GATMAYTAN AND ALDELLON VS. MISIBIS LAND, INC.

G.R. No. 222166

June 10, 2020

Facts:

On December 9, 1991, Petitioners purchased from Oscar and Cidra Garcia (Spouses Garcia) a
parcel of land in Misibis, Cagraray Island, Albay covered by TCT No. T-77703 issued in the
latter's name.

On April 6, 1992, Petitioners attempted to register the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale
dated December 9, 1991 (1991 DOAS) with the Register of Deeds of Albay (RD). They were
successful in having the 1991 DOAS duly annotated on TCT No. T-77703, but they were not
able to cause the transfer of the Torrens title in their name since they lacked the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) clearance necessary to do so.

In 2010, when Petitioners resumed processing the transfer of the Torrens title to their names,
they discovered that the disputed lot had been consolidated by Misibis Land, Inc. (MLI) with
other adjoining lots in Misibis, and sub-divided into smaller lots covered by several new Torrens
titles.

Petitioners learned that TCT No. T-77703 had been stamped "cancelled", and replaced by
subsequent Torrens titles issued in the name of DAA Realty (TCT No. T-97059) and MLI (TCT
No. T-97059) based on the following transactions:

1. 1996 DOAS between Spouses Garcia as seller and DAA Realty Corporation as buyer

2. 2005 DOAS between DAA Realty as seller and MLI as buyer

On December 10, 2014, Petitioners led a complaint before the RTC for declaration of
Plainti ’s ownership and for the nulli cation of the 1996 DOAS and all subsequent transactions
involving the disputed lot for being void ab initio against Spouses Garcia, DAA Realty and MLI
as well as PNB to whom the disputed lot had been mortgaged.

In its Answer, MLI claimed, among others, that it was an innocent purchaser for value since it
relied on DAA Realty's TCT No. T-97059 which did not bear any defects, and that Petitioners'
cause of action is already barred by prescription since an action for reconveyance of real
property based on an implied constructive trust arising from fraud prescribes ten (10) years
after the issuance of title in favor of the defrauder. MLI stressed that the Complaint was led in
2014, or more than ten (10) years after the issuance of DAA Realty's Torrens title in 1996.

The RTC issued the First RTC Order dismissing the Complaint on the ground of prescription of
action and failure to pay the correct docket fees. Petitioners' subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied through the Second RTC Order. Petitioners received a copy of
the Second RTC Order on January 14, 2016.

On January 28, 2016, Petitioners led a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
on Certiorari.

On February 24, 2016, this Petition was led but on April 18, 2016 the Court issued a
Resolution denying the Petition for failure to su ciently show any reversible error in the
assailed orders and for failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 45 and other
related provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Page 1 of 42
ff
fi
fi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
 Petitioners received the Court's April 2016 Resolution on May 30, 2016. On June 14, 2016,
Petitioners led a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court take a "second hard look"
on the merits of the Petition. On August 22, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution granting the
Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, the Petition was reinstated and respondent MLI was
directed to le its comment thereto.

MLI led its Comment on October 24, 2016, to which Petitioners led their Reply. Here,
Petitioners mainly argue that their Complaint should be allowed to proceed since it is an action
primarily for the declaration of nullity of the 1996 DOAS and alternatively, for quieting of title.

Issues:

I. Whether the outright dismissal of Petitioners’ Complaint on the ground of

prescription and on the alleged failure to pay the correct docket fees was valid. — No.

II. Whether Petitioners' allegation for reconveyance based on the nullity of the 1996
DOAS and the Torrens titles resulting therefrom was su ciently made. — Yes.

III. Whether Petitioners’ action is already barred by prescription. — No

Ruling:

I. No, the outright dismissal was not valid.

In ruling that Petitioners' action had already prescribed, it is clear that the RTC treated the
Complaint as an action for reconveyance based solely on implied constructive trust. This is
clearly grievous error, if not grave abuse of discretion, as the Complaint clearly alleged
Petitioners' other causes of action.

Under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, "If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
bene t of the person from whom the property comes." The law thus creates the obligation
of the trustee to reconvey the property and its title in favor of the true owner. An action for
reconveyance of property based on an implied constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years, in accordance with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, which states that that an action
involving an obligation created by law must be brought within ten (10) years from the time
the right of action accrues.

However, in cases where fraud is speci cally alleged to have been attendant in the trustee's
registration of the subject property in his/her own name, the prescriptive period is ten (10)
years counted from the true owner's discovery of the fraud.

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has
likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. (Adille v.
Court of Appeals)

The Court's ruling in Adille is in congruence with Section 53 of PD 1529, which states that
in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud and that registration procured by the
presentation of a forged deed or other instrument shall be null and void.

Page 2 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
 Among the allegations hypothetically admitted by MLI are those concerning DAA Realty's
failure to present Spouses Garcia's owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-77703 upon
issuance of TCT No. T-97059 in its name, as required by Section 53 of PD 1529.

In  Levin v. Bass, the Court  en banc  unanimously held that failure to comply with the
registration requirements of the Torrens system  averts the registration process,
and prevents the underlying transaction from a ecting the land subject of the registration.

Levin thus teaches that a Torrens title issued without prior presentation and cancellation of
the existing owner's duplicate title does not bind the property to which it pertains. The title
so issued does not produce the e ects of a Torrens title contemplated under PD
1529, including the e ects of constructive notice. It is literally a scrap of paper.

On this basis, coupled with the fact that they were always in possession of the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-77703, Petitioners cannot be deemed to have been
constructively noti ed of the issuance of DAA Realty's TCT No. T-97059. The ten (10)-year
prescriptive period thus referred to in Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code must be
reckoned  not  from the issuance of DAA Realty's Torrens title, but rather, from Petitioners'
actual discovery of the fraud in 2010. The Complaint, having been led barely four (4) years
after, or on December 10, 2014, was therefore timely led.

Apart from prescription, the RTC also anchored the outright dismissal of the
Complaint on Petitioners' alleged failure to pay the correct docket fees. Again, this is
error.

Assuming that the payment made by Petitioners is in fact de cient, belated payment of the
di erence may still be permitted consistent with the Court's ruling in Sun Insurance O ce,
Ltd. v. Asuncion: “It is not simply the ling of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the ling of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.”

In determining whether belated payment of the de ciency of Petitioners' docket fees may
still be allowed, the prescriptive periods applicable to Petitioners' alternative causes of
action should be considered.

As already explained, Petitioners' Complaint should be characterized primarily as an action

for reconveyance based on a void contract which is imprescriptible, and alternatively, as an
action for quieting of title which prescribes thirty (30) years after the cause of action
accrues, which, in this case, occurred on February 22, 1996 when the issuance of DAA
Realty's Torrens title cast a cloud on Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed lot.
As none of Petitioners' alternative causes of action has prescribed, payment of the
de ciency in the docket fees paid, if any, should still be permitted.

II. Yes. Petitioners have alleged a su cient cause of action.

An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a rightful owner of land wrongfully
or erroneously registered in the name of another to compel the latter to reconvey the land
to him. In reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously

Page 3 of 42
ff
fi
fi
ff
ffi
ff
fi
ff
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
ffi
registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better
right.

In  Uy v. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded on the statutory basis of reconveyance,
the two kinds of actions for reconveyance, and the prescriptive periods applicable to each,
thus:

An action for reconveyance is based on Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree

(PD) No. 1529, which provides:

In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal
and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certi cate of title.

In Caro v. Court of Appeals, we said that this provision should be read in conjunction with
Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the bene t of the person
from whom the property comes.

The law creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and its title in favor of
the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of PD No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the
Civil Code with Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code,  the prescriptive period for the
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the certi cate of title. This ten-year prescriptive period
begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which
repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. An exception to this
rule is when the party seeking reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is in
actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved. Prescription
does not commence to run against him because the action would be in the nature of
a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

The foregoing cases on the prescriptibility of actions for reconveyance apply when the
action is based on fraud, or when the contract used as basis for the action is voidable.
Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, a contract is voidable when the consent of one of the
contracting parties is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue in uence or
fraud. When the consent is totally absent and not merely vitiated, the contract is void.
An action for reconveyance may also be based on a void contract. When the action
for reconveyance is based on a void contract, as when there was no consent on the
part of the alleged vendor, the action is imprescriptible. The property may be
reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding the TCTs already issued in another's
name. The issuance of a certi cate of title in the latter's favor could not vest upon him or
her ownership of the property; neither could it validate the purchase thereof which is null
and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our
land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.
Being null and void, the sale produces no legal e ects whatsoever.

Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore determined by the nature
of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a claim of the existence of an implied or
constructive trust, or one based on the existence of a void or inexistent contract.

Page 4 of 42
fi
fi
ff
fi
fi
fl
 There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a void contract is
imprescriptible. However, We simply cannot apply this principle to the present case
because the action led by petitioner before the trial court was 1) for reconveyance based
on fraud since the ownership of private respondents over the questioned property
was allegedly established on "false assertions, misrepresentations and deceptive
allegations"; and 2) for rescission of the "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati.”

In essence, Petitioners assert that the 1996 DOAS is void and inexistent, as: (i) the
purported sellers were no longer the owners of the disputed lot at the time of execution; (ii)
the signature of one of the sellers therein had been forged; and (iii) the buyer-corporation
was legally inexistent at the time of execution.

Here, recovery of ownership is not restricted to the mere fact that a Torrens title had been
issued in favor of DAA Realty, and later, MLI. The above allegations show that the recovery
of ownership is predicated on the nulli cation of the underlying mode of transfer of title of
the disputed lot — the issuance of the Torrens titles to DAA Realty and then to MLI being
merely the result of the 1996 DOAS sought to be nulli ed.

Petitioners allege in their Complaint that the owner's duplicate title of Spouses Garcia was
surrendered to them upon the execution of the 1991 DOAS, and that because such owner's
duplicate title never left their possession, DAA Realty's Torrens title was necessarily
issued in violation of Section 53 of PD 1529 which sets forth the requirements for
registration of voluntary instruments a ecting registered land.

In addition, both DAA Realty and MLI may be deemed to have been constructively noti ed
of the 1991 DOAS in favor of Petitioners, as it was duly annotated on Spouses Garcia's
TCT No. T-77703. Hence, contrary to MLI's assertions, it may not be considered an
innocent purchaser for value in this case.

It must be noted that MLI invoked the defenses of prescription and lack of jurisdiction for
failure of Petitioners to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the disputed lot. In
asserting these a rmative defenses, MLI hypothetically admitted the material allegations in
Petitioners' Complaint, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, the material allegations in Petitioners' Complaint, including the possession by

Petitioners of the owner's duplicate title of Spouses Garcia's TCT No. T-77703 and the
annotation of the 1991 DOAS in both original and owner's duplicate title covering the
disputed lot, are deemed hypothetically admitted.

Since the nullity of DAA Realty's Torrens title may be anchored on the non-presentation of
Spouses Garcia's owner's duplicate title, and MLI may not be considered an innocent
purchaser for value, then Petitioners' allegation for reconveyance based on the nullity
of the 1996 DOAS and the Torrens titles resulting therefrom was su ciently made.

Petitioners' action for reconveyance can also be viewed from the law on sales. Petitioners
alleged that a prior sale had been consummated in their favor. It must be noted that the
copy of the 1991 DOAS forming part of the records shows that it is a public document.
That the 1991 DOAS is a public document is further con rmed by the fact that Petitioners
were successful in having the 1991 DOAS duly annotated on TCT No. T-77703, and that the
only reason they were unable to cause the transfer of the Torrens title in their name was
because they lacked the DAR clearance necessary to do so.

Page 5 of 42
ffi
fi
ff
fi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
 According to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, the execution of this public document may
partake constructive delivery of the property so as to constitute the Petitioners as full
owners thereof. In turn, the validity of this sale, documented through the 1991 DOAS, was
hypothetically admitted by MLI through its Motion for Preliminary Hearing. In other words,
the second sale to DAA Realty, documented through the 1996 DOAS, may be considered
void, since Spouses Garcia would no longer be the owners of the disputed lot at such time.
As early as 1991, Petitioners may be considered full owners of the property covered by TCT
No. T-77703. This means that DAA Realty could not have acquired anything in 1996. It
follows that MLI purchased nothing from DAA Realty in 2005. Clearly, Petitioners have
alleged a su cient cause of action in this regard.

III. No. Petitioners’ cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, an action for quieting of title may be led "whenever
there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or e ective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ine ective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title." This action may be brought by one who has legal or equitable title to, or interest
in the real property which is the subject matter of the action, whether or not such party is in
possession. As a general rule, an action for quieting of title, being a real action, prescribes
thirty (30) years after accrual. However, by way of exception, an action to quiet title
involving property in the possession of the plainti is imprescriptible.

For an action for quieting of title to prosper:

1. the plainti or complainant must have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and

2. the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his

title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its  prima
facie appearance of validity or legal e cacy

Here, Petitioners claim to have equitable title over the disputed lot based on the 1991
DOAS registered with the RD and annotated on the original and owner's duplicate of
Spouses Garcia's TCT No. T-77703. In addition, they allege that the 1996 DOAS
purportedly executed between Spouses Garcia and DAA Realty, and all transactions
subsequent thereto, cast a cloud of doubt on such equitable title. Hence, the two requisites
to sustain an action for quieting of title have been met.

As stated, an action for quieting of title involving property  not  in the possession of the
plainti prescribes thirty (30) years after the cause of action accrues, which, in this case,
appears to have taken place on February 22, 1996, upon issuance of DAA Realty's Torrens
title. Hence, Petitioners' action for quieting of title has not prescribed, as the Complaint was
led only eighteen (18) years thereafter, on December 10, 2014.

Page 6 of 42
fi
ff
ff
ffi
ff
ffi
ff
ff
fi
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
PHILIPPINE EXPORT-IMPORT CREDIT AGENCY
G.R. No. 233850
July 1, 2019

Facts:

The instant case stems from a Complaint for Speci c Performance led on September 22,
2016 before the RTC by respondent PVB against petitioner TIDCORP.

In its Complaint, respondent PVB alleged that on November 23, 2011, PVB, together with other
banking institutions entered into a Five-Year Floating Rate Note Facility Agreement (NFA) with
debtor Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PhilPhos), a PEZA registered domestic
corporation situated in Leyte, up to the aggregate amount of ₱5 billion. Under the said NFA,
respondent PVB committed the amount of ₱1 billion.

On November 8, 2013, Typhoon Yolanda made landfall in Central Visayas, which resulted in
widespread devastation in the province of Leyte where PhilPhos' manufacturing plant was
situated. Due to the damage brought by said typhoon to PhilPhos' manufacturing facilities, it
failed to resume its operations.

Thus, on September 17, 2015, PhilPhos led a Petition for Voluntary Rehabilitation under the
Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA) before the RTC of Ormoc City
(Rehabilitation Court). On September 22, 2015, the Rehabilitation Court issued a
Commencement Order, which included a Stay Order.

On November 5, 2015, respondent PVB led its Notice of Claim with petitioner TIDCORP,
which received the same on November 6, 2015. Petitioner TIDCORP declined to give due
course to respondent PVB's Notice of Claim, invoking the Stay Order issued by the
Rehabilitation Court. Despite several demands made by respondent PVB pursuant to the
Guarantee Agreement, petitioner TIDCORP maintained its position to deny PVB 's claim due to
the issuance of the said Stay Order.

In its Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner TIDCORP argued that the RTC cannot validly try the
case because of the Rehabilitation Court's Stay Order, which enjoined the enforcement of all
claims, actions and proceedings against PhilPhos.

In view of the Answer led by petitioner TIDCORP, respondent PVB led a Motion for Summary
Judgment. RTC granted respondent PVB's Motion for Summary Judgment. The RTC held that
as made manifest in the pleadings, supporting a davits, and admissions on record, there was
no genuine issue as to any material fact posed by petitioner TIDCORP with respect to its
liability under the Guarantee Agreement, except as to the amount of damages. Thus, the RTC
found that respondent PVB was entitled to a judgment in its favor as a matter of law.

Hence, petitioner TIDCORP directly led the instant Petition before the Court under Rule 45, in
relation to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent PVB led a Motion to Dismiss arguing that petitioner TIDCORP led the wrong
mode of appeal. In a Resolution, the Court denied respondent PVB's Motion to Dismiss for
lack of merit.

Issues:

Page 7 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 I. Whether the instant Petition should be summarily dismissed because the petitioner
allegedly pursued the wrong mode of appeal. — No.

II. Whether the RTC's Order granting respondent PVB's Motion for Summary Judgment
was proper. —Yes.

III. Whether the Stay Order of the Rehabilitation Court divested the RTC of its jurisdiction
to hear and decide respondent PVB’s Complaint. —No.

IV. Whether there are genuine issues on material facts that necessitate trial on the
merits, contrary to the ndings of the RTC. —No.

Ruling:

I. No. Respondent PVB's contention is incorrect in maintaining that the assailed Order
is a mere interlocutory order and not a nal order subject of an appeal under Rule 45.

An order or resolution granting a Motion for Summary Judgment which fully determines the
rights and obligations of the parties relative to the case and leaves no other issue
unresolved, except the amount of damages, is a nal judgment.

As explained by the Court in Ybiernas, et al. v. Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., when a court, in

granting a Motion for Summary Judgment, adjudicates on the merits of the case and
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is
in the right, such order or resolution takes the nature of a nal order susceptible to appeal.
In leaving out the determination of the amount of damages, a summary judgment is
not removed from the category of nal judgments.

In the instant case, it is clear that the assailed Order discussed at length the applicable
facts, the governing law, and the arguments put forward by both parties, making an
extensive assessment of the merits of respondent PVB's Complaint. The RTC then made a
de nitive adjudication in favor of respondent PVB. As manifestly seen in the assailed Order,
the RTC categorically determined what the rights and obligations of the parties are, ruling in
no uncertain terms that respondent PVB's Complaint was meritorious and that petitioner
TIDCORP should be made liable under the Guarantee Agreement.

Hence, respondent PVB's argument in its Motion to Dismiss is unmeritorious.

II. Yes, the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper.

Summary judgment is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage
of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

According to Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a
claim may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting a davits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his/her favor.

According to Section 3 of the same Rule, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, supporting a davits, depositions, and admissions on le, show that, except
as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Page 8 of 42
fi
ffi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 The term "genuine issue" has been de ned as an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham, ctitious,
contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings,
admissions, documents, a davits and/or counter-a davits submitted by the parties before
the court.

III. No, the Stay Order issued by the Rehabilitation Court did not preclude the RTC from
hearing and deciding respondent PVB' s Complaint.

First and foremost, the Stay Order merely ordered the staying and suspension of
enforcement of all claims and proceedings against the petitioner PhilPhos and not against
all the other persons or entities solidarily liable with the debtor. According to the Stay Order,
the said order only covers "all claims, actions, or proceedings against the petitioner
[referring to debtor PhilPhos].”

Second, Section 18(c) of the FRIA explicitly states that a stay order shall not apply "to the
enforcement of claims against sureties and other persons solidarily liable with the debtor,
and third party or accommodation mortgagors as well as issuers of letters of credit.”

In addition, under Rule 4, Section 6 of A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC or the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, a stay order has the e ect of staying enforcement
only with respect to claims made against the debtor, its guarantors and persons not
solidarity liable with the debtor.

In Situs Dev. Corporation, et al. v. Asiatrust Bank, et al., the Court held that when a stay
order is issued, the rehabilitation court is only empowered to suspend claims against the
debtor, its guarantors, and sureties who are not solidarity liable with the debtor. Hence, the
making of claims against sureties and other persons solidarily liable with the debtor is not
barred by a stay order.

Thus, the question now redounds to whether the provision of the FRIA on the non-
application of a stay order with respect to the enforcement of claims against sureties
and other persons solidarily liable with the debtor applies to petitioner TIDCORP.

Upon a simple perusal of the Guarantee Agreement, to which petitioner TIDCORP readily
admitted it is bound, the answer to the aforementioned question becomes a clear and
unmistakable yes. Petitioner TIDCORP indubitably engaged to be solidarily liable with
PhilPhos under the Guarantee Agreement.

The Guarantee Agreement unequivocally states that petitioner TIDCORP waived its right of
excussion under Article 2058 of the Civil Code and that, consequently, the Series A
Noteholders can claim under the Guarantee Agreement DIRECTLY against petitioner
TIDCORP without having to exhaust all the properties of PhilPhos and without need of any
prior recourse against PhilPhos

Hence, in accordance with the Guarantee Agreement, which states that respondent PVB
can claim DIRECTLY from petitioner TIDCORP without the former having to exhaust all the
properties of and without need of prior recourse to PhilPhos, in accordance with Section
18(c) of the FRIA, the issuance of the Stay Order by the Rehabilitation Court clearly did
not prevent the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over respondent PVB's Complaint, as
correctly held by the RTC in the assailed Order.

Page 9 of 42
ffi
fi
ffi
ff
fi
 IV. No, there are no genuine issues on material facts that necessitate trial on the merits.

The Court concurs with the RTC's nding that upon examination of the records of the
instant case, there was no genuine issue raised as to a material fact.

There is no "genuine issue" which calls for the presentation of evidence if the issues raised
by a party are a sham, ctitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so
as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of
the pleadings, admissions, documents, a davits and/or counter-a davits submitted by the
parties to the court. In a collection case, where the obligation and the fact of non-ful llment
of the obligation, as well as the execution of the debt instrument, are admitted by the
debtor, with the rate of interest and/or amount of damages being the only remaining issue,
there is no genuine issue and a summary judgment may be rendered upon proper motion.

As correctly pointed out by the RTC, petitioner TIDCORP readily admitted that it was
bound by the Guarantee Agreement, which expressly obligated petitioner TIDCORP to
guarantee the payment of the Guaranty obligation. With petitioner TIDCORP admitting that
it was "bound by the terms and conditions enumerated in this Guarantee Agreement and
such other related documents,” the RTC did not commit any error in holding that
respondent PVB was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Jurisprudence holds that "the defendant must show that he has a bona de defense to the
action, one which he may be able to establish. It must be a plausible ground of defense,
something fairly arguable and of a substantial character. This he must show by a davits or
other proof.”

The RTC was correct in holding that petitioner TIDCORP failed to pro er a plausible ground
of defense of a substantial character, considering that in its Answer, the only special and/or
a rmative defense raised by petitioner TIDCORP was the argument on the lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC in light of the Rehabilitation Court's Stay Order, which as previously
discussed, is an erroneous assertion.

Hence, taking together the fact that petitioner TIDCORP expressly admitted its obligations
under the Guarantee Agreement, and that it failed to o er any substantial defense against
the claim of respondent PVB, the RTC was not in error in holding that there is no genuine
issue as to a material fact extant in the instant case.


Page 10 of 42
ffi
fi
fi
ffi
ff
ffi
ff
fi
ffi
fi
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO R. DE BORJA
G.R. No.  187448
January 9, 2017

Facts:

The case stems from a Complaint led by petitioner Republic before the SB (Civil Case No.
0003) for the recovery of ill-gotten assets allegedly amassed by the individual respondents
during the administration of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Geronimo Z. Velasco, was
the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC). Herein respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew.

It appears from the records that PNOC, in the exercise of its functions, would regularly enter
into charter agreements with vessels and, pursuant to industry practice, vessel owners would
pay "address commissions" to PNOC as charterer, amounting to ve percent (5%) of the total
freight. Allegedly, during the tenure of Velasco, no address commissions were remitted to
PNOC.

Instead, starting 1979, the percentage of the address commission no longer appeared in the
charter contracts and the words "as agreed upon" were substituted therefor, per instructions of
Velasco. As a result, the supposed address commissions were remitted to the account of
Decision Research Management Company (DRMC), one of the defendant corporations in Civil
Case No. 0003 and the alleged conduit for address commissions.

Velasco was likewise alleged to have diverted government funds by entering into several
transactions involving the purchase of crude oil tankers and by reason of which he received
bribes, kickbacks, or commissions in exchange for the granting of permits, licenses, and/or
charters to oil tankers to service PNOC.

Given the foregoing, petitioner Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected these
address commissions in behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony of Epifanio F.
Verano, a witness for petitioner Republic. De Borja was further alleged to have acted as
Velasco's dummy, nominee, and/or agent for corporations he owned and/or controlled, such as
DRMC.

Trial on the merits ensued. In its Resolution, the SB found that the evidence presented was
insu cient to support a claim for damages against De Borja, thereby granting respondent De
Borja's Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioner Republic then led its Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied by the SB in a Resolution.

Hence, petitioner Republic led the instant Petition solely with respect to the liability of
respondent De Borja, claiming that the SB erred in granting the Demurrer to Evidence and in
denying its Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court required respondent De Borja to le a Comment. In compliance, respondent De

Borja led his Comment reiterating the insu ciency of the evidence adduced before the SB
(e.g., testimony of Verano, a davit of deceased Jose M. Reyes). Petitioner Republic then led
its Reply in due course. Thereafter, a Motion for Early Resolution was led by respondent De
Borja.

SB rendered a Decision dismissing Civil Case No. 0003 with respect to the remaining
respondents therein. This, in turn, was subject of an appeal and docketed as G.R. No. 199323,
but the Court rendered a Resolution, denying the appeal.

Page 11 of 42
ffi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 Thereafter, an Entry of Judgment was made with respect to G.R. No. 199323. Subsequently,
respondent De Borja led a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Petition had been
rendered moot and academic by reason of the Entry of Judgment.

Issue:

I. Whether petitioner Republic was able to adduce su cient evidence to prove the
alleged complicity of respondent De Borja with the required quantum of evidence.
— No.

Ruling:

I. After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties, the
Court rules in the negative.

Case law has de ned "burden of proof' as the duty to establish the truth of a given
proposition or issue by such quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at
which the issue arises. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plainti to establish
his case by preponderance of evidence, i.e., superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved. "Preponderance of evidence" means evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing than that which is o ered in opposition to it.

In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of "preponderance of

evidence" because it is led prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is
precisely the o ce of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without
the need of the defendant's evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the determination as to
whether the plainti s evidence entitles it to the relief sought.

Speci cally, the inquiry in this case is con ned to resolving whether petitioner Republic
is entitled to "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture, Restitution, and Damages" based
on the evidence it has presented.

As repeatedly stressed by respondent De Borja, the only evidence presented with

respect to his liability is the testimony of Verano and the a davit of one Jose M. Reyes.

(i) A davit of Jose Reyes

With respect to the a davit of Jose M. Reyes, his non-appearance before the SB
due to his untimely demise rendered the same inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay, as correctly observed by the SB

(ii) Testimony of Verano

Verano was presented to prove that on two (2) occasions, Velasco had instructed
him to deliver to De Borja envelopes allegedly containing the "address
commissions".

Moreover, during Verano's cross-examination, it was revealed that he was not

knowledgeable of the contents of the envelopes and that he also never con rmed
whether respondent De Borja had actually received them.

Page 12 of 42
ffi
fi
ffi
fi
ff
ffi
fi
fi
ff
fi
ffi
ffi
ff
fi
 In the face of Verano’s testimony, the insinuations of petitioner Republic in the
instant Petition can best be described as speculative, conjectural, and inconclusive
at best. Nothing in the testimony of Verano reasonably points, or even alludes, to
the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of Velasco in receiving
address commissions from vessel owners.

The Court joins and concurs in the SB's observations pertaining to Verano's want of
knowledge with respect to the contents of the envelopes allegedly delivered to
respondent De Borja's o ce, which remained sealed the entire time it was in
Verano' s possession. As admitted by Verano himself, he did not and could not have
known what was inside the envelopes when they were purportedly entrusted to him
for delivery. In the same vein, Verano did not even con rm respondent De Borja's
receipt of the envelopes, despite numerous opportunities to do so. Relatedly, it was
further revealed during the cross-examination of Verano that in the rst place,
Velasco did not even deal directly with brokers.

All told, the Court nds that the evidence adduced is wholly insu cient to support
the allegations of the Complaint before the SB. Thus, for failure of petitioner
Republic to show any right to the relief sought, the Court a rms the SB in granting
the Demurrer to Evidence.


Page 13 of 42
fi
ffi
fi
ffi
ffi
fi
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOVO TANES y BELMONTE
G.R. No. 240596
April 3, 2019

Facts:

On April 6, 2011, an Information was led against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165. Tanes pleaded not guilty to the charge. On April 10, 2015, he led a Petition for Bail. On
March 31, 2017, the RTC issued an Order granting Tanes' application for bail.

The RTC found that the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong because there was doubt as to
whether the chain of custody in the buy-bust operation was preserved.

The court noted that in the a davits of the prosecution's witnesses, there was allegedly a
previous buying transaction of shabu with the accused prior to the buy-bust operation
subject of this case. Thus, the PDEA agents had enough time to contact the media or
DOJ representatives, or any elected public o cial to witness the buy-bust operation
being conducted following the report on the illegal trading in drugs by the accused, but
they failed to do so. Instead, they were just merely called to sign the inventory sheet.

The RTC ruled that the failure of the prosecution to show that the three witnesses (i.e., media
representative, DOJ representative, elected o cial) were also present in the actual buy-bust
operation and not only during the inventory negated the requirement of strong evidence of the
accused's guilt to justify a denial of bail. Moreover, the RTC ruled that the defense correctly
cited the case of People v. Jehar Reyes in support of its argument.

Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner went to
the CA via petition for certiorari. It alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting bail to Tanes because:

(1) it did not state a summary of the prosecution's evidence in its Order, therefore, petitioner
was not accorded due process;

(2) it required the presence of the three witnesses during the conduct of the buy-bust
operation and during the actual seizure of the drug, thereby extending the
requirement laid down in R.A. 9165.

The CA dismissed the petition. According to the CA, petitioner failed to show that the RTC's
exercise of discretion in granting the application for bail was unsound and unguided by
jurisprudence. It found that the RTC's Order was based on jurisprudence, speci cally on the
rule on chain of custody and the Jehar Reyes case, which held that the three witnesses must
be present during the buy-bust operation and the con scation of the dangerous drugs from the
accused. Moreover, the CA also found that "the evidence presented by the prosecution in
establishing that Tanes’ guilt was strong was tarnished by a seemingly broken chain in the
custody.”

Further, the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. The records showed that
three hearings were conducted by the trial court for the bail application. During these hearings,
petitioner was duly represented by its prosecutors. Moreover, the CA stated that petitioner
failed to identify which piece/s of evidence that the prosecution presented before the bail
hearings was/were excluded by the RTC in weighing whether the evidence against Tanes' guilt
was strong.

Page 14 of 42
fi
ffi
fi
ffi
ffi
fi
fi
fi
 Furthermore, the CA also disagreed with petitioner's assertion that the RTC Order did not
contain a summary of the prosecution's evidence.

Petitioner's MR was denied by the CA in a Resolution. In its Rule 45 Petition, petitioner argues
that the CA erred in not nding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when the
latter granted the petition for bail based solely on Jehar Reyes. In particular, petitioner claims
that R.A. 9165 only requires the presence of the three witnesses during the conduct of
the inventory, and not during the actual buy-bust operation. Also, petitioner avers that the
CA erred in a rming the trial court's ruling despite the latter's failure to appreciate the
evidence of the prosecution.

Issues:

I. Was there was non-compliance with the rules on chain of custody of illegal
drugs negates a strong evidence of Tanes’ guilt. — Yes.

II. Whether the accused is entitled to bail? — Yes.

Ruling:

I. Yes, there was non-compliance with the rules on chain of custody of illegal
drugs.

Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 lays down the following procedure to be followed in
order to maintain the integrity of the con scated drugs used as evidence:

(1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or con scation;

(2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a)
the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public o cial,
(c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and con scation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not
practicable that the IRR of R.A. 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be
done as soon as the buy bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest
o ce of the apprehending o cer/team.

In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already
be physically present at the time of the conduct of the physical inventory of the
seized items which, as mentioned, must be immediately done at the place of seizure
and con scation - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust
team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.

In the present case, it appears that the buy-bust team committed several procedural
lapses concerning the chain of custody of the seized drug. In particular, the RTC and
the CA found that:

Page 15 of 42
ffi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
-­
ffi
fi
fi
ffi
 (1) there was no representative from the DOJ present during the buy-bust operation
and the inventory;

(2) the two other witnesses (i.e., the media representative and the elected public
o cial) were not present during the apprehension and seizure of the illegal drug
but were merely called to sign the inventory sheet;

(3) no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in the
presence of Tanes and the witnesses.

These lapses in the chain of custody created doubt as to the identity and integrity of
the seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes' guilt cannot be
characterized as strong.

II. Yes, the accused is entitled to bail.

The right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, as stated in Section 13, Article III
of the Constitution:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with o enses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by su cient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.

In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Capital o ense or an o ense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital o ense, or an
o ense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.

Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the o ense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of
discretion if the o ense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.

In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165
which carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter
of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong.

To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail
hearings is required where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to
the right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence in
rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a summary hearing, consistent with the
purpose of merely determining the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.

There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug
seized during the buy-bust operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of
illegal sale of drugs against Tanes is deemed not strong. Accordingly, he is
entitled to bail.


Page 16 of 42
ffi
ff
ff
ffi
ff
ff
ff
ff
ff
 SPOUSES MARCELIAN TAPAYAN and ALICE TAPAYAN vs. PONCEDA M. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. 207786
January 30, 2017

Facts:

The parties herein are relatives by a nity. Petitioner Alice Tapayan is the sister of Clark
Martinez's wife. Clark is Respondent's son.

Respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated along Pingol Street, Ozamiz
City. Based on the records, it appears that two (2) mortgages were constituted over this
property - the rst in favor of Philippine National Bank, and the second in favor of Development
Bank of the Philippines. The records further show that Respondent agreed to constitute the
DBP Mortgage upon Clark's request, and that, in order to release the Pingol Property from the
PNB Mortgage, the Petitioners and Respondent agreed to utilize a portion of the proceeds
of the DBP Loan to settle the remaining balance of Respondent's PNB Loan.
Subsequently, the parties herein executed a Deed of Undertaking in reference to the DBP
Mortgage. When it fell due, the DBP Loan was not paid.

Thus, respondent led a complaint for Speci c Performance with Damages against Petitioners
before the RTC. The Complaint sought to compel Petitioners to constitute a mortgage over
their house and lot in Carangan, Ozamiz City in accordance with the provisions of the Deed of
Undertaking.

Respondent averred that Petitioners used the proceeds of the DBP Loan exclusively for
their own purposes and that since Petitioners failed to pay the DBP Loan, she and her
children were constrained to pay DBP the sum of ₱1,180,200.10 to save the Pingol Property
from foreclosure. Notwithstanding this, Petitioners have neither paid their indebtedness nor
executed a mortgage over the Carangan Property to secure the same.

The Petitioners denied Respondent's allegations and claimed that the Deed of
Undertaking "is a falsity. Petitioners argued that the proceeds of the DBP Loan were primarily
used as capital for the construction business that petitioner Marcelian put up with Clark, Mario
Delos Reyes, and Richard Sevilla (collectively, Joint Venturers). Petitioners supposedly applied
for the DBP Loan in furtherance of the verbal agreement among the Joint Venturers, while
Respondent freely agreed to constitute the DBP Mortgage to secure said loan upon Clark's
request. Petitioners further emphasized that a portion of the proceeds of the DBP Loan was
used to pay o the balance of Respondent's PNB Loan. On the procedural aspect,
Petitioners argued that Respondent's Complaint was premature and should have been be
dismissed outright, since she failed to resort to barangay conciliation proceedings before ling
her Complaint with the RTC.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Respondent. In so ruling, the RTC noted that
the Deed of Undertaking was acknowledged before a notary public, and reasoned that since
the latter enjoys the presumption of having performed his duties regularly, Petitioners' claim
that the Deed of Undertaking was a falsity must be rejected. On such basis, the RTC held that
the Deed of Undertaking constitutes a valid and binding contract, which Petitioners are bound
to respect.

Aggrieved, Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed Decision
denying the Petitioners' appeal. Contrary to the Petitioners' claim, the CA found that the

Page 17 of 42
fi
ff
fi
ffi
fi
fi
 requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law were complied with, as evidenced by the
Certi cate to File Action led by the Lupon Tagapamayapa before the RTC.

Moreover, the CA held that the Deed of Undertaking merits consideration, since Petitioners
failed to overcome the presumption of regularity ascribed to it as a public document. Thus, on
the basis of the stipulations in the Deed of Undertaking, the CA concluded that Respondent
indeed stood as Petitioners' accommodation mortgagor. Hence, Respondent possesses the
right to enforce the Deed of Undertaking and compel Petitioners to comply with its stipulations.

Issue:

I. Whether the CA erred in a rming the RTC Decision directing Petitioners to

execute a mortgage over the Carangan Property in favor of Respondent. — No.

Ruling:

The Court holds that no misapprehension of facts was committed by both the RTC and the
CA so as to justify deviation from their ndings, except only as to the RTC's nding
regarding the amount that Petitioners are bound to reimburse to Respondent.

๏ Petitioners waived their right to object to the admission of the Deed of Undertaking
on the basis of the best evidence rule.

In this Petition, Petitioners assert that the RTC and CA erred in ruling that the plain copy
of the Deed of Undertaking was admissible as proof of its contents, in violation of the
best evidence rule under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners' assertion is erroneous.

The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section
3 of Rule 130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is
necessary. As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the
best evidence rule.  Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and
may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not
precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection
was raised when it was formally o ered.

In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made

at the proper time, and the grounds speci ed. Objection to evidence must be made at
the time it is formally o ered. In case of documentary evidence, o er is made after all
the witnesses of the party making the o er have testi ed, specifying the purpose for
which the evidence is being o ered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that
objection to the documentary evidence may be made.  And when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were o ered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is
inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the
proper time. Moreover, grounds for objection must be speci ed in any case.  Grounds
for objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the
evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate
court may not consider any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at
the proper time.

Page 18 of 42
fi
ff
fi
ff
ffi
ff

ff
fi
fi
fi
fi
ff
ff
fi
 The Court notes that Petitioners failed to object to the admission of the plain copy of
the Deed of Undertaking at the time it was formally o ered in evidence before the RTC.
In fact, in their Reply, Petitioners admit that they only raised this objection for the rst
time before the CA.

Instead of arguing against the truth of this established fact, the respondent made an
implied admission of the truth thereof when she shifted instead to raise the argument
that petitioner cannot raise this issue for the rst time in this petition

Having failed to timely raise their objection when the Formal O er of Evidence was led
in the RTC, Petitioners are deemed to have waived the same. Hence, they are
precluded from assailing the probative value of the plain copy of the Deed of
Undertaking.

๏ Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of regularity ascribed to the Deed of

Undertaking as a notarized public document.

Notwithstanding the ndings of the RTC and CA, Petitioners still assail the genuineness
and due execution of the Deed of Undertaking before this Court. Petitioners insist that
the Deed of Undertaking is a falsity and should not be given credence.

The Court disagrees.

As correctly held by the RTC and CA, the Deed of Undertaking became a public
document by virtue of its acknowledgment before a notary public. Hence, it enjoys the
presumption of regularity, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence.

While Petitioners vehemently deny participation in the execution of the Deed of

Undertaking, they did not present any evidence to support their claim that their
signatures thereon were forged. Hence, consistent with the ruling of the RTC and CA,
the Court upholds the presumption of regularity ascribed to the Deed of Undertaking.

๏ Petitioners' claim that they are accommodation borrowers is supported by

su cient evidence.

Petitioners' payment of the interest on the DBP Loan, the insurance premiums
corresponding to the Pingol Property, and other incidental fees solely on their account,
without seeking reimbursement from the alleged Joint Venturers, establishes
Petitioners' direct interest in the DBP Loan, and negates the claim that they are mere
accommodation borrowers. Since the proceeds of the DBP Loan redounded to
Petitioners' bene t, they must bear the liability arising from its non-payment, and
comply with the obligations imposed by the Deed of Undertaking executed in
connection therewith

Page 19 of 42
ffi
fi
fi
fi
ff
ff
fi
fi
 DENMARK S. V ALMORES vs. DR. CRISTINA ACHACOSO
G.R. No. 217453
July 19, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose

fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day. As such,
petitioner Valmores joins the faithful in worshipping and resting on Saturday, the seventh
day of the week, and refrains from non-religious undertakings from sunset of Friday to
sunset of Saturday.

Prior to the instant controversy, petitioner Valmores was enrolled as a rst-year student at
the MSU-College of Medicine for Academic Year 2014- 2015. To avoid potential con ict
between his academic schedule and his church's Saturday worship, petitioner Valmores
wrote a letter to respondent Achacoso, requesting that he be excused from attending his
classes in the event that a regular weekday session is rescheduled to a Saturday. At the
same time, petitioner Valmores expressed his willingness to make up for any missed
activity or session due to his absence.

Between the months of June to August 2014, some of petitioner Valmores' classes and
examinations were moved from weekdays to Saturdays. In one instance, petitioner
Valmores was unable to take his Risto-Pathology laboratory examination held on
September 13, 2015, a Saturday. Respondent Cabildo was his professor for the said
subject. Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was given by either of the
respondents. As a result, petitioner Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that particular
module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.

Thereafter, several pastors and o cers of the Seventh-day Adventist Church sent a letter to
respondent Achacoso, requesting for a possible audience with the members of the MSU
school board. In addition, the church, through Pastor Hanani P. Nietes, issued a
Certi cation dated September 15, 2014 in connection with petitioner Valmores' request
for exemption. On September 19, 2014, petitioner Valmores again wrote a letter to
respondent Achacoso to seek reconsideration regarding his situation, reiterating his
willingness to take make-up classes or their equivalent in order to complete the
requirements of his course.

Despite the foregoing communications, petitioner Valmores' requests fell on deaf ears.
Hence, aggrieved by respondents' lack of consideration, petitioner Valmores elevated the
matter before the CHED.

The CHED Regional O ce referred the matter directly to the President of MSU as well as
respondent Achacoso and requested that the o ce be advised of the action thus taken. In
response, Dr. Macapado Abaton Muslim, President of MSU, instructed respondent
Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum.

Despite the foregoing correspondence, petitioner Valmores' request still went unheeded.
Thus, petitioner Valmores, this time through his counsel on record, sought reconsideration
from respondent Achacoso for the last time and manifested his intention to resort to
appropriate legal action should no action be taken. Notwithstanding the lapse of several
months, no written or formal response was ever given by respondent Achacoso. Hence, the
present Petition.

Page 20 of 42
fi
ffi
ffi
ffi
fi
fl
 Issue:

I. Whether mandamus lies to compel respondents to enforce the 2010 CHED

Memorandum in the case of petitioner Valmores. — Yes.

Ruling:

I. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty by a

tribunal, board, o cer, or person. Case law requires that the petitioner should have
a right to the thing demanded and that it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required; such duty need not be absolutely
expressed, so long as it is clear. In this regard, a duty is considered ministerial
where an o cer is required to perform an act not requiring the exercise of o cial
discretion or judgment in a given state of facts. Conversely, if the law imposes a
duty upon a public o cer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary.

MSU is an HEI created by legislative charter under Republic Act No. 1387, as amended,
and was established "to better implement the policy of the Government in the
intensi cation of the education of the Filipino youth, especially among the Muslims and
others belonging to the national minorities.” Thus, respondents herein, as faculty
members of MSU, fall under the policy-making authority of the CHED and therefore
bound to observe the issuances promulgated by the latter.

The crux of the dispute therefore lies in the interpretation of the 2010 CHED
Memorandum.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL WORK FOR TEACHERS, PERSONNEL AND STUDENTS TO BE EXCUSED DUE TO
COMPLIANCE WITH RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS

Our fundamental Law explicitly provides under Section 5 of the Bill of Rights that "The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed." In this regard,
the Commission is obligated to ensure that all higher education institutions render proper respect and compliance
to this constitutional right, while at the same time acknowledging the exercise of their academic freedom also
guaranteed under the Constitution.

The Commission therefore clari es that in implementing the aforementioned policy, [higher education institutions]
shall be enjoined to: (1) excuse students from attendance/participation in school or related activities if such
schedule con icts with the exercise of their religious obligations, and (2) allow faculty, personnel and sta to
forego attendance during academic and related work and activities scheduled on days which would con ict
with the exercise of their religious freedom. Instead, the a ected students, faculty, personnel and sta may
be allowed to do remedial work to compensate for absences, within the bounds of school rules and
regulations without their grades being a ected, or with no diminution in their salaries or leave credits or
performance evaluation/assessment, provided they submit a certi cation or proof of attendance/participation duly
signed by their pastor, priest, minister or religious leader for periods of absence from classes, work or school
activities.

For your guidance and strict compliance.

Analyzed, the following are derived:

HEIs are enjoined to excuse students from attending or participating in school or related activities, if such
schedule con icts with the students' exercise of their religious obligations;
to compensate for absences, students may be allowed to do remedial work, which in turn should be within the
bounds of school rules and regulations and without a ecting their grades; and

to be entitled to exemption, a ected students must submit a certi cation of attendance duly signed by their
respective minister.

Page 21 of 42
fi
fl
fl
ffi
ffi
ffi
fi
ff
ff
ff
ff
fi
fi
ff
ff
fl
ffi
 A plain reading of the memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty
imposed upon HEIs. Its policy is crystal clear: a student's religious obligations
takes precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant with the
constitutional guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship.
Accordingly, the CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as
well as faculty members, from academic activities in case such activities interfere
with their religious obligations.

Although the said memorandum contains the phrase "within the bounds of school
rules and regulations," the same relates only to the requirement of remedial work,
which, based on the language used, is merely optional on the part of the HEI. Neither
can such phrase be said to have conferred discretion as the use of the words "shall be
enjoined" and "strict compliance" denote a mandatory duty on the part of the HEI to
excuse its students upon submission of the certi cation prescribed in the same
memorandum.

Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not possess absolute discretion to
grant or deny requests for exemption of a ected students. Instead, the memorandum
only imposes minimum standards should HEIs decide to require remedial work, i.e., that
the same is within the bounds of school rules and regulations and that the grades of the
students will not be a ected.

To evade liability, respondents made the blanket assertion that the Certi cation dated
September 15, 2014 submitted by petitioner Valmores was improper. Against such
de cient claim, petitioner Valmores argues that the said certi cation issued by Pastor
Hanani P. Nietes on behalf of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was su cient to satisfy
the requirement in the 2010 CHED Memorandum. The Court agrees.

As a condition for exemption, the 2010 CHED Memorandum simply requires the
submission of "a certi cation or proof of attendance/participation duly signed by their
pastor, priest, minister or religious leader for periods of absence from classes, work or
school activities.”

It is likewise well to note that respondents, by placing the su ciency of the Certi cation
dated September 15, 2014 in issue, in e ect admitted the ministerial nature of the duty
imposed upon HEIs. By raising such defense, respondents admitted to the existence of
a concomitant duty to exempt and that such duty on their part would have been called
for had petitioner Valmores submitted a correct certi cation.

Thus, to recapitulate, once the required certi cation or proof is submitted, the concerned
HEI is enjoined to exempt the a ected student from attending or participating in school-
related activities if such activities are in con ict with their religious obligations. As to
whether HEIs will require remedial work or not, the Court nds the same to be already
within their discretion, so long as the remedial work required is within the bounds of
school rules and regulations and that the same will not a ect the grades of the
concerned students.

For these reasons, the Court nds that respondents were duty bound to enforce the
2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it requires the exemption of petitioner Valmores
from academic responsibilities that con ict with the schedule of his Saturday worship.
Their failure to do so is therefore correctible by mandamus.


Page 22 of 42
fi
ff
fi
fi
ff
fl
ff
ff
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
ff
ffi
fi
fi
 PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 218901
February 15, 2017

Facts:

This case originated from a Complaint for collection of a sum of money led by PBCOM against
private respondents before the RTC of Makati City. Private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the Complaint alleging that their obligation had already been paid in full and that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket
fees.

On September 29, 2010, the RTC issued an Order directing PBCOM to pay additional docket
fees within fteen days from receipt of thereof. On October 21, 2010, PBCOM paid the
additional docket fees but led its Compliance with the RTC only on November 11, 2010. In
the interim, however, the RTC issued an Order dated November 4, 2010, dismissing PBCOM's
Complaint for failure of the plainti to comply with the Order dated September 29, 2010.

PBCOM led a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 22, 2010, stating that it had paid
the additional docket fees within the period prescribed by the court as evidenced by the
O cial Receipt attached thereto. In an Order dated May 3, 2011, the RTC denied PBCOM's
motion for reconsideration because it is only on November 11, 2010 that plainti led with the
Court a Compliance with the Order of the Court dated September 29, 2010 but without any
plausible explanation relative to its failure to submit such proof of compliance on or before
October 23, 2010.

Undaunted, PBCOM timely led a Notice of Appeal dated May 26, 2011.

On June 2, 2011, the RTC issued an Order (Assailed Order), denying due course to PBCOM's
Notice of Appeal on the ground that said appeal is not the proper remedy. Without ling a
motion for reconsideration, PBCOM led a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA.

On July 31, 2014, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying PBCOM's Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus and a rming the order of the RTC. The CA reasoned that, apart from availing
itself of a wrong mode of appeal, PBCOM failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of a motion for reconsideration. The CA emphasized that the ling of a motion
for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for a petition for certiorari to prosper. Hence,
this petition before the Court.

This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus led by petitioner PBCOM seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision and Resolution of the CA and prays that the RTC of Makati City be ordered
to approve PBCOM's notice of appeal and to transmit the case records to the CA.

Issue:

I. Whether or not PBCOM’s Notice of Appeal was the proper remedy. — Yes.

Ruling:

I. PBCOM argues that the CA should have given due course to its Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus because it is the proper remedy to question the Order dated June 2,

Page 23 of 42
ffi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
ff
fi
fi
fi
fi
ff
fi
fi
 2011 of the RTC denying its Notice of Appeal and that a motion for reconsideration is
not required when the order assailed of is a patent nullity for having been issued without
jurisdiction.

In the assailed Decision, the CA appears to have confused the RTC Order dismissing
PBCOM's complaint with the RTC Order denying PBCOM's notice of appeal, and
mistakenly ruled that the petition for certiorari and mandamus led by PBCOM was a
wrong mode of appeal.

Notably, in its petition before the CA, PBCOM assailed the RTC Order denying due
course to its notice of appeal.

In Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, this Court ruled that a trial court's order disallowing a
notice of appeal, which is tantamount to a disallowance or dismissal of the appeal
itself, is not a decision or nal order from which an appeal may be taken. The
suitable remedy for the aggrieved party is to elevate the matter through a special civil
action under Rule 65. Clearly, contrary to the CA's nding, PBCOM availed itself of the
correct remedy in questioning the disallowance of its notice of appeal.

While it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is led before the respondent court; there are well-
de ned exceptions established by jurisprudence:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The rst exception applies in this case.

Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. - Prior to the transmittal of the original record or
the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or
on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-
payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period.

Page 24 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 In Salvan v. People, this Court held that the power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is
limited to the instances speci ed in the aforequoted provision. In other words, the RTC
has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on an entirely di erent ground - such as
"that an appeal is not a proper remedy.”

The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper remedy is speci cally vested
upon the CA and not the RTC. Rule 50, Section 1 of the same Rules states:

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by

the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
following grounds:

xxx

(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable.

The Court's pronouncement in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco is

apropos:

Dismissals of appeals from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court by the

latter are authorized only in the instances speci cally set forth in Section
13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding provision, Section 14 of said
Rule 41, provides that "(a) motion to dismiss an appeal may be led in the
Regional Trial Court x x x prior to the transmittal of the record to the appellate
court;" and the grounds are limited to those "mentioned in the preceding
section," i.e., Section 13 to wit: where "the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or
record on appeal is not led within the period of time herein provided x x x.”

These two (2) sections clearly establish "that unless the appeal is
abandoned, the only ground for dismissing an appeal in the trial court is the
failure of the appellant to le on time the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or
record on appeal x x x. (A) trial court may not dismiss an appeal as frivolous, or
on the ground that the case has become moot and academic, such step
devolving upon the appellate courts. Otherwise, the way would be opened for
(regional trial) courts x x x to forestall review or reversal of their decisions by
higher courts, no matter how erroneous or improper such decisions should be.”

Dismissals of appeal may also be had upon the grounds speci ed by Rule
50 of the Rules of Court; but it is the Court of Appeals, not the trial court,
which is explicitly authorized to dismiss appeals on said grounds.
Generally, these grounds do not include matters which go into the merits of
the cause or to the right of the plainti or defendant to recover. Case law
has come to recognize other grounds for dismissal, by way of exception, e.g.,
that the cause has become moot, or the appeal is frivolous or manifestly
dilatory. But, to repeat, authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that it is
frivolous or taken manifestly for delay "is not certainly with the court a quo
whose decision is an issue, but with the appellate court."

In ne, the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to PBCOM's notice of appeal on
the ground that it was a wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction.


Page 25 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fi
ff
fi
ff
fi
fi
fi
 SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 229288
August 1, 2018

Facts:

This complaint arose from the sale of shares in Express Savings Bank, Inc. (ESBI), in which
Gatchalian was a stockholder, in 2009, to Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), a
government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC).

In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian of the
following: (a) one count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, (b) one count of malversation
of public funds, and (c) one count of violation of Section Xl26.2 (c) (1) and (2) of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks (MORB) in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. 7653.

The respondents in the Ombudsman cases, including Gatchalian, led separate motions for
reconsideration of the Joint Resolution. However, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order
denying the motions for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, Gatchalian led with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, and sought to annul the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order of the Ombudsman
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Ultimately, Gatchalian claimed that there
was no probable cause to indict him of the crimes charged. Procedurally, he explained that he
led the Petition for Certiorari with the CA, and not with this Court, because of the ruling in
Morales v. Court of Appeals.

The Ombudsman, through the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), led a Comment on the
Petition for Certiorari. The OSG argued that the CA had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case, as the decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases were unappealable and
may thus be assailed only through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 led with the
Supreme Court. On the merits, it maintained that the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order
were based on evidence, and were thus issued without grave abuse of discretion.

The CA issued a Resolution wherein it held that it had no jurisdiction over the case.
Gatchalian sought reconsideration of the CA's Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
He reiterated his arguments in the petition, and maintained that the CA has jurisdiction over the
case by virtue of the ruling in Morales.

The CA issued another Resolution where it upheld its earlier Resolution. It held that the points
raised in Gatchalian's motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of the arguments which
had already been passed upon by the CA in the earlier decision.

Gatchalian thus appealed to this Court. He maintains that the import of the decision in Morales
is that the remedy for parties aggrieved by decisions of the Ombudsman is to le with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43 for administrative cases, and a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 for criminal cases.

Gatchalian thus appealed to this Court. He maintains that the import of the decision in Morales
is that the remedy for parties aggrieved by decisions of the Ombudsman is to le with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43 for administrative cases, and a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 for criminal cases.

Page 26 of 42
fi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 According to the OSG, jurisprudence is well-settled that the CA has no jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. It reiterated that the Morales decision
should be understood to apply only in administrative cases.

Issue:

I. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 for its alleged lack of jurisdiction over the said case. — No.

II. Whether the decision of the Court En Banc in Morales v. Court of Appeals
abandoned the principles enunciated in the aforementioned line of cases. — No.

III. Whether the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 declared in Morales

equally applies to both administrative and criminal cases — and thus the CA from
then on had jurisdiction to entertain petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 to
question orders and decisions arising from criminal cases. — No.

Ruling:

I. In the 1998 case of Fabian vs. Desierto, the Court held that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770, which provides that all "orders, directives, or decisions in administrative cases
of the O ce of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by ling a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court," was unconstitutional for it increased the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court without its advice and concurrence. The Court thus held that
"appeals from decisions of the O ce of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43.

In Kuizon v. Desierto, the Court stressed that the ruling in Fabian was limited only to
administrative cases, and added that it is the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction
when the assailed decision, resolution, or order was an incident of a criminal
action. Thus:

In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited
the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate court correctly ruled that its
jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the O ce of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of
the O ce of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It
bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as
unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for
judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In ne, we hold
that the present petition should have been led with this Court.

In Golangco vs. Fung, the Court held that "the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
orders, directives and decisions of the O ce of the Ombudsman in administrative

Page 27 of 42
ffi
ffi
ffi
ffi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
 disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of
the O ce of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.”

With regard to orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-

administrative cases, the Court, in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario, held that the remedy for the
same is to le a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Court in Tirol, Jr., however, was unable to specify the court - whether it be the RTC,
the CA, or the Supreme Court - to which the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should
be led given the concurrent jurisdictions of the aforementioned courts over petitions for
certiorari.

Five years after, the Court clari ed in Estrada v. Desierto that a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the nding of the existence of probable
cause - or the lack thereof - by the Ombudsman should be led with the Supreme Court.

In the 2009 case of Ombudsman v. Heirs of Margarita Vda. De Ventura, the Court
reiterated Kuizon, Golangco, and Estrada, and ruled that the CA did not have
jurisdiction over orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in non-administrative cases,
and that the remedy of aggrieved parties was to le a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
with this Court.

II. No. In the Morales case, what was involved was the preventive suspension order issued
by the Ombudsman against Jejomar Binay, Jr. in an administrative case led against
the latter. The preventive suspension order was questioned by Binay in the CA via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order. The CA then granted Binay's prayer for a TRO, which the Ombudsman
thereafter questioned in this Court for being in violation of Section 14 of R.A. 6770,
which provides:

SECTION 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The Court agrees with the CA that the Morales decision should be read and viewed in its
proper context. The Court in Morales held that the CA had subject matter jurisdiction
over the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 led therein because what was assailed in
the said petition was a preventive suspension order, which was an interlocutory
order and thus unappealable, issued by the Ombudsman.

Consistent with the rationale of Estrada, the Court held that a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 was proper as R.A. 6770 did not provide for an appeal procedure for
interlocutory orders issued by the Ombudsman. The Court also held that it was
correctly led with the CA because the preventive suspension order was an incident of
an administrative case. The Court in Morales was thus applying only what was already
well-established in jurisprudence.

A thorough reading of the Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was limited in
its application - that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases. The Court never intimated, much less categorically stated, that it

Page 28 of 42
fi
ffi
fi
fi
fi

fi
fi
fi

fi
fi
 was abandoning its rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the distinction made therein
between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in
administrative and non-administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an
interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot thus be read to apply to decisions
or orders of the Ombudsman in non-administrative or criminal cases.

It is thus clear that the Morales decision never intended to disturb the well-established
distinction between the appellate remedies for orders, directives, and decisions arising
from administrative cases and those arising from non-administrative or criminal cases.

III. No. Gatchalian's contention is simply misplaced. Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was declared
unconstitutional because it trampled on the rule-making powers of the Court by 1)
prescribing the mode of appeal, which was by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for all
cases whether nal or not; and 2) rendering nugatory the certiorari jurisdiction of the CA
over incidents arising from administrative cases.

The unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, therefore, did not necessarily have an
e ect over the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases
precisely because the said procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned
section.

To recall, the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman nding the existence of
probable cause (or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 led with the Supreme Court was laid down by the Court itself in the
cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr., Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman, Estrada, and subsequent cases
a rming the said rule.

The rule was, therefore, not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule
prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers. The declaration of
unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was therefore immaterial insofar as the
appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is
concerned.


Page 29 of 42
ff
ffi
fi
fi
fi
 PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. RONALD RAPANOT
G.R. No. 191636
January 16, 2017

“Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari brought before this Court
under Rule 45, since this Court is not a trier of facts. While there are recognized exceptions which
warrant review of factual ndings, mere assertion of these exceptions does not su ce. It is
incumbent upon the party seeking review to overcome the burden of demonstrating that review is
justi ed under the circumstances prevailing in his case.”

Facts:

On May 9, 1995, Rapanot paid Golden Dragon a reservation fee for a 41.1050 sqm unit in
Wack-Wack Twin Towers Condominium, particularly designated as Unit 2308-B2, and covered
by Condominium Certi cate of Title (CCT) No. 2383 in the name of Golden Dragon.

On September 13, 1995, the Bank extended a loan to Golden Dragon to be utilized by the latter
as additional working capital. To secure the loan, Golden Dragon executed a Mortgage
Agreement in favor of the Bank. Among the units subject of the Mortgage Agreement was Unit
2308-B2. The mortgage was annotated on CCT No. 2383 on September 13, 1995.

On May 21, 1996, Rapanot and Golden Dragon entered into a Contract to Sell covering Unit
2308-B2. On April 23, 1997, Rapanot completed payment of the said unit so Golden Dragon
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Rapanot of the same date. Thereafter, Rapanot
made several verbal demands for the delivery of Unit 2308-B2.

Prompted by Rapanot's verbal demands, Golden Dragon sent a letter to the Bank requesting
for a substitution of collateral for the purpose of replacing Unit 2308-B2 with another unit with
the same area. However, the Bank denied Golden Dragon's request due to the latter's unpaid
accounts. Because of this, Golden Dragon failed to comply with Rapanot's verbal demands.

On April 27, 2001, Rapanot led a Complaint in the Field O ce of the HLURB. It then
scheduled a preliminary hearing and held several conferences with a view of arriving at an
amicable settlement. However, no settlement was reached.

After service of summons to all the defendants, only the Bank led its Answer. Thus, on April 5,
2002, the Arbiter issued an order declaring Golden Dragon and its President Maria Victoria
Vazquez in default, and directing Rapanot and the Bank to submit their respective
position papers and draft decisions. Copies of the April 2002 Order were served on Rapanot
and the Bank via registered mail. However, the envelope bearing the copy sent to the Bank was
returned to the Arbiter, bearing the notation "refused to receive”.

Rapanot complied with the April 2002 Order and personally served copies of its position paper
and draft decision on the Bank on May 22, 2002 and May 24, 2002, respectively.

On July 3, 2002, the Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Rapanot.

The Bank led a Manifestation and Motion for Clari cation, requesting for the opportunity to le
its position paper and draft decision, and seeking con rmation as to whether a decision had
indeed been rendered notwithstanding the fact that it had yet to le such submissions.
However, the Bank's Manifestation and Motion for Clari cation remained unresolved
despite the lapse of ve (5) months from the date of ling.

Page 30 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
ffi
fi
 On January 16, 2003, the Bank led a Petition for Review with the HLURB Board of
Commissioners alleging, among others, that it had been deprived of due process when the
Arbiter rendered a decision without a ording the Bank the opportunity to submit its position
paper and draft decision.

Anent the issue of due process, the HLURB Board held that it was untenable because records
show that prior to the rendition of its decision, the o ce below has issued and duly sent an
Order to the parties declaring respondent GDREC in default and directing respondent Bank to
submit its position paper.

The Bank appealed the decision of the HLURB Board to the O ce of the President (OP) but it
was denied in a Resolution. Same with its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an
Order by the OP.

The Bank led a Petition for Review with the CA assailing the resolution and subsequent order
of the OP. The CA, however, dismissed the Bank’s Petition for Review, even its Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks to reverse the questioned Decision of the CA insofar as it found that the Bank (i) was not
deprived of due process, and (ii) cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith.

Issues:

I. Whether the Petition for Review on Certiorari should be granted. — No.

II. Whether the CA committed reversible error when it concluded that the Bank was
properly a orded due process before the HLURB, and when it failed to recognize
the Bank as a mortgagee in good faith. — No.

Ruling:

I. The Petition for Review on Certiorari was denied. Time and again, the Court has
emphasized that review of appeals under Rule 45 is "not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion.” Thus, a petition for review on certiorari shall only be
granted on the basis of special and important reasons.

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions led under Rule 45.
However, there are recognized exceptions to this general rule, namely:

(1) when the ndings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the ndings of facts are con icting; (6) when in
making its ndings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
ndings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the ndings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the ndings are
conclusions without citation of speci c evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the ndings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant

Page 31 of 42
fi
fi
ff
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
ff
fi
fi
ffi
ffi
fl
fi
fi
 facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
di erent conclusion.

The Bank avers that the second, fourth and eleventh exceptions above are present in
this case. However, after a judicious examination of the records of this case and the
respective submissions of the parties, the Court nds that none of these exceptions
apply.

II. Neither mistake nor misapprehension of facts can be ascribed to the CA in

rendering the questioned Decision. The Court likewise nds that contrary to the
Bank's claim, the CA did not overlook material facts, since the questioned
Decision proceeded from a thorough deliberation of the facts established by the
submissions of the parties and the evidence on record.

The Bank was not deprived of due process before the HLURB.

"The essence of due process is to be heard.” In administrative proceedings, due

process entails "a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.”

As correctly pointed out by the CA in the questioned Decision, the Bank was able
to set out its position by participating in the preliminary hearing and the scheduled
conferences before the Arbiter. The Bank was likewise able to assert its special and
a rmative defenses in its Answer to Rapanot' s Complaint.

The fact that the Arbiter's Decision was rendered without having considered the
Bank's position paper and draft decision is of no moment. An examination of the
1996 Rules of Procedure of the HLURB then prevailing shows that the Arbiter
merely acted in accordance therewith when he rendered his decision.

The Bank cannot likewise rely on the absence of proof of service to further its
cause. Notably, while the Bank rmly contends that it did not receive the copy of
the April 2002 Order, it did not assail the veracity of the notation "refused to
receive" inscribed on the envelope bearing said order.

The Mortgage Agreement is null and void as against Rapanot, and thus
cannot be enforced against him.

First of all, under Presidential Decree No. 957 (PD 957), no mortgage on any
condominium unit may be constituted by a developer without prior written approval
of the National Housing Authority, now HLURB. PD 957 further requires developers
to notify buyers of the loan value of their corresponding mortgaged properties
before the proceeds of the secured loan are released.

Thus, the Mortgage Agreement cannot have the e ect of curtailing Rapanot's right
as buyer of Unit 2308-B2, precisely because of the Bank's failure to comply with
PD 957. Moreover, contrary to the Bank's assertions, it cannot be considered a
mortgagee in good faith. The Bank failed to ascertain whether Golden Dragon
secured HLURB's prior written approval as required by PD 957 before it accepted

Page 32 of 42
ffi
ff
fi
fi
ff
fi
 Golden Dragon's properties as collateral. It also failed to ascertain whether any of
the properties o ered as collateral already had corresponding buyers at the time
the Mortgage Agreement was executed.

It bears stressing that banks are required to exercise the highest degree of
diligence in the conduct of their a airs.

In loan transactions, banks have the particular obligation of ensuring that clients
comply with all the documentary requirements pertaining to the approval of their
loan applications and the subsequent release of their proceeds.

If only the Bank exercised the highest degree of diligence required by the nature of
its business as a nancial institution, it would have discovered that (i) Golden
Dragon did not comply with the approval requirement imposed by Section 18 of PD
957, and (ii) that Rapanot already paid a reservation fee and had made several
installment payments in favor of Golden Dragon, with a view of acquiring Unit 2308-
B2.

The Bank's failure to exercise the diligence required of it constitutes negligence,

and negates its assertion that it is a mortgagee in good faith.


Page 33 of 42
ff
fi
ff
 MARGARITA FERNANDO vs. ROSALINDA RAMOS PAGUYO
G.R. No. 237871
September 18, 2019

Facts:

The respondents and Lucena Ramos are the nine (9) children and heirs of spouses Dominador
Ramos and Damiana Porciuncula. On the other hand, petitioners Margarita, Felix, and Remigia
Fernando are the collateral heirs of Tomas Fernando.

On October 30, 1952, Lucena unilaterally executed a Declaration of Heirship declaring that she
is the sole heir of Dominador Ramos and Damiana Porciuncula (Spouses Ramos). Hence,
Lucena was able to transfer the ownership of the 3.1541-hectare agricultural land in her name
and as a result, TCT No. NT-12647 was issued in her favor. Subsequently, Lucena sold to
Tomas the subject property through a pacto de retro sale.

Aggrieved by Lucena's unilateral act of executing a Declaration of Heirship, the respondents

led a complaint against the spouses Lucena and Alfredo Mateo before the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

The CFI rendered a Decision which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. NT-12647 in the name
of Lucena, and the issuance of a new title covering the land in favor of all the legal heirs of
Spouses Ramos. The CFI also ordered for the partition of the property among the heirs in the
proportion of 1/9 each. Finally, it ordered Lucena to pay Tomas the sum of P8,800.00 with legal
interest until fully paid, and as security for the payment of such amounts, subjected the shares
appertaining to Lucena and other heirs to a lien of equitable mortgage in favor of Tomas.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals a rmed the Decision and the same became  nal and
executory.

Petitioners Fernandos (collateral heirs of Tomas Fernando) learned of the Decision issued by
the CA. Thus, petitioner Margarita went to the residence of spouses Lucena and Alfredo to
demand that the latter comply with the said Decision. An alleged  verbal agreement  was
entered into between the petitioners Fernandos and spouses Lucena and Alfredo wherein the
latter were given more time to pay or surrender the title of the subject property to the
petitioners Fernandos.

Four years thereafter, the petitioners Fernandos led a complaint for speci c performance and
damages to enforce the oral agreement covering the entire subject property against the
spouses Lucena and Alfredo before the RTC which was docketed as Civil Case No. 31-SD(97).

The RTC rendered a Decision ordering the proper Registry of Deeds to issue another title in the
name of Tomas upon payment of the fees due. The aforementioned Decision was appealed by
Spouses Lucena and Alfredo before the CA. But the CA issued a Resolution dismissing
Spouses Lucena and Alfredo's appeal due to their failure to le an appellants' brief within the
prescribed period. An Entry of Judgment was then issued, certifying that the aforesaid
Resolution became nal and executory.

As a result thereof, TCT No. N-32644 was subsequently issued in the name of Tomas.
Consequently, the title over the subject property was transferred to petitioners Fernandos as
collateral heirs of Tomas. TCT No. 34698 was then issued in their names in lieu of TCT No.
N-32644.

Page 34 of 42
fi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 Hence, the respondents (or the heirs of Spouses Ramos) led this Petition for Annulment of
Decision in Civil Case No. 31-SD(97) under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The respondents
maintained that the complaint sought to recover only the shares of spouses Lucena and
Alfredo over the subject property and did not cover the shares which pertained to the other
heirs. Moreover, the respondents alleged that  they were not impleaded as defendants and
spouses Lucena and Alfredo did not have any authority to enter into a verbal agreement with
the petitioners Fernandos with respect to the other co-heirs' shares over the subject property.

Thereafter, a Resolution was issued by the CA declaring Spouses Lucena and Alfredo in default
for failure to submit the required Answer to the instant Petition for Annulment of Decision and
Damages despite receipt of the notices therein. Furthermore, the case was remanded to the
Executive Judge of the RTC for reception of evidence.

The CA found merit in the Petition for Annulment of Decision, hence, it granted the same. The
CA held that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case because of the undisputed fact that the
respondents, who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners Fernandos led their Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution.

Hence, the instant appeal before the Court.

Issue:

I. Whether the CA gravely erred in giving due course to the Complaint for Annulment
of Decision led by the respondents and declaring the Decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 31-SD(97) annulled and set aside for lack of jurisdiction. — No.

Ruling:

I. No. Upon exhaustive review of the facts and the law surrounding the instant case,
the Court nds that the CA did not err in granting the respondents' Petition for
Annulment of Decision.

Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of decision "is resorted to
in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process."17 According to Section 3 of Rule 47, if based on extrinsic fraud,
the action must be led within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

The Court held in Dr. Orbeta v. Sendiong, that a petition for annulment grounded on lack
of jurisdiction, owing to the failure to implead the indispensable parties, "is ample basis
for annulment of judgment. We have long held that  the joinder of all indispensable
parties is a condition sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.”

In the instant case, it goes without saying that in an action for speci c performance
compelling the transfer of the subject property co-owned by nine heirs who have already
been adjudged by a nal and executory decision as co-owners of the subject property,
the latter are indispensable parties in such an action. Jurisprudence has indubitably held

Page 35 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 that  in a suit involving co-owned property, all the co-owners of such property are
indispensable parties.

The petitioners Fernandos cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the respondents have
been declared with nality as the co-owners of the subject property, being the co-heirs
of the original owners of the subject property, i.e., the spouses Ramos.

Therefore, with the joinder of all indispensable parties being a condition sine qua non to
the exercise of judicial power, the petitioners Fernandos' assertion that the RTC validly
acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 31-SD(97) fails to convince.

The petitioners Fernandos likewise assert that the CA erred in granting the respondents'
Petition for Annulment of Decision because the said Petition is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.

According to jurisprudence, an annulment of decision may not be invoked (1) where the
party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies
through his own fault or negligence.

It must be stressed that the respondents were not able to avail at all of the remedy of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or any other remedy against the RTC's Decision in
Civil Case No. 31-SD(97), not due to their own fault or negligence, but precisely because
they were not impleaded by the petitioners Fernandos.

Hence, considering the foregoing, the CA did not err in granting the respondents'
Petition for Annulment of Judgment, annulling the RTC's Decision in Civil Case No. 31-
SD(97) for lack of jurisdiction. Necessarily, TCT No. N-32644, which was issued in the
name of Tomas in accordance with the null and void Decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 31-SD(97), which was eventually transferred in the names of the petitioners
Fernandos under TCT No. N-34698, must be cancelled.

Page 36 of 42
fi

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEODORO ANSANO Y CALLEJA

G.R. No. 232455
December 02, 2020

Facts:

An Information was led against Ansano for the rape of minor AAA. Upon arraignment, Ansano
entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial and trial on the merits then ensued.

The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court and a rmed by the CA, is as
follows:

The complaining witness is AAA, 15 years old, student and a resident of XXX. She testi ed
that she led this case of rape against accused Teodoro Ansano, whom she pointed to and
identi ed in open court. She stated that she did not know him at rst, but when she went to
the Municipal Building, she came to know him because of his niece who is her friend.

She came to know the name and identity of the accused on March 19, 2006 at 8:00 o'clock
in the evening, when she saw him in their house having a drinking spree with her father. She
was able to recognize him ("namumukhaan"); he has a scar and "butil-butil" on his face; he
has a moustache and "medyo singkit". She came to know his name for the rst time when
she went to the XXX Municipal Hall, where accused was detained because of the case led
by BBB. She was shown a picture of the accused, which she examined clearly, and she was
sure that he was the one who raped her.

Upon cross-examination, she stated that she had been residing in XXX, since the year 2005,
and that she had not known the accused, even by face, before April 6, 2005. She came to
know him through BBB who was then living in their house, when accused had a drinking
spree with her father on March 19, 2006.

On the other hand, the accused relied on denial and alibi to establish his innocence.

After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Ansano of the crime charged.

The RTC was convinced by the testimony of AAA identifying Ansano as the one who
sexually abused her. It found such testimony to be clear, consistent, spontaneous, and
unrelenting, thus establishing that it was Ansano who sexually abused her. The RTC likewise
found her testimony to be corroborated through the testimony of the medico-legal who
conducted a medical examination on AAA. Thus, as between her credible testimony and
Ansano's bare denial, the RTC ruled that the evidence at hand established Ansano's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Aggrieved, Ansano appealed to the CA.

The CA a rmed Ansano's conviction, and held that the prosecution was able to su ciently
prove the elements of the crime charged.

The CA noted that AAA's testimony was clear, consistent, and spontaneous, and that she
positively identi ed Ansano as the perpetrator. Moreover, her claim that she was assaulted
was supported by the medico-legal examination, which found multiple fresh lacerations on
her hymen. The CA held that there was therefore no doubt that AAA was indeed assaulted.

Page 37 of 42
fi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
fi
ffi
fi
ffi
fi
fi
 The alleged inconsistency of AAA's testimony with regard to the time she rst saw the
accused-appellant face to face only on March 19, 2006 was properly explained during her
re-direct examination. Again, there is no inconsistency as to having known accused-
appellant's name only on May 15, 2006. That is di erent from having to see the accused-
appellant again for the rst time on March 19, 2006 after the rape incident that occurred on
April 6, 2005.

Accused-appellant's claim of the absence of scar on his face may be true. However, AAA
also identi ed accused-appellant through his other physical features such as, "butil-butil sa
mukha," "medyo singkit," and his moustache. In this case, AAA consistently testi ed that
she was able to see and recognize accused-appellant as her rapist.

Finally, the CA also ruled that Ansano's alibi cannot be given probative value, as AAA's
positive identi cation, which was clear and credible, has destroyed Ansano's alibi which, in
turn, was unsupported by evidence.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:

I. Whether the prosecution established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt — No.

II. Whether the out-of-court identi cation by AAA failed to pass the test of reliability
to establish the identity of the accused as the perpetrator beyond reasonable
doubt. — No.

Ruling:

I. No. The Court acquits Ansano on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that every accused is
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is "a basic
constitutional principle, eshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution
the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the o ense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.”

In  People v. Mingming, the Court outlined what the prosecution must do to hurdle the
presumption and secure a conviction:

First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until nal
conviction; conviction requires no less than evidence su cient to arrive at a moral
certainty of guilt, not only with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more importantly,
of the identity of the accused as the author of the crime.

Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot
draw its strength from the weakness of the defense.

Corollary to such principle, the Court has also laid down the following guidelines in its
review of rape cases:

Page 38 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fl
fi
ff
ff
ffi
fi
fi
fi
 (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is
di cult to prove, it is even more di cult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove the charge;

(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution;

(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

From these principles, and based on its own careful review of the records of the case,
the Court rules that a reasonable doubt exists as to Ansano's culpability. While the
Court does not doubt AAA's claim that she had been raped, the Court does not,
however, have moral certainty that it was Ansano who committed the dastardly act.

Verily, a successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two

things: the identi cation of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the
same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is
unable to convincingly prove the o ender's identity.  The constitutional presumption of
innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identi cation that is full of
uncertainties.

The Court has always been mindful that "the greatest care should be taken in
considering the identi cation of the accused, especially when this identi cation is made
by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the
identi cation.” This stems from the recognition that testimonial evidence, unlike other
forensic evidence such as ngerprint and DNA testing which are real or object evidence,
are subject to human errors which may be intentional or unintentional.

II. No, the out-of-court identi cation by AAA failed to pass the test of reliability.

The Court nds in this case that the out-of-court identi cation by AAA failed to pass the
test of reliability to establish the identity of the accused as the perpetrator beyond
reasonable doubt.

To reiterate, the  totality of circumstances  test requires the Court to look at the
following factors in weighing the reliability of the out-of-court identi cation: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree
of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the length of time between the crime and the identi cation; (5) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identi cation; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identi cation procedure.  

Applying the test in the present case:

(a) The rst two factors: opportunity to view, and degree of attention.

Discussions relating to these factors include, for example, the duration of the
commission of the crime, the lighting conditions, and whether the eyewitness was
put on alert that he or she must remember the identity of the particular person,
among others.

Page 39 of 42
ffi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
ff
ffi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 In the present case, the Court recognizes that the witness had a good opportunity
to view the criminal at the time of the crime, given that they spent considerable time
together during the commission of the crime. The witness also said that the crime
happened around 5:00 in the afternoon, thus the lighting conditions were well
enough for her to see the face of her assailant. As well, it could be said that AAA
had a high degree of attention, especially on the identity of her assailant, during this
time as they were the only people in the crime scen.

Despite these, however, AAA's identi cation of Ansano as the assailant fails the rest
of the other factors to be considered. 

(b) Accuracy of any prior description.

AAA's description of her attacker was general and related mostly to, not her
assailant's physical features, but what he was wearing at the time of the crime. In
her direct testimony, the only descriptions that she gave were that: "he is taller
than I am; he was carrying a bolo; he was wearing a long-sleeved shirt; he was
wearing long pants he used in the farm, sir.” These were her only descriptions of
her assailant as she was narrating the rape incident. The description that her
assailant had a scar on his face and that it had "butil-butil" came after, when she
saw Ansano on March 19, 2006.

The defense made a manifestation to make it of record that the face of the witness
has no scar whatsoever. The prosecution made a counter-manifestation that the
scar may have been gone since it had been four years between AAA's
identi cation and the time the accused took the witness stand.

However, the Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which being
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence has not ful lled the test of moral certainty and is thus insu cient to
support a conviction.

In other words, doubts — no matter how slight, as long as they are reasonable —
created in the identity of the perpetrator of the crime, should be resolved in favor
of the accused.

(c) The length of lime between the crime and the identi cation.

The Court also held in Nuñez that:

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the length of

time between the crime and the identi cation made by the witness. 'It is by now a
well-established fact that people are less accurate and complete in their
eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval than after a short one.' Ideally
then, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the
incident.

In the present case, AAA was raped in April 2005. She supposedly saw her
assailant again in March 2006, and was nally able to de nitively point to Ansano
as her assailant in May 2006. There was thus, more or less, one year between the
time the crime was committed to the time of the identi cation.

Page 40 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
ffi
 In People v. Rodrigo a time lapse of 5 1/2 months between the commission of the
crime and the out-of-court identi cation was one of the factors that led the Court
to hold that the identi cation of the accused was unreliable. The present case, in
comparison, even involves a longer passage of time. While a longer passage of
time  per se  will not automatically make an eyewitness recollection unreliable, it
certainly impacts its overall reliability when considered along with the other factors
in the totality of circumstances test.

(d) The last two factors: the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identi cation, and the suggestiveness of the identi cation procedure.

The Court notes that AAA did not show a high level of certainty in her initial
identi cation of Ansano. For instance, in her testimony quoted above, she used the
word "namumukhaan" instead of "nakilala" when she saw Ansano on March 19,
2006. More glaring, however, was that she needed a second look for her to be able
to ascertain that Ansano was her assailant — this time, through a photograph
while Ansano was detained for another charge.

The foregoing testimony, apart from being an indication of AAA's level of

uncertainty as to her identi cation of Ansano, is more importantly an indication that
the identi cation was marred by improper suggestion.

To recall, the Court has already said in Pineda that:

The rst rule in proper photographic identi cation procedure is that  a series of photographs
must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule directs that when a
witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way
suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.

This is so because: Where a photograph has been identi ed as that of the guilty party, any
subsequent corporeal identi cation of that person may be based not upon the witness's
recollection of the features of the guilty party, but upon his recollection of the
photograph. Thus, although a witness who is asked to attempt a corporeal identi cation of a
person whose photograph he previously identi ed may say, "That's the man that did it," what
he may actually mean is, "That's the man whose photograph I identi ed.”

A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the conclusion that where a
witness has made a photographic identi cation of a person, his subsequent corporeal
identi cation of that same person is somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must
be evaluated in light of the fact that he rst saw a photograph.

Again, the circumstances of AAA's identi cation of Ansano were that almost a year
after the rape incident, she supposedly recognized him as her assailant as he was
having a drinking spree with her father. She, however, only knew of his name two
months after, or on March 19, 2006, when she went to the municipal hall to inquire if
Ansano was still detained for the case led by her best friend, BBB, who was also
Ansano's niece. Incidentally, BBB was also present when AAA rst "recognized"
Ansano in the drinking spree with her father.

It is important to note that the records re ect that the present charge was once
consolidated with a case led by BBB against Ansano, but BBB eventually decided to
not pursue the case and this case thus proceeded on its own. While the records do
not re ect the exact nature of the case led by BBB, it could reasonably be inferred
that it was likewise a rape or sexual assault charge for it to have been initially
consolidated with this case.

Page 41 of 42
fi
fi
fi
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 To the mind of the Court, there is a reasonable possibility that the con uence of these
circumstances may have, albeit inadvertently, improperly suggested to the mind
of AAA that Ansano was her assailant. It is true that the latter nding — on the
possible e ect of BBB on the identi cation — did not arise from State action; thus,
this nding would not amount to a violation of Ansano's right to due process that
would render the identi cation inadmissible. This does not, however, preclude the
courts from taking the said nding into consideration as evidentiary inquiries do not
end on questions of admissibility. "Admissibility of evidence should not be equated
with weight of evidence.” Hearsay evidence, for instance, cannot be given credence
whether objected to or not for it has no probative value. Eyewitness testimony, like all
other evidence, must not only be admissible — it must be able to convince.

Ultimately, the Court's independent assessment of the reliability of the out-of-court

identi cation when the totality of circumstances test is applied resulted in reasonable
doubt on the said identi cation. All told, the foregoing ndings ultimately
impressed upon the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt — to reiterate, not on
the fact that the crime happened, but rather — on the identity of the accused.
Acquittal must perforce follow.

The Court thus takes this opportunity to remind courts that "a conviction for a crime
rests on two bases: (1) credible and convincing testimony establishing the identity of
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime; and (2) the prosecution proving beyond
reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime  are attributable to the accused.”
"Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary
responsibility. Thus, in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the o ender, like the
crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the rst
duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no
conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.”

As a nal note, the Court ends with the following discussion in People v. Fernandez:

Given the foregoing ndings, we are not concluding that complainant has not been a
victim of rape, or that appellant's defense of alibi and denial can be given full faith
and credence. We only stress that her testimony was unable to pass the exacting test
of moral certainty that the law demands and the rules require to satisfy the
prosecution's burden of overcoming appellant's presumption of innocence.

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt

— moral certainty that the accused is guilty.

Page 42 of 42
fi
fi
fi
ff
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fl
ff
fi