The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

Daniel Chandler
Within linguistic theory, two extreme positions concerning the
relationship between language and thought are commonly
referred to as 'mould theories’ and 'cloak theories'. Mould
theories represent language as 'a mould in terms of which
thought categories are cast' (Bruner et al. 1956, p. 11). Cloak
theories represent the view that 'language is a cloak
conforming to the customary categories of thought of its
speakers' (ibid.). The doctrine that language is the 'dress of
thought' was fundamental in Neo-Classical literary theory
(Abrams 1953, p. 290), but was rejected by the Romantics
(ibid.; Stone 1967, Ch. 5). There is also a related view (held by
behaviourists, for instance) that language and thought are
identical. According to this stance thinking is entirely
linguistic: there is no 'non-verbal thought', no 'translation' at all
from thought to language. In this sense, thought is seen as
completely determined by language.

The Sapir-Whorf theory, named after the American linguists

Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, is a mould theory of
language. Writing in 1929, Sapir argued in a classic passage
that:

Human beings do not live in the objective world alone,

nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily
understood, but are very much at the mercy of the
particular language which has become the medium of
expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to
imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without
the use of language and that language is merely an
incidental means of solving specific problems of
communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is
that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously
built upon the language habits of the group. No two
languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered
as representing the same social reality. The worlds in
which different societies live are distinct worlds, not
merely the same world with different labels attached...
We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely
as we do because the language habits of our community
 predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir 1958
[1929], p. 69)

This position was extended in the 1930s by his student Whorf,

who, in another widely cited passage, declared that:

We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native

languages. The categories and types that we isolate from
the world of phenomena we do not find there because
they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the
world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of
impressions which has to be organized by our minds -
and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our
minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and
ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are
parties to an agreement to organize it in this way - an
agreement that holds throughout our speech community
and is codified in the patterns of our language. The
agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one,
but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at
all except by subscribing to the organization and
classification of data which the agreement decrees.
(Whorf 1940, pp. 213-14; his emphasis)

I will not attempt to untangle the details of the personal

standpoints of Sapir and Whorf on the degree of determinism
which they felt was involved, although I think that the above
extracts give a fair idea of what these were. I should note that
Whorf distanced himself from the behaviourist stance that
thinking is entirely linguistic (Whorf 1956, p. 66). In its most
extreme version 'the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis' can be described
as consisting of two associated principles. According to the
first, linguistic determinism, our thinking is determined by
language. According to the second, linguistic relativity, people
who speak different languages perceive and think about the
world quite differently.

On this basis, the Whorfian perspective is that translation

between one language and another is at the very least,
problematic, and sometimes impossible. Some commentators
also apply this to the 'translation' of unverbalized thought into
language. Others suggest that even within a single language
any reformulation of words has implications for meaning,
however subtle. George Steiner (1975) has argued that any act
of human communication can be seen as involving a kind of
translation, so the potential scope of Whorfianism is very
broad indeed. Indeed, seeing reading as a kind of translation is
a useful reminder of the reductionism of representing textual
reformulation simply as a determinate 'change of meaning',
since meaning does not reside in the text, but is generated by
interpretation. According to the Whorfian stance, 'content' is
bound up with linguistic 'form', and the use of the medium
contributes to shaping the meaning. In common usage, we
often talk of different verbal formulations 'meaning the same
thing'. But for those of a Whorfian persuasion, such as the
literary theorist Stanley Fish, 'it is impossible to mean the same
thing in two (or more) different ways' (Fish 1980, p. 32).
Reformulating something transforms the ways in which
meanings may be made with it, and in this sense, form and
content are inseparable. From this stance words are not merely
the 'dress' of thought.

The importance of what is 'lost in translation' varies, of course.

The issue is usually considered most important in literary
writing. It is illuminating to note how one poet felt about the
translation of his poems from the original Spanish into other
European languages (Whorf himself did not in fact regard
European languages as significantly different from each other).
Pablo Neruda noted that the best translations of his own poems
were Italian (because of its similarities to Spanish), but that
English and French 'do not correspond to Spanish - neither in
vocalization, or in the placement, or the colour, or the weight
of words.' He continued: 'It is not a question of interpretative
equivalence: no, the sense can be right, but this correctness of
translation, of meaning, can be the destruction of a poem. In
many of the translations into French - I don't say in all of them
- my poetry escapes, nothing remains; one cannot protest
because it says the same thing that one has written. But it is
obvious that if I had been a French poet, I would not have said
what I did in that poem, because the value of the words is so
different. I would have written something else' (Plimpton 1981,
p. 63). With more 'pragmatic' or less 'expressive' writing,
meanings are typically regarded as less dependent on the
particular form of words used. In most pragmatic contexts,
paraphrases or translations tend to be treated as less
fundamentally problematic. However, even in such contexts,
particular words or phrases which have an important function
in the original language may be acknowledged to present
special problems in translation. Even outside the humanities,
academic texts concerned with the social sciences are a case in
point.

The Whorfian perspective is in strong contrast to the extreme

universalism of those who adopt the cloak theory. The Neo-
Classical idea of language as simply the dress of thought is
based on the assumption that the same thought can be
expressed in a variety of ways. Universalists argue that we can
say whatever we want to say in any language, and that
whatever we say in one language can always be translated into
another. This is the basis for the most common refutation of
Whorfianism. 'The fact is,' insists the philosopher Karl Popper,
'that even totally different languages are not untranslatable'
(Popper 1970, p. 56). The evasive use here of 'not
untranslatable' is ironic. Most universalists do acknowledge
that translation may on occasions involve a certain amount of
circumlocution.

Individuals who regard writing as fundamental to their sense of

personal and professional identity may experience their written
style as inseparable from this identity, and insofar as writers
are 'attached to their words', they may favour a Whorfian
perspective. And it would be hardly surprising if individual
stances towards Whorfianism were not influenced by
allegiances to Romanticism or Classicism, or towards either
the arts or the sciences. As I have pointed out, in the context of
the written word, the 'untranslatability' claim is generally
regarded as strongest in the arts and weakest in the case of
formal scientific papers (although rhetorical studies have
increasingly blurred any clear distinctions). And within the
literary domain, 'untranslatability' was favoured by Romantic
literary theorists, for whom the connotative, emotional or
personal meanings of words were crucial (see Stone 1967, pp.
126-7, 132, 145).

Whilst few linguists would accept the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

in its 'strong', extreme or deterministic form, many now accept
a 'weak', more moderate, or limited Whorfianism, namely that
the ways in which we see the world may be influenced by the
kind of language we use. Moderate Whorfianism differs from
extreme Whorfianism in these ways:

 the emphasis is on the potential for thinking to be

'influenced' rather than unavoidably 'determined' by
language;
  it is a two-way process, so that 'the kind of language we
use' is also influenced by 'the way we see the world';
 any influence is ascribed not to 'Language' as such or to
one language compared with another, but to the use
within a language of one variety rather than another
(typically a sociolect - the language used primarily by
members of a particular social group);
 emphasis is given to the social context of language use
rather than to purely linguistic considerations, such as
the social pressure in particular contexts to use language
in one way rather than another.

Of course, some polemicists still favour the notion of language

as a strait-jacket or prison, but there is a broad academic
consensus favouring moderate Whorfianism. Any linguistic
influence is now generally considered to be related not
primarily to the formal systemic structures of a language
(langue to use de Saussure's term) but to cultural conventions
and individual styles of use (or parole). Meaning does not
reside in a text but arises in its interpretation, and interpretation
is shaped by sociocultural contexts. Conventions regarding
what are considered appropriate uses of language in particular
social contexts exist both in 'everyday' uses of language and in
specialist usage. In academia, there are general conventions as
well as particular ones in each disciplinary and methodological
context. In every subculture, the dominant conventions
regarding appropriate usage tend to exert a conservative
influence on the framing of phenomena. From the media
theory perspective, the sociolects of sub-cultures and the
idiolects of individuals represent a subtly selective view of the
world: tending to support certain kinds of observations and
interpretations and to restrict others. And this transformative
power goes largely unnoticed, retreating to transparency.

Marshall McLuhan argued in books such as The Gutenberg

Galaxy (1962) and Understanding Media (1964) that the use of
new media was the prime cause of fundamental changes in
society and the human psyche. The technological determinism
of his stance can be seen as an application of extreme
Whorfianism to the nature of media in general. Similarly, the
extreme universalism of the cloak theorists has its media
counterpart in the myth of technological neutrality (Winner
1977; Bowers 1988). My own approach involves exploring the
applicability of moderate Whorfianism to the use of media.
References

 Abrams, M. H. (1953): The Mirror and the Lamp:

Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition. Oxford:
Oxford University Press
 Bowers, C. A. (1988): The Cultural Dimensions of
Educational Computing: Understanding the Non-
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 Bruner, J. S., J. S. Goodnow & G. A. Austin ([1956]
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Authority of Interpretative Communities. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press
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 McLuhan, M. (1964): Understanding Media: The
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differs)
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(ed. D. G. Mandelbaum). Berkeley, CA: University of
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 Steiner, G. (1975): After Babel: Aspects of Language
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 Stone, P. W. K. (1967): The Art of Poetry 1750-1820:
Theories of Poetic Composition and Style in the Late
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 Whorf, B. L. (1940): 'Science and Linguistics',
Technology Review 42(6): 229-31, 247-8. Also in B. L.
Whorf (1956): Language, Thought and Reality (ed. J. B.
Carroll). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
 Winner, L. (1977): Autonomous Technology: Technics-
Out-Of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Daniel Chandler
UWA 1994
http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/short/whorf.html

(Adapted from The Act of Writing)