Montenegro vs. Montenegro
Montenegro vs. Montenegro
Montenegro vs. Montenegro
FACTS:
On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro, for herself and as mother and guardian of
her two minor children Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel, filed with the trial court below a complaint for
support against her husband, herein petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
8467. Four years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement
which was submitted to the trial court for approval on 13 October 1998. On the same date, the trial court rendered a
Decision approving the compromise agreement and ordering the parties to comply with it. The parties did not appeal
from the Decision; hence, it became final and executory.
Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the compromise agreement despite the lapse of
the periods provided therein, respondent Teresa filed a motion for the execution of the judgment. The trial court
granted the motion and issued a writ of execution on 15 February 1999. A second writ of execution and a notice of
garnishment, issued by the trial court on 21 May 2001 and and a notice of garnishment issued on 28 May 2001 weon
28 May 2001, respectively, were returned unsatisfied.
In several conferences called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his failure to comply with his obligations
under the compromise agreement but alleged that he was no longer in a position to do so as he was already insolvent.
In the conference held on 6 March 2002, respondent Teresa manifested that she would file a motion for examination
of petitioner as judgment obligor. The trial court gave her 30 days within which to file the appropriate motion and
informed petitioner that he would have 30 days to file a comment or reply to the motion.
On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine petitioner as judgment obligor under
Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the trial court issued on 19 March 2002 an Order
granting the motion for examination of petitioner as judgment obligor and setting his examination on 22 March 2002.
On the same day the motion for examination was granted, petitioner filed with the court a Manifestation alleging that
the grant of the motion for examination was premature because he still would have 30 days from receipt of the motion,
or until April 14, 2002, within which to file a comment or opposition thereto as agreed upon during the conference on
6 March 2002.
Due to the repeated failure of the petitioner to appear on the scheduled hearings for his examination as
judgment obligor, the trial court declared petitioner in contempt of court under Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court and imposed on him the penalty of imprisonment for three months and ordered him to pay a fine of ₱20,000.
His motion for reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial court in its Order of 3 January 2003,
petitioner filed the petition in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether, based on the facts found by the trial court, the latter erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt for willfully disobeying the orders of the trial court/
RULING:
No. The totality of petitioner’s acts clearly indicated a deliberate, and unjustified refusal to be examined as a
judgment obligor at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing by the trial court. His Such acts tended to
degrade the authority and respect for court processes and impaired the judiciary’s duty to deliver and administer
justice. Petitioner tried to impose his will on the trial court.
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and indirect contempt. Indirect
contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an order or any other formal charge requiring
the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified petition,
complying with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings. In the present case, the trial court initiated the
proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not be
punished for indirect contempt.
Petitioner’s deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the orders of the trial court are clearly shown
in the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court. Hence, the trial court acted with utmost judiciousness to
avoid a miscarriage of justice because petitioner was reported to be about to leave for Canada, a fact which petitioner
did not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March 2002.