WAHHABI DOCTRINE

AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

Ruins of Diriyah, old city near Riyadh, Saudi Arabia [Shutterstock / Fedor Selivanov]

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Founded on a rigid understanding of monotheism, Wahhabism
has come to terms with political power over the centuries, but
has not renounced its main tenets.

“There is no god but God, and Muhammad is of religious life, which he declared had lapsed
the messenger of God.” For centuries, this into the very same idolatrous “spiritual igno-
profession of faith provided the foundation rance” the Prophet Muhammad combated a
for Muslim unity in the face of diverse popu- thousand years before.
lar religious customs such as seeking the in-
tercession of holy men, paying respect to the
In practical terms, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s
graves of honored ancestors, and appealing to
creed implied the excommunication of fellow
Sufi saints for spiritual blessings. Muslim the-
Muslims. The Arabic term for excommunica-
ologians criticized popular customs as devia-
tion, takfīr, has become familiar in the West
tions from prescribed canonical prayers, but
because of its association with the extremist
they also maintained that as long as one pro-
violence committed by the Islamic State in
fessed the faith and performed the ritual du-
Iraq and Syria, whose theologians draw exten-
ties—prayer, charity, fasting, and the pilgrim-
sively from Wahhabi doctrine. Ibn ‘Abd al-
age to Mecca—one counted as a Muslim. In
Wahhāb’s critics accused him of reckless,
1740, an Arabian theologian named Muham-
wrongful excommunication of Muslims. He
mad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1702-1792) made a
deflected the accusation, maintaining that he
startling break with consensus by asserting
carefully restricted excommunication to situa-
that popular religious customs were inexcusa-
tions where individuals received a clear expla-
ble expressions of idolatry. His dissent
nation of the meaning of monotheism and
sparked a controversy that has divided Mus-
then rejected it.
lims ever since.

The root of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s dissent lay Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb embarked on a mission
in his bold claim that Muslims had forgotten to establish a domain of perfect worship, the
the true meaning of “there is no god but God:” elimination of idolatrous customs, obedience
Not only all worship is owed to God, as all to divine law, and the exclusion of idolaters.
Muslims believe, but any word or action that At first, he pursued his mission by proselytiz-
implies worship for another creature makes ing, in accord with the customary Muslim
one an idolater. Other theologians denied that path of calling (da‘wa) to true belief. For the
seeking intercession and the like were acts of most part, other religious scholars condemned
worship, but he insisted they were. He there- him. His critics coined the term “Wahhabi” to
fore felt compelled to call for the purification marginalize his message as the false notion of

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a misguided rustic preacher. Of course, he re- duty. This is in accord with the Sunni Muslim
jected the Wahhabi label, and insisted he was tradition that believers must obey a ruler who
reviving Islam’s true monotheism. upholds Islam as long as a ruler does not com-
mand believers to violate Islamic law. But
The Alliance with the Sa‘ūd clan Wahhabism sets a high bar for “upholding
Critics were able to have him expelled from Islam.” It requires a ruler to prohibit devia-
two Arabian towns before he found backing tions from a strict definition of correct wor-
from the ruler of an oasis settlement— ship. It also requires a ruler to rigorously un-
Muhammad ibn Sa‘ūd—giving birth to the dertake the duty to “command right and for-
alliance of Wahhabism and the Sa‘ūd clan. bid wrong,” a formula that envisions a society
The alliance provided Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb conforming to Wahhabism’s definition of
the political support he needed to create a do- right and wrong. Since the 1920s, conformity
main cleansed of idolatry and to expand the has been enforced by religious police with the
domain through expansionist warfare. After authority to enforce gender segregation, the
his death in 1792, religious leadership passed closure of shops and offices at prayer times,
to his sons and then to later descendants who and public morality in general.
upheld Wahhabi theology and kept close ties
with Saudi rulers. Dependence on a strong ruler to preserve reli-
gious purity has the paradoxical effect of re-
From the 1740s to the early 1900s, Saudi po- quiring Wahha-
bi clerics to
THE CLERICS
litical fortunes had their ups and downs. Dur-
TYPICALLY RESIST
ing periods of political strength, Wahhabi yield when a
BEFORE REACHING A
clerics used their monopoly over religious au- ruler decides
COMPROMISE
thority to construct a puritanical religious that expediency
culture by suppressing dissent and excluding calls for breaking with the clerics’ sense of
non-Wahhabi Muslims. Citing the religious right and wrong. At such moments, the cler-
duty to bear enmity toward infidels and ics typically resist before reaching a compro-
friendship toward believers, Wahhabi clerics mise. That was the pattern when rulers first
even tried to ban travel to neighboring lands admitted infidel Westerners for the sake of
such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, for fear that developing oil resources in the 1930s, and
interaction with non-Wahhabi Muslims, when they introduced television and schools
whom they considered infidels, would lead to for girls in the 1960s. The clerics did their
sympathy with them and their religious ideas. best to limit the impact of these changes. If
Wahhabism’s dependence on Saudi power the ruler would no longer support the ban on
meant that sustaining religious purity re- allowing infidels to live in Saudi Arabia, they
quired a strong ruler. Consequently, Wahhabi would be confined to residential enclaves in
clerics made obedience to the ruler a religious order to minimize interaction that might cor-

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rupt Saudi ways. If the ruler insisted on al- prayers seeking the intercession of the imams
lowing television, then the clerics would have and celebrations honoring the imams. In the
censorship powers over programming. And if eyes of Wahhabis, it is all pure idolatry.
the ruler opened schools for girls, then the
clerics would be put in charge of them. Apart from Wahhabism’s doctrinal enmity
toward Shiism, geography and politics shape
The Relationship with Shiism the Saudi gov-
EPISODIC SHIITE
How to deal with Saudi Arabia’s Shiite minor- ernment’s han-
UNREST POSES
ity is a question that pits political expediency dling of the Shi-
ENORMOUS RISKS TO
against religious purity. Crafting a lasting ite minority.
THE NATIONAL
compromise has proven elusive because of Most Shiites live
ECONOMY
complexities embedded in history, theology, in the eastern
geography, and politics. province along the Persian Gulf—the precise
location of the country’s enormous oil fields.
The division between Sunnis and Shiites goes The extraction and export of oil is essential to
back to early Muslim history. After the death Saudi prosperity, therefore episodic Shiite un-
of the Prophet, Muslims could not agree on rest poses enormous risks to the national
how to choose leader. In Shiite belief, the economy.
Prophet made clear that leadership would
pass to his kinsman Ali and his male descend- Furthermore, the Shiites of Saudi Arabia form
ants, known as “imams.” In Sunni belief, lead- part of a Shiite zone in the Persian Gulf re-
ership is decided through consensus. Over gion encompassing coreligionists in Bahrain,
time, theological differences deepened the gap Kuwait, Iraq and Iran. The rise of modern na-
between Shiites and Sunnis. Shiites came to tional governments under Sunni rulers in all
believe that the imams possessed unique in- those countries, except Iran, has fostered a
sight into the meaning of revelation, turning common sense of grievance among Shiites
them into infallible guides to understanding facing sectarian discrimination. In response,
and following God’s will. Shiism endows the Shiite communities spawned transnational
imams with something akin to apostolic au- movements devoted to defending their inter-
thority. By contrast, Sunnis vested authority ests.
to discern the meaning of revelation in the
collective wisdom of religious scholars, Against this complex background, Saudi rulers
deemed “the heirs of the Prophet.” In addi- have generally struck a compromise between
tion, Shiites believe that the imams have a Wahhabi doctrine that would suppress Shiism
special standing with God that allows them to and the need for stability that would be
intercede with God on behalf of faithful be- threatened by implementing Wahhabi doc-
lievers. Hence, Shiite religious life includes trine. The compromise allows Shiites to wor-

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ship in their own mosques but forbids public ‘Abd al-Wahhāb dispatched epistles to reli-
celebration of their holy days. At the same gious scholars in Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia,
time, the compromise gives the Wahhabi es- and Morocco, calling on them to support his
tablishment free rein in mosque sermons and mission. He encountered nearly unanimous
school classrooms to condemn Shiism as infi- rejection. Wahhabi proselytizing did not
dels secretly plotting to undermine Islam. begin to find a receptive audience until the
1920s, when the founder of the modern Saudi
The oppressive religious climate translates in- state, ‘Abd al-Azīz ibn Sa‘ūd, subsidized the
to pervasive discrimination. Shiites find them- distribution of Wahhabi treatises by a pub-
selves at a disadvantage when seeking govern- lishing house in Egypt.
ment jobs in an economy where the public
sector is the It was only in the 1960s that proselytizing in
SHIITE PROTESTS IN main source of its current form took shape, largely thanks to
1979 AND 2011 WERE employment political expediency. In response to the popu-
DISMISSED AS for Saudi na- larity and dynamism of secular Arab national-
SUBVERSION tionals. Since ist regimes, Saudi Arabia put together an in-
INSPIRED BY IRAN the 1970s oil ternational coalition of Muslim governments
boom, the claiming to represent loyalty to Islam. Wah-
government has invested enormous sums to habi clerics saw an opportunity to create or-
raise the material standard of living through- ganizations to spread their doctrine and they
out the country, except in Shiite neighbor- helped launch pan-Islamic organizations such
hoods, towns, and villages. To make matters as the Muslim World League and the World
worse, after the Iranian revolution of 1979 Assembly of Muslim Youth. These organiza-
brought to power an officially Shiite govern- tions converted Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues
ment, Saudi Shiites became suspected of har- into religious influence by funding schools,
boring loyalty to a hostile foreign power. mosques, charities, and medical clinics under
Consequently, Shiite protests in 1979 and the supervision of Saudi clerics and religious
2011 were dismissed as subversion inspired by allies throughout the Muslim world and the
the Iranian government. The first set of pro- Muslim diaspora in the West. The effect of
tests led the Saudi government to pledge to Wahhabism’s spread has been to inject ten-
address grievances, but the more recent un- sions between Muslims over the arrival of a
rest met sheer repression. doctrine that breeds a mood of intolerance
where a pluralist spirit had long prevailed.
Proselytizing
What Western and Muslim critics call “the The proselytizing campaign has been ampli-
export of Wahhabism” is a pejorative term for fied by cooperation with Islamic activists and
proselytizing. In the 1700s, Muhammad ibn organizations that do not embrace Wahhabi

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doctrine but share its hostility toward the controversial doctrine that appeared in the
spread of Western customs and the call for 1700s, so it seems like a recent invention
solidarity to defend endangered Muslim com- whereas “Salafi” calls to mind the original
munities in places such as Palestine and Kash- Muslim community—salaf means “ancestors.”
mir. Transnational Muslim cooperation
Parsing the terms Salafi and Wahhabi is
reached a high point when the Soviet Union
tricky, but it comes down to theology and
invaded Afghanistan in 1979 in order to stabi-
law. They share the same definition of mono-
lize a shaky Marxist regime.
theism that seeks to purify worship and that
condemns Shiism, Sufism, and so forth.
The governments of Saudi Arabia and Paki-
Salafis, however, consider Wahhabis to be in
stan worked with activist groups to organize,
error when it comes to Islamic law. The disa-
fund, and equip Afghan rebels and Muslim
greement stems from Wahhabism’s affiliation
volunteers to resist Soviet forces. The United
with Hanbalism, one of the four historic legal
States viewed Afghanistan through the lens of
traditions in Sunni Islam. Salafis reject affilia-
Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union and
tion with any of the legal schools on the
threw its support to the cause. The Afghan
grounds that they represent historical devel-
war’s after-
opments long after the first Muslim genera-
WAHHABIS math, howev-
tion. Disagreement over Islamic law does not
COMMONLY DESCRIBE er, saw the
stand in the way of collaboration for the sake
THEMSELVES AS opening of
of spreading Salafi/Wahhabi theology. But the
“SALAFIS” new fronts
ranks of Salafis themselves are divided over
for jihad in
the conditions for waging jihad, with Saudi
Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, and elsewhere
clerics on the side of restraint because of their
that were more alarming to the West. The
position that only a ruler may declare jihad.
1990s saw the emergence of a new kind Is-
lamic militance that blended Wahhabi prose-
lytizing with armed resistance to threats
Jihad
against Muslim communities. This new mili-
Wahhabism follows the general consensus in
tance would become known as Salafi jihadism.
Sunni Islamic law that defines two kinds of
Salafism
jihad. (There is a Sufi tradition that defines
Wahhabis commonly describe themselves as military jihad as a lesser form and that defines
“Salafis,” that is, Muslims dedicated to reviv- “spiritual jihad” as a greater form. Wahhabism
ing Islam’s original beliefs and practices. does not recognize spiritual jihad). In offen-
Shedding the “Wahhabi” label and assuming sive jihad, the ruler calls on idolaters to em-
the “Salafi” mantle makes it easier for Saudi brace Islam, and if they refuse, then he is to
Arabia’s religious message to resonate in the launch a military campaign to bring them un-
Muslim world: “Wahhabi” calls to mind a der Islamic rule. In defensive jihad, the ruler

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leads a military campaign to protect Muslims exile. Saudi Arabia gave refuge to Muslim
from enemy attack. Whether offensive or de- Brotherhood members fleeing persecution in
fensive, according to Sunni Islamic law, only Egypt and other countries like Sudan and Syr-
the ruler may authorize a military campaign. ia. The Saudis did not allow them to create an
Saudi Arabia’s support for anti-Soviet insur- official branch, but they were able to spread a
gents in Afghanistan during the 1980s was spirit of political activism at odds with Wah-
justified as defensive jihad because a non- habism’s doctrine of obedience to rulers. In
Muslim enemy, the Soviet Union, had invad- the 1960s and 1970s, young Saudis blending
ed a Muslim country. the Brotherhood’s activist ethos with Wahha-
bi theology emerged to oppose a modest but
Wahhabism does not condone three innova- vocal liberal trend.
tions in jihad associated with Salafi jihadism.
In the 1980s, the Wahhabi-Muslim Brother-
First, when Muslims come under the rule of
hood synthesis emerged as a full-blown
an apostate, they are to wage jihad to over-
movement calling itself the Awakening
throw the government. For example, in Alge-
(sahwa). The Awakening appealed to younger
ria, the Armed Islamic Group waged jihad
Saudi clerics alarmed at inroads of Western
during the 1990s to overthrow the govern-
culture. It erupted into a robust protest move-
ment for failing to rule according to Islamic
ment in 1990-91 when the government invit-
law. Second, defensive jihad should be ex-
ed thousands of Western troops to shield it
tended from fighting a foreign invader to
against possible attack by Iraq after its inva-
fighting foreign domination. For example, al-
sion of neighboring Kuwait. The government
Qaeda waged jihad against the United States
tamped down the protests by jailing the most
because of Washington’s support for Israel
outspoken Awakening clerics and distributing
and secular regimes that oppress Muslims.
patronage and resources loyalist clerics.
Third, the authority to command jihad is not
restricted to a ruler when conditions warrant
The Crown Prince
jihad and the ruler fails to do his part; then,
ordinary Muslims may assume the authority. In 2017, King Salman shuffled the line of suc-
cession and elevated his young son Muham-
The Awakening Movement mad (b. 1985) to crown prince. To strengthen
During the Arab Cold War in the 1950s and his position for the royal succession, Muham-
1960s, Saudi Arabia forged an alliance with mad bin Salman took steps to win popular
the Muslim Brotherhood against secular and support from young Saudis. His claim that he
leftist forces led by Egyptian president Gamal is new kind of leader attuned to the outlook
Abdel Nasser. To consolidate power, Nasser and needs of Saudi youth may merely reflect
banned the Muslim Brotherhood, jailed hun- generational affinity. But with nearly sixty
dreds of its members, and drove others into percent of the population under age 30, court-

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ing this massive constituency has also the ring cy is used to justify suppressing dissent and
of political expediency. protest. In April 2019, more than thirty Shi-
ites were put to death—their alleged crimes
Whether driven by affinity or expediency,
included spying for Iran.
Crown Prince Muhammad has exhibited sym-
pathy with young Saudis dissatisfied with
Wahhabi-inspired restrictions. Arguing that The Resilience of Wahhabism
the country deviated from religious modera- In a sense, Wahhabism demands that one fo-
tion in the 1980s, he proclaimed it was time cus worship on God in the face of a tempting
to relax restrictions on cinemas and lift the illusion—the illusion that mortal creatures
ban on women driving motor vehicles. How have the capacity to intercede with God in
far he will or can go in liberalizing the social order to offer relief from suffering in this life
climate remains to be seen. In 2019, the gov- and salvation in the next. One might imagine
ernment revoked regulations requiring wom- this illusion as a sign of God’s bountiful mercy
en to obtain permission from male guardians that blesses the world with exemplary men
to travel abroad, but did not alter other male possessing spiritual powers offering access to
guardianship rules that place women under the Creator. But Wahhabi doctrine insists the
the authority of male relatives, and patriar- profession of faith, there is no god but God,
chal laws governing marriage, divorce, and strips away the illusion and leaves anybody
custody remain in place. beholden to it on the side of unbelief. While
dependence on Saudi rulers has put limits on
Expediency and Wahhabi doctrine have
what Wahhabi clerics can command and for-
aligned in the crown prince’s promotion of a
bid, over time, the clerics have been able to
crusade against Shiism. He has embraced the
safeguard and proselytize Wahhabism’s core
idea that Iran is leading a Shiite plot to de-
doctrine.
stroy Sunni Islam, with assistance from Shiites
in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, and yes, members The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and
of Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite minority. The do not necessarily reflect the position of the Oasis International
Foundation
narrative ignores Shiism’s own diversity root-
ed in divisions dating to early Islamic times. David Commins
Yemen’s Zaidi Shiites (the Houthi movement)
David Commins is Professor of History
and Syria’s Alawis (supposedly represented by at the Dickinson College, USA. His re-
the regime of Bashar al-Asad) do not share search interests include the modern hi-
story of the Middle East, with a special
theology, law, or religious leadership with focus on Islamic thought and political
Iran’s Twelver Shiites. Nevertheless, the nar- movements. His most recent book is
Islam in Saudi Arabia (2015). He has
rative has proven effective in generating sup- also published: The Gulf States: A Mo-
port from Sunni regimes in the region and at dern History (2014), The Wahhabi Mis-
sion and Saudi Arabia (2009), Historical
home, where the specter of a Shiite conspira- Dictionary of Syria (2013).