RULES 84-88

Rule 84

1. Caro v CA 113 S 10 - Tolentino

Topic: What constitutes administration

Doctrine: An administrator has no power to exercise the right of redemption.

Facts:
● Alfredo, Mario, and Benjamin, all surnamed Benito were the original co-owners of 2 parcels of
land.
● When Mario died, Basilia (Mario’s wife) and Saturnino (Mario’s father) were appointed as joint
administrators of his estate.
● Benjamin, one of the co-owners, executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Luz Caro
(petitioner) of his one-third undivided portion over the said parcels of land. Subsequently, with
the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito (shown in their affidavits dated 1960) a
subdivision title was issued to petitioner Caro.
● Basilia found out about the sale around May 1966 and sent Caro a letter dated August 25, 1966
offering to redeem the said one-third undivided share. Caro ignored this offer.
● Basilia, in an independent action sought to prove that she had not been notified of the sale as
required by Art. 1620 and 1623 of the NCC.
● Caro refuted this by presenting the affidavit of Benjamin Benito, executed ante litem motam,
attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his
intention to sell his undivided share.
● The trial judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (a) private respondent, as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the power to exercise the
right of legal redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his obligation of
furnishing written notice of the sale of his one-third undivided portion to possible redemptioners.
● On appeal, the CA found for Basilia.

Issue:
W/N Basilia, as administratix of the estate of Mario Benito, can exercise legal redemption with respect to
the lots in question? - NO.

Ruling:
● Petitioner Caro contends that the right sought to be exercised by Basilia in the case assumes
that the land in question is under co-ownership.
● However, the fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated
when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by
administrators Saturnino Benito, as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito,
agreed to subdivide the property.
● A petition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. This was accompanied by the affidavits
of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, to the effect that they agree to the segregation of the
land formerly owned in common by Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito and Benjamin Benito. A
 subdivision plan was made and by common agreement with an area of 163 hectares, more or
less, was ceded to petitioner Caro. A subdivision title was subsequently issued on the lot
assigned to petitioner Caro.
● In Caram, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. the Court held that once the property is subdivided
and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no
reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.
● Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right of legal
redemption exists, Basilia, as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right for and in
behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-administrator
Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino’s consent to the sale of the one-third portion to petitioner
Caro cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of redemption
was not within the powers of administration, in the same manner, Basilia, as co-administrator
has no power to exercise the right of redemption, the very power which the Court of Appeals
ruled to be not within the powers of administration:
“While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the
possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the
payment of the expenses of administration and the administrator may bring and defend
action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule
88), such right of possession and administration do not include the right of legal
redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after
the death of another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption only came into
existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of
the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir of the
deceased co-owner.(Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.)

2. Mananquil v Villegas 189 S 335 - Villadolid

Topic: What constitutes administration

Doctrine: Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or
administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate
of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from
the court having jurisdiction of the estate.

Facts:
● This is actually a disbarment case against VILLEGAS.
● It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the
testate estate of one Felomina Zerna.
● In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a lease contract with the
partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over several lots included in Zerna’s estate.
● The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth.
● It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner in
the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS.
● When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator
for LEONG’s estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous
terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS should have first notified
 and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts were
renewed, VILLEGAS being counsel of that estate’s administrator.

Issue/s:
(1) W/N VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease? -
NO.
(2) W/N VILLEGAS should be disbarred? - NO.

Ruling:

(1)
● Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or
administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the
expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special
authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled
that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the
estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.
● Thus, considering that administrator Leong was not required under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real
properties of the estate, VILLEGAS, as counsel of Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to
notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial
approval thereto.

(2)
● There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although VILLEGAS should be suspended from
practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involving
properties of Zerna’s estate in favor of the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. Under Art. 1646
of the Civil Code, “lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession” are prohibited for leasing,
either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned. Such
act constituted gross misconduct, hence, suspension for four months.

3. Estate of Olave v Reyes 123 S 767 - Yap

Topic: What constitutes administration

Doctrine: Where the estate of a deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.

Facts:
● Herein private res. Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a civil case against Carlos
and Matias Matute, in their capacities as co-administrators of the Estate of Olave, for the collection of an
alleged indebtedness of P28k (P19k for principal amount; P8k for other fees). Carlos and Matias filed an
answer claiming their lack of knowledge and questioning the legality of the claim of SAMCO.
 ● CFI-Manila issued an order directing Carlos and Matias to secure the probate court’s approval before
entering into any transaction involving the 17 titles of the estate—one of which is a parcel of land in Davao
covered by OCT-27 (subject property).
● Against the court’s orders, the parties submitted an Amicable Settlement to CFI-Davao. The Settlement
alleged: (1) Acknowledged the estate’s debt to SAMCO amounting to P28k; (2) Rhat at present, the estate
does not have any funds with which to pay or settle the obligation; (3) Rhat the estate, through its
administrators, decided to pay SAMCO by way of conveying and ceding unto it the ownership of certain
real property under their administration; (4) That SAMCO accepts the offer as full and complete payment
and satisfaction of the debt; (5) That the parties waive all other claims which they might have against each
other.
● Said Settlement was not submitted to and approved by CFI-Manila, nor was notice thereof given to the
beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.
● Despite the opposition of other parties who sought to intervene and the lack of approval by the probate
court, CFI-Davao still approved the Amicable Settlement and enforced it thru a court decision ceding the
subject property, with an assessed value of P31k, to SAMCO, in satisfaction of its claim amounting to only
P19k.
● Thus, the Estate of Olave, represented by Jose Matute (judicial administrator in the special proceeding),
filed a petition for certiorari, praying for the Amicable Settlement submitted by the parties to be set aside,
as it will operate as a judgment that conveys illegally and unfairly the property of the estate without the
requisite approval of the probate court, which has the sole jurisdiction to convey this property in custodia
legis of the estate.
● SAMCO answered:
(1) NCC 2032 applies only to extrajudicial compromise entered into by the administrators of the
estate; the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, as it was entered into
in another independent action and in another court of equal rank.
(2) Even so, the lack of probate court’s approval does not render the Settlement void, but only
voidable, which must be attacked directly in the CFI.

Issue:
W/N the compromise agreement herein entered into by administrators of the estate requires the approval of the
probate court? - YES.

Ruling:
● Section 1, Rule 87 of the ROC provides that “no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator.” The claim of SAMCO, being
one arising from contract, may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the
CFI for the settlement of the estate of Olave, and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed lest it
be barred forever.
○ Purpose of presentation of claims against decedents in the probate court:
(1) To protect the estate of the deceased, that way, the executor or administrator will be able
to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed;
(2) To apprise the administrator and probate court of the existence of the claim so that a
proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full and by pro-rata
portion in the due course of administration, inasmuch as upon decedent’s death, his
entire estate is burdened with payment of debts and no creditor shall enjoy any
preference or priority.
● It is clear that the main purpose of SAMCO in filing the civil case is to secure a money judgment against the
Estate of Olave, which eventually resulted in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than 29 hec. of land
 belonging to the estate, in payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate court which has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case of the estate of Olave.
● It was a mistake for CFI-Davao to have given due course to the case, much less issue the questioned
Order approving the Amicable Settlement.
○ Section 1, Rule 73 provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
○ Where the estate of a deceased is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate
court.

Fallo: GRANTED.

Rule 85

4. Pascual v CA 300 S 214 - Acabado

Topic: Attorney’s fees, when chargeable to estate, exec/adm

Doctrine: A money claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his/her acts of
administration can be filed in the intestate proceedings in the same court. The intestate court may
resolve the nature of the claim as a necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the
estate.

Facts:
● Don Pascual died interstate and was survived by his widow, his nephews and nieces (from his
full and half blood brothers), his brother’s estate. Dr. Olivia Pascual (petitioner) is the illegitimate
child of his brother.
● His widow filed a petition for letters of administration, and was appointed as special
administratrix. She hired private resp. Atty. Santos. As her counsel for the proceedings, for a fee
equal to 15% of her share of the estate.
● Pascual’s heirs entered into a compromise agreement - 3/4th of the estate would go to the
widow, and 1/4th would go to the other heirs.
● The widow died during the pendency of the proceedings, leaving a will naming petitioner Olivia
the sole universal heir.
● The rendered judgement in accordance with the compromise agreement, awarding Atty. Santos
his 15% of the widow’s share, and a writ of execution in his favor was released, ordering the
garnishment of certain deposits and shares belonging to the widow’s estate.
● Petitioner Olivia sought Reconsideration and Quashal of the Writ, and later petitioned for
annulment of the award before the CA.
● CA dismissed - intestate court had jurisdiction to make the award, and that petitioner Olivia had
been accorded due process. An attorney’s lien had already been placed by the RTC on the
estate in the early stages of the proceedings. Though not incurred by Don Pascual, the claim
was related to ordinary acts of administration of the estate.

Issue:
W/N the intestate court has jurisdiction to determine the nature of the expenses in the administration
and settlement of the estate? - YES. Petition denied.

Ruling:
● Petitioner argues that the intestate court lost jurisdiction over the person of the widow, who was
the administrator, after her death. Hence it could not consider the lien as a necessary expense of
the estate allowed to the administrator in Rule 85.
● The death of the widow did not extinguish Atty. Santos’ claim, nor require him to refile his claim.
This is because he had filed his claim against the estate and was granted an atty.’s lien on
it, rather than against the estate of the widow.
● The estate of Don Pascual is distinct and separate from that of the widow, who merely
served as the administratrix of the former. The widow was merely a representative, and
the atty.’s claim was an item of the administrative expense of the estate.
● A money claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his/her acts of
administration can be filed in the intestate proceedings in the same court. It was the duty
of the intestate court to determine whether the money claim was allowable as
administrative expense if it was obtained in reference to the management of the estate -
the performance of legal services the administratrix could not perform, prosecution or
defense of actions on behalf of the estate, the discovery, recovery or preservation of the
properties of the estate. In other words, the intestate court may resolve the nature of the
claim as a necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate.
● In the present case, petitioners averment that the fees in question are not proportionate to the
services rendered by private respondent fails to consider the numerous properties involved and
the private respondents labor for thirteen years, during which time he became responsible for
the estate of Don Andres. In fact, the established standards in fixing attorneys fees calls for the
upholding of the award.

Rule 86

5. Villanueva v. PNB, 9 SCRA 145 - Banguis

Topic: How claims presented or prosecuted

Doctrine: It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within which to present claims against the
estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be granted under special
circumstances.

Facts:
● Mauricia G. Villanueva, the widow, petitioned for letters of Administration for his the estate of his
husband, before CFI Agusan. It was set for hearing and Notice thereof was published in the
Manila Daily Bulletin.
● At the hearing, other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate under administration, opposed
the appointment the widow.
○ The name of Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte was suggested and all the parties agreed.
 ○ After the taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his
duties.
● In 1950, the Clerk of the Agusan CFI, issued the following Notice to Creditors:
○ Notice is hereby given to all persons having claims for money against the decedent, the
said Pascual Villanueva, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due or contingent, for funeral expenses and expenses of last sickness of the
deceased, and Judgment for money against him, requiring them to file their claims
with the clerk of court within six but not beyond twelve months after date of the
first publication of this notice, serving copies of such claims upon administrator, the
said Teodulo R. Ricaforte.
● The above notice contained the usual order for publication thereof (once a week for three
consecutive weeks) which was effected, thru the Morning Times of City, a newspaper of
general circulation, on Nov. 16, 23 and 30, 1950, which expired on November 16, 1951.
● In 1953, the defendant-appellant PNB filed in the administration proceedings, Creditor's
Claim amounting to P1, 347.45. That this has been due and demandable since Dec. 1940.
● Subsequently, In 1954, PNB filed a Motion for Admission of claim, stating the administrator
has not answered the claim nor denied the same, hence it is respectfully prayed that an order be
issued admitting and approving the claim and ordering the administrator to pay the Bank the
amount of the claim.
● The administrator opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations therein. He averred that it has already been paid,
cause of action barred by statute of limitations and that claim is also barred since PNB failed to
file its claim within the time stated in the notice.
● The appellant PNB, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the claim presented by
the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time within
which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging, among others:
○ That Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in
the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable;
○ That its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of
knowledge of administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in
Agusan, the employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been
published in the Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.
● CFI = Denied petition for an extension of time for filing the claim. Barred by statute of limitations
since 10 years have passed. And that it was not able to file within the period fixed by court after
notice and also because there was no justifying reason for the same or any excusable
negligence.
● MR = Denied. PNB had knowledge of the present administration proceedings because of the
second payment of the claim due to deceased from Philippine War Damage Commission which
was deposited in the Agusan Bank.
● CA = Certified the same to SC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the order in question is already barred? - YES.
Ruling:
● Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court,
within which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on
November 16, 1951 and the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late.
○ This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did not know of such
administration proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan
City, Agusan.
● It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors
were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively,
which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the supposed
lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and its employees had been
belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of
money by the administrator Of the estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). The deposit was
made on December 1, 1951, inspite of which the appellant Bank only filed its claim on July
20, 1953. It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within Which to present
claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension
should be granted under special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable
reason to give the extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same
had elapsed.
● Having reached the above conclusions, We deem it necessary to determine the question as to
whether or not the Moratorium Law had suspended the prescriptive period for filing of the claim
under consideration.

SC = The order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant Philippine
National Bank, in both instances.

6. Sheker v. Estate of Alice Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007 - Bries

Topic: How claims presented/prosecuted

Doctrine: The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money
claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

Facts:
● The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an
order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.
● Petitioner filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately
P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the
 amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by
petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
● The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
● RTC dismissed without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by
respondent.
● Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising that RTC erred in strictly
applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a
written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the
claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary
actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

Issue:
W/N the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping? - YES.

Ruling:
● The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and
the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,
subject to certain exceptions.
● Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors'
claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties
of the estate. A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of
the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute
a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money
claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping.

7. Elchico v. Pampanga Bus, G.R. No. L-18936, May 23, 1967 - Calantoc

Topic: How claims presented/prosecuted

Doctrine/s:
(1) The general rule is that when an action is one for recovery of money, debt or interest, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the CFI, the said money claims should be filed in the
testate/intestate proceedings “to avoid useless duplicity of procedure”. An exception is when
the estate, through its administrator, waives such rule and proceeds with the civil case.
 (2) Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court permits acceptance of claims belatedly made, for cause
shown and on such terms as are equitable.

Facts: (this involves 2 proceedings - CIVPRO and SPECPRO)

● Pampanga Bus Company (PAMBUSCO) filed a civil case against Valentin Fernando and
Encarnacion Vda. de Fernando to collect P105,000 upon a contractual obligation.
● Encarnacion died and by this time, PAMBUSCO in the civil case presented its evidence and
submitted its case.
○ (March 23, 1955) Meanwhile, intestate proceedings for the estate of Encarnacion were
filed and notice to the estate’s creditors was given for them to file their claims within 6
months from the first publication of the notice.
● The court in the civil case ordered Jose Nicolas, then administrator, to substitute for the
deceased Encarnacion. As such, PAMBUSCO’s complaint was amended, naming Jose and
Valentin as defendants. No objection was made on the substitution. Jose, as administrator, filed
an amended answer with counterclaim against PAMBUSCO and in due course, presented his
evidence.
● The CFI in the civil case ruled in favor of PAMBUSCO.
○ (February 25, 1959) While the defendants were perfecting their appeal from the
judgment of the CFI, PAMBUSCO registered its “contingent” claim in the intestate
proceedings - for whatever money judgment may be rendered in his favor in the civil
case.
● An appeal to the CA was made, which affirmed the CFI. The SC likewise dismissed the
defendants’ appeal by certiorari for having been filed out of time and for raising issues of fact.
○ The judgment in the civil case having reached finality, PAMBUSCO moved in the
intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the present joint administrators Ignacio and
Almazan be ordered to pay the share of the deceased in the judgment debt.
○ (March 13, 1961) PAMBUSCO’s motion was granted by the probate court, thereby
ordering the heirs and/or joint administrators to pay the former, but further ruled that no
payment shall be made until after the administrators have informed the Court, within 10
days from its order, in writing as to the existence of other unsettled money claims
against the estate and of the sufficiency of the assets available for payment of all the
debts.
○ Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N PAMBUSCO’s claim was properly admitted by the probate court? - YES.

Ruling:
● The general rule is that when an action is one for recovery of money, debt or interest, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the CFI, the said money claims should be filed in the
testate/intestate proceedings “to avoid useless duplicity of procedure.” (Sec. 21, Rule 3 ROC)
However, whether the original suit for the recovery of money - as in this case - proceeds to its
conclusion, or is dismissed and the claim covered thereby is filed with the probate court, one
thing is certain: no substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced.
 ● An exception to the aforementioned rule is made in the present case. At the time of the death of
Encarnacion, PAMBUSCO had already rested its case after presentation of its evidence. The
deceased was then substituted by Jose (administrator), without objection. By this substitution,
the estate had notice of the claim and the estate was thus represented. At no point in time did
the estate (through Jose) impugn the authority of the regular courts to determine the civil case.
In fact, Jose even took active steps to protect the interests of the estate by filing an answer with
counterclaim, and by going to trial. The case was even elevated to the SC, and has now become
final. As such, the estate waived its right to have PAMBUSCO’s claim re-litigated in the estate
proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is generally understood
that it may be waived by the estate’s representative. And, waiver is to be determined from the
administrator’s acts and conduct.
○ The revival of the civil action against the administrator, the decedent’s representative, is
generally considered equivalent to presentation of such claim in the probate court and
dispenses with the actual presentation of the claim. The administrator represents the
deceased’s estate itself and is an alter ego of the heirs. More than this, he is an officer of
the probate court. In the present circumstances, presentment of PAMUSCO’s claims in
the intestate proceedings was at best reduced to a mere formality.
● It does not matter that PAMBUSCO’s claim was filed with the probate court beyond the 6-month
period from March 25, 1955, set forth in the notice to creditors. Section 2, Rule 86 permits
acceptance of such belated claims.
○ Here, the claim was filed in the probate court only on February 25, 1959, while the
defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does
not show that the administrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of
time. The pendency of that case is thus, a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the
claim. Besides the order of the lower court of March 18, 1961 allowing payment of
PAMBUSCO’ claim impliedly granted petitioner an extension of time within which to file
said claim.
● The judgement in PAMBUSCO’s favor should be enforced. Petitioners’ objection - after
judgment had become final in the civil case - that PAMBUSCO’s claim should have been
litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgement. For, such objection
does not go into the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter.

8. Heirs of Pizarro, Sr. v. Hon. Consolacion & Tan, G.R. No. L-51278, May 9, 1988 - Caro

Topic: How claims presented/prosecuted

Doctrine: First 2 paragraphs in Held.

Facts:
● Respondent Luis Tan filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration in favor of one
Alfonso Atilano in CFI Davao. The petition alleges that Tan is the only surviving son of Dominga
Garcia who died intestate in China, but left a parcel of land in Davao. Such lot is in the
possession of petitioner-heirs of Pizarro.
● Pizarro heirs filed an opposition claiming that Pizarro (their dad) bought ½ of the lot via
extrajudicial settlement executed by Vicenta Tan in HK.
 ● During trial, Tan and the Pizarro heirs entered into a compromise agreement whereby Pizarro heirs agreed
to withdraw their opposition to the appointment of Atilano as admin, and for the intestate proceedings to
proceed in due course → approved
● After Atilano submitted his inventory, respondent court ordered the filing of creditors’ claims
against the estate within 6 months from date of 1st publication
● [not impt] Meanwhile, Tan and the City of Davao filed a joint motion for the court to take notice
of their agreement to file a joint motion to proceed with the determination of heirs of decedent
Garcia which will be determinative of their respective claims
● [not impt] Pizarro heirs filed their opposition to the joint motion on the ground that it is without procedural
basis. → court granted the joint motion, taking note of the Tan x Davao City agreement.
● Tan then filed a motion to exclude Pizarro heirs from the case on the ground that they don’t even
claim to be Garcia’s heirs and that the EJ deed of partition allegedly made in HK was simulated.
● Pizarro heirs filed an opposition. They also filed 2 claims against the estate: (1) P350k
representing services allegedly rendered by daddy Pizarro for Vicenta Tan (2) P200k for
advances of realty and income taxes on the lot
● Tan countered that the claim was barred for having been filed beyond the 6mo period.
● Court dismissed both claims for being filed out of time.
● Pizarro heirs argue that the court’s order for period of filing claims violated §2 R86 providing that
filing should be for 6mo starting from the 6th month after the date of the first publication until the
12th month [ex. 1st publication: 1 Jan 2018. Period for filing claims is 1 July-1 Jan 2019]

Issue:
W/N the claims were filed out of time? - NO.

Ruling:
● The range of the period specified in R86 is intended to give the probate court the discretion to
fix the period for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted to set the period provided it
is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of the first publication of the
notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory.
● [Purpose is speedy settlement of estate and early delivery of the property to the person entitled
to it] The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
● The period set by the respondent court was obviously too short. Since the order was void, what
applies is the period provided for in §2 R86. The 1st publication of the notice was on March 30,
1978. Thus the two claims against the estate filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979
respectively were filed on time.

9. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation, G.R. No. 147561,
June, 2006 - Celeste

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation –
obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of
the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor.

Facts:
● Respondent Republic-Asahi entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS
Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and drainage system in Republic-Asahi’s compound
within 240 days, where the Republic-Asahi is to pay P5,300,000.
● In order to guarantee faithful performance, JDS posted a performance bond of P795,000. JDS executed
the performance bond, jointly and severally with petitioner, Stronghold Insurance, Co., Inc. (SICI).
● Several times, respondent’s engineers called the attention of JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of
the construction, which resulted in the fear that construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-
day period. However, said reminders were unheeded by JDS.
● Dissatisfied, respondent extrajudicially rescinded the contract and informed JDS thereof. Such rescission,
according to the contract shall not be construed as a waiver to respondent’s right to recover damages from
JDS and the latter’s sureties.
● Respondent then sent JDS two letters demanding for payment of the performance bond but both letters
went unheeded, so respondent filed a complaint against JDS and SICI seeking for payment for the amount
representing additional expenses incurred by respondent for the completion of the project using another
contractor, as well as damages.
● According to the Sheriff’s Return, summons were duly served on SICI. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr., died
the previous year, and JDS was no longer at its address, and its whereabouts were unknown.
● SICI then filed an answer alleging that respondent’s money claims are not extinguished by the death of
Jose D. Santos. And even if this were not the case, SICI had been released from its liability under the
performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the active participation and/or involvement,
pursuant to procedural due process, of herein surety and Jose D. Santos, Jr., hence there was no
ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and SICI under the performance bond. At this point
in time, said liquidation was impossible because of the death of Santos, who as such can no longer
participate in any liquidation.
● The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the
death of Santos. However, upon MR by respondent, the lower court modified its decision holding that
Stronghold is liable. The case against Santos remained undisturbed. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
W/N SICI’s liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the
principal? - NO.

Ruling:
● As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified
with the persona themselves are extinguished by death.
● §5, Rule 86 of the Rules expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against
the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished
is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
● In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with
respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death
did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate.
 ● Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance
bond. Consequently, SICI as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its
performance bond.
● Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor and the
petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal debtor will not
work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor. Evidently, despite the
death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in accordance with the solidary
nature of the latter’s liability under the performance bond.

10. Gabriel v. Bilon, G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007 - Coronel

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Thus,
in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims must be filed against the estate.

Facts:
● Petition for review on certiorari was filed assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner, represented by his surviving spouse, Flordeliza V. Gabriel, was the owner-
operator of a public transport business, Gabriel Jeepney. Petitioner had a pool of drivers, which
included respondents, operating under a boundary system of P400 per day. Respondents filed
their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, and separation pay against
petitioner. On March 17, 1997, the Labor Arbiter handed down his decision, in favor of the
respondents claim. Incidentally, on April 4, 1997, petitioner passed away. On April 18, 1997, a
copy of the above decision was delivered personally to petitioner’s house. The labor arbiter’s
decision was subsequently served by registered mail at petitioner’s residence and the same was
received on May 28, 1997.
● On June 5, 1997, petitioner appealed the labor arbiter’s decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission, it affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision but upon motion for reconsideration, it was
reversed. NLRC held that the case is for recovery of money which does not survive, and
considering that the decision has not become final, the case should have been dismissed and
the appeal no longer entertained1. (NLRC considered, the decision of the labor arbiter as not
final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to petitioner, however SC ruled that
the service via registered mail and subsequent appeal cured the procedural defect).

1 Rule 86, Sec. 5. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money
against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in they notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may
be set forth as counter claims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where the executor
or administrator commence an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may
set forth may answer the claims he has against the decedents, instead of presenting them independently to the court has herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and in final judgment is rendered in favored of the
decedent, the amount to determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim has been
presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent may be approved at their
present value.
 ● Aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
On August 4, 2000, the CA reversed the decision, it held that the decision of the Labor Arbiter
became final and executory and disagreed with the ratiocination of the NLRC that the death of
the Husband on April 4, 1997 ipso facto negates recovery of the money claim against the
successors-in-interest. As basis, CA used Section 3, Rule III of the NLRC Manual on Execution
of Judgment, which provides:
SECTION 3. Execution in Case of Death of Party. Where a party dies after the
finality of the decision/entry of judgment of order, execution thereon may issue or one
already issued may be enforced in the following cases:

a.)x x x ;
b) In case of death of the losing party, against his successor-in-interest,
executor or administrator;
c) In case of death of the losing party after execution is actually levied upon any
of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the sheriff
making the sale shall account to his successor-in-interest, executor or
administrator for any surplus in his hands.
● The CA set aside the NLRC’s ruling that the money claims of the respondent’s can
no longer be availed of, due to the death of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the claims survive? - YES.

Ruling:
● Yes, however, the same shall be governed by Section 20 (then Section 21), Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at
the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
● In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money
against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants.
● Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims of respondents must be
filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio Gabriel. Petition denied with
modification that the money claims of respondents should be filed against the
estate of Melencio Gabriel, within such reasonable time from the finality of this
Decision as the estate court may fix.

11. Hilado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009 - Dolar

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: Persons with contingent claims against the estate of the deceased may be allowed to access
the records of the intestate or testate proceedings.

Facts:
● Robert Benedicto died intestate, survived by his wife Julita and his daughter Francisca.
● At the time of Roberto’s death, there were 2 pending civil cases involving the petitioners against
him.
● Julita filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favour, which the RTC of
Manila granted.
● Julita filed an Inventory of the Estate. A list of liabilities was attached to the inventory, which
included the 2 pending civil cases litigated in Bacolod (torts cases against Roberto).
● Petitioners then filed with the RTC of Manila a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,
praying to be furnished with copies of all processes and ordered pertaining to the intestate
proceedings.
● Respondent Julita opposed this, contending that Petitioners had no personality to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of Roberto.
● Petitioners then filed 2 other Manifestations/motions, which sought to set a deadline for the
submission of the inventory, and alleged that the inventory so far that was submitted was
inaccurate, respectively.
● The RTC denied the Petitioners’ manifestation/motion on the ground that there are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the ROC to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
● On appeal, the CA also dismissed the petition, holding that the claim of the Petitioners’ against
the deceased Roberto were contingent or expectant as these were still pending litigation.

Issue:
(1) W/N Petitioners may be allowed to access the records of the intestate proceedings? - YES.
(2) W/N the Petitioners can compel the placing of a deadline on submission of the inventory? - NO.

Ruling:
(You can skip this is. It's just fluff, but it helps give some context to what the SC’s saying)
● While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.
● Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings, as the settlement of estates fall within
the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
● The Rules of Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons to participate in varying
capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. The claims against Benedicto were based on
tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal
Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under
the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the
death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87.
 (1)
● While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules,
if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no
other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected.
● The Petitioners asked to be furnished copies of all the processes and ordered issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of
the estate. While the utility of this relief is unquestioned, it must be counterbalanced by the fact
that the interest of the Petitioners remain inchoate and contingent.
● Instead of ordering the courts to furnish the Petitioners copies of the records, they will be
allowed access to the records of the proceedings. This is more preferable than mandating the
service of court processes and pleadings to them. This will be less cumbersome on the intestate
court while providing a viable means by which the interest of the Petitioners in the estate are
preserved.

(2)
● Petitioners also seek the setting of a deadline for the submission of a verified and complete
inventory of the estate. However, the SC cannot grant said relief. Sec. 1 of Rule 83 requires the
administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased within 3 months from appointment, while Sec. 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within 1 year from receipt of the letters
testamentary or of administration. There are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the
party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these
duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the
estate.

12. Echaus v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-30453, December 4, 1989 - Loyola

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: Money claims against a defendant who dies before a decision could be rendered in the civil
case, should have been instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of the deceased person

Facts:
● The petitioner herein, Angelina Puentevella Echaus, in her own behalf and as Administratrix of
the intestate estate of her deceased father Luis Puentevella, assisted by her husband, Rene
Echaus filed a complaint on May 30, 1962 against Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges)
praying for an accounting of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her
share in the profits and remaining assets of their business and the payment of expenses and
moral and exemplary damages. However, C.N. Hodges died which resulted to the filing of a
petition for the settlement of his estate. A notice to the creditors was published in “Yuhum”, a
newspaper of general circulation.
 ● The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the private respondent to pay the
amount indicated in the decision. On January 21, 1967, the same trial court issued an order
granting plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against PCIB (administrator of
the estate of C.N. Hodges). However, the writ was not enforced as plaintiff opted to file a motion
dated February 20, 1967 in Special Proceedings No. 1672 (estate proceedings of deceased C.
N. Hodges) for the payment of the judgment.
● In a motion dated November 25, 1968, Angelina P. Echaus prayed for the resolution of her
previous motion to direct payment of the judgment credit which was held in abeyance, stating
that the petition for relief from judgment filed in Civil Case No. 6628 was dismissed by the trial
court which dismissal has become final and executory in view of the failure of Avelina Magno
(Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) to file a record on appeal on time.
● On February 26, 1969, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco issued an Order reiterating his position
that the motion to direct payment of the judgment credit cannot yet be resolved and holding in
abeyance the resolution thereof in view of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, (PCIB v. Blanco), enjoining respondent judge
from hearing Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672, entitled "Testate Estate of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges" and "Testate Estate of Charles N. Hodges," respectively.
● Petitioner then filed the instant petition for mandamus dated April 21, 1969 seeking: a) to set
aside respondent judge's order of February 26, 1969; and b) to order PCIB to pay the judgment
credit in Civil Case No. 6628.
● It is the contention of petitioner that the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 is now final and
executory and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right under Rule 39, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court. The duty to order the execution of a final and executory judgment is ministerial
and the failure of respondent judge to issue such order is a proper case for mandamus.
● On the other hand, private respondents contend that the judgment rendered in Civil Case No.
6628 is null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Money claims against a
defendant who dies without a judgment having been rendered in the Regional Trial Court shall
be dismissed and prosecuted as a claim in the estate proceedings as laid down under Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This procedure was not followed in Civil Case No. 6628. Also,
even, if it is assumed that the judgment in the said civil case is valid, the claim presented in the
estate proceedings is already barred by the statute of non-claims.

Issue:
(1) W/N the money claim should have been filed in the intestate estate of CN Hodge? - YES.
(2) W/N the judgement sought to be enforced by the petitioner is barred under the ROC? - NO.
(3) W/N Mandamus is proper? - NO.

Ruling:
● It must be noted that Civil Case No. 6628 which is a money claim, was instituted during the
lifetime of C. N. Hodges. During its pendency and before a decision could be rendered by the
Regional Trial Court hearing the case, C. N. Hodges died. Upon his death, he was substituted by
PCIB as administrator of his estate. Being a money claim, said civil case should have been
dismissed and instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of C. N. Hodges (Sp. Proc. No.
1627) in accordance with Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
 ● However, this is not to suggest that because the claim of petitioner was pursued to its
conclusion in Civil Case No. 6682 instead of being dismissed and filed as a money claim in
Special Proceedings No. 1672, the judgment rendered therein is null and void.
● Citing the case of Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc, the court held that “The philosophy behind
the rule which provides for the dismissal of the civil case is that, upon the death of a defendant,
all money claims should be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings ‘to avoid useless
duplicity of procedure.’
● Moreover, when PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges was ordered to be
substituted as defendant, it registered no objection to the order. Thus, even if We admit for the
sake of argument that the trial court, after the death of C. N. Hodges has no jurisdiction to
render a judgment therein, the argument must fail. PCIB, participated actively in the said case. It
did not appeal the decision rendered therein, neither did it raise the issue of jurisdiction at any
stage.
● The judgement sought to be enforced by the petitioner is not barred under the Rules of Court.
● The above argument of private respondent is not correct. The Rules of Court allows a creditor to
file his claim after the period set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions
stated in the rules are present. The rule provides:
○ Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.-... . However, at any time before an order
of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim
within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as
are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.
(Rule 86).
○ It is clear from the foregoing (Section 2 of Rule 87 [now Rule 86]) that the period
prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the
estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the
discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms as are equitable.
● Nonetheless, the petition for the writ of Mandamus is dismissed for lack of merit. The court
stressed that the time for paying debts (and legacies) is to be fixed by the probate court having
jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased (Sec. 15, Rule 18). In the absence of any showing
that respondent judge who is taking cognizance of the estate proceedings had already allowed
the administrator to dispose of the estate and to pay the debts and legacies of the deceased, a
writ of mandamus will not issue to compel him to order payment of petitioner's claim.

13. Melliza v. Melliza, (different title of the case - Gabin v. Melliza)

Topic: Claims allowed

Facts:
● 1944, January 19: Raymundo Melliza (Raymundo) and Laureana Gabin (Gabin) entered into a
written agreement whereby Gabin will administer certain haciendas owned by Raymundo for a
period of thirty (30) years. As compensation for said personal services Raymundo agreed to pay
Gabin 350 cavans of palay every agricultural year. They also stipulated that Gabin cannot be
dismissed without just and legal cause, and in case of dismissal she shall have the right to be
indemnified for the rest of the period at the rate of 150 cavans of palay for each agricultural year.
 ● 1945, December 11: Raymundo died and testamentary proceedings were instituted in the CFI of
Iloilo for the administration and distribution of his estate.
● Having been deprived by the executrix Remedios de Villanueva of the administration of the
haciendas in question, Gabin presented to the probate court a claim against the estate of
Raymundo for the payment of her 150 cavans of palay beginning the agricultural year 1945-1946
until the expiration of 30 years.
● The heirs opposed the claim on the following grounds:
(1) That, not being a claim for money, it is not a proper claim under section 5 of Rule 87
(now Rule 86);
xxxxx
● Probate court denied the claim of Gabin. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
W/N Gabin’s claim for the cavans of palay as compensation against the estate can be allowed in the
testamentary proceedings? - NO

Ruling:
● Sec. 1, Rule 87 (now Rule 86) provides that immediately after the granting of letters testamentary
or of administration the court shall issue a notice requiring all person having money claims
against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court; and Section 5 provides
that all claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses of the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within
the time limited in the notice. "
● 'By money claims, is meant any claim for "money, debt, or interest thereon," according to
section 21 of Rule 3 and section 1 of Rule 88 (now Rule 87). Not all money claims may, however,
be presented, but only those which are proper against the decedent, that is, claim upon a
liability contracted by the decedent before his death. Accordingly, claims arising after his death
cannot thus presented, except funeral expenses."
● First, the claim in question arose after the death of the decedent. Assuming without deciding
that the contract on which the claim is based is valid, the decedent appears to have complied
with it up to the time of his death. It was the executrix who dismissed the claimant from the
service as administratrix or manager of the haciendas of the deceased.
● Second, the claim is not for money, debt, or interest but for 150 cavans of palay a year for 29
agricultural years. Even if it wanted to, the probate court could not determine in advance the
value of the palay in money because the price of palay varies from year to year.
● Gabin also presented this claim when she filed a motion in the probate court for her to be
appointed as co-administratix of the estate based on the said “contract of service”. The judge
denied the motion without prejudice to the right of Gabin to present a claim in due form against
the estate. The mere reservation by the judge to Gabin of her right to present the claim in lieu of
her appointment as coadministratrix did not preclude the court from denying said claim if, after
hearing, it found the same to be improper or not allowable in these proceedings.

Dispositive Portion:
Without deciding whether or not the contract claimed upon is valid and binding against the heirs of the
decedent, and without prejudice to any proper action that Gabin may bring upon said contract, denial of
the claim is affirmed. Costs against Gabin.

14. Olave v. Canlas, G.R. No. L-12709, Feb. 28, 1962 - Payad

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral
security may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by ordinary action in court making the
executor or administrator a party defendant, and need not file his claim before the probate court to share
in the general distribution of the assets of the estate. Under the same theory, an action to recover real or
personal property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, may be prosecuted by the interested
person against the executor or administrator independently of the testate or intestate proceedings.

Facts:
● Amadeo Matute Olave died on April 4, 1855.
● Testamentary proceedings were instituted before the CFI.
● During the lifetime of Matute, he was a party defendant in a civil case wherein Atty. Paterno
Canlas was his counsel. They entered into an agreement that the atty’s fees will amount to 20%
of the market value of the property in litigation payable upon termination of the case.
● On August 4, 1953, upon motion of Atty. Canlas, the court stated that his claim for atty’s fees is
thereby established on the P100,000 balance of the deposit in the Clerk of Court and all other
properties involved in the said case. The court also ordered the lien to be annotated on the titles
of all the real properties involved in the case.
● After the death of Matute, Atty. Canlas filed an urgent for the amount of P85,000 deposit be
delivered to him in full settlement of his services as he had already filed the brief in the then
pending case before the SC.
● The administrator of the estate opposed claiming that the court had no jurisdiction because the
motion involving a money claim must be submitted to the probate court.
● In the meantime, the CFI granted Atty. Canlas authority to withdraw partial payments from said
deposit. Then on April 30, 1957, it issued an order holding that it had authority to entertain
Canlas' claim for attorney's fees.
● Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Having Amadeo Matute Olave died before the attorney's fees he agreed to pay to his counsel Paterno R.
Canlas had been fully paid and after the claim of the latter for attorney's fees had been established as a
charging lien in the ordinary civil case, which court shall entertain the payment of the balance of said
claim? - The court in the ordinary case has jurisdiction.

Ruling:
● [DOCTRINE]
 ● It cannot be gainsaid that a charging lien established on the property in litigation to secure the
payment of the attorney's fees of Atty. Canlas partakes of the nature of a collateral security or of
a lien on real or personal property within the meaning of the provisions of our rules.
● The reason behind the rule which exempts money claims covered by a mortgage or other
collateral security or lien from the jurisdiction of probate courts appears well-stated in the
American authorities as follows:
○ According to the weight of authority, a creditor whose claim is secured by mortgage,
pledge, or any specific lien need not present his claim for allowance in order to preserve
his right to subject the property covered by the lien to the satisfaction of his claim, for
the reason that such claims cannot in any just sense be considered claims against the
estate, but the right to subject specific property to the claim arises from the contract of
the debtor whereby be has during life set aside certain property for its payment, and
such property does not, except in so far as its value may exceed the debt, belong to the
estate, and the instrument being of record or the property being in the possession of the
creditor is notice to all the world of the contract.
● The conclusion is also supported by the principle that a probate court, being of limited
jurisdiction, has no authority to enforce a lien unless conferred by a statute. The statutory
jurisdiction of a probate court is exclusive, and since the lien referred to in Section 1, Rule 88 is
not among those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 87, it is reasonable to assume that all money
claims secured with a lien are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court.
● PETITION DISMISSED.

15. First National City Bank of New York v. Cheng Tan, G.R. No. L-14234, Feb. 28, 1962 - Santos

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: A deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be filed with the probate court where the
settlement of the estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the period of time fixed for the filing
of claims.

Facts:
● On July 2, 1947 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 59502
—which was an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage—ordering the defendants therein,—
Silvio Cheng Tan alias Silvio Cheng Pan amongst them—to pay, jointly and severally, The First
National City Bank of New York the sum of P142,000.56.
● After the sale of the mortgaged properties a deficiency judgment was rendered for P98,256.13.
● After execution there was a remaining balance of P38,090.06.
● Petitioner filed a case for collection of the balance against Silvio Cheng Tan.
● Cheng Tan died during the pendency of the case.
● One of the heirs substituted him but filed a Motion to Dismiss. Stating that he should file his
claim in the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said deceased
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Issue:
W/N Petitioner should just file his claim with the settlement of the estate of the deceased? - YES na YES!

Ruling:
 ● Deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be filed with the probate court where the
settlement of the estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the period of time fixed for
the filing of claims.
● Were the present proceedings allowed to continue, they could end with nothing more than a
judgment reviving the one subject matter of the action. Thus revived said judgment could not be
enforced except through the probate court because the judgment debtor died before execution
could be actually levied upon any of his properties.
● There is, therefore, no need to prosecute the present action the herein plaintiff-appellee having
the right to go directly to the probate court to file his claim based on the deficiency judgment
mentioned heretofore.

16. Vera v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979 - Sta. Ana

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: A perusal of Rule 86, Sec. 5 shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligation
of the decedent created by law.

Facts:
● In 1969, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue filed a motion for allowance of
claim and for payment of taxes, which represents the indebtedness to the Government of the
late Tongoy for deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3,254.80 as above stated, covered
by Assessment Notices.
● The Administrator opposed the motion solely on the ground that the claim was barred under
Section 5, Rule 862 of the Rules of Court.
● The trial court dismissed the motion.

Issue:
W/N the statute of non-claims Section 5, Rule 86 of the New Rule of Court, bars claim of the government
for unpaid taxes, even if it still within the period of limitation prescribed in Section 331 and 332 of the
National Internal Revenue Code? - NO.

Ruling:
● A perusal of the aforequoted provisions shows that it makes no mention of claims for
monetary obligation of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of
different character from the claims expressly enumerated therein, such as: "all claims for money
against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
due or contingent, all claim for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent and judgment for money against the decedent."
○ Under the familiar rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a
statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must
necessarily, and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect.

2 Decisions of the Labor Arbiter are concerned, Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that, “decisions, awards,
or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the NLRC by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from the receipt of such decisions, awards or orders.
 ○ The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate
in the form of exception from the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to
find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability
are imperious need.
● Even assuming arguendo that claims for taxes have to be filed within the time prescribed in
Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, the claim in question may be filed even after the
expiration of the time originally fixed therein:
○ Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. - In the notice provided in the
preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate,
which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the
first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time
previously limited the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable,
allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.

17. People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994 - Tolentino

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: It is clear from the exclusive enumeration in Sec. 5, Rule 86 that money claims arising from
delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a
civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.

Facts:
● Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June
19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay.
● Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid
Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
● The SolGen expressed his view that the death of the accused does not extinguish his civil
liability.
● Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the SolGen arguing
that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both
his criminal and civil penalties.
● In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v.
Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the
criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgment is rendered.

Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? - In this case,
YES.

Ruling:
 ● As jurisprudence evolved, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends
on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated
differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it
were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
● However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego,et al. departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted
by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego’s death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction. This court in an unprecedented
move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego’s appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His
civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively
dependent on the criminal action already extinguished.
● A reexamination of the SC decision in Sendaydiego impels them to revert to the old ruling.
(Translation: SC changes their mind back to old ruling and says civil liability will only survive if
not solely based on or independent of a criminal action).

[Part of ruling related to SPECPRO]:

● Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if
defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
Court’s conclusion:
“When the action is for the recovery of money’ ‘and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided’ in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court).”
● The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against
him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal.”Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural
law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned.
● Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions
of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable
for Sendaydiego’s civil liability.
“What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, are
contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include
even the restitution of personal or real property.”
● Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against
the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money
and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims
arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no
legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred
to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.
● Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto
desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action,
 this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The
source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom
the same shall be enforced.
● If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of
law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court.

Summary of the Court’s ruling [nasa case talaga siya guys]:

(1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. (xxx)
(2) Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. (xxx)
(3) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
(4) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case conformably with provisions of Art. 1155 of the CC that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

18. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498,
January 9, 2013 - Villadolid

Topic: Claims allowed

Doctrine: All money claims against an already deceased person must be filed in SPECPRO not ordinary
actions.

Facts:
● Sherwood Holdings Corp Inc (SHCI) filed complaint for sum of money against Absolute
Management Corp (AMC). This complaint was alleged to come from P8.3M worth of undelivered
plywood and plyboard products which SHCI bought from AMC.
● SHCI, in lieu of its order, gave METROBANK checks to AMC’s general manager, Chua. (take
note also that before the commencement of this case, Chua died and the settlement of his estate
was commenced).
● AMC, now, as a defense, impleaded through a third party complaint METROBANK. It was
discovered that METROBANK allowed the deposit of the checks to a certain Ayala Lumber and
Hardware – a sole proprietorship owned by Chua.
(SPECPRO TOPIC)
● METROBANK answered that AMC is estopped from questioning this because it knew of this
transactions. Further, it filed a FOURTH PARTY COMPLAINT against the ESTATE OF CHUA
 alleging that in case of that contingent event that METROBANK would be held liable to pay, the
ESTATE OF CHUA should be held liable to it (Section 11, Rule 6).
● RTC – wrong remedy. Metrobank’s claim stems from a quasi-contract (cobro de Io indebido) and
thus should be filed in the SPECIAL PROCEEDING for the settlement of the estate of Chua, not
through a fourth party complaint.
● CA – affirmed.

Issue:
W/N Metrobank availed correct remedy? - NO.

Ruling:
● Rule 86, Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. – All
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the
time limited in the notice[.]
● The contingent indebtedness of Metrobank to AMC also falls under the principle solutio indebiti
which arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no right to
demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received through mistake. Thus, a quasi-
contract
● Under Maclan v Garcia, it was held by SC that quasi-contracts fall within purview of implied
contracts, thus making it fall under this provision. Also, the case is a contingent one, which is also
a claim that falls under the same.
● LASTLY, under statcon principle of lex specialis derogate generali, specific provisions prevail
over general ones. We read with approval the CA’s use of the statutory construction principle of
lex specialis derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of
the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the
deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the
rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely
apply suppletorily.
● Petition DENIED. RTC and CA AFFIRMED.

19. Evangelista v. La Provedra, 38 SCRA 379 - Yap

Topic: Procedure on Claims

Doctrine: Judgment must be presented as a claim against estate, where judgment debtor dies before
levy of execution on his properties.

Facts:
● This case is a continuation of the original case entitled La Proveedora v Santos, wherein the CFI
rendered a decision in favor of La Proveedora, ordering Santos to pay the unpaid difference in
the rent of the premise.
● After the order was rendered, Santos, the judgment debtor, died.
● Subsequently, CFI issued a writ of execution pursuant to which the Provincial Sheriff levied on a
parcel of land and on the house situated thereon, both owned by Santos. An auction sale of the
said properties was scheduled.
 ● In the meantime, an intestate proceeding for settlement of the estate of Santos was filed.
Petitioner herein, Hollanda Evangelista, was appointed special administratrix of the intestate.
● Even prior to her appointment, having been notified of the writ of execution and scheduled
auction sale of the properties levied upon, Evangelista informed the Provincial Sheriff of Santos’
death and demanded that he desist from proceeding with the sale. She also filed an urgent
motion in court for the writ of execution to be recalled. But motion was denied, the sale was
carried out, and La Proveedora was declared highest bidder.
● Hence, Evangelista filed a petition for certiorari to annul the writ of execution and subsequent
proceedings which took place by virtue of the original case.

Issue:
W/N the writ of execution issued by the CFI was proper? - NO.

Ruling:
● Section 7, Rule 39 provides: “Where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order,
execution thereon may issue, or one already issued may be enforced in the ff. cases: (c) In case
of death of the judgment debtor after the execution is actually levied upon any of his property,
the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the officer making the sale shall account
to the corresponding executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands.”
● On the other hand, Section 5 of Rule 86 provides that a judgment for money against the
decedent must be filed with the court in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate. In other
words, the cut-off date is the date of actual levy of execution.
○ If the judgment debtor dies after such levy, the property levied upon may be sold.
○ If he dies before, the money judgment must be presented as a claim against the estate,
although the same need no longer be proved as the judgment itself is conclusive. But
the judgment creditor will share the estate with other creditors, subject only to such
preferences as are provided by law.

Time of death Procedure

After entry of judgment or order Present as a claim against

+ the estate
Before levy on properties

After entry of judgment or order Property levied upon may

+ be sold
After levy on properties

● Case herein: The death of the deceased Santos preceded the levy of execution on his
properties. Hence, the judgment against should be presented as a claim against the estate, and
the sale at auction carried out by the sheriff is null and void.

Fallo: Writ of execution and all proceedings which took place by virtue thereof, including the sale itself
and its registration, if it has been registered, are ordered set aside.
20. Briones v. Henson-Cruz, G.R. No. 159130, August 22, 2008 - Acabado

Topic: Procedure on Claims

Doctrine: The ruling on the extent of the Special Administrator's commission - effectively, a claim by the
special administrator against the estate - is the lower court's last word on the matter and one that is
appealable. (This is the doctrine in relation to the topic. The actual issue of this case is forum shopping;
this was merely collaterally addressed)

Facts:
● Resp. Ruby Henson filed a petition for probate of her mother’s holo will. Her sister Lilia opposed,
alleging Ruby understate the value of the estate and acted with unconscionable bad faith in its
management.
● Lilia also prayed for appointment as Intestate Administratrix. Lilia moved for appointment of
Prudential Bank as an Interim Special Administrator of the estate. Trial court partially granted
and appointed Atty. Briones.
● Atty. Briones performed multiple acts as Special Administrator. After he submitted his final
report, the trial court ordered an audit of his administration, the expenses of which would be
charged against the estate, and also directed payment of Atty. Briones’ commission.
● The respondents filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the order of payment, filing their record on
appeal. RTC denied and disapproved he record on appeal for forum shopping.
● They filed a petition for mandamus before the CA assailing the RTC’s disapproval of their Notice
of Appeal. They likewise filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the
order of the RTC appointing an auditor.
● Atty. Briones imputed that the petitioners were guilty of forum shopping, since both petitions
assailed the same order.
● CA granted the petition for mandamus and commanded the RTC judge to give due course to the
appeal. The RTC may only dismiss an appeal, motu proprio or on motion, only where the appeal
was out of time or for failure to pay docket and other fees.

Issue:
W/N the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping by the filing of two different petitions before the CA? -
NO. Petition dismissed.

Ruling:
● Atty. Briones alleged the CA failed to consider the issue of forum shopping. The CA merely
stated that since the RTC had no power to disallow the appeal, it was not necessary to discuss
the issue.
● The assailed order of the RTC resolved the matter of appointment of an auditor, the payment of
the Special Admin.’s commission, and the directive to the Special Admin. to deliver the shares of
the heirs.
● The part of the order relating to the appointment of an auditor is interlocutory, since the
designation did not have the effect of final determination on the merits. The second part
 relating to the payment of commission, is an independently determinable issue, being the
court’s definite and final word on that matter, subject only to an appeal.
● From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator's commission is no less a
claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules
recognizes this when it provides for "Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.
"Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate "is
appealable as in ordinary cases." Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the
extent of the Special Administrator's commission - effectively, a claim by the special
administrator against the estate - is the lower court's last word on the matter and one that
is appealable.
● Therefore, there is no forum shopping, since neither the petition for certiorari relating to
the audit nor the petition for mandamus relating to the commission would result in litis
pendentia nor res judicata in the other. They involved two different and distinct issues.

21. Paredes v. Moya, G.R. No. L-38051, Dec. 26, 1974 - Banguis

Topic: Procedure on Claims

Doctrine: All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed (before the
probate court) within the time limited in the notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants.

Facts:
● Petitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit in 1964 in CFI-Manila for the collection of
separation and overtime pays against his employer, August Kuntze.
○ A decision was rendered against the defendant August Kuntze, from which judgment, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
● While the case was pending appeal in the said Court, August Kuntze died on June 19,
1972. Accordingly, plaintiff Parades (now petitioner) was duly notified.
○ Thereafter, Carmencita D. Navarro Kuntze, administratrix of the estate of the
deceased, was substituted in his place as party in the appealed case.
● CA dismissed the appeal for appellant's (Kuntze) failure to file the printed record on appeal, and
so the record of the case was ordered remanded to respondent court. Then a motion for
execution was filed by plaintiff-appellee (petitioner Parades).
● In 1973, the provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of defendant-appellant (now
substituted by the Administratrix of the estate of the Deceased, consisting of two (2) lots
covered by TCT No. 45089 issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
○ In the auction sale conducted by the Sheriff, petitioner Paredes being the highest bidder,
acquired said lot for the total sum of P17,296.16, as per certificate of sale which was
duly annotated in the back of TCT No. 45089.
 ● However, in spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by respondent-appellant
Administratrix and still pending resolution, Parades plaintiff-appellee, below sold the
property he acquired in execution sale in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio Ignacio.
● Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition to the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, CFI
Manila issued an order setting aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's Sale and Public
Auction of the property without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a claim in the
proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased.
● Hence, this petition by plaintiff Paredes.

Issue:
W/N CFI erred when it issued an order setting aside the Writ of Execution and Sheriff’s Sale and Public
Auction of the property without prejudice to filing claims in the settlement proceedings? - NO.

Ruling:
● If the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered by the CFI, as in the case at bar, the
action survives. And as already above stated, the appeal should proceed with the deceased
defendant being substituted by his legal representative.
○ This would prevent a useless repetition of presenting (anew) before the probate court
the evidence already presented in the Court of First Instance on the validity of the claim.
Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the judgment against the deceased
Kuntze became final and executory; it was not arrested by his death on July 19, 1973.
● But it was error on the part of the plaintiff Paredes, now one of the petitioners, to have the
money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze.
● The proper remedy of plaintiff Paredes should have been to file his claim in the
administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze where private
respondent is the administratrix.
● Judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed at the time limited in the notice (to
creditors) before the court where the administration proceeding involving the estate of the
deceased Kuntze are pending. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides:
○ All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed (before the probate court) within the time limited in the
notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set
forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against
the claimants. (1st sentence, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court) (Emphasis ours)
● Consequently, the respondent court, in the challenged order of November 2, 1973,
correctly nullified its order of execution issued on August 18, 1973 pursuant to the
judgment which became final and executory on June 28, 1973 and the corresponding levy
on execution on August 22, 1973 and the public auction sale held on October 2, 1973.
● In the case of Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, promulgated on
December 29, 1949 (85 Phil. 228), We already held that the writ of execution was not the
proper procedure for the payment of debts and expenses of the administration. The
proper procedure is for the court to order the administratrix to make the payment; and if
 there is no sufficient cash on hand, to order the sale of the properties and out of the
proceeds to pay the debts and expenses of the administration. We followed the same ruling
in the case of Domingo vs. Garlitos, June 29, 1963, 8 SCRA 443, with respect to the payment of
estate and inheritance taxes.
● The petition to set aside the above orders of the court below and for the execution of the
claim of the Government against the estate must be denied for lack of merit.
○ The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a
deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the
probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof.
To such effect is the decision of this Court in Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, Dec. 29, 1949, thus:
■ . . a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of
Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The proper
procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or
mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of
administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage.
The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the
administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and
devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and
Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made,
the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with.
● We hold that the same rule must be applied in connection with money judgments against
the deceased that have already become final, such as the money judgment in favor of
petitioner Paredes. No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the
deceased. The claim for satisfaction of the money judgment should be presented in the
probate court for payment by the administrator.
● Our decision in this case against the petitioner Paredes binds his co-petitioner Victorio G.
Ignacio not only because the order of execution and the public auction sale in question are null
and void, but also because petitioner Ignacio cannot be considered as a purchaser in good
faith, for Ignacio purchased the "Right of Execution Sale" of Paredes over the property in
question on October 10, 1973 when, at that time, the respondent administratrix of the
estate of Kuntze had already filed on September 6, 1973 a motion to quash the Writ of
Execution and auction sale; as a matter of fact the validity of said writ of execution was still up
for respondent court's resolution on October 14, 1973 after the parties shall have submitted
memoranda on the question raised in the aforesaid motion as required by the respondent court
in its order of September 29, 1973.

SC = Order of the Lower Court nullifying its Order of Execution of August 18, 1973, the levy on
execution dated August 22, 1973, and the auction sale of October 2, 1973, is AFFIRMED. Certiorari
DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the judgment (in favor of Paredes) as a claim in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Kuntze).

22. Manalansan v. Castaneda, G.R. No. L-43607, June 27, 1978 - Bries
Topic: Procedure on claims
Doctrine: The saving clause in Sec. 7, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which the respondent
Judge required to be performed and the observance of which he gave as reason for setting aside the writ
of execution he had previously caused to be issued, and in delegating the authority to execute the
judgment in the foreclosure proceedings to the probate court, does not confer jurisdiction upon the
probate court, of limited jurisdiction, to enforce a mortgage lien. Nor can it be relied upon as sufficient
ground to delegate the execution of the judgment of foreclosure to the probate court. As stated, the rule
merely reserves a right to the executor or administrator of an estate to redeem a mortgaged or pledged
property of a decedent which the mortgage or pledgee has opted to foreclose, instead of filing a money
claim with the probate court, under said Section 7 of Rule 86. While the redemption is subject to the
approval of the probate court, the exercise of the right is discretionary upon the said executor or
administrator and may not be ordered by the probate court upon its own motion.

Facts:
● The spouses Dominador and Adoration Danan constituted a mortgage over their fish-pond and
residential lot, situated at Lubao, Pampanga, in favor of herein petitioners, spouses Benito
Manalansan and Ines Vitug-Manalansan, to guarantee the payment of the amount of P62,574.80,
within one (1) year, with 12% interest thereon, compound annually. As the mortgagors did not pay
notwithstanding demands, an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage was filed.
● The trial court held judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants sentencing the
latter to pay the former, jointly and severally, within a period of ninety (90) days from date, the
sum of P62,574.80 with interest at 12% compounded annually, from June 2, 1962 until the full
obligation is paid; to pay further the sum equivalent to ten (10) percentum of the amount due and
unpaid as attorney's fees, plus moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit. In
the event that defendants shall fail to make payment within the period heretofore stated, let the
properties mortgaged and described in paragraph '3' of the complaint be sold at public auction,
with the proceeds thereof to be applied to the payment of the above-mentioned mortgage
indebtedness and other sums herein adjudged.
● Defendant spouses Dominador and Adoracion Danan appealed to the Court of Appeals which
modified the judgment by eliminating therefrom the portion ordering the said spouses to pay
moral damages. Dissatisfied, the defendant spouses filed a petition for review with this Court, but
their petition was denied.
● The records of the case were remanded to the court below and upon application, a writ of
execution was issued. When the sheriff was about to levy upon the mortgaged properties, herein
private respondent Adoracion Danan, opposed the levy on execution and filed a motion to set
aside the writ of execution for reasons that the properties are in custodia legis and that the
judgment should be presented as a money claim in the Intestate Estate of Dominador Danan,
pursuant to Sec. 5. , Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court since Dominador Danan had died on
November 7, 1970, while the case was pending appeal before the Court of Appeals and intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his estate had already been instituted.
● Acting upon the motion, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the sheriff to desist from
enforcing the writ of execution, and set the incident for hearing. After hearing the parties, the
respondent Judge issued an order setting aside the writ of execution.
● Petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, but their motion was denied.
Unable to obtain, relief, the spouses, Benito Manalansan and Ines Vitug-Manalansan filed the
instant petition, seeking the annulment of the order and to direct the respondent Judge to proceed
with the execution of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceedings.
Issue:
W/N the probate court has jurisdiction over the said property? - NO.

Ruling:
● The saving clause in Sec. 7, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which the respondent Judge
required to be performed and the observance of which he gave as reason for setting aside the
writ of execution he had previously caused to be issued, and in delegating the authority to
execute the judgment in the foreclosure proceedings to the probate court, does not confer
jurisdiction upon the probate court, of limited jurisdiction, to enforce a mortgage lien. Nor can it be
relied upon as sufficient ground to delegate the execution of the judgment of foreclosure to the
probate court. As stated, the rule merely reserves a right to the executor or administrator of an
estate to redeem a mortgaged or pledged property of a decedent which the mortgage or pledgee
has opted to foreclose, instead of filing a money claim with the probate court, under said Section
7 of Rule 86. While the redemption is subject to the approval of the probate court, the exercise of
the right is discretionary upon the said executor or administrator and may not be ordered by the
probate court upon its own motion.
● Besides, the action filed herein is for the foreclosure of a mortgage, or an action to enforce a lien
on property. Under Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is an action which survives.
Being so, the judgment rendered therein may be enforced by a writ of execution. In the case of
Testamentaria de Don Amadeo Matute Olave vs. Canlas, the Court ruled that an action to
enforce a lien on property may be prosecuted by the interested person against the executor or
administrator independently of the testate or intestate proceedings "for the reason that such
claims cannot in any just sense be considered claims against the estate, but the right to subject
specific property to the claim arises from the contract of the debtor whereby ha has during life set
aside certain property for its payment, and such property does not, except in so far as its value
may exceed the debt, belong to the estate.
● Since the mortgaged property in question does not belong to the estate of the late Salvador
Danan, according to the foregoing rule, the conclusion is reasonable that the probate court has
no jurisdiction over the property in question, and that the respondent Judge had abused his
discretion in delegating the execution of the judgment to the probate court.
● The fact that the defendant Salvador Danan died before, and not after the decision of the Court of
Appeal became final and executory will not nullify the writ of execution already issued. Thus, in
Miranda, vs. Abbas, judgment was rendered two months before the death of the defendant. Since
neither the defendant nor his heirs after his death appealed from the judgment, the writ or
execution was issued as a matter of course. The death of the defendant was communicated to
the trial court six months after the decision had become final. The successors of the decedent
contended that the writ of execution issued was void because contrary to Section 7, Rule 39, the
defendant died before, not after, the entry of judgment. The Court rejected the theory, saying:
○ We cannot accept this argument. The provision (Section 7 of Rule 39) relied upon by the
petitioners cannot be so construed as to invalidate the writ of execution already issued in
so far as service thereof upon the heirs or successors-in-interest of the defendant is
concerned. It merely indicates against whom the writ of execution is to be enforced when
the losing party dies after the entry of judgment or order. Nothing therein, nor in the entire
Rule 39, to our mind, even as much as intimates that a writ of execution issued after a
party dies, which death occurs before entry of the judgment, is a nullity. The writ may yet
be enforced against his executor or administrator, if there be any, or his successors-in-
interest.
23. Aldamiz v. Judge of CFI of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, December 29, 1949 - Calantoc

Topic: Procedure on claims

Doctrine: The court procedure for the collection of attorney’s fees is for the counsel to request the
administrator to make payment and file an action against him, in his personal capacity and not as an
administrator, should he fail to pay. If judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he
may include the fees so paid in his account to the court. The attorney also may, instead of bringing such
an action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding asking that the court, after notice to all
persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration.

Facts:
● Santiago Aldamiz, the decedent, was a Spaniard and member of the commercial partnership
“Aldamiz y Rementeria.” The other members were the brothers, Gavino and Jose Aldamiz.
● In 1937, Santiago died in Spain and probate proceedings were instituted. Gavino was appointed
administrator and as such, he was represented by respondent Atty. Juan Luna. The latter then
instituted testate proceedings for the estate of Santiago Aldamiz.
● After 10 years from the date of his appointment, Gavino, through Atty. Luna, submitted his
accounts for the years 1944-1946 and also a project of partition with a view to close the testate
proceedings. The court approved the accounts but refused to approve the project of partition
unless all debts including attorney’s fees be first paid.
● It is for this reason that Atty. Luna, without previously preparing and filing a written petition to
have his professional fees fixed, and without previous notice to all the interested parties,
submitted evidence of his services and professional standing so that the court may fix the
amount of his compensation, and the administrator to make payment thereof. The failure to file a
written claim and to notify the interested parties was, however, not due to bad faith or fraud, but
to an honest belief on the part of Atty. Luna that such requirements were not necessary under
the circumstances.
● The Court issued an order (herein referred to as the “1st order”) awarding Atty. Luna, in payment
of his professional services, an amount of P28,000 in the following manner:
(1) For the institution and preparation of the pleadings in the probate case, and for the
project of partition - P15,000;
(2) For the registration of a parcel of land in favor of the estate - P5,000;
(3) For 3 naturalization cases - P3,000; and
(4) For services rendered in the deduction of inheritance tax - P5,000.
● Gavino was able to pay P5,000 only, hence, Atty. Luna filed an ex-parte motion for execution
(again without notice to all interested parties), which was granted. 2 parcels of land belonging to
the commercial partnership “Aldamiz y Rementeria” were levied on execution and sold at a
public auction.

Issue:
W/N the order of the court fixing the amount of Luna’s attorney’s fees is null and void? - YES.

Ruling:
 ● The court procedure for the collection of attorney’s fees is for the counsel to request the
administrator to make payment and file an action against him, in his personal capacity and not
as an administrator, should he fail to pay. If judgment is rendered against the administrator and
he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the court. The attorney also may,
instead of bringing such an action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding “asking
that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator
to pay it as an expense of administration.”
● In the instant case, no written petition has ever been filed by Atty. Luna and the interested
parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by the court.
Consequently, the orders issued by the CFI (including all orders implementing the 1st order) are
null and void, as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
● The Court also finds that the order of execution is null and void, not only because it was
intended to implement the 1st order, which in itself was null and void, but because a writ of
execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the ROC for the payment of debts and
expenses of administration.
○ The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or
mortgage of real property of the decease, and all debts or expenses of administration
should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. Such order for the sale or
mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written notice
to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines.
○ Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into
possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of
the debts and expenses of administration, and it is later ascertained that there are such
debts and expenses to be paid.
● Furthermore, as to the issue on laches, although it is true that Gavino failed to appeal the 1st
order within the time provided by the ROC, he cannot be considered as being guilty of laches.
Here, aside from Gavino, there are other interested parties who have never been notified of the
order complained of, and as to them, said order has not yet become final and executory.
○ Even so, Gavino has not lost his appeal through his own negligence. When he received
notice of the order of the Court fixing Atty. Luna’s fees, he immediately wrote his lawyer
a letter asking for a substantial reduction and extension of time to pay. His lawyer, in
fact, advised him through a letter that he file a motion for reconsideration, but he
received this letter after the 30-day period had expired.

Rule 87

24. Melgar (Balla’s heirs) v. Hon. Buenviaje & Sps. Prades 179 S 196 - Caro

Topic: Actions that survive

Doctrine: In case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator of the estate
or in case where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court may adopt the
alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased.

Facts:
 ● A Fuso passenger bus (PUB 4J-136 ‘79) driven by Cuso, and owned by Felicidad Balla collided
with a Ford Fiera, causing the Fiera to swerve into the opposite lane and collide with another
passenger bus driven by Fabian Prades.
● As a result of the accident, petitioners’ mother, Fabian Prades, and Felicidad Balla died.
● Respondent Sps. Prades, as the only survived forced heirs of deceased Prades filed a complaint
for damages against the children of deceased Balla. They alleged that it was Balla’s driver who
was reckless and imprudent and was the proximate cause of the incident resulting to the death
of Prades. Thus, as Cuso’s employer, the estate of Balla should be held liable for damages.
● Balla’s heirs filed MTD for lack of COA because it is incorrect to (1) hold them liable for the alleged
negligence of their mother, and (2) sue the heirs of a deceased person inasmuch as the last portion of §21
R3 states that the creditor should institute the proper intestate proceedings in which he may be able to
interpose his claim. → MTD denied.
● Balla’s heirs filed MR, arguing that there is a distinction between a suit against the estate of
Balla and the action for damages against the children, considering that the latter had absolutely
no participation in the alleged negligent acts of Balla and there was no logical basis to hold the
kids liable therefor because they’re only liable to the extent of their share in their mother’s
estate.
○ In their argument, they presented the ruling in the other cases for damages filed by the
widow of the Fiera driver, where in the judge granted their MTD because the suit filed
was procedurally erroneous.
● Sps. Prades then motioned to admit amended complaint where the defendant was renamed as Estate of
Balla→ court granted amended complaint.

Issue:
W/N CFI had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages arising from the death of a person, filed against
the estate of another person represented by the heirs?

Ruling:
● Under §5 R86, actions that are abated by death are:
(1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due or contingent;
(2) All claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent;
(3) Judgments for money against the decedent.
● The case at bar is not among those enumerated → actions for damages caused by the tortious conduct of the
defendant survive the death of the latter. The action can therefore be properly brought under §1 R87 against
an executor or administrator. But the bone of contention is that no estate proceedings existed yet because
Balla’s heirs had not filed any proceedings for the settlement of her estate (they claimed kasi that Balla left
no properties).
● Thus, while Balla’s may have correctly filed MTD, and Sps. Prades corrected the deficiency with
an amended complaint, the action under §17 R3 which allows the suit against the legal
representative of the deceased (the executor/administrator) would still be futile, because there
appears to be no steps taken towards the settlement of the estate of Balla, nor has an executor
or administrator of the estate been appointed. It also seems that Balla’s heirs will NOT initiate
settlement proceedings because they averred that Balla had no properties [pero may bus…].
 ● EVEN STILL, under the circumstances, the absence of an estate proceeding may be avoided by
requiring the heirs to take the place of the deceased. [see doctrine]

25. Hilado v Court of Appeals GR 164108 May 8, 2009 - Celeste

Topic: Actions that survive

Doctrine: Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.

FACTS
● Sugar Magnate Roberto Benedicto died intestate. He was survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto) and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino.
● At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners. The first case was with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs. The second
case was with petitioners Lopez Sugat Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as
one of the plaintiffs.
● Julita filed with RTC Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor
which was granted. She then submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real
Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her husband.
● In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, Julita included as among the liabilities, the
above-mentioned two pending claims and stated the amounts of liability corresponding to the
two cases. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required Julita to submit a complete and updated
inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
● petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that
they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of her husband.
● Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of
the required inventory of the decedent’s estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions
with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of
the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified,
incomplete and inaccurate.
● The manifestation/motion was denied by the Manila RTC on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
● In a Petition of Certiorari in the CA, petitioners argue that they had the right to intervene since
Roberto Benedicto is a defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the RTC Bacolod. – Denied.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the
claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were
still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Issue:
W/N the lower courts erred in denying petitioners the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
the estate of Benedicto? - NO.

Ruling:
● Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court." While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally
preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently
held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
● Intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit
is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 does not
accommodate contingent claims.
● However, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with
Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the
RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
● Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice
to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.
● However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from
his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort
or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors
required under Rule 86.
● These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records
indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto's death.
● Evidently, the merits of petitioners' claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for
damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against
the estate.
● While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules,
if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no
other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this
standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

26. Chua v Absolute Management Corporation 413 S 547 - Coronel

Topic: Right to compel 3rd persons to examination and right to recover property
Doctrine: Third persons to whom the decedent’s assets had been conveyed may be cited to appear in
court and examined under oath as to how they came into possession of the decedent’s assets. In case
of fraudulent conveyances, a separate action is necessary to recover these assets. Motion for
examination is only for purposes of eliciting information or securing evidence from persons suspected of
concealing or conveying some of the decedent’s properties to the prejudice of creditors.

Facts:
● Sometime in 1999, upon a petition for letters of administration filed by herein petitioners Jennifer
T. Chua-Locsin, Benison T. Chua, and Baldwin T. Chua with the Regional Trial Court, Pasay,
Betty T. Chua was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Jose L.
Chua. Thereafter, she submitted to the trial court an inventory of all the real and personal
properties of the deceased. One of the creditors of the deceased, herein respondent, Absolute
Management Corporation, filed a claim on the estate in the amount of P63,699,437.74. As
administratrix, Betty T. Chua tentatively accepted said amount as correct, with a statement that
it shall be reduced or adjusted as additional evidences may warrant.
● In the interim, Absolute Management Corporation noticed that the deceased shares of stocks
with Ayala Sales Corporation and Ayala Construction Supply, Inc. were not included in the
inventory of assets. As a consequence, it filed a motion to require Betty T. Chua to explain
why she did not report these shares of stocks in the inventory. Through a reply, Betty T.
Chua alleged that these shares had already been assigned and transferred to other parties
prior to the death of her husband, Jose L. Chua. She attached to her reply the deeds of
assignment which allegedly constituted proofs of transfer. The RTC accepted the
explanation as meritorious.
● Absolute Management Corporation, suspecting that the documents attached to Betty T. Chuas
reply were spurious and simulated, filed a motion for the examination of the supposed
transferees. It premised its motion on Section 6, Rule 87, Revised Rules of Court, which
states that when a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed
away any of the properties of the deceased, a creditor may file a complaint with the trial
court and the trial court may cite the suspected person to appear before it and be
examined under oath on the matter of such complaint. Private respondents opposed the
motion on the ground that this provision bears no application to the case.
● RTC: Denied respondent Absolute Management Corporations motion for examination, finding no
merit in the motion filed by claimant respondent, as it in effect seeks to engage in a fishing
expedition for evidence to be used against the administratrix and others whom it seeks to
examine, it being the consensus of the Court that the Rules of Procedure does not allow the
fishing of evidence to use against the adverse party. Aggrieved, Respondents filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
● CA: Reversed, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the presentation of the deeds of
assignment executed by the decedent in petitioner’s favor does not automatically negate the
existence of concealment. The appellate court stated that it is a common occurrence in estate
proceedings for heirs to execute simulated deeds of transfer which conceal and place properties
of the decedent beyond the reach of creditors. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
W/N the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the trial court to give due course to the Motion for
Examination? - YES.

Ruling:
● Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from persons suspected of having possession or
knowledge of the properties left by a deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or
conveyed any of the properties of the deceased. The court which acquires jurisdiction over the
properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings has
supervision and control over these properties. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it
that the inventory of the administrator lists all the properties, rights and credits which the law
requires the administrator to include in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court also
has the inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased the
administrator should include or exclude in the inventory. An heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased may call the court’s attention that certain properties, rights or credits
are left out from the inventory.
● It is likewise the courts duty to hear the observations of such party. The court has the power to
determine if such observations deserve attention and if such properties belong prima facie to the
estate.
● However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether the properties,
real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If after such examination there
is good reason to believe that the person examined is keeping properties belonging to the
estate, then the administrator should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same.
Inclusion of certain shares of stock by the administrator in the inventory does not automatically
deprive the assignees of their shares. They have a right to be heard on the question of
ownership, when that property is properly presented to the court.
● In the present case, some of the transferees of the shares of stock do not appear to be heirs of
the decedent. Neither do they appear to be parties to the intestate proceedings. Third persons
to whom the decedent’s assets had been conveyed may be cited to appear in court and
examined under oath as to how they came into possession of the decedent’s assets. In
case of fraudulent conveyances, a separate action is necessary to recover these assets.
● Taken in this light, there is no reason why the trial court should disallow the examination of the
alleged transferees of the shares of stocks. This is only for purposes of eliciting information
or securing evidence from persons suspected of concealing or conveying some of the
decedent’s properties to the prejudice of creditors. Petitioners admission that these persons
are the decedent’s assignees does not automatically negate concealment of the decedent’s
assets on their part. The assignment might be simulated so as to place the shares beyond the
reach of creditors. In case the shares are eventually included in the estate, this inventory is
merely provisional and is not determinative of the issue of ownership. A separate action is
necessary for determination of ownership and recovery of possession. CA affirmed.

Also, (may be relevant) Whether 65 was the proper remedy in the denial of motion for examination.
● In the present case, Absolute as a creditor of the decedent filed the petition after the trial court
denied its Motion for examination. Absolute questioned the ruling in favor of the administratrix
and heirs of the decedent. Although as a creditor, Absolute does have the remedy of filing
another case to recover such properties, its Motion for examination was intended merely to
 investigate and take testimony in preparation for an independent action. Aside from the
administratrix and the heirs of the decedent, Absolute also sought to examine the supposed
assignees of the decedents shares, who are third persons with respect to the probate
proceedings. The Motion was a preparatory move sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The denial
of Absolutes Motion was an interlocutory order not subject to appeal. The order of denial may,
however, be challenged before a superior court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Rule 88

27. De Bautista v de Guzman 125 S 676 - Cruz

Topic: Prescriptive periods on right to reach distributes

Doctrine: The contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in the probate court before
the creditors can file an action directly, against the distributees.

Facts:
● Numeriano Bautista, husband and father of the plaintiffs-appellees, respectively, was a
passenger of jeepney owned and operated by Rosendo de Guzman, deceased husband and
father of defendants-appellants. Eugenio Medrano y Torres was employed by said Rosendo de
Guzman as the driver of said jeepney. Said driver drove and managed said jeepney at that time
along Taft Avenue, Pasay City, in a negligent and reckless manner and, as a result, the jeepney
turned turtle and, consequently, passenger Numeriano Bautista sustained physical injuries which
caused his death.
● Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was accused and convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence by the trial court. Medrano was asked to indemnify the heirs of Numeriano Bautista,
plaintiffs-appellees herein, in the sum of P3,000.00. A writ of execution was issued against said
driver, Eugenio Medrano for the said sum of P3,000.00 but the same was returned to the Court
unsatisfied.
● On May 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman died. Because of their failure to collect the said sum of
P3,000.00 from the driver, Eugenio Medrano, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint against
defendants-appellants alleging, among other things besides the above-mentioned incidents, that
they demanded from Rosendo de Guzman and from the defendants-appellants the payment of
the sums of P3,000.00 as subsidiary liability; P10,000.00 as actual exemplary and moral
damages and Pl,000.00 as attorney's fees for the suit by reason of the death of Numeriano
Bautista as related above, but Rosendo de Guzman and later the herein defendants-appellants
refused to pay the same.
● Defendants-appellants through counsel filed a motion to dismiss predicated on two grounds,
namely, that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation and that
the complaint stated no cause of action.
● In support of said motion, they maintained that the suit was for a money claim against the
supposed debtor who was already dead and as such it should be filed in testate or intestate
proceedings or, in the absence of such proceedings, after the lapse of thirty (30) days, the
creditors should initiate such proceedings, that the heirs could not be held liable therefor since
there was no allegation that they assumed the alleged obligation.
● The lower court sustained the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the claimant may only proceed to
sue the heirs of the deceased directly where such heirs have entered into an extra-judicial
partition of such estate and have distributed the latter among themselves, in which case, the heirs
become liable to the claimant in proportion to the share which they have received as inheritance.
Plaintiffs' complaint does not state that the defendants have received any such inheritance from
 their said deceased father, Rosendo de Guzman, and hence, there is no cause of action against
aforesaid defendants.
● Plaintiffs-appellees filed with the same trial court a civil case against the same defendants, but in
this second complaint they further allege that on June 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman died
intestate and that intestate proceedings were filed in the same court wherein a project of partition
was presented in and approved by said Court with the five heirs receiving their shares.
● Defendants-appellants again filed a motion to dismiss on May 5, 1955, alleging the same grounds
as those interposed in the first complaint but adding the further ground of res judicata in view of
the dismissal of the first case which became final as no appeal or any other action was taken
thereon by the appellees.
● The lower court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient merit.

Issue:
W/N the trial court erred in giving due course to the complaint on the grounds stated above? - YES.

Ruling:
● Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides:
○ All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever;
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants ... Claims not yet due, or contingent, may
be approved at their present value.
● The above-quoted rule is mandatory. The requirement therein is for the purpose of protecting
the estate of the deceased. The executor or administrator is informed of the claims against it,
thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. Therefore, upon the dismiss of the first complaint of herein plaintiffs-
appellees, they should have presented their claims before the intestate proceedings filed in the
same court. Instead of doing so, however. the plaintiffs-appellees slept on their right. They
allowed said proceedings to terminate and the properties to be distributed to the heirs pursuant
to a project of partition before instituting this separate action. Such do not sanctioned by the
above rule for it strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the
decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts
and distribute the residue. With the exception provided for in the above rule, the failure of herein
plaintiffs-appellees to present their claims before the intestate proceedings of the estate of
Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed period constituted a bar to a subsequent claim against
the estate or a similar action of the same import.
● The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action against a distributee of the debtor's asset
is under Section 5, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court which provides:
○ If such contingent claim becomes absolute and is presented to the court, or to the
executor or administrator, within two (2) years from the time limited for other creditors to
present their claims, it may be allowed by the court if not disputed by the executor or
administrator, and, if disputed, it may be proved and allowed or disallowed by the court
as the facts may warrant. If the contingent claim is allowed, the creditor shall receive
payment to the same extent as the other creditors if the estate retained by the executor
or administrator is sufficient. But if the claim is not so presented, after having become
 absolute, within said two (2) years, and allowed, the assets retained in the hands of the
executor or administrator, not exhausted in the payment of claims, shall be distributed by
the order of the court to the persons entitled to the same; but the assets so distributed
may still be applied to the payment of the claim when established, and the creditor may
maintain an action against the distributees to recover the debt, and such distributees and
their estates shall be liable for the debt in proportion to the estate they have respectively
received from the property of the deceased.
● Even under the above rule, the contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in
the probate court before the creditors can file an action directly, against the distributees. Such is
not the situation, however, in the case at bar. The complaint herein was filed after the intestate
proceedings had terminated and the estate finally distributed to the heirs. If we are to allow the
complaint to prosper and the trial court to take cognizance of the same, then the rules providing
for the claims against the estate in a testate or intestate proceedings within a specific period
would be rendered nugatory as a subsequent action for money against the distributees may be
filed independently of such proceedings. This precisely is what the rule seeks to prevent so as to
avoid further delays in the settlement of the estate of the deceased and in the distribution of his
property to the heirs, legatees or devisees.

28. Pastor v CA, supra - Cruz

Topic: Liability of heirs/distributes

Doctrine: A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom
execution is authorized to be issued.

Facts:
● Alvaro Pastor, Sr., a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City survived by his Spanish wife Sofia
Bossio, their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Sofia Pastor de Midgely, and an
illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada.
● PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish
subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother’s citizenship.
● QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of
PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
● The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting
of 30% of PASTOR, SR.’s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation.
● the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him
special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not covered or affected by
the holographic will.
● QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the
legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena
Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by
inheritance.
● PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order
appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.
 ● The PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate. CA affirmed. On petition for
review, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution and remanded the same
to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration
● For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after
pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy.
PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings
remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.
● While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that
the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious.
● The order being “immediately executory”, QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of
Execution and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the same on ATLAS on the
same day.
● The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the
PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of
the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA’s legacy after prematurely passing upon
the intrinsic validity of the will.
● Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, PASTOR, JR., this time
joined by his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction.
● They assailed the Order dated August 20, 1980 and the writ of execution and garnishment
issued pursuant thereto. The petition was denied on November 18, 1980 on the grounds (1) that
its filing was premature because the Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order was
still pending determination by the PROBATE COURT; and (2) that although “the rule that a
motion for reconsideration is prerequisite for an action for certiorari is never an absolute rule,”
the Order assailed is “legally valid.”

Issue/s:
(1) W/N the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the questions of ownership
and intrinsic validity? - NO.
(2) W/N certiorari is the valid remedy? - YES.

Ruling:

(1)
● In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
● The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of
the decision. However, in case of ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be
scanned for guidance in construing the judgment.
● The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order of
December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining
properties. The dispositive portion of which reads:
○ “The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings as it hereby allows
and approves the so-called holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed on
July 31, 1961 with respect to its extrinsic validity, “
● Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On
the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the
question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special
administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law.”
● There actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other respects. It was
obviously for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980—more than 7 years after the Probate
Order was issued—the Probate Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on the intrinsic
validity of the will.

(2)
● Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations
of the probate court to be overlooked or condoned.
● The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued purportedly under Rule
88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:
“Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or heirs have been in
possession.—Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into possession of portions of the
estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid and have become liable to
contribute for the payment of such debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the
estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities,
and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution
as circumstances require.”
● The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A
legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom execution is
authorized to be issued.
● “. . . there is merit in the petitioners’ contention that the probate court generally cannot issue a
writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer
to the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy
without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not
render any judgment enforceable by execution.
● “The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue
execution (a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees
and heirs in possession of the decedent’s assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the
expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for
 examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion
unius est exclusion alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of
execution. (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96, 108.)
● Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of execution which varies the
terms of the judgment sought to be executed or does not find support in the dispositive part of
the latter, there are circumstances in the instant case which justify the remedy applied for.
● Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the holder in her own
right of three mining claims which are one of the objects of conflicting claims of ownership. She
is not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and was not a party to the probate proceedings. Therefore, she
could not appeal from the Order of execution issued by the Probate Court. On the other hand,
after the issuance of the execution order, the urgency of the relief she and her co-petitioner
husband seek in the petition for certiorari militates against requiring her to go through the
cumbersome procedure of asking for leave to intervene in the probate proceedings to enable
her, if leave is granted, to appeal from the challenged order of execution which has ordered the
immediate transfer and/or garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral properties of which
she is the duly registered owner and/or grantee together with her husband. She could not have
intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders because she had no valid ground to
intervene. The matter of ownership over the properties subject of the execution was then still
being litigated in another court in a reconveyance suit filed by the special administrator of the
estate of PASTOR, SR.
● Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, appeal was not available to him since his motion for reconsideration of the execution
order was still pending resolution by the Probate Court. But in the face of actual garnishment of
their major source of income, petitioners could no longer wait for the resolution of their motion
for reconsideration. They needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of the execution order.
Under the circumstances, recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.