista-Ricafort said, "We will proceed first with the hearing,"45 she was referring to the
be resolved first before hearing this case. scheduled hearing of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner
claims that it is crystal clear that it was deprived due process when a ruling was had on the
Motion to Dismiss despite the clear absence of a hearing. Petitioner concludes that the Court of
Atty. Nuñez: Appeals was manifestly mistaken when it ruled that due process was observed in the issuance of
the assailed Orders of Judge Bautista-Ricafort, despite the lack of opportunity to submit a
Your Honor, please, with due respect to the opposing counsel, the hearing today is supposed to comment or opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and the lack of issuance of an order submitting
be on the presentation of petitioner’s evidence in support of its prayer for preliminary said motion for resolution. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals sanctioned the ruling of
injunction. In connection with the amended complaint, I guess it is a matter of right to amend its the RTC that violated both substantial and procedural law. 46
pleading. What happened here, the amended petition was filed before this Honorable Court on
November 13 at 11:10 a.m. but I think the motion to dismiss was filed by the respondent on Moreover, petitioner avers that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the RTC had
November 13 at 11:20 a.m.. Therefore, it is the right of the petitioner insofar as the case is jurisdiction to hear and decide the Amended Petition, and the doctrine of exhaustion of
concerned. administrative remedies was not applicable. This is because, according to petitioner, such
doctrine "requires that were a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must
And therefore, this Court should proceed with the hearing on the preliminary injunction instead first be sought from the administrative agencies prior to bringing an action before courts of
of entertaining this matter. The temporary restraining order will expire today and we have the justice."47 Petitioner claims that when it filed Civil Case No. 98-08420, it did not have the
right to be heard. luxury of time to elevate the matter to the higher authorities under Sections 32 and 57 of the
Local Government Code. Petitioner alleges that the tenor of BSV Resolution No. 98-096
Court: necessitated the immediate filing of the injunction case on October 29, 1998, to forestall the
prejudicial effect of said resolution that was to take effect two days later. Thus, petitioner
claims that it had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy except to file the case. 48
We will proceed first with the hearing (referring to the scheduled hearing of the prayer for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction). (Transcript of Stenographic Notes, November
20, 1998) (Underscoring and explanation petitioner’s.)40 Anent the question of whether the Sangguniang Barangay should have passed an ordinance
instead of a resolution to open the subject roads, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals
should not have relied on respondents’ claim of ownership, as this led to the erroneous
Petitioner claims that the RTC proceeded to hear the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary conclusion that there was no need to pass an ordinance. Petitioner insists that the supposed titles
injunction and no hearing was conducted on the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner reiterates its to the subject roads were never submitted to the RTC, and the respondents merely attached
earlier claim that it did not receive an order requiring it to submit its Comment/Opposition to certifications that the ownership of the subject roads was already vested in the City Government
the Motion to Dismiss or informing it that said Motion had been submitted for resolution.41 of Parañaque City as Annexes to their Appellees’ Brief before the Court of Appeals. Those
annexes, according to petitioner, were not formally offered as evidence.49
Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420 arose from the grant of
respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner claims that it filed its Amended Petition on Petitioner avers that the records of Civil Case No. 98-0420 clearly show that there was no proof
November 13, 1998 at 11:10 a.m., or before respondents served any responsive pleading, or or evidence on record to support the findings of the Court of Appeals. This is because,
before they had filed their Motion to Dismiss on the same date at about 11:20 a.m. 42 Petitioner allegedly, the dismissal of said case was due to the grant of a motion to dismiss, and the case
avers that the filing of said Amended Petition was a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10 of did not go to trial to receive evidence.50 Petitioner avers that a motion to dismiss hypothetically
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.51 In adopting the annexes as basis for its We admit that we erred in not going to you directly because at that time, the NSVHA received
findings of fact, the Court of Appeals allegedly disregarded the rules on Evidence. the letter-order of Brgy. Capt. Guevara two days before the effectivity of the order. Aside from
this, there was a long holiday (long weekend prior to November 1). Thus, the Board of
Petitioner raises the following grounds for the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining Governors had no other recourse but to seek a TRO and thereafter a permanent injunction.
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction:
We now would like to seek your assistance concerning this urgent problem. For your
Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 is repugnant to the proprietary rights of the information there are already two (2) gates in and out of Sun Valley Subdivision.
affected homeowners who are members of petitioner NSVHAI, such rights undoubtedly
protected by the Constitution. Under P.D. 957, the Homeowners Association is mandated to protect the interest of the
homeowners and residents especially in so far as it affects the security, comfort and the general
As there is no proof otherwise (except the baseless findings of fact by the Honorable Court of welfare of the homeowners.
Appeals) that the streets encompassed by the concerned subdivision, Sun Valley Subdivision,
are all private properties. As such, the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision have all the right to Thank you and because of the urgency of the matter, we anticipate your prompt and favorable
regulate the roads and open spaces within their territorial jurisdiction. action. (Emphasis ours.)

This Honorable Supreme Court can take judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as 2. A letter54 signed by Parañaque City Mayor Joey Marquez dated January 27, 2003, addressed
robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in Philippine society. Residents have to Mr. Roberto Guevara, Office of the Barangay Captain, Barangay Sun Valley, which reads in
invested their lifetime’s savings in private subdivision since subdivision living afford them part:
privacy, exclusivity and foremost of all, safety. Living in a subdivision has a premium and such
premium translates into a comparatively more expensive lot because of the safety, among This refers to your intended implementation of Barangay Sun Valley Resolution No. 98-096
others, that subdivision lifestyle offers. entitled, "A RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION TO OPEN ROSEMALLOW AND ASTER STREETS TO VEHICULAR
But, with the enactment and intended implementation of Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC."
98-096 to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets for public use, it is indubitable that, instead of
promoting the safety of resident of Sun Valley Subdivision, respondents are endangering the In this regard and pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 32 of the Local Government Code of 1991
life and property of the residents of the said subdivision as they will now be exposed to criminal which vests upon the city mayor the right to exercise general supervision over component
and lawless elements. barangays, to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions, you are hereby directed to defer your implementation of the subject ordinance based
It is respectfully submitted that Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 has a place only on the following grounds:
in an authoritarian government where proprietary rights and privacy are alien concepts. Lest it
be forgotten, ours is a democratic society and therefore, it should not be ruled in a manner 1. The roads subject of your resolution is a municipal road and not a barangay road;
befitting of a despotic government.
2. The opening or closure of any local road may be undertaken by a local government
Petitioner NSVHAI, in protection of the rights and interest of the residents of Sun Valley unit pursuant to an ordinance and not through a mere resolution as provided under
Subdivision and in order to ensure that public officials will not abuse governmental powers and Sec. 21 of the Local Government Code of 1991;
use them in an oppressive and arbitrary manner, invokes the judicial power of this Honorable
Supreme Court and pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued and, after hearing, be
declared permanent. 52 3. There is no more need to order the opening of the aforementioned roads in view of
the fact that Gelia and State Ave., have already been opened by the subdivision to the
general public to accommodate vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the area;
A perusal of the documents attached by petitioner as Annexes revealed to the Court the
following, which were not discussed in the body of the petition:
4. There is a need to conduct public hearings, as in fact we shall be conducting public
hearings, on the matter to enable us to arrive at an intelligent resolution of the issues
1. A letter53 dated January 25, 2003 signed by Sonia G. Sison, President of NSVHAI, to Mayor involved.
Joey P. Marquez, the pertinent portions of which provide:

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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
 3. A letter55 dated January 31, 2003 addressed to Mayor Joey Marquez, signed by determination in the Barangay resolution regarding what class of roads to open or what to close
counsel for respondents, wherein the latter wrote: by way of general policy. 60

We regret to observe that all the reasons that you have cited in your letter as grounds for your Respondents contend that the Barangay Resolution was internal and temporary, passed to solve
order of non-implementation of the Barangay Resolution have been passed upon and decided by a traffic problem. They propose a reason why petitioner allegedly wants to control the subject
the Court of Appeals, which lately denied the NSVHA Motion for Reconsideration x x x. roads, as follows:

xxxx The directive of the Barangay is certainly a declaration of an intention expressed by resolution
on complaints of residents for a convenient outlet of cars and pedestrians during certain hours
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is now the subject of an appeal taken by the NSVHA to of the [day] or night. This need not be the subject of an ordinance. It is addressed to a special
the Supreme Court. In deference to the high Court, you would do well to reconsider your order group of residents, and not to the general community. It refers to particular roads and at certain
to the Barangay and not pre-empt the high Court on its decision. x x x. hours only, not to all the roads and at all hours.

Arguments of Respondents Hence, the Barangay Resolutions (sic) is but temporary in character, being a solution to a
momentary traffic problem then visualized by the Barangay and encouraged by the MMDA.
There is no legal question involved that is of any concern to the NSVHA. The prevailing reason
Respondents filed their Comment56 on July 17, 2003. They manifest that the petition is why the NSVHA desires to control the roads is the monetary consideration it gains by its
substantially a reproduction of petitioner’s brief filed with the Court of Appeals, and consists of unilateral requirement of car stickers and of substantial fees exacted from delivery vans and
almost identical issues which have already been ventilated and decided upon by the said court. trucks for bringing in cargo into the subdivision. And yet, the residents who, never gave their
consent to this activities (sic), are busy people and have merely tolerated this for a long time
Respondents claim that the hearing held on November 20, 1998, as found by the Court of now. This tolerance did not of course give legality to the illegal act. x x x. 61
Appeals, covered both the injunction and dismissal incidents, and that the motion to dismiss on
issues of jurisdiction was a prejudicial matter. Respondents confirm that the RTC said it will As regards petitioner’s argument that the BSV Sangguniang Barangay should have passed an
proceed first with the hearing, but the lower court did not specify if the hearing was going to ordinance instead of a resolution, respondents present their counter-argument as follows:
take up the prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction or the motion to dismiss.
Respondents further claim that by the end of the hearing, after Atty. Florencio R. Herrera’s
manifestation on the donated public roads, counsels for both parties were asked by the court if Hence, even assuming for the sake of argument that a legal question exists on whether it be a
they were submitting, and both of them answered in the affirmative. 57 Respondents aver that resolution or ordinance that should contain the Barangay directive, such an issue is of no
petitioner’s reply to its charge of misleading the Court was an admission that counsel had moment as plaintiff-appellant failed to exhaust the necessary administrative remedies before
tampered without authority with the TSN, and that the phrase "referring to the scheduled resorting to court action, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Section 32, R.A.
hearing of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction"58 was said counsel’s 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides for a remedy from Barangay actions to the
own mere footnote. Mayor under the latter’s power of general supervision.62

Respondents allege that the issuance of the titles in favor of Parañaque over all the roads in Sun With regard to the Mayor’s involvement in this case, respondents have this to say:
Valley Subdivision was an official act by the land registration office of the City of Parañaque,
and was perfectly within the judicial notice of the Courts, pursuant to Rule 129, Section 1 of the The Mayor’s act of interfering in Barangay Sun Valley affairs stemmed out of a long-standing
Rules of Court.59 Respondents likewise allege that the gates were earlier built illegally on the political feud of the Mayor with the Punong Barangay. Its general supervision did not extend to
roads by the Association, and while petitioner may lend a helping hand to the barangay, it pure Barangay matters, which the Barangay would be x x x in a better position to determine.
cannot control the latter’s discretion as to the wisdom of its traffic policies within the barangay.
They maintain that petitioner had no business putting up road blocks in the first place; that this Furthermore, the general supervision of the Mayor is limited to the overseeing authority that the
matter is purely a local government determination; and that it is even doubtful if courts would Barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. Sadly, there is nothing
encroach upon this autonomous determination for local constituents of the Barangay in in this Mayor’s letter x x x that would as much as show a deviation by the Barangay Sun Valley
deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. from any prescribed powers or function. The Mayor’s directive to the Barangay is of doubtful
legality.
Respondents claim that since the subject matter of the case is a directive of the Barangay to the
petitioner, the requirement for an ordinance would not be necessary, as there was no legislative

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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
It was mainly the mounting traffic problem progressively experienced through the years that Laguna Tayabas Bus Company versus Benjamin Bitanga, G.R. Nos. 137934 & 137936[)]. In
prompted the Barangay to resolve to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets in accordance with its the instant case, Appellant cannot be said to have been denied of due process. As borne by the
power under Section 21 of R.A. 7160 to "temporarily open or close any local road falling within records, while Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss did not set the time for the hearing of the motion,
its jurisdiction". This Resolution x x x was decided upon after the Barangay Council made the the day set therefore was the same date set for the hearing of Appellant’s prayer for the issuance
necessary investigation and conducted hearings in consultation with affected residents. In order of a writ of preliminary injunction – that is, November 20, 1998, with the precise purpose of
to maintain some kind of cordial relationship with the NSVHA, the Barangay by its resolution, presenting evidence in support of the motion to dismiss on the same said scheduled hearing date
opted to give the NSVHA the chance to open the roads, which it earlier closed by means of and time when Appellant and its counsel would be present. Moreover, Appellant’s predication
arbitrarily putting up steel gates without any apparent authority. 63 of lack of due hearing is belied by the fact that the hearing held on November 20, 1999 took up
not only the matter of whether or not to grant the injunction, but also tackled the jurisdictional
Furthermore, respondents aver that the trial court and the appellate court have ruled that only a issue raised in Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss, which issues were intertwined in both
local government unit (LGU), in this case the Barangay, can open or close roads, whether they incidents. 67
be public or private, in accordance with Section 21 of the Local Government Code.
Respondents contend that Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s recourse in
Association, Inc.,64 wherein the Court discussed the power of LGUs to open and close roads, is questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096 should have been with the Mayor of Parañaque City,
substantially in point.65 as clearly stated in Section 32 of the Local Government Code, which provides:

After the submission of the parties’ respective memoranda,66 this case was submitted for Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city or
decision. municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision
over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed
The issues before us are: powers and functions.

1. Whether or not petitioner has a right to the protection of the law that would entitle We do not see how petitioner’s act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion
it to injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096; and of administrative remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a
recent case, wherein we held:
2. Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system.
The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
The Ruling of the Court functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides
The Court of Appeals passed upon petitioner’s claims as to the validity of the dismissal in this for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of
wise: justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed.68
We do not agree. Although the Motion to Dismiss was filed on the same day, but after, the
Amended Petition was filed, the same cannot be considered as directed merely against the It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s actions to see if it acted
original petition which Appellant already considers as non-existing. The records will show that within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be
Appellant’s Amended Petition contained no material amendments to the original petition. Both resolved within the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial
allege the same factual circumstances or events that constitute the Appellant’s cause of action court committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioner’s failure to exhaust
anent the Appellee’s alleged violation of Appellant’s propriety rights over the subdivision roads administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure
in question. Corollarily, the allegations in Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss, as well as the grounds and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not
therefore predicated on lack of cause of action and jurisdiction, could very well be considered applicable in this case because the subject roads belong to the City Government of Parañaque.
as likewise addressed to Appellant’s Amended Petition.
Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on petitioner to
xxxx show ownership over the subject roads. This, petitioner failed to do.

It bears stressing that due process simply means giving every contending party the opportunity
to be heard and the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor (Batangas

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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them daily fares in Philippine society."71 This is absurd. The Rules of Court provide which matters
by a preponderance of evidence. Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not constitute judicial notice, to wit:
upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. 69
Rule 129
Petitioner dared to question the barangay’s ownership over the subject roads when it should WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
have been the one to adduce evidence to support its broad claims of exclusivity and privacy.
Petitioner did not submit an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership, which, as pointed out SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.—A court shall take judicial notice, without the
by respondents, consisted of closing the subject roads that belonged to the then Municipality of introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
Parañaque and were already being used by the public, limiting their use exclusively to the forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
subdivision’s homeowners, and collecting fees from delivery vans that would pass through the courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
gates that they themselves had built. It is petitioner’s authority to put up the road blocks in the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
first place that becomes highly questionable absent any proof of ownership. nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.(1a)1avvphi1

On the other hand, the local government unit’s power to close and open roads within its The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the rule
jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides: quoted above and do not support its petition for injunctive relief in any way.

Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. – (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and
ordinance,permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of
within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code, the petition must be denied.
must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when
necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals’
DECISION dated October 16, 2002 and its RESOLUTION dated January 17, 2003 in CA-G.R.
We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this regard, as follows: CV No. 65559 are both AFFIRMED.

Contrary, however, to Appellant’s position, the above-quoted provision, which requires the SO ORDERED.
passage of an ordinance by a local government unit to effect the opening of a local road, can
have no applicability to the instant case since the subdivision road lots sought to be opened to
decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets – have already been
donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of,
the City Government of Parañaque since the year 1964 (Annexes "2" to "7" of Appellees’
Brief). This fact has not even been denied by the Appellant in the proceedings below nor in the
present recourse. Having been already donated or turned over to the City Government of
Parañaque, the road lots in question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are
withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of
herein Appellant. Accordingly, the Appellant was not in the lawful exercise of its predicated
rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic
for the use of the general Public. Consequently, Appellees’ act of passing the disputed barangay
resolution, the implementation of which is sought to be restrained by Appellant, had for its
purpose not the opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a directive or
reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public road which should rightfully be open
for use to the general public.70

Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of Sun Valley
Subdivision but it miserably failed to establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the
subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for. It even wants this Court to
take "judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming

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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
 154 trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized
by law.—As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that said petitioners,
as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein and
Tano vs. Socrates that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts charged
therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional. It
G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997.* cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, must further be stressed that even if petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof
TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari,
MESA, GENEROSO ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses
CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR, involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to
LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA, ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. And, even where in an exceptional
RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES, DANILO PANGARUTAN, circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for
NOE GOLPAN, ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN TABANG, reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity to correct its
ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional
LABABIT, PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL, BILLY D. circumstances. Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the
BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MELCHOR J. LAYSON, MELANIE AMANTE, CLARO remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in
E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASETA, JOSELITO MANAEG, Section 1 thereof. For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not, and could not have, alleged
LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO any of such grounds.
VALMORIA, WILFREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGGA, ROBERTO TADEPA,
RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGGARUTAN, Same; Same; Same; While the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial Courts and
DANIEL PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
RONILO MODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of
SAYANG, NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILFREDO A. choice of court forum.—Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of
RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B. action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy
BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAÑEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE ESCALICAS, of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has
ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent
ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari,
VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YBAÑEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives
SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON, ALBERTO petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN, JOVELITO Same; Same; Same; The judicial policy that the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless
BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL, ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF PALAWAN, petitioners, vs. HON. GOV. compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of a
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF primary jurisdiction.—In Santiago v. Vasquez, this Court forcefully expressed that the
PALAWAN, namely, VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA, ROSALINO propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not
R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A. CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the
CIPRIANO C. BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUNA, RODOLFO inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often
C. FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA, NAPOLEON F. has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of
ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN, MEMBERS OF procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY reiterated “the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
DAGAT, MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
AND CITY PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of
JUDGES OF PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND METROPOLITAN, respondents. [its] primary jurisdiction.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; The general rule is that where a motion to
quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go Same; Same; Declaratory Relief; Supreme Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over
to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.—As to the second set
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a The following is petitioners’ summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to the petition:
declaration that the Ordinances in question are a “nullity. . . for being unconstitutional.” As
such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over 1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, it being settled that Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: “AN ORDINANCE
the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions. BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
Constitutional Law; Statute; Statutory Construction; It is settled that laws (including ordinances EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF,” the full text of
enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.—It is of course which reads as follows:
settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and “Section 1. Title of the Ordinance.—This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA
In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS,
doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.
sustain.
Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage.—To effectively free our City Sea Waters from
Same; Same; Same; Court finds petitioners’ contentions baseless and holds that the Ordinances Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance[s], and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating
do not suffer from any infirmity both under the Constitution and applicable laws.—After a within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are (sic) directly or indirectly in the
scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.
have been violated, we find petitioners’ contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not
suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. Section 3. Definition of terms.—For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby
defined:
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
A.SEA BASS—A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP;
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. B.CATFISH—A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as HITO-HITO;
C.MUDFISH—A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG;
Arturo S. Santos for petitioners. D.ALL LIVE
FISH—All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s] use[d] for food and for
Agustin M. Rocamora for Edward S. Hagedorn, Sanggunian Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa aquarium purposes.
City and Bantay Dagat of Puerto Princesa City. E.LIVE LOBSTER—Several relatively, large marine crusteceans [sic] of the genus Homarus
that are alive and breathing not necessarily moving.
Romeo M. Seratubas, Robert Y. Peneyra and Martin E. Ruelo for Salvador P. Socrates. Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship
out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any
DAVIDE, JR., J.: live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.

Petitioners caption their petition as one for “Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary and Section 5. Penalty Clause.—Any person/s and or business entity violating this Ordinance shall
Mandatory Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order” and pray that this Court: be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve
(1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the (12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.
January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c)
Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found violating the provisions of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall
respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager, as
the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts1 and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the case maybe [sic].
Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the
Ordinances and of the Office Order. Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this
ordinance is deemed repealed.
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition. Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.

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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
SO ORDAINED.” “WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five (5)
percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a] habitat of marine
xxx coral dwelling aquatic organisms;

2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of our
Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows: province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide
fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities;
“In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74,
otherwise known as ‘AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of the
INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate
PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;
A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYOR’S PERMIT” and
“City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others.
Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any
point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft. NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon unanimous decision
of all the members present;
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required
Mayor’s Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the
by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit:
all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.
ORDINANCE NO. 2
Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must Series of 1993
be held for proper disposition.
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the ASSEMBLED:
PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support and
cooperation. Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in the Section 1. TITLE—This Ordinance shall be known as an “Ordinance Prohibiting the catching,
conduct of the inspection. gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3.
Please be guided accordingly.” Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna
Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other
xxx species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus
(Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (T[r]opical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of
3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters.
enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: “A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING,
GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE
(MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS 1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the territorial and
(PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable
TRIDACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, them to attain their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more
OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN for [a] more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,” the full text of responsibilities and resources.
which reads as follows:
2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall be
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the
favor of devolution of powers and of the lower government units. “Any fair and reasonable criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex “D”; while xerox copies
doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government are attached as Annex “D” to the copies of the petition;
Unit concerned.”
6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the respondent
3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, a xerox copy of the complaint
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic is hereto attached as Annex “E”;
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutor’s office and
4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the courts, petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that:
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY.—It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not only for the
greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with [the] proper perspective and Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor’s
consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to
henceforth declares that is [sic] shall be unlawful for any person or any business entity to determine whether or not to issue the permit.
engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan “altogether prohibited the catching,
Waters for a period of five (5) years; gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms,
without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method,” the
Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE.—Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways;
shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were
Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering “into contracts which are proper,
forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion of necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.”
the Court;
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal
Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE.—If for any reason, a Section or provision of this cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed.
Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other provisions
hereof. In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition, and
furnished the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy thereof.
Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE.—Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any ordinance
inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or repealed. Section VII. In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and Members
EFFECTIVITY.—This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication. of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series
of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government’s power under the general welfare
SO ORDAINED.” clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific
power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
xxx environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section
447(a)(1)(vi), Section 458(a)(1)(vi), and Section 468(a)(1)(vi), of the LGC. They claimed that
4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes “A” and “C” hereof thereby in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had “the right and responsibility. . . to
depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy
their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and for the future generation.” The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine coral
other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade; dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds
of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for
5. Petitioners only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to
Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and regenerate.
Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.5
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were
conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven
employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed “between a (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan—an alleged private
fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who association of several marine merchants—are natural persons who claim to be fishermen.
catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live,” i.e., “the former uses sodium cyanide
while the latter does not.” Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial
class. and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances
they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the ordinances.
Restraining Order, claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan was bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of
petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that said petitioners, as
Andres Linijan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein and that
Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts charged therein
restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional.6 It cannot
with the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223. then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, further be stressed that even if petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not
considering that as claimed by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is
were already represented by counsel. that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party
aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said
The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition. motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law.7 And, even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial
In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment on the petition as may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have
the Answer, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective to be filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion
memoranda.2 may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances.8 Finally, even if a
motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still
On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof.9 For obvious
and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office of the Solicitor reasons, the petition at bar does not, and could not have, alleged any of such grounds.
General to comment on their behalf. But in light of the latter’s motion of 9 July 1997 for an
extension of time to file the comment which would only result in further delay, we dispensed As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY
with said comment. RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a “nullity. . . for being
unconstitutional.”10 As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
merit, and on 22 July 1997, assigned it to the ponente to write the opinion of the Court. involved,11 it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.12
I
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the
Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no
Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced
charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with
Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the 1st Municipal Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan;3 and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who were charged mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma:13
1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa.4
All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon de Mesa, This concurrence of jurisdiction is not . . . to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will
violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions Constitution as having been transgressed by the Ordinances.
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs SEC. 2. x x x
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s
docket. . . . The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and
lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:
their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of
the land. . . . SEC. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
In Santiago v. Vasquez,14 this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and
lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the xxx
imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland
to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated “the judicial policy that and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State
the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore
remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction.” fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a
just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we opt to There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is self-described
about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 as “a private association composed of Marine Merchants;” petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia
January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, Lim, as “merchants;” while the rest of the petitioners claim to be “fishermen,” without any
is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the qualification, however, as to their status.
exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the
environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms “subsistence” or
allowed in the resolution of the issues raised. “marginal” fishermen,18 they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A
marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover
the presumption of constitutionality.15 To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear the cost of gathering the fish,19 while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative irreducible minimum for his livelihood.20 Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a
contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable marginal farmer or fisherman as “an individual
doubt.16 Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.17 of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family.” It bears
repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these
After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners definitions.
claim to have been violated, we find petitioners’ contentions baseless and so hold that the
former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. What
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming,
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. Our
survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of a preferential MR. RODRIGO:
right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC, which pertinently provides:
So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the Philippines and
SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.—x x x fish in any fishing grounds.

(b) The sangguniang bayan may: MR. BENGZON:

(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus
fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided, Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed, may be existing or
however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have will be passed.21 (italics supplied)
the preferential right to such fishery privileges. . . .
In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3 dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding
Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
guidelines concerning the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.22 On this score, in Oposa v.
mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such fishery right. Factoran,23 this Court declared:

Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
resources, but of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
generations to come. self-perpetuation—aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners—the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization . . . shall be under the full control ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
and supervision of the State.” Moreover, their mandated protection, development and highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come—generations
curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal fishermen, the following exchange which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place
at the plenary session of the Constitutional Commission: The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. . .
MR. RODRIGO:
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the
Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes of our people, and right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause,
afterwards fail in the implementation. How will this be implemented? Will there be a licensing expressly mentions this right:
or giving of permits so that government officials will know that one is really a marginal
fisherman? Or if policeman say that a person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his SEC. 16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
permit, to prove that indeed he is one. granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
MR. BENGZON: promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned and this particular of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
question could be tackled when we discuss the Article on Local Governments—whether we will encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
leave to the local governments or to Congress on how these things will be implemented. But technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
certainly, I think our congressmen and our local offic ials will not be bereft of ideas on how to justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
implement this mandate. the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (italics supplied).
xxx
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Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the
the LGC “shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in BFAR.
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community.” To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal
waters and the protection of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters following:
and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of
explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious 1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery 2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;
laws.24 Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang 3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;
panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its 4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal waters;
inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that “[p]rotect the environment and 5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters;
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing 6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;
and other forms of destructive fishing. . . and such other activities which result in pollution, 7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance.”25 8. Establishment of “closed season” in municipal waters.
These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization26 as expressly mandated by Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
the Constitution.27 Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly
provides that “[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare
devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a)(1)(vi), 458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)(vi), which
to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances
concerned.”28 Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power cannot be doubted.
and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.29 Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611,
otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is June 1992. This statute adopts a “comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of
the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered
mangroves.30 This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out environment of the province,” which “shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan and
such fishery laws within the municipal waters. the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs
and projects affecting said province.”32
The term “municipal waters,” in turn, includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within
the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed
national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto
waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the
where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the statement
parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it.31 Under P.D. No. 704, the of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.
marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general
coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line. It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to
establish a “closed season” for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a
These “fishery laws” which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b)(2)(i) in period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto
municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
establishment of a “closed season” in any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or
ecological purposes; (3) P.D. The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery
laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of “closed
No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization and conservation of coral seasons.” The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of
resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
person, association or corporation to catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or Interior and Local Government.
have in possession any of the fish specie called gobiidae or “ipon” during closed season; and (5)
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the BFAR under P.D. No. 704, over the management, conservation, development, protection,
LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.33 encompassing. First, Section
4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters, which shall be
The destruction of coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for under the municipal or city government concerned, except insofar as fishpens and seaweed
coral reefs are among nature’s life-support systems.34 They collect, retain and recycle nutrients culture in municipal centers are concerned. This section provides, however, that all municipal or
for adjacent nearshore areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder
marine plants and animals; and serve as a protective shelter for aquatic organisms.35 It is said shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources for appropriate
that “[e]cologically, the reefs are to the oceans what forests are to continents: they are shelter action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval.42
and breeding grounds for fish and plant species that will disappear without them.”36
Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon of live- Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order
fish trade which entails the catching of so-called exotic species of tropical fish, not only for No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister
aquarium use in the West, but also for “the market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually (formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and
insatiable in ever more affluent Asia.37 These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen converted it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the regional offices
catch them by “diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide of the MAF.
poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are immobilized
[merely stunned] and then scooped by hand.”38 The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was
into a submerged net attached to the skiff. Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally. retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987,43 the
Back on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide BFAR is placed under the Title concerning the Department of Agriculture.44
from their system and are ready to be hauled. They are then placed in saltwater tanks or
packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major markets for Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is
live food fish.39 While the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for their former invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all,
home as “[a]fter the fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of
which fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its function as Agriculture. However, the requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of
habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral. The reef Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal
becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all color and waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons: (1) Section 534 (Repealing
vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the waves.”40 It has been found that cyanide fishing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Sections 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 70445 insofar
kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated application.41 as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced
Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities
Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In
sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted. _______________

As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of fish, and in so doing and when necessary, fix different price levels for various areas or regions
the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or statutory taking into account such variable factors as availability, accessibility to transportation facilities,
provision. The Order refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the packing and crating, and to regulate the movement, shipment and transporting of such fry and
Mayor’s Permit. fingerling: Provided, Further, That the price so fixed shall guarantee the gatherers of fry a just
and equitable return for their labor: Provided, Finally, That any administrative order issued by
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the the Secretary to implement the foregoing shall take effect immediately, the provisions of
part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of Section 7 hereof to the contrary notwithstanding.
1992, on the theory that the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as xxx
the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of
approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in C. MUNICIPAL FISHERIES
accordance with P.D. No. 704.
SEC. 29. Grant of fishery privileges.—A municipal or city council, conformably with an
The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the ordinance duly approved by the Secretary pursuant to Section 4 hereof may:
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
a. grant to the highest qualified bidder the exclusive privilege of constructing and operating fish
corrals, oyster culture beds, or of gathering “bangus” fry, or the fry of other species, in
municipal waters for a period not exceeding five (5) years: Provided, That in the zoning and
classification of municipal waters for purposes of awarding, through public bidding, areas for
the construction or operation of fish corrals, oyster culture beds, or the gathering of fry, the
municipal or city council shall set aside not more than one-fifth (1/5) of the area, earmarked for
the gathering of fry, as may be designated by the Bureau, as government “bangus” fry
reservation: Provided, Further, That no fish corral shall be constructed within two hundred
(200) meters of another fish corral in marine fisheries, or one hundred (100) meters in
freshwater fisheries, unless they belong to the same licensee, but in no case shall the distance be
less than sixty (60) meters, except in waters less than two (2) meters deep at low tide, or unless
previously approved by the Secretary;

b. authorize the issuance to qualified persons of license for the operation of fishing boats three
(3) gross tons or less, or with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and
impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of
explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery
laws.46 Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the
sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to “[p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing
and other forms of destructive fishing. . . and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.”47

In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will
to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby
sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other
local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand
in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the
repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary
restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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VOL. 181, JANUARY 29, 1990 development council.

495 Same; Same; Same; Same; Creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit to these regions.—The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
G.R. No. 79956. January 29, 1990.* autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and
G.R. No. 82217. January 29, 1990.* property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. CORTÉS, J.:
YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C.
HAMADA, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15,
MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON. 1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground
GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the
S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents. autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Enactments; Legislative enactments must be accorded the
presumption of constitutionality.—It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the Constitution, in Article X, provides:
inherent and stated powers and prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful
adherence to the principle of separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
presumption of constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the
burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality always rests upon the Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the challenge. consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
Same; Same; Autonomous Regions; E.O. 220; E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region, characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
it merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
the creation of an autonomous region; E.O. 220, not unconstitutional.—A reading of E.O. No.
220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure
delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas that laws are faithfully executed.
covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the autonomous regions shall be
the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does
not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we 498
shall show later.
498
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Cordillera Administrative Region is not a territorial or political
subdivision, it is a mere sophisticated version of a regional consultative council.—After SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new
territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. 1. Firstly, Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit
the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. x x x Then, vested in the National Government.
considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices
created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance
departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives
as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act
development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. x shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
x x In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the
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constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with people shall have been substantially granted.
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws. On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in
pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only and 3 of which state:
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region. Par. 2—Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could
perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.
the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Par. 3—Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in
drafting the Executive Order.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people.
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues; On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; E.O. 220. [Rejoinder, G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development; Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under
(6) Economic, social and tourism development; Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region
(7) Educational policies; (CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the
the people of the region. Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units
local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in
responsibility of the National Government. the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete without reference to its historical background. Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing
arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].
ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military
arm___the New People’s Army (NPA). Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last “Whereas” clause provides:

After President Aquino was WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act
installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national security
called on all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative
President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some members of her structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the
Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986 and signed with Fr. Government’s legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt the
Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA) and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on a
Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA) a ceasefire agreement permanent basis.
that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not undertake their Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region,” was enacted and signed into law. The Act
demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory
negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
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 who views E.O. No. 220 as capitulation to the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) of
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Regional Assembly, as well as all Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken by the
offices and agencies created under Executive Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately President. We can only inquire into whether or not the measures violate the Constitution. But as
upon the ratification of this Organic Act. we have seen earlier, they do not.

All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional 2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner
Assembly shall automatically be transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous Government. Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, “the interim autonomous region in the Cordil-leras”
[Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].
I
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and
prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful adherence to the principle of separation property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did
of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the presumption of constitutionality. Thus, in not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area,
any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and unequivocally for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and
proving its unconstitutionality always rests upon the challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a
will necessarily defeat the challenge. representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with,
among others, identifying priority projects and development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an
We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated petitions. implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of
Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration,
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all
exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as ex-officio members
Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do
act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government
Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the conclusion that petitioners’ assertions agencies. They merely constitute
are unfounded. Events subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this conclusion. the mechanism for an “umbrella” that brings together the existing local governments, the
agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of
the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by the
to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and appropriate national departments and agencies to
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of make available sources of funds for priority development programs and projects recommended
the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call upon the appropriate
the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the executive departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24].
Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The
Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft organic act which
appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
multisectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which
the autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be
Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law. conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution.
Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18].
Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created. In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we find
that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created,
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative showing the lack of basis of petitioners’ assertion. Events have shown that petitioners’ fear that
powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to E.O. No. 220 was a “shortcut” for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was
address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been totally unfounded.
passed and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps
taken by the President are obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon Clearly, petitioners’ principal challenge has failed.
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 2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and
II the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation
of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a territorial anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the
and political subdivision. The Constitution provides in Article X: regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X,
sec. 14]. These councils are “composed of local government officials, regional heads of
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim organizations within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region.” [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a
xxx more sophisticated version of the regional development council. III Finally, petitioners
incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. We find first a need to clear up petitioners’ apparent misconception of the concept of local
autonomy.
We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated
by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners’ assertion that E.O. No. 220 contravenes It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art.
the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution,
territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no
express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible
not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]
vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue
and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and
nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later increased
to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare
Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
the regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or
laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the
area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the Anent petitioners’ objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of the CAR
area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-
functions as may be provided by law. [See Part II, chap. III, art. I, of the Reorganization Plan]. emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the
invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the
participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government but also SO ORDERED.
the local governments, ethnolinguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing
about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose. Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
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VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 violations committed in Metropolitan Manila.

837 Same; Same; Same.—The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing
law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority. delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to
create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself).
G.R. No. 102782. December 11, 1991.* They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As
delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are
DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners, vs. THE METROPOLITAN merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents. statute.
Court rules; Power of Supreme Court to suspend procedural rules.—The Metropolitan Manila
Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged PETITION to review the resolution of the Metropolitan Manila Authority.
only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that
rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
those in the present controversy. x x x. Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a
formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could CRUZ, J.:
have been more assertive of their rights. Given these considerations, the Court feels it must
address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No.
the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990,1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates
them to fester. The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid
inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also
“pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.” In proper cases, procedural rules may be observed that even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations was not directly
relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.
because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules, No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and
executory on August 6,1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on
Administrative Law; Local Government; Delegation of legislative power.—The Court holds July 13, 1990.
that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing
that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are: 1) the completeness of Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. Under the first
requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he
that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver’s license was confiscated by Traffic
be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a second
requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to
function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and thus “prevent the the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they
delegation from running riot.” This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the could seek damages for confiscation of their driver’s licenses, and where they should file their
“convenience and welfare” of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at complaints.
bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate’s authority.
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto,
Same; Same; Requisites for validity of a municipal ordinance; Measures under consideration do complaining against the confiscation of his driver’s license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez
not conform to existing law.—According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of the lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver’s license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police
Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion Force.
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not
allow either the removal of the license plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392, It particularly cited
Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of:
his driver’s license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western
Police District. 1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or
consolidation for the Authority; and
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked 2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver’s of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers.
licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste’s driver’s license pursuant to a the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself
memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or
District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that
the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his validity.
own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally
parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void
decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the
License Plates and dated February 28,1991. measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver’s licenses for
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged
removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver’s licenses. impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.

On May 24,1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, On October 24,1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early
authorizing itself “to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their
motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.” validity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its
contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case
On July 2,1991, the Court issued the following resolution: or controversy before the Court.

The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law
Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that: or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled
principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.
thru the Traffic Operations Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of
in Metro Manila. confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More
importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman
reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not who confiscated a driver’s license dismissed the Gonong decision as “wrong” and said the
be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has police would not stop their “habit” unless they received orders “from the top.” Regrettably, not
received several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver’s licenses for one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and
alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.
may be imposed under PD 1605.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical
Court Resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester.
the Solicitor General to submit, within ten {10) days from notice hereof, separate
COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision. The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the
Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning “pleading, practice
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
and procedure in all courts."2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code.4 It is not
the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public
formalistic adherence to such rules. and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to
violations of traffic rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan,3 where
Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that “the transcendental importance to the The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are: 1)
must, technicalities of procedure.” the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient
standard.5
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
G.R. No. 81190, May 9,1988,161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its
own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient
justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and thus
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits “prevent the delegation from running riot.” This requirement has also been met. It is settled that
of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31). the “convenience and welfare” of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the
case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate’s authority.6
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on
other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question
is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case
G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the
L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the
the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners’ cause of action or the propriety of the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we
procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly governing municipal corporations.
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco,
G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.) According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general
petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11-Series of 1991, of the and consistent with public policy.7
Metropolitan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not
Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD
Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver’s
G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the
account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised. following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now
the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has
recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and
them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to file the otherwise discipliñe drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws,
appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such
interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised. Now to the merits. penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation
Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11Series of 1991, under the specific punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the
authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver’s license or certificate of
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public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend
or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver’s license or the report of The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself.
suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own
update. sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself).8 They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
xxx Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in
Section 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator
to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the second offense, P50.00 The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously,
for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver’s license for the fourth offense, and a it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes
revocation of the driver’s license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction.
Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances
prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in In Villacorta vs. Bernardo,9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of
Metropolitan Manila. Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part;

xxx In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:

Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be confiscated but the erring “From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of
driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila the questioned ordinance, Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act
Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City
violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land
violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 68 of said Act.
their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the
latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of
Metropolitan Manila Commission or the lawenforcement agency concerned shall endorse the Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City
case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last
the competent traffic court, city or municipal court. section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does
not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision
If at the time a driver renews his driver’s license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, owner additional conditions.
his driver’s license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding
surcharges. xxx

xxx “The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the
surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimated above,
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall
ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated
modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied). to a local ordinance.”

In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. We affirm.
The Commission was allowed to “impose fines and otherwise discipline” traffic violators only
“in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed,” that is, by the decree itself. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed
to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that “in case imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be confiscated.” These restrictions are registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud;
applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce
comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra
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vires.

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances
disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.

We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong Case that PD 1605 applies only to the
Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No.
4136 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules
elsewhere in the country with the sanctions therein prescribed, including those here questioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and
shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon
traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses
that may attend the enforcement of such sanctions, including the illicit practices described in
detail in the Gonong
decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for—and indeed there is a
statutory prohibition against—the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by
virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose
such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect
to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains
effective and continues to prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except
under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver’s licenses as well for traffic violations
in Metropolitan Manila.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver’s
licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado; Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., No part. Did not participate in the deliberations.

850 Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority., 204 SCRA 837, G.R. No. 102782
December 11, 1991

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[No. L-7708. 30 May 1955] but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed against the municipal
official, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of
JOSE MONDANO, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO SILVOSA, Provincial Governor of Surigao, the charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an
JOSE ARREZA and OLIMPIO EPIS, Members of the Provincial Board, respondents. information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party and the crime of
1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DEPARTMENT HEAD AS AGENT OF THE PRESIDENT HAS concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon a sworn complaint of the offended spouse (Article
DlRECT CONTROL ONLY OVER BUREAUS AND OFFICES UNDER His JURISDICTION 344 of the Revised Penal Code).
BUT NOT OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.—The department head as agent of the President ORIGINAL action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided
for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the D. Avila and C. H. Lozada for petitioner.
service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only Olimpio R. Epis in his own behalf and for his co-respondents.
general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the
Constitution). If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be PADILLA, J.:
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and
supervision over all local governments and that The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of
for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolación Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her
section 10, article VII, of the Constitution. daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place
other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the
2.ID.; ID.; CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, DISTINGUISHED.—In administrative law complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control, on the other the provincial board. On the same day, the provincial governor issued Administrative Order No.
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
for that of the latter.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
3.ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF SUPERVISION OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OVER MUNICIPAL respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and
OFFICIALS; INSTANCE WHERE INVESTIGATION OF PROVINCIAL BOARD is for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is
ILLEGAL.—The provincial supervision over municipal officials is lodged in the provincial illegal and without legal effect.
governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued after the filing and
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral approval of a bond for P500.
turpitude." (Section 2188, Revised Administrative Code). If the charges are serious he shall
refer the matter to the provincial board and "may in such case suspend the officer (not being the The answer of the respondents admits the facts alleged in the petition except those that are
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting inferences and conclusions of law and invokes the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised
the official integrity of the officer in question." (Ibid.) But where, as in the present case, the Administrative Code which clothes the department head with "direct control, direction, and
municipal officer was charged with rape and concubinage which have nothing to do with the supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction * * *" and to that end "may order
perf ormance of his duties as mayor of the municipality nor do they constitute or involve the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office, as under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an
provided for in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such official or person who shall conduct such investigations; * * *" and the rule in the case of
charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. Hence, his suspension as mayor of Villena vs, Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, which upheld "the power of the Secretary of
the municipality is unlawful and without authority of law. Interior to conduct at its own initiative investigation of charges against local elective municipal
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE BEFORE CHARGES OF RAPE AND CONCUBINAGE MAY officials and to suspend them preventively," on the board proposition "that under the
BE FlLED AND TRIED BY PROVINCIAL BOARD.—It is true that the charges of rape and presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental
concubinage may involve moral turpitude of which a municipal official may be proceeded organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 11, Article VII, of our
against in accordance with the provisions of section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Page | 34
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Departments, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court held that the power of the President to remove
Chief Executive." officials from office as provided for in section 64(6) of the Revised Administrative Code must
be done "conformably to law;" and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he
The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and organized before "may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government
the approval of the Constitution continued to exist as "authorized by law until the Congress of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.'" Again, this power of removal must be exercised
shall provide otherwise."1 Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: conformably to law.
"The President shall have control of all the executive reversed by the Court in banc, questions
the competence of departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary requested
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed." immediate investigation, appropriate action and report on the complaint indorsed to him, and
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of called his attention to section 2193 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for the
all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which institution of judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial
he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The governor. If the indorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of
Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus the provincial governor to investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of
and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative the Executive, but the investigation to be conducted by him would not be that which is provided
Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over for in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges preferred
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section
any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do
confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve "neglect of duty,
over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office." True, they may
provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed in
be construed as conf erring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, accordance with the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by
and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the
investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn
would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age and the crime of concubinage cannot be
If "general supervision over all local governments" is to be construed as the same power prosecuted but upon a sworn complaint of the offended spouse.4 The charges preferred against
granted to the Department Head in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any of those
there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that 'of specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges
supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of
officer to see that subordinate officers perf orm their duties. If the latter f ail or neglect to f ulfill the municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perf orm their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs.
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section Pablo, Acting C.J, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.
and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against Writ of prohibition granted. Mondano vs. Silvosa, etc., et al., 97 Phil., 143, No. L-7708 May 30,
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of 1955
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude."2 And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter
to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of
the officer in question."3 Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the
power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of * * *
municipalities * * *. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same
authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10(1),
Article VII, of the Constitution.

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VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 officers perform their duties.”

271 Same; Same; Suspension.—The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the
possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings.
G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.* The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon
is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. x x x.
LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.* Same; Same; Same.—The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, x x
x because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as a suspension, x x x is simply “to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the
Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses” or to keep him off “the
as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR records and other evidence.” It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a
CABALUNA, JR., respondents. case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not
G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.* exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period
is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
respondents. PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Local Governments; Power to discipline local officials.—It is the considered opinion of the
Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
to divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
omission (of “as may be provided by law”) signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments ‘autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ “control” over local Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy,
to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.
discipline.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Same; Same; Local autonomy explained.—It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local
autonomy” is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary
local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also
noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local governments under the The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the
general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest
that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in
done, delegate its exercise to the President. number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges,
among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
Same; Same; Supervision and control, meaning of.—The petitioners are under the impression conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.1 The
that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador
the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and
disciplinary authority. x x x “Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or Eduardo Peña Redondo, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter.” “Supervision” on the Court of Appeals.2 We quote:
other hand means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
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xxx xxx xxx was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador
Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office hearings but was actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and
of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. unpreparedness of petitioner’s counsel.
Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and
the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue—Iloilo City. Again,
suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the
To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to
alien to the complainant’s duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled
petitioner’s act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or hearings (Annex M).
force her to resign.
In the said hearings, petitioner’s counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform
task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on
padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around
treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a
the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner
Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B). were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement
which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified in Adm.
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected ViceMayor of Iloilo City and Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Peña
Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified
arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was including their witnesses.
unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor
Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants On October 10, 1988, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the
sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with his October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion
fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong for change of venue was denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the
denounced the petitioner’s actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved
office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in
witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to
with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December
bystanders. 13 to 15, 1988.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or
mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the
no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.
upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing
injuries. He was released only the following day.3 On December 14, 1988, petitioner’s counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the
hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December
The Mayor thereafter answered,4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for
Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events: resolution.

xxx xxx xxx In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed
by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner’s second preventive suspension dated
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining
at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City.
telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the The second preventive suspension was not enforced.5
petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and
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Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that “political feud”
against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.
Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently,
he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so’s that Secretary Santos had
Appeals. attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.
Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them at face
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them,18 for the same
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-so’s were never corroborated by
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an
Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of
prohibition,6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
As to Mayor Ganzon’s contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court
16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from
In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.19
Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing
from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a
Appeals’ two decisions. matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon’s above
story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of
January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto. The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos’ actuations deprived
Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of Local
Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
the respondent Secretary had been “biased, prejudicial and hostile” towards him7 arising from President’s alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
his (Mayor Ganzon’s) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party8 and
the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections;9 and It is the petitioners’ argument that the 1987 Constitution20 no longer allows the President, as
his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.10 He also alleges that he requested the the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over
Secretary to life his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-
elections of November 14, 1988),11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase “as may be provided by
hearing—and meted out two more suspension orders—of the aforementioned cases.12 He law,”21 to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so
likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request.13 He states that
he asked for postponement on “valid and justifiable”14 grounds, among them, that he was The provision in question reads
suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his “vital”15 witness was also as follows:
hospitalized16 but that the latter unduly denied his request.17
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
Mayor Ganzon’s primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746). component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22

As to Mayor Ganzon’s charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His
claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were (are) political rivals and that his “persecution” Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way care that the laws be faithfully executed.23
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 in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of “as may be provided by law”) is significant, as their Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to “small
argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is “provided by law” and (2) hence, no law republics”.26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not
may provide for it any longer. It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution—and as the
question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal “supervision clause” itself suggest—is to wean local government units from overdependence on
provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote: the central government.

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.—Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not instantly self-executing, but
Local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code,27 a local tax law,28
respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and income distribution legislation,29 and a national representation law,30 and measures31
commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy,
of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It
election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code
suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
lifted.24 powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President. Thus:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.—(1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of
Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
respondent is an elective barangay official. decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when local units.32
the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of “as may be provided by law” was meant to stress, sub
not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional
control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.33
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the
without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.25
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
Constitution, in deleting the phrase “as may be provided by law” intend to divest the President control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held,34
Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the thus:
significance of the change in the constitutional language?
xxx xxx xxx
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of “as may be provided by law”) signifies nothing government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of
more than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two
“control” over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the
of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in Court has made the following digression: “In administration law supervision means overseeing
particular, concerning discipline. or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
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alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this Department Head over the administration of x x x municipalities x x x. If it be construed that it
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by
over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed
the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised to have been abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution.47
Administrative Code. xxx35
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials
“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code.48
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for test of the latter.”36 “Supervision” on the other hand means Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was
“overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited
duties.”37 As we held,38 however, “investigating” is not inconsistent with “overseeing”, power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law
although it is a lesser power than “altering”. gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining
him.49
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court’s pronouncements in at least three cases,
Lacson v. Roque,39 Hebron v. Reyes,40 and Mondano v. Silvosa,41 and possibly, a fourth one, The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the
Pelaez v. Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control Constitutional Commission to defeat the President’s powers. The Court believes that the
powers but only supervision “as may be provided by law,”43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo
and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President “may not . . . suspend an elective official would exclude the power of removal from the President,50 Commissioner Blas Ople would
of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a not.51
decision of the corresponding provincial board.”44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor
Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local
authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, “supervision” and “removal” are not
exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson: incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of
local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.52
without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled
by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means “a more responsive and accountable
limitations.45 local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.”53 The Constitution,
as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government
In Hebron, we stated: over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to “liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila.” Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken
to the contrary—which does not exist with respect to municipal officers ...46 such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-
In Mondano, the Court held: government.

x x x The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national administration—
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate but not power—to the local levels. Thus:
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit written is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their
(not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.” Section 86 of the Revised pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central
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government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over them, but only to “ensure that Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is
local affairs are administered according to law.” He has no control over their acts in the sense held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a
that he can substitute their judgments with his own. presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be
favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a longer suspension is unjust and
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to “self-immolation,” since in that event, the autonomous government becomes As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension—which is not a remote possibility—
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.55 on Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in
inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another
matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor’s guilt has not been
Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his
days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of
misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see
which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held:56 that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon
successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor-without suspending him a day
does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak,
Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all on the Mayor piecemeal—apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the
this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the
electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from
elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising
be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future
continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made
even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code)—which brings
There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure.
of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to
protracted continuance perpetuate an arbitrary act.
of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression.
A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs. We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo
that the order of suspension should be lifted.57 Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary
Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons,58 urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake
and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon’s usual remedies of appeal, judicial or
objective of a suspension, as we have held,59 is simply “to prevent the accused from hampering administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from
the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings
witnesses”60 or to keep him off “the records and other evidence.”61 It is a means, and no more, of prima facie evidence.
to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local
Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly In resumé, the Court is laying down the following rules:
sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought
to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. 1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration,
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not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the
manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but
to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative
regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law,
and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. “Supervision” and “investigation” are not inconsistent terms; “investigation” does not signify
“control” (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no
longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges “due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time
of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.” [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits
another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the
aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future
suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for
acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate
all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petitions dismissed. Suspension of petitioners affirmed.

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G.R. No. 209185. October 25, 2013.* free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. In Pangandaman v. COMELEC, 319
MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SCRA 283 (1999), Lining Pangandaman (Pangandaman) filed a petition for certiorari and
represented by its CHAIRMAN, ATTY. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., and the PROVINCIAL prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to challenge
ELECTION OFFICER OF DAVAO DEL SUR, represented by ATTY. MA. FEBES the Omnibus Order of the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc ordered the conduct
BARLAAN, respondents. of special elections in certain municipalities in Lanao del Sur on 18 and 25 July 1998, or more
than 30 days after the failure of elections on 11 May 1998. Like Cagas, Pangandaman insisted
Local Government Units; Plebiscite; The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of on a strict compliance with the schedule of the holding of special elections. Pangandaman
a province.—The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10 asserted that COMELEC’s authority to call a special election was limited by the 30-day period
and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or and that Congress had the power to call a special election after the 30th day. We admonished
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, Pangandaman against a too literal interpretation of the law, and protected COMELEC’s powers
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to against the straitjacketing by procedural rules. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according
a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall to its spirit and intent.
retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Plebiscite; The Commission on
limited to basic services requiring coordination. Elections has residual power to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by
law.—It is thus not novel for this Court to uphold the COMELEC’s broad power or authority to
Constitutional Law; Local Elections; The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix the date fix other dates for a plebiscite, as in special elections, to enable the people to exercise their right
of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned of suffrage. The COMELEC thus has residual power to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the
Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government officials.—The deadline prescribed by law. The date 28 October 2013 is reasonably close to 6 April 2013, and
Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is in contrast there is no reason why the plebiscite should not proceed as scheduled by the COMELEC.
with its provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8, Article VI and of
the President and Vice President in Section 4, Article VII. The Constitution recognizes that the SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in
previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
officials. Section 10 of R.A. No. 7160 furnishes the general rule as to when a plebiscite may be
held: Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement.—No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial Benjamin B. Wong for petitioner.
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units The Solicitor General for respondents.
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or RESOLUTION
ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixed another date.
CARPIO, J.:
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Jurisdiction; The Commission on
Elections has “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the This Resolution resolves the Petition for Prohibition,1 filed by Marc Douglas IV C. Cagas
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections.”—The (Cagas), in his capacity as taxpayer, to prohibit the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to “[e]nforce and administer all laws from conducting a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections within the whole province of
recall.” The COMELEC has “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all Davao del Sur, except in Davao City.
laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections.” The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC “all the Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same
peaceful and credible elections.” province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao
Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360),
Statutory Construction; It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law
determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 10360 provide for the composition of the new provinces of Davao
intent.—This Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of election laws in favor of holding Occidental and Davao del Sur:
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 No. 9771 provided for the following calendar of activities:
Sec. 2. Province of Davao Occidental.—There is hereby created a new province from the
present Province of Davao del Sur to be known as the Province of Davao Occidental, consisting DATE/PERIOD ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED ACTS
of the municipalities of Sta. Maria, Malita, Don Marcelino, Jose Abad Santos and Sarangani. SEPT. 09, 2013 (MON) Last day to constitute the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers
The territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Davao Occidental shall be within the present SEPT. 28, 2013 (SAT) – NOV. 12, 2013 (TUE) (30 DAYS BEFORE THE DATE
metes and bounds of all the municipalities that comprise the Province of Davao Occidental.
PLEBISCITE PERIOD
xxxx Bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including
any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, or even if licensed to possess or
Sec. 7. Legislative District.—The Province of Davao Occidental shall have its own carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission (Sec. 261 (p) (q) OEC, as
legislative district to commence in the next national and local elections after the effectivity of amended by Sec. 32, RA 7166);
this Charter. Henceforth, the municipalities of Sta. Maria, Malita, Don Marcelino, Jose Abad
Santos and Sarangani shall comprise the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Davao
Occidental while the City of Digos and the municipalities of Malalag, Sulop, Kiblawan, Padada,
Hagonoy, Sta. Cruz, Matanao, Bansalan and Magsaysay shall comprise the Lone Legislative Suspension of local elective officials (Sec. 261 (x), OEC);
District of the Province of Davao del Sur. Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service (Sec. 261 (h), OEC);
Alteration of territory of a precinct or establishment of a new precinct (Sec.
xxxx 5, R.A. 8189);
Organizing or maintaining reaction/strike forces or similar forces (Sec. 261,
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite. (u), OEC);
Illegal release of prisoners (Sec. 261 (n), OEC);
Sec. 46. Plebiscite.—The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in Use of security personnel or bodyguards by candidates, whether or not such
this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas bodyguards are regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police or Armed Forces
in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of the Philippines or other law enforcement agency (Sec. 261 (t), OEC, as amended by Sec. 33,
within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.The amount RA 7166);

necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be borne by the COMELEC. Release, disbursement or expenditures of public funds (Sec. 261 (v), OEC);
Construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury
R.A. No. 10360 was passed by the House of Representatives on 28 November 2012, and by the warrants or similar devices for a future undertaking chargeable against public funds (Sec. 261,
Senate on 5 December 2012. President Benigno S. Aquino III approved R.A. No. 10360 on 14 (w) OEC).
January 2013.2 R.A. No. 10360 was published in the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin SEPTEMBER 28, 2013 (SAT) to OCTOBER 26, 2013 (SAT) INFORMATION
only on 21 January 2013. Considering that R.A. No. 10360 shall take effect 15 days after its CAMPAIGN PERIOD Making any donation or gift in cash or in kind, etc. (Sec. 104,
publication in at least two newspapers of general and local circulation,3 COMELEC, therefore, OEC); Use of armored/ land/ water/ air craft. (Sec. 261 (r), OEC); Appointing or using special
only had until 6 April 2013 to conduct the plebiscite.4 policemen, special/ confidential agents or the like. (Sec. 261 (m), OEC);
SEPTEMBER 28, 2013 (SAT) to OCTOBER 28, 2013 (MON) Issuance of
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC appointments, promotions, creation of new positions, or giving of salary increases.
suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for OCTOBER 27, 2013 (SUN) EVE OF PLEBISCITE DAY Campaigning (Sec. 3, OEC);
the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.5 On 9 July 2013, the COMELEC extended the Giving, accepting free transportation, foods, drinks, and things of value
policy on suspension of the holding of plebiscites by resolving to defer action on the holding of (Sec. 89, OEC);
all plebiscites until after the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections.6 During a meeting held on Selling, furnishing, offering, buying, serving or taking intoxicating liquor
31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao (Sec. 261 (dd), (1), OEC).(NOTE: Acts mentioned in the three (3) preceding paragraphs are
Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.7 prohibited until election day.)
The COMELEC, in Minute Resolution No. 13-0926, approved the conduct of the Concept of OCTOBER 28, 2013 (MON) PLEBISCITE DAYCasting of votes- (from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
Execution for the conduct of the plebiscite on 6 August 2013.8 On 14 August 2013, Bartolome simultaneous with the voting for the Barangay and SK Elections) Counting of votes shall be
J. Sinocruz, Jr., the Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the COMELEC, issued a after the counting of votes for Barangay and SK Elections) Convening of the City Plebiscite
memorandum furnishing a copy of Minute Resolution No. 13-0926 to Atty. Remlane M. Board of Canvassers – (6:00 p.m.)
Tambuang, Regional Election Director of Region XI; Atty. Ma. Febes M. Barlaan, Provincial Vote-buying and vote selling (Sec. 261 (a), OEC); Voting more than once or in substitution of
Election Supervisor of Davao del Sur; and to all election officers of Davao del Sur. On 6 another (Sec. 261 (z) (2) and (3), OEC);
September 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution Nos. 97719 and 9772.10 Resolution
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Campaigning (Sec. 3, OEC); Soliciting votes or undertaking any propaganda for or against any 4. Public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted; and
candidate or any political party within the polling place or within thirty (30) meters thereof
(Sec. 261 (cc) (6), OEC); 5. The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions.16

Selling, furnishing, offering, buying, serving or taking intoxicating liquor, etc. (Sec. 261 (dd) In this Resolution, we simplify the issues raised by the parties, thus: Did the COMELEC act
(1), OEC); Opening of booths or stalls for the sale, etc., of wares, merchandise or refreshments, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
within thirty (30) meters radius from the polling place. (Sec. 261 (dd) (2) OEC); excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of
Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
Giving and/or accepting free transportation, food, drinks and things of value (Sec. 89, OEC);
Holding of fairs, cockfights, boxing, horse races or similar sports. (Sec. 261 (dd) (3), OEC). We answer in the negative.

Resolution No. 9772, on the other hand, provided that copies of R.A. No. 10360 be posted11 The COMELEC’s power to administer elections
and that information campaigns be conducted prior to the plebiscite.12
includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law.
On 9 October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas cites three causes of
action: The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of
Article X of the Constitution provide that:
1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or MODIFY Section 46 of
Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE RESOLUTION because it is only CONGRESS who Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
can validly amend, repel [sic] or modify existing laws, thus COMELEC [sic] act in suspending abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
the holding of a plebiscite is unconstitutional;13 established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite this coming October 28,
2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental because Section 46 of Republic Act Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject
[No.] 10360 has already lapsed;14 and to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall
retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative
3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent the COMELEC from holding the assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
Plebiscite on October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental except limited to basic services requiring coordination.
through the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction because
COMELEC had already commenced the preparation for holding of the Plebiscite for the Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise by the people of their
creation of the Province of [Davao] Occidental synchronizing it with that of the Barangay and sovereignty. After the legislative branch’s enactment of a law to create, divide, merge or alter
SK elections this coming October 28, 2013.15 the boundaries of a local government unit or units, the people in the local government unit or
units directly affected vote in a plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the
On 17 October 2013, we issued a Resolution requiring respondents COMELEC, represented by change.17
its Chairperson, Hon. Sixto Brillantes, Jr., and the Provincial Election Officer of Davao del Sur,
represented by Atty. Ma. Febes Barlaan, to file their comment to Cagas’ petition not later than The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is in
21 October 2013. contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8, Article
VI18 and of the President and Vice President in Section 4, Article VII.19 The Constitution
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their comment on 21 recognizes that the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by
October 2013. The OSG raises the following arguments: the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of
local government officials.20
1. The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for the creation of a local
government unit; Section 10 of R.A. No. 7160 furnishes the general rule as to when a plebiscite may be held:

2. There was logistical and financial impossibility for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite at a Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement.—No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
mere two months’ notice; alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
3. Legislative intent is for R.A. No. 10360 to be implemented; directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or
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ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixed another date. in the accreditation and registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections.26 The logistic
and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides that the plebiscite for the creation is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative mishaps
of the province of Davao Occidental be held within 60 days from the effectivity of R.A. No. covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave
10360, or until 6 April 2013.21 Cagas claims that R.A. No. 10360 “did not confer express or abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of the province
implied power to COMELEC to exercise discretion when the plebiscite for the creation of the of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.
Province of Davao Occidental will be held. On the contrary, said law provides a specific period
when the COMELEC should conduct a plebiscite.”22 Cagas views the period “60 days from the The OSG illustrated the COMELEC’s predicament in this manner:
effectivity” in R.A. No. 10360 as absolute and mandatory; thus, COMELEC has no legal basis
to hold a plebiscite on 28 October 2013. To be sure, at the time R.A. No. 10360 was approved, the COMELEC had to deliver and
accomplish the following, among many others, for the May 2013 National and Local Elections:
The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to “[e]nforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and 1. Preparation of the Project of Precincts indicating the total number of established precincts
recall.”23 The COMELEC has “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all and the number of registered voters per precincts [sic] in a city or municipality.
laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections.”24 The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC “all the 2. Constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors including the precincts where they will be
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, assigned and the barangay where the precinct is located.
peaceful and credible elections.”25
3. Inspection, verification and sealing of the Book of Voters containing the approved voter
Sections 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881) the Omnibus Election Code, registration records of registered voters in the particular precinct which must be inspected,
provide the COMELEC the power to set elections to another date. verified, and sealed.

Sec. 5. Postponement of election.—When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, 4. Finalization and printing of the computerized voters list for use on election day.
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become 5. The preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of the voters’ information.
impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified
petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties 6. Configuration, testing, and demonstration of the PCOS machines and their distribution to
are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which the different precincts.
should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted, petitioner would
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. have the COMELEC hold off all of its above tasks. If COMELEC abandoned any of its tasks or
did not strictly follow the timetable for the accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put
Sec. 6. Failure of election.—If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or in serious jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local Elections. The COMELEC
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its manpower and other resources on its
had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the preparation for the May 2013 National and Local Elections, and to ensure that it would not be
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360.
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure
or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the Parenthetically, for the COMELEC to hold the plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. No. 10360
basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the within the fixed period, it would have to reconfigure for said purpose some of the PCOS
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect machines that were already configured for the May 2013 National and Local Elections; or in the
on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a alternative, conduct the plebiscite manually.
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. However, conducting the plebiscite manually would require another set of ballots and other
election paraphernalia. Besides, another set of election materials would also require additional
The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 logistics for printing, checking, packing, and deployment thereof. Lest it be forgotten, that all of
February 2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 these things should undergo public bidding.
May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for
the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. Since the plebiscite would be a separate undertaking, the COMELEC would have to appoint
No. 10360. We also take judicial notice of the COMELEC’s burden separate sets of board[s] of election inspectors, tellers, and other personnel to canvass the result
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of the plebiscite — all of which would have entailed further cost for the COMELEC whose Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the
budget had already been overly stretched to cover the May 2013 National and Local Elections. COMELEC’s powers in conducting elections. As stated in the old but nevertheless still very
much applicable case of Sumulong v. COMELEC:
More importantly, it bears stressing that the COMELEC was not given a special budget to
defray the cost of the plebiscite. In fact, the COMELEC had to take P11 million from its Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically — not from
savings and from the Barangay Elections budget to finance the plebiscite to ratify R.A. No. the standpoint of pure theory.
10360 on October 28, 2013.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
The COMELEC’s questioned Resolution then directing the holding of the plebiscite for the strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
ratification of R.A. No. 10360 simultaneously with the Barangay Elections was not an abuse of controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions
its discretion, as alleged, but simply an exercise of prudence, because as the COMELEC itself x x x. There are no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are
noted, doing so “will entail less expense than holding it separately.” [p. 9, Resolution No. 13- necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the
0926, Annex B, Petition.] administration of laws relative to the conduct of election x x x we must not by any excessive
zeal take away from the Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutional and
The determination of the feasibility of holding a plebiscite on a given date is within the legal mandates properly belongs to it.
competence and discretion of the COMELEC. Petitioner cannot therefore simply insist that the
COMELEC should have complied with the period specified in the law when doing so would be More pointedly, this Court recently stated in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, et al., that “[O]ur
virtually impossible under the circumstances.27 elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices,
candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap
This Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of election laws in favor of holding free, judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable.
We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very
In Pangandaman v. COMELEC,28 Lining Pangandaman (Pangandaman) filed a petition for difficult circumstances.”
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
to challenge the Omnibus Order of the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc ordered The purpose of the governing statutes on the conduct of elections —
the conduct of special elections in certain municipalities in Lanao del Sur on 18 and 25 July
1998, or more than 30 days after the failure of elections on 11 May 1998. Like Cagas, x x x [i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and
Pangandaman insisted on a strict compliance with the schedule of the holding of special defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental
elections. Pangandaman asserted that COMELEC’s authority to call a special election was requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate,
limited by the 30-day period and that Congress had the power to call a special election after the must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the
30th day. We admonished Pangandaman against a too literal interpretation of the law, and elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable
protected COMELEC’s powers against the straitjacketing by procedural rules. latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created — to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute
with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. Thus, a too
literal interpretation of the law that would lead to absurdity prompted this Court to — Guided by the above-quoted pronouncement, the legal compass from which the COMELEC
should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that “clean
x x x [a]dmonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than elections control the appropriateness of the remedy.”
fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in
‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth’ x x x In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should not be
later than thirty (30) days after
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to
“enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, elect; and, 2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” There can hardly be any doubt that the text and which resulted in the failure to elect. The first involves a question of fact. The second must be
intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the holding of elections
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension or
elections. failure to elect may still be considered “reasonably close to the date of the election not held.”

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In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates set for the special undertakings:
elections were actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial failure of elections was
determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the challenged 1. Bidding for election paraphernalia;
Omnibus Order. Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for the
holding of special elections were only a few days away from the time a total/partial failure of 2. Cleansing of voters’ registration list;
elections was declared and, thus, these were “dates reasonably close” thereto, given the
prevailing facts herein. Furthermore, it bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its 3. Preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of the voters’ information;
powers to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to resolve election disputes.29 4. Preparation and completion of the projects of precincts;

In Sambarani v. COMELEC,30 petitioners were candidates for punong barangay in different 5. Printing of ballots;
barangays in Lanao del Sur. There was a failure of elections in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, and special elections were set on 13 6. Constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors;
August 2002 in the affected barangays. No special elections were held on 13 August 2002, so
petitioners asked the COMELEC to declare a failure of elections in their barangays and to hold 7. Training and assignment of personnel; [and]
another special election. The COMELEC, however, directed the Department of Interior and
Local Government to appoint the Barangay Captains, Barangay Kagawads, SK Chairmen, and 8. Information dissemination/campaign.
SK Kagawads in the affected barangays. The COMELEC stated that it is no longer in a position
to call for another special election since Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that To demand now that the COMELEC desist from holding the plebiscite would be an utter waste
“special elections shall be held on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, of time, effort and resources, not to mention its detriment to public interest given that public
but not later than thirty days after cessation of the cause of such postponement.” funds are involved.32

We directed the COMELEC to conduct special elections and stated that the deadline cannot In election law, the right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding
defeat the right of suffrage of the people. elections or plebiscites. Indeed, Cagas’ insistence that only Congress can cure the alleged legal
infirmity in the date of holding the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao
The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause Occidental fails in light of the absence of abuse of discretion of the COMELEC. Finally, this
of the failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC Court finds it unacceptable to utilize more of our taxpayers’ time and money by preventing the
possesses residual power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by COMELEC from holding the plebiscite as now scheduled.
law. The deadline in Section 6 cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by
the Constitution. The COMELEC erroneously perceived that the deadline in Section 6 is WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
absolute. The COMELEC has broad power or authority to fix other dates for special elections to
enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the SO ORDERED.
conduct of special elections when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period
prescribed by law.31

It is thus not novel for this Court to uphold the COMELEC’s broad power or authority to fix
other dates for a plebiscite, as in special elections, to enable the people to exercise their right of
suffrage. The COMELEC thus has residual power to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the
deadline prescribed by law. The date 28 October 2013 is reasonably close to 6 April 2013, and
there is no reason why the plebiscite should not proceed as scheduled by the COMELEC. The
OSG points out that public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted.

At this point, there is nothing more for the COMELEC to do except to hold the plebiscite as
scheduled on October 18, [sic] 2013. In fact, the COMELEC already scheduled the shipment
and deployment of the election paraphernalia to all the precincts in Davao del Sur, except
Davao City.

The COMELEC had put so much work and effort in its preparation for the conduct of the
plebiscite. A substantial amount of funds have also been defrayed for the following election
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736 legal question now before this Court, are no longer in issue, the same need not be determined by
a trial court. In any case, the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court from
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED assuming jurisdiction over the petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court’s
primary jurisdiction. The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the
G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004.* proper legal interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the
“transcendental importance” of the case, as it necessarily involves the application of the
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its Governor, HERMILANDO I. constitutional principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present
MANDANAS, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary and controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to
Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution; HON. EMILIA BONCODIN, Secretary, resolve the case forthwith.
Department of Budget and Management; HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, respondents. Same; Moot and Academic Questions; Supervening events, whether intended or accidental,
Actions; Parties; Locus Standi; The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete Constitution; Another reason justifying the resolution by the Court of the substantive issue now
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”—The gist of the question of standing is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”—Granting arguendo that, as contended by the
whether a party has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to respondents, the resolution of the case had already been overtaken by supervening events as the
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court IRA, including the LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had already been released and the
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Accordingly, it has government is now operating under a new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason
been held that the interest of a party assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct for this Court to resolve the substantive issue raised by the instant petition. Supervening events,
and personal. Such party must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a
invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Another reason justifying the
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. a question otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” For
the GAAs in the coming years may contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be
Same; Same; Same; Local Autonomy; Local Government Code; A local government unit invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It, thus,
(LGU), seeking relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.
LGUs, pertaining to their interest in their share in the national taxes or the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), has the requisite standing to bring suit.—The Court holds that the petitioner Municipal Corporations; Local Autonomy; Local Government Code; Consistent with the
possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a local government principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to
unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. one of general supervision, which provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
This interest pertains to the LGUs’ share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioner’s control.—Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision. This provision has been
2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating interpreted to exclude the power of control. The distinction between the two powers was
the “automatic release” to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes. Further, the injury that enunciated in Drilon v. Lim: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided under they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or redone by his
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority.
assailed measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself
the validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the
resolutions as the petitioner clearly has “a plain, direct and adequate interest” in the manner and rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the
distribution of the IRA among the LGUs. prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling Same; Same; Same; When parsed, it would be readily seen that Section 6, Article X of the
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of the Supreme Constitution readily mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes,
Court’s primary jurisdiction.—Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the (2) the “just share” shall be determined by law, and (3) the “just share” shall be automatically
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
released to the LGUs.—Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads: Sec. 6. Local IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.—Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising
government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall discretion, even control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is
be automatically released to them. When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; (2) the “just share” Constitution. Moreover, it finds no statutory basis at all as the Oversight Committee was created
shall be determined by law; and (3) the “just share” shall be automatically released to the merely to formulate the rules and regulations for the efficient and effective implementation of
LGUs. the Local Government Code of 1991 to ensure “compliance with the principles of local
autonomy as defined under the Constitution.” In fact, its creation was placed under the title of
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The LGUs are not required to perform any act to “Transitory Provisions,” signifying its ad hoc character. According to Senator Aquilino Q.
receive the “just share” accruing to them from the national coffers—the “just share” of the Pimentel, the principal author and sponsor of the bill that eventually became Rep. Act No. 7160,
LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further action”; “Automatic” means the Committee’s work was supposed to be done a year from the approval of the Code, or on
“involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely October 10, 1992. The Oversight Committee’s authority is undoubtedly limited to the
negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the same.
automation.”—Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “automatic” as Neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.
“involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely
negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton.” Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The assailed provisos in the Gen-eral Appropriations Acts
Further, the word “automatically” is defined as “in an automatic manner: without thought or (GAAs) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the Oversight Committee on Devolution (OCD)
conscious intention.” Being “automatic,” thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA—they effectively encroach on the
and perfunctory. As such, the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the “just fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down.—In like manner, the assailed
share” accruing to them from the national coffers. As emphasized by the Local Government provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
Code of 1991, the “just share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further “withholding” of a portion of the IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the five
action.” billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations, including
the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like
Same; Same; Same; Internal Revenue Allotments; Local Government Service Equalization Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
Fund (LGSEF); Statutory Construction; The entire process involving the distribution and resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be
release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible—to subject its distribution and release struck down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.
to the vagaries
of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic
unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, makes the release not release of the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal
automatic; Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must be year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case
taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the
obeyed.—To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the current fiscal year.—Thus, from the above provision, the only possible exception to the
LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for
LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year,
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the
automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” current fiscal year. In the instant case, however, there is no allegation that the national internal
of the LGUs “shall be automatically released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy revenue tax collections for the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have fallen compared to the
of the Oversight Committee. Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and preceding three fiscal years.
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to
see to it that the mandate is obeyed. Moreover, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the use of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Appropriations Bills; Amendments and Repeals of
the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative Laws; While it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions of the Local
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Government Code, a substantive law, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs—
any amendment to the Local Government Code should be done in a separate law, not in the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters
over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.—The respondents argue that this
subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution; The Oversight modification is allowed since the Constitution does not specify that the “just share” of the
Committee’s authority is undoubtedly limited to the implementation of the Local Government LGUs shall only be determined by the Local Government Code of 1991. That it is within the
Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the power of Congress to enact other laws, including the GAAs, to increase or decrease the “just
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
share” of the LGUs. This contention is untenable. The Local Government Code of 1991 is a meaningful local autonomy.
substantive law. And while it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions
therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local Same; Same; The value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the
Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, degree of autonomy that they enjoy—our national officials should not only comply with the
because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty
properly enacted in a separate legislation. upon which these provisions are based.—Indeed, the value of local governments as institutions
of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. As eloquently put by M.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Inappropriate Provisions; Words De Tocqueville, a distinguished French political writer, “[l]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute
and Phrases; A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is the strength of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit— science; they bring it within the people’s reach; they teach men how to use and enjoy it. A
any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate nation may establish a system of free governments but without the spirit of municipal
provision.”—A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” Our national officials should not only comply
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Any with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and
provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate liberty upon which these provisions are based.
provision.” The category of “inappropriate provisions” includes unconstitutional provisions and
provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
place in an appropriations bill. Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their
percentage sharing therein, which are fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
of general and substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake these amendments through the
GAAs, as the respondents contend, would be to give Congress the unbridled authority to unduly Ma. Cecilia L. Austria-Chua and Minerva Rosales-Dimaano for petitioner.
infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every year. This,
the Court cannot sanction. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Same; Same; It is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while concededly The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed the
expounded in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of the century present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
when President William McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
dated 7 April 1900, ordered the new Government “to devote their attention in the first instance Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for
to the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives of the Islands, both in the each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal
cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and
affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of imposed conditions for the release thereof.
supervision and control in which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the
workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as Chairman
loyalty.”—In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while concededly of the Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of the Department of
expounded in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of the century Budget and Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the Department of Interior and
when President William McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission Local Government (DILG).
dated April 7, 1900, ordered the new Government “to devote their attention in the first instance
to the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives of the Islands, both in the Background
cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of No. 48 entitled “ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND
supervision and control in which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the EQUALIZATION.” The program was established to “facilitate the process of enhancing the
workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the discharge of the functions and services
loyalty.” While the 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy, devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local
nonetheless, it limited the executive power over local governments to “general supervision . . . Government Code.”1 The Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution Committee in
as may be provided by law.” Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution explicitly stated that “[t]he E.O. No. 48) constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local
State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the Government Code of 1991) has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.” An entire article on regulations necessary for its effective implementation.2 Further, to address the funding
Local Government was incorporated therein. The present Constitution, as earlier opined, has shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the
broadened the principle of local autonomy. The 14 sections in Article X thereof markedly program, the “Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund” was created.3 For 1998, the
increased the powers of the local governments in order to accomplish the goal of a more DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee based
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on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG.4 The initial fund was to be DEVOLUTION TO SET ASIDE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) OF THE LOCAL
sourced from the available savings of the national government for CY 1998.5 For 1999 and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) FOR LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE
succeeding years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be ACTION PROJECTS AND OTHER PRIORITY INITIATIVES FOR LGUs INSTITUTIONAL
incorporated in the annual GAA.6 The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the AND CAPABILITY BUILDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IMPLEMENTING
implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said GUIDELINES AND MECHANICS AS PROMULGATED BY THE COMMITTEE.
fund to the LGUs.7
These OCD resolutions were approved by then President Estrada on October 6, 1999.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 1999
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the GAA of 1999, the program was renamed as Under the allocation scheme adopted pursuant to Resolution No. OCD-99-005, the five billion
the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF). Under said pesos LGSEF was to be allocated as follows:
appropriations law, the amount of P96,780,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in the
internal revenue taxes. Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title XXXVI—A. Internal Revenue 1. The PhP4 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in accordance with the allocation scheme
Allotment of Rep. Act No. 8745 contained the following proviso: and implementing guidelines and mechanics promulgated and adopted by the OCD. To wit:
a. The first PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in accordance with the codal formula
. . . PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS (P5,000,000,000) shall be sharing scheme as prescribed under the 1991 Local Government Code;
earmarked for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund for the funding requirements b. The second PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated, in accordance with a modified
of projects and activities arising from the full and efficient implementation of devolved 1992 cost of devolution fund (CODEF) sharing scheme, as recommended by the respective
functions and services of local government units pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known leagues of provinces, cities and municipalities to the OCD. The modified CODEF sharing
as the Local Government Code of 1991: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be formula is as follows:
released to the local government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations, Province
including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of said
fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the 40%
Oversight Committee on Devolution as constituted pursuant to Book IV, Title III, Section
533(b) of R.A. No. 7160. The Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by the Cities
Department of Budget and Management to the Local Government Units concerned.
20%
On July 28, 1999, the Oversight Committee (with then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora
as Chairman) passed Resolution Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005 and OCD-99-006 entitled as Municipalities
follows:
40%
OCD-99-005
This is applied to the P2 Billion after the approved amounts granted to individual provinces,
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP5 BILLION CY cities and municipalities as assistance to cover decrease in 1999 IRA share due to reduction in
1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) AND land area have been taken out.
REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA TO
APPROVE SAID ALLOCATION SCHEME. 2. The remaining PhP1 Billion of the LGSEF shall be earmarked to support local affirmative
action projects and other priority initiatives submitted by LGUs to the Oversight Committee on
OCD-99-006 Devolution for approval in accordance with its prescribed guidelines as promulgated and
adopted by the OCD.
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP4.0 BILLION OF In Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the Oversight Committee set aside the one billion pesos or
THE 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND AND ITS 20% of the LGSEF to support Local Affirmative Action Projects (LAAPs) of LGUs. This
CONCOMITANT GENERAL FRAMEWORK, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND remaining amount was intended to “respond to the urgent need for additional funds assistance,
MECHANICS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE, AS PROMULGATED BY otherwise not available within the parameters of other existing fund sources.” For LGUs to be
THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION. eligible for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF, the OCD promulgated the
following:
OCD-99-003
III. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY:
RESOLUTION REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA TO APPROVE THE REQUEST OF THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON 1. LGUs (province, city, municipality, or barangay), individually or by group or multi-LGUs or
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leagues of LGUs, especially those belonging to the 5th and 6th class, may access the fund to to the locality and the expected impact to the local program/project arising from the full and
support any projects or activities that satisfy any of the aforecited purposes. A barangay may efficient implementation of social services and facilities, at the local levels;
also access this fund directly or through their respective municipality or city. (c) target outputs or key result areas;
2. The proposed project/activity should be need-based, a local priority, with high development (d) schedule of activities and details of requirements;
impact and are congruent with the socio cultural, economic and development agenda of the (e) total cost requirement of the project;
Estrada Administration, such as food security, poverty alleviation, electrification, and peace and (f) proponent’s counterpart funding share, if any, and identified source(s) of counterpart funds
order, among others. for the full implementation of the project;
(g) requested amount of project cost to be covered by the LGSEF.
3. Eligible for funding under this fund are projects arising from, but not limited to, the Further, under the guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee as contained in
following areas of concern: Attachment-Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the LGUs were required to identify the projects
a. delivery of local health and sanitation services, hospital services and other tertiary services; eligible for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF and submit the project
b. delivery of social welfare services; proposals thereof and other documentary requirements to the DILG for appraisal. The project
c. provision of socio-cultural services and facilities for youth and community development; proposals that passed the DILG’s appraisal would then be submitted to the Oversight
d. provision of agricultural and on-site related research; Committee for review, evaluation and approval. Upon its approval, the Oversight Committee
e. improvement of community-based forestry projects and other local projects on environment would then serve notice to the DBM for the preparation of the Special Allotment Release Order
and natural resources protection and conservation; (SARO) and Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to effect the release of funds to the said LGUs.
f. improvement of tourism facilities and promotion of tourism;
g. peace and order and public safety; The LGSEF in the GAA of 2000
h. construction, repair and maintenance of public works and infrastructure, including public Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the amount of
buildings and facilities for public use, especially those destroyed or damaged by man-made or P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. As in the
natural calamities and disaster as well as facilities for water supply, flood control and river GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000 contained a proviso earmarking five billion pesos of the IRA
dikes; for the LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title XXXVII—A.
i. provision of local electrification facilities; Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as that contained in the GAA of 1999.
j. livelihood and food production services, facilities and equipment;
k. other projects that may be authorized by the OCD consistent with the aforementioned The Oversight Committee, in its Resolution No. OCD-2000-023 dated June 22, 2000, adopted
objectives and guidelines; the following allocation scheme governing the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2000:
4. Except on extremely meritorious cases, as may be determined by the Oversight Committee
on Devolution, this portion of the LGSEF shall not be used in expenditures for personal costs or 1. The PhP3.5 Billion of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be allocated to and shared by the four levels
benefits under existing laws applicable to governments. Generally, this fund shall cover the of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, using the following percentage-
following objects of expenditures for programs, projects and activities arising from the sharing formula agreed upon and jointly endorsed by the various Leagues of LGUs:
implementation of devolved and regular functions and services: For Provinces 26% or P 910,000,000
a. acquisition/procurement of supplies and materials critical to the full and effective
implementation of devolved programs, projects and activities; For Cities
b. repair and/or improvement of facilities;
c. repair and/or upgrading of equipment; 23% or
d. acquisition of basic equipment;
e. construction of additional or new facilities; 805,000,000
f. counterpart contribution to joint arrangements or collective projects among groups of
municipalities, cities and/or provinces related to devolution and delivery of basic services. For Municipalities
5. To be eligible for funding, an LGU or group of LGU shall submit to the Oversight
Committee on Devolution through the Department of Interior and Local Governments, within 35% or
the prescribed schedule and timeframe, a Letter Request for Funding Support from the
Affirmative Action Program under the LGSEF, duly signed by the concerned LGU(s) and 1,225,000,000
endorsed by cooperators and/or beneficiaries, as well as the duly signed Resolution of
Endorsement by the respective Sanggunian(s) of the LGUs concerned. The LGU-proponent For Barangays
shall also be required to submit the Project Request (PR), using OCD Project Request Form No.
99-02, that details the following: 16% or
(a) general description or brief of the project;
(b) objectives and justifications for undertaking the project, which should highlight the benefits 560,000,000
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 Modified Codal Formula
Provided that the respective Leagues representing the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays shall draw up and adopt the horizontal distribution/sharing schemes among the P 3.000 billion
member LGUs whereby the Leagues concerned may opt to adopt direct financial assistance or
projectbased arrangement, such that the LGSEF allocation for individual LGU shall be released Priority Projects
directly to the LGU concerned;
1.900 billion
Provided further that the individual LGSEF shares to LGUs are used in accordance with the
general purposes and guidelines promulgated by the OCD for the implementation of the LGSEF Capability Building Fund
at the local levels pursuant to Res. No. OCD-99-006 dated October 7, 1999 and pursuant to the
Leagues’ guidelines and mechanism as approved by the OCD; .100 billion
P 5.000 billion
Provided further that each of the Leagues shall submit to the OCD for its approval their
respective allocation scheme, the list of LGUs with the corresponding LGSEF shares and the RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P3.0 B of the CY 2001 LGSEF which is to be allocated
corresponding project categories if project-based; according to the modified codal formula shall be released to the four levels of LGUs, i.e.,
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, as follows:
Provided further that upon approval by the OCD, the lists of LGUs shall be endorsed to the
DBM as the basis for the preparation of the corresponding NCAs, SAROs, and related LGUs
budget/release documents.
Percentage
2. The remaining P1,500,000,000 of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be earmarked to support the
following initiatives and local affirmative action projects, to be endorsed to and approved by the Amount
Oversight Committee on Devolution in accordance with the OCD agreements, guidelines,
procedures and documentary requirements: Provinces

On July 5, 2000, then President Estrada issued a Memorandum authorizing then Executive 25
Secretary Zamora and the DBM to implement and release the 2.5 billion pesos LGSEF for 2000
in accordance with Resolution No. OCD-2000-023. P 0.750 billion

Thereafter, the Oversight Committee, now under the administration of President Gloria Cities
Macapagal-Arroyo, promulgated Resolution No. OCD-2001-29 entitled “ADOPTING
RESOLUTION NO. OCD-2000-023 IN THE ALLOCATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND 25
RELEASE OF THE REMAINING P2.5 BILLION LGSEF FOR CY 2000.” Under this
resolution, the amount of one billion pesos of the LGSEF was to be released in accordance with 0.750
paragraph 1 of Resolution No. OCD-2000-23, to complete the 3.5 billion pesos allocated to the
LGUs, while the amount of 1.5 billion pesos was allocated for the LAAP. However, out of the Municipalities
latter amount, P400,000,000 was to be allocated and released as follows: P50,000,000 as
financial assistance to the LAAPs of LGUs; P275,360,227 as financial assistance to cover the 35
decrease in the IRA of LGUs concerned due to reduction in land area; and P74,639,773 for the
LGSEF Capability-Building Fund. 1.050

The LGSEF in the GAA of 2001 Barangays

In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general appropriations law for 2001, the GAA of
2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with the IRA of the LGUs therein and the proviso 15
earmarking five billion pesos thereof for the LGSEF.
0.450
On January 9, 2002, the Oversight Committee adopted Resolution No. OCD-2002-001
allocating the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2001 as follows: 100

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 P 3.000 billion the possible disapproval by the Oversight Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs
would result in the diminution of the latter’s share in the IRA.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P1.9 B earmarked for priority projects shall be distributed
according to the following criteria: Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions is the improper
amendment to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on the percentage sharing of
1.0 For projects of the 4th, 5th and 6th class LGUs; or the IRA among the LGUs. Said provision allocates the IRA as follows: Provinces—23%;
Cities—23%; Municipalities—34%; and Barangays—20%.8 This formula has been improperly
2.0 Projects in consonance with the President’s State of the Nation Address (SONA)/summit amended or modified, with respect to the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA allotted for the
commitments. LGSEF, by the assailed OCD resolutions as they invariably provided for a different sharing
scheme.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the remaining P100 million LGSEF capability building fund shall
be distributed in accordance with the recommendation of the Leagues of Provinces, Cities, The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal amendment by the executive branch of a
Municipalities and Barangays, and approved by the OCD. substantive law. Moreover, the petitioner mentions that in the Letter dated December 5, 2001 of
respondent Executive Secretary Romulo addressed to respondent Secretary Boncodin, the
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the individual former endorsed to the latter the release of funds to certain LGUs from the LGSEF in
members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of Resolution accordance with the handwritten instructions of President Arroyo. Thus, the LGUs are at a loss
No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said as to how a portion of the LGSEF is actually allocated. Further, there are still portions of the
resolution as it violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. LGSEF that, to date, have not been received by the petitioner; hence, resulting in damage and
injury to the petitioner.
On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution No. OCD-2002-001.
The petitioner prays that the Court declare as unconstitutional and void the assailed provisos
The Petitioner’s Case relating to the LGSEF in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the assailed OCD resolutions
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the provisos in (Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the Oversight and OCD-2002-001) issued by the Oversight Committee pursuant thereto. The petitioner,
Committee’s Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, likewise, prays that the Court direct the respondents to rectify the unlawful and illegal
OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001 issued pursuant thereto. The petitioner submits that the distribution and releases of the LGSEF for the aforementioned years and release the same in
assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount accordance with the sharing formula under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and Finally, the petitioner urges the Court to declare that the entire IRA should be released
imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate the Constitution and the Local Government automatically without further action by the LGUs as required by the Constitution and the Local
Code of 1991. Government Code of 1991.

Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the “just share” of the The Respondents’ Arguments
LGUs shall be automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to dismiss the
Code of 1991, which enjoin that the “just share” of the LGUs shall be “automatically and petition on procedural and substantive grounds. On the latter, the respondents contend that the
directly” released to them “without need of further action” are, likewise, cited. assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the assailed resolutions issued by
the Oversight Committee are not constitutionally infirm. The respondents advance the view that
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five-billion-peso portion Section 6, Article X of the Constitution does not specify that the “just share” of the LGUs shall
of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules be determined solely by the Local Government Code of 1991. Moreover, the phrase “as
and regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight determined by law” in the same constitutional provision means that there exists no limitation on
Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that the LGUs’ share in the the power of Congress to determine what is the “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes.
national taxes “shall be automatically released to them.” The petitioner maintains that the use of In other words, Congress is the arbiter of what should be the “just share” of the LGUs in the
the word “shall” must be given a compulsory meaning. national taxes.

To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the Oversight Committee The respondents further theorize that Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
with the authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is a part of the which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs, was not intended to be
IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the a fixed determination of their “just share” in the national taxes. Congress may enact other laws,
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. The petitioner cites as an example the including appropriations laws such as the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, providing for a
experience in 2001 when the release of the LGSEF was long delayed because the Oversight different sharing formula. Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 was merely
Committee was not able to convene that year and no guidelines were issued therefor. Further, intended to be the “default share” of the LGUs to do away with the need to determine annually
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by law their “just share.” However, the LGUs have no vested right in a permanent or fixed some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.10
percentage as Congress may increase or decrease the “just share” of the LGUs in accordance
with what it believes is appropriate for their operation. There is nothing in the Constitution The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit.
which prohibits Congress from making such determination through the appropriations laws. If The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of
the provisions of a particular statute, the GAA in this case, are within the constitutional power its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest pertains to the LGUs’ share in the national taxes or
of the legislature to enact, they should be sustained whether the courts agree or not in the the IRA. The petitioner’s constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the
wisdom of their enactment. GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution, mandating the “automatic release” to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes.
On procedural grounds, the respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition outright as the Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as
same is defective. The petition allegedly raises factual issues which should be properly threshed provided under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the
out in the lower courts, not this Court, not being a trier of facts. Specifically, the petitioner’s implementation of the assailed measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner
allegation that there are portions of the LGSEF that it has not, to date, received, thereby causing standing to question the validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
it (the petitioner) injury and damage, is subject to proof and must be substantiated in the proper and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has “a plain, direct and adequate interest” in
venue, i.e., the lower courts. the manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.

Further, according to the respondents, the petition has already been rendered moot and The petition involves a significant legal issue
academic as it no longer presents a justiciable controversy. The IRAs for the years 1999, 2000 The crux of the instant controversy is whether the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of
and 2001, have already been released and the government is now operating under the 2003 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local
budget. In support of this, the respondents submitted certifications issued by officers of the Government Code of 1991. This is undoubtedly a legal question. On the other hand, the
DBM attesting to the release of the allocation or shares of the petitioner in the LGSEF for 1999, following facts are not disputed:
2000 and 2001. There is, therefore, nothing more to prohibit.
1. The earmarking of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF in the assailed provisos in the
Finally, the petitioner allegedly has no legal standing to bring the suit because it has not GAAs of 1999, 2000 and re-enacted budget for 2001;
suffered any injury. In fact, the petitioner’s “just share” has even increased. Pursuant to Section 2. The promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions providing for the allocation schemes
285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the share of the provinces is 23%. OCD Nos. 99- covering the said five billion pesos and the implementing rules and regulations therefor; and
005, 99-006 and 99-003 gave the provinces 40% of P2 billion of the LGSEF. OCD Nos. 2000- 3. The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their compliance with the implementing
023 and 2001-029 apportioned 26% of P3.5 billion to the provinces. On the other hand, OCD rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed by the Oversight
No. 2001-001 allocated 25% of P3 billion to the provinces. Thus, the petitioner has not suffered Committee.
any injury in the implementation of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001
and the OCD resolutions. Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal question now before this
Court, are no longer in issue, the same need not be determined by a trial court.11 In any case,
The Ruling of the Court Procedural Issues the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the
Before resolving the petition on its merits, the Court shall first rule on the following procedural petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
issues raised by the respondents: (1) whether the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
file the present suit; (2) whether the petition involves factual questions that are properly remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction.12
cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether the issue had been rendered moot and
academic. The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper legal
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the “transcendental
The petitioner has locus standi to maintain the present suit importance” of the case, as it necessarily involves the application of the constitutional principle
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal stake in the on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present controversy, therefore,
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the case forthwith.
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”9 Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party assailing the The substantive issue needs to be resolved notwithstanding the supervening events
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must be able to show, not Granting arguendo that, as contended by the respondents, the resolution of the case had already
only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in been overtaken by supervening events as the IRA, including the LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely 2001, had already been released and the government is now operating under a new
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for this Court to resolve the substantive
been or is about to be denied issue raised by the instant petition. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.13
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Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the assailed provisos in the
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each corresponding year the amount of five
bench, bar and public.14 billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated pursuant thereto,
transgress the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now before it is
the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
repetition, yet evading review.”15 For the GAAs in the coming years may contain provisos and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the
similar to those now being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided constitutional precept on local autonomy
before another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the
substantive issue now. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:

Substantive Issue Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
As earlier intimated, the resolution of the substantive legal issue in this case calls for the taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.16 In
Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly adopted as a policy that: When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have
a “just share” in the national taxes; (2) the “just share” shall be determined by law; and (3) the
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.

An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and The
promoting the autonomy of LGUs. Section 2 thereof reiterates the State policy in this wise: Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions, underscores the automatic
release of the LGUs’ “just share” in this wise:
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources.—Local government units shall have the
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power power and authority to establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and
over the LGUs to one of general supervision.17 This provision has been interpreted to exclude effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives and priorities; to
the power of control. The distinction between the two powers was enunciated in Drilon v. create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue
Lim:18 exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them; to have a just
share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them without need
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, of further action;
in his discretion, order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do
it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely ...
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares—(a) The share of each local government unit shall be
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or
manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of
followed.19 each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose.
The Local Government Code of 199120 was enacted to flesh out the mandate of the
Constitution.21 The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof: (b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local government units
under existing laws.
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “automatic” as “involuntary either
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton.” Further, the word
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of “automatically” is defined as “in an automatic manner: without thought or conscious intention.”
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, Being “automatic,” thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National such, the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them
Government to the local government units. from the national coffers. As emphasized by the Local Government Code of 1991, the “just
share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further action.” Construing
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Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,22 viz.: Cities—23%; Municipalities—35%; Barangays—16%);

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the P1.5 billion—projects (LAAP) approved by the OCD.25
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue. This is mandated by
no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release For 2001
shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year
and “shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national P3 billion—Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces—25%;
government for whatever purpose.” As a rule, the term “SHALL” is a word of command that
must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE. Cities—25%; Municipalities—35%; Barangays—15%)

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent P1.9 billion—priority projects
of the LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation” in the country. Such withholding P100 million—capability building fund.26
clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a
holdback, which means “something held back or withheld, often temporarily.” Hence, the Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight Committee’s
“temporary” nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention prior approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the LGSEF allocated for various projects
is prohibited. of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999; P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2 billion for 2001), the Oversight
Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid down guidelines and mechanisms that
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national the LGUs had to comply with before they could avail of funds from this portion of the LGSEF.
crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding based on the
encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was well- criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project proposal’s
intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of law requires that to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be
even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was only upon
law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.23 approval thereof that the Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release the funds for
the projects.
The “just share” of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the appropriations law or GAA
enacted by Congress annually. Under the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is
2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five billion pesos was earmarked for the LGSEF, constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the
and these provisos imposed the condition that “such amount shall be released to the local national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules
government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the
and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of said fund among local Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant
on Devolution.” Pursuant thereto, the Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be
resolutions, apportioned the five billion pesos LGSEF such that: automatically released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight
Committee.
For 1999
Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
P2 billion—allocated according to Sec. 285 LGC exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.27
Moreover, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the use of the word “shall” connotes a
P2 billion—Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces—40%; mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion.28
Cities—20%; Municipalities—40%)
Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and
P1 billion—projects (LAAP) approved by OCD.24 release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of
local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution. Moreover, it finds no statutory basis at all as
For 2000 the Oversight Committee was created merely to formulate the rules and regulations for the
efficient and effective implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 to ensure
P3.5 billion—Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces—26%; “compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution.”29 In
fact, its creation was placed under the title of “Transitory Provisions,” signifying its ad hoc
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character. According to Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the principal author and sponsor of the
bill that eventually became Rep. Act No. 7160, the Committee’s work was supposed to be done As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy ‘means a more responsive and accountable
a year from the approval of the Code, or on October 10, 1992.30 The Oversight Committee’s local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.’ The Constitution, as
authority is undoubtedly limited to the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government
not to supplant or subvert the same. Neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to “liberate the local
portion thereof, of the LGUs. governments from the imperialism of Manila.” Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and promote local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken
autonomy can be gleaned from the discussion below between Messrs. Jose N. Nolledo and such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
Regalado M. Maambong, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit: however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-
government.
MR. MAAMBONG. Unfortunately, under Section 198 of the Local Government
Code, the existence of subprovinces is still acknowledged by the law, but the statement of the As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national administration—but
Gentleman on this point will have to be taken up probably by the Committee on Legislation. A not power—to the local levels. Thus:
second point, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that under Article 2, Section 10 of the 1973 Constitution,
we have a provision which states: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
barrio, to insure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. process to make local governments ‘more responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit
This provision no longer appears in the present configuration; does this mean that the concept of national development and social progress.’ At the same time, it relieves the central
of giving local autonomy to local governments is no longer adopted as far as this Article is government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerned? concerns. The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
MR. NOLLEDO. No. In the report of the Committee on Preamble, National Territory, and can substitute their judgments with his own.
Declaration of Principles, that concept is included and widened upon the initiative of
Commissioner Bennagen. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
[sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you for that. autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
With regard to Section 6, sources of revenue, the creation of sources as provided by previous intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of
law was, “subject to limitations as may be provided by law,” but now, we are using the term power amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
“subject to such guidelines as may be fixed by law.” In Section 7, mention is made about the accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.34
“unique, distinct and exclusive charges and contributions,” and in Section 8, we talk about
“exclusivity of local taxes and the share in the national wealth.” Incidentally, I was one of the Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. The fairly recent case of
authors of this provision, and I am very thankful. Does this indicate local autonomy, or was the Pimentel v. Aguirre35 is particularly instructive. The Court declared therein that local fiscal
wording of the law changed to give more autonomy to the local government units?31 autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities:
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. In effect, those words indicate also “decentralization” because local
political units can collect taxes, fees and charges subject merely to guidelines, as recommended Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in
by the league of governors and city mayors, with whom I had a dialogue for almost two hours. the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local
They told me that limitations may be questionable in the sense that Congress may limit and in governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
effect deny the right later on. equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power
to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation
MR. MAAMBONG. Also, this provision on “automatic release of national tax share” points to of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are
more local autonomy. Is this the intention? not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are
relevant to local needs and resources or not . . .36
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, the Commissioner is perfectly right.32
Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally mandated automatic
The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals33 in this wise: release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.37
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 Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs:
Following this ratiocination, the Court in Pimentel struck down as unconstitutional Section 4 of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 372 which ordered the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, Sec. 285. Allocation to Local Government Units.—The share of local government units in the
of ten percent of the LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner:
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.”
(a) Provinces—Twenty-three (23 %)
In like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD (b) Cities—Twenty-three percent (23%);
resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA. They put on hold the distribution (c) Municipalities—Thirty-four (34%); and
and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and (d) Barangays—Twenty percent (20%).
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion pesos LGSEF
from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the and 2001, provided for a different sharing scheme. For example, for 1999, P2 billion of the
LGUs and must be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld. LGSEF was allocated as follows: Provinces—40%; Cities—20%; Municipalities—40%.39 For
2000, P3.5 billion of the LGSEF was allocated in this manner: Prov-inces—26%; Cities—23%;
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 Municipalities—35%; Barangays—26%.40 For 2001, P3 billion of the LGSEF was allocated,
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions cannot amend thus: Prov-inces—25%; Cities—25%; Municipalities—35%; Barangays—15%.41
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991
Section 28438 of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third year of its The respondents argue that this modification is allowed since the Constitution does not specify
effectivity, the LGUs’ share in the national internal revenue taxes shall be 40%. This percentage that the “just share” of the LGUs shall only be determined by the Local Government Code of
is fixed and may not be reduced except “in the event the national government incurs an 1991. That it is within the power of Congress to enact other laws, including the GAAs, to
unmanageable public sector deficit” and only upon compliance with stringent requirements set increase or decrease the “just share” of the LGUs. This contention is untenable. The Local
forth in the same section: Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is conceded that Congress may
amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs.
Sec. 284. Any amendment to the Local Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not
in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill
... matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.42

Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon recommendation of Secretary specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit.43 Any
of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate
Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding provision.” The category of “inappropriate provisions” includes unconstitutional provisions and
officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no
adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the place in an appropriations bill.44
allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of the national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year; Provided, further That in the first Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage sharing therein,
year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in addition to the thirty which are fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters of general and substantive
percent (30%) internal revenue allotment which shall include the cost of devolved functions for law. To permit Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs, as the respondents
essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of devolved contend, would be to give Congress the unbridled authority to unduly infringe the fiscal
personnel services. autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every year. This, the Court cannot
sanction.
Thus, from the above provision, the only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release
of the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less It is relevant to point out at this juncture that, unlike those of 1999, 2000 and 2001, the GAAs
than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should of 2002 and 2003 do not contain provisos similar to the herein assailed provisos. In other
be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current words, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 have not earmarked any amount of the IRA for the LGSEF.
fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual Congress had perhaps seen fit to discontinue the practice as it recognizes its infirmity.
collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. In the Nonetheless, as earlier mentioned, this Court has deemed it necessary to make a definitive
instant case, however, there is no allegation that the national internal revenue tax collections for ruling on the matter in order to prevent its recurrence in future appropriations laws and that the
the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have fallen compared to the preceding three fiscal years. principles enunciated herein would serve to guide the bench, bar and public.

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Conclusion
In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while concededly expounded By upholding the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion
in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of the century when President the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds,
William McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission dated April 7, the genuine and meaningful local
1900, ordered the new Government “to devote their attention in the first instance to the autonomy of the LGUs is ensured. (Leynes vs. Commission on Audit, 418 SCRA 180 (2003).
establishment of municipal governments in which the natives of the Islands, both in the cities
and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own affairs to ——o0o——
the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and
control in which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native _______________ Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736, G.R. No. 152774 May
control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.”45 While the 27, 2004
1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy, nonetheless, it limited the
executive power over local governments to “general supervision . . . as may be provided by
law.”46 Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution explicitly stated that “[t]he State shall guarantee
and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barangay to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities.”47 An entire article on Local Government was
incorporated therein. The present Constitution, as earlier opined, has broadened the principle of
local autonomy. The 14 sections in Article X thereof markedly increased the powers of the local
governments in order to accomplish the goal of a more meaningful local autonomy.

Indeed, the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree
of autonomy that they enjoy.48 As eloquently put by M. De Tocqueville, a distinguished French
political writer, “[l]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Township
meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s
reach; they teach men how to use and enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free
governments but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of
liberty.”49

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.50

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations
Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug (Actg. C.J.), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.) and Puno, J., On official leave.

Petition granted, assailed provisos in General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and
OCD Resolutions declared unconstitutional.

Notes.—Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions—
municipal governments are still agents of the national government. (Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre,
336 SCRA 201 [2000])
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 retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by
Basco vs. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government.” (MC Culloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579) This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the
G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991.* National Government over local governments. “Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme
Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US
LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal
CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent. instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or
Constitutional Law; Taxation; Municipal Corporations; Municipal corporations have no even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.” (Antieau, Modern Constitutional
inherent power to tax; their power to tax must always yield to a legislative act.—The City of Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, italics supplied). Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National
Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or
of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of enterprise using the power to tax as “a tool for regulation” (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The
Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, “the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the “power to destroy” (Mc Culloch v.
power or the municipality cannot assume it” (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity
“power to tax” therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been which has the inherent power to wield it.
passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax” (Bernas, the Revised
[1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445). Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always
subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law.—The power of local government to
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress has the power of control over local governments; if “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law.
Congress can grant a municipal corporation the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide Since PD 1869 remains an “operative” law until “amended, repealed or revoked” (Sec. 3, Art.
for exemptions or even take back the power.—The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its “exemption clause” remains as an exception to the exercise of the
control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather
Congress” (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to “create is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers” (Asuncion v.
Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power Same; Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The principle of local autonomy does not make local
of control over local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if governments sovereign within the state, it simply means decentralization.—Besides, the
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization” (III
exemptions or even take back the power. Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not
Same; Same; Same; License Fees; The power of local governments to regulate gambling thru make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.” Local
the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771, it is now vested Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
exclusively on the National Government.—The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can
regulate gambling thru the grant of “franchise, licenses or permits” was withdrawn by P.D. No. only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in
771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. xxx xxx Therefore, only the imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the
National Government has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of function of government. (italics supplied)
gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of
the issuance of “licenses or permits” is no longer vested in the City of Manila. Same; Equal Protection Clause; The “equal protection” clause does not preclude classification
of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.—Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates
National Government; PAGCOR, being an instrumentality of the Government, is therefore the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because “it legalized PAGCOR—conducted
exempt from local taxes.—Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an other vices” (p. 82, Rollo). We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the
xxx xxx PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v.
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or
exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R.
control by a mere Local government. “The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to No. 89572, December 21, 1989). The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the
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Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall It waived the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are recognized by law;
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. “B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention
violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), “C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR—
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
unconstitutional. “If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be “C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied.” (Gomez v. economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.” (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) “The equal protection clause of the 14 th Amendment does not mean
that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the
what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to declared national policy of the “new restored democracy” and the people’s will as expressed in
the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a “gambling objective” and therefore is
were made mathematically exact.” (Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 U.S. 2651). contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of
Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
Same; Statutes; Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, for a law to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.— The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can
Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D.
other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D 1067-B also dated January
Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, 1, 1977 “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the
unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” Its operation was originally conducted in the well
must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. known floating casino “Philippine Tourist.” The operation was considered a success for it
1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socioeconomic projects,
this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
considering the issues of “morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as
the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values” being raised, is up Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
for Congress to determine. Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law, under the following declared policy—
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
“Section 1 . Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners. centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or
permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
“(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance
PARAS, J.: into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.
“(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports
A TV ad proudly announces: gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and
recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial
“The new PAGCOR—responding through responsible gaming.” jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund
infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter—PD 1869, because it such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will
is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because— expand and improve the country’s existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally
eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct
“A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement.” (Section
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1, P.D. 1869) legislation should be adopted.” (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton,
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. 106 N.W. 2 nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739
Under its Charter’s repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v.
inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal
Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
franchise tax, government’s income share, the President’s Social Fund and Host Cities’ share.
In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other sociocultural and charitable projects on its own or in Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families. Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D No. 1869. They allege that the same is “With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We
“null and void” for being “contrary to morals, public policy and public order,” monopolistic and hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has
tends toward “crony economy”, and is violative of the equal protection clause and local sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
Constitution.
“In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were
deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
described as “the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that ‘the transcendental
the government.” (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323). importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure.’ We have since then applied the
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate exception in many other cases.” (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must
be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has
over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of
the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police
supra). power.

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
Zaldivar underscored the— “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare.” (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of
“x x x thoroughly established principle which (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It
must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
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IMEE C. COBARRUBIAS/ LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
 Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the (b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909,
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to January 18, 1957) which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been “general legislative powers” (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state “to govern its citizens”. (Tribe, 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power coextensive G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax
with self-protection and is most aptly termed the “law of overwhelming necessity.” (Rubi v. certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is “the most essential, insistent, and (c) The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As
illimitable of powers.” (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of “franchise,
enables the state to meet the exigencies of the winds of change. licenses or permits” was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government, thus:
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869? “Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered
cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate,
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to “regulate and centralize thru maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby
an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by revoked.
law” (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing
gambling operations in one corporate entity—the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the “Section 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog
Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government
cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant x x x.”
to “close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government” (4th Whereas Clause,
PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the Therefore, only the
evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. National Government has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896. gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of
the issuance of “licenses or permits” is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle (d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869.
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate
otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local.” powers (Sec. 3, Title II,PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers, thus:
“Sec. 9. Regulatory Power.—The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities,
“(2)Income and other taxes.—(a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and
otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section,
be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of tax including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in
or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the
(5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary
under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.”
and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
government authority” (Section 13 [2]). governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons: exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government.
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. “The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner
Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, “the Charter or statute must plainly show an control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it” (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 powers vested in the federal government.” (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
SCRA 62). Its “power to tax” therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior
having been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax” (Bernas, the This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local
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governments. governments.

“Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of “As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power
power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. x x x In the
the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are
political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from inconsistent with the state laws are void.” (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte
consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accmplishment of Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St.
them.” (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, italics supplied) Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 ibid, p. 548, italics supplied)

Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as because “it legalized PAGCOR—conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed
“a tool for regulation” (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices” (p. 82, Rollo).
Justice Marshall as the “power to destroy” (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed
to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners’ posture ignores
it. the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil.
Autonomy) provides: 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable
“Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21,
and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the 1989).
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.” (italics supplied) The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847).
The power of local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an “operative” law until in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
“amended, repealed or revoked” (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its “exemption clause”
remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities
autonomy. like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions,
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one,
“decentralization” (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in unconstitutional.
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.” “If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because
there are other instances to which it might have been applied.” (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA
“Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is 827)
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can “The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called
only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which
imperio . Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less
the function of government. (italics supplied) than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically
exact.” (Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 US 2651).
As to what state powers should be “decentralized” and what may be delegated to local
government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political Anent petitioners’ claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the “avowed trend of the Cory Government
question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization” suffice
539). it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs
counter to the government’s policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a Congress its repeal or amendment.
State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
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“The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some
what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in
of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF,
state power.” (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256). issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not
constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments
On the issue of “monopoly,” however, the Constitution provides that: of government: the President and the Congress.”

“Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.” (Art. XII, National when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on
Economy and Patrimony) the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual
outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes,
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are
the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not
regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of
food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
On petitioners’ allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family)
and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these
are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, SO ORDERED.
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

“In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the
executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of
the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their
displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the
ballot.” (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec,
179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec,
supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must
clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on
the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is
therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the
issues of “morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state
principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values” being raised, i s u p for
Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens’ Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board,
162 SCRA 521—

“Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its
favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the
KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the
Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not
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[No. L-9657. November 29, 1956] Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National Coconut
Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question.
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, plaintiffs and appellees, vs. NATIONAL On February 6, 1954, the Auditor General issued an order directing the Cashier of the
COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants, NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION Department of Justice to deduct from the salary of Leopoldo T. Bacani the amount of P25 every
and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, defendants-appellants. payday and from the salary of Mateo A. Matoto the amount of P10 every payday beginning
1.POLITICAL LAW; TERM “GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES" March 30, 1954. To prevent deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial
CONSTRUED.—The term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 ruling that the National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of
of the Revised Administrative Code refers to that government entity through which the section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the Court of First
functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included Instance of Manila.
those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial,
municipal or other ex orm of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is a government entity
They do not include government entitles which are given a corporate personality separate and within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is
distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law, such as the exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. After trial,
National Coconut Corporation. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the the court found for the plaintiffs declaring (1) “that defendant National Coconut Corporation is
light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; (2)
exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court. that the payments already made by said defendant to plaintiffs herein and received by the latter
2.STENOGRAPHERS; TRANSCRIPT FEES; PAYMENT OF FEES BEYOND THE LIMIT from the former in the total amount of P714, for copies of the stenographic transcripts in
PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES OF COURT, VALID.—It is true that in section 8, Rule 130, question, are valid, just and legal; and (3) that plaintiffs are under no obligation whatsoever to
stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30 for each page of transcript of not less than 200 make a refund of these payments already received by them.” This is an appeal from said
words before the appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but decision.
where, as in the case at bar, the party has agreed and in fact has paid P1 per page for the
services rendered by the stenographers and has not raised any objection to the amount paid until Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the Philippines is exempt
its propriety was disputed by the Auditor General, the payment of the fees became contractual from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and among these fees are those which
and as such is valid even if it goes beyond the limit prescribed by the Rules of Court. stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes taken by them that may be requested by
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Bayona, J. any interested person (section 8) The fees in question are for the transcript of notes taken during
the hearing of a case in which the National Coconut Corporation is interested, and the transcript
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. was requested by its assistant corporate counsel for the use of said corporation.

Valentin C. Gutierrez for appellees. On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines” as follows:
First Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and Lorenzo Mosqueda for appellants National
Coconut Corporation and Board of Liquidators. “‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for appellants. Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local
government.”
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut Corporation may be
National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, coun-sel for considered as included in the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” for the
defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills As may be noted, the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” refers to a
for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to government entity through which the functions of government are exercised, including the
Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the central government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of local government. This requires a little digression on the nature and functions of our
these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor government as instituted in our Constitution.
General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the
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To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-
aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut
action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government,
the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth
has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and
legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, “The
are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public
which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that corporation” (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586–587). “By
are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the Government divested itself of its
optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as ex ollows: sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. * * * Unlike the
Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the
“'(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government.” (Government of
violence and robbery. the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)
'(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
'(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity
'(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and
'(5) The definition and punishment of crime. in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they
'(6) The administration of justice in civil cases. be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal
'(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens. corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality
'(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law.
or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.’ " (Malcolm, The Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their
Government of the Philippine Islands, p. 19.) corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles
determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: “Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the
(1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would State.” (Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation Law)
not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very
nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or “‘The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only include organized
group of individuals. (Malcom, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19–20.) cities and towns, and like organizations, with political and legislative powers for the local, civil
government and police regulations of the inhabitants of the particular district included in the
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions boundaries of the corporation.’ Heller vs. Stremmel 52 Mo. 309, 312."
which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may “In its more general sense the phrase ‘municipal corporation’ may include both towns and
exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people To this latter class counties, and other public corporations created by government for political purposes. In its
belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to more common and limited signification, it embraces only incorporated villages, towns and
promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661." (McQuillin,
Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations which may Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. I, p. 385.)
take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics
of a private corporations under the Corporation Law. “We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict sense to be the
incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or
The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporation perform certain functions district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified
of government make them a part of the Government of the Philippines? powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This
power of local government is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a
The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not municipal corporation proper.” (Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)
come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National
Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut It is true that under section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30 for each
industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing page of transcript of not less than 200 words before the appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page
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after the filing of the appeal, but in this case the National Coconut Corporation has agreed and
in fact has paid P1.00 per page for the services rendered by the plaintiffs and has not raised any
objection to the amount paid until its propriety was disputed by the Auditor General. The
payment of the fees in question became therefore contractual and as such is valid even if it goes
beyond the limit prescribed in section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

As regards the question of procedure raised by appellants, suffice it to say that the same is
insubstantial, considering that this case refers not to a money claim disapproved by the Auditor
General but to an action of prohibition the purpose of which is to restrain the officials
concerned from deducting from plaintiffs’ salaries the amount paid to them as stenographers’
fees. This case does not come under section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court relative to appeals
from a decision of the Auditor General.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Parás, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B. L., Endencia
and Felix, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

476 Bacani and Matoto vs. Natl. Coconut Corp., et al., 100 Phil. 468, No. L-9657 November
29, 1956

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