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G.R. No. 163021 April 27, 2007

PATRICIO A. VILLENA, Petitioner,

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated November 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70513 and its Resolution2 dated March 18, 2004, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court had affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated April 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 78.

The facts are undisputed.

On October 28, 1997, respondent Patricio Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, petitioner Patricio Villena,
entered into a contract for the delivery and installation of kitchen cabinets in Payoyo’s residence. The cabinets were
to be delivered within ninety days from downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. On October 29, 1997, Payoyo
paid Villena ₱155,183 as downpayment.

On December 9, 1997, Payoyo entered into another contract with Villena for the delivery of home appliances. On the
same day, Payoyo paid 50% of the purchase price equal to ₱29,638.50 as downpayment.

However, Villena failed to install the kitchen cabinets and deliver the appliances. Payoyo made several demands upon
Villena but the latter failed to comply.

In a letter dated March 12, 1998, Payoyo demanded the cancellation of the contracts and the refund in full of the
downpayments amounting to ₱184,821.50. Villena promised to install the kitchen cabinets on or before May 10, 1998
and to deliver the appliances. Despite repeated demands, Villena again failed to do so.

Payoyo sent Villena two demand letters on June 24, 1998 and on July 28, 1998 asking the latter to either deliver all
items or return the downpayments.

On October 26, 1998, Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Villena. Villena
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. He argued that there was no ground to cancel
the contract; thus, there was no basis for refund. The trial court denied his motion. Villena thereafter filed an answer
with compulsory counterclaim citing as an affirmative defense Payoyo’s failure to state a cause of action.

On June 1, 1999, immediately after the trial court issued a pre-trial order, Villena filed a second motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter but it was denied. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The trial court decided in favor of Payoyo, reasoning that the power to rescind is implied in reciprocal obligations.
Considering that Villena repeatedly failed to comply with his obligation, Payoyo had the right to rescind the contract
and demand a refund. The trial court ordered petitioner to pay respondent ₱184,821.50 as actual damages plus 12%
interest per annum from the date of filing of the complaint and ₱20,000 as moral damages plus legal interest from
judicial demand until fully paid.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications:

1) [Petitioner Villena is] hereby ordered to pay [respondent Payoyo] actual damages in the amount of ₱
155,183.00 with 12% interest per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint;
 2) [Petitioner is] likewise ordered to deliver the Indesit Multifunction Oven and Indesit Hob in favor of
[respondent] within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision; and

3) [Respondent] is hereby ordered to pay the purchase price of the Indesit Multifunction Oven and Indesit
Hob in favor of [petitioner] on the day the delivery is made.4

The appellate court reasoned that while there was delay in the delivery and installation of the kitchen cabinets, there
was none in the delivery of the appliances. The contract for said appliances did not specify the date of delivery but
that delivery should be made upon payment of the 50% balance of the purchase price. Considering that Payoyo failed
to pay the balance, Villena did not incur delay.

Hence, the instant petition, where petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT [THE] DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS (PETITIONER AND NOVALINE, INC.), ARE

Simply, the issue in this case is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the complaint.

Petitioner maintains that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. He posits that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum of money in the amount of ₱184,821.50
which is below the jurisdictional amount set for RTCs.6 Moreover, petitioner contends that the issue of jurisdiction may
be raised at any time, even on appeal, since jurisdiction is conferred only by law and cannot be acquired through or
waived by any act or omission of the parties.7

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint as the allegations therein
show that it is actually a case for rescission of the contracts. The recovery of a sum of money is merely a necessary
consequence of the cancellation of the contracts.8

The pertinent portion of Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,9 provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

xxxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the
claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.10

Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.11
In our considered view, the complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of money with damages, is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the RTC’s jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that it is
actually for breach of contract, thus,

xxxx

7. Under their Contracts, prestation and/or delivery of the items will be performed and delivered within NINETY (90)
DAYS from the receipt of downpayment. Plaintiff complied with its prestation but defendants defaulted with their
obligation;

xxxx

10. On 12 March 1998, plaintiff sent letter to defendants requesting the latter for the cancellation of the purchase
contracts and refund in full the (50%) downpayment paid in the total amount of (P 184, 821.50) within five (5) days
upon receipt of the letter…

xxxx

12. On 24 March 1998, plaintiff and defendant Patricio A. Villena, personally talked [to] each other regarding the full
refund of the (50%) downpayment in the amount of P 184, 821.50. Defendant informed the plaintiff that it was their
fault because the order from their Australian supplier was made only on 15 December 1997. Defendant promised
plaintiff [delivery of] the three (3) Kitchen Cabinets on or before 10 [M]ay 1998, and the three (3) home appliances
were considered fully paid applying the (50%) downpayment of (P 29,638.50) for home appliances only. But defendant
did not fulfill his promise;

13. Despite all these, repeated demands for the installation of the (3) three kitchen [c]abinets and complete delivery
of home appliances were made, but defendants did nothing;

x x x x12 (Emphasis added.)

A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of contracts.13 An action
for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.14 In the present case, the averments in the complaint show that
Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the downpayments since Villena failed to comply with
the obligation to deliver the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. The court then must
examine the facts and the applicable law to determine whether there is in fact substantial breach that would warrant
rescission or cancellation of the contracts and entitle the respondent for a refund. While the respondent prayed for the
refund, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the contracts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 21, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70513 and the Resolution dated March 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
# 12

G.R. No. L-27619 February 4, 1928

RAUL ROGERIO GONZALEZ, by his guardian ad litem Adelaida Gonzalez, plaintiff-appellee,

Feria & La O and Araneta & Zaragoza for appellant.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, through his guardian ad
litem, Adelaida Gonzalez, against the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, a corporation sole, represented by his
Grace, M. J. O'Doherty, Apostolic Archbishop, for the purpose of obtaining a writ of mandamus requiring the
respondent to appoint the plaintiff to a vacant chaplaincy, to enforce an accounting for the income of the chaplaincy
for the period during which it has been vacant, and to secure other relief. Upon hearing the accuse the trial court
entered judgment which, as subsequently amended, embraces three features, namely: First, ordering the defendant,
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, as a corporation sole, and His Grace, Michael J. O'Doherty, Roman
Catholic Apostolic Archbishop of Manila, it sole representative, forthwith to appoint plaintiff, Raul Rogerio Gonzalez,
as chaplain of the said chaplaincy founded by Doña Petrolina de Guzman; secondly, ordering the defendant and to
pay to the plaintiff, through his guardian ad litem, the sum of one hundred seventy-three thousand, seven hundred
and twenty-five pesos (P173,725) as the rents and income of the property of said chaplaincy from January 1, 1911,
to December 31, 1925, plus the rents and income accrued since December 31, 1925, from the total of which should
be deducted the expenses allowed by the court as legitimate charges against the fund, and requiring the defendant,
furthermore, to pay to the plaintiff, through his guardian or guardian ad litem, from the date of plaintiff's appointment
as chaplain, the net income of said property from time to time as collected; thirdly, reserving to plaintiff any legal rights
that he may with reference to the cancellation of the transfer certificate of title No. 17603 in a proper proceeding before
the fourth branch of this court, which branch has exclusive jurisdiction of all cases relative to the registration or real
estate in the City of Manila (Art No. 2347, sec. 11). From this judgment the defendant appealed.

On March 13, 1816, Doña Petrolina de Guzman, as resident of what is now the district of Binondo, in the City of
Manila, executed a will in which she instructed her executor to take the steps necessary to the foundation of a collative
chaplaincy upon certain real property adjacent to her residence in Binondo. The part of the will pertinent to the
foundation is found in three paragraphs of the will which reads as follows:

Ninth Item: I declare and dispose that the new house situated in this said town and bounded by this house of
my residence toward the right of its exit, which between myself and my deceased sister Da. Vicenta de
Guzman we have constructed with own money, at a cost of one thousand six hundred pesos without
including the value of the lot on which it is erected, and I charge my executor to constitute said house into a
collative chaplaincy, the foundation of which they shall effect immediately after my death, choosing for
chaplain D. Esteban de Guzman, legitimate son of my grandson Dn. Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and his
default, the nearest relative, and in default of the latter, a collegian of San Juan de Letran, who should be an
orphan mestizo, native of this said town, and I request the father chaplain to celebrate sixty masses
annually, which should be said in the churches of the City of Manila or in those outside of its walls, and in
privileged altars, in behalf of the souls of my father, Dn. Tomas de Guzman, and of my mother, Dña.
Sebastiana de Jesus, and of my brothers and sisters, and for me, the testatrix, after my days.

Tenth Item: It is my will that for patron of said chaplaincy my executors name the Father President of the
College of San Juan de Letran.

Eleventh Item: I appoint my first executor as administrator of the chaplaincy which shall be founded on the
house referred to, during the minority of said chaplain.

The property thus intended as the foundation of the chaplaincy consists of the lots now known as Nos. 210-212 and
214, Rosario Street, Manila, with the improvements thereon.
After the death of the testatrix her executor, Don Jose Telesforo de Guzman, on April 24, 1820, addressed a petition
to the Archbishop, informing him of the wishes of the testatrix and praying that the property be declared sufficient and
that the chaplaincy be created, with the petitioner's son as chaplain and the petitioner himself as administrator of the
property during the minority of the son. This petition, addressed by the executor to the Archbishop, in the part material
to be here considered, reads as follows:

Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Sir — Don Jose Telesforo de Guzman resident of the town of Binondo with all
due respect, before Your Illustrious Grace in the best legal form, I present myself and say, — That the annexed
testimony which with due solemnity I enclose shows that my deceased great grandmother Da. Petrolina de Guzman
provided in her last will the institution of a collative chaplaincy for one son of mine named Esteban Sixto de Guzman,
student of the Royal College of San Juan de Letran, for the patronage of which the Most Reverend Father President
of said college has been named, with a house of lime and stone situated at Calle Rosario as capital, which, according
to the certificate hereto attached, nets are rent of one hundred eighty pesos annually, it being located on the Calle
Real del Rosario; and I, being her testamentary executor and appointed administrator of my above-mentioned son,
present myself before Your Most Illustrious Grace, praying that you declare the living sufficient and order that a title
to said chaplaincy issue to my said son and to me the administrator during his minority."

In support of this petition the executor of the will of the foundress executed, on April 26, 1820, a formal document of
endowment, setting aside for pious uses the property intended for the foundation and transferring it to the spiritual
properties of the archbishop. This document, omitting formal parts at the end, reads as follows:

In the City of Manila on the 26th day of April one thousand eight hundred and twenty, before me the Clerk of
Court and the undersigned witnesses, (appeared) D. Jose Telesforo, President of the town of Binondo, and
testamentary executor of the deceased Da. Petrolina de Guzman. as shown by the certificate which was
shown me and which appears to have been sealed and signed by the Public Clerk Dn. Francisco Castro de
Reyes, to me known, and said —

That whereas the said Petrolina de Guzman, deceased, has ordered in the ninth clause of her will that after
her death a house of lime and stone belonging to her be constituted into a chaplaincy, which house had
been constructed by her and her deceased sister Doña Vicente de Guzman who died single, at a cost of one
thousand six hundred pesos without including the value of the lot whereon said house is erected, in said
town of Binondo, being bounded towards the right of its exit by the house in which the said testatrix formerly
lived, which was her own; and to accomplish the foundation of said chaplaincy in accordance with law, the
said executor appeared before the most Illustrious and Most Reverend Metropolitan Archbishop, stating that
(the chaplaincy) was subject to the charge that the incumbent was required to say sixty masses annually,
either in the churches of this City or in those without its walls, and in privileged altars, for the benefit of the
souls of her deceased parents, Don Tomas de Guzman and Doña Sebastiana de Jesus, of the testatrix and
of her brothers and sisters, electing as chaplain her great grandson Don Esteban de Guzman, a student of
the Royal College of San Juan de Letran, and as administrator during the minority of the said chaplain, the
executor himself, upon whom she has conferred power to appoint as Patron of the chaplaincy the Father
President of the said Royal College of San Juan de Letran, asking that the said living (congrua), the rents of
the property of which amount at present to P180 per year, be declared sufficient, issuing the corresponding
title of chaplain to his said son (i. e., of the executor); and as a consequence whereof he (i. e., the executor)
segregates said property from temporal properties and transfers it to the spiritual properties of this
Archbishopric, with the restriction that, as a spiritual property, it cannot be alienated or converted into any
other estate for any cause, even though of a more pious character, (the grantor) protesting that if the
contrary should be done from now until then, he declares null and without value or effect whatever may be
done or executed contrary to the tenor of these presents, and the said executor affirms and ratifies said
conditions before me and the witnesses hereinbelow named, so that by virtue of this Deed of Foundation
canonical collation may be conferred on the said appointed chaplain. And for its stability and greater validity
he renounces with all solemnity the laws that may favor the said decedent, inserting and repeating herein all
the clauses that may be necessary with all the requisites and conditions, so that the purpose which actuated
her to do this act of piety may be duly accomplished, with the solemnities above set forth and the conditions
herein inserted, which he asks and charges the above named chaplain and those who will succeed him to
respect, comply and execute ad perpetuam rei memoriam amen.

The two documents from which we have just quoted appear to have been passed to the procurator fiscal for comment;
and this official made indorsement to the effect that no reason occurred to him for opposing the project and that he
accordingly recommended that the establishment be effected. The matter was then brought to the attention of the
Archbishop who gave the necessary formal approval to the foundation and an appropriate decree to this effect was
entered. According to the note of this decree, His Grace declared that "concurring entirely with what had been
expressed by the promotor fiscal, he was approving and approved the foundation of said chaplaincy, with all the
circumstances and conditions specified in said clause (of the will) and the deed of foundation, as also the charge of
P1,700 upon said house, erecting said sum into spiritual property and making it, as he makes it, by perpetual title, to
be of the ecclesiastical forum and jurisdiction."

Since the foundation of this chaplaincy, five chaplains have been appointed thereto by the Archbishop of Manila. The
first and second chaplains were great grandsons of the foundress, the third was great grandson, and the fourth and
fifth great great grandsons. At the time of their appointments they were respectively more than 13, 21, 22, 27 and 19
years old.

The fifth and last chaplain or beneficiary of the chaplaincy in question was Angel Gonzalez, father of the present
plaintiff. This individual resigned the office of chaplain, effective December 6, 1910, since which date the chaplaincy
has remained vacant. Though not of decisive importance in the case, the document by which Angel Gonzalez was
appointed to the chaplaincy on August 21, 1901, is perhaps instructive as indicating the nature of the rights
appurtenant to the office. Omitting the formal conclusion, this document reads as follows:

Whereas, the Chaplaincy founded by Da. Petronila de Guzman, the capital of which consists of a building of
brick and mortar erected on its own lot located on the Calle de Rosario, District of Binondo, is now vacant
because of the renunciation by it last possessor D. Fernando Maniquis y Guzman; now, therefore, the
necessary requisites and qualifications according to law being found concurring in D. Angel Gonzalez y
Guzman, tonsured, a boarding student in the College of San Juan de Letran of this City, we order to issue
and do issue this present title by virtue of which we elect and appoint the above-named D. Angel Gonzalez y
Guzman, as chaplain of the benefice above referred to, and by manner and form which we best can do, we
hereby given him collation, canonical institution and real possession vel quasi of the above-mentioned
chaplaincy, which shall be administered as heretofore by the administrator of the funds of this Holy
Archbishopric, so that, as such chaplain he may possess and enjoy it as an ecclesiastical benefice and by
perpetual title with the obligation of ordering to be said, by means of a priest, while he himself cannot say
them, sixty masses annually according to the will of the foundress, and with the understanding that every
year he has to show to our Court of Chaplaincies wherein this shall be recorded, that he has discharged said
masses, without which requisite the rent which for the purpose may be necessary shall be withheld from
him. And by virtue of Holy Obedience we order those to whom these presents may concern to have and
treat the said D. Angel Gonzalez y Guzman as the beneficiary and possessor of said chaplaincy, and that
they pay him well and faithfully the income which in the future the capital produce and that which it has
produced while vacant, placing upon his conscience the duty of complying with the annexed conditions and
relieving us thereof.

The function of administering the property pertaining to the foundation appears to have been exercised, at least since
about 1863, by the Archbishop; and for this service a commission has been charged against the incumbent whenever
a chaplain has been in office. In September, 1914, a Torrens title in fee simple was issued for the property in the name
of the Archbishop. During vacancies the duty of causing sixty masses to be said per annum, as provided in the will,
devolves upon the Archbishop; and this obligation has been performed by the present respondent, at an expense of
not more than P300 per year.

The trial judge found that, from January 1, 1911, to December 31, 1925, the administrator had obtained, in the way of
rents of the property, a total of P153,600. In addition to this there was collected, in the year 1912, the sum of P20,125,
as insurance, upon occasion of the destruction by fire of the house belonging to the chaplaincy. The expenses of
rebuilding and repairs, over the same period, is stated to have been P24,503.34. All of the income thus received, less
the expenses of administration and cost of the masses, has been applied to the purposes of education, beneficence,
and charity, under the directions of the Archbishop, with the approval of His Holiness, the Pope.

Since the Council of Trent it has been the law of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church that no person who has
received the first tonsure or who has already been ordained in minority is eligible to a benefice before his 14th year
(Council of Trent, Chap. 6, sec. 23, July, 1563), that is to say, he must be at least 13 years and 1 day old. With this
exception there seems to have been no ecclesiastical law or ordinance of the Church in force at the time the chaplaincy
in question was founded, prescribing ecclesiastical qualifications for incumbents of the office of chaplain. However, in
the year 1918 a new canon law was promulgated by the Catholic Church to the effect that "the chaplaincies, or simple
benefices, are conferred on clericals of the secular, or simple benefices, are conferred on clericals of the secular
clergy;" and in order to be a clerical, one must have received the first tonsure. Also in order to take the first tonsure,
one must have begun the study of theology, and in order to study theology, one must be a bachelor.

Raul Gonzalez, the plaintiff in this action, was born on September 16, 1912. He was therefore nearly 12 years of age
when this action was instituted on July 31, 1924. He is a son of Angel Gonzalez, the last incumbent of the chaplaincy
in question. At the trial the young man testified that he was then a student in the sixth grade of the public school and
that this inclination and desires are towards an ecclesiastical career. More than two years prior to the institution of this
action he was presented to the Archbishop of Manila, with the request that he be appointed to the chaplaincy in
question, he being at that time 10 years of age. The application was turned down by the Archbishop in a letter,
addressed to the boy's father, and dated March 20, 1922, on the ground that the youth did not have the necessary
qualifications under existing canon law. His Grace, the Archbishop of Manila, testified that although he could not
appoint plaintiff as chaplain of the chaplaincy in question, he had made an offer at his expense to educate the plaintiff
so that he might obtain the necessary preparations to qualify himself as a cleric and might later be appointed as
chaplain. He added, however, that although he did consider himself in duty bound to make such an offer, the same
was made for equitable motives in view of the claim of the child as the nearest relative of the foundress of the said
chaplaincy.

In the deed of foundation of April 26, 1820, the Presiding Father of the Royal College of San Juan de Letran is
designated as patron of the chaplaincy; and before this action was instituted, Father Calixto Prieto, then rector of San
Juan de Letran College, addressed a letter to the Archbishop, presenting the plaintiff as candidate for the chaplaincy.
Father Prieto stated that, prior to presenting the plaintiff was the heir to the chaplaincy, but did not take account of his
moral or intellectual qualifications, leaving these matters to be passed upon his superior. The application of the plaintiff
was also indorsed by other priests of the church.

We now pass to the consideration of the nature of the chaplaincy, or office of chaplain, as understood in Spanish and
ecclesiastical law. In the first place, it is to be noted that the collative chaplaincy is a form of ecclesiastical benefice,
in which the incumbent is appointed and canonically installed by the Bishop, or Archbishop, and given a living,
constituting a charge upon specified property, subject to the duty of saying masses and performing other pious or
religious duties. The collative chaplaining is said to be a simple benefice. In the second place, the term "collative
chaplaincy" is used in contradistinction to "lay chaplaincy"; and the difference is that the collative chaplaincy can be
constituted only upon the intervention of ecclesiastical authority, while the lay chaplaincy does not require such
intervention.

In the case before us it is undeniable, and admitted, that the chaplaincy in question is of the sort known as the collative
chaplaincy. The documents of foundation expressly provide that this chaplaincy shall be of a collative character; and
to this end the property which was to serve as the foundation of the chaplaincy was segregated by the executor of
Doña Petronilla de Guzman form other property pertaining to her estate and transferred to the Church, with the effect
of its being converted into spiritual property for the pious use intended. Furthermore, in accepting the transfer, the
Archbishop declared that said property was raised to the status of spiritual property and that it thereby passed to the
ecclesiastical forum and jurisdiction. Speaking broadly, the substantial effect of the conveyance of the property to the
Church and the acceptance of the transfer by the Archbishop, in the manner above stated was that the legal title of
the property became vested in the Archbishop, subject to the ecclesiastical charge intended in the creation of the
chaplaincy.

The trial judge found that the plaintiff is next kin (pariente mas cercano) to the foundress of the chaplaincy, in the
sense intended in the Ninth Item of the will, and, therefore, that he is qualified for the chaplaincy in point of relationship.
Exception is taken to this finding by the appellant, who maintains that there is no evidence in the record to support it.
We are of the opinion, however, that the proof on this point is sufficient, and we shall assume in what so to follow that
the necessary relationship on the part of the plaintiff to the foundress exists.

As has been already stated, this action was instituted shortly before the plaintiff had reached the age of 12 years; and
upon this fact the appellant plants the proposition that the plaintiff is not qualified for the chaplaincy on the point of his
age. The appellee has attempted to meet this criticism by the filing of an amended complaint on April 5, 1926, when
the plaintiff was in his 15th year. We shall therefore assume, for the purposes of this decision, that the immaturity of
the plaintiff in point of age is not a fatal obstacle to the maintenance of the action; and at any rate in the view we take
of the case this question may be ignored.
Upon turning our attention more directly to the legal aspects of the controversy, we discover that the case of the
plaintiff proceeds upon a train of reasoning which may be expressed as follows, namely, that the Archbishop, as
representative of the Church, is the holder of the empty legal title to the property on which the chaplaincy is founded;
that the beneficial interest thereto is vested exclusively in the heirs of the foundress, that the plaintiff, as her next of
kin, has an unqualified right to be appointed to the chaplaincy, without regard to his lack of ecclesiastical qualifications;
that the plaintiff, having title to the chaplaincy, is entitled to demand of the defendant the entire net income received
by the latter as administrator of the property during the pendency vacancy, as well as the right to be paid the income
that may hereafter be produced by the property so long as the plaintiff shall occupy the post of chaplain. In a word, it
is the contention of the plaintiff that the foundation question is a perfected trust, enforcible in a court of equity, that the
Archbishop is a mere trustee, and that the plaintiff is the present rightful beneficiary of the entire property.

On the other hand, the attorneys for the Archbishop challenge practically every phase of the plaintiff's presentation of
the case; and in this connection various propositions are submitted by them, which may perhaps be fairly condensed
as follows: That the transfer made by the executor of the foundress of the property with which we are here concerned
had the effect of conveying it to the Archbishop, as representative of the Church, in whom, upon his acceptance of
the same, the entire property became vested, for the purpose of maintaining the chaplaincy in question, and subject
to all the circumstances and conditions specified in the documents; that the collative chaplaincy thus constituted is an
ecclesiastical benefice, the right of appointment to which is vested exclusively in the Archbishop; that the Church, by
lawful ordinance, effective in 1918, has required that, in order to be eligible to the office of chaplain, the candidate
must posses ecclesiastical qualifications, of the sufficiency of which the Archbishop is constituted judge; that the
plaintiff in this action does not possess the qualifications for chaplain which have thus prescribed, and the Archbishop
has no found and declared; that, by the laws of the Church, the plaintiff, if aggrieved by the decision of the Archbishop,
has a right of appeal to His Holiness, the Pope, of which right the plaintiff has not availed himself; that, as the owner
of the property which is the subject to this foundation, the Archbishop has the free disposition, for charitable,
educational, and religious purposes, of the income derived from the property during a vacancy in the office of chaplain,
subject only to the obligation of causing masses to be said as required in the documents of foundation; that the
incumbent of the office of chaplain is entitled, from the bounty of Archbishop, to receive the income derived from the
property during his incumbency in the office to the extent necessary to secure a suitable living only, and that, as to
the residue, it is the duty of the chaplain to apply it to charitable and religious purposes, that the subject matter of this
suit is not a proper matter of cognizance in any civil court; and, finally, that the court of origin was without jurisdiction
to compel the Archbishop to perform a canonical function, to wit, to appoint the plaintiff to an ecclesiastical office.

While the field of controversy thus laid out is extensive, it will be found, upon a careful of the ground, that the decision
must in the end turn upon one or two vital points, which are concerned with the right of the plaintiff to the chaplaincy
and the right of the court to compel the Archbishop to appoint the plaintiff to said office.

At the outset of the discussion we may state that we see no reason to question the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the action. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is beneficiary of a trust, and that the defendant, as
trustee, has refused to recognize the plaintiff's right to the office of chaplain and is diverting the income of the
foundation to unlawful uses. As was observed by Mr. Justice Miller, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
leading case of Watson vs. Jones (13 Wallace, 679, 723; 20 Law. ed., 666), it seems hardly to admit of rational doubt
that an individual may dedicate property by way of trust to the purpose of sustaining religious doctrines, provided that
in so doing he violates no law of morality and gives to the instrument by which his purpose is to be accomplished the
formalities which the law requires. It also seems to be the obvious duty of the court, in a case properly made, to see
that the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust which is thus attached to its use; and so long as there is
any one so interested in the execution of the trust as to have a standing in court, it must be that he can prevent the
diversion of the property or fund to other and different uses. This is the general doctrine of courts of equity as to
charities, and it seems equally applicable to ecclesiastical matters (23 R. C. L., p. 451). But while it may be, and is,
the duty of the court to inquire into a case of the character stated in this complaint, the rule to be applied in the right
to relief is to be sought in the principles governing the courts in dealing with rights derived from ecclesiastical sources.

The rule that appears to offer most assistance in the solution of the case before us that formulated by the Court of
Appeals of South Carolina in the case of Harmon vs. Dreher (Speers Eq., 87), to the effect that: Where a civil right
depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the civil right and nothing more,
taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right has arisen as it finds them, and accepting those decisions
as matters adjudicated by another jurisdiction. The proposition thus stated in Harmon vs. Dreher has subsequently
been considered from different points of view by many able courts, and it has informly been looked upon as sound
and correct statement of the law cases where it is of proper application. among decisions in which said rule has been
quoted with approval are Watson vs. Jones (13 Wall., 679; 20 Law. ed., 666); Lamb vs. Cain (129 Ind., 486; 14 L. R.
A., 518; 29 N. E., 13); and White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends vs. White Lick meeting of Friends (89 Ond., 136).

Upon examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical
rights have always received the profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but
because of far reaching effects of the decisions in human society. Moreover, courts have learned the lesson of
conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the complete
separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude
unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature.

It will be noted that the first and principal relief sought by the plaintiff in the case before us is to obtain from the court
an order, in the form of writ of mandamus or injunction, requiring the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila to appoint
the plaintiff to an ecclesiastical office, for that the office of chaplain is of an ecclesiastical nature is undeniable. It is a
sinister omen for the plaintiff's case that no decision of any civil court whatever can be pointed to as a precedent for
such an exercise of judicial power, and the mere novelty of the proposition is an argument against the soundness of
the plaintiff's case. It is true that there are decisions from the Supreme Court of Spain wherein the right to the
possession of properties constituting the foundation of chaplaincies has been debated, and numerous cases are found
in modern Spanish jurisprudence where actions have been maintained by heirs of the founders to recover property
constituting the foundation of chaplaincies; but such actions had their basis in the Spanish legislation abolishing
chaplaincies. But so far as our investigation go, and as far as the industry of counsel has revealed, no case has been
discovered where Bishop or Archbishop has been compelled to appoint any person to the office of chaplain or other
ecclesiastical benefice. It is also true that there are few English and American decisions in which the rights of rectors,
or ministers, after the title to the ecclesiastical office had once been acquired, have sustained in the courts in the face
of attempts to deprive them of their office. But so far as the American courts are concerned, the cases proceed
exclusively on the idea of supplying redress for breach of contract; and neither American nor English jurisprudence
supplies any precedent for compelling the ecclesiastical authorities to appoint a person to an ecclesiastical office.

In dealing with the subject of the conclusiveness of the decisions of church authorities is ecclesiastical matters the
author of the monographic article on "Religious Societies," in Ruling Case Law, has to this to say: ". . . The judgment
of the constituted church tribunal is absolutely conclusive upon the civil courts, whether, in the opinion of the judges
of such courts, the decision appears to be right or wrong. Where a right of property turns upon such a decision, the
civil courts will allow the property to go in that direction in which the decision of the church tribunal carries it. According
to the rule broadly stated by some courts, when a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical
affairs, the civil tribunals tries the right and nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right
has arisen as it finds them, and accepts such decisions as matters adjudicated by another legally constituted
jurisdiction."

In conformity with the ideas above set forth, it is insisted, for the appellant, that it was erroneous on the part of the trial
court to order the defendant to perform the canonical act of appointing the plaintiff chaplain of the chaplaincy in
question, and furthermore that the trial court erred in not accepting as conclusive the decision of the Archbishop in
regard to the question whether or not the plaintiff is ecclesiastically qualified to be appointed chaplain. The authorities,
we think, strongly indicate that there is another proposition, still more clear, upon which the decision can be safely
rested, and this is, that as a matter of fact the plaintiff does not possess the qualifications necessary for appointment
to the office of chaplain and consequently that the Archbishop was justified in refusing to appoint the plaintiff to that
office. We shall therefore provisionally assume that it is proper for the court to acquire into these qualifications and
state our conclusion with respect thereto.

Under the law of the Church as is stood when this chaplaincy was created, no ecclesiastical qualifications were
required in a candidate for appointment to the office of chaplain; but as we have already stated, a new canon became
effective in the Church in 1918 to the effect that, in order to be appointed chaplain, the candidate must be clerical, and
that in order to be a clerical, one must have taken the first tonsure, as a prerequisite to which he must also be a
bachelor who has begun the study of theology. It is admitted that the plaintiff in this case not possess these
qualifications, and it is obvious that if the new canon is to be applied to the chaplaincy in question, the action of the
Archbishop in refusing to appoint the plaintiff was correct and this court must recognize the validity of his exclusion
from the chaplaincy.

That the new canon is valid and applicable to candidates for chaplaincies already is, in our opinion, obvious, since it
is general in terms and evidently intended to be applicable to all chaplains appointed in the future. There is no reason
discernible why the court should read into it an exception in favor of candidates to chaplaincies already created. But
it is said that, if interpreted in this sense, the ordinance will be retroactive. This is in our opinion a mistake. If the
Church had attempted to make the ordinance applicable to chaplains already appointed, thereby depriving them of
an office as to which title had been previously acquired, the effect would to make the statute truly retroactive. But such
is not the case now before us.

When the foundress caused this property to be originally conveyed to the Church as a foundation for the chaplaincy
requirement of ecclesiastical qualifications for the chaplains to be appointed to the benefice; and in submitting the
appointment of the chaplains to the ecclesiastical authority, as resulted from the creation of a collative chaplaincy, it
must be considered as an implied term of the agreement that the ecclesiastical qualifications for the spiritual office
should be such as might be required by the Church. As was said by Mr. Justice Miller in Watson vs. Jones (13 Wall.,
679, 729), all who unite themselves to an ecclesiastical body do so with an implied consent to submit to the Church
government and they are bound to submit to it.

The trial court appears to have been of the opinion that the new canon of 1918 cannot be given effect as regards the
chaplaincy in question for the reason that to do so would impair the obligation of the trust involved in the acceptance
by the Archbishop of the provisions for the establishment of the chaplaincy, with the result of impairing the obligation
of a contract in violation of our Organic Act. This idea is in our opinion fallacious. It is undeniable that under Spanish
law an ecclesiastical canon such as we are now considering could have been adopted regardless of its effect upon
the foundation or the persons interested therein, and it cannot be admitted that persons interested therein, and it
cannot be admitted that an obligation which could be changed under Spanish law has become immutable from the
promulgation by Congress of the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of contracts by legislative Acts.
Under said constitutional provision obligations are to respected as they stand, and it was not intended that, by virtue
of this provision, obligations should be made more onerous to either party. If the proposition maintained by the plaintiffs
attorneys be true, then we are confronted with the spectacle of a chaplaincy which is a perpetual sinecure for a
chaplain without ecclesiastical qualifications. Perpetuities of any sort are objectionable, but one of this character would
be intolerable. As is justly said by the attorney for the appellant, "It is unthinkable that qualifications for chaplains
should remain stagnant and the same forever." In passing upon a question of this character the court is not at liberty
to ignore the effects upon human society which would result from adopting the proposition upon which the case for
the plaintiff here rests.

It follows from what has been said that the plaintiff has not the requisite qualifications for the office of chaplain and the
defendant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, acted within the limits of his proper ecclesiastical authority in
excluding the plaintiff from the chaplaincy in question. The trial court was therefore in error in ordering the said
defendant to appoint the plaintiff as chaplain of the chaplaincy founded by Doña Petronila de Guzman. As corollary of
this, there was also error on the part of the trial court in ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, through his
guardian ad litem, the amount awarded in paragraph (b) of the dispositive part of the appealed decision.

The appellant's brief contains an elaborate discussion of the rights of the respective parties to the income of the
property during the vacancy in the office of chaplain, and of the extent of the rights of the plaintiff during the time that
he might occupy the chaplaincy, — all on the supposition that the right of the plaintiff to the office might be upheld by
this court. But in view of the fact that we are now to reverse the judgment in its principal features, with the result that
the plaintiff will not be appointed chaplain, all discussion of his rights to the income, based on the supposition of his
appointment to the chaplaincy, becomes in a measure academic. We shall therefore not enter into any discussion of
this phase of the case, and shall content ourselves by observing that if those who are interested in conserving the
income derived from the chaplaincy and in holding the defendant responsible for alleged in proper diversion of funds
should see fit proceed judicially in an independent proceeding, the action should be brought as a class unit-suit in
behalf of all the descendants of Doña Petronilla de Guzman, since under the present decision the minor plaintiff in
this action has no particular title to relief.

In Paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of the appealed decision the trial court reserved to the plaintiff any legal rights
that he may with reference to the cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 17603, in a proper proceeding before
the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The plaintiff did not appeal from this disposition, and the
appellant has not assigned error against said feature of the decision. We shall therefore not interfere with the decision
on this point, but we should perhaps observe that it relief should be sought in the direction indicated the contention
will probably in the end resolve itself into the question whether the Torrens certificate of title now held by the defendant
should be annotated so as to show that the property covered by the certificate is held by the defendant subject to the
conditions stated in the documents constituting the chaplaincy in question; and of course such proceeding ought also
to be brought as a class-suit.

The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the defendant, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, is
hereby absolved from the complaint, without prejudice to the right of proper persons in interest to proceed for
independent relief in either above indicated.

SO ORDERED, without express pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR
OF FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22ND MICO,
CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL.
ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A
CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A
CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, Respondents.

For action by the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated September 26, 2010 filed by petitioner Francis Saez
of our Resolution2 dated August 31, 2010 denying the Petition for Review3 he filed on July 21, 2008.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment4 thereon stating that it does not find cogent grounds to
warrant setting aside our decision.

Antecedent Facts

On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of documents.5 In the
petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary
appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and
monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records
connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo commanding the
respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision.The
case before the CA was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA.

In the Return of the Writ,6 the respondents denied the assignment in the units of Captains Lawrence Banaag and
Rommel Gutierrez and Corporal Ariel Fontanilla. The respondents also alleged that the names and descriptions of
"Capt. Alcaydo," "a certain First Sergeant," "Cpl. James," "Pfc. Sonny," and "Joel" were insufficient to properly identify
some of the persons sought to be included as among the respondents in the petition.

On the other hand, respondents General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (Gen. Esperon), Capt. Jacob Thaddeus Obligado,
Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio (Pvt. Osio), Pfc. Romanito C. Quintana, Jr. and Pfc. Jerico Duquil submitted their affidavits.

The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to determine specific acts which
threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security.

During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always being followed
by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the
petitioner’s store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed him of his
marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was still involved
with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after
having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the
pier.

CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA

On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,7 denying on formal and substantial grounds the reliefs prayed for in the
petition and dropping former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent. The CA ratiocinated:
There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy Osio’s presence at their pier if the
former had not gone home since the petition was filed and what Zaldy Osio was doing there to constitute violation or
threat to violate petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security. This Court cannot just grant the privilege of the writs without
substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s entitlement thereto. This Court cannot grant the privilege of the writs
applied for on mere speculation or conjecture. This Court is convinced that the Supreme Court did not intend it to be
so when the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted. It is the impression of this Court that the
privilege of the writs herein prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies available to address the
specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other.

xxxx

Not only did the petition and the supporting affidavit x x x fail to allege how the supposed threat or violation of
petitioner’s [right to] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances
attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violatepetitioner’s right to life, liberty or security to warrant entitlement
to the privilege of the writs prayed for.

xxxx

A reading of the petition will show that the allegations therein do not comply with the aforestated requirements of
Section 6 Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data of the pertinent rule. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with
specific definiteness as to how petitioner’s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. He did not include
any allegation as to what recourses he availed of to obtain the alleged documents from respondents. Neither did
petitioner allege what specific documents he prays for and from whom or [sic] from what particular office of the
government he prays to obtain them. The petition prays "to order respondents to produce any documents submitted
to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military intelligence reports."

xxxx

Both the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and Section 16, A.M. No.
08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. Not only was petitioner unable
to establish his entitlement to the privilege of the writs applied for, the exigency thereof was negated by his own
admission that nothing happened between him and Joel after July 21, 2007. The filing of the petition appears to have
been precipitated by his fear that something might happen to him, not because of any apparent violation or visible
threat to violate his right to life, liberty or security. Petitioner was, in fact, unable to establish likewise who among the
respondents committed specific acts defined under the rules on both writs to constitute violation or threat to violate
petitioner’s rights to life, liberty or security or his right to privacy thereof.

xxxx

x x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160,
224) is aptly instructive:

"Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. x x x."

xxxx

IV. The petition lacks proper verification in violation of Section 12, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.8

On July 21, 2008, Petition for Review was filed assailing the foregoing CA decision with the following issues submitted
for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND
DROPPING GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO AS PARTY RESPONDENT.
WHETHER OR NOT THE NOTARIAL OFFICER’S OMISSION OF REQUIRING FROM THE PETITIONER
IDENTIFICATION CARDS RELATIVE TO THE LATTER’S EXECUTION OF THE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONCLUDE
FROM THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PETITIONER THE FACT THAT BY BEING PLACED IN THE ORDER
OF BATTLE LIST, THREATS AND VIOLATIONS TO THE LATTER’S LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY WERE
ACTUALLY COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS.9

Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010

On August 31, 2010, the Court issued the Resolution10 denying the petition for review for the following reasons, viz:

A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly found that the petition was bereft of any allegation
as to what particular acts or omission of respondents violated or threatened petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security.
His claim that he was incommunicado lacks credibility as he was given a cellular phone and allowed to go back to
Oriental Mindoro. The CA also correctly held that petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that his right to life,
liberty and security were violated, or how his right to privacy was threatened by respondents. He did not specify the
particular documents to be secured, their location or what particular government office had custody thereof, and who
has possession or control of the same. He merely prayed that the respondents be ordered "to produce any documents
submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military intelligence
reports."

Petitioner assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in his Affidavit and Fact Sheet, he had specifically detailed the
violation of his right to privacy as he was placed in the Order of Battle and promised to have his record cleared if he
would cooperate and become a military asset. However, despite questions propounded by the CA Associate Justices
during the hearing, he still failed to enlighten the appellate court as to what actually transpired to enable said court to
determine whether his right to life, liberty or security had actually been violated or threatened. Records bear out the
unsubstantiated claims of petitioner which justified the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition.

As to petitioner’s argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party-respondent, we find the same also to
be without merit. The Court has already made it clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo that the President, during his or
her tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if the
President can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that the President
be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable the President to fully attend to the
performance of official duties and functions.11 (Citation omitted)

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.12

Petitioner’s Arguments

Contrary to the CA’s findings, it had been shown by substantial evidence and even by the respondents’ own
admissions that the petitioner’s life, liberty and security were threatened. Military personnel, whom the petitioner had
named and described, knew where to get him and they can do so with ease. He also became a military asset, but
under duress, as the respondents had documents allegedly linking him to the CPP and including him in the order of
battle. The petitioner claims that the foregoing circumstances were not denied by the respondents.

The petitioner likewise challenges the CA’s finding that he was not rendered incommunicado as he was even provided
with a cellular phone. The petitioner argues that the phone was only given to him for the purpose of communicating
with the respondents matters relative to his infiltration activities of target legal organizations.

The petitioner cites Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,13 which pronounced that "in the amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is actually the ‘freedom from threat’".14 According to the petitioner, his
freedom from fear was undoubtedly violated, hence, to him pertains a cause of action. Anent the quantum of proof
required in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, mere substantial evidence is sufficient. The petition "is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings".15

Sadly, in the petitioner’s case, the court not only demanded a greater quantum of proof than what the rules require,
but it also accorded special preference for the respondents’ evidence.

The petitioner also cites a speech delivered in Siliman University by former Chief Justice Reynato Puno who
expressed that "the remedy of habeas data can be used by any citizen against any governmental agency or register
to find out what information is held about his or her person." The person can likewise "request the rectification or even
the destruction of erroneous data gathered and kept against him or her." In the petitioner’s case, he specifically sought
the production of the order of battle, which allegedly included his name, and other records which supposedly contain
erroneous data relative to his involvement with the CPP.

OSG’s Comment

In the respondents’ comment16 filed by the OSG, it is generally claimed that the petitioner advances no cogent grounds
to justify the reversal of the Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The Court’s Disquisition

While the issuance of the writs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the Court nevertheless finds ample grounds
to modify the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The petition conforms to the

Section 517 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) and Section 618 of A.M. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data) provide for what the said petitions should contain.

In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner made specific allegations relative to his personal circumstances and
those of the respondents. The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which are allegedly violative of his rights
and the participation of some of the respondents in their commission. As to the pre-requisite conduct and result of an
investigation prior to the filing of the petition, it was explained that the petitioner expected no relief from the military,
which he perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request for assistance from a human rights organization, then a
direct resort to the court. Anent the documents sought to be the subject of the writ of habeas data prayed for, the
Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been satisfied. The documents subject of the petition include the
order of battle, those linking the petitioner to the CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence
reports making references to him. Although the exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not
identified, this does not render the petition insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear
that the requirement of specificity arises only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known.
The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights.19
Thus, despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require,
for as long as their absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be
susceptible to outright dismissal.

From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations stated in the petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data filed conform to the rules. However, they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept "hook,
line and sinker", so to speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different
matter altogether.

No substantial evidence exists to

The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of the evidentiary difficulties attendant to the filing of a petition for
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data, not only direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence, indicia,
and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced.20

With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring that no
substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner. The Court took a second look
on the evidence on record and finds no reason to reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs prayed for.

In the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that "Joel" once inquired from the petitioner if the latter was still involved
with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored. The
encounter happened once and the petitioner, in his pleadings, nowhere stated that subsequent to the time he was
asked about his involvement with ANAKPAWIS, he still noticed "Joel" conducting surveillance operations on him. He
alleged that he was brought to the camp of the 204th Infantry Brigade in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro but was sent home
at 5:00 p.m. The petitioner and the respondents have conflicting claims about what transpired thereafter. The petitioner
insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to stay by the respondents in places under the latter’s
control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who voluntarily offered his service to
be a military asset, but was rejected as the former still doubted his motives and affiliations.

Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact and law can be
raised before the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not bound by
the factual findings made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs
of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner
failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be
overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their
coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and intimidation
that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a violation of the
right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat".21

It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on the surrounding circumstances of the case.
In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of
his inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation
exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of
protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made
allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous
grounds.

The Court is cognizant of the evidentiary difficulties attendant to a petition for the issuance of the writs. Unlike,
however, the unique nature of cases involving enforced disappearances or extra-judicial killings that calls for flexibility
in considering the gamut of evidence presented by the parties, this case sets a different scenario and a significant
portion of the petitioner’s testimony could have been easily corroborated. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay22 dated March
5, 2008 and the Fact Sheet dated December 9, 200723 executed before the Alliance for the Advancement of People’s
Rights-Southern Tagalog (KARAPATAN-ST), the petitioner stated that when he was invited and interrogated at the
military camp in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, he brought with him his uncle Norberto Roxas, Barangay Captain Mario
Ilagan and two of his bodyguards, and Edwardo Estabillo – five witnesses who can attest and easily corroborate his
statement – but curiously, the petitioner did not present any piece of evidence, whether documentary or testimonial,
to buttress such claim nor did he give any reason for their non-presentation.This could have made a difference in light
of the denials made by the respondents as regards the petitioner’s claims.

The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner’s name in it is another allegation by the petitioner
that does not find support on the evidence adduced. The Court notes that such allegation was categorically denied by
respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who, in his Affidavit dated March 31, 2008, stated that he "does not have
knowledge about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) ‘order of battle’ which allegedly lists the petitioner as a
member of the CPP."24 This was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who the petitioner identified as the one who told him that
he was included in the order of battle.25 The 2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter) Division of the Philippine Army also conducted
an investigation pursuant to the directive of AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Esperon,26 and it was shown that the persons
identified by the petitioners who allegedly committed the acts complained of were not connected or assigned to the
2nd Infantry Division.27
Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner’s mobility was never curtailed. From the time he was allegedly
brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN-ST, there was no
restraint upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several instances. And while he may
have been wary of Pvt. Osio’s presence at the pier, there was no claim by the petitioner that he was threatened or
prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding any vehicle that may transport him back home. The petitioner also admitted that
he had a mobile phone; hence, he had unhampered access to communication and can readily seek assistance from
non-governmental organizations and even government agencies.

The respondents also belied the petitioner’s claim that they forced him to become a military informant and instead,
alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to be one. Thus, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay28 executed on March
25, 2008, Pvt. Osio admitted that he actually knew the petitioner way back in 1998 when they were still students. He
also stated that when he saw the petitioner again in 2007, the latter manifested his intention to become a military
informant in exchange for financial and other forms of assistance.

The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a certain "Joel", e.g., the latter’s
alleged act of following him, pretending to peddle pandesal and asking him about his personal circumstances. Such
allegation by the petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere impression that the petitioner had,
based on his personal assessment of the circumstances. The petitioner even admitted in his testimony before the CA
that when he had a conversation with "Joel" sometime in July 2007, the latter merely asked him whether he was still
connected with ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with anything" and no other incident occurred between them
since then.29 There is clearly nothing on record which shows that "Joel" committed overt acts that will unequivocally
lead to the conclusion arrived at by the petitioner, especially since the alleged acts committed by "Joel" are susceptible
of different interpretations.

Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, the reliefs prayed for,
therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant
is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands
some adequate evidence."30

The President cannot be automatically dropped as a respondent pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility

In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.,31 the Court stated:

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be
resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
the perpetrators thereof.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that
qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of
knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the
Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine
of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the
Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a government official
may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime
or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his
area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before,
during, or immediately after its commission. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is
presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have
been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved.

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military. (Citations
omitted)

Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be
held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to
show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to
exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. 1âwphi1

The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s
incumbency.32

Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts
committed during his or her tenure.33 Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially
when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.34

The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his allegations against
the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In
the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President’s name as a party respondent without any attempt at all
to show the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the
petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the President’s attention. Thus,
while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish
accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.

Compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be

Among the grounds cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data
was the defective verification which was attached to the petition. In Tagitis,35 supporting affidavits required under
Section 5(c) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were not submitted together with the petition and it was ruled that the
defect was fully cured when the petitioner and the witness personally testified to prove the truth of their allegations in
the hearings held before the CA. In the instant case, the defective verification was not the sole reason for the CA’s
denial of the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that
although rules of procedure play an important rule in effectively administering justice, primacy should not be accorded
to them especially in the instant case where there was at least substantial compliance with the requirements and
where petitioner himself testified in the hearings to attest to the veracity of the claims which he stated in his petition.

To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be accorded primacy. In the
proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified to prove the veracity of his allegations which he stated in
the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached
to the petition was deemed cured.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
#30

G.R. No. 151149 September 7, 2004

GEORGE KATON, petitioner,

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with
the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated
for review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 8, 2000 Decision2 and
the November 20, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision disposed
as follows:

"Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right in applying for the patent over
the land in question, it appears that his action is already barred by laches because he slept on his alleged
right for almost 23 years from the time the original certificate of title has been issued to respondent Manuel
Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was certified as agricultural land. In addition, the proper
party in the annulment of patents or titles acquired through fraud is the State; thus, the petitioner’s action is
deemed misplaced as he really does not have any right to assert or protect. What he had during the time he
requested for the re-classification of the land was the privilege of applying for the patent over the same upon
the land’s conversion from forest to agricultural.

"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to cost."4

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the
RTC’s dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because
of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.

The Antecedent Facts

The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:

"On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau
of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as
Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of approximately 18 hectares. Said
property is within Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C of Aborlan, Palawan, per BF Map LC No. 1582.

"Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, ordered the inspection,
investigation and survey of the land subject of the petitioner’s request for eventual conversion or re-
classification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead
patent.

"Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection
and survey of the area in the presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased) and his
cousin, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the island
but there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by petitioner and [R]espondent Manuel
Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to the island from time to time to undertake
development work, like planting of additional coconut trees.
 "The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by the Forestry
District Office of Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo
Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as
co-applicants of the petitioner.

"In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of
Lands, Manila, that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore
certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

"Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had been classified from forest land to
agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Mr.
Lucio Valera, then [l]and investigator of the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably
endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey on
November 15, 1965. On November 22, a second endorsement was issued by Palawan District Officer
Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island for the
respondents consisting of five (5) hectares each. On December 10, 1965, Survey Authority No. R III-342-65
was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador to survey ten (10) hectares of
Sombrero Island for the respondents. On December 23, 1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin filed a
homestead patent application for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area of 4.3 hectares.

"Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application
for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango
filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead
Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 19775 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero
Island.

"Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain
portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained
through fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.

"On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself requested for the
reclassification of the island in dispute and that on or about the time of such request, [R]espondents
Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous
improvements. In addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application for the island.
Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey of the island.

"According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the respondents insist that they already had their
respective occupancy and improvements on the island. Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the
petitioner because he said he was acting for himself in developing his own area and not as anybody’s
caretaker.

"Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have
declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for
twenty years.

"Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned
because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant
and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an
unreasonable and unexplained period of time.

"In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued
in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of
the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for
homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to
agricultural land."6

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30,
1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order
to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent
Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated
December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner
charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while
petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a
homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.

The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the
State were matters between the latter and the homestead grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to
annul the grant, the homesteader’s right thereto stands.

Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was
already barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Respondent Palanca’s title
had been issued.

In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed
with petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999
Motion for Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually
only his first motion.

Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of
five members – with two justices dissenting – pursuant to its "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court.

From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek
reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It
reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion
of the land to the public domain.

Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. First, petitioner’s action was brought
24 years after the issuance of Palanca’s homestead patent. Under the Public Land Act, such action should have been
taken within ten years from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from the submission
(Annex "F" of the Complaint) of petitioner himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six
hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal steps to assert his right to the property. His action
was filed beyond the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the Civil Code.

Hence, this Petition.7

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the
merits of the case) in the Petition?

"2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?"8
 The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:

Propriety of Ruling on the Merits

This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He raised it
with the appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected
itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:

"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid
by the variety, complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues involved in the case below,
the apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often
confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand corrected."9

That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered
petitioner’s issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed
acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact,
raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction.
Such writ does not include a review of the evidence,10 more so when no determination of the merits has yet been
made by the trial court, as in this case.

Second Issue:

Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction

Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him,
residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly
exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.

Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA.

Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3)
res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted
instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus:

"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the
court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the
plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the
Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change.
Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or
evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or
by statute of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as
to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
 "A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.

"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied)

The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of
the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original
records or the records on appeal.13 In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal,
and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual
jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives
were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more
fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction"15 and for prescription of the action.
Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.16

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.17 In his Complaint for "Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate
of Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of Title,"18 petitioner averred:

"2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr.,
[petitioner’s] cousin, in connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x fraudulently and in bad
faith:

2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre-requisite to the filing of an application for
homestead patent in his name and that of his Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware
that [Petitioner] KATON had previously applied or requested for re-classification and certification of
the same land from forest land to agricultural land which request was favorably acted upon and
approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic fraud and misrepresentation;

xxx xxx xxx

2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was applying for the VACANT
PORTION of Sombrero Island where there was none, the same constituted another clear case of
fraud and misrepresentation;

"3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of [Respondent]
Manuel Palanca Jr. and the filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo
Agustin, Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having been done fraudulently and in bad faith, are ipso facto
null and void and of no effect whatsoever."19
 xxx xxx xxx

"x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with natural necessity arise knowing
from such act or omission, [Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, trust,
interdependence and intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x."20

Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent applications of
Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the
name of Respondent Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to reconvey the
Sombrero Island to petitioner.21

The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate
of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion?

The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the trial court could have exercised
jurisdiction.

In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1)
that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to
the defendant; and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title
over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.22 In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the
fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or
certificate of title was void ab initio.23

In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer
of the property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the defendant’s name.24 As with an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle
the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant
illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property.25 Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property through
mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff the property or the title thereto.26

In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land in
question. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land,27 that it had never been privately
titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act. 28 This
Court has held that a complaint by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent
means, and who consequently prays for its annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must
be dismissed.29

Neither can petitioner’s case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only
the solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action.30 A private person may not bring an action
for reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the
result that the land thereby covered would again form part of the public domain.31

Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the public domain even if the title
is canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party who may bring action is the government, to
which the property will revert.32 A mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of
action in a suit for reconveyance.33 As it is, vested rights over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly
claimed only by the applicant, after approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the former’s final
proof of homestead patent.34

Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of
the utter absence of a cause of action,35 a defense raised by respondents in their Answer.36 Section 2 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court37 ordains that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest,
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to protect
has no cause of action by which to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.38
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the
case should still be dismissed for being time-barred.39 It is not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original
Certificate of Title was issued to Palanca on February 21, 1977,40 while the Complaint was filed only on October 6,
1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive
period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.41

It must likewise be stressed that Palanca’s title -- which attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance
of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud.
Ybanez v. Intermediate Appellate Court42 ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an administrative proceeding
pursuant to a homestead patent, is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration proceeding one year
from its issuance; provided, however, that the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case.

In Aldovino v. Alunan,43 the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the action has
prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the defendant.
In Gicano v. Gegato,44 we also explained thus:

"x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the
parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15,
1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14,
1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may
do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up
such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on
the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not
been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA
250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where
a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is
that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily
apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the
evidence."45 (Italics supplied)

Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts
must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent future litigations.46

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of
action and prescription. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.