Case Study

2
Australian defence industry
Introduction
2.1 Part One of this chapter provides an overview of the Australian defence
industry, its economic and strategic significance and discusses the concept
of ‘spillover’ effects generated by industry.
2.2 Part Two of the chapter outlines Australian defence industry policy
settings and current measures to support industry. It details three issues
that were subject to particular attention during the inquiry:
 Intellectual property and innovation;
 The impact of Defence’s procurement decisions which seem to be often
taken without regard to published defence industry policy; and
 Extant measures designed to assist Australian defence industry to be
involved in large Defence acquisition and sustainment projects;
specifically, the Australian Industry Capability and Priority/Strategic
Industry Capability programs.
2.3 Part Three of the chapter discusses the probable impact of reforms that
are expected to be implemented in the near term:
 Recognising elements of defence industry as a fundamental inputs to
capability;
 Other recommendations of the First Principles Review;
 Moving to a continuous build approach to naval shipbuilding; and
 Developments related to the 2015 Defence White Paper.
2.4 The chapter concludes with the Committee’s view of the implications of
the relationship between Defence and industry for defence exports.
4 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE – AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY AND EXPORTS
An overview of the Australian defence industry
2.5 The Australian Defence Magazine has estimated that the top 40 Australian
defence contractors had an estimated turnover of $9.27 billion in 2014.1
2.6 Published estimates of the number of people employed in the defence
industry have cited varying figures. The 2010 Defence Industry Policy
Statement estimated that employment in the Australian defence industry
is as high as 29,000 people.2 In 2012, Skills Australia estimated the number
to be between 15,000 and 25,000 people.3 Defence’s submission estimated
that ‘Defence demand on Australian industry in relation to capital
equipment programs accounts for the direct employment of around 27,000
people’ and ‘substantially more… through economic flow-on’.4
2.7 The Committee was not provided with nor referred to any current official
figures to measure the value of Australian defence exports or the annual
revenue of the defence industry.
2.8 The following table lists the top 20 Defence contractors and SMEs located
in Australia based on annual turnover for 2014.
1 Australian Defence Magazine, Vol.23, No.1, December 2014/January 2015, Top 40 Defence
Contractors and Top 20 SMEs Survey, p.27.
2 Department of Defence, ‘Building Defence Capability: A Policy for a Smarter and More Agile
Defence Industry Base’, June 2010, p.28.
3 Skills Australia, ‘Building Australia’s Defence Supply Capabilities: Main Report for the
Defence Industry Workforce Strategy’, 2012, p.9, at
<http://industry.gov.au/skills/Publications/Documents/BuildingAustraliasDefenceSupply
Capabilities_260912-2012.pdf> (viewed 26 August 2015).
4 Department of Defence, Submission 41, p.2.
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY 5
Table 2.1 Top defence contractors and small/medium enterprises in Australia 2014
Top 20 Defence Contractors in Australia Top 20 Defence SMEs in Australia
(Companies with 200 employees or less)
1 BAE Systems Australia Cubic Defence New Zealand Ltd
2 ASC Pty Ltd CAE Australia Pty Ltd
3 Thales Australia Rockwell Collins Australia
4 Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd Australia Defence Apparel Pty Ltd
5 Airbus Group Australia Pacific GH Varley Pty Ltd – Defence & Aerospace
Division
6 John Holland Group Pty Ltd Chemring Australia
7 Transfield Services Limited L-3 Oceania
8 Spotless Group Limited Rohde & Schwartz (Australia) Pty Ltd
9 Boeing Defence Australia Marand Precision Engineering Pty Ltd
10 Lockheed Martin Australia Pty Limited Ultra Electronics
11 Austal Adagold Aviation Pty Ltd
12 Serco Australia Pty Ltd Rosebank Engineering Pty Ltd
13 Saab Australia Pty Ltd Eylex Pty Ltd
14 Lend Lease Building Pty Ltd Broens
15 Aspen Medical Cubic Defence Australia Pty Ltd
16 Northrop Grumman Australia Pty Ltd TAE
17 Babcock ANZ (incl Australian Helicopters) H.I. Fraser Pty Ltd
18 Forgacs Communications Design & Management Pty
Ltd
19 IBM Australia Limited Calytrix Technologies Pty Ltd
20 ESS Support Services Worldwide Owen International Pty Ltd
Source: Australian Defence Magazine, Vol.23, No.1, December 2014/January 2015, Top 40 Defence Contractors and
Top 20 SMEs Survey, p. 27.
2.9 Sonartech Atlas’ submission described the historic background of the

defence industry in Australia:
In the 1970’s and early 80’s Australian defence industry was
largely a collection of government owned and operated facilities,
with a focus on meeting the needs of the Australian armed
services. The commercially owned entities in the defence market
place were primarily ‘shopfronts’ for overseas companies to
supply their products into Australia.5
2.10 During this time, local industry was protected by import quotas and
tariffs, which have since been eliminated or reduced to low levels.6
5 Sonartech Atlas, Submission 26, p.1.

2.11 John O’Callaghan (Director, Defence and Government Relations,

Australian Industry Group) said that the defence industry had moved
from ‘unproductive government-owned ammunition, dockyards and
aerospace entities’ towards ‘a more vibrant and efficient innovative world-
class commercially driven group of entities such as the prime defence
contractors and their sub-entities.’7
2.12 Determining the size and scale of Australia’s defence industry depends
upon how the industry is defined. Mr Chris Burns (CEO, Defence
Teaming Centre) said there is ‘no agreed definition’ of the defence
industry.8
2.13 A company may supply products and services sold for either military or
civilian purposes. In 2012 a study of the defence industry workforce
conducted by Skills Australia9 stated:
Given that many of the firms working for Defence also undertake
significant civilian work, many of the employees engaged directly
or indirectly in supporting Defence’s materiel requirements could
move between military and civilian tasks if required. A degree of
uncertainty over the exact size of the Defence materiel workforce
is therefore to be expected.10
2.14 The significance of defining the ‘defence industry’ was noted in a
submission to the 2015 Defence White Paper process by the Defence
Teaming Centre:
The breadth and scope of Australia’s defence industry is not well
understood because it is ill-defined. Without formal definition the
industry’s capabilities and capacities cannot be fully
comprehended or appreciated. It also limits the capacity to
determine and measure the impact of defence industry on
decisions related to Defence capabilities.11
2.15 Mr Chris Burns said that industry should be broadly defined:
7 Dunk and O’Callaghan, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.2.

8 Burns and Taylor, Committee Hansard, 9 October 2014, p.20.
9 Skills Australia was succeeded by the Australian Workforce and Productivity Agency. In July
2014, the AWPA ‘transitioned’ into the Department of Industry and Science. See
<http://www.industry.gov.au/skills/Publications/Pages/Former-Australian-Workforce-
and-Productivity-Agency-Publications.aspx> (viewed 16 October 2015).
10 Skills Australia, ‘Building Australia’s Defence Supply Capabilities: Main Report for the
Defence Industry Workforce Strategy’, 2012, p.9, at
<http://industry.gov.au/skills/Publications/Documents/BuildingAustraliasDefenceSupply
Capabilities_260912-2012.pdf> (viewed 26 August 2015).
11 Defence Teaming Centre, Submission to 2015 Defence White Paper, p.2.
We consider that defence industry is any company that is

contributing, or might contribute to, military capability, or that is
impacted by Defence procurement practices and procedures.12
2.16 Mr Burns observed that ‘there is a vast variety of companies in the defence
industry. When you consider the spectrum of it, it is quite large.’13
Australian defence imports and exports

2.17 Figures published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI),14 which maintains a database of the world’s ‘major weapon’
transfers, shows Australia’s position relative to other countries.
According to SIPRI’s analysis, Australia is among the world’s leading
importers of major weapons. SIPRI’s commentary noted that Australia
was the recipient of 10 per cent of all US deliveries from 2009 to 2013.15
Table 2.2 Leading suppliers of major weapons 2009 to 2013
Volume of exports
(SIPRI trend indicator values in $million)
Rank/Country 2013 2009-2013
1. United States 6,153 39,080

2. Russia 8,283 36,243
3. Germany 972 8,800
4. China 1,837 7,379
5. France 1,489 7,211
6. United Kingdom 1,394 5,515
7. Spain 605 3,986
8. Ukraine 589 3,503
9. Italy 801 3,480
10. Israel 773 3,155
…
20. Australia 63 438
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2014, p.258.

14 Prof Roos, Submission 8, p.4.
15 SIPRI Yearbook 2014 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), p.259; Thales, Submission 19, p.2.
Table 2.3 Leading recipients of major weapons 2009 to 2013

Volume of imports
(SIPRI trend indicator values in $million)
Rank/Country 2013 2009-2013
1. India 5,581 18,564

2. China 1,534 6,581
3. Pakistan 1,002 6,426
4. United Arab Emirates 2,245 5,777
5. Saudi Arabia 1,486 5,231
6. United States 759 5,074
7. Australia 303 5,027
8. South Korea 188 4,758
9. Singapore 142 4,439
10. Algeria 336 4,221
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2014, p.268.
2.18 Thales Australia’s submission noted that Australia accounts for a small
percentage of global arms sales and stated that Australian defence exports
‘are mostly driven by individual company commercial strategies –
sometimes unrelated to local defence requirements.’16
2.19 Nonetheless, the Australian Industry Group’s submission noted some
contemporary examples of Australian success in the global market:
Australia’s defence industry has progressively matured over the
past 20 years, with an increasing focus on exports. The Team
Australia initiative on the Joint Strike Fighter program has
provided the template for building export performance. This is
particularly so for Ai Group member companies, such as Marand
Precision and Ferra. Other member companies, such as Austal,
have been remarkably successful in winning valuable work
offshore in the maritime domain. Aerosonde and Thomas Global,
among others, have proven their ability to compete successfully in
international markets.17
2.20 As discussed below, a sizeable proportion of overall defence industry
revenue is generated by sales to the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
16 Thales Australia, Submission 19, p.3.

17 Australian Industry Group, Submission 35, p.1.
Domestic defence sales and Defence’s requirements of industry

2.21 The ADF’s expenditure on capital equipment accounts for approximately
one-third of Defence’s total annual budget. The Defence submission claims
that the proportion of this expenditure within Australia has remained
relatively steady over time at between 50 to 55 per cent, with a larger
proportion of the in-country spend directed to equipment sustainment,
acquisition and development.18
2.22 Defence and Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO)19 expenditure is
sizeable. The Department of Finance’s procurement statistics show that in
2013-14:
 DMO procurement expenditure is the largest among government
agencies, with expenditure of $16.72 billion (or 32.4 per cent as a
proportion).
 Defence ranked in second place, with expenditure was $12.68 billion (or
25.9 per cent in proportion).20
2.23 A February 2014 Department of Defence submission to a Senate inquiry on
government procurement procedures included the following figures:
 Defence spends around $10 billion annually on acquisition and
sustainment, which equates to around 0.6 per cent of Australia’s GDP;
 Around 54 per cent to 60 per cent of Defence expenditure on capital
equipment is spent within Australia;
 Around 70 per cent of expenditure on sustainment is spent within
Australia;
 At a regional level, ‘it is not unusual’ for around 10 per cent of the
workforce to be employed in jobs related to Defence;
 More than half of this expenditure ‘leaks’ from the region when
company profits are distributed, consumables are sourced from outside
the region and workers spend their earnings on items made
elsewhere.21
2.24 Defence’s submission to the Senate inquiry concluded:

19 The Defence Materiel Organisation became the Capability, Acquisition and Sustainment
Group on 1 July 2015.
20 Department of Finance, ‘Statistics on Australian Government Procurement Contracts’ at
<http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/statistics-on-commonwealth-purchasing-
contracts/> (viewed 26 August 2015).
21 Department of Defence, Submission 43, Senate Finance and Public Administration References
Committee Inquiry into Commonwealth Procurement Procedures, pp.19-20.
For this reason, the regional economic impacts of Defence

expenditure are often substantially lower than initial impressions
suggest. Such impacts tend to be overstated in the public arena.22
2.25 However, Defence’s submission to this inquiry described its economic
contribution as sizeable:
Defence demand on Australian industry in relation to capital
equipment programs accounts for direct employment of around
27,000 people, and substantially more than that number through
economic flow-on or multiplier effects.23
2.26 Defence’s submission added:
These broad budgetary parameters influence the overall size of
domestic defence industry given that Australia’s defence industry
is centred on the ADF as a customer. Defence analysis suggests
that exports by Australian-based companies with strong and direct
links to supporting the ADF account for only a small element of
their overall output.24
2.27 The ADF is therefore a key customer of the defence industry. The
Department of Defence’s submission acknowledged the significance of the
defence industry:
Australia’s defence industry builds and supports a myriad of
capital equipment - including advanced weapons platforms and
systems - on which the ADF depends. This equipment is a critical
contributor to Australia’s defence preparedness, and the domestic
defence industry is essential to ensuring the majority of this
equipment is able to be deployed.25
Defence requirements dominate national shipbuilding and repair
activity and contribute substantially to the overall size of the
Australian market for aircraft maintenance. It makes a smaller
contribution to overall Australian markets for electronics, vehicles
and other products.26
2.29 Notwithstanding Defence’s above acknowledgement of industry’s
contribution, in a submission to a 2014 Senate inquiry into government
procurement, Defence stated:
Committee Inquiry into Commonwealth Procurement Procedures, p.20.
It is a long held and widely accepted principle that Australian

industry exists to support the ADF, not the other way around.
Military-strategic issues should always assume a position of
primacy in the Defence procurement process, generally
irrespective of the economic impacts of Defence spending. The
potential economic impacts of Defence capital equipment projects
do not form part of the normal process through which value for
money is evaluated at a Departmental level.27
2.30 The Defence Teaming Centre’s submission to the 2015 White Paper
process rejected this view, stating:
Defence industry’s capacity to generate global credibility is also
greatly reduced when the Federal Government very publically
denigrates and defames its own defence industry. … The
Government’s recent pronouncement that “industry exists to
support defence, not defence supporting industry” suggesting a
‘master-servant’ or ‘hand-out’ relationship is equally unhelpful.
Industry would prefer to partner with Government and Defence in
a mature and collegiate manner rather than what is perceived as
the Government‘s current confrontational approach.28
2.31 The Northern Territory Government submitted that whilst Defence’s
presence is considerable:
Very few businesses rely solely on defence as a customer, with the
workflow too spasmodic for reliance on defence alone as a
customer.29
2.32 According to analysis prepared by Graeme Dunk (Manager, Australian
Business Defence Industry), published in the ASPI Strategist, the
proportion of Defence spend within Australia is declining:
In the period from 1 July 2007 to 31 March 2015 the DMO [Defence
Materiel Organisation] has placed approximately 117,000 contracts
worth a little over A$71 billion for acquisition, sustainment and
sundry other items. In the financial year 2007–08 almost 80 per
cent of the DMO contracting was to companies operating within
Australia, but this has steadily declined since that time to the
current state where less than 60 per cent are awarded locally.30
Committee Inquiry into Commonwealth Procurement Procedures, p.19.
28 Defence Teaming Centre, Submission to Defence White Paper 2015, p.5.
29 Northern Territory Government, Submission 5, p.4.
30 Graeme Dunk ‘Australian Defence Industry – Where to Next?’ ASPI Strategist, 1 May 2015, at
<http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australian-defence-industry-where-to-next/>.
2.33 Mr Dunk’s article added:

When ASC is taken out of the equation less than 5 per cent (by
value) of all DMO acquisition and sustainment contracts are
awarded directly to Australian-owned companies.31
2.34 The AMWU made similar observations in its submission.32
2.35 Thales Australia submitted that Defence views local industry’s role as
being to support ADF acquisitions in Australia, rather than to create
unique and exportable products. As a consequence:
That means that Australia does comparatively little R&D [research
and development]… from which export possibilities with a unique
value proposition may emerge. As weapons systems become
increasingly sophisticated, the opportunities for local industry to
forge a unique export value proposition from support activities is
also difficult, because so much of the intellectual property,
software, hardware, manufacturing processes and replacement
parts are locked into, or controlled by, foreign original equipment
manufacturers.33
The economic and strategic significance of the Australian defence

industry
2.36 During the inquiry, the Committee was urged to consider the strategic and
economic significance of the domestic defence industry and how this
relates to defence exports. More specifically, the following issues arose:
 The defence industry’s contribution to the Australian economy;
 The importance of sovereignty, self-reliance and national interest; and
 The economic and knowledge ‘spillover’ effect created by undertaking
defence projects within Australia.
2.37 The Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union submitted:
More than any other industry, countries around the world have
historically and continue to identify their defence industry as a
strategic capability. Practically, what this recognition means is
<http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australian-defence-industry-where-to-next/>.
32 AMWU, Submission 24, pp.2-3; see also NSW Business Chamber, ‘Analysis Reveals Federal
Government Exporting Australian Defence Industry Jobs Overseas’, at
<http://www.nswbusinesschamber.com.au/News-Media/Latest-News/Media-Releases-
2013/Analysis-reveals-Federal-Government-exporting-Aust> (viewed 26 August 2015).
these countries have refused to allow the laws of economics to

determine the fate of their domestic defence industries.34
2.38 Dr Tom Skladzien (National Economic and Industry Advisor, Australian
Manufacturing Workers’ Union) stated:
…if any government wishes to support defence exports, they need
to support defence capability. The only way that a government can
do that is to use and build its defence sector.35
2.39 In Mr Dunk’s 2015 ASPI Strategist article calling for greater recognition of
the defence industry’s role he said:
We need to determine those parts of industry that are associated
with high strategic risk and then unashamedly support and
develop them. We also need to determine how the defence
industry sector plays into the wider industrial and economic base,
and to make a policy decision that we’ll support defence industry
activities that contribute to the national economic well-being.
Those aren’t offsets in disguise. It’s not protectionism. It’s
Australia as a sovereign nation taking actions that are associated
with our national security.36
2.40 Professor Goran Roos submitted that the robustness of the defence
industry directly affects Australia’s sovereign capability:
The extent to which industry is critical to sovereign capability is
frequently not realised in the public debate. Without local industry
expertise, it is impossible to sustain operations.37
2.41 Professor Roos defined sovereign capability as being:
…the ability to ensure, under full national control and without
reliance on any direct foreign assistance, the execution and
sustainment of national security operations. This will require:
 Sufficient numbers of highly capable and competent staff;
 Defence systems with the required capabilities and operational
availability; [and]
 Domestic capabilities to support and sustain these defence
systems. 38
34 AMWU, Submission 24, pp.1-2.

35 Skladzien, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, p.27.
<http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australian-defence-industry-where-to-next/> (viewed 26
August 2015).
37 Roos, Exhibit 9, p.21.
38 Roos, Exhibit 9, p.21.
2.42 The extent to which Government policy recognises sovereign interests was
questioned by H I Fraser Pty Ltd:
Nations other than Australia view defence products and services
as a strategic capability and they keep the work in-country. This is
a sovereign issue and is often borne out of the brutal experience of
civil and world wars where they have had no-one else to rely
upon.39
2.43 Mr Burns (CEO, Defence Teaming Centre) said:
Another significant impediment to the growth of Australia’s
defence exports is the lack of recognition by government of the
strategic importance of an indigenous defence industry to
Australia’s security and economy. The cornerstone of a viable
defence industry export capability is the existence of a sustainable
and competitive indigenous defence industry.40
2.44 The Returned and Services League of Australia agreed that ‘the Australian
defence industry is a strategic asset.’41 The RSL’s submission stated:
The ability to manufacture, repair and maintain complex defence
equipment is as vital a part of a credible defence posture today as
it has been in the past.42
2.45 The RSL noted that there may be instances in the future when foreign
supply cannot be assured.43 In this context, naval shipbuilding was
suggested as being such an example. Austal submitted:
The strategic importance of a domestic naval shipbuilding
capability seems clear to most developed countries. … The
Australian Government has not demonstrated an unambiguous
desire to maintain naval shipbuilding as a strategic capability for
the future.44
2.46 Austal noted that a submarine rescue gear ship for Defence is being built
at shipyards in Vietnam.45 In Austal’s view:
The economic advantages of these decisions needs to be weighed
against the long term strategic implications of the loss of domestic
39 H I Fraser Pty Ltd, Submission 2, p.1.

41 RSL, Submission 13, p.3.
44 Austal, Submission 31, p.9
45 Austal, Submission 31, p.10.
naval ship construction capability and any potential export

opportunities that may flow from this capability.46
2.47 Mr David Shiner (Vice President International Sales, Austal) said:
Austal’s competitive business model has always been based on
our ability to win domestic and export opportunities, which is the
only sustainable model for us as an organisation and what we
believe is the only sustainable model for industry as a whole.
…government support for Australian defence export with regard
to shipbuilding is absolutely critical and probably should be
considered as a strategic issue and of national interest.47
Spillover and second order effects of the defence industry

2.48 Advanced manufacturing industries, such as the defence industry, have a
sizeable economic footprint by virtue of the wider economic or technology
benefits generated, which are respectively known as ‘spillover’ and
‘second-order’ effects.
2.49 Examples of these wider benefits may be found in some recent reports on
manufacturing and naval shipbuilding:
 RAND Corporation, ‘Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise:
Preparing for the 21st Century’ (April 2015), commissioned by the
Department of Defence;
 ACIL Allen Consulting, ‘Naval Shipbuilding and Through Life
Support: Economic Value to Australia’ (December 2013), commissioned
by the Australian Industry Group; and
 Professor Goran Roos, ‘Manufacturing in the Future’ (January 2012),
commissioned by the South Australian Government.
2.50 RAND’s report considered the extent to which naval shipbuilding would
generate economic spillover. RAND defined the concept of ‘spillover’ in
terms of economic multipliers:
Suppose that the government spends $100 buying a good or
service from a shipyard. The shipyard might then be expected to
spend at least a portion of that money on inputs, such as labor or
materials. The original $100 creates a cascade (i.e., multiples) of
spending through the economy; that is, $100 spent at a shipyard
results in additional spending by shipyard workers at local

47 Shiner, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.27.
restaurants, which then hire additional workers who rent

additional housing, and so forth.48
2.51 Based on case studies and a literature review, the report stated:
Most of the resulting estimates are in the range of 1.7–1.9—that is,
$100 spent at a shipyard ultimately results in $170–$190 worth of
additional economic activity in the shipyard’s region (inclusive of
the original $100). Economic multipliers may be lower (i.e., less
than 1.0) if the increased spending displaces other economic
activity.49
2.52 In one case, RAND’s research found that development of the Gripen
aircraft in Sweden had led to the creation of an ‘aerospace cluster’, which
had grown from employing around 1,200 people in the 1980s to 18,000
people in 2015.50 RAND concluded:
Unfortunately, RAND’s analysis of shipbuilding in the United
States did not find favorable spillovers in the fashion of Gripen.
Shipbuilding has been favorable to local economies, but it has
done so in a more modest fashion, without the ecosystem of
favorable spin-offs and spillovers associated with Gripen. We do
not think an outcome from shipbuilding similar to that in Silicon
Valley from technology is a realistic aspiration.51
2.53 Creation of jobs and workforce utilisation was cited by RAND as a
favourable benefit, depending on whether ‘workers hired by the shipyard
would simply be displaced from other gainful employment.’52 In the
Australian context, RAND observed:
It is impossible, lacking greater specificity, to estimate the
economic consequences of a shipbuilding project on a region of
Australia or on the nation as a whole. Rather, the applicable
economic multiplier is a highly contextually dependent question.53
48 RAND Corporation, ‘Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise: Preparing for the 21st
Century’, April 2015, pp.133-134.
Century’, April 2015, p.134.
2.54 While this may to true during times of economic growth, Australia’s
economic circumstances and workforce trends may change over time. Mr
Christopher Jenkins (CEO, Thales Australia and New Zealand) said:
Right now, there are warning signs from the automotive sector
collapsing and from other manufacturing sectors struggling,
which the advanced-technology manufacturing sector is
concerned about. That may have graduates and students thinking
about other career directions.54
2.55 He added:
Having a strong, globally competitive defence industry sector
attracts students and graduates to go through the STEM courses—
science, technology, engineering and mathematics courses—so
that the strength of Australia will build in this area.55
2.56 ACIL Allen Consulting’s report considered spillover in terms of economic
and technology benefits of naval shipbuilding:
In addition to these direct dollar and employment effects, the
naval shipbuilding industry has a number of other significant
economic benefits:
 Technology transfer (for example, the development of Bisalloy
steel);
 Transfer of expertise – firms involved in the naval shipbuilding
supply chain gain skills that enable them to compete
successfully in other projects and sectors; [and]
 Improved practices in areas such as quality assurance, business
planning, sub-contracting and dealing with Defence in other
fields.56
2.57 Professor Goran Roos similarly viewed spillover from economic and
technology perspectives. He defined spillover as ‘the effects of economic
activity that benefit those beyond the originators’, which may include
technology spillover that leads to new innovation.57 He said:
Whereas, if you include a development phase, the return on the
development phase is different. …you are solving problems not
previously solved and that gives you an edge as a company once
54 Jenkins, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, p.20.

56 ACIL Allen Consulting, ‘Naval Shipbuilding and Through Life Support: Economic Value to
Australia’, December 2013, p.ii and p.20.
57 Goran Roos/South Australian Department of Premier and Cabinet, ‘Manufacturing into the
Future’, January 2012, p.43.
you have the solution. That solution can then be spread out and
implemented to drive the business thoroughly.58
2.58 Prof Roos referred the Committee to economic analysis of building the
future submarines in South Australia.59 In addition to benefits to the
Australian gross domestic product, he also found that ‘in these types of
complex projects there is normally an additional ‘knowledge spillover’
effect from ‘the increased range of competencies… that result from
domestic construction.’60 In his research, Prof Roos has also noted the
relationship between government procurement decisions and spillover
effects:
Public procurement is an area of economic, political and legal
significance, involving governments at various levels buying
goods and services from private firms, thereby representing a
significant proportion of economic activity in most jurisdictions.
The public procurement process spans the whole life cycle from
initial conception and definition of the needs of the public service
through to the end of the useful life of an asset or the end of a
contract.61
2.59 Procurement involves choices:
…the public service has to determine the type of products and
services it wishes to buy. The choices range from simple items
such as paper clips and office furniture to complex items such as
telecommunications systems which have the potential to affect
technical progress and also provide an opportunity for some of the
technology to ‘spillover’ into the rest of the economy.62
2.60 The Committee sought Defence’s views on the notion of spillover benefits.
Defence advised:
The industry innovation and export assistance programs currently
managed by Defence are, to some extent, provided on the
understanding that industry recipients will generate so-called
spillovers. … However, spillovers can be formidably difficult to
quantify even after a project is complete.63
58 Roos, Committee Hansard, 9 October 2014, p.3.

59 Roos, Exhibit 9, pp.14-16.
60 Economic Development Board of South Australia, ‘Economic Analysis of Australia’s Future
Submarine Program’, p.2.
63 Department of Defence, Response to Questions on Notice (Question No. 25).
2.61 Dr Robert Bourke (Director-General, Economic and Commercial Analysis,

Department of Defence) said that economic impacts are not necessarily
considered by Defence:
As you know economic impact, broadly defined, is not considered
as part of Defence tender evaluations within the department. …
Commonwealth procurement rules, as you know, do not clearly
require that the department take economic impact into account.
That is true of course not just for Defence but for other
government departments as well.64
2.62 Dr Bourke added:
That situation may change, if the Department of Finance or
another area of government instructs that clearly to be the case,
but, as far as I know, up to this point there has not been that clear
instruction from central agencies.65
2.63 H I Fraser Pty Ltd’s submission suggested that this reluctance may be
attributable to influence exercised by Treasury and the Department of
Finance:
Supporting a strategic industry is [a] difficult argument to make in
the current cost constrained environment. … It is clear that the
Department of Finance and Deregulation [sic] and Department of
the Treasury have the upper hand in the current decision-making
process.66
2.64 The Committee asked the Department of Finance whether anything
prevents Defence from considering spillover effects as part of its analysis
of value for money. Mr John Sheridan (First Assistant Secretary, Business,
Procurement and Asset Management, Department of Finance) said:
The challenge in the area of spillover costs, which is the term that
you used, or perhaps second order costs, is first of all about how
one might ask a tenderer to represent those costs in response to a
request for tender; and then how procurement officials might
assess the validity of those costs in the consequences of
procurements.67
2.65 He added that less than two per cent of Commonwealth procurements
involve amounts exceeding $5 million.68 Against this background, he said:
64 Birrer et al, Committee Hansard, 24 March 2015, p.7.

66 H I Fraser Pty Ltd, Submission 2, p.1.
67 Edge and Sheridan, Committee Hansard, 3 March 2015, p.3.
The difficulty of getting the required economic advice on those

sorts of second order effects that you discussed or that other
witnesses have discussed, and how they might be applied to a
particular procurement decision … might be quite considerable …
That would tend to add both expense to a procurement and, of
course, time to how long it took to conduct such a procurement.69
2.66 In a written response to the Committee, the Department of Finance
subsequently advised that ‘consistent with long-standing practice, second
round effects… are not included’ in costings.70 The Department of Finance
further advised the Committee that their role in individual procurement
decisions was minimal, unless it involved a new spending proposal.71
Defence also advised that decisions in cases of individual procurements
are the responsibility of Defence’s delegates and internal procurement
specialists.72
Australian defence industry policy
2.67 There have been three iterations of defence industry policy from 1998 to
2010.73 Although a new policy statement is expected to accompany the
2015 White Paper, the most recent defence industry policy statement
(DIPS), ‘Building Defence Capability Report: A Policy for a Smarter and
More Agile Defence Industry Base’ was released in June 2010. It listed
four objectives to further support the local defence industry:
 Setting clear investment priorities;
 Establishing a stronger Defence-industry relationship;
 Seeking opportunities for growth; and
 Building skills, innovation and productivity.74
2.68 The 2010 DIPS argued that ‘industry must become more resilient and self-
reliant if it is to prosper and grow’75 and stated:

70 Department of Finance, Response to Questions on Notice, p.1.
72 Department of Defence, Response to Questions on Notice, (Question No. 24).
73 Preceding the 2010 policy statement were the Defence Industry and Strategic Policy Statement
(June 1998) and the Defence and Industry Policy Statement (March 2007).
Defence Industry Base’, June 2010, pp.9-11.
It can no longer expect the Government to use offsets or local

content quotas to help protect Australian defence industry from
overseas competition.76
2.69 Furthermore:
Protectionist measures such as offsets and local content quotas are
costly and counterproductive. They have no place in the
Government’s defence industry policy. Defence industry policy
will encourage local enterprises to identify opportunities and
enhance their productivity, skilling and innovation. It is these
strengths, rather than guarantees of work with little or no
competition, which will assure industry’s future.77
2.70 Changes to the global strategic order and the role of Australia’s defence
industry were also highlighted in the 2010 DIPS:
The global defence industry has undergone significant changes
over the last several decades. Globalisation and the end of the
Cold War have contributed to a major consolidation within
industry, which has seen the rationalisation of major defence
suppliers. This has resulted in a global defence industry
dominated by a few very large defence companies, mostly based
in Europe and North America. ...it is also an opportunity for
Australian SMEs to make profits through integrating into the
global supply chains of international primes and their major
subcontractors.78
2.71 The DIPS noted the significance of priority industry capabilities (PICs),
which are capabilities that ‘confer an essential strategic advantage by
being resident within Australia’ and would ‘significantly undermine
defence self-reliance and ADF operational capability’ if unavailable.79 The
DIPS stated:
When making procurement and sourcing decisions, the
Government will always emphasise the need to obtain value for
money for the Australian taxpayer through competition. …
Nevertheless, in reaching its decision based on value for money in
PIC-related procurements, the Government may take into account
factors such as Australian industry impacts, the national interest,

broader strategic factors, and other whole-of-government
considerations.80
2.72 Actions to support industry and sustain PICs included managing the
timing of new projects to maintain regular work; access to export
promotion; workforce skills development; longer term contracting
arrangements; and targeting industry development initiatives at SMEs.81
2.73 Other notable elements of the 2010 DIPS, intended to support ‘business
opportunities within Australia and overseas’ were the Australian Industry
Capability (AIC) program and the Global Supply Chain (GSC) program.82
The AIC program essentially requires tenderers for Defence projects to
consider Australian industry participation (such as by supplying
componentry) and to test the Australian market.83 The objective is to ‘use
major Defence projects to create opportunities for Australian defence
industry.’84 The Global Supply Chain (GSC) program is a similar concept,
except its objective is to facilitate Australian industry involvement on an
international level within the supply chains of large multinational defence
companies (known as ‘primes’).85
2.74 Defence’s submission stated that its policy towards industry is based on
four pillars:
 Evaluating the payment of price premiums for preferring
domestic over foreign sources of capital equipment;
 Shaping the structure of defence markets and consequently the
levels of competition within them;
 Establishing suitable contracting policies and procedures
through which defence materiel should be purchased,
including approaches to regulating the profits and costs of
monopoly suppliers; and
Defence Industry Base’, 2010, p.73; see also Birrer et al, Committee Hansard, 24 March 2015, p.5.
Defence Industry Base’, 2010, p.73.
85 Department of Defence, Submission 41, p.8. Primes are defined as ‘prime contractors which
contract directly with the DMO and employ more than 200 people working essentially full-
time on Defence projects.’ See also Department of Defence, ‘Building Defence Capability: A
Policy for a Smarter and More Agile Defence Industry Base’, June 2010, p.14.
 Assistance to Australian-based defence manufacturers, to help

these firms overcome economic distortions or imperfections in
the way some defence markets function.86
Assistance which Defence provides to Australian industry,
including assistance relating to exports, has as its clear objective
the longer-term creation and maintenance of a domestic industrial
base able to deliver capital equipment to the ADF on time, on
schedule and to the appropriate level of quality and value-for-
money.87
2.76 More recently, the Australian Government’s Industry Innovation and
Competitiveness Agenda, released on 14 October 2014, has maintained
that competition and competitiveness will increase productivity and open
market access. The 2014 Agenda stated:
The Government will further open our economy to domestic and
international competition and investment to improve access to
high-quality, low-cost goods and services. This will benefit
consumers and enhance the competitiveness of businesses that
rely on these goods and services as inputs. Greater competition
within Australia will also provide incentives for domestic
producers to innovate and lift their productivity, while greater
market access will enable exporters to achieve global scale.88
2.77 Like the DIPS, the Agenda recognised globalisation, specialisation and
diversity of supply chains as an emergent trend in the international
economy:
Globally integrated companies source intermediate inputs from
many suppliers, across industries and geographic locations, for
assembly and distribution worldwide. This is enabling local
producers to specialise in one element of a larger production
process and network, which might otherwise not have been viable
in their own country or region.89
2.78 The Department of Industry confirmed that the Agenda applies to all
Australian industries, including defence exporters.90 Mr Peter Chesworth
(Head of Sectoral Growth Policy Division) said:

88 Australian Government, ‘Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda: An Action Plan
for a Stronger Australia’, October 2014, p.xi.
89 Australian Government, ‘Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda: An Action Plan
for a Stronger Australia’, October 2014, p.4.
90 Byrne and Chesworth, Committee Hansard, 10 February 2015, p.1.
The agenda sets up four broad ambitions: a lower cost business-

friendly environment, with less regulation; a more skilled labour
force; better economic infrastructure; and an industry policy that
fosters innovation and entrepreneurship. In line with these four
ambitions, the department provides support to Australian
industry defence exports as well as to all other exports through a
range of programs that are delivered through the Entrepreneurs’
Infrastructure Program and the Industry Growth Centres
Initiative.91
2.79 Some witnesses were concerned that this approach does not adequately
recognise the benefits of working in partnership with the Australian
defence industry. Mr Graeme Dunk (Manager, Australian Business
Defence Industry) said:
As a country with a small defence sector, the barriers and
impediments to the growth of Australia’s defence exports are
many and, apart from the simple consideration of market size,
include no strategic view to developing and supporting defence
exports nor how exports may fit into the overall direction for the
acquisition and sustainment of Australia’s military capability; no
consideration of industry as a capability and hence how exports fit
within the overall capability, development and support chain; an
overreliance on defence engagement through a small number of
large offshore companies; a simplistic assumption that the
interests of the global primes and our national interest will align;
and an overall focus on the delivery of programs rather than on
achieving strategically relevant outcomes.92
2.80 Northrop Grumman submitted that industry’s role should be factored into
Defence’s capability planning:
Defence exports should not be looked at independent of the
overall national industrial policy for defence industry. Defence
industry policy should be moved upward to a level of
consideration integrated with development of military capability
in the Defence Capability Plan and Force Structure Review. A new
Industry Capability Plan should be developed to articulate the
industrial capability development required by the nation in order
to support its overall national defence objectives.93
91 Byrne and Chesworth, Committee Hansard, 10 February 2015, p.2.

93 Northrop Grumman, Submission 28, p.2.
2.81 Mr Peter Nicholson (Head of Government Relations, BAE Systems

Australia) said:
Defence exports should not be considered as a stand-alone
element in government policy. Rather, they are part of a strategic
industry policy and most of the same factors apply to the wider
manufacturing sector, not just defence industry.94
2.82 Dr Andrew Davies (Australian Strategic Policy Institute) said:
One of the things I can say very clearly, having spent a lot of time
last year talking to Australian defence industry, is that there is a
yawning gap between what was stated in defence industry policy
and what was delivered. … They see one thing written down, and
there is a glossy brochure of priority industry capabilities or
strategic industry capabilities, and then DMO go and do their own
thing.95
2.83 Dr Davies said that the missing element of defence industry policies had
been aspects related to ‘implementation rather than the statement of
policy’.96
2.84 The Committee subsequently sought Defence’s views on whether open
competition may undermine or risk the long-term capabilities of local
defence industry. Defence advised that an open-market approach is
preferred:
Market competition, from domestic and/or overseas sources,
provides in many or even most cases the single most effective and
efficient policy instrument for securing the best capability and
value for money for capital equipment acquisition and
sustainment projects.97
2.85 Defence noted that in some cases, a ‘sole sourcing’ procurement method
may be used ‘where this is likely to achieve the best value for money
outcomes for Government.’98 Nevertheless, competition remains
Defence’s preference:
As a general rule, Defence does not protect Australian industry
from international competition except where such protection is
needed to secure in-country industry capabilities of especially high
military-strategic value. However, even in this case, protection is
only provided when industry cannot overcome its own ‘health’
94 Nicholson and Wilson, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.32.

95 Davis, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.21.
problems and protection constitutes the best policy option

available.99
2.86 Defence informed the Committee that sovereignty factors are given
consideration:
When determining the outcome of contracts, Defence takes the
issue of sovereign industry capabilities into account primarily
through a combination of two programs: the Australian Industry
Capability (AIC) program and the Priority Industry Capability
(PIC) program.100
2.87 Notwithstanding Defence’s views, some submissions and witnesses were
sceptical of the extent to which industry impacts, whole-of-life acquisition
and sustainment costs and ongoing support for priority ADF capabilities
have been given adequate recognition. In particular, these concerns
related to:
 The degree of support directed to the creation of Australian intellectual
property through innovation;
 How Defence’s procurement and purchasing decisions can impact on
industry’s ability to sustain key ADF capability requirements; and
 The effectiveness of the AIC and PIC models and how Defence oversees
industry capability.
2.88 These issues are discussed in the following sections of the chapter.
Intellectual property and innovation
2.89 In order to export products or services, the Australian defence industry

needs to own or have permission to use the associated intellectual
property (IP). Overcoming or negotiating IP was cited by a number of
defence exporters as a key barrier to the ability to growing defence
exports; specifically the challenges of accessing IP and the creation of IP.
2.90 Australian companies have developed different business models,
depending on their area of innovative advantage and IP ownership:
 Building components to supply another company, where only the
intellectual property surrounding the production method is uniquely
Australian;
 Developing technology for products or production methods with the
resulting intellectual property being sold back to the customer; or
99 Department of Defence, Response to Questions on Notice (Question No. 4)

 Developing successful products, technology and production methods

with all related intellectual property being largely Australian-owned.
2.91 The Committee was informed that pursuing innovation and the creation
of intellectual property has allowed Australian companies to move
beyond commodity production (or ‘build to print’) towards build to
specification. There was evidence that although some Australian
companies had moved beyond a build to print capacity, most companies
remained in this category and only a minority were in a position to
produce and export complete complex systems.
2.92 Sonartech Atlas submitted:
Much of the manufacturing work being undertaken in Australia
has been manufacture under licence. To export you must have
control of the intellectual property, otherwise the exports are at the
behest of the foreign owner.101
2.93 Mr Mark Baker (Managing Director, Sonartech Atlas Pty Ltd) said:
If Australia is to have a viable and meaningful defence export
industry then the appropriate environment has to be established—
one which nurtures development in Australia, building a skill and
experience base and generating IP. It must utilise Australian
technology and seek to capitalise on that Australian technology
overseas, both financially and diplomatically. These more
intangible elements can be difficult to attribute a cost or value to.
Ultimately, however, they must form part of assessing the value
for the taxpayer.102
2.94 Mr Baker was asked about the ability of Australian companies to generate
their own intellectual property:
CHAIR: Would I be correct to take out of that a lot of the work
that is put forward as being Australian companies successfully
integrating into the global supply chain is actually using the IP
that belongs to the parent company to manufacture and just
deliver a good, as opposed to generating their own IP and their
ability to have an exportable product outside of that one contract.
Mr Baker: I believe that is the case for the majority. There is one
example… carbon fibre manufacturing—where they have got the
process which is covered and in their IP for the actual
manufacturing process. So even though they are manufacturing
components to somebody else’s design—and from that perspective

102 Baker, Schulte and Sedgman, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, p.11.
they can be replaced—they have a process that gives them an

efficiency advantage and they are now going through the stages to
license their process, which is good. One of the issues potentially
that the Global Supply Chain program will face is that, because
you do not own the IP, you are easily supplanted or replaced by
somebody else.
CHAIR: I think that is Quickstep you are referring to.
Mr Baker: Quickstep, that is correct.103
2.95 The Committee subsequently sought Quickstep’s views on the barriers
related to intellectual property. Mr Michael Schramko (Vice President –
Operations, Quickstep Technologies ) said:
What we are trying to sell is a process that can be used by
somebody else in their technology. The resistance we find is that
people do not want to embody somebody else’s IP into their own,
because they would see it as you being under their control for
some part of what they want to sell, which is partly the resistance
that we are finding on introducing the Quickstep process in the
F35 [Joint Strike Fighter] program.104
2.96 Mr Michael Halloran (Managing Director, Supacat Pty Ltd) was similarly
asked whether the ability to export depends upon Australian innovation
and ownership of intellectual property. Mr Halloran said:
I agree absolutely. I do not think we need to generate all of the IP.
We need to be able to take IP where it exists and put that together
in a lot of cases. Even as an OEM [original equipment
manufacturer], we use a lot of other people’s IP to generate a
system or a solution for customers. Our IP management is not
necessarily all about owning it, but it is certainly about being able
to access it, deliver it and exploit it.105
2.97 Mr Graeme Dunk (Manager, Australian Business Defence Industry) had a
similar view:
We do not necessarily have to control the IP. We do not have to
own the IP, but we need to have access to the IP.106
2.98 He added:
We need access to the IP not only in order to maintain and not
only in order to protect what we have got but also to give us the
104 Driver and Schramko, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, pp.53-54; see also Exhibit 4.
105 Halloran, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2014, p.8.
flexibility to upgrade systems as and when we see that we need to

do it for our own sovereign reasons.107
2.99 Other companies have developed specialisations and are filling niche
markets, which has led to exports, such as EM Solutions Pty Ltd, a
company that designs and manufactures broadband telecommunications
systems.108 Dr Rowan Gilmore (CEO, EM Solutions) said:
Our success has come by offering innovative and customised
products that often cannot be obtained elsewhere. …we have been
successful at exporting small volumes of our products, particularly
to blue chip defence systems integrators currently in Spain, Italy,
the UK and France.109
2.100 Dr Gilmore added that notwithstanding success overseas, EM Solutions
had been ‘unsuccessful at tendering satellite terminals to our very own
Defence department.’110 He said that business development has been
hindered by Government:
…there are institutional barriers, systemic barriers and a cultural
cringe in government procurement that work against the success
of small, innovative IP-creating companies such as ours being able
to grow and to become the next generation of multinational
systems integrators exporting more to the world.111
2.101 Mr Aaron Thompson (Business Unit Manager – Global Supply Chain,
Ferra Engineering) said:
When we started export 10 years ago we were primarily build to
print, so the IP was owned by the prime contractor and we were
manufacturing a product. Our strategy is similar to what I heard
with EM Solutions—move up the value chain. To put it in
layman’s terms, rather than producing a screw or a washer and
competing as a commodity, it is a matter of moving up and
upskilling our people so that we can build a centre fuselage or a
wing of an aircraft and have multiple Australian companies in our
supply chain.112
2.102 CEA Technologies, an Australian defence exporter that specialises in
communication systems, missile control radars and radar systems,
explained that its participation in past Australian Defence projects had led

108 EM Solutions, Submission 7, p.1.
109 Gilmore, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, p.34.
112 Gaka, Hill and Thompson, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, p.41.
to innovation and, eventually, to international sales. Mr Merv Davis

(CEO, CEA Technologies Pty Ltd) said:
We operate within what is referred to as the high-frequency and
phased array radar priority industry capability, and as such we
deliver critically important capability—capability that is world
leading in terms of its capability and cost. … DMO’s and Navy’s
strategic approach to CEA’s participation in the Anzac anti-ship
missile defence program underpinned the development and
fielding of our phased array radars.113
2.103 As a result of CEA’s product success, Mr Davis said that ‘CEA radar
systems provide capabilities that are in demand internationally’ and the
company has had ‘in excess of $100 million in export orders in the past 10
years’.114 Mr Davis said:
Our intellectual property, clearly, is the commercial jewel, and it
also underpins the military capability that we offer. However, our
customer is supportive of export. I believe Navy and the DMO
understand the benefits and the risks. They understand the
benefits of reduced long-term costs; of the ability for us, on the
basis of export, to undertake further development and hence
provide further capability improvements; and of course, the
strategic benefit in contributing to our allies’ needs; and of
retaining real engineering and real manufacturing capability
within Australia.115
2.104 The Committee was informed that innovation may be stifled due to risk
aversion. Dr Rowan Gilmore (CEO, EM Solutions Pty Ltd) cited
unwarranted risk aversion as having prevented his company from selling
to Defence and to be able to capitalise on such benefits. He stated:
We have current collaborations with CSIRO, DSTO and the
University of Queensland. We have a strong IP portfolio. We
collaborate with several defence primes. We employ 40 people,
including seven PhDs, and we are successfully satisfying some of
the world’s most demanding customers. Yet, we have been
unsuccessful at tendering to our very own Defence department.
…it is disappointing to be eliminated on the basis of risk.116
2.105 He added:
113 Davis and Forbes, Committee Hansard, 28 October 2014, p.1.

I believe the real obstacle with an SME being able to supply to

DMO is DMO’s fear of risk. Never in my 40 year career have I
heard the term ‘risk’ raised more frequently than in the last few
years when I have been trying to supply to defence procurement.
It is probably the most frequently used word in their culture.117
2.106 Mr Alfred Schulte (Chief Technical Officer, Sonartech Atlas Pty Ltd)
highlighted the importance of supporting innovation to deliver product
performance:
That needs to be managed, because it requires a plan. It requires
consistency and feedback, interaction between industry and users,
in order to make these incremental steps work. If you do not have
a structure that supports this kind of innovation, then you will
never get to the final performance of the product. That is a
particular problem for SMEs because it is a longer process. It takes
some time and it requires interaction and feedback from using
your system. And we need to look at both things when we talk
about innovation.118
2.107 Northrop Grumman Australia submitted:
Without ongoing innovation, Australian industry will not have the
world leading capability offerings to attract export sales. Whilst it
is recognised that these innovations will come from industry, the
Government should be focussed on ensuring that an environment
exists such that the defence industry sector is encouraged to
provide world leading innovation in Australia.119
2.108 Mr Mark Baker (Managing Director, Sonartech Atlas Pty Ltd) outlined the
UK’s approach to supporting capability:
There have been some cases in the UK, where—by virtue of
wanting to have the piece of equipment, even if it is built under
licence in the UK—the costs have gone up threefold. There needs
to be a balance but—because it forms part of an industrial strategy
that the government has set, and because of the need to have
certain industries available in the event that they want them—they
are prepared to pay a certain premium in some cases.120
2.109 Mr Baker added:
I would not, for one second, argue that Australia needs to go
down the exact path where… we will build it in Australia and

119 Northrop Grumman Australia, Submission 28, p.7.
120 Baker, Schulte and Sedgman, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, pp.16-17.
build it under licence, even if it costs us four times or three times

the amount. But I think it is very important to weigh up the
intangible benefits that the rest of the country can get from having
that industry viable.121
2.110 Mr Andrew Watson (Managing Director, MBDA Australia) said that
Defence’s approach to procurement does not encourage the creation of
Australian intellectual property:
A largely off-the-shelf procurement policy misses a vital
opportunity to stimulate creation of Australian-owned IP. I believe
that the Australian government has the leverage to challenge the
major international defence companies to truly partner and work
jointly on programs and, in particular, to exercise the high-end
technical skills that Australia undoubtedly has. But this can only
work if those multinationals and their respective governments are
prepared to truly partner, share IP and genuinely share
development work and, through that, foster Australian industry’s
ability to create Australian-owned IP. Without the creation of IP it
is difficult to see how Australian companies can succeed in
export.122
2.111 MBDA’s submission also suggested that Australia could work with
international partners ‘who are able to share intellectual property with
local SMEs who have capabilities in specific niche areas.’123 EM Solutions’
submission recommended that a portion of DMO’s budget should be
dedicated to ‘procurement from innovative Australian SMEs.’124
2.112 Defence advised that intellectual property issues, among other barriers to
defence exports, are being considered in the 2015 White Paper process.125
Defence’s procurement decisions
2.113 In the context of this inquiry, Defence’s approach to procurement was

criticised for privileging acquisition price over whole-of-life costs despite
published policy to the contrary, and pursuing competition at the expense
of Australia’s strategic and economic interests. Witnesses argued that
122 Watson, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.52.
123 MBDA, Submission 16, p.15.
124 EM Solutions Pty Ltd, Submission 7, p.2 and p.6.
these interests should include supporting the Australian defence industry.

The implication of this argument was that decisions not to purchase from
Australian companies where that is feasible, diminishes innovation and
capacity in Australia’s defence industry, impacting in the long term on its
ability to sustain capabilities for the ADF. It was put to the Committee that
the dominant culture within Defence prefers to deal with large prime
contractors as a means of managing perceived risk, which in turn reduces
the opportunity for Australian industry to generate intellectual property
and limits the prospect of growing defence-related exports.
2.114 When procuring goods and services, Defence is obliged to follow the
Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs), which are a binding
legislative instrument applicable to Commonwealth entities. The CPRs
state that ‘achieving value for money is the core rule’,126 although an
exception can be made for decisions ‘necessary for the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security’ or ‘the protection of
essential security interests’.127
2.115 A new addition to the 2014 version of CPRs was a section relating to
whole of life costs. Along with value for money, this was an issue subject
to discussion during the inquiry. In relation to elements of value for
money, the CPRs state:
When conducting a procurement, an official must consider the
relevant financial and non-financial costs and benefits of each
submission including, but not limited to: the quality of the goods
and services; fitness for purpose of the proposal; the potential
supplier’s relevant experience and performance history; flexibility
of the proposal (including innovation and adaptability over the
lifecycle of the procurement); environmental sustainability of the
proposed goods and services (such as energy efficiency and
environmental impact); and whole-of-life costs.128
2.116 The CPRs define the meaning of whole-of-life costs as follows:
Whole-of-life costs could include: the initial purchase price of the
goods and services; maintenance costs; transition out costs;
licensing costs (when applicable); the cost of additional features
procured after the initial procurement; consumable costs; and
disposal costs.129
126 ‘Commonwealth Procurement Rules’, July 2014, p.13.

127 ‘Commonwealth Procurement Rules’, July 2012, p.14; ‘Commonwealth Procurement Rules’,
July 2014, p.7.
2.117 Changes to legislation130 also resulted in updates to Defence internal

processes and policies relating to procurement.131 In October 2014, a new
version of the ‘Defence Procurement Policy Manual’ (DPPM) was
published. The manual advises:
Value for money is not limited to a consideration of capability
versus price, or ‘cheapest price wins.’ Value for money requires
consideration of Australian Government policy, specifically values
such as open competition, efficiency, ethics and accountability.132
2.118 The manual also advises:
For any Defence procurement, price is seldom the only relevant
cost of a purchase. A minimum consideration for all procurement
is a prediction of useful life.
…
In making a value for money judgement, a comparison of the
relevant benefits and costs on a whole of life basis should be
undertaken. This requires that whole of life costing principles be
used in the evaluation of offers.133
2.119 Mrs Sue Smith (Executive Officer, Australian Industry and Defence
Network Inc) said that in practice, Defence procurement decisions are
focussed on ‘the sticker price’ and overlook ‘the cost of through-life
maintenance and support of major acquisitions’.134 She said:
Australia needs to adopt more holistic whole-of-life, value-for-
money criteria when assessing tenders. This myopic approach
denies SMEs the opportunity to build capability that will enable
them to be more productive and competitive in global markets.
Currently we have a situation where often only the initial
procurement costs are considered.135
2.120 Mrs Smith also said this could lead to export growth:
130 The timing of this inquiry has coincided with changes to the Commonwealth Procurement
Rules. This has occurred after submissions for this inquiry were received and at around the
same time public hearings had commenced. The Public Governance, Performance and
Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) commenced on 1 July 2014, replacing both the former Financial
Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies
Act 1997 (Cth). The current Commonwealth Procurement Rules are a legislative instrument made
under the PGPA Act 2013. In July 2014, at the time submissions to the inquiry were due, a new
version of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) was issued.
131 Department of Defence, ‘Annual Report 2013-14’, p.165.
132 Department of Defence/DMO, ‘Defence Procurement Policy Manual’, October 2014, p.5.6-4.
134 Smith, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2014, p.39.
Australia needs a long-term perspective to be taken, especially in

relation to having an indigenous defence industry, and to consider
the whole-of-life cost benefits to the nation. Then industry can
invest in innovation and new capabilities for not only the ADF but
for more competitive exporting.136
2.121 She added:
Defence acquisition decisions should not only be based on defence
requirements, but also consider the national industrial and
regional requirements.137
2.122 Mr Christopher Burns (CEO, Defence Teaming Centre) questioned the
benefit to industry of the Government’s approach:
Understandably, Defence is allocated a budget and its ambition is
to get the maximum value from that limited resource. When it is
not pressed or compelled to consider national interests of its
investments, unsurprisingly it is motivated to acquire the least
expensive hardware with minimal risk and without having to
consider the benefits to the nation of its investments. To truly
resolve this, government must be compelled to consider value for
money in the context of holistic, whole-of-life cost-benefit to the
nation.138
2.123 Similarly, the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU)
submitted that Defence and DMO have had a ‘focus on contract cost
minimisation’.139 The AMWU’s submission stated:
Such a focus ignores the benefits of sourcing locally by ignoring
flow on tax returns and significant industry capability benefits
such as improvements in skills, technological development and
innovation. An equation of contract price for value for money
neglects half of the determinant of true value for money, namely
the economic benefits of procurement decisions.140
2.124 The submission continued:
This one sided approach to general government procurement is a
long standing policy error that needs to be corrected. …it denies
and neglects the strategic industry capability that should form a
central concern in defence procurement decisions, and in doing so

139 AMWU, Submission 24, p.2.
places Australia’s long term national security interests in

jeopardy.141
2.125 Dr Tom Skladzien (National Economic and Industry Advisor, Australian
Manufacturing Workers’ Union) stated:
We take the view that the government should value Australian
jobs more than jobs elsewhere, for obvious reasons. … it is the
Australian government’s role to look after the interests of
Australia and Australian citizens, and, in being blind to these
benefits of $1 here versus $1 there, we do not think that true value
for money is actually being achieved.142
2.126 EM Solutions Pty Ltd submitted:
In our dealings with individual Defence personnel, we have
typically found strong enthusiasm and support for an innovative
local manufacturer such as ourselves to succeed. However, we
lament that the institutional support during the procurement
process does not match this enthusiasm.143
2.127 Dr Andrew Davies (ASPI) said that with ‘some important caveats’144
competitiveness should form the basis of Defence purchase decisions:
I tend to have views up the dry end of the economic spectrum and
I have long been an advocate of acquisition processes that are as
competition driven as possible. I am inclined against paying a
premium for local work for its own sake.145
2.128 The Committee sought Defence’s views on value for money
considerations. Defence advised that price is not the sole determinant:
Choosing the best value for money option entails balancing what
is being offered against the price being asked. In some cases, better
value for money can be - and is - obtained by paying more to
achieve the required capability effects (including interoperability),
to achieve earlier delivery or to provide assurance of long-term
supportability.146
2.129 Mr John Edge (Acting Deputy Secretary, Business Procurement and Asset
Management, Department of Finance) said that he did not believe the
CPRs required value for money to be interpreted narrowly:

142 Skladzien, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, p.28.
143 EM Solutions Pty Ltd, Submission 7, p.2.
144 Davies, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.19.
I do not know that we would say that the value for money
assessment as it is framed in the Commonwealth Procurement
Rules necessarily leads an agency to a very, very narrow
interpretation of value for money.147
2.130 Defence’s procurement procedures have been subject to a previous review
by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference Committee in
2012.148 A more general review of Commonwealth procurement
procedures was completed by the Senate Finance and Public
Administration Committee in 2014.149
2.131 The Government response to the 2012 inquiry into procedures for Defence
capital projects stated:
The report suggests there is a growing disconnect between
strategic guidance and capability development, confused
accountabilities, poor appreciation of risk, and a need for
structural reform in Defence procurement. Government supports
the thrust of the report’s findings and Defence is already
implementing a number of initiatives which will address some of
the Committee’s concerns.150
2.132 Defence advised the Committee that the Department’s Capability
Development Group (CDG) consults with industry on future projects ‘up
to ten years prior’ to initial Government approval and this continues ‘via a
range of engagement mechanisms.’151 However, Dr Rowan Gilmore (CEO,
EM Solutions Pty Ltd) said that in his experience:
We are not like a prime contractor that has a government office
and government relations people based in Canberra, where they
are aware of what is coming next. We are way behind in terms of
understanding.152
2.133 Subsequent to the Committee receiving advice on this issue from Defence
in March 2015, the First Principles Review recommended ‘disbanding the

148 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, ‘Procurement Procedures
for Defence Capital Projects’, August 2012, p.xxi.
149 Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee, ‘Commonwealth
Procurement Procedures’, July 2014.
150 Australian Government Response to Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References
Committee’s Final Report: Procurement Procedures for Defence Capital Projects, October 2012,
p.1.
Capability Development Group and dispersing its functions to more

appropriate areas.’153
2.134 The Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee’s report
included a recommendation that ‘the Government develop a methodology
to quantify the factors used to assess whole-of-life costs.’154 The
Government did not support this recommendation on the grounds that:
Due to the large range of goods and services procured by
Commonwealth entities, a one-size fits all cost benefit analysis
methodology would not be feasible to implement.155
2.135 Defence advised the Committee that sovereign interests are given
consideration by way of the Australian Industry Capability (AIC) and
Priority Industry Capability programs, which are intended to encourage
prime contractors to involve Australian industry in Defence projects.156
The Australian Industry Capability and Priority Industry

Capability programs
2.136 The 2010 Defence Industry Policy Statement (DIPS) contained a

framework for identifying and supporting key industry capabilities, based
on the strategic and operational necessity of retaining these capabilities
within Australia, of which the AIC and PIC programs were key elements.
Whilst greater investment in identified capabilities could follow, the DIPS
cautioned that ‘Government does not guarantee future work or funding
for particular companies’.157
2.137 Defence’s submission stated that the AIC program aims to create a
‘systematic mechanism for ensuring that Australian industry has adequate
opportunity to bid for work and that suitable domestic supply options are
properly considered by Defence’, unless a case can be made by the
Department to the contrary.
153 David Peever, ‘First Principles Review: Creating One Defence’, April 2015, p.35; see also FPR
recommendation 2.1.
154 Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee, ‘Commonwealth
Procurement Procedures’, July 2014, p.39.
155 Australian Government Response to the Senate Finance and Public Administration References
Committee Report: Commonwealth Procurement Procedures, April 2015, p.6.
2.138 The Priority Industry Capabilities (PIC)158 program is used by Defence to

ensure industry capabilities of strategic value to the ADF are considered
when tenders are called for capital equipment projects.159 An additional
range of related Strategic Industry Capabilities (SICs)160 were identified in
the 2010 DIPS, which are more general and intended to ‘provide Australia
with enhanced defence self-reliance, ADF operational capability or longer-
term procurement certainty.’161 Defence’s submission summarised the
objectives of the AIC and PIC programs as follows:
The aim… is to secure, and then build, on the foundation of
defence-oriented firms which the AIC program has helped to
create. By identifying areas of industry where these capabilities are
of highest strategic value to the ADF, the PIC program provides
initial guidance on how grants-based and associated assistance
measures should be targeted - keeping in mind that the
Government’s defence industry policy extends well beyond the
PIC arena.162
2.139 Defence explained to the Committee that where a project includes an
identified PIC, ‘an AIC plan needs to be prepared for that PIC capability,
as an automatic requirement.’163 In addition, Defence’s submission stated
that ‘for export-oriented companies in Australia, the AIC program helps to
ensure an adequate base workload.’164 The current Defence Procurement
158 Identified PICs are as follows: Electronic warfare; high frequency and phased array radars;
‘high end’ system and ‘system of systems’ integration; through-life and real time support of
mission and safety critical software; anti-tampering capabilities; signature management; in-
service support of Collins combat system; acoustic technologies and systems; ship dry docking
facilities and common user facilities; selected ballistic munitions and explosives; infantry
weapons and remote weapons stations; and combat clothing and personal equipment.
Department of Defence, ‘Priority Industry Capabilities’ at
<http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/DoingBusiness/Industry/IndustryPrograms/PriorityStr
ategicIndustryCapability/> (viewed 26 August 2015).
160 Identified SICs are as follows: Composite and exotic materials; elements of national
infrastructure (these include aviation fuel, communication systems and logistical
infrastructure in Darwin and Townsville); geospatial information and systems; guided
weapons; naval shipbuilding; protection of networks, computers and communications; repair,
maintenance and upgrade of specialist airborne early warning and control systems; armoured
vehicles; and aircraft; secure test facilities and test ranges; system assurance capabilities; and
system life cycle management. Department of Defence/DMO, ‘Defence Procurement Policy
Manual’, October 2014, p.3.12-5.
Policy Manual contains instructions for procurement officers relating to

AIC requirements, including:
The AIC program is conducted on a best value basis and Defence
Procurement officers must ensure that value for money is the
prime consideration when determining whether Defence
capability is to be sourced from Australian or overseas suppliers.
The AIC program identifies three types of industry capability
(‘Industry Requirements’):
 Priority Industry Capabilities (PICs);
 Strategic Industry Capabilities (SICs); and
 Project/ Product Specific Industry Capabilities (PSICs).
Procurement officers must include applicable Industry
Requirements in request documentation released to the market.
…
Procurement officers must include in request documentation a
requirement for tenderers to submit an AIC Plan as part of their
tender where:
 The estimated value of the procurement is $20 million or more;
or
 The procurement will impact on a PIC.165
2.140 In addition:
Where a PIC exists, Procurement officers must seek a costed
Australian industry option in the request documentation for the
relevant procurement.166
2.141 Defence advised that the precise detail of the PICs can change and ‘the
exact criteria used to identify PICs remains confidential to Defence.’
Nevertheless, three general criteria are applied:
 The importance of an industry capability to the operational
needs of the ADF;
 The ability of the ADF to access these capabilities from overseas
should the need arise; and,
 The availability of the capabilities from Australian industry in
the normal course of business.167
2.142 Some witnesses and submissions expressed reservations regarding the
effectiveness of the AIC and PIC programs. Dr Andrew Davies (ASPI)
was asked whether he believed value for money could override the
identified PICs and SICs. He said:
165 Department of Defence/DMO, ‘Defence Procurement Policy Manual’, October 2014, pp.3.12-1.
166 Department of Defence/DMO, ‘Defence Procurement Policy Manual’, October 2014, pp.3.12-6.
Yes; best value for money in the narrow sense. That is the nub of
the problem. To be fair, in many cases, you would make the same
decision anyway. There are probably some instances where, if you
took that longer view, you would pay a little bit more up-front for
the ongoing depth of capability later on.168
2.143 A submission from H I Fraser Pty Ltd stated:
Successive Australian governments have made the decision not to
show any preference or offset for Australian industry. Even the
AIC policy is flawed because it is not audited after the tender
phase nor during the course of the project and there are no
consequences to not meeting the AIC quoted during the tender
phase.169
2.144 Similarly, Mrs Sue Smith (Executive Officer, Australian Industry and
Defence Network Inc) said that there is a ‘dependence’ on global primes to
deliver major defence contracts. She said this has led to:
…the reluctance of DMO to enforce local production goals and
Australian industry capability plans, even when these are an
express condition of their contract.170
2.145 The AMWU submitted that the AIC program ‘should not be abolished…
but should be well-resourced and expanded’.171 Furthermore:
While these programs fall short of requiring Australian defence
industry involvement, they do represent a step in the right
direction. In the AMWU’s view, this program should go further by
requiring project proponents to provide sub-contract work to
Australian businesses if Australian businesses are shown to be
capable potential suppliers to the project.172
2.146 The Defence Procurement Policy Manual provides the following direction
to procurement officers in cases of contractors flouting AIC requirements:
Defence Procurement officers are responsible for monitoring and
enforcing contractor achievement of contracted AIC program
requirements. Procurement officers must ensure that request
documentation specifies that where contractors have
underperformed against contracted AIC requirements under

169 H I Fraser, Submission 2, p.2.
previous contracts, they may be excluded from consideration in

the tender evaluation process.173
2.147 And further:
Contractors that continue to underperform against their AIC
obligations will be reported to CEO DMO and the Minister for
Defence Materiel. Contractors that do not seek to redress
identified shortfalls in performance against their AIC obligations
may be reported in the Defence Annual Report.174
2.148 Other witnesses were concerned with the development and selection of
the current PICs. Mr Mike Lovell (Director, Operations and Integration,
Northrop Grumman Australia) said:
Some of the current PICs, quite frankly, are probably past their
use-by date, but others will continue to evolve. While I say they
might be past their use-by date, industry around the world has
moved on in some areas and there are some things that just do not
make economic sense to do in this country.175
2.149 Mr Lovell also said:
…essentially what we are talking about is a cohesive defence
industry policy that aligns with the DCP [Defence Capability Plan]
and using that to evaluate, re-evaluate or test the PICs going
forward. That will enable us in industry to focus our investment,
R&D [research and development] and the development of our
industrial capacity to service the local defence need and also to
export.176
2.150 Mr Lovell added that, in his view, there is a ‘disconnect between a
declared PIC and current policy and DMO decisions’.177
2.151 Ferra Engineering submitted that whilst there had been ‘progress’ with the
AIC and the related PICs and SICs, improvement is needed:
…there remain deficiencies in at least two key components; a
coherent overarching performance management framework and a
coordinated approach to industry effort across
projects/programs.178
2.152 Sonartech Atlas submitted:
175 Lovell, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.41.
178 Ferra Engineering, Submission 15, p.6.
…it is unlikely that Australia will ever be able to develop and

produce major items of military equipment competitively and nor
should we. Specific areas should be targeted. One possible basis
for selection would be the PICs, then aligned with the needs of the
ADF, as elucidated in the DCP [Defence Capability Plan].179
2.153 Thales Australia agreed that priorities should be identified, but questioned
whether the current PIC program had been effective. Mr Chris Jenkins
(CEO, Thales Australia and New Zealand) said:
We need to be focusing our efforts into the priority areas for
Australia. Innovating products that can be globally competitive in
all areas of defence technology does not make sense. We do not
have the scale of funds and the scale of expertise in resources.
Prioritising that is important. We have previously had priority
industry capabilities enunciated, and that has been useful except
that those identified areas need to be reviewed and we need to
understand whether they are really the priorities that we want or
whether there are more definitive and perhaps more appropriate
priorities to be set. That is not for industry to determine; that is for
the Department of Defence and government to determine.180
2.154 Thales Australia’s submission stated that ‘Australia’s investment choices
in defence technology and industry support continue to be tested through
open market competition.’181 Thales observed that although Priority
Industry Capabilities and Strategic Industry Capabilities have been
identified, the PICs policy is ‘essentially passive’ and ‘Defence does not
commit to buy or accept anything developed in or for a PIC.’182 Thales’
submission noted that:
 Although acoustic technologies are identified as a PIC, an anti-
submarine towed array solution for Air Warfare Destroyers was
tendered and awarded to a UK-based company.183
 Whereas the Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle is ‘not associated’
with any PIC, it has been successfully exported.184
2.155 Thales Australia’s submission stated:

In simple terms, a national defence export strategy must support

the development of products and services that offer foreign
customers a unique value proposition.185
2.156 The Committee asked Defence whether a tendency to procure from
overseas had led to a loss of Australian industry capability and the
effective lapse of certain PICs. Dr Robert Bourke (Director-General,
Economic and Commercial Analysis, Department of Defence) said:
Simply because you are a PIC does not mean that you are
automatically entitled to, if you like, industry assistance or an
inclusion in government programs. The idea behind the PIC
program and the AIC program is to look at capabilities on a case-
by-case basis, look at where those capabilities fit into projects and
programs and then, on a cost-benefit basis, evaluate whether
investment in a particular capability can be justified.186
2.157 Dr Bourke was then asked whether industry capability is considered in the
context of PIC-related procurements. Dr Bourke explained how PICs are
applied:
PICs of course are broad ranging capabilities and when they are
assessed within the department they are done not purely on a
case-by-case or project-by-project basis. They are done on a
capability basis. For example, electronic warfare, as you have
cited, will have a number of programs and projects that cover the
EW space. The PIC is assessed and measured, if you will, taking
into account all that program activity and, indeed, it is considered
as well outside of the program space.187
2.158 He added:
As you are probably aware, what happens within industry and
how industry is structured and evolves depends partly on what
happens with Defence programs, but it is also influenced, in part,
by what happens between Defence programs and in other
markets.188

Defence industry as a fundamental input to capability
2.159 Currently, Defence recognises the eight fundamental inputs to capability

(FIC): personnel; organisation; collective training; major systems;
supplies; facilities and training areas; support; and command and
management.189 Defence defines the concept of fundamental inputs to
capability as follows:
A capability is provided by one or more systems, and is made up
of the combined effect of multiple inputs. The inputs are known
as the Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC)… Understanding
FIC enables Defence to better understand and manage the whole-
of-life workforce and funding implications of a new capability.190
2.160 In August 2015, then-Defence Minister Kevin Andrews stated that the
forthcoming White Paper would recognise industry as a FIC:
Through the White Paper and the accompanying Defence Industry
Policy Statement, the Government will re-set the foundations for
how industry engages with Defence. For the first time, the
Government will recognise the vital role of Australian industry as
a fundamental input to Defence capability.191
2.161 He continued:
This means that it will be mandatory for Defence to consider
Australian industry in the formal capability development process
ensuring Defence better understands and identifies its needs for
industrial support, and is able to better advise industry on its
future needs.192
2.162 During the inquiry, witnesses and submissions similarly proposed that
Defence should recognise industry as a FIC. In its submission, the
Defence Teaming Centre argued:
Australia’s defence industry be recognised by the Federal
Government as the ninth FIC. This would assist in generating an
189 Department of Defence, ‘Fundamental Inputs to Capability’ at

<http://www.defence.gov.au/CDG/FundamentalInputs/> (viewed 26 August 2015).
190 Department of Defence, ‘Defence Capability Development Handbook’, December 2012, p.2.
191 Minister for Defence Address to the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia, 27 August
2015, at <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/08/27/minister-for-defence-address-to-
the-american-chamber-of-commerce-in-australia-qt-hotel-canberra/> (viewed 16 October
2015).
192 Minister for Defence Address to the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia, 27 August
2015, at <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/08/27/minister-for-defence-address-to-
the-american-chamber-of-commerce-in-australia-qt-hotel-canberra/> (viewed 16 October
2015).
understanding and acceptance that defence industry is a critical

partner to Defence’s capacity to deliver military capability for
government.193
2.163 Dr Andrew Davies (ASPI) was asked whether the defence industry could
be recognised as a fundamental input to capability. He said:
The short answer is yes. Defence is clearly a key stakeholder of
defence industry and the services and goods it provides. … At the
moment the bulk of that work is done as part of DMO’s ongoing
processes. Making it a fundamental input to capability would
throw the onus on to the service chiefs and the capability manager
to make sure that defence industry was healthy enough to provide
them with the ability to raise, train and sustain the forces that
government requires.194
2.164 Mr Graeme Dunk (Manager, Australian Business Defence Industry) said:
If industry is recognised as a fundamental input to capability, it
would mean firstly that, at the time major acquisition and
sustainment decisions are being made, the ability of the
indigenous industry to address that acquisition and sustainment
would have to be taken into account. Secondly, in any decision
that is to be taken by Defence associated with acquisitions, the
impact on the industry would also have to be assessed.195
2.165 A submission from Australian Business Defence Industry to the 2015
Defence White Paper process expanded on this concept, proposing the
creation of six fundamental inputs to industry capability: in country
facilities; skilled and available workforce; access to intellectual property
and design information; sustainable workflow; access to capital; and
national infrastructure.196
2.166 Mr Peter Nicholson (Head of Government Relations, BAE Systems) agreed
that the defence industry should be a fundamental input to capability.197
He added:
Defence industry is a vital part of ADF capability because of the
sustainment requirements through life of type. That includes not
just maintenance, repair and overhaul but also upgrade.198
193 Defence Teaming Centre, Submission 6, p. 2.

196 ABDI Submission to 2015 Defence White Paper, p.6.
2.167 Some witnesses cautioned that relying entirely on the domestic defence
industry for all ADF requirements would not be possible. Dr Andrew
Davies (ASPI) said that increasing globalisation meant that some reliance
on overseas suppliers was inevitable.199 Nevertheless, he said Australia
could pursue areas of advantage.200 He said:
It is a matter of looking at comparative advantage and identifying
sectors of the Australian industry where we can really add some
value. I do not think there is a blanket solution in terms of this
model or that model. When it is all said and done, we are a
country of 24 million people in an increasingly globalised defence
industry setting.201
2.168 In its submission, Thales Australia referred to the 1992 report
commissioned by Defence entitled ‘The Strategic Priorities for Australian
Defence Industry’. According to Thales:
The report gave weight to the argument that Australia’s geo-
political circumstances did not warrant, nor could the country
afford, a high level of self-reliance in defence technology and
production.202
2.169 The 1992 report stated:
There is no need, in most circumstances, for full local design and
production of high risk capabilities… Proven overseas designs
adapted for local conditions, such as the ANZAC frigate, are the
lower risk strategy that must be adapted for the austere financial
circumstances of the 1990s.203
2.170 The report also stated:
It will be important, therefore, for Australian industry to be
targeted on those areas where retaining a technological edge is
most critical for our contingency planning.204
2.171 BAE Systems presented a similar view. Mr Peter Nicholson (Head of
Government Relations, BAE Systems) said:

203 Paul Dibb, ‘The Strategic Priorities for Australian Defence Industry’, ANU Strategic Defence
Studies Centre, November 1992, p.70.
204 Paul Dibb, ‘The Strategic Priorities for Australian Defence Industry’, ANU Strategic Defence
Studies Centre, November 1992, p.28.
In general, Australian industry does not have the capacity—that is,

the resources—to design, develop and field complex weapon
systems.205
2.172 Mr Nicholson noted that Australia’s capability strengths rested in the
ability to make systems within complex systems, for example, ‘some types
of platform, sensors, communications, software development and
electronic warfare’ and the integration of these elements into the overall
system.206 He added that there are two approaches:
The first one is to design, develop and produce and export
individual systems that could not be categorised as complex.
Secondly, and most likely, to produce systems for export as part of
the supply chain of a complex weapons system produced by an
overseas manufacturer.207
First Principles Review reforms to capability development

2.173 In August 2014, the Defence Minister commissioned a review of the
Defence organisation’s ‘first principles’ to ensure defence remains ‘fit for
purpose and is able to deliver against its strategy with the minimum
resources necessary.’ The review was completed in April 2015, after the
Committee had concluded public hearings for this inquiry.208 As noted by
the Minister for Defence when the Review was released in April 2015, the
Government has agreed (or agreed in-principle) to 75 of the First
Principles Review’s 76 recommendations.209
2.174 The First Principles Review recommended reforming capability
development processes to create:
An end-to-end approach for capability development with
Capability Managers having clear authority and accountability as
sponsors for the delivery of capability outcomes to time and
budget, supported by an integrated capability delivery function
and subject to stronger direction setting and contestability from
the centre.210

206 Nicholson and Wilson, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.32; see also BAE Systems,
Submission 3, p.2.
208 David Peever, ‘First Principles Review: Creating One Defence’, April 2015, p.5.
209 Minister for Defence media release, ‘First Principles Review of Defence’, 1 April 2015, at
<http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/04/01/first-principles-review-of-defence/>
(viewed 26 August 2015). The sole recommendation Government did not agree to accept
related to the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.
2.175 The Review found that the existing capability development process
(shown in a graphical representation at Annex E of the Review) created
‘disconnect between customers and the purchaser as well as multiple and
unnecessary handover points’.211 The Review also stated that Defence is
‘more focussed on process adherence than high quality capability
outcomes.’212 To achieve an end-to-end capability development approach,
the Review recommended forming a new Capability Acquisition and
Sustainment Group (CASG):
The new group would manage a project from Gate Zero through
to Final Operating Capability, including the integration of all
Fundamental Inputs to Capability.213
2.176 With the defence industry recognised as being among the fundamental
inputs to capability, its ability to fulfil capability requirements would be
overseen from CASG. The Review stated:
The outputs of Defence industry should be viewed as a
Fundamental Input to Capability and be integrated into the
acquisition life cycle. This may well mean a more imaginative use
of a small number of potential contractors early in the process or
the extension and use of already existing collaborative
mechanisms (such as rapid prototyping, development and
evaluation) at the very early stages of requirements
development.214
2.177 This means Defence may need to display a greater willingness to foster
innovation by managing or accepting project risks, rather than deliberately
excluding or avoiding options due to risk anxiety.
2.178 The First Principles Review acknowledged that the current approach to
procurement may not be appropriate in the defence context. The Review
stated:
We have had significant evidence from industry and other
commentators that the current reliance on a ‘one size fits all’
competition policy and the use of complex procurement contracts
does not produce the best results from domestic and international
industry. It also adds significant cost and time for all participants
and encourages unrealistic costing to be included in the decision-
making process. The importance and relevance of competitive
tension amongst prospective bidders varies from project to project.

In some cases there may be only one realistic option.215
2.179 The Review recommended that procurement strategies for Defence
acquisition and sustainment should follow a ‘smart buyer’ approach,
which would involve:
 An ‘enhanced relationship’ between CASG and industry, with industry
providing ‘expertise in managing projects in the acquisition and
sustainment phases’;
 Defence would focus on planning and governance, including reviewing
plans adopted by industry; industry would then focus on meeting the
outcomes required by Defence.
 Involving industry in procurement strategies;
 Recognising the outputs of the defence industry as a FIC;
 Formulating a Defence Investment Plan and making it available to
industry ‘to enable appropriate planning for future capital projects.’216
2.180 Furthermore:
We recommend that Defence, in partnership with academia and
industry, review its developmental research priorities, their
alignment with future force requirements and capacity to leverage
allied partners, in order to promote innovation and make the most
valuable contribution to future Defence capability.217
2.181 Implementing these changes necessitates managing industry’s ability to
deliver the capabilities Defence requires. The continuous build approach
adopted for naval shipbuilding could be applied (or adapted) as a
template for other segments of the defence industry.
RAND report - continuous build strategy an example of managing FIC

2.182 In September 2014, the Australian Government requested the RAND
Corporation to produce a report on Australia’s naval shipbuilding. The
report was released in April 2015, to inform the next Defence White Paper.
The scope of the RAND report was limited to naval shipbuilding, rather
than defence industries generally; however, aspects of the report
contained discussion relevant to themes arising during this inquiry, in
particular:
 How acquisition decisions provide certainty for industry when
Government planning creates ongoing production activity; and
216 David Peever, ‘First Principles Review: Creating One Defence’, April 2015, pp.36-37 and p.41.
 Continuity may generate savings and mitigate sovereign risks.

2.183 A ministerial statement issued upon release of the RAND report stated:
The RAND report is a critical input into the Defence White Paper
and the Naval Shipbuilding Plan. The Government will now
carefully consider the report’s analysis and findings in preparation
for the release of these documents later this year.218
2.184 RAND’s analysis found that Defence could adjust the timing of ship
construction to provide industry with an uninterrupted cycle of activity:
Australian domestic naval shipbuilders can sustain an 18- to 24-
month pace of large ship construction starts if AUS DoD [the
Australian Department of Defence] carefully manages Future
Frigate deliveries and keeps those ships operational for 25 to 30
years.219
2.185 The report recommended ‘steady production’ and a ‘continuous build
strategy’ for naval shipbuilding:
Supporting an Australian shipbuilding industry that is cost
effective will require specific steps, including lessening the gap
between the end of the AWD program and the start of Future
Frigate construction and adopting a continuous build strategy that
starts a new surface combatant every 18 months to two years.220
2.186 RAND stated that the price premium of Australian shipbuilding ‘could
drop over time, however, with steady production drumbeats and mature
designs.’221
2.187 Subsequent to release of RAND’s report, the Minister for Defence initiated
preparation of a naval shipbuilding plan, which the Minister indicated
was to be ‘informed by the expert, independent advice from the RAND
review.’222 In August 2015, the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence
jointly released the plan and endorsed the continuous build approach
recommended by RAND:
The Government will implement a continuous build of surface
warships in Australia. This means that Australia’s shipbuilding
218 Minister for Defence, ‘Release of the RAND Corporation Report’, 16 April 2015, at
<http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/04/16/minister-for-defence-release-of-the-rand-
corporation-report/> (viewed 26 August 2015).
Century’, April 2015, p.xxxviii.
222 ‘Launching a New Deal for Naval Shipbuilding’, the Australian, 22 April 2015, p.12.
workforce will build Navy’s Future Frigates and Offshore Patrol

Vessels.223
2.188 The Defence Minister recently reiterated that ‘the Government has
committed to an unprecedented continuous build of surface warships in
Australia.’ The Minister also acknowledged that ‘a sustainable
shipbuilding industry will also generate significant benefits for the wider
Australian economy, including through knowledge transfer and
innovation.’224
Departmental and ministerial responsibilities for the

defence industry
2.189 Responsibility for matters related to the defence industry is currently

shared between three ministers.225 The role of Minister for Defence
Materiel and Science was revived in September 2015.
2.190 The Australian Strategic Policy Institute recommended that the Minister
Assisting the Minister for Defence should have ‘particular responsibility
for defence export promotion.’226 Dr Andrew Davies (ASPI) said that
having a minister responsible for the defence industry, in his view, would
be a ‘positive step’ given the size and complexity of the Department of
Defence.227 Dr Davies said:
Defence is a very large and very complex beast. I think it is too big
for a single minister. I think the personnel issues are sufficiently
complex and sufficiently important that there be a junior minister
in charge of them. Just going from my experience, when there was
a defence procurement minister was when the projects of concern
list really started kicking goals in terms of taking difficult projects
and remediating them. That is because there was a minister who
had the time to do that, to pull the industry stakeholders and
Defence together and get all the important people in a room to sort
223 Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, ‘The Government’s Plan for a Strong and Sustainable
Naval Shipbuilding Industry’, 4 August 2015, at <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-08-
04/governments-plan-strong-and-sustainable-naval-shipbuilding-industry> (viewed 26
August 2015).
224 Minister for Defence, speech to Sea Power Conference, 7 October 2015, at
<http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/10/07/minister-for-defence-sea-power-
conference-sydney/> (viewed 16 October 2015).
225 Department of Defence, ‘Department of Defence Ministers’ at
<http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/> (viewed 26 August 2015).
226 ASPI, Submission 20, p.3.
227 Davies, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, pp.24-25.
out these multibillion-dollar projects that had gone off the rails.
Having a dedicated minister who had the time to do all of that was
very valuable.228
2.191 The portfolio of Minister for Defence Materiel has existed intermittently
between 1939 and 2013. Responsibilities have included defence
procurement, materiel engineering, financial management, project and
sustainment management and materiel logistics.229
2.192 Austal submitted:
On numerous occasions key ministers from various portfolios visit
many countries of interest to defence exporters. There is currently
no way of coordinating this visit schedule to harness the potential
value of this level of support. This lack of coordination is a
significant impediment to publicising potential Australian exports.
Industry has been left to its own devices and is often a low priority
afterthought, when trying to squeeze into a Minister’s busy
schedule.230
2.193 In the UK, the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology
is given specific responsibility for defence exports. Mr Andrew Watson
(Managing Director, MBDA Australia) said that the UK Government had
‘decided at the highest level the need to support defence exports.’231
Forthcoming White Paper and industry policy statement
2.194 Following the release of the 2015 Defence White Paper, Defence intends to
publish a 10-year Defence Capability Plan and a Defence Industry Policy
Statement to provide defence industry with greater certainty about the
Government’s key priorities and timeframes. Additionally, the
Government has indicated that the White Paper will be followed by a fully
costed Force Structure Review.232

229 44th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia 2014 (33rd ed.)
(Parliamentary Library/Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra, 2015), pp.505-593.
231 Watson, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.54; see also
<https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/parliamentary-under-secretary-of-state-
defence-equipment-support-and-technology> (viewed 26 August 2015).
232 Prime Minister and Minister for Defence media release, 4 April 2014, ‘Delivering a World
Class Defence Force’, at <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-04-04/delivering-world-class-
defence-force-0> ; Minister for Defence, ASPI Future Surface Fleet Conference speech, 31
March 2015, at >http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/03/31/minister-for-defence-aspi-
australias-future-surface-fleet-conference/> (viewed 26 August 2015).
2.195 In an address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Future Force

Structure Options Conference on 25 June 2015, Prime Minister Abbott
stated:
We need a strong defence industry to support and sustain our
armed forces. The White Paper will reset this critical relationship.
It is certainly not necessary or practical that all our defence
equipment be made here in Australia but it is necessary that it be
sustainable in Australia.233
2.196 The Prime Minister added:
The White Paper, a Defence Investment Plan, covering major
equipment and its sustainment, the Defence Industry Policy
Statement, a Naval Shipbuilding Plan and our commitment to
increase funding — in combination — will provide the clarity and
certainty that the defence of Australia needs.234
2.197 The Committee asked Defence for its views on the linkage between the
defence industry and defence capability. Defence advised:
The Government supports local industry and recognises how
valuable it is to our nation. The new Defence White Paper and the
associated Defence Industry Policy Statement will articulate the
critical role of industry in Defence business and provide greater
clarity and certainty of Defence’s requirements of industry.235
2.198 Subsequently, the Defence Minister has given an indication of the position
likely to be taken in the White Paper and Industry Statement. She said:
The Government very strongly supports the principle that we
should maximise the opportunities for Australian industries to
participate in Defence acquisition and sustainment. We are also
strongly committed to Australian industry that can deliver
Defence capability that is internationally cost-competitive.236
…
The new Defence Industry Policy will offer industry greater
opportunities to build its innovation, its productivity and its
233 Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Conference,
Canberra’, 25 June 2015, at <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-06-25/address-australian-
strategic-policy-institute-conference-canberra> (viewed 26 August 2015).
234 Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Conference,
Canberra’, 25 June 2015, at <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-06-25/address-australian-
strategic-policy-institute-conference-canberra> (viewed 26 August 2015).
international competitiveness – which is all in Australia’s national

interests. To ensure that the Government’s significant investment
in Defence is spent wisely, this will be Australia’s first fully‑
costed, and externally cost-assured, Defence White Paper.237
Implications for defence exports
2.199 Once it is established that there are elements of domestic defence industry
that are FIC (including those that generate the competence and capacity to
be a smart buyer), it is easier to make the linkage to which Defence exports
should be actively supported. This creates a positive cycle with Australian
investment in innovation to enhance FIC leading to new IP that can
(subject to export controls) increase opportunities for export.
2.200 Mr Graeme Dunk (Manager, Australian Business Defence Industry)
explained how exports are related to industry capability and government
policy:
Defence export opportunities do not spring fully formed out of the
ground, but need to be considered as a result of defence industry
engagement and associated involvement in multiple upstream
activities, including determination of military capability needs
based on the consideration of the strategic outcomes desired by
the government; definition and description of military capability
requirements; support for innovative developments to address
identified needs and requirements; support for the commercial-
isation of innovative concept and prototypes; and acceptance of
the outcomes of innovation and commercialisation and
introduction into service.238
2.201 Thales’ submission stated:
In Thales’ experience, our most successful exports have been
products designed and developed in Australia and launched
through large contracts to fulfil local requirements… One way to
describe exports of this type is the ‘push’ model – a unique
product is developed and launched through a local requirement
that then has sufficient momentum to ‘push’ its way into the
global market as a unique value proposition.239
2.202 Prof Goran Roos said:

Hence, there is a natural link between the requirements of
somebody working with your local industry, the increase of the
capability in that industry and the opening up of that industry for
opportunities that they otherwise would not have both through
capability and through linkages.240
Identifying FIC and alternatives to competition

2.203 The practical benefit of analysing industry to identify FIC and then using
procurement to not only sustain it, but save money in the process is
demonstrated by the UK’s approach to complex systems procurement.
This policy has significant changed how the UK approaches naval ship
(and submarine) building, elements of aviation capability and complex
weapons procurement.
2.204 A submission from MBDA Australia detailed how the UK’s preference to
engage sole suppliers for complex weapons has retained capabilities in-
country, led to savings and created opportunities for exports. MBDA
submitted that an ‘interdependent relationship’ had been developed
between Government and industry whereby:
The UK MoD [Ministry of Defence] requires current and future
military capability with operational advantage, freedom and
action and value for money, which is achieved by the sustainment
of appropriate industrial sovereign capability; and MBDA UK
requires a sustainable and profitable business through being
MoD’s primary partner of choice for the supply and support of
world leading complex weapons which delivers shareholder
value.241
2.205 MBDA submitted that this ‘collaborative approach’ to procurement was
delivering savings for the UK Government:
These savings are achieved through activities such as commonality
and modularity of sub-systems and technologies, optimising the
design to minimise through life costs, as well as enabling greater
flexibility to trade requirements and cost across the portfolio.242
2.206 While the partnership between the MoD and MBDA allowed for the MoD
to acquire any system it deemed necessary (including an off-the-shelf
system from an offshore supplier), to date it has not chosen to exercise that
option due to the increased capability and savings achieved through the
240 Roos, Committee Hansard, 9 October 2014, p.1.

241 MBDA Australia, Submission 16, p.6.
partnership with MBDA. According to MBDA, UK Government support

for the export of unique capabilities would lead to increased tax
contributions and additional savings:
These savings may accrue as a result of an increase in the
production quantity enabling a reduced unit price, reduced
overheads as a result of increased business volume, and
potentially the spread of non-recurring development costs if the
timescales of domestic and export requirements can be aligned.243
2.207 For Australia, MBDA suggested that relations between Government and
industry could be modelled on the UK approach:
Proactive and joined up relationships… could stimulate more
innovative business models for the longer term preservation of a
defence sector within Australia, providing skills, knowledge,
capability and the generation of intellectual property which is
ultimately needed for the growth of exports.244
2.208 MBDA concluded:
As such, if the Australian government is to seriously address
support to defence industry exports, one of the first steps is to
assess the options for a ‘non-OTS’ procurement policy in specific
technologies and capabilities. These technologies and capabilities
would need to be targeted at those areas where it is not only
essential to maintain a level of in-country capability, but also
where export market analysis demonstrates greatest opportunity
for exploitation of Australian developed products.245
2.209 The committee notes the parallel process developed in the UK to support a
long term partnering relationship in shipbuilding. The combination of
new contracting models and investment in production processes and
technology to assess which industry elements (down to specific trades)
were sovereign shipbuilding capabilities that should be retained have
transformed the UK approach to shipbuilding, delivering savings,
certainty for industry and a sustainable sovereign capability.246
2.210 Chapter four details other aspects of UK Government support for its
defence industry and defence exports.

246 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper’, December 2005,
pp.6-11, and see Appendix E.
Committee comment
2.211 The Committee notes that despite policies which appear to support closer
engagement with industry, a paradigm shift in Defence culture and
practice is required if the stated outcomes are actually to be achieved. The
Committee’s starting point is accepting the evidence provided during this
inquiry—and validated by recommendations of the First Principles
Review—that elements of defence industry are essential to ADF capability.
Industry elements that the Committee considers could be categorised as
FIC include:
 Products;
 Services;
 Competence and capacity (for example, design, engineering and
manufacturing capacity); and
 Intellectual property.
2.212 While it will be for Defence and industry to jointly establish a
methodology to identify FIC and update it on a regular basis, the
Committee recognises that not all industry activity should be regarded as
essential. Products or services that can be readily sourced from alternative
domestic or international suppliers, or in times of conflict, even be
substituted with minimal cost or disruption are clearly not FIC, even if
they are the result of a Defence related program such as AIC or the Global
Supply Chain. The manufacturing capability to produce low technology
items such as trailers or vehicle trays are two recent examples that would
clearly be in this category. At the other end of the spectrum, where
Australia operates a small fleet of a complex system with a unique
configuration, recent experience in both the maritime and aerospace
domains have proven that there are elements of engineering competence
and manufacturing capacity that must be maintained in Australia.
2.213 Noting that Service Chiefs are responsible to ensure that FIC are
sustained, the Committee is of the view that Defence has an interest,
indeed an obligation to identify FIC elements in industry and then to use
available means—including domestic procurement programs and support
for exports—to enhance and sustain them.
2.214 This framework is represented schematically in Figure 1.
2.215 The Committee expects that this approach will lead to a far more strategic
partnership between Defence and industry. In line with the experience of
peer nations, it will most likely result in longer term, whole-of-life
contracts and a commitment from Government to underwrite a given level
of procurement activity in key sectors (eg: the continuous build of surface
ships). This will in turn develop more IP, capacity and sustainable skilled
work in Australia’s industrial base. The Committee notes, however, that
the driver for this framework must be sustaining the skilled jobs that
enable Defence capability, not job creation as an end in itself.
2.216 The comment by Dr Davies of ASPI (paragraph 2.82) captured the
sentiment of many witnesses which indicates that there is a gulf between
policy and practice when it comes to Defence interaction with industry.
Many aspects of previous Defence Industry Policy Statements (eg: DIPS
2010) and the 2014 Defence Procurement Manual were commendable and,
if consistently implemented, would have served both Defence and
industry well. The Committee notes ANAO comments that past reform in
Defence has resulted in much new process but seldom the intended
outcomes. The First Principles Review also identifies this adherence to
process rather than strong, strategic leadership, including in this field of
industry engagement.
2.217 The step change that will underpin a change in cultural mores will be for
Defence to accept that they have a strategic and operational need to be a
smart buyer who manages the sustainability of industry FIC, just as they
do for other fundamental inputs to Defence capabilities. This will require a
new level of analysis and engagement with industry as well as change in
the culture that drives current procurement practices. These changes
should be implemented top down through policy and reporting
frameworks as well as bottom up, through highlighting the role of
industry as FIC during specialist training (eg: trades, engineering, project
management) and generalist career training such as the various levels of
staff training for ADF officers.
2.218 The Committee recognises that profit and loss are prime considerations for
industry and that probity is required in the Commonwealth’s dealings
with all commercial entities. In comparison with peer nations however,
the Committee also accepts the evidence that anxiety about probity has led
to an over reliance on competition as the prime vehicle to drive value for
money, as highlighted in discussion regarding DPPM guidance in
paragraph 2.117. Even when Defence sought to provide evidence that they
already had policy that allowed them to consider whole of life costs when
evaluating value for money, the Committee noted that the reference
provided—being the most recent edition of the DPPM—detailed the
primacy of competition: “Value for money is not limited to a consideration of
capability versus price, or ‘cheapest price wins’. Value for money requires
consideration of Australian Government policy, specifically values such as
open competition, efficiency, ethics and accountability”.
2.219 The Committee received evidence that in the longer term, many projects
could deliver better value for money where a long term partnering
agreement is reached. Such an agreement provides incentive for the
company to invest in the quality and longevity of its people, processes and
infrastructure which has the tangible benefit of increasing productivity,
decreasing costs and increasing availability of the asset to the warfighter.
There are some examples of this practice in Australia but they are not
widespread, as is the case in nations such as the UK.
2.220 The UK Government’s management of complex weapons procurement,
which has been designed to establish ongoing relationships with
suppliers, has demonstrated how partnering with industry can deliver
savings to government, improved capability, innovation, unique products
with export potential and maintain UK sovereign capability. The
applicability of industry as a FIC has been demonstrated by the UK’s
Defence Industry Strategy White Paper in 2005. This has resulted in a
long-term partnership between the UK Ministry of Defence and BVT
Surface Fleet Ltd in 2009 (Appendices E and F contain extracts from the
White Paper and the contract between the UK Secretary of State for
Defence and BVT Surface Fleet Ltd).
2.221 The Committee also accepts that there has been a recognised aversion to
risk, with decisions taken to procure offshore, even when Australian
companies offer products in areas that are classified as PICs. The risk cited
as reasons to go offshore range from commercial to technical or a
perceived lack of interoperability with allies. The Committee accepts that
in some cases these judgements may be valid but has received evidence
that Australian industry has often been denied the chance to provide
solutions to Defence at all, or in some cases has been told to get an
overseas prime interested so that they can provide it to the ADF as part of
a broader solution. While the Committee recognises the CPR requirements
to consider scale and commercial longevity are valid, managing these
risks—where appropriate in order to sustain and develop industry
elements identified as FIC—would appear to deliver more value in the
long term than simply defaulting to acquisition from an overseas prime.
2.222 The ability of Australian industry (sometimes supported by DSTG, CSIRO
and the university sector) to innovate and develop IP has improved
Australian defence capabilities and is an essential enabler to export.
Evidence suggests, however, that the majority of the defence industry is
building to print, rather than generating indigenous intellectual property.
Where elements of industry are identified as being FIC, programs that
encourage research & development that leads to IP and a path to
commercialisation should be funded as a priority. The DMTC model is
one existing example that should be expanded into other technology areas
to help achieve this goal.
2.223 A number of witnesses highlighted to the Committee that industry
competence and capacity take time to develop. The competence to sustain
a FIC or to be a smart buyer, requires graduates from trades or
engineering courses who also have hands on experience applying their
knowledge in a relevant field. This drives a requirement to undertake
some acquisition programs in Australia or where this is not feasible, to
form contractual arrangements that allow for Australian workers (Defence
or industry) to be embedded with the overseas prime and in some cases,
the relevant foreign military engineering regulatory authority. The
Committee saw that the key failing in the PIC program was a mistaken
assumption by Defence that short term, grant based activities could create
sustainable industry competence and capacity. Likewise the AIC program
has sometimes created jobs, but often not in a manner that sustainably
targeted industry elements that could have been regarded as FIC.
2.224 When describing the PIC program, Defence indicated a reliance on
individual project officers to evaluate PIC elements. This approach has led
to an inconsistent application of this policy, and as highlighted by the First
Principles Review, is an example of form over substance. In the
Committee’s view, Defence’s capability managers (Service Chiefs) should
be making decisions affecting FIC-related defence industry capability. This
would create the opportunity to take a strategic view on a programmatic
basis rather than project by project. Where a project officer may not see
that the particular equipment being procured needs an industry element
as FIC, a programmatic view may see the potential for that project to
contribute in a cost effective manner to sustainment of a FIC that is under
pressure to support other ADF weapons systems. There would need to be
an agreed threshold of significance (eg: value, complexity or technology)
above which this evaluation of each individual project was mandatory.
2.225 Lastly, recent ministerial changes have resulted in the appointment of A
Minister for Defence Materiel and Science (DM&S). The Committee
recognises that the Defence Minister as a member of National Security
Committee of Cabinet will have the lead role in what capabilities are to be
procured, the Minister for Defence Materiel and Science should be
responsible for how. The Minister for DM&S should have oversight of how
Defence plans for future capability (encompassing management of FIC –
including industry), how capability is procured and supported throughout
its service life, as well as defence exports including government-to-
government sales.
2.226 In summary, support for defence exports—where they assist to sustain or

develop industry elements that are identified as FIC—should be viewed as
a core Defence responsibility in the same way as the services manage other
FIC elements including training, personnel plans, facilities and doctrine
development.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1
The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence

incorporate into policy, doctrine, procurement instructions and all
associated training the addition of defence industry as the ninth
fundamental input to capability.
Recommendation 2
The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence build on

previous activities in Australia and abroad to develop a system to
identify those elements of industrial competence or capacity that are
deemed to be fundamental inputs to ADF capability (FIC). This activity
should be led by the Service Chiefs and implemented by Capability,
Acquisition and Sustainment Group at a strategic level with an
assessment of how each new significant project may change the
assessment of FIC or indeed could contribute to the maintenance of FIC
from a whole of program perspective.
Recommendation 3
The Committee recommends that when implementing the First

Principles Review changes to roles and responsibilities, capability
development, procurement and sustainment, Defence take into account
the framework for industry engagement based around the fundamental
inputs to capability illustrated in Figure 1.
Recommendation 4
The Committee recommends that in areas where an aspect of industry is

identified as a fundamental input to capability, Defence’s procurement
and probity guidelines provide suitable pathways for long term
partnerships to be the default approach to driving innovation,
productivity and value for money rather than a primary focus on open
competition. Defence should publicly report savings achieved by virtue
of this revised approach to procurement.
Recommendation 5
The Committee recommends that where a procurement activity is linked

to a fundamental input to capability, the Department of Defence
develop guidelines that encourage identification and management of
risk rather than avoidance of risk through defaulting to an offshore
contract.
Recommendation 6
The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence

significantly expand its investment in activities that generate
fundamental input to capabity-related innovation and intellectual
property, and support commercialisation through partnership models
such as the Defence Materials Technology Centre.
Recommendation 7
The Committee recommends that where an industry-related

fundamental input to capability has been identified, the Department of
Defence prioritise Australian based procurement contracts so that
relevant industry and Defence staff can develop competence in specific
tasks via hands-on experience, or where this is not possible, through
making the placement of Australian staff in original equipment
manufacturers or foreign military engineering bodies a condition of
contract.
Recommendation 8
Subject to acceptance of Recommendations 1-7, the Committee

recommends that the Department of Defence discontinue the Priority
Industry Capability and Strategic Industry Capability programs, retain
the Australian Industry Capability targets for procurement activity that
do not involve an identified fundamental input to capability and
continue to promote the Global Supply Chain scheme wherever
possible.
Recommendation 9
The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence increase

the level of support to defence exports where such exports will help
sustain or develop a fundamental input to capability.
Recommendation 10
The Committee recommends that the Minister for Defence Materiel and
Science have responsibility for how the capability development,
procurement and sustainment systems work, the investment in
fundamental input to capability-related innovation and export
opportunities including an increased focus on Government to
Government sales.
Recommendation 11
The Committee recommends that Defence develop performance

measures relevant to the management of the defence industry as a
fundamental input to capability and publicly report the outcomes.

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2

Australian defence industry

An overview of the Australian defence industry

2.9 Sonartech Atlas’ submission described the historic background of the

5 Sonartech Atlas, Submission 26, p.1.

2.11 John O’Callaghan (Director, Defence and Government Relations,

7 Dunk and O’Callaghan, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.2.

We consider that defence industry is any company that is

Australian defence imports and exports

1. United States 6,153 39,080

12 Burns and Taylor, Committee Hansard, 9 October 2014, p.20.

Table 2.3 Leading recipients of major weapons 2009 to 2013

1. India 5,581 18,564

16 Thales Australia, Submission 19, p.3.

Domestic defence sales and Defence’s requirements of industry

18 Department of Defence, Submission 41, p.2.

For this reason, the regional economic impacts of Defence

It is a long held and widely accepted principle that Australian

2.33 Mr Dunk’s article added:

The economic and strategic significance of the Australian defence

these countries have refused to allow the laws of economics to

34 AMWU, Submission 24, pp.1-2.

39 H I Fraser Pty Ltd, Submission 2, p.1.

naval ship construction capability and any potential export

Spillover and second order effects of the defence industry

46 Austal, Submission 31, p.10.

restaurants, which then hire additional workers who rent

54 Jenkins, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, p.20.

58 Roos, Committee Hansard, 9 October 2014, p.3.

2.61 Dr Robert Bourke (Director-General, Economic and Commercial Analysis,

64 Birrer et al, Committee Hansard, 24 March 2015, p.7.

The difficulty of getting the required economic advice on those

Australian defence industry policy

69 Edge and Sheridan, Committee Hansard, 3 March 2015, p.3.

It can no longer expect the Government to use offsets or local

factors such as Australian industry impacts, the national interest,

 Assistance to Australian-based defence manufacturers, to help

86 Department of Defence, Submission 41, p.3.

The agenda sets up four broad ambitions: a lower cost business-

91 Byrne and Chesworth, Committee Hansard, 10 February 2015, p.2.

2.81 Mr Peter Nicholson (Head of Government Relations, BAE Systems

94 Nicholson and Wilson, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.32.

problems and protection constitutes the best policy option

Intellectual property and innovation

2.89 In order to export products or services, the Australian defence industry

99 Department of Defence, Response to Questions on Notice (Question No. 4)

 Developing successful products, technology and production methods

101 Sonartech Atlas, Submission 26, p.3.

they can be replaced—they have a process that gives them an

flexibility to upgrade systems as and when we see that we need to

107 Dunk and O’Callaghan, Committee Hansard, 13 February 2015, p.8.

to innovation and, eventually, to international sales. Mr Merv Davis

113 Davis and Forbes, Committee Hansard, 28 October 2014, p.1.

I believe the real obstacle with an SME being able to supply to

117 Gilmore, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2014, p.35.

build it under licence, even if it costs us four times or three times

Defence’s procurement decisions

2.113 In the context of this inquiry, Defence’s approach to procurement was