Wahhabism and the House of Saud

Dave Grundfest

1 Born out of the extremity of the Arabian dessert, the Wahhabi school of thought and its puritanical adherents have sought to define the political and religious trajectory of the Arabian Peninsula for the past three centuries. Through a symbiotic political relationship with the al-Saud royal family, they have been largely successful, and a historic comparison of this relationship sheds light on the intricate history of a kingdom fighting to remain austere. However, this success has paralleled great and often grudging compromises between the two parties that threaten the fabric of their relationship and the society they have built. Today these historic compromises segregate the Saudi royal family between a faction that is loyal to the conservative clerics, and those who support a comparatively more pluralistic system.i This division, which would regularly be of little significance, is amplified globally by the oil-funded expansion of Wahhabi beliefs throughout the Muslim world. If the Wahhabis stay their current course of intolerant puritanical conservatism, exporting their beliefs with the aide of oil revenues, the future of Saudi Arabia and the gulf region as a whole is deeply troubling. The future of Saudi society is inextricably linked with the compromises and power plays required to balance the will of the Wahhabi puritans with any hopes of modernity.ii The Puritans 1703-1744 Wahhabism derives its name from its ideological founder, Muhammad ibn Abd alWahhab. Al-Wahhab was born in the isolated central Arabian province of Nejd at the beginning of the 18th century. Nejd, a desert plateau in central Arabia, is a land of extreme and fundamental contrast- day and night, hot and cold, dessert and oasis. These contrasts were the basis for alWahhabs new interpretation of Islam that contrast belief and unbelief, monotheism and idol worship, and right and wrong in the same uncompromising nature. Al-Wahhab lived in a unique and by many accounts deficient intellectual setting, removed from the pressures and currents of

2 mainstream Islamic scholarship, but was nonetheless heavily influenced by past fringe Islamic scholars. This can again be attributed to al-Wahhabs home Nejd province, which lacked strategic and economic value, historically allowing it to avoid colonialism and invasion.iii The ideology and worldview of al-Wahhab was not created by an uneducated tribal puritan isolated from Islamic scholarship, as argued by the movements many critics and enemies, nor was it a legitimate derivative of mainstream Islamic thought, as proposed by adherents to the creed. Al-Wahhabs early education was provided by his father, a descendent of a long line of Hanbali jurists, the most conservative of the four schools of Sunni Jurisprudence. This began alWahhabs exposure to conservative Muslim scholarship, which formed the basis of his later revisionist ideology. Al-Wahhab traveled widely throughout his youth, spending time in Medina studying the work of Ibn Taymiya, a 13th century Islamic scholar. Taymiyas father was a refugee of the Mongol destruction of Damascus, and he watched with disdain as the Mongols created a cosmopolitan and tolerant society based on Sufi mysticism and Shia doctrine.iv This disdain was reflected in his writing, which stressed an absolute and literalistic commitment to tawhid, or the oneness of God expressed in the universal call to Islamic faith, there is no God but God and Muhammad is his messenger. While absolute tawhid is a fundamental tenant of Sunni revivalism, Taymiya is most notably remembered for his reinterpretation of jihad. The Hanbali school of thought and the overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars hold that there is a division between jihad kabeer, lesser military struggle, and jihad akbar, greater interpersonal struggle. Taymiya rejected this consensus and in doing so set a precedent for independent and literal interpretation of the Koran and Hadithv, as opposed to traditional reinterpretation of past Islamic scholarship. He stated that jihad against disbelievers is the most noble of actions and moreover it is the most important action for the sake of mankindvi This inability to accept the

3 division of jihad is the second tenant of more militant Sunni revivalism. Together these two tenants, and the precedent of puritanical reinterpretation of scripture formed the basis for the scholarship behind al-Wahhabs doctrine. While al-Wahhab gained his scholarly inspiration from the fringe works of Taymiya, conditions at home incited his puritanical rhetoric. As Islam spread after the time of the prophet, it was fused with various religions and customs of the era to create a composite belief structure.vii Out of this composite belief structure arose practices in Sunni Islam derived from Christianity and Shiaism- among these the veneration of saints and notable Muslim leaders, as well as general disregard for what Wahhab saw as true Shariaviii in favor of more traditional tribal law. These practices offended al-Wahhabs notion of tawhid, as he perceived them to defile the purity of Islam. For al-Wahhab, the logical answer was a return to a simpler, more pure Islam, specifically that which predominated after the death of the prophet under the rule of the four rightly guided caliphs.ix Al-Wahhab had now experienced all the factors responsible for the creation of his doctrine: historically conservative scholarship, a precedent of literalistic reinterpretation, the concept of absolute tawhid, a militarized interpretation of jihad, a puritanical worldview, and most importantly a perceived decay of societal morality. Al-Wahhab first published this doctrine in Kitab al-Tawhid (The Book of Unity) that declared the necessity of absolute tawhid, rejected progression in Islam, and laid out a four step plan for salvation that demanded total loyalty to religious leaders and armed jihad against nonbelievers.x Al-Wahhab took an uncompromising stance in Kitab al-Tawhid regarding Muslims who followed more pluralistic traditions as a function of their composite belief structure or other schools of jurisprudence. Breaking with traditional Islamic interpretation that held these persons to be fellow Muslims, al-Wahhab declared them nonbelievers living in a state of willing jahilya,

4 the ignorant times before Islam. Under this new interpretation, Shiites and non-Wahhabi Sunnis were transformed into those who have known the religion of the prophet and yet stand against it, prevent others from accepting it, and show hostility to those who follow it. These people, by al-Wahhabs definition, should be denounced as infidels and killed. xi Al-Wahhab returned to Nejd and attempted to implement his religious doctrine without the sponsorship of a local ruler. He failed, recognizing the shortcoming of his past attempts to spread tawhid to be a lack of political influence, al-Wahhab formed the first and lesser of his two religio-political alliances with Ibn Mummar, a local tribal Sheikh. This alliance was sealed by the marriage of al-Wahhab to Mummars aunt, the first of al-Wahhabs two attempts to gain continual influence through family lineage. While under the protection of Mummar, al-Wahhab delivered three religious rulings that have become symbolically representative of Wahhabism. He ruled in favor of cutting down a sacred tree, destroying the tomb of a revered Muslim leader, and stoning an adulteress, all in line with his ardent belief in absolute tawhid and his literalistic interpretation of Sharia law.xii With the extreme and revisionist nature of these decisions, alWahhab broke from the traditional implementation of Islamic law and threatened the established clerical structure or ulema, which used its influence to challenge al-Wahhab. The protection of Mummar was no longer sufficient to insure al-Wahhabs safety, and in a journey later compared to the prophets pilgrimage between the holy cities, he traveled to Dariya. There he gained the favor and conversion of the local ruler Muhammad Bin Saud, forging the second and more significant of his religio-political alliances. In 1744 this alliance was formalized in a symbiotic relationship wherein al-Wahhab retained the position of imam while relinquishing political rule to the emir Bin Saud. The alliance was sealed by the marriage of al-Wahhabs daughter to Bin Sauds eldest son, creating the Saud-Wahhab lineage.xiii Bin Saud at the time of the alliance

5 possessed few favorable traits to differentiate himself or his territory from the countless other warring sheikhdoms of the area. However, the religious legitimacy and zeal for proselytizing conquest attained through Sauds pact with al-Wahhab would propel the religio-political alliance towards a regional dominance that still exists to this day. The First State 1744-1819 Bin Saud began a reconquest of Nejd through military dominance, extorting a tribute from conquered rulers under the guise of zakat, the obligatory giving of charity that represents one of the five pillars of Islam. While al-Wahhab held radicalized views concerning fellow Muslims who failed to follow tawhid, he preferred to contact neighboring leaders and peacefully convince them to accept the Wahhabi creed rather than gain coerced submission. Despite alWahhabs attempt at peaceful alliance building few rulers accepted, and Bin Saud continued in conquest until his death in 1767. His son Abd al-Aziz, who compared to his father and the ultraconservative Wahhabi clergy emphasized materialism rather than religious zeal and piety, succeeded him.xiv This perhaps is the reoccurring theme of the Wahhabi-Saudi relationship, the influence of a more conservative religious leadership in constant opposition to their perception of growing materialism and modernity within the realms of the political leadership. In 1773 alWahhab stepped down as imam under questionably coercive circumstances and was replaced by Abd al-Aziz, who assumed the dual role of emir-imam and in doing so permanently returned ultimate religious authority to the political ruler. In 1773 Abd al-Aziz conquered Riyadh, relocating his capitol and uniting the entire Nejd region. From 1780-1800 Abd al-Aziz continued to conquer territory along the eastern Arabian coast in a manner intended to resemble the initial conquest of Arabia in the time of the prophet. As the conquest gained momentum, legitimate religious zeal morphed into less than holy attempts to justify the large economic and material

6 advantage of conquest through faith. In 1802 Abd al-Aziz conquered the Shiite town of Kerbala in modern day Iraq, massacring its inhabitants as well as desecrating the tombs of several companions of the prophet under the precepts of tawhid.xv In 1803 after gaining control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, a Shiite taking revenge for the Kerbala massacre assassinated Abd al-Aziz at prayer, leaving his son Saud to succeed him.xvi Saud was a talented military commander, and sought to reinvigorate the religious conquest of Abd al-Aziz. He dispatched copies of Kitab al-Tawhid to local Sheikhs, using any hostility or failure to implement the doctrine as an excuse for conquest. One such Sheikh, upon refusing to implement the Wahhabi creed that had little legitimacy within more mainstream Islamic scholarship, commented that it is a small book that legalizes the murder of all Muslims who dissent from them (the Wahhabis), the appropriation of their property, the enslavement of their offspring, and the marriage of their wives without first being divorced from their husbands.xvii After gaining control of most of the modern kingdom, Saud began raids into current day Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. These raids, combined with the loss of control of the holy cities agitated the Ottomans, and in response, Sultan Selim III sent an Egyptian force to route the Saudis in 1811 regaining control of Mecca and Medina in 1814.xviii Shortly thereafter, Saud died of fever, creating a succession struggle between his oldest son Abdullah bin Saud and a descendant of the original Saud-Wahhab family pact, Abdullah bin Muhammad Abdullah bin Saud was victorious; however, the struggle significantly weakened the state and divided its military forces, allowing a revitalized Egyptian force to conquer Riyadh in 1818. Abdullah bin Saud was extradited to Istanbul to stand trail, where he was executed.xix The Ottomans found little value in the Arabian Peninsula beyond the holy cities, and discontinued their occupation of Nejd. The withdraw led to a reversion to century old patterns of

7 tribal warfare and local conflict. During this era Wahhabism was largely maintained and perpetuated by tribal zealots rather than religious institutions, allowing it to easily survive the transition between unified Saudi states. The first Saudi state had been a grand experiment, combining traditional tribal conquest with fanatical religious zeal. It was largely effective formula that would be repeated again with equal success, but the over ambitious nature of the zealots towards external powers had detrimental effects to the longevity of the state. The Second State 1824-1897 Turki bin Saud, the son of Abdullah bin Sauds challenger, retook Riyadh in the name of the original alliance in 1824. Turki relied heavily on the prestige of his family name, which was still associated with religious purity and political capability, for the legitimacy that he utilized to incite a new religious fervor for expansion.xx Learning from the lessons of the past Saudi realm, Turki focused his conquest east, away from the holy cities and their Egyptian protection. In 1833 Turki had established control over the entire Persian Gulf coast of the Arabian Peninsula with the blessing of the British Empire, which hoped unification would quiet the warring Sheiks of the region.xxi Internal strife began to tear apart the second Saudi realm. In 1834 Mishari bin Saud, with the support a disparate group of tribal Sheikhs, lead a rebellion against his cousin, Turki. The rebellion failed and Mishari was imprisoned; however, Turki was subsequently assassinated. Mishari, in the absence of Turkis eldest son Faisal, was named ruler by the Wahhabi clerics who were reluctant to suspend political unity while waiting for Faisals return. The clerics were comprised of descendants of the al-Wahhab lineage known as the al Sheikh.xxii A precedent was set mandating that endorsement by the al Sheikh was necessary for political legitimacy. The precedent was played out again, gaining a dimension of appeasement in exchange for

8 endorsement. Faisal returned from conquest and defeated Mishari, agreeing to uphold, spread, and enforce the more conservative tenants of Wahhabi doctrine in exchange for the blessing of the al Sheikh.xxiii In 1838 the Egyptian pasha Muhammad Ali defeated Faisal in an attempt to build a Cairo centered Islamic empire to rival that of the failing Ottomans. Ali installed Khaled bin Saud- the brother of Abdullah bin Saud, who was captured at the first Egyptian conquest of Riyadh twenty years earlier-as the Saudi king. In 1841 Alis empire failed, leaving Khaled as the ruler of the second Saudi state. In 1843 Faisal returned from Cairo, deposed and executed Khaled, and began a revitalization and transformation of Wahhabism. Wahhabi doctrine was codified as law, transforming the initial revolutionary zeal of the Wahhabis to ultra-conservative Islamic jurisprudence that was implemented throughout the Kingdom.xxiv Faisals reign brought with it relative stability, but compared with the consolidated unity of the first state, internal conflict and divisions ran high. Faisal, still cautious of upsetting foreign powers, continued to focus expansion toward the east, fighting and entering into a British brokered truce with Bahrain in the years before his death in 1865.xxv Intense family rivalry caused the Saudi royal family to begin a slow disintegration. The emir was shuffled between close relatives of Faisal eight times in the eleven years after his death. Eventually Abdullah bin Faisal, Faisals first cousin, gained the semblance of stable control in 1886. A northern Sheikh, Muhammad bin Rashid capitalized on the weak Saud authority, capturing Riyadh in 1887. In 1891 Rashid exiled the remaining Sauds to Kuwait, ending the second Saudi State.xxvi The second Saudi state was capable of controlling zeal for conquest and in doing so avoided the agitation of the Ottomans and other external powers influential in the region. This control was achieved at a costly price, appeasing the Wahhabi religious zealots with a long-term

9 commitment to implement Wahhabi doctrine as codified law. Inter-family tribalism as well as the political divisions and chaos it created allowed a relatively inconsequential Sheikh from the north to conquer the kingdom and exile its ruling family. The Ikwahn Wahhabism, as a primarily verbally transmitted ideology, had survived the five-year transition between the two unified Saudi states with surprising continuity. Easing this transition was the retention of control of small sheikdoms by representatives of the original alliance. Contrasting this ease of transition were the significant changes undergone by Wahhabism during the transition from the second Saudi state to the modern Kingdom. Wahhabi doctrine, at the fall of Riyadh, had been transformed from the radical oral ideology of the first state, to a codified system of Islamic jurisprudence. This has been attributed to al-Wahhabs emphasis on the importance of personal learning that stemmed from conceptual and thematic understanding of the Koran, rather than root memorization that had been common.xxvii However, while al-Wahhab did place emphasis on learning, the Wahhabi transition was one of necessity. As the unified second state concluded its phase of conquest, the need for a stable legal system superceded the need for proselytizing zeal, and the Wahhabi doctrine evolved. This shift in Wahhabi doctrine made it nearly impossible for it to survive the fall of the second state and the subsequent exile of the royal family with the same continuity as did the original doctrine. After the fall of the second state the preservers of the faith in Nejd became the Artaib and Harb, Bedouin tribes. These tribes formed the Ikwahn or the brotherhood, and upheld the tenants of Wahhabism in their most conservative and puritanical forms. The Ikwahn abandoned the traditional Nomadic lifestyles of their tribal heritage in exchange for the hujar, an oasis community that became the basic unit of the modern kingdom. The Ikwahn become the cavalry

10 and zealots of Wahhabism under the renewed territorial expansion of Ibn Saud. In doing so they led the revival of the proselytizing zeal of Wahhabism and the parallel reversion from a comparatively more moderate and scholarly version of the doctrine. The strategic need for the zealots for conquest would preclude the need for rational scholarship and the moderation of the doctrine. xxviii The Unification 1902-1932 Faisals eldest son Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud began the reunification of the Arabian Peninsula from Kuwaiti exile in 1902. With the support of the Kuwaiti emir, Ibn Saud launched a legendary covert attack on hostile Riyadh.xxix Ibn Saud led a small outfit of cavalry through the southern desert to Riyadh, where they slipped through the citys defenses under the cover of darkness and infiltrated the royal palace. At day break Ibn Saud and his men massacred the royal court along with the governor of Riyadh, seizing control of the city. From his new central stronghold, Ibn Saud aligned himself with the Ikwahn zealots, and declared jihad on the nonWahhabis of the region.xxx In 1902 and 1904 Ibn Saud, who had gained control of all of Nejd, fought inconclusive battles over the control of the northern Qassim province with the Ottomanbacked Sheikh Rashid, of the lineage that originally conquered Riyadh from Saud control. Ibn Saud nominally became a Ottoman vassal, demonstrating his strategic foresight in postponing military action until internal pressures forced the over extended Ottomans to withdraw from Qassim. Ibn Saud lost a major battle in 1910, and two years were required to forcefully displace the internal rebellion that occurred the same year.xxxi Ibn Saud entered into a treaty with the British Empire in 1915, recognizing the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Sharif Hussein of Mecca in exchange for British favor and support against the Ottomans.xxxii

11 Ibn Saud continued to clash with Hussein, who ostentatiously declared himself king of all Arabs with British support.xxxiii Ibn Saud and Hussein signed a British mandated armistice in 1920; however, shortly after, the balance of military power shifted significantly towards the Saudis. Ibn Saud, who first recognized the potential of the Ikwahn when he first regained control of Riyadh in1902, had implemented a policy to strengthen their forces and expand their membership. Other tribes were encouraged to abandon their nomadic ways and settle in oasis regions, building deeply fundamental religious communities with the help of Wahhabi clerics dispatched by Ibn Saud. Until the treaty of 1920, the highly motivated religious zealots of these hujar communities had remained an untapped military resource. However, the Ikwahn forces, estimated at 30,000 strong, soon played an integral role in the conquest of western Arabia that brought Ibn Saud to the gates of the Hijaz province, the dominion of Sharif Hussein that contained the holy cities. In 1924 Ibn Saud and his Ikwahn Calvary conquered Mecca and in 1925 Medina was brought under Ibn Sauds influence, nominally concluding his territorial acquisition.xxxiv Ibn Saud moved to consolidate his rule over the disparate tribes of his north central Arabian kingdom and was forced to choose between the Bedouin tribal tribute system based on continued conquest that had been employed by his family for two and half centuries in the region, or a more centralized model offered by his British allies. After questioning the sustainability and longevity of a truly tribal state, he chose the latter, and in doing so significantly eroded the position of the Wahhabi Ikwahn, who desired continued conquest and proselytizing jihad, in society. The Ikwahn approached Ibn Saud with complaints in 1927, including the unholy relationship with Britain, the introduction of new communication technologies, and the tolerance of Shiism. The Ikwahns continued raids outside the borders of

12 the modern kingdom posed the same threat to Ibn Saud as did the continued raids of the first kingdom, which proved to be its eventual undoing.xxxv Ibn Saud attempted to suppress the more extreme elements of Ikwahn militancy, leading to a revolt in 1929.xxxvi Ibn Saud questioned the religious legitimacy of violent suppression of fellow Wahhabis, and looked to the ulema, which represented a more institutionalized Wahhabism, for a sanction to contain the Ikwahn. In exchange for a revitalized commitment to the Wahhabi creed in the modern kingdom, the ulema issued a fatwa sanctioning the suppression of the Ikwahn. Ibn Saud, with newfound religious legitimacy routed the Ikwahn at the battle of Siblia in 1929.xxxvii While the Ikwahn had been suppressed, the political necessity that had prompted the first transition from revolutionary Wahhabism to institutional Wahhabism in the second state again arose anew. The transition in its infancy drew from the radical Ikwahn ideology rather than the already moderated ideology of the second state. While the Ikwahn were suppressed as a military force, its ardent followers still remain a powerful conservative fringe of Saudi society. In 1932 Ibn Saud declared the modern kingdom, naming himself king and giving the newly formed state, Saudi Arabia, his family name. Ibn Saud, to cement his rule, took a wife from each of the tribes of his new kingdom and the prominent families comprising the Al-Shaikh. He fathered more the forty-five legitimate sons with his twenty wives, and every king of Saudi Arabia has since been a son of Ibn Saud.xxxviii With the foundation of Saud Arabia the Wahhabi doctrine: conservative scholarship, literalistic reinterpretation, absolute tawhid, a militarized jihad, a puritanical worldview, and a perceived decay in societal morality had been institutionalized as the moral, religious, and legal principles of the land. The Saudi royal family would be faced with the daunting challenge of running a state on the principles of puritanical zealotry and tribalism, while integrating it into the modern world.

13

Oil and Infidels 1933-1953 Ibn Saud faced two secular and pragmatic realities upon the kingdoms unification: fiscal stability and security. The true challenge of his reign occurred not only in facing these realities, but doing so in such a way as to appease the clerics and still prominent tribal sheikhs of nascent Saudi Arabia. Ibn Sauds charisma coupled with the religious uniformity and zeal provided by Wahhabism had led the Saud-Wahhab family alliance to provincial prominence. However, this alliance, operating in a resource scarce desert, would have gained little regional or global significance without the discovery of oil, which took place in 1931 in a failed attempt to locate water. Ibn Saud, who recognized the importance of foreign investment and expertise in the developing oil industries of his neighbors, invited foreign prospectors to the kingdom.xxxix The ulema resisted, declaring the invitation extended to foreigners by Ibn Saud as an attempt to bring infidels into the holy land of Mecca and Medina. The power of Ibn Sauds personality overpowered the challenge of the clerics. A group of senior clerics supposedly visited the court of Ibn Saud, where he challenged them to provide justification for their resistance to foreigners. Before allowing them to respond Ibn Saud cited the instances from the Hadith in which the prophet used Christians and Jews for his advancement. He paralleled these instances to his invitation to foreign oil firms to develop the Saudi petroleum industry.xl Ibn Saud was indifferent as to which Western nations oil firms received the concessions, and they were awarded to the highest bidder, the United States, which paid $170,000 in gold in 1932.xli ARAMCO, the Arab American Oil Company began operating in the kingdom and was controlled the four major American oil firms of the day, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and Socal.xlii Ibn Saud had won a victory

14 for fiscal reality with the clerics; however, there was no compromise concerning the reoccurring modernity and more importantly the moderation of the state or its religious institutions. Oil revenues would only exacerbate the division between the modernizers and puritans. Saudi Arabia, in its infancy, demonstrated no significant political or military strength to differentiate itself from the short-lived first and second states, which fell to external regional pressures. Further validating security concerns were the hostile neighboring Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq, the Hashemite were the same group that controlled the Sharif of Mecca before Ibn Sauds conquest.xliii To avoid Hashemite conquest, Ibn Saud chose to exchange the large fiscal potential of his kingdom for long-term security, without the transitional phase of militarization. Ibn Saud met with President Roosevelt, who was sailing from the Yalta conference, in 1945. The meeting took place aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal, where what has come to be known as the Oil for Security Deal was forged. The United States agreed to provide for the territorial security of the kingdom, and established the Dahran military base in return for insurance of easy access to Saudi oil.xliv In the eyes of the clerics, the man who had massacred the Ikwahn, a potent but uncontrollable Wahhabi cavalry, was now contracting the defense of the kingdom to the Americans. Ibn Saud died in 1953, separating his authority between his two sons, Saud, the eldest and Faisal, the third. Saud received the crown but proved to be largely inept and apathetic towards rulings. Faisal managed foreign affairs and proved to be much more competent than his elder brother.xlv From the military conquest of his youth to the directional and existential decisions of unified rule, Ibn Saud had, by force of personality, defined Saudi Arabia. ARAMCO and oil revenues brought with them western opulence and materialism. Saud whose father was a Bedouin tribal warrior, eagerly adopted this ultra-excessive lifestyle and

15 lived a life of grand, opulent, comfort.xlvi The transition from Bedouin subsistence to western materialism within the royal family was instant, occurring just as abruptly as the discovery of oil. The ulema, a generally elderly body still accustomed to traditional Bedouin living, was vehemently opposed to Sauds lifestyle. Adding to the ulemas disapproval, Saud was an ineffective and incompetent ruler, and while kept strictly within the family, had developed severe alcoholism.xlvii Ibn Sauds sons recognized the threat that Saud, without the consent of the religious institution or political capabilities, posed to Saudi stability. In 1964 they gained the ulemas sanction for Sauds exile, and for Faisals ascension to the throne.xlviii The Appeasement of Exportation 1964-1989 Faisal was a descendant of the original Saud-Wahhab alliance and was intimately intertwined with the religious establishment. Faisal nonetheless perceived a necessity for modernization; however, the implementation of modern technologies and institutions would require the constant appeasement of the ulema. Faisals first reform that met significant resistance from the clerics was the introduction of female education, which the ulema viewed as a violation of Islamic decency. Faisal approached the problem both gradually and institutionally. He began to implement female education first in the more liberal urban areas, allowing a generation of conservative rural Bedouins to become accustomed to the concept. He also separated the ministries responsible for male and female education, giving the ulema oversight privileges into the curriculum.xlix Faisal began a transformation of the Saudi ministry system, which had been simplistic and absolute under his fathers rule. Ibn Saud had three ministries: foreign affairs, finance, and defense. Under Faisals reign this system swelled to twenty-three ministries. The control of many newly created ministries was seeded to the al Sheikh and the ulema. To gain further legitimacy with the clerics, Faisal allowed the kingdom to become a

16 refuge for regional extremist including expelled leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman later convicted of involvement in the world trade center bombing of 1993, Ayman al-Zawari al-Queadas ideologue, and Abdullah Azzam a prolific fundamentalist. These extremists integrated into the Wahhabi controlled Saudi education system, teaching their violent jihadi interpretations to Saudi children and university students.l In 1965 Faisal approved television broadcast to the strong opposition of the clerics, who objected to the depiction of the human form and the content associated with television programming. To counter the second concern, Faisal had a Quaranic recitation filmed and broadcasted constantly, thus demonstrating that while television did have a potential to propagate immoral content, it had an equal potential to propagate learning and religion. While the mainstream ulema had been convinced, the ultra-conservative fringe was not. Faisals nephew was involved with a demonstration held outside a Saudi television station. The demonstration became violent and when riot police intervened Faisals nephew was killed. li For Faisal the increased fervor of the religious establishment was a useful tool to counterbalance the socialism of pan-Arab nationalism. In 1962 a conference of Islamic scholars in Mecca was convened to create the Muslim World league, effectively a conservative proselytizing institution. Later in 1972 he created the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, an organization designed to fund Wahhabi style education across the Muslim world. Both these organizations were inspired by the beliefs of the grand mutif, a descendant of the al-Sheikh and a close advisor to the king. The grand mutif viewed the Saudi as the inherent leaders of Islam due to their control of the holy cities. As such they had an equal duty and right to export their belief structure through their vast wealth.lii For the first time since al-Wahhabs initial reversion to fundamentalism Wahhabi rhetoric had been focused on change rather than puritanical

17 consistency. This was natural progression but nonetheless a fundamental change in Wahhabi doctrine. Faisal was assassinated in 1975 in a revenge killing by his nephew, brother to the nephew who was killed in the protest over television broadcast. The division within the royal family was one of violent tribal tradition. Faisals brother Khaled bin Abdul Aziz, Ibn Sauds second son, succeeded him. In 1975 the oil revenue of Saudi Arabia was greater than $22 billon annually, and the pace of construction and development was unimaginable. This exterior change was not paralleled by moderation of the Wahhabi outlook, and as the royal family became more extravagant, they became more contradictory to the Wahhabi clerics. Dr. Saad al Fafih, an ultraconservative dissident cleric, stated that the royal family is corrupt in every sense, in Islamic sense, in financial sense, in administrative sensethe only way to save the country, in every sense, even the basic human sense, is to change the whole royal family.liii Rapid construction within the kingdom was a faade of modernization that covered the increasingly pressured and fragmented religo-poltical institutions of 18th century puritanical tribalism. This pressure boiled over in 1979 with the seizure of the grand mosque in Mecca by descendants of the Ikwahn, led by Juhayman al Utayba. Utayba and his followers demanded that the kingdom return to puritanical tawhid. They rejected all progress and modernization, and believed one of their members to be the messiah. The Saudi royal family could not intervene in the grand mosque without a fatwa from the ulema, and after an eighteen-day standoff the clerics issued a fatwa allowing the royal family to remove the apostates from the holy mosque.liv Along with the fatwa came the greatest transfer of power to the ulema since the original religio-political alliance was formed. The clerics were given control over the extraordinarily well-funded education system, the minister of education was chosen from within the al Sheikh. The al Sheikh

18 and the more conservative clerics utilized their increasing influence in the education system to perpetuate the view that the Wahhabi doctrine was the only true form of Islam. The clerics attained full media oversight censorship and began to play an integral role in monitoring the morality of society.lv As a whole, the royal family viewed the conservative reversion that occurred after the seizure of the grand mosque as a means through which to stabilize the country. In reality it only forfeited whatever gains were made over the past half century to the Wahhabi clerics. King Khaled, in a move to bolster religious credibility and shift the dissenting focus of the clerics from the morality of the monarchy, expanded Faisals initial exportation. Funding for Wahhabi schools abroad through the International Islamic Relief Organization, the action arm of the Muslim World League, increased exponentially as oil revenues were pumped into the organization and other Islamic charities. A puritanical understanding and implementation of Islam was promoted throughout centers of Islamic thought globally, especially in renowned institutions in Egypt. lvi Khaled died in 1982 and was succeeded by Ibn Sauds fourth son Fahd. Fahd, like Faisal, was devoutly religious; he changed his official title to Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and viewed his power as a mandate to strengthen and spread Islam.lvii The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 offered the great impetus to exercise this mandate and disseminate Wahhabi beliefs. The Saudis in total offered nearly four billion dollars in official foreign aid to the Mujahideenlviii, not including the private funding of the princes or Islamic charities.lix To Fahd funding the Muslim Afghan resistance was the silver bullet solution to a multitude of internal and external challenges. Aiding in the fight against infidels invading Muslim lands offered Fahd immense religious credibility, while allowing Saudis to volunteer for Jihad in Afghanistan

19 offered an outlet for the frustrations of indoctrinated youth, another way to insure that a crisis similar to the 1979 seizure of the grand mosque would not occur again. The two most radical and ideologically Wahhabi factions received the majority of the funding, and many of their members morphed into the Taliban at the conclusion of the conflict.lx While formal Saudi aid into Afghanistan was terminated upon the conclusion of the conflict, Saudi charities continued to fund Wahhabi education in the mountainous Pashtun badlands of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. A considerable portion of this funding went to create Jamaat Ulama Islami and Jamat-IIslami madrasas, virulently radical religious seminaries that provide free Quranic education to Muslim youth.lxi These madrasas spawned the Taliban and are largely considered the breeding grounds of global Islamic terror. It is unclear to what degree the royal family was aware of the implications of its actions; however, the desire for global Wahhabi proselytizing efforts is clearly evident. This desire translated itself into a global network of Saudi charities designed to inspire puritanical piety and preach jihad against the oppressor, often synonymous with the west. Mosques and madrasas were constructed in the former Soviet republics, notably Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and there was a significant effort to support Muslim causes in Chechnya and the Balkans.lxii The 1970s and 1980s were an era of continuity for the royal family, Faisal, Khaled, and Fahd were forced to continually appease the ulema. In exchange for their grudging sanction of modernization, the kings ultimately began to fund, export, and perpetuate the Wahhabi mission. The royal family had discovered a formula for limited sovereignty from the religious establishment-an Islamic agenda abroad would buy complacency for modernization at home. While this allowed the Saudi state to modernize, the tensions that arose from the failure of religious institutions to moderate were simply projected through oil funds onto a largely

20 unsuspecting Islamic world. It would require an instance of existential pragmatism for these tensions to disrupt Saudi balance. Reactionary Clerics 1990-2005 This instance of existential pragmatism presented itself in the invasion of Kuwait by Sadaam Hussiens Iraq concerning foreign debt and oil production. This invasion imminently threatened the kingdom, which had failed to effectively increase its military potential since unification.lxiii King Fahds only avenue for military victory was to accept an open-ended defense offer from the Untied States; however, he first needed the sanction of the ulema. A conference was convened in Mecca, and a fatwa was issued by Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, allowing the US intervention in order to defend Islam. The United States subsequently used Saudi Arabia as the staging ground for Operation Dessert Storm, driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. Despite the approval of the religious institution, the presence of hundreds of thousands of US troops in the holy lands offended the religious sensibilities of many conservatives. Upon the conclusion of combat, the majority of US troops withdrew from Saudi Arabia.lxiv The disgruntled clerics first voiced their opinion to the royal family in 1991. An open letter was signed by four hundred clerics and demanded among other things the repeal of nonsharia laws, a more equitable use of oil revenue, and an Islamic foreign policy independent of western influences. In 1992 a more in depth version entitled "Memorandum of Advice to King Fahd" called for more sweeping reversion, including official veto power for the ulema. This document was signed by the seventeen member senior ulema and the grand mutif, posing a serious threat to royal legitimacy. Fahd condemned the document, demanding that the senior ulema do the same. While ten clerics including the grand mutif caved under Fahds pressure, seven did not and Fahd subsequently dismissed them. These seven joined a younger more hard

21 line group of clerics who had been educated and radicalized by the foreign extremist harbored by the Saudi royal family. In doing so their former stature added scholarly legitimacy to the hatred of the west that these hard line puritanical zealots espoused.lxv Many members within the radical segment of the ulema began to question and preach against the policies of the royal family along side their already powerful messages of hate towards non-Wahhabis. Most prominent among them were Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and Sheikh Salaman al-Auda who held vehement views concerning the supremacy of Islam and the necessity of a indivisible and total jihad. These clerics were arrested in 1994 for disseminating sermons by illegal means and preaching against Saudi foreign policy. They were released a month later under the condition that they remain loyal to the royal famiy, and the authorities seemed apathetic to their ideology if the vehemently violent rhetoric was not directed towards the Saudi government. A new tension-causing factor had arisen in Saudi society, this time within the organization whose worldview was based on continuity, the ulema. lxvi In 1995 King Fahd suffered a debilitating stroke and his half brother Crown Prince Abdullah took over the kingdoms government. Abdullah began slow but comparatively sweeping reforms within the Saudi system. He liberalized trade, relaxed repressive religious laws, opened the doors to more prominent roles for women, combated the funding of extremist clerics, moderated the education system, and implemented population control measures.lxvii Abdullah was capable of effecting much of this reform through the more moderate grand mutif of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz who commanded great respect within the ulema, even from the radical clerics. Sheikh Baz died in 1999, opening the door for a resurgence of hard line clerics to gain prominence within the ulema.lxviii

22 Wahhabism and the Future Saudi Arabia was affected by the events of September 11th, 2001, but it was truly rocked by a six-month string of terror that started with the bombing of a residential compound in Riyadh in November 2003. The attackers were disgruntled about Abdullahs reforms, especially his relationship with the west. Most of their activities were linked to radical clerics and were conducted by men who had once traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Mujahideen.lxix These attacks caused a reversion in Wahhabi doctrine and exacerbated a deep rift in the royal family. Since the 1992 Memorandum of Advice to King Fahd, two strains of Wahhabi scholarship-entirely similar from an external perspective but directionally unique in context-had developed. They both held to absolute tawhid as al-Wahhab had but took differing stances on jihad: the first held jihad as a separate concept from tawhid and instead stressed taqarub or reconciliation between faiths, the second drew no distinction between jihad and tawhid and thought them both integral to the practice of true Islam. Within the royal family Crown Prince Abdullah endorsed the more moderate strain of clerics, although the death of Sheikh Baz dealt this group a serious blow, while Prince Nayef, the interior minister, a much more fundamentally religious man, endorses the hard line strain of Wahhabism. This ideological difference which began with the Crown Princes ascension as regent, was exacerbated by the attacks of 2003 and then formalized by King Fahds death in 2005, and exists to this day, dividing the royal family along the same lines as the clerics. After the attacks Nayef, who possessed a largley independent power base began to crack down on Abdullahs reform especially womens rights by strengthening the secret police force responsible for enforcing Islamic mortality and sharia.lxx While the struggle between Abdullah and Nayef prevents legitamate progress, a true existential challenge for the Kingdom will come with the next generation. For the entire history

23 of the unified kingdom Ibn Saud and his sons have kept a stranglehold on political power, while elderly Wahhabi clerics have maintained religious control. However, as these individuals age into their seventies a new generation is preparing to take over the reigns of leadership. This generation is as polarized as it is diverse and sprawling. It is split between Western educated royals who wish to bring the kingdom forward into politically and religiously moderated modernity, and vehemently anti-western clerics who were schooled under the tutelage of the most extreme Islamic dissidents of the era and posses their own base of support among less moderate royals. The future of the Kingdom is dependant on who takes the reigns of power, and judging from past history whoever it may be will require the sanction of the established ulema for legitimacy and any attempt at unified or peaceful progress.

24 Notes M. S. Doran, 2004, The Saudi Paradox, Foreign Affairs, 83:1. M. S. Doran, 2004, The Saudi Paradox, Foreign Affairs. iii Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabism: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, 7-8. iv Sufism is a mystical movement within Islam that stresses a personal connection with Allah and holds that faith can be expressed through a multitude of means. Shia Islam is a breakaway Islamic movement that arose through the power struggle after the death of the Prophet. It literally means followers of Ali, the prophets cousin and in the eyes of the Shia the rightful leader of Islam. Alis son Hussein was martyred in his struggle against the Sunni caliphate and is venerated through he holiday of Ashura, a violation of tawhid in the mind of Taymiya. For a discussion of these doctrines and their influence on the ideology of Taymiya see Charles Allen, Gods Terrorist: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad, 44. v The Saying of the Prophet and his companions, this text offers a supplementary content to that of the Quran for discerning the intent and beliefs of the Prophet. vi Charles Allen, Gods Terrorist: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad, 4546. vii Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabism: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, 7-8. viii Sharia literally means the way or the path. It is a dynamic and diverse compilation of Islamic legal jurisprudence derived from the Quran, Hadith, and precedents of past scholarship. An Islamic society is governed by its precepts. For an in depth discussion of Sharia as it pertains to the ideology of al-Wahhab see Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabism: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. ix The first four caliphs or Islam are considered by many fundamentalists to be the purest Muslim leaders ushering in the golden age in Islamic history. Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabism: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, 54. x This first publication by al Wahhab has received varying amounts of scholarly scruitiny. For Islamic interpretation of the time it was well documented and balanced; however, from the modern western perspective it appears violent and archaic. Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam the Search for a New Ummah, 169. xi Some have argued that al-Wahhabs message was violent towards Central Arabian Muslims who did not follow Islam and for greater reconciliation and harmony with other monotheistic faiths. For a less harsh scholarly interpretation of al- Wahhab see Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabism: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad . Charles Allen, Gods Terrorist: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad, 50. xii Quintan Wiktorowicz, A Genealogy of Radical Islam, 7-8. xiii David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, 21. xiv Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom, 24. xv Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, 207. xvi Charles Allen, Gods Terrorist: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad, 63. xvii Allen, 50. xviii David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, 23. xix Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom, 28. xx This is another instance of the pattern of religious justification for territorial conquest, David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, 24.
ii

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Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom,29. The al Sheikh is the family lineage of Saud and Wahhab and still has great influence in the kingdom. In one sense the royal family and the clerics are synonymous, with many future Saudi kings including Turki deriving from the dual line of Saud-Wahhab. xxiii Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom,30. xxiv This represents a significant transition within Wahhabi doctrine. No longer was Wahhabism the radical oral faith of Bedouin conquest, it had now gained a new dimension as legitimate law. Champion,31. xxv Champion, 32-33. xxvi David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, 25. xxvii Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabism: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. xxviii For an in depth discussion of the Ikhwan, their idealogy and its implications see, Holden and Johns, The House of Saud, 69. xxix Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, 207. xxx Robert Lacey, The Kingdom, 41-52. xxxi Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom,39. xxxii Champion,41-42. xxxiii David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, 60. xxxiv Holden and Johns, The House of Saud, 84-88. xxxv Gwenn Okruhlik, Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia,2. xxxvi David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, 91-93. xxxvii Gwenn Okruhlik, Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia ,2. xxxviii Robert Lacey, The Kingdom, 131. xxxix Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom,44. xl Martin Smith, The House of Saud, PBS (Documentary). xli Interview conducted with Frank Jungers by PBS frontline for the House of Saud documentary. Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/interviews/jungers.html. xlii Frank Jungers. xliii Frank Jungers. xliv Benjamin E. Schwartz, Americas Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement,108 xlv Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom, 49. xlvi Interview conducted with Herman F. Eilts by PBS frontline for the House of Saud documentary. Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/interviews /eilts.html. xlvii Herman F. Eilts. xlviii Robert Lacey, The Kingdom, 354-356. xlix Martin Smith, The House of Saud, PBS (Documentary). l Dore Gold, Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism, 94. li Martin Smith, The House of Saud, PBS (Documentary). lii Dore Gold, Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism, 74-77. liii Interview Conducted with Dr. Saad al Fafih by PBS frontline for the House of Saud documentary. Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/etc/script.html liv Robert Lacey, The Kingdom, 478-86. lv David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, 533.
xxii

xxi

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Dore Gold, Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism,90. Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam the Search for a New Ummah, 66. lviii Mujahideen is Arabic for a holy army, fighting jihad. Upon the soviet invasion of Afghanistan, young Muslim males from around the world came to aid in the Afghan resistance and joined militias referred to as the Mujahideen. lix Stephen Schwartz, Two Faces of Islam: The House of Saud from Tradition to Terror, 154-158. lx Schwartz, 154-158. lxi Benjamin E. Schwartz, Americas Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement,113114. lxii Schwartz,113-114. lxiii Martin Indyk, Back to the Bazaar. lxiv Indyk, Back to the Bazaar. lxv Dore Gold, Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism,161. lxvi Gold, 161. lxvii M. S. Doran, 2004, The Saudi Paradox, 2-7 lxviii Dore Gold, Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism,183. lxix M. S. Doran, 2004, The Saudi Paradox, 1-3. lxx Doran, 1-3.
lvii

lvi

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