Power Plant Safety

PROJECT REPORT ON
POWER PLANT SAFETY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
FOR THE AWARD OF
PG DIPLOMA IN HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT
FIRE AND SAFETY FORUM, ERNAKULAM, INDIA
PROJECT REPORT SUBMITED BY
Mrs. LOLOWA FADHEL AL QUBAISI
BATCH: 2018 DEC CPD 108
REGISTER NUMBER: PGDHSE/D/2018/FSF101553
DECEMBER 2019
i
CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that the project report, “POWER PLANT SAFETY”, which is being
submitted herewith for the award of PG Diploma in Health, Safety and Environment,
is the result of the work completed by Mrs. Lolowa Fadhel Al Qubaisi under my
supervision and guidance of the institute and the same has not been submitted
elsewhere for the award of any degree.
Ms. Aswathy P. S Mr. Aashin U. S

Director Course Coordinator
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DECLERATION
I hereby declare that the project report entitled, “POWER PLANT SAFETY” was
carried out and written by me. This work has not been previously formed the basis for
the award of any degree or diploma or certificate nor has been submitted elsewhere
for the award of any degree or diploma.
Batch: 2018 DEC CPD 108
Register Number: PGDHSE/D/2018/FSF101553
Place: United Arab Emirates
Date: 12th December 2019
Name: Mrs. Lolowa Fadhel Al Qubaisi
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First and foremost, I thank God Almighty for giving us the courage and perseverance
to pursue my project work successfully. At the outset, I wish to express my sincere
thanks to a few persons without whose help this venture would not have been a
success.
I am grateful to our respected Course Director for her kindness and encouragement. I
would like to express my sincere thanks to Safety in charge of Fire and Safety Forum,
and all faculties of Fire and Safety Forum for their innumerable support. I record your
heartfelt gratitude to your topics for helping us to select this Project and helping us
time to throughout the development of this Project. I wish to extent our special thanks
to the staffs and members of fire and safety forum for their support.
Finally, I express our gratitude to my parents, friends and relatives for their valuable
support rendered for the successful completion of this project.
Mrs. Lolowa Fadhel Al Qubaisi
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ABSTRACT
Power plant is a workplace of the high level from hazard, where safe working
procedures are important as workers face many risks due to the nature of the job.
Although power plants are much safer than they once were, plant employees still
encounter many hazards, and it is up to employers to implement programs and policies
aimed at eliminating accidents.
The risks associated with power plant operations must be assessed and controlled.
Workers are exposed to a variety of power plant hazards if the right preventative steps
are not taken. Keeping the workers safe is a constant challenge. A mistake in a power
plant can easily be fatal. In this project we observe that risk assessment is very helpful
for finding hazards conditions in power plant. Hazard analysis and risk assessment
can be used to establish priorities so that the most dangerous situations are addressed
first and those least likely to occur and least likely to cause major problems can be
considered later.
Safety procedures and regulations need to be followed by the management as well as

the workers. Many business enterprises have proven that good safety management
leads to increased productivity, and the same works for power plant. Nuclear
power plants rank first in terms of their economic cost, accounting for 41 % of all
property damage. Oil and hydroelectric follow at around 25 % each, followed by natural
gas at 9 % and coal at 2 %.
Although all hazards should be addressed, resource limitations usually do not allow
this to happen at one time from the study carried out in the thermal power plant and
the risk rating which were made and analysed shows that various risks in the power
plant were more over certain distance. Both operations and maintenance of power
plant facilities deserves special attention, as they can have both a direct and an indirect
effect on equipment reliability. Adverse safety effects can arise, depending upon the
level of skill of the personnel involved, safety awareness and the complexity of the
work process. Any delayed effects resulting from challenges to maintenance can
cause interruptions in operation, and hence affect the safety of a plant or facility.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... xii
1.1 Background .................................................................................................. xii
1.2 Hazards to Power Plant Workers ................................................................ xiv
1.3 Evaluation of Power Plant Risks ..................................................................xv
1.4 Hierarchy of Controls for Power Plant Hazards ........................................... xvi
1.5 Accidents at Power Plant ........................................................................... xvii
1.5.1 Property Damage ..................................................................................xx
2. Objectives of the Study ...................................................................................... xxi
3. Review of Related Literature ............................................................................ xxii
3.1 Overview of Safety at the Power Plants ..................................................... xxii
3.2 Hazard Identification .................................................................................. xxv
3.2.1 Electrical Hazards .............................................................................. xxvii
3.2.2 Boiler Hazards .................................................................................... xxix
3.2.3 Chemical Hazards ............................................................................ xxxiii
3.3 Risk Determination .................................................................................. xxxvi
3.4 Hydro Power Plant ................................................................................. xxxvii
3.4.1 Hydro Power Plant Incidents ...........................................................xxxviii
3.5 Gas Turbine Driven Power Plants ........................................................... xxxix
3.5.1 Gas Turbine Driven Power Plant Incidents .............................................xl
3.6 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) .......................................................................... xli
vi
3.6.1 Nuclear Incidents .................................................................................. xlii
3.7 Thermal Power Plant .....................................................................................lx
3.7.1 Thermal Power Plant Incidents ...............................................................lx
3.8 Accident Risks in Power Plants .................................................................... lxi
3.9 Organizational Issues ................................................................................. lxiii
3.9.1 Role of Safety Culture in Power Plant Operations ............................... lxiv
3.9.2 Commitment to High Standards of Safety............................................. lxv
3.10 Human Factor in Power Plant Operations .................................................. lxvi
3.10.1 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) ...................................................... lxvii
3.11 Safe Work Management .......................................................................... lxviii
3.12 Managing Contractor Safety ...................................................................... lxix
3.13 Emergency Preparedness .......................................................................... lxxi
4. Study Area Profile ............................................................................................. lxxi
5. Methodology .................................................................................................... lxxii
6. Results and Discussion .................................................................................. lxxiii
7. Summary and Conclusions .............................................................................. lxxv
8. References .................................................................................................... lxxvii
vii
List of Tables
Table 1 Power Boiler Incidents from 1999 to 2003 ................................................. xviii
Table 2 Nuclear power accidents in Belgium .......................................................... xliii
Table 3 Nuclear power accidents in Canada ........................................................... xliv
Table 4 Nuclear power accidents in France ............................................................. xlv
Table 5 Nuclear power accidents in Germany........................................................ xlvii
Table 6 Nuclear power accidents in India .............................................................. xlvii
Table 7 Nuclear power accidents in Japan............................................................ xlviii
Table 8 Nuclear power accident in Pakistan ............................................................... li
Table 9 Nuclear power accidents in the Russian Federation ...................................... li
Table 10 Nuclear power accident in South Korea ...................................................... lii
Table 11 Nuclear power accidents in Ukraine ............................................................ lii
Table 12 Nuclear power accidents in United Kingdom .............................................. liii
Table 13 Nuclear power accidents in the United States of America .......................... liii
viii
List of Figures
Figure 1 Types of power plants for energy generation .............................................. xii
Figure 2 Energy Accidents by Source from 1907–2007 .......................................... xvii
Figure 3 Power Boiler Fatalities from 1999 to 2003 ................................................. xix
Figure 4 Power Boiler Accidents from 1999 to 2003 ................................................. xx
Figure 5 Energy Accident Property Damage by Source from 1907–2007 ................ xxi
Figure 6 Power Boiler Incidents from 1999 to 2003 ............................................... xxix
Figure 7 Types of Boiler Incidents from 1999 to 2003 ............................................. xxx
Figure 8 Power Boiler Accidents by Category from 1999 to 2003 .......................... xxxi
Figure 9 Power Boiler Injuries from 1999 to 2003 ................................................ xxxiii
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List of Abbreviations
AC Alternating Current
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Possible
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CCGT Combined Cycle Gas Turbine Plant
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CHP Combined Heat and Power
FMEA Failure Mode Effect Analysis
HFE Human Factors Engineering
HRA Human Reliability Analysis
HRA Human Reliability Analysis
HSE Health and Safety Executive
HSI Human System Interface
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ILO International Labour Organization
ILO-OSH International Labour Organization - Occupational Safety and Health
INES International Nuclear Event Scale
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident
MTO Man, Technology, Organization
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NBBI National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors,
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NTPC National Thermal Power Corporation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developments
OHSAS Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series
OSH Occupational Health and Safety
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment
QA Quality Assurance
UK United Kingdom
US NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
USA United States of America
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LOLOWA FADHEL AL QUBAISI
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POWER PLANT SAFETY
1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Power plant is a place to generate energy of electricity for millions of household and
industries (Moir et al., 1994). Figure 1 displays the types of power plants all over the
world such as nuclear power plant, hydroelectric power plant, coal fired power plant,
diesel fired power plant, geo thermal power plant, gas and steam power plant, solar
power plant, wind power plant, and tidal power plant.
Nuclear
power
Tidal plant
Hydroelectric
power power plant
plant
Wind Coal-fired
power power
plant plant
Types of
power plants
for energy
generation
Solar Diesel-
thermal fired
power power
plant
plant
Solar Geotherma
power Gas &
l power
plant plant
Steam
Combined-
cycle power
plant
Figure 1 Types of power plants for energy generation
Halder et al. (2014) mentioned that, power plant is a workplace of the high level from
hazard, where safe working procedures are important as workers face many risks due
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to the nature of the job. Dudhani et al. (2006) in the Electrical Power & Energy Systems
journal highlighted that, the need of power plants is increasing more than ever as the
demand of energy is rising day by day.
Omer (2007) in his recent study sated that energy resources bring with them great
social and economic promise, providing financial growth for communities and energy
services for local economies. However, the infrastructure which delivers energy
services can break down in an energy accident, sometimes causing much damage,
and energy fatalities can occur, and with many systems often deaths will happen even
when the systems are working as intended (Kampa and Castanas, 2008).
Sovacool (2007), reiterated that nuclear power plants rank first in terms of their
economic cost, accounting for 41 percent of all property damage. Oil and hydroelectric
follow at around 25 percent each, followed by natural gas at 9 percent and coal at 2
percent (Geller et al., 2004). Cawthorne (2006) in his publications discussed about the
100 catastrophic disasters of which excluding Chernobyl and the Shimantan Dam, the
three other most expensive accidents involved the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Alaska),
The Prestige oil spill (Spain), and the Three Mile Island nuclear
accident (Pennsylvania). However, Felder (2009) presented the analysis in
the Human and Ecological Risk Assessment International Journal, stated that coal,
oil, liquid petroleum gas and hydro accidents have cost more than nuclear power
accidents.
Charter and Tischner (2017) emphasised that safety is not an end in itself but a
prerequisite for the purpose of the protection of people in any country and of the
environment — now and in the future. The risks associated with power plant
operations must be assessed and controlled (Omer, 2007). Workers are exposed to a
variety of power plant hazards if the right preventative steps are not taken. Keeping
the workers safe is a constant challenge. Dudhani et al. (2006) says that a mistake in
a power plant can easily be fatal. The work environment is often hot and noisy, consist
several major equipment and operations involve in its process, and there is an always
present risk for crushing injuries, electrical shocks and burns, boiler fires and
explosions, and contact with hazardous chemicals (Charter and Tischner, 2017).
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Power plant safety requires a continuing quest for excellence (Moir et al., 1994). Lobel
(2005) emphasized that all individuals concerned need constantly to be alert to
opportunities to reduce risks to the lowest practicable level. The quest, however, is
most likely to be fruitful if it is based on an understanding of the underlying objectives
and principles of safety, and the way in which its aspects are interrelated. In the past
several decades, power plant owners and industry in general have vastly improved
employee safety (Strupczewski, 2003). Mandal and Sengupta (2003) said that
numerous organizations that hand down safety requirements and regulations have
been established, creating a safer work environment. Although power plants are much
safer than they once were, plant employees still encounter many hazards, and it is up
to employers to implement programs and policies aimed at eliminating accidents
(Sikka and Kansal, 1994).
The Boy Scout motto “be prepared” certainly applies when it comes to power plant
employee safety (Oliveira et al., 2014). Comprehensive training, detailed pre-job
planning, and proper and well-maintained safety equipment are key to accident
prevention, regardless of the hazard (Hansen, 2005). The most critical requirements
for safe and reliable power plant operations is the availability of competent
maintenance personnel.
1.2 Hazards to Power Plant Workers
Power plants are inherently dangerous. Although safety is taken very seriously at most
facilities, every year workers around the world are killed on the job by electrocution,
falls, explosions, fires, and while working in confined spaces (Li and Pridov, 1985).
Many more are injured through various less-extreme accidents. Hansen (2005)
detailed the most common hazards to power plant workers which are electrical shocks
and burns, boiler fires and explosions, and contact with hazardous chemicals
(including asbestos). Asbestos has been widely used in power plants to provide
thermal insulation for steam pipes and turbines, and instances of exposure to workers
have been documented in a variety of jobs (Mandal and Sengupta, 2003). Preventive
measures were put into effect only in the late 1970s. Charter and Tischner (2017)
studies of asbestos insulation workers have shown a higher than expected death rate
due to malignant mesothelioma. The asbestos related health risk in power plants was
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also confirmed by the presence of ferruginous bodies in the sputum of power station
workers (Adhikary et al., 2012).
1.3 Evaluation of Power Plant Risks
The safe working operation of a power plant needs to identify the hazards, assess the
associated risks and bring the risks to tolerable level on a continuous basis (Bucker et
al., 2009). Oliveira et al. (2014) researched about several unsafe conditions and
practices in various process and equipment’s of the power plant lead to a number of
accidents and which can cause loss and injury to human lives, damages the property,
interrupt production etc. A risk assessment is an important step in protecting the power
plant from such conditions (Parnas et al., 1991). It helps us to focus on the risks that
really have the potential to cause harm. Cawthorne, (2006) believes that the hazard
resolution process is to assess the identified hazards in terms of the severity or
consequence of the hazard and the probability of occurrence of each type of hazard.
Risk is always associated with the frequency of failure and consequence effect.
Predicting such situations and evaluation of risk is essential to take appropriate
preventive measures (Hansen, 2005). The major concern of the assessment is to
identify the activities falling in a matrix of high & low frequencies at which the failures
occur and the degree of its impact. Baker et al. (1994) says that the high frequency,
low impact activities can be managed by regular maintenance Whereas, the low
frequency, high impact activities (accidents) are of major concern in terms of risk
assessment. According to (Reason, 2016) when the frequency is low, often the
required precautions are not realized or maintained. However, the risk assessment
identifies the areas of major concerns which require additional preventive measures
(Doty and Turner, 2004).
Due to the risky workplaces that power plants constitute, the organizations need to
assure safe working conditions through systematic and regular hazard identification
and risk assessment (Strupczewski, 2003). Safety procedures and regulations need
to be followed by the management as well as the workers (Kennedy et al., 1980). Many
business enterprises have proven that good safety management leads to increased
productivity, and the same works for power plant.
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Risk Assessment is where the severity of the hazard and its potential outcomes are
considered in conjunction with other factors including the level of exposure and the
numbers of persons exposed and the risk of that hazard being realised (Geller et al.,
2004). There are a number of different formulae used to calculate the overall risk from
basic calculations using high, medium and low categories to complicated algorithms
to calculate risks at power stations and other high-risk work locations.
It is important to ensure that the residual risk following implementation of control

measures is ‘as low as is reasonably possible (ALARP). For a risk to be ALARP it must
be possible to demonstrate that the cost involved in reducing the risk further would be
grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained (Rao et al., 2007).
1.4 Hierarchy of Controls for Power Plant Hazards
The best step an Employer can take to keep the workers safe from power plant
hazards is to implement the hierarchy of controls that are designed to ensure a safe
workplace. Lobel (2005) states that these controls are listed in order of effectiveness
and these should form the basis of your workplace safety strategy.
• Elimination – Physically removing the hazard – this is the most effective hazard
control. Consider moving a power control station from a raised platform to
ground level to remove the risk of falling.
• Substitution – This is the second most effective hazard control and involves
replacing something that produces a hazard (similar to elimination) with
something that does not produce a hazard.
• Engineering Controls – These do not eliminate power plant hazards, but rather
isolate people from hazards by employing a physical barrier that protects
workers from a hazard. Examples include machine guards, railings, or locked-
out machines.
• Awareness – Provide information to enable workers to make safe decisions that
lead to more efficient processes. Provide clear and obvious signage, specific
machine training, and other education.
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• Administrative Controls – Administrative controls change the way people work.

You can implement specific policies to limit employee exposure to power plant
hazards.
• Personal Protective Equipment – PPE is the least effective means of controlling
power plant hazards because of the potential for damage or misuse to make it
ineffective. Arc-rated clothing and fall harnesses should be used in power plants
depending on a worker’s role.
1.5 Accidents at Power Plant
An accident is defined as an unfortunate that happens unpredictably and inadvertently,

resulting in harm or injury (Sikka and Kansal, 1994). A combination of technical
complexity, tight coupling, speed, and human fallibility contribute to the unexpected
failure of large-scale energy technologies (Ghosh and Apostolakis, 2005).
Energy Accidents by Source, 1907–2007
63
23%
51
18%
71 3
25% 1%
91
33%
Natural gas Oil Nuclear Coal Hydroelectric
Figure 2 Energy Accidents by Source from 1907–2007
According to Sovacool (2007), 279 major energy accidents occurred from 1907 to
2007 and they caused 182,156 deaths with $41 billion in property damages, with these
figures not including deaths from smaller accidents. However, by far the greatest
energy fatalities that result from energy generation by humanity, is the creation of air
pollution (Adhikary et al., 2012). The most lethal of which, particulate matter, which is
primarily generated from the burning of fossil fuels and biomass is (counting outdoor
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air pollution effects only) estimated to cause 2.1 to 4.21 million deaths annually
(Sagan, 2004).
Table 1 Power Boiler Incidents from 1999 to 2003

(Source: National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors)
Year Accidents Injuries Deaths
1999 335 41 8
2000 459 20 8
2001 296 56 7
2002 282 14 3
2003 105 12 0
Sovacool (2007) said that the accident occurs depending on the situations, either
results in minor fatalities or have the potential for but do not result in a loss. Accidents
are more usually related with event on site leading to adverse significances for the
establishments like leaks, fire and explosions.
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Power Boiler Fatalities from 1999 to 2003
8 8
7
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Year
Figure 3 Power Boiler Fatalities from 1999 to 2003
In the industrial revolution of the early 1800s, deaths and injuries from boiler
explosions and other pressure vessels were a daily occurrence. As larger and larger
boilers were constructed the loss of life from explosions continued to increase. Kampa
and Castanas (2008) study, found that injury rates are contrast with business cycle
which means when economic sector increases, the number of injuries will increase too
and vice versa. Perrow (2011) relate injury rates to structural effects such as workers
characteristic, firm size, production process, types of industry and types of occupation.
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Power Boiler Accidents from 1999 to 2003
459
335
296 282
105
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Year
Figure 4 Power Boiler Accidents from 1999 to 2003
Even though there has been a drastic reduction in power boiler accidents (referring to
Figure 3 and 4) over the years, power plants continue to report accidents involving
personnel.
Although the loss of life was unacceptable, it was only after a major boiler exploded
on board a riverboat in 1865, killing 1,238 passengers, that the public finally demanded
action to make boilers and other pressure vessels safer (Adhikary et al., 2012). The
outcome of this was the formation of Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance
Company in 1866. In 1879, Hartford wrote the first boiler construction standard
“Uniform Steam Boiler Specifications.” This was followed in 1914, when the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) wrote and published the first American
“Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.” This standard is now accepted worldwide.
Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice.
1.5.1 Property Damage
Only a small amount of accidents caused property damages greater than $1 billion,
with most accidents below the $100 million mark. The second largest source of
fatalities, nuclear reactors, is also the second most capital intense, supporting the
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notion that the larger a facility the more grave (albeit rare) the consequences of its
failure (Charter and Tischner, 2017). The inverse seems true for oil, natural gas, and
coal systems: they fail far more frequently, but have comparatively fewer deaths and
damage per each instance of failure. Halder et al., (2014) study mentioned that
hydroelectric plants were responsible for the most fatalities, nuclear plants rank first in
terms of their economic cost, accounting for 40 % of all property damage. Referring to
Figure 5 Oil and hydroelectric come next at around 25 % each, followed by natural gas
at 9 % and coal at 2 %.
Energy Accident Property Damage by Source
$ 0.7B
2%
$ 16.6B
Natural gas 40%
Oil
Nuclear
$ 9.7B
Coal 24%
Hydroelectric
$ 10.1B
25% $ 3.7B
9%
Figure 5 Energy Accident Property Damage by Source from 1907–2007
2. Objectives of the Study
This project sought to assess the health and safety measures of power plants. The
main goal of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 181 is: “to provide for the health
and safety of persons at work and for the health and safety of persons in connection
with the use of plant and machinery; the protection of persons other than persons at
work against hazards to health and safety arising out of or in connection with the
activities of persons at work; to establish an advisory council for occupational health
and safety; and to provide for matters connected therewith.”
Moreover, the European Union directives on safety and health at work do not establish
any strict regulatory framework on Occupational Health and Safety (OSH)
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management (Felder, 2009). It is up to the employers to decide on how to organize
their power plant operations.
The objectives of this research are as follows:
• Scope what existing research literature is available to address specific

questions relating to the understanding and control of major hazard accidents
at power plants.
• Investigate and describe work related accidents at power plants based on the
Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Control process.
• Identify the causes of major hazard incidents in the power plants and how to
improve risk control.
• Control measures and safety related behaviours to prevent major hazard
incidents.
3. Review of Related Literature
The main focus of the literature review is on the aspects of human behaviour and
organizational aspects that could trigger a major incident and how this behavioural
aspect can be improved to reduce the likelihood and consequences of such incidents
(Dudhani et al., 2006). The review also looked at literature to identify the underlying
causes of accidents and the factors that impact on human behaviour in the major
hazards sectors (Perrow, 1983). Research into the most effective ways of changing
behaviour and systems is also discussed.
In order to understand the nature of accidents, the first question to be addressed by

the literature search was “What are the probable causes and underlying causes that
have been attributed to major hazards incidents in the different types of power plants
e.g. gas turbine power plant, steam turbine power plant, fossil fuel power plant, nuclear
power plant, and hydro power plant (Kennedy et al., 1980).
3.1 Overview of Safety at the Power Plants
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Accidents in the power plant are rare but the consequences are usually very fatal.
Planners need to take a lot of geological and environmental issues into account when
building new power plants (Li and Pridov, 1985).
Safety Fundamentals present the fundamental safety objective and principles of

protection and safety, and provide the basis for the safety requirements (Geller et al.,
2004). An integrated and consistent set of safety requirements establishes the
requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment,
both now and in the future (Reason, 1995). The requirements are governed by the
objective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. Li and Pridov (1985) says that if
the requirements are not met, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required
level of safety. Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to
comply with the safety requirements, indicating an international consensus that it is
necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative measures)
(Parnas et al., 1991). The Safety Guides present international good practices, and
increasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve high levels of
safety (Wall et al., 2001).
In 2009, an accident occurred at Sayano-Shushenskaya near Sayanogorsh in

Khakassia, Russia where the failure of a hydroelectric power station caused death to
75 people. The accident was due to a violent breakdown of turbines. The turbine hall
and engine room were flooded, the ceiling of the turbine hall collapsed, and nine out
of 10 turbines were damaged or destroyed. The entire plant output, totalling
6,400 MW, and a significant portion of the supply to the local electric grid was lost,
leading to widespread power failure in the local area, and forcing major users such as
aluminium smelters to switch to diesel generators (Reyes, 2012).
Since 1950, the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization
have shared a common definition of occupational health that was adopted in 1950 and
later in 1995. The definition reads as follow: “Occupational health should aim at: the
promotion and maintenance of the highest degree of physical, mental and social well-
being of workers in all occupations; the prevention amongst workers of departments
from health caused by their working conditions; the protection of workers in their
employment from risks resulting from factors adverse to health; the placing and
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maintenance of the worker in an occupational environment adapted to his
physiological and psychological capabilities; and, to summarize, the adaptation of
work to man and of each man to his job.”
In recent times, occupational health and safety in power plants has seen a significant
improvement due to increased oversight and government regulations in safety
(Strupczewski, 2003).
Despite the power plant safety laws and regulations, there are unfortunately, an
estimated 2.3 million men and women who die every year according to the
International Labour Organization (ILO) and this is as a result of occupational
accidents and work-related diseases. Halder et al. (2014) pointed that this can be
attributed to the noncompliance of most power industries to the regulations.
The construction of power plants involves potentially high risks for the health and lives
of persons as well as for the environment. Therefore, a particularly high level of safety
is required for power plants. Although most regulations in this sector are provided by
international organizations such as International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) in the form of standards, many companies and countries, including United Arab
Emirates, failed to live up to the expectation of those standards.
Even though the power plants are committed to health and safety excellence, it is yet
to realize its full potential with regard to current applicable Occupational Health and
Safety Legislation that are available on risk and safety standards such as: the ISO
45001:2018 (Occupational Health and Safety) specifies the requirement for a work
health and safety management system. By implementing this system, the power plants
can show more improvements in its performance, by means of effective control of
occupational accidents and disease risks.
The ISO 45001:2018 standard was developed by a committee of occupational health

and safety experts, and follows other generic management system approaches such
as ISO 14001:2015 and ISO 9001:2015. It was based on earlier international
standards in this area such as BS OHSAS 18001, the International Labour
Organization's ILO-OSH Guidelines, various national standards and the ILO's
international labour standards and conventions.
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The significant factors that influence the safety of employees at the power plant are:
• lack of training and supervision;

• non-observance of safe work procedures;
• lack of management commitment; and
• lack of periodical check on machine operations.
3.2 Hazard Identification
The aim of hazard identification is to develop a comprehensive list of sources of risks

and events that might have an impact the power plant operations (Cawthorne, 2006).
This step in the risk assessment process involves the identification of hazards and the
determination of their causes (Kampa and Castanas, 2008). Hazard identification is
the process of defining and describing a hazard, including its Physical characteristics,
magnitude and severity, probability and frequency, causative factors, and locations or
areas affected. Dudhani et al. (2006) explained five basic methods of hazard
identification that may be employed to identify hazards:
• Data from previous accidents (case studies) or operating experience

• Scenario development and judgment of knowledgeable individuals
• Generic hazard checklists
• Formal hazard analysis techniques
• Design data and drawings.
When identifying the safety hazards present in a system, every effort should be made
to identify and catalogue the whole universe of potential hazards (Rasmussen, 1990).
Electric power generation facilities can range from nuclear power plants and wind
turbines, to coal burning facilities and hydroelectric dams (Baker et al., 1994). Each
presents a unique combination of hazards.
Some of the worst workplace accidents in the past 100 years were at power generation
plants, and historically, coal-fired operations have proved the deadliest for workers.
Hazards include fires, explosions, and serious respiratory risks.
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When mining operations first began in the U.S., deaths averaged 1,500 or more each
year. Over time, increased safety efforts helped to reduce the number of deaths to
now less than 30 fatalities each year, yet coal mining and coal burning factories still
pose numerous risks to workers (Adhikary et al., 2012).
In March 2015, a fire and explosion in Xcel Energy’s coal-fired power plant in
Burnsville, Minnesota, sent one worker to the hospital and left three firefighters injured.
The fire began in a smouldering coal bin, and lead to a blast that rocked the plant,
shaking homes well outside the blast radius (Strupczewski, 2003).
The facility’s spokesperson, Patti Nystuen, noted that stored coal must be watered and
monitored frequently because coal dust is so combustible. It’s not clear how often the
Burnsville plant’s coal was being watered at the time, but to prevent further damage
once the initial fire began, plant management shut down coal-fired boilers in the
surrounding area.
Explosions at coal-fired power plants are a real danger. Safety precautions are
critically important to prevent fires and other accidents.
Coal dust, hydrogen, and other gases pose the highest explosion risk in coal power
plants. Whenever these hazards are present, all flame sources should be eliminated
to prevent a combustion hazard, which is exactly what Xcel Energy did after the blast,
only much too late.
Power generation plants pose an array of dangers, but there’s no denying that the
energy produced from power generation operations is vital to modern society and our
way of life. Thankfully, risks associated with power generation can be mitigated
through safe work practices. In the power generation industry, it’s especially important
for employees to be trained in controlling hazardous energy and working safely around
special machinery.
It’s important to note, though, that safety training offers no benefit to workers if they
don’t remember the content covered in the training. Course components like
compelling visuals and 3D animation, as well as interactive practice exercises, help
workers stay engaged and retain the information they learn.
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With quality safety training, the number and severity of accidents in the power
generation industry can be greatly reduced.
3.2.1 Electrical Hazards
Employees should understand the perils of working around electricity, as well as the
precautions that should be taken to avoid injuries and accidents (Hansen, 2005).
There is really not a good common system in place for reporting and recording the
number and type of electrical injuries and fatalities that occur in power plants or
general industry for that matter. “For example,” a worker on a platform could hit a
power line, receive an electrical shock and fall from the platform, breaking an arm or
leg, or worse. This accident could easily be reported and classified as a fall, even
though the fall was obviously caused from an electrical shock (Charter and Tischner,
2017).
Another example could be a worker who drops a screwdriver near open-bus,

energized electrical switchgear and receives a burn from a subsequent arc flash. This
incident might be reported as a burn, not an electrical arc-flash incident (Hale et al.,
2007).
Even with the potential for these incidents to be wrongly classified, the Electrical Safety
Foundation International reports that an average of 133 workers die each year due to
contact with power lines. In addition, most authoritative sources on electrical incidents
report that approximately 400 general industry workers, including power plant workers,
die each year from electrical shocks. When combined, these figures represent one or
two deaths daily due to electrical incidents.
Although these numbers may not seem that large when compared to the total number
of people working around electrical hazards, even one death or serious accident can
be extremely costly and devastating to a company. The National Safety Council
estimates that an electrocution death costs about $1 million.
This figure includes costs of lost productivity over the life of the employee, direct
medical expenses and insurance premiums. Bucker et al. (2009) believes that this is
only a small portion of the actual costs associated with such an accident, because it
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does not reflect the cost of legal liability – such as defending against lawsuits. Bucker
et al. (2009) also points out that this figure does not represent costs associated with
severe injuries, such as burns, that do not cause death. Because of the expense
associated with treating serious burns, the long recovery time associated with them
and the debilitating nature of burns, the costs can be much more than the National
Safety Council’s $1 million estimate.
Often, the person actually working in an electrical cabinet is wearing proper protection,
but others, who may be working with that person but not directly in the cabinet, are not
protected at all. An arc can reach 10 feet from the source, so it is important for anyone
working near an electrical cabinet or similar electrical equipment to be protected.
OSHA sets many of the electrical safety rules for general industry and for utility
workers. According to Bucker et al. (2009), OSHA’s electrical safety rules for utility
workers are a little more stringent than the electrical safety rules for general industry.
This is because under the OSHA rules utility electrical workers are likely classified by
their employer as “qualified workers.” In 29 CFR 1910.269, a qualified worker is
defined as: “One knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the electric power
generation, transmission and distribution equipment involved, along with the
associated hazards.” This category obviously includes power plant workers and
electrical transmission and distribution workers routinely exposed to electrical
hazards.
The best way to prevent accidents is for organizations to conduct more frequent
electrical hazard training; conduct awareness training to make sure workers
understand all the hazards, including arc flash hazards, associated with the specific
equipment; and most importantly, include a safety review during job preplanning.
Employees who work around electricity can easily become complacent because
they’ve performed the tasks for many years.
Failure to recognize a hazard or its potential intensity is one of the main causes of
electrical-related injuries. Employees need to be asking: What arc flash protection do
we need and what is the hazard potential for the arc flash? Some electrical equipment
is capable of a more intense arc flash than other equipment. Employees need to know
this and recognize the potential risk to everyone involved in the job, not just the worker
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actually performing the work. Employees should be trained in the skills and techniques
needed to distinguish exposed live parts and work on or near them.
In addition to improved training and preplanning, adequate safety equipment is

essential. Voltage-rated gloves and tools are a must when working on energized
electrical equipment. Flame-resistant clothing is needed, even if not required, to
protect power plant workers from arc flashes. Shields and hoods are also necessary.
Utilities must use all the tools and techniques available to ensure worker safety, which
includes planning on how the task can be performed with the equipment de-energized,
locked-out and tagged-out.
3.2.2 Boiler Hazards
According to the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI),
between 1999 and 2003, there were 1,477 reported power boiler accidents, resulting
in 143 injuries and 26 deaths (Refer to Figure 6 and 9). Power boilers include utility
boilers as well as boilers used by other industries for cogeneration and on-site power
production.
Power Boiler Incidents from 1999 to 2003
500 459 10
400 335 8
296 282
Deaths
300 6
200 8 8 4
7 105
100 2
3 0
0 0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Deaths Accidents Injuries
Figure 6 Power Boiler Incidents from 1999 to 2003
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It is also important to note that when all boiler types (power boilers, steam heating
boilers and water heating boilers) are considered, power boilers were involved in only
about 16 percent of the total number of accidents, yet they were responsible for more
than 76 percent of boiler-related deaths and approximately 58 percent of all injuries
(Oliveira et al., 2014). These numbers emphasize how important it is for utilities and
other power generators to do everything possible to mitigate power boiler accidents.
Types of Boiler Incidents (1999 to 2003)
Power Boilers
1477
16%
Water Heating
Boilers
4297
46% Steam Heating
Boilers
3615
38%
Figure 7 Types of Boiler Incidents from 1999 to 2003
As shown in Figure 8 there are several causes of power boiler accidents. While low
water condition was the number one cause, operator error or poor maintenance was
a close second.
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Power Boiler Accidents By Category (1999 to 2003)
Safety Valve 15
Others 39
Improper Installation 40
Faulty Design or Fabrication 46
Improper Repair 63
Limit Controls 65
Burner Failure 95
Operator Error or Poor Maintenance 535
Low-Water Condition 579
Figure 8 Power Boiler Accidents by Category from 1999 to 2003
In addition, operator error or poor maintenance was the number one cause of injuries
and second only to burner failure in the number of deaths (Bucker et al., 2009).
As with electrical hazards, adequate operator training is one of the best ways to reduce
power boiler accidents. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code
says training has three important and distinct components:
• providing employees/operators with basic knowledge about their operations;

• providing information about components and equipment; and
• making employees/operators aware of hazards.
ASME’s boiler code suggests that these requirements can be met by conducting mock
upset or event drills. This mock upset or event drills are the largest single need in
boiler related safety training.
Other things that must be considered when putting together a boiler or combustion
equipment safety program include legal compliance issues, such as training records,
proof of interlock, valve tightness testing, lock-out/tag-out OSHA compliance issues,
operator licensing requirements and state or municipal jurisdictional inspection
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requirements. Beyond training, the best way to prevent power boiler accidents is
through proper maintenance and testing of safety devices.
Interlocks are instruments installed to verify that safe conditions exist for lighting off
and operating boilers. They can be switches and/or transmitters depending on the size
and design of the equipment. They include fuel train-related devices like low and high
gas pressure switches, fuel oil temperature switches, atomizing medium switches, fuel
oil gun position switches, air flow switches, flame detectors, low fire proving switches
for light-offs, proof of closure switches on fuel valves, high steam pressure burner cut-
out switches, high and low water cut-offs, auxiliary low water cut-offs, and furnace
pressure switches. In some cases, any or all of these can be alarms as well as cut-
offs.
All nationally recognized safety codes call for at least annual interlock safety testing of
critical components and systems. According to Geller et al. (2004), there are at least
a dozen interlock items to check on almost every boiler, regardless of its size.
Documentation that proves testing was performed should include a detailed list of all
safety items and their status. In addition to finding failed components, testing
sometimes reveals obvious safety violations such as components being bypassed.
Only experienced and trained personnel should perform this testing.
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Power Boiler Injuries from 1999 to 2003
56
41
20
14 12
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Year
Figure 9 Power Boiler Injuries from 1999 to 2003
The ASME, NFPA and NBBI set most standards for the safe construction, operation
and maintenance of boiler systems. Each one publishes a number of codes and
standards relevant to its area of expertise. The NFPA codes cover fire and fuel issues,
while the ASME and NBBI codes cover primarily pressure vessel and/or waterside
issues.
Upgrading equipment is another way to keep boiler operators and plant personnel
safe. Even though codes are not retroactive, this should not be used as an excuse to
never upgrade equipment when it comes to safety issues that could reduce risks.
3.2.3 Chemical Hazards
Many power plants workers are routinely exposed to dangerous chemicals such as
corrosives (acids and bases), oxidizers and solvents (Sikka and Kansal, 1994).
Although there is really no accurate record of the actual number of accidents and
injuries that occur because of exposure to hazardous materials in the workplace, it is
safe to assume that thousands occur each year (Reyes, 2012). It is also safe to say
that the cost associated with injuries from these chemical exposures is far greater than
the cost of preventing them or, at least, mitigating their effects (Doty and Turner, 2004).
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Felder (2009) highlighted that many of the hazardous chemical substances used by
power plant industries are potentially dangerous if accidentally released into the
atmosphere because they can be either toxic or flammable, or both. Despite
improvements in chemical safety management systems, incidents involving the
release of hazardous chemicals continue to happen. In some cases, they result in the
evacuation of residents. For hazardous chemical release accidents, an evacuation
plan needs to be selective enough to consider both the indoor and outdoor
concentrations of nearby buildings and the time in which the maximum allowable
concentration may occur (Woods et al., 1981).
Although the suitable equipment for drenching dictated in the OSHA requirement isn’t
listed, the equipment consists of emergency showers, face washes and eyewashes.
This equipment is designed to immediately curtail the harmful effects of exposure to
hazardous materials. It uses large amounts of water to drench the affected areas of
the body, thus diluting and removing the hazardous materials.
Because the regulations are somewhat general and vague, it is primarily up to the
employer to determine when and where chemical hazards exist and what type of
emergency equipment is needed. It is also up to employers to train their employees
on the proper use of emergency equipment and to ensure emergency equipment is
properly tested and maintained.
OSHA and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) develop and enforce
most of the training and safety regulations related to injuries from hazardous chemical
exposure.
Because the regulations are vague and provide little detail, Hayes offers some tips for
mitigating injuries caused by exposure to hazardous chemicals. It is important to make
sure employees are aware of potential hazards. This requirement is best met through
proper training. It is also important for employees to know the exact location of the
emergency equipment. The equipment can often be hard to find, especially in power
plants, where pipes, conduits and other equipment can hide emergency equipment. It
is extremely important for employees to know how to properly operate the equipment.
Again, this requires proper training.
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Even if employees have the proper training and know exactly what to do when and if
they are exposed to hazardous chemicals, they can still be at great risk of injury if the
equipment is not maintained properly. According to Lobel (2005), showers and washes
are often not properly tested, and therefore, when called upon, do not operate
correctly. All this equipment needs to be tested weekly to ensure there is sufficient
water to the units and to keep the water lines clear of sediment. Lobel (2005) also
recommends that emergency equipment be tested thoroughly at least annually to
ensure that it still meets all the ANSI standards.
Monitoring systems for emergency equipment should also be considered. At the very
least, a local alarm with a flashing light and audible horn should be installed. Often an
employee may be alone in the power plant. Without some sort of alarm, no one will
know an employee is injured. An alarm that alerts the control room is even better and
is not uncommon. This allows at least a record of the event, and it can allow an
emergency response team to be dispatched to the proper locations. Depending on the
distance of the control room to the hazard area(s), the alarm can be either hardwired
into a control panel or a signal can be sent to the control room via a radio frequency
signal, much like the signal used for a garage door opener.
Operating instructions usually deal primarily with the protection of equipment. Rules
and devices for personnel protection are also essential, regardless of the type of boiler
design or fuel. Safety training programs and written safety procedures are integral to
the safe operation of all power plant equipment.
When establishing emergency action plans for power plants especially where
dangerous chemicals are used, it is crucial to be able to predict the dispersal of these
hazardous chemical substances. The adequate prediction of hazardous chemical
distributions can also facilitate evacuations and victim rescue in affected areas.
Whether to “recommend evacuation” or “shelter-in-place” is one of the most critical
decisions facing decision-makers (e.g., emergency managers) as they respond to a
hazardous chemical release incident. To create an appropriate emergency evacuation
procedure (e.g., exit routes, critical plant operations, rescue or medical duties) that
could minimize casualties in a hazardous chemical release, the emergency response
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plan needs to consider indoor/outdoor pollution concentrations and the time-to-
maximum allowable concentrations of nearby buildings, based on release duration.
3.3 Risk Determination
Risk is always associated with the frequency of failure and consequence effect.
Mandal and Sengupta (2003) says predicting high risk situations and evaluation of risk
is essential to take appropriate preventive measures. The major concern of the
assessment is to identify the activities falling in a matrix of high & low frequencies at
which the failures occur and the degree of its impact (Sagan, 2004). The high
frequency, low impact activities can be managed by regular maintenance whereas,
the low frequency, high impact activities (accidents) are of major concern in terms of
risk assessment (Moir et al., 1994). As the frequency is low, often the required
precautions are not realized or maintained (Dekker, 2014). However, the risk
assessment identifies the areas of major concerns which require additional preventive
measures.
Risk classification by severity and probability can be performed by using a risk

assessment matrix. According to Perrow (2011) risk assessment allows one to assign
a risk assessment value to a hazard based on its severity and its probability. This value
is then often used to rank different hazards as to their associated risks. To determine
what actions to take to eliminate or control identified hazards, a system of determining
the level risk involved must be developed. Parnas et al. (1991) view is, a good mishap
risk assessment tool will enable decision makers to properly understand the level of
risk involved, relative to what it will cost in schedule and dollars to reduce that risk to
an acceptable level. Risk determination is an essential and systematic process for
assessing the impact, occurrence and the consequences of human activities on
systems with hazardous characteristics (Wall et al., 2001).
A general approach taken to minimise workplace risks involves planning ahead to

prevent workplace accidents, injuries and illnesses. We do this by ensuring that
systems of work are safe and that equipment is properly maintained (Parnas et al.,
1991). Employees must receive health and safety information, training and appropriate
supervision.
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The implicit assumption is that safety culture is clearly a pervasive and important
aspect of operations but one whose effect on risk may be difficult to quantify. Methods
like preventive MTO (Man, Technology, Organization) analyses and FMEA (Failure
Mode Effect Analysis) are used in a systematic way with the involvement of engineers
and workers to identify possible risks or problems (and their consequences) that might
arise during the performance of the work. These analyses have contributed greatly to
the development of work processes and methods. Power plant workers are also better
prepared for the work and they obtain ‘ownership’ of the work methods used.
3.4 Hydro Power Plant
Advances in Alternating Current (AC) technology opened up new realms for power
generation. Hydropower, for example, marked several milestones between 1890 and
1900 in Oregon, Colorado, Croatia (where the first complete multiphase AC system
was demonstrated in 1895), at Niagara Falls, and in Japan. At about the same time
that hydropower was gaining popularity, inventors were also figuring out how to use
the windmills of the past to generate electricity for the future (Charter and Tischner,
2017).
Hydropower stations can pose significant safety risks to those who work in them.
Some of the hazards at hydropower stations differ from those at thermal power
stations or commercial installations. Hydropower stations typically have limited access
and no natural lighting says Kennedy et al. (1980). Lower floors are often below the
outside water level, and many are underground.
According to (Jacobs and Haber, 1994) hydropower hazards include fire, explosion
(e.g. of pressure vessels), electrocution, flood, entanglement, slips and falls,
chemicals (e.g. sulfur hexafluoride, hydrogen sulfide) and hazardous products (e.g.
asbestos), and asphyxiation (e.g. carbon dioxide).
When designing and implementing a new hydropower scheme, or when upgrading an

existing station, we need to carefully consider the required standard of workplace
health and safety, and the scope of work necessary to achieve that standard.
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This means understanding the relevant legislation, building codes and the
requirements of the insurer. We also need to be clear about how responsibilities are
shared between all the parties involved – the designer, developer, owner, contractors,
and so on. But while standards, codes and guides are a good starting point, the final
solution needs to be tailored to the particular circumstances and level of risk at the
station in question. Safety systems for hydropower plants can be complex and
sophisticated, but simple systems can also be robust – it all depends on the specific
requirements of the facility.
Typically, new hydropower stations are well designed and comply with appropriate
safety standards and local building codes (Rao et al., 2007). Larger hydropower
stations can have safety systems as complex and thorough as those in modern multi-
floor commercial buildings. However, older plants were often designed with little regard
to safety, and now need urgent attention to comply with modern workplace health and
safety standards.
While safety facilities are readily incorporated into new hydropower schemes, they
may be more difficult to retro-fit into existing stations. The scope of work will need to
take into account the interfaces with existing facilities and the tailoring required to suit
the specific site and location.
3.4.1 Hydro Power Plant Incidents
The Shimantan hydroelectric facility failed catastrophically on August 8, 1975, causing

almost $9 billion in property damage and 171,000 deaths. Shimantan was a Soviet-
style hydroelectric facility constructed in the early 1950s on the Ru River. Engineers
designed it to be part of a flood control and electrification scheme intended to reduce
the incidence of severe flooding in the Huai River Basin and provide local villages with
energy services. In early August 1975, Typhoon Nina dumped almost 8 inches of rain
into the basin in 24 h, exceeding the yearly precipitation rate, collapsing buildings and
destroying thousands of villages. Sedimentation clogged the sluice gates on many of
the adjacent reservoirs and dams, worsening the problem, and telegraphs to open
nearby dams failed to reach any of the facilities because of the storm (Adhikary et al.,
2012).
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On 17 August 2009, a turbine of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power
station near Sayanogorsk in Russia failed catastrophically, flooding the building and
killing 75 people. A section of the roof of the turbine hall collapsed; all but one of the
ten turbines were damaged or destroyed. The entire plant output, totalling 6,400 MW
– a significant portion of the supply to the local area – was lost, leading to
widespread power outages.
3.5 Gas Turbine Driven Power Plants
A Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plant consists of an engine, normally a gas turbine
or an internal combustion engine, connected to an electricity generator, and with a
waste heat recovery system connected to the engine exhaust leading to high
efficiencies. The recovered heat may be used for industrial process purposes, space
heating, domestic hot water, etc. A Combined Cycle Gas Turbine Plant (CCGT)
similarly consists of a gas turbine driving a generator, but the recovered heat is used
to generate steam which is used to drive a conventional steam turbine and generate
further electrical power.
The concepts are not new, and similar systems based on reciprocating engines have
been used for many years. The most common larger systems now being installed
comprise a gas turbine, usually fuelled by natural gas and, in some cases, with a liquid
fuel available for stand by purposes. In United Kingdom (UK), the Energy Act 1983
and the reduced regulatory burden on utilities have supported an enormous increase
in activity over the last few years. In addition, most off-shore rigs contain one or more
gas turbine-based plants.
The fuel supply to a gas turbine is required at high pressure. A fuel leak from the fuel
supply pipework is foreseeable. It may arise following assembly, either when new or
following maintenance, since the fuel pipework is routinely dismantled for turbine
maintenance at intervals of one to three years. Gas turbines should operate without
excessive vibration, and vibration detectors are often, but not always, fitted to larger
units to detect bearing failure etc. Such vibration could also cause fuel pipe joint failure.
Catastrophic, e.g. sudden guillotine pipe failure is very improbable, but a fuel leak from
a control valve, flexible pipe, or flanged, screwed or welded pipe joint is a hazard
against which appropriate precautions should be taken.
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Apart from the hazard of an explosion within the acoustic chambers, there are other
explosion hazards, characteristic of any gas fired plant. In particular there is the
possibility of the accumulation of a flammable gas/air mixture within the turbine and
associated inlet and exhaust systems, and its ignition by the combustion process itself,
e.g. at start-up. This hazard is relatively easier to mitigate, with adequate purging and
reliable gas safety shutoff arrangements.
3.5.1 Gas Turbine Driven Power Plant Incidents
Following the Piper Alpha incident in the North Sea in 1988, and the recommendations
of an inquiry held by Lord Cullen, an offshore hydrocarbon release data base has been
set up in UK by the Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
Most offshore installations include gas turbines and the data base thus records
incidents relating to them (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000). Data from 5.5 years of
operation has been analysed, showing that there were 85 incidents within this period
associated with fuel at gas turbines in general. Of these 52 were ignitions, and 4
resulted in explosions. One incident in particular was classified as of major potential.
There was a gas explosion in Holland in 1996 in which an acoustic chamber was
damaged following a fuel leak (Hale et al., 2007). Other incidents in USA, France,
Argentina and Indonesia have been reported, but with little detail, and may be less
relevant (Reyes, 2012).
In Henriksen et al. (2008) point of view, depending on circumstances, and the

indications of a risk assessment which should always be carried out, any necessary
reduction of the foreseeable risk of an explosion can be achieved by the adoption of a
combination of solutions. Different solutions will be appropriate at different plants,
depending upon design, size, location etc. Improvements to both the hardware and to
the software, i.e. the safety management systems, may be possible.
In most cases consideration should be given to improvements in both categories,

although the options for changes to hardware will always be greater during the design
of new installations (Strupczewski, 2003). Software improvements could include
attention to a formal safety management system, quality assurance procedures,
written operating and maintenance procedures, alarm testing, emergency procedures,
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change control and audits, for example. A number of alternatives are available for
selection as a basis for safety and protection against the explosion hazard. These
include the isolation or elimination of the enclosure, explosion relief, explosion
suppression, and ventilation. There are also a range of risk reduction measures such
as access control and fuel pipework engineering improvements.
It is concluded however that the potential for explosions as a consequence of the

identified hazards in the gas turbine power plant has been realised often enough in
practice to make these hazards foreseeable and their mitigation necessary.
3.6 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)
Nuclear power reactors have become a major source of electricity supply in many
countries since the start of operation of the first nuclear power reactor in 1957. Based
on the experience of safe and reliable operation, many operators have sought and
have received authorisation for long-term operation, whereby plant operation
continues beyond the period assumed in the design of the plant. Halder et al.
(2014) states that it is likely that the operators of many other nuclear power plants
around the world will also seek authorisation of long-term operation as the plants
approach the end of their assumed design lives and/or their licence periods.
Nuclear energy is defined as the clean energy as it doesn’t produce any carbon based
by product (Parnas et al., 1991). So nuclear energy is very environment friendly.
Nuclear energy becomes useful in many sectors including generation of electricity,
medicine, farming, and food preservation etc. Now a days the idea of Nuclear Power
Plant (NPP) as well as other nuclear facilities become more popular than ever as using
small amount of nuclear fuel give us a vast outcome of energy. Radioactivity is a
natural phenomenon and natural sources of radiation are features of the environment.
The radiation risks to workers and the public and to the environment that may arise
from these applications have to be assessed and, if necessary, controlled.
The extreme events that led to the prolonged electrical power outage and finally to
sever damage of four units of the Fukushima nuclear plant have highlighted the
importance of ensuring a technical means for stable, long-term cooling of the nuclear
fuel and the containment following a complete station blackout.
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In addition to consideration of plant safety for long-term operation, the environmental
impacts of long-term operation may also need to be considered and assessed.
Approvals by regulatory bodies of long-term operation have been based on reviews of
safety assessments completed by operators.
A global nuclear safety regime is in place and is being continuously improved.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards, which support the
implementation of binding international instruments and national safety infrastructures,
are a cornerstone of this global regime. The IAEA safety standards constitute a useful
tool for contracting parties to assess their performance under these international
conventions.
3.6.1 Nuclear Incidents
Nuclear power plant safety systems are designed to mitigate a range of abnormal
operating conditions. Wall et al. (2001) articulates that nuclear power plants are
equipped with multiple safety systems able to deal with a wide range of abnormal
operating conditions. They also have well-proven emergency operating procedures
that help operators achieve a stable and safe end state (Jacobs and Haber, 1994).
However, the most severe circumstances can result in damage to the nuclear fuel and
the containment structures, possibly leading to a release of radioactivity to the
environment (Sikka and Kansal, 1994). Yet even in these events the consequences
can still be mitigated using available and, in some cases, dedicated plant equipment.
As in other industries, the design and operation of nuclear power plants aims to
minimise the likelihood of accidents, and avoid major human consequences when they
occur (Rao et al., 2007). There have been three major reactor accidents in the history
of civil nuclear power (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima). One was
contained without harm to anyone, the next involved an intense fire without provision
for containment, and the third severely tested the containment, allowing some release
of radioactivity.
• Three Mile Island (USA 1979) where the reactor was severely damaged but
radiation was contained and there were no adverse health or environmental
consequences.
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• Chernobyl (Ukraine 1986) where the destruction of the reactor by steam

explosion and fire killed two people initially plus a further 28 from radiation
poisoning within three months, and had significant health and environmental
consequences.
• Fukushima (Japan 2011) where three old reactors (together with a fourth) were
written off after the effects of loss of cooling due to a huge tsunami were
inadequately contained. There were no deaths or serious injuries due to
radioactivity, though about 19,000 people were killed by the tsunami.
These are the only major accidents to have occurred in over 17,000 cumulative
reactor-years of commercial nuclear power operation in 33 countries (Adhikary et al.,
2012). The evidence over six decades shows that nuclear power is a safe means of
generating electricity. The risk of accidents in nuclear power plants is low and
declining. The consequences of an accident or terrorist attack are minimal compared
with other commonly accepted risks. Radiological effects on people of any radioactive
releases can be avoided.
To protect the public and the environment from the consequences of a nuclear power
plant accident, each plant operator establishes a severe accident management
programme, which is kept under constant review and development. The main objective
of the guidelines used to design such programmes is to utilize any available equipment
at the nuclear power plant to terminate core damage, maintain containment integrity
and minimize the release of radioactivity from the site.
There have been significant incidents reported in the nuclear industry but they were
recognised sufficiently early to prevent their escalation to a major accident.
Table 2 Nuclear power accidents in Belgium
Date Description
2002 "Safety injection during hot shutdown at Tihange 2 unit"
2005 "Inadequate protection relays and related setpoints"
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Date Description
"Severe health effects for a worker at a commercial irradiation facility

2006
as a result of high doses of radiation"
2007-2016 94 incidents at INES level 1
2008 Iodine-131 release in the environment
2011 "Inadequate setting of the auxiliary feedwater turbopump"
Table 3 Nuclear power accidents in Canada
Date Description
The NRX accident. A hydrogen explosion occurred in the

Dec 12, 1952 reactor core due to a cascade of malfunctions and operator
errors. The world's first major nuclear reactor accident.
The NRU accident. A fuel rod caught fire and broke when
May 24, 1958 removed, then dispersed fission products and alpha-emitting
particles in the reactor building.
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident. 2,739 litres of coolant oil

Nov 1978 leaked, most of it into the Winnipeg River. The repair took
several weeks for workers to complete.
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident. Pressure tube, that holds the

Aug 1, 1983 fuel bundles, ruptured due to hydriding. All four reactors re-
tubed with new materials (Zr-2.5%Nb) over ten years.
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident. Pressure tube rupture during

Mar 1986 pressurizing test (reactor shut down). Pressure tube holds the
fuel bundles.
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Date Description
A Heavy water leak of 2300 trillion becquerels of radioactive

Aug 2, 1992 tritium into Lake Ontario, resulting in increased levels
of tritium in Toronto drinking water
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident. A spill of 185 tonnes of heavy

Dec 10, 1994 water. The Emergency Core Cooling System was used to
prevent a meltdown
Pressure tube and calandria tube damage during a channel

June 11, 2002 maintenance procedure, required replacement of the two
tubes.
Around 200,000 litres of water with trace amounts of

Dec 21, 2009 radioactive isotope tritium coming from a storage tank
mistakenly were released by workers into Lake Ontario,
representing 0.1% of the monthly allowed amounts of tritium
for this power
A leak of 73 plant.
cubic metres (73,000 litres) of demineralized
March 14, 2011 water into Lake Ontario from a failed pump seal. There was
negligible risk to the public according to the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission.
Table 4 Nuclear power accidents in France
Date Description
50 kg of uranium dioxide melted inside of the A1 nuclear reactor

17 Oct 1969
of Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux, during a refuelling operation
Radioactive fluids escaped into drains designed for ordinary

25 Jul 1979 wastes, seeping into the local watershed at the Saclay BL3
Reactor
A malfunctioning cooling system fused fuel element together at

13 Mar 1980 the Saint Laurent A2 reactor, melting two fuel assemblies and
forcing an extended shutdown
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Date Description
Electrical cables failed at the command centre of the Bugey

14 Apr 1984 Nuclear Power Plant and forced a complete shutdown of one
reactor
Pipe maintenance at the fuel reprocessing plant at La Hague

21 May 1986 released a radioactive solution to which three welders and two
plant workers were exposed.
An unexpectedly strong storm flooded the Blayais Nuclear Power

27 Dec 1999 Plant, forcing an emergency shutdown after injection pumps and
containment safety systems failed from water damage
Control systems and safety valves failed after improper installation

21 Jan 2002
of condensers, forcing a two-month shutdown
Sub-standard electrical cable trays at the Cattenom-2 nuclear

16 May 2004 reactor caused a fire in an electricity tunnel, damaging many safety
systems cables
Dozens of litres of wastewater contaminated with uranium were

13 Jul 2008
accidentally poured on the ground and runoff into a nearby river
Assembly system failed to properly eject spent fuel rods from

9 Aug 2009 the Grave lines Nuclear Power Plant, causing the fuel rods to jam
and the defueling operation to be suspended
Fire on a primary pump of the second reactor, followed by a small

5 Apr 2012
radioactive leak into the containment
20 reactors of the 1300 MW-class with seismic weaknesses on

2017
their emergency diesel generators
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Table 5 Nuclear power accidents in Germany
Date Description
A near core meltdown at Greifswald Nuclear Power Plant: Three out

of six cooling water pumps were switched off for a failed test. A
1975
fourth pump broke down and control of the reactor was lost. 10 fuel
elements were damaged before recovery
Operator actions to dislodge damaged fuel elements at the thorium

4 May 1986 high-temperature reactor released radioactivity to
4 km2 surrounding the facility
Stop valve failed for a moment at Biblis Nuclear Power Plant;

17 Dec 1987
contamination of local area in the reactor building
Table 6 Nuclear power accidents in India
Date Description
Fast Breeder Test Reactor at Kalpakkam refuelling accident that

4 May 1987
ruptures the reactor core, resulting in a two-year shutdown
Operators at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station find that the reactor
10 Sep 1989 had been leaking radioactive iodine at more than 700 times normal
levels. Repairs to the reactor take more than a year
A malfunctioning tube causes the Tarapur Atomic Power Station to

13 May 1992
release 12 curies of radioactivity
The Narora Atomic Power Station suffers a fire at two of its steam
31 Mar 1993 turbines blades, damaging the heavy water reactor and almost
leading to a meltdown
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Date Description
The Rajasthan Atomic Power Station leaks radioactive helium and

2 Feb 1995 heavy water into the Rana Pratap Sagar River, necessitating a two-
year shutdown for repairs
Almost 100 kg radioactive sodium at a fast breeder reactor leaks

22 Oct 2002 into a purification cabin, ruining a number of valves and operating
systems
Table 7 Nuclear power accidents in Japan
Date Description
8 Jan 1975 Radioactivity released from Mihama nuclear power plant.
Japan's first criticality accident at No 3 reactor, this accident was

2 Nov 1978
hidden for 29 years and reported on 22 Mar 2007
Two workers suffer radioactive contamination at the Tokaimura

2 Apr 1979
complex.
24–28 Jan 1981 29 workers were exposed to radiation.
56 workers were exposed to about 45 tonnes of radioactive waste

which spilled from storage tanks at the Tsuruga Nuclear Power
Plant. The waste was cleaned up with buckets and mops, and
8 Mar 1981
was also discharged into Tsuruga Bay via the town sewer. At the
time, the plant had recorded 30 malfunctions since it was
commissioned in 1970.
31 Aug 1985 Fire at Fukushima nuclear power plant during routine shutdown.
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Date Description
Twelve people suffer "slight" plutonium contamination while

23 Jun 1986
inspecting a storeroom.
Radioactivity was released from Fukui nuclear power plant after

8 Feb 1991 an emergency release valve failed. Officials said the release "did
not pose a threat to humans or the environment."
High-pressure steam accident kills one worker and injures two

22 Feb 1993
others.
The fast breeder Monju Nuclear Power Plant sodium leak. State-
Dec 1995 run operator Donen was found to have concealed videotape
footage that showed extensive damage to the reactor.
The Tokaimura nuclear reprocessing plant fire and explosion. 37

workers were exposed to low doses of radiation. Donen later
11 Mar 1997
acknowledged it had initially suppressed information about the
fire.
A fuel loading system malfunctioned and set off an uncontrolled

18 Jun 1999
nuclear reaction and explosion.
The criticality accident at the Tokai fuel fabrication facility.

30 Sept 1999 Hundreds of people were exposed to radiation and two workers
later died. This is not a nuclear power plant accident, however.
Two workers were exposed to a small amount of radiation and

2002
suffered minor burns during a fire.
A main piping burst in the turbine building of the Mihama-3

station; the subsequent investigation revealed a serious lack in
9 Aug 2004
systematic inspection in Japanese nuclear plants, which led to a
massive inspection program.
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Date Description
A small amount of radioactive steam was released at the

2006
Fukushima Dai-ichi plant and it escaped the compound.
A severe earthquake (measuring 6.8 on the Richter magnitude

scale) hit the region where Tokyo Electric's Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Nuclear Power Plant is located and radioactive water spilled into
the Sea of Japan; as of March 2009, all of the reactors remained
16 Jul 2007
shut down for damage verification and repairs. The plant with
seven units is the largest single nuclear power station in the
world, which now again is shut down due to the Fukushima
accident.
Leakage accident of radioactive water. 34 workers were exposed

Dec 2009
to radiation
The world's second INES 7 accident. A magnitude 9.0

earthquake and associated tsunami triggered cooling problems
at Fukushima 1 & 2 stations with several reactors. Loss of coolant
resulted in meltdowns in three units and hydrogen explosions
caused their structural damage. Radioactive steam was released
Mar 2011
into the atmosphere, and highly radioactive water spilled into the
ocean through utility trenches. Some immediate injuries resulted.
117 workers received committed effective doses above 100 mSv,
and 6 workers received doses above the emergency dose limit of
250 mSv.
The incident occurred at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency's

Oarai Research and Development Center, after a bag containing
radioactive material tore open while a check on radioactive
6 Jun 2017 storage inside a "controlled" room was performed. It resulted in
internal radiation exposure in five workers, with one of them
inhaling plutonium. However, no radiation was detected in the
external environment.
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Table 8 Nuclear power accident in Pakistan
Date Description
The KANUPP Karachi nuclear power plant imposed a seven-

hour emergency after heavy water leaked from a feeder pipe to
18 Oct 2011 the reactor. The leakage took place during a routine maintenance
shut down, and the emergency was lifted seven hours later, after
the affected area was isolated.
Table 9 Nuclear power accidents in the Russian Federation
Date Description
Kyshtym disaster: Explosion in a waste tank of the plant with a massive

1957 radioactive cloud, deteriorating deeply the health of the region’s
population
An RBMK reactor released a radioactive cloud which traveled over

1992 north-eastern Europe. Russian officials declared that they saw no
immediate danger posed by the event.
Worker Sergei Kharitonov revealed photographs of cracked walls and

groundwater seepage at a nuclear power plant waste storage facility.
1997
He also revealed that the plant has been dumping 300 litres of
contaminated water into the Gulf of Finland annually "for years".
An RBMK reactor was shut down following the discovery of a radiation

April 1998
leak.
Roshydromet had issued report stated rise in beta activity of aerosols

and surfaces at all monitoring posts in South Ural from 25 Sep to 1 Oct
2017. In two aerosol samples Ru-106 activity increase was detected.
2017 At 26 and 27 Sep Ru-106 decay products was detected in Tatarstan
republic. At 27 and 28 Sep high pollution levels of aerosols and
surfaces was detected in Volgograd and Rostov-on-Don. In two
aerosol samples from Chelyabinsk Oblast 986 and 440-fold activity
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Date Description
increase was measured comparing to preceding month. The Mayak

nuclear plant is widely suspected as the source of the radiation.
On August 9 2019, an explosion triggered radiation levels to rise near

Nyonoksa, which was later confirmed by Russia’s nuclear energy
agency as an accident while testing an isotope power source for a
Aug 2019 liquid-fuelled rocket engine. Five nuclear scientists had died and three
suffered from burns. Russian authorities ordered the evacuation of the
village nearing the blast site, suggesting grave dangers due to nuclear
radiation.
Table 10 Nuclear power accident in South Korea
Date Description
22 workers employed by the Korea Electric Power Corp were exposed

to radioactive liquid and gas at the Wolsung-3 reactor. Two workers
4 Oct 1999 were initially exposed when approximately 12 gallons of heavy water
leaked during pipe maintenance. A further 20 workers were exposed
during clean-up operations.
Table 11 Nuclear power accidents in Ukraine
Date Description
Steam explosion and meltdown (Chernobyl disaster) necessitating

26 Apr 1986 the evacuation of 300,000 people from Pripyat region and dispersing
radioactive material across Europe.
Metal structures broke, causing a gamma ray source to fall out of its
Oct 1999 container and expose two workers to "high" levels of radiation. The
reactor was subsequently shut down until November.
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Table 12 Nuclear power accidents in United Kingdom
Date Description
Radioactivity release contaminated about 800 farms and introduced

Spring,
Strontium 90 to domestic milk supply. Milk was sold to the public
1957
without any warnings.
8 Oct 1957 Fire ignites plutonium piles, contaminating surrounding dairy farms.
Partial meltdown at Dumfries and Galloway. Graphite debris partially

blocked a fuel channel causing a fuel element to melt and catch fire
May 1967 at the Chapelcross nuclear power station. Contamination was
confined to the reactor core. The core was repaired and restarted in
1969, operating until the plant's shutdown in 2004.
A hydrogen explosion at the plant caused by a reaction of potassium

May 1977 and sodium. This furthermore resulted in a concrete slab being
destroyed, and the debris being scattered around the facility.
A fuel reprocessing plant was shut down after elevated radiation

Sep 1996
levels were detected in waste-water discharged to the sea.
Two workers exposed to radiation due to a leak from a damaged bag

Feb 1998
containing a nuclear filter.
20 tonnes uranium and 160 kg plutonium leak from a cracked pipe at

19 Apr 2005
the Thorp nuclear fuel reprocessing plant
Table 13 Nuclear power accidents in the United States of America
Date Description
Power excursion with partial core meltdown at National Reactor

Nov 29, 1955
Testing Station's EBR-1 Experimental Breeder Reactor I
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Date Description
Partial core meltdown at Santa Susana Field Laboratory’s Sodium

Jul 26, 1959
Reactor Experiment
Explosion at National Reactor Testing Station's SL-1 Stationary

Jan 3, 1961
Low-Power Reactor Number One
Sodium cooling system malfunctions at Enrico Fermi demonstration

Oct 5, 1966
breeder reactor causing partial core meltdown
Steam generator leak causes manual shutdown of pressurized

Aug 11, 1973
water reactor
Fire burns for seven hours and damages more than 1600 control
Mar 22, 1975 cables for three nuclear reactors at Browns Ferry, disabling core
cooling systems
Hydrogen gas explosion damages the Cooper Nuclear Station’s

Nov 5, 1975
auxiliary building
Hydrogen gas explosion damages three buildings and forces

Jun 10, 1977
shutdown of Millstone-1 Pressurized Water Reactor
Surry Unit 2 shut down in response to failing tube bundles in steam

Feb 4, 1979
generators
Loss of coolant and partial core meltdown, see Three Mile Island
Mar 28, 1979
accident and Three Mile Island accident health effects
100,000 gallons of Hudson River water leaked into the Indian Point
Energy Center Unit 2 containment building from the fan cooling unit,
Oct 17, 1981 undetected by a safety device designed to detect hot water. The
flooding, covering the first 9 feet of the reactor vessel, was
discovered when technicians entered the building. Two pumps
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Date Description
which should have removed the water were found to be inoperative.

NRC proposed a $210,000 fine for the incident.
Recirculation system piping fails at Nine Mile Point Unit 1, forcing

Mar 20, 1982
two-year shutdown
Damage to steam generator tubes and main generator resulting in

Mar 25, 1982
a shutdown Indian Point Energy Center Unit 3 for more than a year
Feedwater heat extraction line fails at Oconee 2 Pressurised Water

Jun 18, 1982
Reactor, damaging thermal cooling system
Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant fails safety inspection, forced to

Feb 12, 1983
shut down for repairs
Damaged thermal shield and core barrel support at St Lucie Unit 1,

Feb 26, 1983
necessitating 13-month shutdown
Safety violations, operator error, and design problems force six-year

Sep 15, 1984
outage at Browns Ferry Unit 2
Instrumentation systems malfunction during start-up, which led to

Mar 9, 1985
suspension of operations at all three Browns Ferry Units
Recurring equipment problems force emergency shutdown of

Apr 11, 1986
Boston Edison's Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant
1986 Broken Feedwater line at Surry Nuclear Power Plant
Peach Bottom units 2 and 3 shutdown due to cooling malfunctions

Mar 31, 1987
and unexplained equipment problems
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Date Description
Malfunctions force Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation to shut

Dec 19, 1987
down Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Refuelling cavity seal fails and destroys internal pipe system at

Sep 10, 1988
Surry Unit 2, forcing 12-month outage
Atmospheric dump valves fail at Palo Verde Unit 1, leading to main

Mar 5, 1989
transformer fire and emergency shutdown
Inspections at Calvert Cliff Units 1 and 2 reveal cracks at

Mar 17, 1989
pressurized heater sleeves, forcing extended shutdowns
Safety and fire problems force shut down of the FitzPatrick nuclear
Nov 17, 1991
reactor for 13 months
NRC forces shut down of Brunswick Units 1 and 2 after emergency

Apr 21, 1992
diesel generators fail
Auxiliary feed-water pumps fail at South Texas Project Units 1 and

Feb 3, 1993
2, prompting rapid shutdown of both reactors
New York Power Authority shuts down Indian Point Energy

Feb 27, 1993
Center Unit 3 after AMSAC system fails
Equipment failures and broken pipes cause shut down of Sequoyah

Mar 2, 1993
Unit 1
Shut down of Fermi Unit 2 after main turbine experienced major

Dec 25, 1993
failure due to improper maintenance
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Date Description
Steam generator tubes unexpectedly crack at Maine Yankee

14 Jan 1995
nuclear reactor; shut down of the facility for a year
May 16, 1995 Ventilation systems fail at Salem Units 1 and 2
Leaking valve forces shutdown Millstone Nuclear Power Plant Units

Feb 20, 1996
1 and 2, multiple equipment failures found
Balance-of-plant equipment malfunction forces shutdown and

Sep 2, 1996
extensive repairs at Crystal River Unit 3
Reactor recirculation pump fails, prompting shut down of Clinton

Sep 5, 1996
boiling water reactor
Service water system fails and results in closure of LaSalle Units 1

Sep 20, 1996
and 2 for more than 2 years
Sep 9, 1997 Ice condenser containment systems fail at Cook Units 1 and 2
Steam leak in feed-water heater causes manual shutdown and

May 25, 1999 damage to control board annunciator at the Millstone Nuclear Power
Plant
Major Freon leak at Hope Creek Nuclear Facility causes ventilation

Sep 29, 1999 train chiller to trip, releasing toxic gas and damaging the cooling
system
Severe corrosion of control rod drives in the reactor head forces 24-
Feb 16, 2002
month outage of Davis-Besse reactor
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Date Description
A fault in the main transformer at the Donald C. Cook nuclear power

Jan 15, 2003 plant causes a fire that damages the main generator and back-up
turbines
Exelon's Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station leaks tritium and

Jun 16, 2005
contaminates local water supplies
Entergy's Indian Point Energy Centre Nuclear Plant leaks tritium

Aug 4, 2005
and strontium into underground lakes from 1974 to 2005
Nuclear fuel services plant spills 35 litres of highly enriched uranium,

Mar 6, 2006
necessitating 7-month shutdown
Twelve workers were contaminated after radioactive dust was

Nov 21, 2009 mobilized at the Three Mile Island plant during pipe maintenance
works.
NRC inspectors reported that an estimated 600,000 gallons of mildly

radioactive steam was intentionally vented after an automatic
Jan 7, 2010
shutdown of Indian Point Energy Center Unit 2. The levels of tritium
in the steam were below those allowable by NRC safety standards.
Deteriorating underground pipes from the Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Feb 1, 2010
Power Plant leak radioactive tritium into groundwater supplies
Massive steam leak in the turbine building of Donald C. Cook

Jul 2016
Nuclear Plant, unit 2
Ghosh and Apostolakis (2005) investigated the organisational contribution to nuclear

power plant safety and discussed the findings of the investigations into Davis Besse
Nuclear Power Station Incident (2002) and Paks Fuel Damage Incident (2003). They
also reported on two other studies to look at the underlying causes of accidents in
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nuclear power plants. The first of these reports by the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (US NRC) analysed 48 events at US nuclear power plants for
human performance contributions and found human errors were included among the
root causes in 37 of the events. The second study was by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
(2003) on recurring events in the nuclear industry. Management and organisational
factors that were revealed as root causes in multiple events, and specific behaviours
included: deficiencies in safety culture in general; deficiencies in communication;
deficiencies in work practices such as not following procedures, lack of clear work
responsibilities, improper use of system diagrams; a lack of design basis information
available; inadequate management; heavy workload; and insensitivity to shutdown risk
activities (McCulloch and Tweedale, 2008).
Ghosh and Apostolakis (2005) discuss two such incidents in a paper on the
organisational contributions to nuclear power plant safety. Some of the issues
highlighted were:
a) Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station Incident (2002)
• Severe vessel head corrosion resulting from inadequate processes for

assessing safety of the plant; delayed shut down of the plant;
• Failure to recognise and consider other secondary warning signals in a holistic
fashion;
• Inadequate safety culture meant this issue was never identified or dealt with;
• Failure to reflect latest practices within industry;
• Inconsistent and incomplete company policies on safety; and
• Incentive programs based on production levels not safety.
b) Paks Fuel Damage Incident (2003)
• Fuel damage resulted from inadequate new procedures i.e. The unsafe design
and operation of the cooling system; inadequate reporting culture;
• Inefficient monitoring systems;
• No alarm;
• Inadequate organisational commitment to safety; and
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• Inadequate sharing of safety information.
3.7 Thermal Power Plant
Coal is the only natural resource and fossil fuel available in abundance. Consequently,
it is used widely as a thermal energy source and also as fuel for thermal power plants
producing electricity (Rao et al., 2007). India has about 90,000 MW installed capacity
for electricity generation, of which more than 70% is produced by coal-based thermal
power plants. Hydro-electricity contributes about 25%, and the remaining is mostly
from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).
The problems associated with the use of coal are low calorific value and very high ash
content. The ash content is as high as 55 to 60%, with an average value of about 35
to 40%. Further, most of the coal is located in the eastern parts of the country and
requires transportation over long distances, mostly by trains, which run on diesel.
About 70% oil is imported and is a big drain on India’s hard currency. In the
foreseeable future, there is no other option likely to be available, as the nuclear power
programme envisages installing 20,000 MWe by the year 2020, when it will still be
around 5% of the installed capacity. Hence, attempts are being made to reduce the
adverse health and environmental impacts of coal-fired power plants. Similar situation
exists in many developing countries of the region, including the People’s Republic of
China, where coal is used extensively.
Even though coal is available in abundance, its quality is poor in most of the countries.
Whatever good quality coal available is used by the metallurgical industry, like steel
plants. The coal supplied to power plants is of the worst quality. Coal is also used for
cooking and other applications where thermal energy is required, because coal is
cheap. Most of the coal is of anthracite, bituminous and sub-bituminous type.
3.7.1 Thermal Power Plant Incidents
Thermal power plants using fossil fuels produce particulates, oxides of sulphur,
nitrogen, carbon and toxic metals like arsenic, mercury, etc., in trace concentrations.
Woods et al. (1981) point of view is that the health risk of all these are deterministic.
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The end points are also different. In the case of the former, it is the probability of
causing cancer and in the case of the latter, it is certain somatic damage.
On 01 November 2017, an explosion and fire at National Thermal Power Corporation

(NTPC’s) Feroze Gandhi Unchahar Thermal Power Station in India killed 43 people
and injured many more. The incident investigation will take some time to complete, but
an NTPC official reportedly said pressure inside the boiler reached 70 times normal
operating pressure prior to the blast. An emergency shut-off mechanism apparently
failed to actuate, causing the explosion, which resulted in pressurized steam and hot
flue gases overwhelming dozens of workers (Sikka and Kansal, 1994).
The Kingston Fossil Plant coal fly ash slurry spill was an industrial disaster that
occurred on 22 December 2008, when a dike ruptured at a coal ash pond at
the Tennessee Valley Authority's Kingston Fossil Plant in Roane County, Tennessee,
releasing 1.1 billion US gallons (4,200,000 m3) of coal fly ash slurry. The coal-fired
power plant, located across the Clinch River from the city of Kingston, uses ponds
to dewater the fly ash, a by-product of coal combustion, which is then stored in ponds.
The spill released a slurry of fly ash and water, which travelled across the Emory
River and its Swan Pond embayment, onto the opposite shore, covering up to 300
acres (1.2 km2) of the surrounding land. The spill damaged multiple homes and flowed
into nearby waterways including the Emory River and Clinch River (tributaries of
the Tennessee River). It was the largest fly ash release and worst coal ash-related
disaster in United States history.
3.8 Accident Risks in Power Plants
The general safety objective for power plants is to protect the individual, society and
the environment by establishing and maintaining effective measures against all the
identified hazards (Parnas et al., 1991). To reach this objective, safety goals should
be established from the very beginning of its development, and should be more
demanding as the technology matures. According to Adhikary et al. (2012) the initial
qualitative targets were that no individual should bear a significant additional risk due
to power plant operation and the societal risks from power plant operation should not
be a significant addition to other societal risks.
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A more serious accident happened in April 1999 at Tampa Electric’s Gannon Station
when a hydrogen explosion occurred in the generators of Unit 6. At the time it was
determined that the explosion occurred because an access cover was opened before
the unit had been purged of hydrogen. In this accident 42 people were injured,
including three fatalities (Strupczewski, 2003).
In 2001 a worker at the Ebensburg cogeneration plant in Pennsylvania was fatally

injured and three others were scalded from a sudden blast of steam and ash. The
workers had been in the process of rigging scaffolding in the furnace when leaking
water splashed on the hot ash in the bottom of the boiler.
In another incident, this one on 29 June 2017 at the Big Bend Power Station in Apollo
Beach, Florida, five workers were killed while trying to unplug a slag tank blockage
under the plant’s Unit 2 boiler. The workers were water-blasting through a “doghouse
door” while the unit was online. Local media sources reported that about 20 minutes
into the job, molten slag, which can reach temperatures above 1,000F, burst through
the door, burning the workers severely. Two died at the scene and three perished later
as a result of their injuries.
According to Wall et al. (2001) the biggest concern is injuries related to electrical
hazards. In the US, an average of 133 workers suffer fatal injuries from contact with
power lines every year. While the common conception may be that electrocution is the
biggest concern, the majority of electrical injuries in power plants are actually burns
related to arc flashes. They are incredibly dangerous because of the massive currents
created in power plants.
Halder et al. (2014) articulated that the underlying causes of accidents in the power
plants included: maintenance errors, inadequate procedures, inadequate job planning,
inadequate risk assessments, inadequate training of staff, unsafe working condoned
by supervisors/ managers, inadequate control and monitoring of staff by managers,
inadequate control and monitoring of contractors working on site, etc.
The National Safety Council estimates that an electrocution death costs an employer
approximately $1 million. No amount of money can cover the costs of a family’s grief.
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It is both the employer’s and worker’s responsibility to ensure that a workplace is as
safe as possible.
3.9 Organizational Issues
A strong safety culture is supported and sustained by the plant organizational structure
(Halder et al., 2014). Every country and the utilities within that country organize power
plant operations in a fashion that best suits their particular needs (Gherardi and
Nicolini, 2000).
Whatever design structure is used, the following key factors should be incorporated to
foster the safety culture of the power plant:
• One designated individual (e.g. the field supervisor, foreman or lead worker)
should be accountable at all times for the work being performed. This includes
job coordination, use of procedures, clearances or permits, material used and
personnel work practices. This accountability, and the responsibilities involved,
should be written down, clearly defined and communicated.
• Field supervision, involving periodic observation of the work activity, is
necessary. For more complex jobs this supervision may need to be continuous.
Regardless of the case, field supervision provides consistency in the application
and support of safety and quality standards.
• Precursors of negative trends in safety and safety culture need to be tracked
and periodically reviewed with workers. Where appropriate, process and
procedural corrective action need to be instituted to prevent a recurrence of
these negative trends.
• The structure should allow for contractors to be educated in a power plant’s
safety standards. If they are to work on plant equipment, the safety standards
that the contractors need to follow should be the same as those followed by
plant personnel. Long term partnerships with contractor personnel are
encouraged in support of this effort.
• Post-job briefings are very effective in supporting the policy of collating the
lessons learned and in enhancing safety culture.
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• Additionally, the organization can allow for some work activities to be conducted
using a matrix of specializations (for example, systems, components and
individuals with skills in several areas of a discipline or with multidisciplinary
skills).
3.9.1 Role of Safety Culture in Power Plant Operations
Safety culture is an attribute of the whole plant, and thus a strong safety culture is a
vital part of safe plant operation (Jacobs and Haber, 1994). Safety culture is the
complexity of beliefs, shared values and behaviour reflected in making decisions and
performing work in a power plant (Reyes, 2012). Both operations and maintenance of
power plant facilities deserves special attention, as they can have both a direct and an
indirect effect on equipment reliability. Adverse safety effects can arise, depending
upon the level of skill of the personnel involved, safety awareness and the complexity
of the work process (Rao et al., 2007). Any delayed effects resulting from challenges
to maintenance can cause interruptions in operation, and hence affect the safety of a
plant or facility.
The presence of a strong safety culture in power plant operations contributes

significant value to the safe operation of a plant. With respect to power plant
operations, safety culture means keeping the operations process on track and in
control at every stage of plant performance (Wall et al., 2001). Plant management
supports this by monitoring, evaluating and making decisions on all important aspects
(safety, technical and financial) of plant performance as well as on the consequences
of operational activities.
Furthermore, plant management must establish safety priorities based on the safety
and quality policy of the plant. When there is a strong safety culture, staff excel in the
preparation and execution of the tasks in compliance with the safety, quality and
technical specifications. In terms of qualification, personnel are certified, organizations
are qualified and operational technologies are approved. The personnel element is
crucial for the continuous improvement of safety culture and this, in turn, enables each
individual to contribute towards achieving the overall goals.
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To maintain a strong safety culture, procedures should be developed with the
concurrence of the affected maintenance organization. In this connection, safe work
management can address the following issues:
• Job planning, including writing proper safety instructions and/or safety

procedures for the power plant operations;
• Proactive planning, incorporating analysis of risks for disturbances and
continuous awareness of what could go wrong;
• Mechanisms to deal with contractors;
• Interdepartmental and work team coordination;
• Operational prioritization;
• Planning of shutdown and start-up and associated coordination;
• Maintaining an updated schedule of work activities for unplanned shutdowns;
• Pre-job briefings;
• Ensuring accurate control and documentation before performing the task,
during the task and upon completion of work activities;
• Openness to early warning signals, delays, disturbances, etc.;
• Clear accountability at all stages of the process; and
• Procedures for handling work activities which cannot be finalized as planned.
3.9.2 Commitment to High Standards of Safety
Power plants have bragging rights over their consistently high safety performance and
relentless focus on building and sustaining safety culture (Dekker, 2014). It is difficult
to stay focused on something as fuzzy as culture and high-risk industries has more
important things to do like run their operations (Geller et al., 2004).
Cawthorne (2006) explains that company leaders are reluctant to spend time and
energy on organizational health or culture because they feel they are above all that
(and don’t need to be bothered), they are hooked on the daily rush of running the
business, and/or they can’t measure organizational health so why bother. Yet power
plants that do work to build the right culture have an advantage and generally perform
better (Hansen, 2005).
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Felder (2009) emphasized that it is very important to have an alignment from the top
leadership team on the business case for high safety standards. In McCulloch and
Tweedale (2008) point of view leaders need to commit to specific ways in which they
will demonstrate high safety standards and hold one another accountable to those
commitments. Management has to communicate to the organization that employees
are raising the bar by lowering the threshold on what level of event garners attention
and investigation (Kennedy et al., 1980). Consistently respond to low-level events and
repeatedly explain that they are precursors to more serious events and need to be
seen as learning opportunities.
It is vital for an organization to use the human error prevention tools. Adopt a small set
of human error prevention tools, train on their usage, and communicate broadly and
repeatedly how you expect people to use them. Respond accordingly when people
use them and when people fail to properly employ them, with or without a
consequential event. Continually measure and track safety performance, including
human performance error rates, at all levels of the organization. Communicate results
at least monthly, compare yourself to world class (safe environment = no fatalities)
and be transparent.
Safety teams need to have strong employee participation and they need to be credible,
well-run groups. Actively seek input and communicate changes made in response to
employees’ input. Use legitimate (reliable and valid) safety culture assessment
processes annually to determine trends and progress made, as well as to proactively
identify organizational issues that contribute to safety performance.
3.10 Human Factor in Power Plant Operations
In a complex industrial facility such as a power plant, the majority of the tasks are
performed by machines. But man is, of course, involved to a great extent in their
design, testing, maintenance and operation (Reyes, 2012). The performance of a
person working within a complex mechanical system depends on that person's
capabilities, limitations and attitudes, as well as on the quality of instructions and
training provided. The interface between a machine and its operators in any industrial
project is usually known as the human factor.
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Overall system reliability in a power plant is more often dependent on individuals than
on the equipment. Although a human reliability assessment has the same objective as
an assessment of equipment reliability, in the latter case, logical methods are used to
study the structure of the system and the role of the designed safeguards. For human
reliability assessment, there are no equivalent methods for identifying significant
potential human failures on a purely logical basis, and great reliance is placed on the
expertise and experience of the assessor.
It is difficult to evaluate human performance qualitatively because a decision can be

affected by many psychological factors. For example, individuals may vary in their
performance of well-defined tasks, depending on their familiarity with the task, their
state of fatigue, what other tasks have to be performed, a changing physical
environment at work or a tense psychological environment at home, and many other
factors.
A three-level model of human thought processes was developed, and different types
of mental error were identified for each level:
• Errors in trained skills, such as clumsiness;

• Errors in learned rules, such as forgetfulness; and
• Errors in creative thinking, such as incorrect interpretation of an event.
All of these can cause critical mistakes in operating a power plant.
There are obviously many ways to avoid human error, for example, distinctive and
consistent labelling of equipment, control panels and documents; displaying
information concerning the state of the plant so that the operator easily understands it
and does not make a faulty diagnosis; and designing systems to give unambiguous
responses to operator actions so incorrect actions can be easily identified. Systems
should also be designed to limit the need for human intervention, overcome failures
due to human causes or at least minimise their consequences.
3.10.1 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
A Probabilistic Safety, or Risk, Assessment is the method used by the power plant
industry to calculate and compare different accident scenarios and to identify those
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areas of greatest concern. Since human beings are infinitely complex, predicting their
performance is particularly difficult (Dudhani et al., 2006). Henriksen et al. (2008)
highlights that, if it could be done, even with limited accuracy, it would contribute
greatly to such a safety assessment.
After the accidents at the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plants
(NPPs), the influence of human errors on NPPs has aroused wide concern. For this
reason, Human Factors Engineering (HFE) has become important in the design and
operation of Power Plants. In the design of Power Plants, the elements of HFE must
be taken into consideration, particularly the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).
In the past, during the design of Power Plants, analysis of human actions usually
adopted the qualitative analysis of HRA (Rao et al., 2007). As an essential part of the
HFE review, human actions have drawn the attention. Considering the numerosity and
variety human actions in the operation of Power Plants, Baker et al. (1994) says that
it is necessary to screen for the critical human actions and identify the corresponding
risk contributions.
The present ways aim at reducing the workload of designers by providing a theoretical
basis for Human System Interface (HSI) design, procedure development and
improvement of training program. The screening of human actions adopts the concept
of importance measures used to rank components based on their contributions to
system risk, within a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) framework. Importance
measures are often used in the selection of critical components, for reliability design
and maintenance optimization, etc. (Sallak et al., 2013; Zio and Luca, 2003).
3.11 Safe Work Management
The purpose of work management is to ensure that the power plant operations are
performed correctly as planned, scheduled and coordinated (Gherardi and Nicolini,
2000). The planning function is designed to provide consistency in instructions and
procedures for workers during assignments in order to return the equipment to its
original and operable condition, and to avoid introducing any hardware changes that
have not been engineered into the equipment and/or system (Doty and Turner, 2004).
The type and detail of planning will vary with the categorization of the equipment.
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Safety, health, environmental concerns and production capability are the primary
drivers of categorization (Moir et al., 1994). Dekker (2014) reiterated that safe work
management is the administrative process used by the plant to organize various
departments into an effective team to identify, prioritize, plan, coordinate, execute, test
and properly close out work activities.
Safe work management systems can be divided into two primary types, with the level
of planning detail and rigour of adherence being the main differences (Sikka and
Kansal, 1994). According to Geller et al. (2004), for those with hardware that has a
direct effect on the health and safety of the public, the environment, or production, a
prescriptive and instructive form of work control is indispensable for management to
ensure the highest degree of quality control over maintenance. Woods et al. (1981)
mentioned that, those types of components that have little or no direct effect on the
health and safety of the public, the environment, or production, a routine form of work
control is more practical for management to monitor quality control. Safe work
management incorporates both operating and outage unit work (Strupczewski, 2003).
It is a process for the efficient empowerment of a strong safety culture. In other words,
it allows at all times for a safe balance between economic issues and safety issues.
3.12 Managing Contractor Safety
Certain plants have developed quality and safety programmes to ensure that the
proper safety message is passed on to contractors (Rao et al., 2007). Halder et al.
(2014) expressed that permanent staff should be familiar with a power plant’s safety
policies and procedures, contractors may not be intimately acquainted with all of the
rules. Additionally, contractors may not be aware of the plant layout or all of the safety
equipment and systems available in various areas (Jacobs and Haber, 1994).
According to Wall et al. (2001), managers and supervisors have to spend extra time
ensuring contractors have a firm grasp of the plant’s safety expectations, and monitor
their work more closely for potential safety deficiencies.
By establishing a clear communication strategy, incorporating a risk-ranking process

and integrating internal business processes, a sustainable contractor management
system is one that enables you to meet your safety and compliance objectives while
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promoting a culture of transparency, partnership and continuous improvement (Omer,
2007).
Contractors need to receive proper training to work in power plants. This should be
done when they are onboarded so that they are aware of power plant hazards, and
how to avoid them, before they step foot on-site. Safety orientations should be site-
specific and tailored to a worker’s role (Perrow, 2011). An online contractor
management system allows you to conduct orientations for workers based across
multiple sites, while keeping a uniform quality standard.
Plants use contractors as an additional workforce to supply skill sets that are not
normally available in the current workforce of the plants (Baker et al., 1994). The use
of contractors has increased dramatically in the industry (Adhikary et al., 2012). As a
result, it is desirable that safety culture considerations apply not only to the
organization, but to the contractors as well (Kennedy et al., 1980). Because of the
variety of contractors, the following factors are key to maintaining the safety culture of
the plant:
• Contractors are qualified to do the job, and the plant ensures that their
qualifications are updated;
• Contractor staff members receive good training not only in basic power plant
knowledge but also in plant specifics, Quality Assurance (QA) and radiological
protection, and in safety aspects related to their specific jobs;
• Supervision from in-house personnel may vary in detail, depending on the
activities and the type of contractors involved in the job, but should always be
in accordance with safety standards;
• Contractors follow and comply with plant regulations that impact on their jobs;
• Contractors ensure that they have proper internal coordination;
• Contractors are evaluated by the past power plant experience (e.g. quality,
safety, human performance issues);
• Contractors are encouraged to share their experience after an outage in an
open and frank manner;
• Long term relationships with contractors may be a good solution to support a
strong safety culture.
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3.13 Emergency Preparedness
Power plants are designed and built to safely withstand a wide variety of natural and
other severe events and staffed by highly trained, federally licensed operators with a
decade’s long history of safe operations. According to McCulloch and Tweedale
(2008) the operators who staff these plants are capable of taking the actions
necessary to control and minimize abnormal events. The emergency evacuation plan
plays a key role in disaster management and successful evacuation (Dekker, 2014).
National and International laws require the power plant operating companies to
develop and maintain emergency preparedness plans for their power plants to protect
the public (Hale et al., 2007). Oliveira et al. (2014) says that an emergency plan
provides an additional layer of protection by specifying response actions that may be
taken in the event of a serious accident or event.
Mandal and Sengupta (2003) research advised that an effective emergency response
results from mutually supportive planning and preparedness among several parties:
companies that operate the power plants; local, state and federal agencies; and
private and non-profit groups that provide emergency services. The plans can be
implemented during a wide range of severe natural events or security-related events
(Charter and Tischner, 2017). Plant personnel assigned to the emergency response
team must participate in initial and periodic requalification training (Sikka and Kansal,
1994). Energy companies also offer specialized training to off-site personnel who may
be first-responders to a plant emergency (for example, local ambulance or firefighting
crews).
4. Study Area Profile
This project sought to assess the health and safety measures of power plants. During
the research the author looked at the scope of existing literature available to address
specific questions relating to the understanding and control of major hazard accidents
at power plants. Also focussed on investigating and described work related accidents
at power plants based on the Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Control
process. Based on this the causes of major hazard incidents in the power plants were
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identified along with the risk control measures and safety related behaviours to prevent
major hazard incidents.
For this purpose journals, articles and databases of Oxford Digital Reference (E-
books), Occupational Health and Safety Information Service (OHSIS), Emerald
Intelligence, ScienceDirect, Google Scholar, ASTM digital library and standards,
British standards and EBSCOhost Business Source Complete databases were
searched with key words power plant, hazards, risks, accidents at power plants, boiler
hazards, chemical hazards, electrical hazards, hydro power plants operations, gas
turbine driven power plants, nuclear power plants, thermal power plants,
organizational issues, safety culture, safety management system, human reliability
analysis, contractor management and emergency situations.
Few articles are from journals of Safety Science, International Congress Series,
International Journal of Project Management, Journal of Civil Engineering and
Management, Journal of Construction Research, Journal of construction engineering
and management and Journal of Safety Research. Some books and internet websites
are also used for this literature review.
While writing the literature review the sources are cited using the Harvard style.
Citations are listed in alphabetical order by the author’s last name.
5. Methodology
This project report is comprised of eight main sections.
Section 1 explains the role and the importance of power plants along with the
background of different types of power plants all over the world such as nuclear power
plant, hydroelectric power plant, coal fired power plant, diesel fired power plant, geo
thermal power plant, gas and steam power plant, solar power plant, wind power plant,
and tidal power plant. Also, a brief overview of the power plant hazards, risks and
hierarchy of controls are demonstrated in this section. Lessons learnt from accidents
is a key to effectively manage the power plant operations. History of various power
plant accidents along with the property damage incidents are covered under this
section.
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Objectives of this project are covered under Section 2.
The enormous part of this project was based on the literature review. Section 3 talks
about the literature review done for this project. The literature review provides an
insight into the safety at power plants, the hazard identification process (three key
hazards were considered which are electrical, boiler and chemical hazards). Risk
determination is also considered in this literature review because it is always
associated with the frequency of failure and consequence effect. Four different power
plants literature was reviewed (Hydro Power Plant, Gas Turbine Driven Power plant,
Nuclear Power Plant and Thermal Power Plant) along with the history of incidents
related to those power plant types. An organisation’s culture can have a big influence
on safety outcomes as the safety management system. Management commitment,
visible leadership, compliance with safety procedures, safe work management along
with contractor management, communication to all levels of employees and
emergency preparedness is also discussed in this section. Also focussed on
investigating and described work related accidents at power plants based on the
Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Control process. Based on this the
causes of major hazard incidents in the power plants were identified along with the
risk control measures and safety related behaviours to prevent major hazard incidents.
Section 6 includes the discussion and results of the power plant safety. Summary and
conclusion also explained Section 7 in order to shed some light on the outcomes of
the project objectives, and how important this is to the author. The conclusion part will
follow in order to relate the various types of themes that have been highlighted
throughout of the project.
Finally, the references section (8) provides a list of references which allows the
readers to distinguish own ideas and conclusions from those I have drawn from the
work of others.
6. Results and Discussion
The numerous case studies and analyses of incident reports show that human error
influenced by human and organisational factors are implicated as a cause of incidents
in the major hazards sector. It is recognised that controls on human and organisational
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factors are now more important than technology because significant improvements
have been made to ensure the increasingly inherent safety of machinery, technology
and equipment (e.g. Lee, 1998). In addition, during accident investigation, operators
more readily identify and improve on the physical issues than the underlying
organisational factors. Advances in the control of human factors/organisational factors
influencing error are less well developed, yet they are reported to account for 80-90%
of organisational accidents (Reason, 1997).
In most cases, the combination of management decisions, specific events and

circumstances on the day of the incident is extremely complex and numerous factors
contributed to the incident.
Research found the main underlying causes of accidents in the power plants included:
maintenance errors, inadequate procedures, inadequate job planning, inadequate risk
assessments, inadequate training of staff, unsafe working condoned by supervisors/
managers, inadequate control and monitoring of staff by managers, inadequate control
and monitoring of contractors working on site, etc.
What this study does conclusively demonstrate is that power plant accidents exact a
significant toll on human health and welfare, the natural environment, and society.
Such accidents are now part of our daily routines, a somewhat intractable feature of
our energy-intensive lifestyles. Yet energy systems continue to fail despite drastic
improvements in power plant design, construction, operation, and maintenance, as
well as the best of intentions among policymakers and operators.
This project has merely identified the absolute costs of energy accidents in terms of
death and property damage. It says nothing about whether these costs are “worth it,”
or how they compare to other hidden and cumulative events such as drunk driving,
heart disease, automobile accidents, and other “ordinary” risks. Perhaps one striking
difference between energy accidents and other “normal” risks facing society concerns
the involuntary aspects of energy accidents.
As it is probably already apparent to readers, one fundamental, underlying question

that this study has not attempted to answer is whether better governance can really
improve power plant safety systems, or if the current “failings” of power plant safety
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technologies an inevitable and natural by-product of the energy landscape. Here,
additional work is needed that expands beyond this study's temporal and technological
focus into a broader analysis that includes spatial, institutional, economic, and social
dimensions, as well as more fine-tuned statistical analysis that adjusts the occurrence
of power plant accidents to other factors such as population growth and improved
media coverage.
The significant factors that influence the safety of employees at the power plant
stations are:
• lack of training and supervision;

• non-observance of safe work procedures;
• lack of management commitment; and
• lack of periodical check on machine operations.
7. Summary and Conclusions
Power plant is a place to generate energy of electricity for millions of household and
industries. Power plant is a workplace of the high level from hazard, where safe
working procedures are important as workers face many risks due to the nature of the
job. Although power plants are much safer than they once were, plant employees still
encounter many hazards, and it is up to employers to implement programs and policies
aimed at eliminating accidents.
The risks associated with power plant operations must be assessed and controlled.
Workers are exposed to a variety of power plant hazards if the right preventative steps
are not taken. Keeping the workers safe is a constant challenge. A mistake in a power
plant can easily be fatal. The work environment is often hot and noisy, consist several
major equipment and operations involve in its process, and there is an always present
risk for crushing injuries, electrical shocks and burns, boiler fires and explosions, and
contact with hazardous chemicals
In this research we observe that risk assessment is very helpful for finding hazards
conditions in power plant. Hazard analysis and risk assessment can be used to
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establish priorities so that the most dangerous situations are addressed first and those
least likely to occur and least likely to cause major problems can be considered later.
Safety procedures and regulations need to be followed by the management as well as

the workers. Many business enterprises have proven that good safety management
leads to increased productivity, and the same works for power plant. Nuclear
power plants rank first in terms of their economic cost, accounting for 41 % of all
property damage. Oil and hydroelectric follow at around 25 % each, followed by natural
gas at 9 % and coal at 2 %.
The implicit assumption is that safety culture is clearly a pervasive and important
aspect of operations but one whose effect on risk may be difficult to quantify. Methods
like preventive MTO analyses and FMEA are used in a systematic way with the
involvement of engineers and workers to identify possible risks or problems (and their
consequences) that might arise during the performance of the work. These analyses
have contributed greatly to the development of work processes and methods. Power
plant workers are also better prepared for the work and they obtain ‘ownership’ of the
work methods used.
The first step for emergency preparedness and maintaining a safe workplace is
defining and analysing hazards. Although all hazards should be addressed, resource
limitations usually do not allow this to happen at one time from the study carried out in
the thermal power plant and the risk rating which were made and analysed shows that
various risks in the power plant were more over certain distance. Improper use of
personal protective equipment can be managed by appointing security specially to
check if all are wearing personal protective equipment and if not the entry in the
working are should be prohibited. The results of this analysis will be of valuable to find
out the consequence on emergency situation that may occur. With this knowledge, the
level of preparedness can be assessed and measures taken to enhance capabilities
through training and preparation of a more effective response to such occurrences.
Both operations and maintenance of power plant facilities deserves special attention,
as they can have both a direct and an indirect effect on equipment reliability. Adverse
safety effects can arise, depending upon the level of skill of the personnel involved,
safety awareness and the complexity of the work process (Rao et al., 2007). Any
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delayed effects resulting from challenges to maintenance can cause interruptions in
operation, and hence affect the safety of a plant or facility.
The presence of a strong safety culture in power plant operations contributes

significant value to the safe operation of a plant. With respect to power plant
operations, safety culture means keeping the operations process on track and in
control at every stage of plant performance (Wall et al., 2001). Plant management
supports this by monitoring, evaluating and making decisions on all important aspects
(safety, technical and financial) of plant performance as well as on the consequences
of operational activities.
8. References
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PROJECT REPORT ON

POWER PLANT SAFETY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT

FOR THE AWARD OF

PG DIPLOMA IN HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT

FIRE AND SAFETY FORUM, ERNAKULAM, INDIA

PROJECT REPORT SUBMITED BY

Mrs. LOLOWA FADHEL AL QUBAISI

BATCH: 2018 DEC CPD 108

REGISTER NUMBER: PGDHSE/D/2018/FSF101553

Ms. Aswathy P. S Mr. Aashin U. S

Batch: 2018 DEC CPD 108

Register Number: PGDHSE/D/2018/FSF101553

Place: United Arab Emirates

Date: 12th December 2019

Name: Mrs. Lolowa Fadhel Al Qubaisi

Mrs. Lolowa Fadhel Al Qubaisi

Safety procedures and regulations need to be followed by the management as well as

1.1 Background .................................................................................................. xii

1.2 Hazards to Power Plant Workers ................................................................ xiv

1.3 Evaluation of Power Plant Risks ..................................................................xv

1.4 Hierarchy of Controls for Power Plant Hazards ........................................... xvi

1.5 Accidents at Power Plant ........................................................................... xvii

1.5.1 Property Damage ..................................................................................xx

2. Objectives of the Study ...................................................................................... xxi

3. Review of Related Literature ............................................................................ xxii

3.1 Overview of Safety at the Power Plants ..................................................... xxii

3.2 Hazard Identification .................................................................................. xxv

3.2.1 Electrical Hazards .............................................................................. xxvii

3.2.2 Boiler Hazards .................................................................................... xxix

3.2.3 Chemical Hazards ............................................................................ xxxiii

3.3 Risk Determination .................................................................................. xxxvi

3.4 Hydro Power Plant ................................................................................. xxxvii

3.4.1 Hydro Power Plant Incidents ...........................................................xxxviii

3.5 Gas Turbine Driven Power Plants ........................................................... xxxix

3.5.1 Gas Turbine Driven Power Plant Incidents .............................................xl

3.6 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) .......................................................................... xli

3.7 Thermal Power Plant .....................................................................................lx

3.7.1 Thermal Power Plant Incidents ...............................................................lx

3.8 Accident Risks in Power Plants .................................................................... lxi

3.9 Organizational Issues ................................................................................. lxiii

3.9.1 Role of Safety Culture in Power Plant Operations ............................... lxiv

3.9.2 Commitment to High Standards of Safety............................................. lxv

3.10 Human Factor in Power Plant Operations .................................................. lxvi

3.10.1 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) ...................................................... lxvii

3.11 Safe Work Management .......................................................................... lxviii

3.12 Managing Contractor Safety ...................................................................... lxix

3.13 Emergency Preparedness .......................................................................... lxxi

4. Study Area Profile ............................................................................................. lxxi

5. Methodology .................................................................................................... lxxii

6. Results and Discussion .................................................................................. lxxiii

7. Summary and Conclusions .............................................................................. lxxv

8. References .................................................................................................... lxxvii

Table 2 Nuclear power accidents in Belgium .......................................................... xliii

Table 3 Nuclear power accidents in Canada ........................................................... xliv

Table 4 Nuclear power accidents in France ............................................................. xlv

Table 5 Nuclear power accidents in Germany........................................................ xlvii

Table 6 Nuclear power accidents in India .............................................................. xlvii

Table 7 Nuclear power accidents in Japan............................................................ xlviii