G.R. No.

140487 April 2, 2001 on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, building a house on the property he donated to BPS. judgement is hereby rendered:
vs. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already
LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT, respondents. the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim
1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of
KAPUNAN, J.: endeavored to stop the construction of the house on
merit;
the donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma
advised him to just file a case in court.
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45
2. Dismissing the counterclaim for the
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
sake of harmony and reconciliation
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43840, entitled Leon Silim, et al. On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for
between the parties;
vs. Wilfredo Palma, et al., which declared null and void Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation,
the donation made by respondents of a parcel of land Annulment of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of
in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with 3. With costs against plaintiffs.
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita
Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before SO ORDERED.3
the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 21. In
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
its Decision dated 20 August 1993, the trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.2 The pertinent Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court,
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon portion of the decision reads: respondents elevated the case to the Court of
Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square Appeals. In its Decision dated 22 October 1999, the
meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that and declared the donation null and void on the
Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur
there was no breach or violation of the grounds that the donation was not properly accepted
(BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed
condition imposed in the subject Deed of and the condition imposed on the donation was
the condition that the said property should "be used
Donation by the donee. The exchange is violated.4
exclusively and forever for school purposes only."1 This
proper since it is still for the exclusive use for
donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the
school purposes and for the expansion and
District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the
improvement of the school facilities within the
Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation. following issues:
community. The Deed of Exchange is but a
continuity of the desired purpose of the
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim. I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, DECLARING THE DONATION NULL AND VOID
a school building was constructed on the donated DUE TO AN INVALID ACCEPTANCE BY THE
In sum, it may be safely stated that the
land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building DONEE.
aforesaid transaction of exchange is a (sic)
that was supposed to be allocated for the donated
exception to the law invoked by the plaintiffs
parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be
(Art. 764, Civil Code). The donee, being the II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
released since the government required that it be built
State had the greater reciprocity of interest in DECLARING THE DONATION NULL AND VOID
upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this
the gratuitous and onerous contract of DUE TO AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF A
predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent
donation. It would be illogical and selfish for CONDITION IN THE DONATION.5
of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani
the donor to technically preclude the donee
Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to
from expanding its school site and
officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) The Court gives DUE COURSE to the petition.
improvement of its school facilities, a
hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary
paramount objective of the donee in
School to a new and suitable location which would fit
promoting the general welfare and interests of Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this,
the people of Barangay Kauswagan. But it is a declaring the donation null and void for the reason that
District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered
well-settled rule that if the contract is onerous, the acceptance was not allegedly done in
into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was
such as the Deed of Donation in question, the accordance with Articles 7456 and 7497 of the New Civil
exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter.
doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest Code.
Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings
reciprocity of interests, which in the instant
were constructed on the new school site and the
case, is the donee.
school building previously erected on the donated lot We agree.
was dismantled and transferred to the new location.
x x x
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or
Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4)
onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the donation until and unless it has been We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the
underlying cause is plain gratuity.8 This is donation in its accepted in a public instrument and donation.
truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or the donor duly noticed thereof.
compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of (Abellera vs. Balanag, 37 Phils. 85;
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
rewarding the donee for past services, which services Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA
do not amount to a demandable debt.9 A conditional 245). If the acceptance does not
or modal donation is one where the donation is made appear in the same document, it ART. 745. The donee must accept the
in consideration of future services or where the donor must be made in another. Solemn donation personally, or through an authorized
imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon words are not necessary; it is person with a special power for the purpose,
the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the sufficient if it shows the intention to or with a general and sufficient power;
donation given.10 Finally, an onerous donation is that accept, But in this case, it is otherwise the donation shall be void.
which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation necessary that formal notice thereof
or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made be given to the donor and the fact ART. 749. In order that the donation of an
for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal that due notice has been given it immovable may be laid, it must be made in a
to or more than the thing donated.11 must be noted in both instruments public document, specifying therein the
(that containing the offer to donate property donated and the value of the
and that showing acceptance). charge which the donee must satisfy.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the
Then and only then is the donation
onerous type are the most distinct. This is because,
perfected. (11 Manresa 155-11, cited
unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and The acceptance may be made in the same
in Vol. II, Civil Code of the Philippines
the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an deed of donation or in a separate public
by Tolentino.)."
onerous donation is completely governed not by the document, but it shall not take effect unless it
law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this is done during the lifetime of the donor.
regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides: This Court perused carefully the Deed of
Donation marked as exhibit "A" and "1" to
determine whether there was acceptance of If the acceptance is made in a separate
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof
the donation. This Court found none. We
shall be governed by the rules on contracts, in an authentic form, and this step shall be
further examined the record if there is another
and remuneratory donations by the provisions noted in both instruments.
document which embodies the acceptance,
of the present Title as regards that portion
we found one. Although the Court found that
which exceeds the value of the burden
in the offer of exhibits of the defendants, a Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the
imposed.
supposed affidavit of acceptance and/or offer of exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an
confirmation of the donation, marked as affidavit of acceptance and/or confirmation of the
The donation involved in the present controversy is one exhibit "8" appears to have been offered. donation, marked as Exhibit "8," was offered in
which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon evidence. However, private respondents now question
the donee to build a school on the donated property.12 this exhibit because, according to them "there is
However, there is nothing in the record that
the exhibits offered by the defendants have nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the
The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid been admitted nor such exhibits appear on defendants have been admitted nor such exhibit
acceptance of the donation because: record. appear on record."

x x x Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the Respondents' stance does not persuade. The written
said supposed acceptance was not noted in acceptance of the donation having been considered
the Deed of Donation as required under Art. by the trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the
Under the law the donation is void if there is
749 of the Civil Code. And according to presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and
no acceptance. The acceptance may either
Manresa, supra, a noted civilist, the notation is admitted by the court.
be in the same document as the deed of
donation or in a separate public instrument. If one of the requirements of perfecting a
the acceptance is in a separate instrument, donation. In other words, without such a Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of
"the donor shall be notified thereof in an notation, the contract is not perfected Appeals. Nowhere in their brief did respondents
authentic form, and his step shall be noted in contract. Since the donation is not perfected, question the validity of the donation on the basis of the
both instruments. the contract is therefore not valid.13 alleged defect in the acceptance thereof. If there was
such a defect, why did it take respondents more than
x x x ten (10) years from the date of the donation to
"Title to immovable property does
question its validity? In the very least, they are guilty of
not pass from the donor to the
estoppel.14
donee by virtue of a deed of
Respondents further argue that assuming there was a fact confirmed it later and requested that the What does the phrase "exclusively used for school
valid acceptance of the donation, the acceptance donated land be not registered during her purposes" convey? "School" is simply an institution or
was not noted in the Deed of Donation as required in lifetime by Salud. Given this significant place of education.16 "Purpose" is defined as "that
Article 749 of the Civil Code, hence, the donation is evidence, the Court cannot in conscience which one sets before him to accomplish or attain; an
void. declare the donation ineffective because end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is
there is no notation in the extrajudicial synonymous with the ends sought, an object to be
settlement of the donee's acceptance. That attained, an intention, etc."17 "Exclusive" means
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance
would be placing too much stress on mere "excluding or having power to exclude (as by
of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly
form over substance. It would also disregard preventing entrance or debarring from possession,
communicated to the donor. Thus, in Pajarillo vs.
the clear reality of the acceptance of the participation, or use); limiting or limited to possession,
Intermediate Appellate Court,15 the Court held:
donation as manifested in the separate control or use.18
instrument dated June 20, 1946, and as later
There is no question that the donation was acknowledged by Juan.
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the
accepted in a separate public instrument and
donation was not in any way violated when the lot
that it was duly communicated to the donors.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately donated was exchanged with another one. The
Even the petitioners cannot deny this. But
constructed after the donation was executed. purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for
what they do contend is that such
Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the
acceptance was not "noted in both
school building put up on the donated lot through the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the
instruments," meaning the extrajudicial
efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of Barangay exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in
partition itself and the instrument of
Kauswagan. It was when the school building was being furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the
acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
dismantled and transferred to the new site and when donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the
Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house way for the release of funds for the construction of
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either on the donated property that respondents came to Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
of the two instruments showing that "authentic know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge accommodated by the limited area of the donated
notice" of the acceptance was made by by respondents of the construction and existence of lot.
Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the first the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that
instrument contains the statement that "the the acceptance of the donation by the donee be
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
donee does hereby accept this donation and communicated to the donor.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
does hereby express her gratitude for the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
kindness and liberality of the donor," the only
On respondents' claim, which was upheld by the Court
signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and
of Appeals, that the acceptance by BPS District
Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the SO ORDERED.
Supervisor Gregorio Buendia of the donation was
reason for the separate instrument of
ineffective because of the absence of a special power
acceptance signed by Salud a month later.
of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines, it is
undisputed that the donation was made in favor of the
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, his
to no other conclusion that the annulment of acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the
the donation for being defective in form as 1987 Administrative Code which states:
urged by the petitioners. This would be in
keeping with the unmistakable language of
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. -
the above-quoted provision. However, we
Contracts or conveyances may be executed
find that under the circumstances of the
for and in behalf of the Government or of any
present case, a literal adherence to the
of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or
requirement of the law might result not in
instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the
justice to the parties but conversely a
exigency or exigencies of the service and as
distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of
long as the same are not prohibited by law.
the Court to avoid such as interpretation.

Finally, it is respondents' submission that the donee, in

The purpose of the formal requirement is to
exchanging the donated lot with a bigger lot, violated
insure that the acceptance of the donation is
the condition in the donation that the lot be exclusively
duly communicated to the donor. In the case
used for school purposes only.
at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana
was unaware of the acceptance for she in
 [G.R. NO. 149570 - March 12, 2004] The heirs of De Leon, through Valeriana L. Morente, land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio.
thereafter filed a complaint for ejectment against the The latter accepted the donation, as shown by his
HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO, as represented heirs of Florencio before the Municipal Trial Court of San signature above his typewritten name on page one of
by ESTRELLITA FLORENCIO-CRUZ and RODRIGO R. Miguel, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 2061. the deed. The execution of the deed was witnessed by
FLORENCIO, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE Therein, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the pro- Patria L. Manotoc and Valeriana L. Morente. Atty. Tirso
LEON as represented by VALERIANA indiviso owners of the 828 square-meter lot covered by L. Manguiat, a notary public in the City of Manila,
MORENTE, Respondents. TCT No. T-44349, which they inherited from their mother. notarized the deed on said date and entered it in his
During her lifetime, their mother allowed Florencio and notarial record as Doc. No. 1724, page 71, Book IV,
his family to occupy the property without any series of 1976.9
DECISION
compensation, subject to the condition that they shall
vacate the same upon demand; such arrangement The heirs of Florencio further averred that since then,
CALLEJO, SR., J.: went on even after their mothers demise. They further their predecessor and his family possessed the
averred that sometime in 1995, they demanded that aforesaid property as owners. After De Leons death,
Before us is a Petition for Review of the Joint the heirs of Florencio vacate the property, but that the Florencio and his children, in coordination with Jose de
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. latter refused to do so.7 Leon, the administrator of the aforesaid property,
59698-99 which affirmed the June 5, 2000 Decisions2 of arranged for the registration of the land subject of the
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 20 The plaintiff thence donation in the name of Rosendo Florencio, which was,
in Civil Cases No. 1018-M-99 and 1019-M-99, and the prayed:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ however, superseded by the untimely demise of Jose
resolution of the appellate court denying the petitioners de Leon in 1991. Thus, the property remained in the
motion for reconsideration. name of Teresa Sevilla de Leon, even after Florencios
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered death in March of 1995.10
The Antecedents ordering defendants to:
On February 1, 1996, the heirs of De Leon, represented
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an by Valeriana L. Morente, also filed a complaint for
area of 828 square meters located in San Miguel, 1. Vacate the premises which they are presently ejectment against the heirs of Bienvenido Santos
Bulacan. The said lot was covered by Transfer before the MTC of San Miguel, Bulacan, docketed as
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44349.3 In the 1960s, De occupying;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Civil Case No. 2062.11 They prayed,
Leon allowed the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Florencio to construct a house on the said property and
stay therein without any rentals therefor. 2. Pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as and by WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered
On September 26, 1966, De Leon, with the consent of way of attorneys fees;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ordering defendants to:
her husband Luis, leased the aforesaid parcel of land
for P5 per month to Bienvenido Santos "for as long as
the lessor (Teresa de Leon) had an outstanding loan 3. Pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as moral 1. Vacate the premises which they are presently
with the Second Quezon City Development Bank of
Quezon City but not to exceed the period of fifteen damages;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary occupying;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(15) years."4 De Leon assigned her leasehold right in
favor of the Second Quezon City Development Bank.
The lease and De Leons leasehold right were 4. Pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. 2. Pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as and by
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-44349 as Entry Nos.
152248 and 152249,5 respectively. Thereafter, way of attorneys fees;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bienvenido Santos constructed a house thereon. 5. Pay plaintiff P10,000.00 per month from April 26, 1995

In November 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, up to and until defendants vacate the premises. 3. Pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as moral
died intestate. In deference to her wishes, her heirs
allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the Plaintiff prays for other reliefs just and equitable under damages;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate, but the circumstances.8
his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. On
April 26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, 4. Pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as exemplary
In their answer to the complaint, the heirs of Florencio
sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that
alleged that the plaintiffs had no cause of action
they vacate the property within ninety (90) days from damages;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed
receipt thereof.6 The latter refused and failed to vacate
of Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of
the property.
 The heirs of Bienvenido Santos submitted in evidence as
5. Pay plaintiff P10,000.00 per month from April 26, 1995 do not have only the absolute and lawful possession of Exhibits "1" and "1-H" the Contract of Lease dated
September 6, 1966 between Teresa Sevilla and
up to and until defendants vacate the premises. the same but they have the absolute and lawful Bienvenido R. Santos.30

Plaintiff prays for other reliefs just and equitable under ownership of the same not only against the plaintiffs but
On December 3, 1996, the MTC rendered a decision in
the circumstances.12 Civil Cases Nos. 2061 and 2062 dismissing the
against the whole world.
complaints for lack of jurisdiction upon the finding that
In their answer to the complaint, the heirs of Bienvenido the issue of possession cannot be determined without
Santos, through counsel, alleged that the plaintiffs had resolving, in a full blown trial, the issue of ownership.31
b). Defendants are entitled to their counterclaim.13
no cause of action against them, and that they did not
occupy the property by mere tolerance but on the The heirs of De Leon appealed the decisions of the MTC
basis of a contract of lease executed by De Leon on On motion of the plaintiffs in both cases, the court
to the RTC of Bulacan, Branch 83, which rendered
September 26, 1966. Furthermore, De Leon donated the issued an Order directing the heirs of Florencio to
judgment reversing the decision of the court a quo. It
property to Rosendo Florencio on October 1, 1976, and produce the original of the Deed of Donation
held that the MTC had jurisdiction over the cases; as
the latter, after the expiration of the contract of lease, purportedly executed by Teresa de Leon. However,
such, the trial court should proceed and render
allowed and permitted them to continue and remain in they failed to comply with the order of the court and
judgment therefor.
possession of the property without any compensation. submitted a mere photocopy of the same.14
According to the heirs of Bienvenido Santos, only In the course of the proceedings, the defendants
Florencios heirs had the right to cause their eviction The plaintiffs adduced in evidence the following: (1)
adduced in evidence a copy of the Deed of Donation
from the property by reason of the deed of donation TCT No. T-44349 in the name of Teresa Sevilla;15 (2)
as certified by the RTC of Bulacan on May 29, 1996.32
executed in favor of the latter. demand letters sent by the plaintiffs counsel to the
defendants demanding that the latter vacate the
subject premises;16 (3) affidavit-complaint of Valeriana On August 27, 1999, the MTC rendered an Amended
The trial of the two cases was consolidated. Decision in Civil Case No. 2061 in favor of the
Morente filed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Bulacan docketed as I.S. No. 96-1513 for falsification, defendants and against the plaintiffs. The dispositive
The parties agreed to litigate the following portion of the decision
perjury and applicable crimes against Rodrigo
issues:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Florencio and Atty. Tirso Manguiat, dated May 8,
1996;17 (4) affidavit-complaint executed by Ramon de
After the preliminary conference, parties submitted Leon Manotoc dated May 8, 1996;18 (5) copies of WHEREFORE, the court finds the defendants as having a
their respective position papers. Teresa de Leons passport issued on April 28, 1975 better right of possession over the subject parcel of
containing specimens of her signature;19 (6) copy of land as against the plaintiffs and hereby orders this
Plaintiffs raised and argued on the following issues: Patria Manotocs passport issued on September 16, 1997 case DISMISSED.
with her specimen signature therein;20 (7) copy of
Valeriana Morentes passports issued on the following For lack of evidence to prove bad faith on the part of
a). Defendants possession of the premises was merely dates: (a) February 20, 1967;21 (b) April 28, 1975;22 (c) the plaintiffs in the filing of this case, and in line with the
October 4, 1984;23 and (d) August 22, 1994,24 with policy not to put premium on the right to litigate, the
on the tolerance of the late Teresa de Leon. specimens of her signature appearing therein covering counterclaim of the defendants is, likewise, ordered
a span of thirty years; (8) copy of the Certificate of DISMISSED.
Death of Patria Manotoc;25 (9) Certification dated April
b). The alleged Deed of Donation does not exist, is 23, 1996 issued by Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief, Archives With no pronouncements as to costs.
Division of the Records Management and Archives
patently a falsified document and can never be the Division of Manila26 to the effect that nothing in the
SO ORDERED.33
notarial register of Atty. Tirso L. Manguiat show that he
source of any right whatsoever. notarized a deed of donation dated October 1, 1976 in
favor of Rosendo Florencio; (10) copy of Sinumpaang The decision was appealed to the RTC of Bulacan. On
Defendants, on the other hand, raised and argued on Salaysay dated July 19, 1996 executed by one Rodolfo June 5, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment reversing the
the following issues: Apolinario;27 and, (11) copies of the official receipts of decision of the MTC and rendered a new judgment in
the real estate taxes paid.28 favor of the plaintiffs, as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
a). Defendants do not have only a better right of For their part, the heirs of Florencio adduced in
evidence a photocopy of the Deed of Donation dated WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
possession over the questioned parcel of land and they October 1, 1976 purportedly executed by De Leon in August 27, 1999, rendered by the Municipal Trial Court
favor of Rosendo Florencio.29
of San Miguel, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 2061, is hereby name of Teresa Sevilla under TCT No. T-44349 (Exh. "A" The petitioners now contend in this case that the Court
set aside and a new one is hereby rendered, as follows: and "A-1"). There is no showing whatsoever that the of Appeals and the RTC erred in rendering judgment for
same or a copy thereof was submitted to the Office of the respondents, thus:
the Register of Deeds.
a) Ordering the heirs of Rosendo Florencio and all those
Second. As earlier pointed out, throughout the years, 1. In finding no reversible error committed by the
claiming any rights under them to vacate the subject the real estate taxes on the property continued to be
paid in the name of Teresa Sevilla by the caretaker Regional Trial Court as an appellate court and affirming
premises, particularly that parcel of land covered by Rodolfo Apolinario and nobody else. There is no
showing that the defendants had previously laid any its decision.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44349, situated in claim of title or ownership over the property and
attempted to pay the taxes thereon.
San Jose, San Miguel, 2. In concluding that the evidence presented reveals
Bulacan;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Third. Although it purports to have been notarized in the
serious doubts as to the veracity and authenticity of the
City of Manila by one Atty. Tirso L. Manguiat, there is no
indication of its existence in the notarial record of Atty.
notarized deed of donation, contrary to the findings of
b) Ordering the Heirs of Rosendo Florencio to pay the Manguiat, as per Certification dated April 23, 1996 (Exh.
"L") of the Manila Records Management and Archives the trial court that there is a legal presumption of
heirs of Teresa Sevilla the amount of P2,000.00 per Office. One can only wonder why from the place of
execution in San Miguel, Bulacan on October 1, 1976, regularity in the execution thereof.
month as reasonable monthly rental on the premises, to its notarization on the same date had to be in the City
of Manila.
commence on April 1995 until the premises is vacated 3. In holding that private respondents are entitled to
Fourth. The Court has noted, as anyone can easily do,
by them; andcralawlibrary that the signature purported to be that of Teresa de possess the subject property notwithstanding petitioners
Leon appearing in the deed of donation (Exh. "1-B"), is
dissimilar to her customary signatures affixed to her claim to the contrary and despite the latters
c) Ordering the heirs of Rosendo Florencio to pay the passports (Exhs. "E" and "E-1"). The same is true with
those of Patria Manotoc and Valeriana L. Morente continuous, open and adverse possession for more
heirs of Teresa Sevilla the amount of P10,000.00, as appearing in the same deed of donation (Exhs. "1-D
and "1-E"), with those of their customary signatures than forty years.36
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. appearing in their respective passports (Exhs. "F" and "F-
1"; "G," "G-1" and "G-2"; "H," "H-1" and "H-2"; "I" and "I-1" The petitioners aver that donation is one of the modes
SO ORDERED.34 and "J" and "J-1"). of acquiring ownership. Their claim for possession is
precisely based on the deed of donation executed by
The RTC ruled that the deed of donation was And Fifth. There is no explanation given why since 1976, Teresa Sevilla de Leon on October 1, 1976 in favor of
insufficient to support the claim of the heirs of Florencio when the deed of donation was supposedly executed, their father, Rosendo Florencio. The aforesaid deed was
that they were the owners of the property and were, up to the present, the defendants did not register the duly notarized, and by virtue of its notarization, such
thus, entitled to its possession. same to secure a new title in their names. In fact, there deed became a public document. Furthermore,
is no showing that efforts toward that end were ever according to the petitioners, an examination of the
The defendants, now the petitioners, filed a Petition for executed. deed reveals that it had conformed to all the essential
Review with the Court of Appeals of the decision of the requisites of donation, as required by the provisions of
RTC. On May 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered As it is, the Court holds that the deed of donation in the New Civil Code; hence, its validity must be
judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the RTC question is not a credible piece of evidence to support presumed.37 From the time of the donation up to the
decision. The CA adopted the findings of the RTC and the defendants claim of acquisition of title and present, the petitioners assert that they possessed the
its disquisitions on why the deed of donation was not a ownership over the subject property and therefore property openly, publicly and against the whole world.
credible piece of evidence to support the petitioners insufficient to justify their continuing possession and
claim over the property; hence, did not transfer title occupancy thereof. Thus, as against defendants claim As regards the alleged forgery of the signatures of the
over the property in favor of the petitioners. which is unregistered, the plaintiffs right over the donor and the witnesses, the petitioners assert that
property as the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of absent any clear, positive and convincing evidence
First. The deed of donation (Exh. "1"), which purports to the registered owner must prevail.35 that the same were forged, the presumption is that
have been executed in 1976, is not annotated on the they are genuine. The mere variance in the signatures
title to the property which remains registered in the The Present Petition of the donor and the witnesses cannot be considered
as conclusive proof of the forgery. They aver that the
Certification dated April 23, 1996 of the Manila Records The threshold issue in this case is whether or not the document, and the donees acceptance must come to
Management and Archives Office stating that no such petitioners, as heirs of Rosendo Florencio, who appears the knowledge of the donor.45
notarized deed existed in the notarial records of Atty. to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of
Manguiat cannot be conclusive evidence that no Donation, have a better right to the physical or material In order that the donation of an immovable property
donation ever existed. According to the petitioners, possession of the property over the respondents, the may be valid, it must be made in a public
such certification was merely preponderant and, heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the document.46 Registration of the deed in the Office of
therefore, not enough to overthrow the presumption of property. the Register of Deeds or in the Assessors Office is not
regularity in the notarization as well as the genuineness necessary for it to be considered valid and official.
of the document. The petition has no merit. Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of
such title over a particular parcel of land.47 The
The petitioners posit that their failure to register the Prefatorily, in ejectment cases, the issue is the physical necessity of registration comes into play only when the
deed of donation did not affect its validity, it not being or material possession (possession de facto) and any rights of third persons are affected.48 Furthermore, the
a requisite of a valid donation. They allege that their pronouncement made by the trial court on the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by
effort to register the same during the lifetime of Jose de question of ownership is provisional in nature.38 A their predecessors-in-interest.49
Leon, the administrator of the property, did not judgment rendered in ejectment cases shall not bar an
materialize because of the latters untimely death in action between the same parties respecting title to the On the other hand, the fundamental principle is that a
1991. The petitioners conclude that because of the land and shall not be conclusive as to the facts found certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
respondents failure to destroy the validity of the deed therein in a case between the same parties upon a and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
of donation, their right over the property should prevail; different cause of action involving possession of the person whose name appears therein as the registered
the petitioners right accrued on October 1, 1976, while same property.39 owner.50 The registered owner has the right to possess,
that of the respondents accrued only in November of enjoy and dispose of the property without any
1978. limitations other than those imposed by law.
We agree with the petitioners that under the New Civil
Code, donation is one of the modes of acquiring
In their comment, the respondents, through counsel, ownership.40 Among the attributes of ownership is the In this case, the deed of donation, on its face, appears
argue that the deed of donation executed by De Leon right to possess the property.41 to bear all the essential requisites of a valid donation
dated October 1, 1976 in favor of Rosendo Florencio is inter vivos. With Teresa de Leon as the donor and
not a credible piece of evidence. The deed is Rosendo Florencio as the donee, the deed of donation
The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a)
insufficient to justify the petitioners stay in the premises appears to have been notarized by Notary Public Tirso
the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
because the original copy was never presented to Manguiat. On this premise, Florencio, and after his
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c)
them or to the court. Furthermore, while the photocopy death, his heirs, acquired ownership over the property
the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
of the deed of donation states that it was notarized by although Certificate of Title No. T-44349 under the name
When applied to a donation of an immovable
a certain Tirso Manguiat, a notary public for the City of of Teresa de Leon had not yet been cancelled.
property, the law further requires that the donation be
Manila, under Doc. 1724, Page No. 71, Book No. IV,
made in a public document and that the acceptance
Series of 1976, the presumption of regularity in the
thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of
notarization of the deed was destroyed by the
public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is Appeals, there are cogent facts and circumstances of
certification from the Records Management and
made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the substance which engender veritable doubts as to
Archives Office of Manila that no such deed exists. The
donor be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be whether the petitioners have a better right of
respondents further assert that the signatures
noted in both instruments.42 possession over the property other than the
appearing on the said deed, i.e., that of Teresa Sevilla
respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased
de Leon, Patria Manotoc and Valeriana Morente, were
As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in registered owner of the property, Teresa de Leon,
all forgeries.
an effective transfer of title over the property from the based on the Deed of Donation.
donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment
According to the respondents, the following facts
the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the First. Teresa de Leon purportedly executed the Deed of
bolster the incredibility of the deed of donation: (a) the
donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or Donation on October 1, 1976 in favor of Rosendo S.
deed of donation was executed in 1976 but was not
prohibited by law from accepting the donation.43 Once Florencio. If she, indeed, donated the property, she
registered; (b) the TCT is still registered in the name of
the donation is accepted, it is generally considered would surely have turned over the owners duplicate of
Teresa Sevilla de Leon; (c) the owners duplicate copy
irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute TCT No. T-44349 to Florencio, to facilitate the issuance of
of the TCT should have been transmitted to the donees;
owner of the property, except on account of a new title over the property in his favor. There was an
and, (d) the real estate taxes were continuously paid in
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the imperative need for the deed to be registered in the
the name of Teresa Sevilla de Leon. Thus, the
charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.44 The Office of the Register of Deeds, and the title to the
respondents, as her heirs, are the legal owners of the
acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the property to be thereafter issued in the name of the
property.
lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be donee, Florencio. Before then, Florencio and his family
made in the same deed or in a separate public had been residing in the property solely at the
The Ruling of the Court
sufferance of Teresa de Leon and her husband. Their donation over the property in favor of their San Miguel, Bulacan. However, the mayor did not affix
possession of the property and their continued stay predecessor, Florencio. his signature above his typewritten name, thus:
therein was precarious. They could be driven out from
the property at any time by De Leon if she disowned Third. In the meantime, the respondents consistently
the deed or, after her death, by her heirs. It behooved paid the realty taxes for the property from 1978 up to SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of
Florencio to have the said deed filed and duly 1996, completely oblivious to the existence of the deed
registered51 with the Office of the Register of Deeds of donation. On the other hand, Florencio, and, after October, 1976, the DONOR having exhibited her Res.
without delay and, thereafter, to secure a new title his death, the petitioners, never paid a single centavo
under his name. This would have resulted in the for the realty taxes due on the property, even as they Cert. No. A-3723337 issued at Quezon City on January
cancellation of TCT No. T-44349 under the name of continued staying in the property without paying a
Teresa de Leon, and thereby averted any disturbance single centavo therefor. The petitioners should have 10, 1976.
of Florencios possession of the property, and after his declared the property under their names and paid the
death, that of his heirs. realty taxes therefor, if they truly believed that they
were its owners. They failed to do so. The fact of MARCELO G. AURE
At the very least, Florencio should have caused the Florencios inaction and that of the petitioners
annotation of the deed immediately after October 1, weakened the latters claim that they acquired Municipal Mayor53
1976 or shortly thereafter, at the dorsal portion of TCT ownership over the property under the deed of
No. T-44349. Such annotation would have been binding donation. It appears that a second page was added, with the
on the respondents, as De Leons successors-in-interest, name of Atty. Manguiat typewritten therein as notary
as well as to third persons. However, Florencio failed to Fourth. The petitioners never adduced in evidence the public, obviously, with the use of a different typewriter.
do so. Even as De Leon died intestate in 1978, Florencio owners duplicate of TCT No. T-44349 under the name of
failed to secure title over the property in his name De Leon. Their possession of the owners duplicate of the In sum then, we agree with the RTC and the Court of
before he himself died intestate in 1995. If, as the title would have fortified their claim that indeed, De Appeals that the deed of donation relied upon by the
petitioners claimed, Florencio acquired ownership over Leon had intended to convey the property by donation petitioners is unreliable as evidence on which to anchor
the property under the deed, it is incredible that he to Florencio. Furthermore, the petitioners did not explain a finding that the latter have a better right over the
would fail to register the deed and secure title over the why they failed to adduce in evidence the said owners property than the respondents, who, admittedly, are
property under his name for almost twenty years. All duplicate of the title. The only conclusion is that the the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the
these years, Florencio, and thereafter, his heirs, said owners duplicate copy was not turned over to property under TCT No. T-44349 of the Registry of Deeds
remained passive and failed to act upon the deed of Florencio contemporaneously with or after the of Bulacan.
donation to protect their right. This, the Court finds execution of the deed of donation; hence, their failure
difficult to understand. to secure title over the property.52 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
The Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
The claim that Florencio and his heirs sought the Fifth. The respondents adduced in evidence the Bulacan, Branch 20, in Civil Cases Nos. 1018-M-99 and
registration of the deed and the transfer of the title to affidavit-complaint of Valeriana Morente dated May 8, 1019-M-99, and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
and under Florencios name from 1978 to 1991, in 1996, one of the witnesses to the deed, for falsification 59698-99, are AFFIRMED.
coordination with Jose de Leon is incredible. There is no and perjury against Florencio and Atty. Tirso Manguiat.
evidence on record that the deed of donation was They also adduced the Certification dated April 23, SO ORDERED.
ever filed with and registered in the Office of the 1996 issued by Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief, Archives
Register of Deeds at any time during the period from Division of the Records Management and Archives
1978 to 1991. The petitioners claim that the registration Division of Manila, to the effect that nothing in the
of the deed was delayed and later aborted by the notarial register of Atty. Tirso L. Manguiat, a notary
demise of Jose de Leon is not substantiated by public of Manila, showed that the latter notarized a
evidence. Moreover, there is no reason why Florencio, Deed of Donation executed by De Leon and Florencio
or after his death, the petitioners, could not have had in San Miguel, Bulacan dated October 1, 1976.
the deed registered even after Jose de Leons death. However, the petitioners failed to adduce in evidence
Atty. Manguiats counter-affidavit to the said complaint,
Second. Florencio failed to inform the heirs of De Leon or, at the very least, a separate affidavit explaining the
that the latter, before her death, had executed a deed facts and circumstances surrounding the notarization of
of donation on October 1, 1976 over the property in his the deed of donation.
favor. It was only in 1996, or eighteen years after the
death of De Leon when the respondents sued the Sixth. A reading of the deed will show that at the
petitioners for ejectment that the latter claimed, for the bottom of page one thereof, Florencio was to subscribe
first time, that De Leon had executed a deed of and swear to the truth of his acceptance of the
donation before Municipal Mayor Marcelo G. Aure of
 [G.R. NO. 133705. March 31, 2005] WHEREAS, Donee is willing and able, with the wanted the various members of the family of Mr. Jose Yulo, Sr.,
help of Donor and of other benefactors, to establish, on festive and solemn occasions in the said family.
operate and maintain such a home for the aged.
C-J YULO & SONS, INC., Petitioners, v. ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC., Respondents. 5. Except with prior written consent of the Donor or its
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing successor, the Donee shall not use the land except for
premises, Donor hereby transfers and conveys to the purpose as provided above in paragraph 1 hereof,
DECISION
Donee by way of donation all its rights, title and interest nor sell or dispose the land for any reason whatsoever,
in that certain parcel of land covered by TCT No. T- nor convey any portion of the same except in lease for
GARCIA, J.: 82803 of the Land Records of Laguna, the technical commercial use as provided above in paragraph 3
descriptions of which are recited above, subject to the hereof, otherwise the said land with all real
Appealed to this Court by way of a Petition for Review following conditions and covenants, each of which is a improvements thereon shall revert in trust to the Donor
on Certiorari are the Decision1 dated December 19, material consideration for this Deed: for prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable
1997 and Resolution2 dated April 30, 1998 of the Court organization that Donor may deem best suited to the
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392, reversing an earlier care of the aged. (Underscoring supplied).
1. So much of the land as may be necessary shall be
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, used for the construction of a home for the aged and
Laguna, Branch 34, which ruled in favor of the herein infirm, regardless of religion or creed, but preferably On the basis of the same deed, TCT No. T-82803 of the
petitioner C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., in a suit for revocation those coming from Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna; donor was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-91348
of donation with reconveyance of title, thereat provided that retired and/or aged priests may be in the name of donee Roman Catholic Bishop of San
commenced by the petitioner against the herein admitted to the home; and provided further that any Pablo, Inc.
respondent, Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. senior citizen from the area who has retired from
business or work may likewise be admitted to the home,
Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for
The facts are not at all disputed: subject to the payment to the institution of such sum as
purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter
he may afford for his support.
fence on the donated property and the construction of
On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto a nucleus building for the aged and the infirm, leased a
respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang, Calamba, 2. A Green Belt that is 15 meters wide shall be portion of the donated property to one Martin Gomez
Laguna with an area of 41,117 square meters and established and maintained by the Donor along the who planted said portion with sugar cane. There is no
registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title length of the land to separate and insulate it from the dispute that the lease agreement was entered into by
(TCT) No. T-82803. The deed of donation which also projected highway. the donee without the prior written consent of the
bears the acceptance of the donee recites the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease
considerations therefor and the conditions thereto to Gomez ended in 1985.
3. Such part of land as may not be needed for the
attached, to wit: residence and the Green Belt shall be devoted by
Donee with the help of such residents of the home as The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated
WHEREAS, Donee is a religious corporation engaged in are able, to the raising of agricultural crops for the property was again leased by the donee, this time to
much (sic) humanitarian Christian work in Laguna and consumption of the residents of the home, and of such one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch.
elsewhere, educating and forming the young, caring other crops that may be sold to defray the cost of As explained by the donee, it entered into a lease
for the infirm and the aged in the fulfillment of its running the home and feeding its residents; provided, agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from
mission; that should the area later become so fully urbanized as vandals and for the electrification of the nucleus
to make this limitation on use economically, building of the home for the aged and in the infirm,
impractical, any portion of the land may, with the which was named as "Casa dela Merced." As before,
WHEREAS, Donor recognizes the need for a privately written consent of the Donor, be put to commercial use however, the donee executed the lease
endowed institution that will care for the homeless and by the Donee by leasing the same for wholesome and contract without the prior written consent of the donor.
destitute old people in the community, as well as the socially-acceptable activities; provided further that the
other senior citizens who for some reason or other find rentals from such commercial leases shall be used, first,
themselves without family with whom to live the last After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement,
to meet the expenses of the home; second, to enlarge
years of their life: the donee, for the third time, leased a portion of the
its population and expand its facilities; and finally for
donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the
other charitable purposes in Laguna, in that order.
leased area for fattening cattles. The donee explained
WHEREFORE, Donor is willing, in order to help establish that the lease agreement with Bostre was also for the
and support such an institution to donate the land 4. Donee acknowledges that Donor's generous act will purposes of generating funds for the completion of
necessary for its housing, as well as an area of land greatly aid Donee in accomplishing its mission on earth, "Casa dela Merced." Again, however, the donee did
whereon it may raise crops for its support and for the and, recognizing the generosity of the Yulo family as not secure the prior written consent of the donor.
sustenance of its residents; the reason for such act, Donee undertakes to cause
every year the celebration of masses for the intention of
Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board defense that the donor's cause of action for THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (THAT THE
resolution, the donor, through its president Miguel A. revocation, if any, had already prescribed because the REVOCATION OF THE DONATION BY PETITIONER WAS
Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the leases were known to the latter since 1980. IMPROPER) IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE
latter that it was revoking the donation in accordance JURISPRUDENCE.
with Section 5 of the deed due to the donee's non-
In a decision dated December 22, 1995, the trial court
compliance with and material breach of the conditions
rendered judgment for donor-plaintiff C-J Yulo & Sons, We DENY.
thereunder stipulated. In the same letter, the donor
Inc., thus:
requested for the turn-over of the donee's TCT No. T-
91348 over the donated property. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff that the donation is an onerous one since the donee
and against the defendant, declaring the Deed of was burdened with the establishment on the donated
In a reply-letter dated November 5, 1990, the donee,
Donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exh. "C") property of a home for the aged and the infirm. It
through Bishop Pedro N. Bantigue, D.D., denied any
REVOKED, affirming plaintiff's revocation of the same in likewise agreed with the trial court that there were
material breach of the conditions of the deed of
the letter dated September 20, 1990 (Exh. "D"). violations of the terms and conditions of the deed of
donation and manifested its continued and faithful
donation when the donee thrice leased a portion of
compliance with the provisions thereof. In the same
the property without the prior written consent of the
letter, the donee refused the turn-over of its title to the Defendant and all persons claiming rights under them
donor. Likewise upheld by the appellate court is the
donor. are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the
ruling of the trial court that the prescriptive period of
premises of the donated property and to hand over to
the donor's right to revoke the donation is ten (10) years
plaintiff the peaceful possession of the aforesaid
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, based on Article 1144 of the Civil Code, instead of four
premises.
on November 19, 1990, in the Regional Trial Court at (4) years per Article 764 of the same Code, and
Calamba, Laguna the donor, alleging non-compliance therefore the action for revocation filed by the
with and violation by the donee of the conditions of the To avoid multiplicity of suits, the Register of Deeds of petitioner is not barred by prescription.
deed of donation, filed its complaint in this case Calamba, Laguna, is hereby ordered to require the
against donee Roman Catholic Archbishop of San defendant to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
Even then, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
Pablo, Inc., therein reciting the imputed non- 91348 (Exh. "B") and thereafter cancel the same and
court's decision, the reversal being premised on the
compliance and violations by the donee of the terms issue, upon payment of the required fees, a new
appellate court's finding that the breaches thrice
and conditions of the deed of donation, as follows: Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiffs, with cost
committed by the respondent were merely casual
against the defendant.
breaches which nevertheless did not detract from the
a) non-construction of the home for the aged and purpose of which the donation was made: the
infirmed in the lot despite the lapse of a reasonable SO ORDERED. establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm.
and considerable length of time;
Therefrom, donee-defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of We agree.
b) present land use of the area is a cattle farm, the San Pablo, Inc., went to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
owner of which has a lease contract with the donee; CV No. 45392.
Petitioner contends that the case at bar is similar to the
andcralawlibrary
1995 case of Central Philippine University v. Court of
In the herein assailed Decision dated December 19, Appeals,5 where the donee failed for more than 50
c) no prior written consent of the donor has been 1997,3 the Court of Appeals reversed that of the trial years to establish, as required, a medical school on the
obtained for the present and actual use of the property court and upheld the donation in question, to wit: land donated, and where this Court declared the
donated, donation to have been validly revoked.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated
and accordingly prayed that the subject deed of December 22, 1993 is hereby REVERSED and the To the mind of the Court, what is applicable to this case
donation be adjudged revoked and void and the donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exhibit C) which is the more recent [2001] case of Republic v.
donee ordered to return and/or reconvey the property conveyed title to the donated property in the Silim,6 where respondent Silim donated a 5,600-square
donated. appellee's name is hereby UPHELD. meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public
Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur
SO ORDERED. with the condition that the said property should be
In its answer, defendant donee alleged that it was
used exclusively and forever for school purposes only.
doing its best to comply with the provisions of the deed
Although a school building was constructed on the
of donation relative to the establishment of the home Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by property through the efforts of the Parent-Teachers
for the aged and the infirm, adding that the leases of the same court in its Resolution of April 30, 1998,4 donor Association of Barangay Kauswagan, the funds for
portions of the land were with the express, albeit C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., has come to this Court via the a Bagong Lipunan school building could not be
unwritten consent, of Jesus Miguel Yulo himself. In the present recourse on its sole submission that - released because the government required that it be
same answer, defendant donee interposed the
built on a one-hectare parcel of land. This led the First, the violations of the conditions of the donation for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong
donee therein to exchange the donated property for a committed by the donee were merely casual breaches Lipunan school building which could not be
bigger one. of the conditions of the donation and did not detract accommodated by the limited area of the donated
from the purpose by which the donation was made, lot.
i.e., for the establishment of a home for the aged and
In Silim, the Court distinguished the four (4) types of
the infirm. In order for a contract which imposes a
donations: As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered
reciprocal obligation, which is the onerous donation in
into by the donee were for the sole purpose of pursuing
this case wherein the donor is obligated to donate a
the objective for which the donation was intended. In
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be 41,117 square meter property in Canlubang, Calamba,
fact, such lease was authorized by the donor by
categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or Laguna on which property the donee is obligated to
express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the
compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) establish a home for the aged and the infirm (Exhibit C),
prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed.
onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the may be rescinded per Article 1191 of the New Civil
Hence, considering that the donee's acts did not
underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its Code, the breach of the conditions thereof must be
detract from the very purpose for which the donation
truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or substantial as to defeat the purpose for which the
was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a
compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of contract was perfected (Tolentino, "Civil Code of the
lack of prior written consent of the donor would only
rewarding the donee for past services, which services Philippines," Vol. IV, pp. 179-180; Universal Food Corp. v.
constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not
do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v. Court of
warrant the revocation of the donation.
or modal donation is one where the donation is made Appeals, 233 SCRA 551, 562). Thus, in the case of
in consideration of future services or where the donor "Ocampo v. C.A." (ibid), citing the case of "Angeles v.
imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon Calasanz" (135 SCRA 323, 330), the Supreme Court Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of
the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the ruled: a prior written consent by the donor for all contracts of
donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute
which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation ground for revocation of the donation because such a
The right to rescind the contract for non-performance
or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the
of one of its stipulations x x x is not absolute. In Universal
for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal donation, would constitute undue restriction of the
Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals (33 SCRA 1) the Court
to or more than the thing donated. donee's right of ownership over the donated property.
stated that:

Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the Instructive on this point is the ruling of this Court in The
The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not
onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of
be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for
unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and Appeals,7 viz:
such substantial and fundamental breach as would
the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an
defeat the very object of the parties in making the
onerous donation is completely governed not by the
agreement (Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in
law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this
47 Phil. 821,827). The question of whether a breach of a an effective transfer of title over the property from the
regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
contract is substantial depends upon the attendant donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the
circumstances (Corpus v. Hon. Alikpala, et al., L-23707 & donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
ARTICLE 733 Donations with onerous cause shall be L-23720, Jan. 17, 1968). donated. Although the donor may impose certain
governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not
donations by the provisions of the present Title as be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
The above ruling of the Court of Appeals is completely
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the and public policy.
in tune with this Court's disposition in Republic v. Silim,
burden imposed.
supra. The donor therein sought to revoke the donation
on the ground that the donee breached the condition xxx
The donation involved in the present controversy is one to exclusively and forever use the land for school
which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon purpose only, but this Court ruled in favor of the donee: In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the
the donee to build a school on the donated property.
deed of donation against the alienation of the property
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the for an entire century, being an unreasonable
Here, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law on donation was not in any way violated when the lot emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of
contracts instead of the law on donations because the donated was exchanged with another one. The ownership, should be declared as an illegal or
donation involved in this case is onerous, saddled as it is purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for impossible condition within the contemplation of Article
by a burden imposed upon the donee to put up and the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically
operate a home for the aged and the infirm. We thus purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be
quote with approval the terse ruling of the appellate exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in considered as not imposed. No reliance may
court in the challenged decision: furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph
donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent
said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly meaning to the Bishop's letter seeking permission to sell
constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of or exchange the donated property.
the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the
latter, hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for
In Silim, supra, this Court ruled that such exchange does
private respondents must fail.
not constitute breach of the terms and conditions of
the donation. We see no reason for the Court to think
If petitioner would insist that the lack of prior written otherwise in this case. To insist that the home for the
consent is a resolutory condition that is absolute in aged and infirm be constructed on the donated
character, the insistence would not stand the validity property, if the industrialization indeed pushes through,
test under the foregoing doctrine. What would have defies rhyme and reason. Any act by the donor to
been casual breaches of the terms and conditions of prevent the donee from ultimately achieving the
the donation, may, in that event, even be considered purpose for which the donation was intended would
as no breach at all when the Court strikes down such constitute bad faith, which the Court will not tolerate.
absolute condition of prior written consent by the donor
in all instances without any exception whatsoever. The
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
Court, however, understands that such a condition was
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in
written with a specific purpose in mind, which is, to
toto.
ensure that the primary objective for which the
donation was intended is achieved. A reasonable
construction of such condition rather than totally striking No pronouncement as to costs.
it would, therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of
the donation. Thus, for as long as the contracts of lease SO ORDERED.
do not detract from the purpose for which the
donation was made, the complained acts of the
donee will not be deemed as substantial breaches of
the terms and conditions of the deed of donation to
merit a valid revocation thereof by the donor.

Finally, anent petitioner's contention that the Court of

Appeals failed to consider that respondent had
abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the
aged and infirm, the explanation in respondent's
comment is enlightening. Petitioner relies on Bishop
Bantigue's letter8 dated June 21, 1990 as its basis for
claiming that the donee had altogether abandoned
the idea of constructing a home for the aged and the
infirm on the property donated. Respondent, however,
explains that the Bishop, in his letter, written in the
vernacular, expressed his concern that the surrounding
area was being considered to be re-classified into an
industrial zone where factories are expected to be put
up. There is no question that this will definitely be
disadvantageous to the health of the aged and the
infirm. Thus, the Bishop asked permission from the donor
for a possible exchange or sale of the donated
property to ultimately pursue the purpose for which the
donation was intended in another location that is more
appropriate.

The Court sees the wisdom, prudence and good

judgment of the Bishop on this point, to which it
conforms completely. We cannot accede to
petitioner's view, which attributed the exact opposite
G.R. No. 111904 October 5, 2000 petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. On mentioned in the Deed of revocation (Exh. P-
September 29, 1979, the Danlags executed a deed of plaintiff, Exh. 6-defendant Diego Danlag).
revocation6 recovering the six parcels of land subject of
SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO
the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.
GESTOPA, petitioners, 3. Declaring the Deeds of Sale executed by
vs. Diego Danlag in favor of spouses Agripino
COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil (herein private Gestopa and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28,
PILAPIL, respondents. respondent) filed with the RTC a petition against the 1979 (Exh. S-plaintiff; Exh. 18-defendant); Deed
Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title7 over the of Sale dated December 18, 1979 (Exh. T
above parcels of land. She alleged that she was an plaintiff; Exh. 9-defendant); Deed of Sale
DECISION
illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag; that she lived dated September 14, 1979 (Exh. 8); Deed of
and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego Sale dated June 30, 1975 (Exh. U); Deed of
QUISUMBING, J.: and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exh. X) as valid
alive. In recognition of the services she rendered, Diego and enforceable duly executed in
This petition for review,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of executed a Deed of Donation on March 20, 1973, accordance with the formalities required by
Court, assails the decision2 of the Court of Appeals conveying to her the six (6) parcels of land. She law.
dated August 31, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38266, which accepted the donation in the same instrument, openly
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court of and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the
4. Ordering all tax declaration issued in the
Cebu City, Branch 5. donated properties, and caused the transfer of the tax
name of Mercedes Danlag Y Pilapil covering
declarations to her name. Through machination,
the parcel of land donated cancelled and
intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: further restoring all the tax declarations
the husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of
previously cancelled, except parcels nos. 1
the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said
and 5 described, in the Deed of Donation
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and,
Inter Vivos (Exh. "1") and Deed of Sale (Exh. "2")
of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had
executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff
three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which are complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty
and her husband.
dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego
1966, in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag- had no legal basis in revoking the subject donation and
Pilapil.4 The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2 with Tax then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas. [5.] With respect to the contract of sale of
Declaration Nos. 11345 and 11347, respectively. The abovestated parcels of land, vendor Diego
second deed pertained to parcel 3, with TD No. 018613. Danlag and spouse or their estate have the
In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags
The last deed pertained to parcel 4 with TD No. 016821. alternative remedies of demanding the
averred that the deed of donation dated January 16,
All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the balance of the agreed price with legal
1973 was null and void because it was obtained by
donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation interest, or rescission of the contract of sale.
Mercedes through machinations and undue influence.
during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or Even assuming it was validly executed, the intention
encumber the properties donated during the donors' was for the donation to take effect upon the death of SO ORDERED."8
lifetime, if deemed necessary. the donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the
donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all. In rendering the above decision, the trial court found
On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of that the reservation clause in all the deeds of donation
his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its indicated that Diego Danlag did not make any
donation inter vivos5 covering the aforementioned decision, thus: donation; that the purchase by Mercedes of the two
parcels of land plus two other parcels with TD Nos. parcels of land covered by the Deed of Donation Inter
11351 and 11343, respectively, again in favor of private Vivos bolstered this conclusion; that Mercedes failed to
respondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions, "WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court
rebut the allegations of ingratitude she committed
that (1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the hereby renders judgment in favor of the defendants
against Diego Danlag; and that Mercedes committed
fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the and against the plaintiff:
fraud and machination in preparing all the deeds of
donee can not sell or dispose of the land during the donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their
lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent 1. Declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and contents.
and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the Inter Vivos as revoked, and, therefore, has
parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the (sic) no legal effect and force of law.
Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals and
taxes on them.
argued that the trial court erred in (1) declaring the
2. Declaring Diego Danlag the absolute and donation dated January 16, 1973 as mortis causa and
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and exclusive owner of the six (6) parcels of land that the same was already revoked on the ground of
Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein ingratitude; (2) finding that Mercedes purchased from
Diego Danlag the two parcels of land already covered fraudulently secured, namely those covered "That for and in consideration of the love and affection
by the above donation and that she was only able to by O.C.T. T-17836 and O.C.T. No. 17523. which the Donor inspires in the Donee and as an act of
pay three thousand pesos, out of the total amount of liberality and generosity, the Donor hereby gives,
twenty thousand pesos; (3) failing to declare that donates, transfer and conveys by way of donation unto
7. Failing to do so, ordering the Branch Clerk
Mercedes was an acknowledged natural child of the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns and successors, the
of Court of the Regional Trial Court (Branch V)
Diego Danlag. above-described parcels of land;
at Cebu City to effect such reconveyance of
the parcels of land covered by O.C.T. T-17836
On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the and 17523. That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor
trial court. It ruled: shall continue to enjoy all the fruits of the land during his
lifetime and that of his spouse and that the donee
SO ORDERED."9
cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the lands without
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
the prior consent and approval by the Donor and her
REVERSED and a new judgment is hereby rendered as
The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the spouse during their lifetime.
follows:
donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred
to Mercedes the ownership over the donated
xxx
1. Declaring the deed of donation inter properties; that the right to sell belonged to the donee,
vivos dated January 16, 1973 as not having and the donor's right referred to that of merely giving
been revoked and consequently the same consent; that the donor changed his intention by That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the
remains in full force and effect; donating inter vivos properties already donated mortis Donor further states that he has reserved for himself
causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax sufficient properties in full ownership or in usufruct
declarations pertaining to the donated properties enough for his maintenance of a decent livelihood in
2. Declaring the Revocation of Donation
implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that consonance with his standing in society.
dated June 4, 1979 to be null and void and
Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of
therefore of no force and effect;
land donated to her.
That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and
expresses her thanks and gratitude for the kindness and
3. Declaring Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the
Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the generosity of the Donor."13
absolute and exclusive owner of the six (6)
Gestopa spouses, asserting that:
parcels of land specified in the above-cited
deed of donation inter vivos; Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego
"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH donated the properties out of love and affection for
DIVISION, HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter
4. Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by
DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO."10 vivos.14 Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct
Diego Danlag in favor of spouses Agripino and
indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked
Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979 (Exhibits S
ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by
and 18), Deed of Sale dated December 18, Before us, petitioners allege that the appellate court
the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such
1979 (Exhibits T and 19), Deed of Sale dated overlooked the fact that the donor did not only reserve
reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the
September 14, 1979 (Exhibit 8), Deed of Sale the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also
owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved
dated June 30, 1975 (Exhibit U), Deed of Sale prohibited the donee from selling or disposing the land
sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance
dated March 13, 1978 (Exhibit X) as well as the without the consent and approval of the Danlag
with his standing in society, indicating that the donor
Deed of Sale in favor of Eulalio Danlag dated spouses. This implied that the donor still had control and
intended to part with the six parcels of land.15 Lastly, the
December 27, 1978 (Exhibit 2) not to have ownership over the donated properties. Hence, the
donee accepted the donation. In the case
been validly executed; donation was post mortem.
of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said
that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation
5. Declaring the above-mentioned deeds of Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
sale to be null and void and therefore of no vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in
force and effect; the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by
properties upon the execution of the deed.11 the donees during the donors' lifetime.
6. Ordering spouses Agripino Gestopa and
Isabel Silerio Gestopa to reconvey within thirty In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in
(30) days from the finality of the instant deed's provisions must be read together.12 The deed of concluding that the right to dispose of the properties
judgment to Mercedes Danlag Pilapil the donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give
parcels of land above-specified, regarding contained the following: consent was merely intended to protect his
which titles have been subsequently usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a
limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime
implied that ownership had passed to the donees and manipulated and unduly influenced to make the
donation was already effective during the donors' purchase, in the first place.1âwphi1
lifetime.
Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once
The attending circumstances in the execution of the accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account
subject donation also demonstrated the real intent of of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the
the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.19 The
properties upon its execution.16 Prior to the execution of donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in
donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already the deed of revocation. The deed merely stated:
executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses
"WHEREAS, while the said donation was a donation Inter
were aware of the difference between the two
Vivos, our intention thereof is that of Mortis Causa so as
donations. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos,
we could be sure that in case of our death, the above-
they would not again donate the four lots already
described properties will be inherited and/or
donated mortis causa. Petitioners' counter argument
succeeded by Mercedes Danlag de Pilapil; and that
that this proposition was erroneous because six years
said intention is clearly shown in paragraph 3 of said
after, the spouses changed their intention with the
donation to the effect that the Donee cannot dispose
deed of revocation, is not only disingenious but also
and/or sell the properties donated during our life-time,
fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of
and that we are the one enjoying all the fruits
revocation to show the spouses' intent because its
thereof."20
validity is one of the issues in this case.

Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in prohibiting

Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax declarations in her
the donor to gather coconut trees and her filing of
name can not be a basis in determining the donor's
instant petition for quieting of title. There is nothing on
intent. They claim that it is easy to get tax declarations
record, however, showing that private respondent
from the government offices such that tax declarations
prohibited the donors from gathering coconuts. Even
are not considered proofs of ownership. However,
assuming that Mercedes prevented the donor from
unless proven otherwise, there is a presumption of
gathering coconuts, this could hardly be considered an
regularity in the performance of official duties.17 We find
act covered by Article 765 of the Civil Code.21 Nor does
that petitioners did not overcome this presumption of
this Article cover respondent's filing of the petition for
regularity in the issuance of the tax declarations. We
quieting of title, where she merely asserted what she
also note that the Court of Appeals did not refer to the
believed was her right under the law.
tax declarations as proofs of ownership but only as
evidence of the intent by the donor to transfer
ownership. Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses
instituted any action to revoke the donation in
accordance with Article 769 of the Civil
Petitioners assert that since private respondent
Code.22 Consequently, the supposed revocation on
purchased two of the six parcels of land from the
September 29, 1979, had no legal effect.
donor, she herself did not believe the donation
was inter vivos. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals,
however, it was private respondent's husband who WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
purchased the two parcels of land. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court,
especially when it is supported by evidence on record, Costs against petitioners.
is binding on us.18 On the alleged purchase by her
husband of two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the SO ORDERED.
purchase was without private respondent's consent.
Purchase by her husband would make the properties
conjugal to her own disadvantage. That the purchase
is against her self-interest, weighs strongly in her favor
and gives credence to her claim that her husband was
G.R. No. L-57455 January 18, 1990 herein being donated strictly in accordance the foundation. The remaining portion known as Lot No.
with the plans and specifications prepared by 3707-A was retained by the donor. (p. 16, Rollo).
the O.R. Quinto & Associates and made part
EVELYN DE LUNA, ROSALINA DE LUNA, PRUDENCIO DE
of this donation; provided that the flooring of
LUNA, JR., WILLARD DE LUNA, ANTONIO DE LUNA, and On September 23, 1980, herein petitioners, Evelyn,
the Altar and parts of the Chapel shall be of
JOSELITO DE LUNA, petitioners, Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr., Willard, Antonio and Joselito, all
granoletic marble.
vs. surnamed de Luna, who claim to be the children and
HON. SOFRONIO F. ABRIGO, Presiding Judge of the only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna who died on
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch IX, and 4. That the construction of the Chapel, Nursery August 18, 1980, filed a complaint (pp. 14-17, Rollo) with
LUZONIAN UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC., respondents. and Kindergarten School shall start the Regional Trial Court of Quezon alleging that the
immediately and must be at least SEVENTY terms and conditions of the donation were not
(70) PER CENTUM finished by the end of THREE complied with by the foundation. Among others, it
Milberto B. Zurbano for petitioners.
(3) YEARS from the date hereof, however, the prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the
Joselito E. Talabong for private respondent.
whole project as drawn in the plans and reversion of the donated land to the heirs. The
specifications made parts of this donation complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 8624.
must be completed within FIVE (5) YEARS from
the date hereon, unless extensions are
In its answer (pp. 29-36, Rollo), respondent foundation
granted by the DONOR in writing;
claimed that it had partially and substantially complied
MEDIALDEA, J.: with the conditions of the donation and that the donor
. . . . (p. 23, Rollo) has granted the foundation an indefinite extension of
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order time to complete the construction of the chapel. It also
dated July 7, 1981 of respondent judge Sofronio F. invoked the affirmative defense of prescription of
As in the original deed of donation, the "Revival of
Abrigo of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch action and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
Donation Intenrivos" also provided for the automatic
IX in Civil Case No. 8624 dismissing the complaint of reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of
petitioners on the ground of prescription of action. violation of the conditions thereof, couched in the During the pre-trial of the case, the foundation moved
following terms: for a preliminary hearing of its affirmative defense of
The antecedent facts are as follows: prescription of action which was opposed by the
plaintiffs. After the parties have filed their respective
xxx xxx xxx.
written motions, oppositions and memoranda, an Order
On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a (pp., 40-43, Rollo) dated July 7, 1981 was issued
portion of 7,500 square meters of Lot No. 3707 of the 11. That violation of any of the conditions dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion of the
Cadastral Survey of Lucena covered by Transfer herein provided shall cause the automatic Order states:
Certificate of Title No. 1-5775 to the Luzonian Colleges, reversion of the donated area to the donor,
Inc., (now Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein his heirs, assigns and representatives, without
referred to as the foundation). The donation, embodied In view of the foregoing considerations, this
the need of executing any other document
in a Deed of Donation Intervivos (Annex "A" of Petition) Court finds the motion to dismiss deemed filed
for that purpose and without obligation
was subject to certain terms and conditions and by the defendant on the ground of
whatever on the part of the DONOR. (p.
provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of prescription to be well-taken and the same is
24, Rollo).
the donated property in case of violation or non- hereby GRANTED.
compliance (pars. 7 and 10 of Annex "A", p. 20, Rollo).
The foundation, through its president, accepted the
The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is hereby
donation in the same document, subject to all the
the donation. On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna ordered DISMISSED.
terms and conditions stated in the donation (p.
"revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in
24, Rollo). The donation was registered and annotated
a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos"
on April 15, 1971 in the memorandum of encumbrances No pronouncement as to costs.
(Annex "B" of Petition) subject to terms and conditions
as Entry No. 17939 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
which among others, required:
5775 (p. 15, Rollo).
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
On August 3, 1971, Prudencio de Luna and the
No motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners.
foundation executed a 'Deed of Segregation" (Annex
3. That the DONEE shall construct at its own "C" of Petition) whereby the area donated which is now
expense a Chapel, a Nursery and known as Lot No. 3707-B of Subdivision Plan Psd-40392 On July 22, 1981, petitioners brought the instant petition
Kindergarten School, to be named after St. was adjudicated to the foundation. As a result, transfer for review with the following assignments of error:
Veronica, and other constructions and certificate of title No. T-16152 was issued in the name of
Accessories shall be constructed on the land
 I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT compliance. In the instant case, the four-year period donation, it was held that the general rules on
THE DONEE'S CONSENT TO THE REVOCATION for filing the complaint for revocation commenced on prescription applies. (Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra.).
OF A DONATION TO BE VALID MUST BE GIVEN April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9, 1980. Since the The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as
SUBSEQUENT TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE complaint was brought on September 23, 1980 or more provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
DONATION OR VIOLATION OF (THE) ANY OF than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it
THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED THEREIN. was already barred by prescription.
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause
shall be governed by the rules on contracts,
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN TREATING THE On the other hand, petitioners argue that Article 764 of and remuneratory donations by the provisions
COMPLAINT AS ONE FOR JUDICIAL DECREE OF the New Civil Code was adopted to provide a judicial of the present Title as regards that portion
REVOCATION OF THE DONATION IN QUESTION remedy in case of non-fulfillment of conditions when which exceeds the value of the burden
AS CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 764 OF THE revocation of the donation has not been agreed upon imposed.
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WHICH by the parties. By way of contrast, when there is a
PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4) YEARS AND IN NOT stipulation agreed upon by the parties providing for
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
CONSIDERING IT AS AN ACTION TO ENFORCE revocation in case of non-compliance, no judicial
actions for the revocation of a donation must be
A WRITTEN CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN action is necessary. It is then petitioners' claim that the
brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance
TEN (10) YEARS AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 1144, action filed before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our
HENCE, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN is not one for revocation of the donation under Article
opinion that said article does not apply to onerous
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. 764 of the New Civil Code which prescribes in four (4)
donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
years, but one to enforce a written contract which
providing that onerous donations are governed by the
prescribes in ten (10) years.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT rules on contracts.
RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS BY
WAY OF JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. (pp. The petition is impressed with merit.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the
1-2, Petitioner's Brief)
general rules on prescription and not the rules on
From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations are applicable in the case at bar.
We gave due course to the petition on August 3, 1981 donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3)
(p. 45, Rollo). After the parties' submission of their onerous. A simple donation is one the cause of which is
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to
respective briefs, the Court resolved to consider the pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory
a contract have the right "to establish such stipulations,
petition submitted for decision on January 27, 1982 (p. donation is one where the donee gives something to
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
62, Rollo). reward past or future services or because of future
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
charges or burdens, when the value of said services,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy."
burdens or charges is less than the value of the
The assailed order of the trial court stated that Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has
donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject
revocation (of a donation) will be effective only either provided that "violation of any of the conditions
to burdens, charges or future services equal (or more)
upon court judgment or upon consent of the donee as (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the
in value than that of the thing donated (Edgardo L.
held in the case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, No. donated area to the donor, his heirs, . . ., without the
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 11 ed.,
24190, July 13, 1926, 49 Phil. 143. The trial court dismissed need of executing any other document for that
Vol. 11, p. 726).
the claim of petitioners that the stipulation in the purpose and without obligation on the part of the
donation providing for revocation in case of non- DONOR". Said stipulation not being contrary to law,
compliance of conditions in the donation is tantamount It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is
to the consent of the donee, opining that the consent the parties, that the donation subject of this case is one valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily
contemplated by law should be such consent given by with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the consented thereto.
the donee subsequent to the effectivity of the donation burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a
or violation of the conditions imposed therein. The trial nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing
court further held that, far from consenting to the property within five years from execution of the deed of
for the automatic reversion of the donated property to
revocation, the donee claimed that it had already donation.
the donor upon non-compliance cannot be doubted.
substantially complied with the conditions of the
It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the
donation by introducing improvements in the property
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of
donated valued at more than the amount of the
donations with an onerous cause are governed not by breach, without need of going to court. Upon the
donated land. In view thereof, a judicial decree
the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as happening of the resolutory condition of non-
revoking the subject donation is necessary.
held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September compliance with the conditions of the contract, the
Accordingly, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa, L-9449, donation is automatically revoked without need of a
actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-
February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495. On the matter of judicial declaration to that effect. In the case
compliance with any of the conditions of the donation
prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
shall prescribe in four years counted from such non-
of University of the Philippines v. de los Angeles, L-28602, declaration rescinding a contract already deemed
September 29, 1970, 35 SCRA 102-107, it was held: rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order
to determine whether or not the recession was proper.
. . . There is nothing in the law that prohibits the
parties from entering into agreement that
violation of the terms of the contract would The case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra, relied
cause cancellation thereof. even without upon by the trial court, is not applicable in the case at
court intervention. In other words, it is not bar. While the donation involved therein was also
always necessary for the injured party to resort onerous, there was no agreement in the donation
to court for rescission of the contract (Froilan providing for automatic rescission, thus, the need for a
v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., L-11897, 31 judicial declaration revoking said donation.
October 1964, 12 SCRA 276).
The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that
This was reiterated in the case of Angeles v. Calasanz, the complaint in the case at bar is barred by
L-42283, March 18, 1985: prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code
because Article 764 does not apply to onerous
donations.
Well settled is, however, the rule that a judicial
action for the rescission of a contract is not
necessary where the contract provides that it As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971,
may be revoked and cancelled for violation complaince with the terms and conditions of the
of any of its terms and conditions (Lopez v. contract of donation, shall be made within five (5)
Commissioner of Customs, 37 SCRA 327, 334, years from its execution. The complaint which was filed
and cases cited therein). on September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10)
year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract
(Article 1144[1], New Civil Code), counted from April 9,
Resort to judicial action for rescission is
1976.
obviously not contemplated. The validity of
the stipulation can not be seriously disputed. It
is in the nature of a facultative resolutory Finally, considering that the allegations in the complaint
condition which in many cases has been on the matter of the donee's non-compliance with the
upheld, by this court. (Ponce Enrile v. Court of conditions of the donation have been contested by
Appeals, 29 SCRA 504) private respondents who claimed that improvements
more valuable than the donated property had been
introduced, a judgment on the pleadings is not proper.
However, in the University of the Philippines
Moreover, in the absence of a motion for judgment on
v. Angeles case, (supra), it was held that in cases where
the pleadings, the court cannot motu proprio render
one of the parties contests or denies the rescission, "only
such judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: "Where
the final award of the court of competent jurisdiction
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper
the material allegations of the adverse party's
or not." It was held, thus:
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading." (Emphasis supplied)
. . . since in every case, where the extrajudicial
resolution is contested, only the final award of
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No.
the court of competent jurisdiction can
8624 is hereby ordered reinstated. Respondent judge is
conclusively settle whether the resolution was
ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to determine
proper or not. It is in this sense that judicial
the propriety of the revocation of the subject donation.
action will be necessary as without it, the
extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable
and subject to judicial invalidation, unless SO ORDERED.
attack thereon should become barred by
acquiescence, estoppel or prescription.

It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is

necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial