I.

Introduction

II. Preliminary Considerations

A. Sources of Philippine Tort Law
B. Purposes and Fundamental Purposes of Tort Law
C. Classification of Torts
D. Difference between Culpa Aquiliana, Culpa contractual and Crime
E. Difference between Fault and Dolo
F. Elements of Quasi-delict
G. Negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
H. Negligence under Article 1173 of the Civil Code
I. Criminal Negligence under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code

III. NEGLIGENCE

A. DEFINITION AND TEST OF NEGLIGENCE

Cases:
1. PLDT vs. CA, GR No. 57079, September 29, 1989 Unavailable
2. Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA, GR No. 53401, November
6, 1989 Unavailable
3. Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 Unavailable
4. People vs. Delos Santos, 355 SCRA 415 (2001) Unavailable
5. Evelyn Acuna vs. Rodolfo A. Alventara, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br.50,
Villasis, Pangasinan (A.M. No. 01-1463, March 20, 2001)
Unavailable
6. Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping M.V., et.al. vs. Phil.
Insurance Co., In., GR No. 14133, June 5, 2002 Unavailable

B. UNREASONABLE OR UNDUE RISKS & FORSEEABILITY

Cases:
 1. Phoenix Construction vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 353 (1987)
Unavailable
2. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil 398 (1958)
Unavailable
3. Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals and
Ernest E. Simke, G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988
Unavailable

C. PROBABILITY

Cases:
1. Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA
30 (1998) Unavailable

D. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAY AFFECT THE DETERMINATION

OF NEGLIGENCE:
a. Time
b. Place
c. Emergency
d. Gravity of Harm to be Avoided
e. Alternative Cause of Action
f. Social Value or Utility of Activity
g. Person Exposed to the Risk

Cases:
1. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 (1910) BATTAD
Unavailable
2. United States vs. Bonifacio, 34 Phil. 65 (1916)BELINO
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO BONIFACIO, defendant-
appellant.
On or about the 31st day of October 1913, in Santa Rita, Batangas, the accused,
an engineer and while conducting the freight train which was going to the
municipality of Bauan. At about 10 he saw Eligio Castillo, a deaf-mute, was
traveling along the railroad track, and as the said Castillo did not get off the said
track in spite of the whistle or warnings given by the accused, the failed to stop
the train and eventually killed the man.
When the accused engineer claims that he did all in his power to slow down a
few moments afterwards, after he had blown his whistle without apparently
attracting the attention of the pedestrian, who, about that time, turned and
attempted to cross the track. The only evidence as to the speed of the train is
the claim of the accused that indicator showed that he was travelling at the rate
of 35 kilometers an hour, the maximum speed permitted under the railroad
regulations for freight trains on that road.
The lower court held that he was only liable for homicide through simple
negligence.
Issue: Whether or not Bonifacio should be held guilty for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide.
No. The accused was acquitted.
There is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down his
engine, when he sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the
track, unless there is something in the appearance or conduct of the person on
foot which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility that such
person could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping
aside..
The engine driver to adopt every measure in his power to avoid the infliction of
injury upon any person and to slow down, or stop altogether if that be
necessary, should he have reason to believe that only by doing so can an
accident be averted. But he fairly assume that all persons walking or standing
on or near the railroad track, except children of tender years, are aware of the
danger to which they are exposed; and that they will take reasonable
precautions to avoid accident, by looking and listening for the approach of
trains, and stepping out of the way of danger when their attention is directed
to an oncoming train.
There was nothing in the appearance or conduct of the victim of the accident in
the cast at bar which would have warned the accused engine driver that the
man walking along the side of the tract was a deaf-mute, and that despite the
blowing of the whistle and the noise of the engine he was unconscious of his
danger. It was not until the pedestrian attempted to cross the track, just in front
of the train, that the accused had any reason to believe that his warning signals
had not been heard, and by that time it was too late to avoid the accident. the
accused was without fault; and that the accident must be attributed wholly to
the reckless negligence of the deaf-mute, in walking on the track without taking
the necessary precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him from
behind.
The evidence of record in the case at bar clearly and satisfactorily discloses that
even if the train was running at a speed slightly in excess of the maximum speed
prescribed in the regulations, that fact had no causal relation to the accident
and in no wise contributed to it.
 Decision was reversed. Bonifacio was acquiited.
3. Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303 (1996)CARINO
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and
ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC.,
(G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996)

FACTS: This case is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious
physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.

At around 2:00am of June 24, 1990, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street,
Araneta Avenue. She was heading towards the direction of Manila when she noticed that
she had a flat tire. She stopped at a lighted place where there are people to verify the
problem and to solicit help if needed. When she realized that she cannot reach home in
that condition, she parked along the sidewalk (1½ feet away) with her emergency lights
on. She went to the rear to open the trunk. She was on the left side of the rear of her car
to fix the tires when she was bumped by another Lancer driven by Richard Li but
registered under Alexander Commercial, Inc. Lourdes was thrown to the windshield of
Li’s Lancer, which was destroyed, and then she fell to the ground. She was pulled out
from under Li’s car. Her left leg was severed up to the middle of the thigh which was later
amputated above the knee at the hospital. She was confined for 20 days and was
eventually fitted an artificial leg. Her expenses totaled to P147,000 (P120,000 for
confinement; P27,000 for artificial leg) which was paid for by the defendant’s car
insurance.

Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was travelling at 55kph on a rainy night.
Visibility was affected, the road was wet, and the traffic is light. He testified that he was
driving on the right lane when he was suddenly confronted with a car coming from the
opposite direction, traveling at 80kph with full bright lights. He instinctively swerved right
to avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle, instead, he bumped Lourdes’ car, which he
claimed that he did not see because of its color. He also stated that the parking lights
were not on and that the area was poorly lighted. He also claimed that the rear of Lourdes’
car was protruding on the outer portion of the right lane.

A witness said that Li’s car came approaching very fast and that the car was zigzagging.
He also stated that Li was under the influence of liquor as he could smell it very well. He
observed that Lourdes’ car was parked parallel and very close to the sidewalk. He claimed
that it was not raining by the time of the accident but only drizzling.

ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not Li was liable or the injuries sustained by Lourdes.

2. Whether or not Lourdes was guilty of contributory negligence.

HELD: 1. Yes. Li was liable for the injuries because the Court found him negligent in
driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer. The Court found his testimonies to be self-
serving and it was uncorroborated unlike Lourdes’ testimonies which was corroborated
by a witness. He was driving very fast and under the influence of alcohol. The average
 motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling
at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road
conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have
had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert - as every
driver should be - to those conditions.

2. No. Lourdes was not guilty of contributory negligence, applying the emergency rule.
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence. However, the conduct which is required
of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event
which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances.

A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not
a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for
a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help
her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because
the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. Valenzuela did exercise the
standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of
one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk
in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all
reasonable precautions.

4. Julian del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478 (1932)DEL AYRE

Julian Del Rosario vs Manila Electric Company

GR No. L-35283, November 5, 1932

FACTS: On August 4, 1930, at around 2pm, trouble developed in a wire used by the
defendant on Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting
the City of Manila and its suburbs. Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first
noticed that the wire was burning and its connections smoking. In a short while the wire
parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to
the way. It was around 2:25 when the scene was reported to the Manila Electric Company.
At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. Among
these was Alberto del Rosario, of the age of 9 years, who was a few paces ahead of two
other boys, all members of the second grade in the public school. These other two boys
were Jose Salvador, of the age of 8, and Saturnino Endrina, of the age of 10. As the three
neared the place where the wire was down, Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it. His
 companion, Jose Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had
cautioned him never to touch a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current. Jose
therefore stopped Saturnino, telling him that the wire might be charged. Saturnino yielded
to this admonition and desisted from his design, but Alberto del Rosario, who was
somewhat ahead, said, I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires. Jose
Salvador rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current, but Alberto, no
doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter, put out his index finger and touch the
wire. He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre". The end of the wire
remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. A crowd soon collected, and
some one cut the wire and disengaged the body. Upon being taken to St. Luke's Hospital
but the child was pronounced dead. An action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the
purpose of recovering damages from the Manila Electric Company for the death of his son.
ISSUE: W/N Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that caused
the death of Alberto.
RULING: Yes. The defendant is responsible for the death of Alberto. When notice was
received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to
the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but
more than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the company appeared on
the scene, and in the meantime this child had been claimed as a victim. In terms of
Contributory Negligence, it is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be
imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a
child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased
ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the
case. Even if it was true that the victim was negligent, such an incident would never happen
if it the dangling wire was immediately fixed by the Manila Electric Company.

E. STANDARD OF CONDUCT: GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY

Cases:
1. Julian del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478 (1932) ESMILLA
JULIAN DEL ROSARIO v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
[G.R. No. L-35283, November 5, 1932]

FACTS:
On August 4, 1930, along Dimas-Alang Street, Jose Noguera, who had charge of a
tienda nearby, noticed that a wire used by Manila Electric Company was burning and its
connections smoking. The wire parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among
some shrubbery. Noguera asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper, to call Manila Electric Company
that an electrical wire was burning at that place. Soco called at 2.25 p.m. and was told that they
would send an inspector.
At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted, but from the testimony of
Demetrio Bingao, one of the witnesses for the defense, it is clear that the end of the wire was on
the ground shortly after 3 p.m.
At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. Among
these were grade 2 students: Alberto del Rosario, 9 years old, who was a few paces ahead of
Jose Salvador, age 8, and Saturnino Endrina, age 10. As the three neared the wire, Saturnino
made a motion as if it touch it. Jose cautioned him never to touch a broken electrical wire, as it
might have a current. Jose therefore stopped Saturnino. Alberto said, “I have for some time
been in the habit of touching wires.” Jose told him not to touch the wire but Alberto, feeling that
he was challenged in the matter, put out his index finger and touch the wire. He immediately fell
face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre". The end of the wire remained in contact with his body
which fell near the post. Alberto was taken to St. Luke's Hospital and was pronounced dead.
The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire, such as is commonly
used by the defendant company for the purpose of conducting electricity for lighting. The wire
was cased in the usual covering, but this had been burned off for some distance from the point
where the wire parted. The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the
company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months, and that all of
the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this
kind. There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric Company was negligent on the issue of breakage of the
wire

RULING: Yes, Manila Electric Company was negligent.

1. When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p.m., somebody should have
been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the
point of danger; but more than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the
company appeared on the scene.
2. It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased,
owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do
something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of
a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case.
3. Even if Alberto could be imputed for contributory negligence, such negligence would not
be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case because it is not the determining cause of
the accident.
4. The plaintiff is entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death
and burial of the boy. For the rest, in accordance with the precedents cited in Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric Company (55 Phil., 427), the majority of the court are of the opinion that
the plaintiff should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

1. I concur in so far as the defendant company is held liable for the death of the plaintiff's
son, but I dissent in so far as the decision allows the plaintiff to recover of the defendant
the sum of P1,250 only
2. An action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act. In criminal
cases, this court has adopted the rule of allowing, as a matter of course, the sum of P1,000
as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. Following that rule, the court has allowed the
plaintiff in this case to recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service.
3. The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main object sought,
which is the punishment of the guilty party. In a civil action, the principal object is the
recovery of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in this case, the defendant is a
 corporation, not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the question
assumes a vastly different aspect.
4. Both in reason and in justice, there should be a distinction between the civil liability
of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused the death of another; and
the civil liability of a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has caused the
death of a person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its business.
5. The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part of the risks
which it assumes when it undertakes to promote its own business; and just as it is entitled
to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should be made adequately to compensate
those who have suffered damage by its negligence
6. Considering the circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff should
recover the sum of P2,250 as damages.

2. Federico Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo Aquino, 163 SCRA 697, July 29, 1988
ESPINOSA

FEDERICO YLARDE vs. EDGARDO AQUINO (G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988)
Facts: In 1963, respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher in a public school in Pangasinan. At
that time, the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old
school shop that was destroyed in World War II. On October 7, 1963 Aquino gathered eighteen
pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to
dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The
following day, also after classes, Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the
digging. These four pupils —Alonso, Alcantara, Abaga and Ylarde, dug until the excavation was
one meter and forty centimeters deep. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, he left the
children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about
thirty meters away. He wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he
could get some rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not
to touch the stone." A few minutes after Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and
Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and
Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the
concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position.
As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and eventually died.
Issue: Whether or not Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.
Held: No. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an
excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An
ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone"
is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation
would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would
have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.
A truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way Aquino did. Were
it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child
Ylarde would probably be alive today.
3. Culion Ice, Fish and Electric Co. vs. Phil. Motors Corporation, 55 Phil. 129
(1930) GADRINAB
(G.R. No. L-32611 November 3, 1930)
CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION, defendant-appellant

Culion is the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline used in the fishing trade in
the Philippine Islands. Cranston, representative of the company, decided to have the engine on
the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner to save on costs. He was
referred to Philippine Motors Corporation which engaged in business as an automobile agency
and had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build,
operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment. C.E. Quest, manager of PMC, agreed to do the
job.
Quest brought with him a mechanic and commenced with the work while Gwendoline was
anchored in Pasig River. They were assisted by members of the crew of the Gwendoline. Quest
decided to install a Zenith carburetor. The engine worked fine with gasoline. Afterwards, they
introduced a baser fuel which was contained in a tank placed on deck above the engine
compartment. It was connected to the carburetor with a tube that was not well fitted. Fuel
mixture leaked from the tank and dripped down into the engine compartment. The purpose of
this arrangement was to enable the operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the
engine had been operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply. it was observed
that the carburetor was flooding but Quest think lightly of the matter and said that it will
disappear when the engine is running well. After preliminary experiments and adjustments, boat
was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The first part of the course was covered without any
untoward development other than the stopping of the engine few times. At around 7:30 in the
evening, the engine stopped and connection had to be made with gasoline to start the engine.
Upon switching to the new mixture, a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a
flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were
covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. They
were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and their escape was safely
effected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck, when
sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the accident occurred, as the
court found, was P10,000.

Issue: Whether or not Quest/PMC is liable for the damages.

Ruling: Yes, loss of the boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. The
temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from
the carburetor. When the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was
greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was no doubt the cause of the
flooding of the carburetor. When the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor,
 already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to
the highly inflammable material near-by.
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he
will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled
in the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample
experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was
experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.

4. Dr. Ninevetch Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 188 (1997) ILAGAN
UNAVAILABLE
5. E.M. Wright vs. Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co., G.R. No. 7760, October 1, 1914
MERCADER

E. M. WRIGHT vs. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO.

(G.R. No. L-7760, 1 October 1914)
FACTS
This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff on the
night of August 8, 1909 in Caloocan. The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an
electric street railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan
fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street
plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a
calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell,
causing the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle and
caused the injuries complained of.
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in question
not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from
one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or
6 inches or more above the level of the street.
Defendant admitted that it was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is
contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the
time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication
was the primary cause of the accident. The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but
that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's and apportioned the damages and
awarded plaintiff a judgment of P1,000.
ISSUE
Whether or not plaintiff was negligent upon driving the calesa intoxicated.
RULING
No, the plaintiff was not negligent.
 A careful reading of the decision of the trial court leads the conclusion that there is nothing
in the opinion which sustains the conclusion of the court that the plaintiff was negligent with
reference to the accident which is the basis of the action. Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor
does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is
immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed
to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. If one's conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or
sober.
The conclusion that if he had been sober, he would not have been injured is not warranted
by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle
under the conditions described.

F. STANDARD IN DECIDING NEGLIGENCE CASES

Cases:
1. Preciolita V. Corliss vs. The Manila Railroad Co., 27 SCRA 674 (1969)
RODRIGUEZ
UNAVAILABLE

2. Victorino Cusi and Pilar Pobre vs. Philippine National Railways, G.R. No. L-
29889, May 31, 1979 ROXAS

SPOUSES CUSI VS. PNR

G.R. NO. L-29889, May 31, 1979
FACTS: Spouses Victorino and Pilar Cusi attended a birthday party on the night of October 5,
1963 at Paranaque, Rizal. After the party, at around 11 in the evening, they travelled home in their
previously taken route with Victorino in the wheels. As they were about to reach the railroad,
Victorino slackened his speed to check if there were any warnings, lights or whistle to signal an
incoming train. Having not seen or heard any and upon noticing that the level crossing bar was
raised without any flagman, Victorino in their Vauxhaul Car proceeded to cross the tracks.
However, a train passed simultaneously which resulted to a collision between the two. Due to the
accident, the spouses suffered injuries depriving them both of their earning capacity; Pilar being a
piano teacher and Victorino as a successful businessman. Thus, Spouses Cusi filed a case for gross
negligence and damages against PNR.
PNR averred that Victorino’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Their
accusation is based on the idea that if Victorino made a full stop before traversing the crossing as
 required by section 56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard the
approach of the train, and thus, there would have been no collision.
The lower court rendered a decision against the defendants. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N Spouses Cusi were negligent thereby making their action the proximate cause
of the collision.
RULING: No. The court ruled that Spouses Cusi were not negligent as they exercised the
necessary precaution given the surrounding circumstance during the incident and that the
proximate cause of the collision was the gross negligence of PNR. Judge Cooley defined
negligence as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury." By such a test, it can be seen that there is no hard and fast rule whereby
such degree of care and vigilance is measured, it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a
person finds himself so situated. All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a
person to use that care and diligence expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances.
In this case, the circumstances attendant to the collision showed gross negligence of PNR.
There were only 2 shifts of guards provided for the operation thereof — one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00
P. M. shift, and the other, the 3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift. On the night of the accident, the train
for Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During that precise hour, the warning
devices were not operating for no one attended to them. Also, as observed by the lower court, the
locomotive driver did not blow his whistle, thus: "... he simply sped on without taking an extra
precaution of blowing his whistle from a distance of 50 to 10 meters from the crossing. That the
train was running at full speed is attested to by the fact that notwithstanding the application of the
emergency brakes, the train did not stop until it reached a distance of around 100 meters." The
signal devices were wholly manually-operated, there was an urgent need for a flagman or guard to
man the crossing at all times but there was none at the time of the incident. These facts assessed
together show the inadequacy and absence of precautions taken by PNR to warn the travelling
public of the impending danger thereby making them liable for their negligence.

G. PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE

a. Burden of proof
b. Presumptions:
Article 2184, NCC
Article 2185, NCC
Article 2188, NCC
c. Res Ipsa Loquitor
Applicability of the Rule
Cases:
1. Ma-ao Central Co., Inc. vs. C.A. SAY
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HERMINIA FAMOSO
 G.R. No. 83491

Facts:
On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or
"carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive
was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the
train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was
declared dead on the spot. The RTC awarded claims for damages but deducted 25%
thereof for decedent’s contributory negligence and P41,367.60 which accounts for
the pension that the plaintiff and her minor children would be receiving for five (5)
from the SSS, leaving them with Pl6,382.40. The widow appealed, claiming that the
deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not
negligent and therefore not liable at all.

Issue:
Whether the RTC was correct in attributing deductions due to decedent’s
contributory negligence, likewise the pension that would be received from SSS.

Ruling:
No. The immediate cause of the death was the derailment of the locomotive which
can be pointed out to petitioner’s failure to maintain the rail tracks, which was
missing a fish plate. Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or
omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which,
concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." 5
It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body." 6 There is no showing
that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he
recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger. On the
issue of deductions of SSS pension, Art. 173 of the Labor Code provides, that any
amount received by the heirs of a deceased employee from the Employees
Compensation Commission, whose funds are administered by the SSS, shall be
exclusive of all other amounts that may otherwise be claimed under the Civil Code
and other pertinent laws. The pension is the benefit derivable from such
contributions. It does not represent the death benefits payable under the Workmen's
Compensation Act to an employee who dies as a result of a work connected injury.
payment to the member employee of social security benefits would not wipe out or
extinguish the employer's liability for the injury or illness contracted by his
employee in the course of or during the employment.
2. Africa vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 VILLAGONZALO
SPS. AFRICA V. CALTEX (PHIL), INC.
G.R. NO. L-12986, 31 March 1966

FACTS

In the afternoon of 18 March 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo Street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started whole gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of
the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the
personal properties and effects inside. Their owners, among them are Sps. Africa, sued
respondents Caltex and Mateo Boquiren for damages – the first as alleged owner of the station
and the second as its agent in charge of operation. The petitioners attributed negligence on the
part of both of them.

The SC first ruled that the report of the Police and Fire Departments were both inadmissible
following the “hearsay” rule. The material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and
circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted
the investigation. In fact, the sources thereof are not even identified. Neither were the reports
recited by the informants having the duty to give the same.

ISSUE

Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the respondents.

RULING

Yes, res ipsa loquitor can applied in this case so as to presume negligence on the part of the
respondents.

Generally, it is the burden of plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the
negligence of the defendant. But it is also a recognized principle that “where the thing which
caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant
and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury
arose from defendant’s want of care.”

Fire is not a fortuitous event. Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of
which extreme care must be taken. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment, and
employees, was under the control of the respondents. The persons who could have known how
the fire started were the respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. Hence, it is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of
want of care on the part of the respondents.

3. F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et. Al., G.R. No. L-52732, August
29, 1988 WAJE UNAVAILABLE
4. Republic of the Philippines vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., G.R. No. L-21749,
September 29, 1967 ZAMORA Unavailable
5. Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 59 BAYAWA
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. C.A. and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (G.R. No. 130068, October 1,
1998)

Facts: A ship, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila. Senen Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for
the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself
in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel reached the landmark of the Port, Gavino ordered the engine stopped and the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief
conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the
commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Kavankov likewise
noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right
anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing damage to the pier. Consequently, a petition was filed against the herein Defendants-Appellants to
which the decision was in favor of the herein private respondent. FESC imputed that the CA seriously erred
in not holding Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association as the parties solely responsible for the resulting
damages sustained by the pier and in holding that the master, Kavankov, had not exercised the required
diligence demanded from him by the circumstances at the time the incident happened.

Issue: WON the owner of the vessel be likewise liable for the damage caused to the port due to the concurring
negligence of the master and the pilot.

Ruling:
Yes. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY is likewise liable for the damage sustained by the Port. On
compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. It can only be absolved
from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided it has exercised prudence
and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. However, in this case, it was not only the pilot who was
negligent in the matter, master was also found to be in error. Under the law, any damage caused to a vessel or
to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and
liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master.

Accordingly, it is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where
several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would
not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of
them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the
injury.

In addition thereto, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
 person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to act when the perilous
situation should have spurred him into quick and decisive action as master of the ship. In the face of imminent
or actual danger, he did not have to wait for the happenstance to occur before countermanding or overruling
the pilot. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot. Kavankov was fully aware of the bulk and
size of the vessel and its cargo as well as the weight of the vessel. There was thus a need for the vessel to move
“full-astern” for the vessel to avoid hitting the pier. Kavankov refused to act even as Gavino failed to act. Even
as Gavino gave mere "half-astern" order, Kavankov supinely stood by. By his own admission,
Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavino's decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he decided not
to countermand any of the latter's orders. Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.

Therefore, even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the
negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. Thus, the owners of the vessel are
responsible to the injured party for the acts of the pilot, Gavino, and the negligence of Kabankov.

6. Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCR 334 (1996) BEJARIN

Unavailable
Cases (when doctrine held inapplicable)

1. S.D. Martinez, et.al. vs. William Van Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, December 27,
1910 CUARESMA
S.D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ VS WILLIAM
VAN BUSKIRK
G.R. No. L-5691 (December 27, 1910)

FACTS:
On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata on Calle Real,
Ermita, Manila. Along the left side of the street as she was going, a delivery wagon
belonging to the defendant, used for the purpose of transportation of fodder, wherein which
a pair of horses was attached, came along in the street in the opposite direction. The driver
of the carromata, observing that the defendant’s delivery wagon was coming at great speed
stopped on the left side of the road to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, it hit the
carromata containing the plaintiff and her son, overturning it. Plaintiff sustained cuts to her
head. The carromata was damaged, as well as the harness of the horses drawing it.
The defendant contends that the cochero was a good servant and was considered a safe and
reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage and for
that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end
of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a
 vehicle passed by the driver and cracked a whip and made some other noises that frightened
the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown
inside of the wagon and out through the rear. The defendant was not with the delivery
wagon on the questioned day. Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty
of negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the negligence of his cochero?

RULING:
NO. The horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years; that to leave
the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of
the accident was the custom of all cocheros, which custom was sanctioned by their
employers. The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was
not unreasonable or imprudent. They were not proved to be destructive or injurious and
which have been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into
custom. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they are
beneficial rather than prejudicial.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is universal practice to leave
the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the
custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding
itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection.

2. Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Dev. Co., C.A.- G.R. No. L-3240-R, September
20, 1949 JUSAYAN Unavailable
3. Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-
4478, August 29, 1986 NADORA
G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.
FACTS

Loreto Dionela, received a telegram which was processed by RCPI’s Manila Office,
which read at the bottom portion as follows:

“…SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-

WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO…”

Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only
wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his
business as well because other people have come to know of said defamatory words. Defendant
corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between
 the sending (Legaspi) and receiving operators (Manila) and that they were not addressed to or
intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words
are not defamatory.

RTC, ruled that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous. The Court fixes the amount
of P40,000.00 as the reasonable amount of moral damages and the amount of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fee. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision but modified the The award of
P40,000.00 as moral damages to P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00.

Issue
W/N RCPI is liable for the defamatory words in the telegram caused by its employees.

Ruling

Yes, The action for damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent
corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the
NCC in relation to Art. 103 of the RPC. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on
Arts. 19 and 20 of the NCC As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of
its own employees.

To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit
of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of
an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that
plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we
may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering
the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

IV. DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES

A. PLAINTIFF’S OWN NEGLIGENCE AS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE

Article 2179, NCC

Cases:
1. PLDT vs. SPOUSES ESTEBAN OCAMPO

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN
G.R. No. L-57079 | September 29, 1989

FACTS: 1968, in Negros, Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an earth
mound and fell in an open trench on the road resulting to slight injuries to the husband and serious
injuries to the wife. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered due to the accident. Spouses
Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of lack of warning signs placed near the manhole
 dug resulting on the earth mound on the road causing injuries to the wife. PLDT contends the
injuries were the result of the negligence of the independent contractor the company hired (Barte)
and should be the one held liable and not the company. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses while
the CA under Justice Agrava as ponente reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not PLDT may be held liable for the injuries obtained by the Spouses Estaban.

HELD: No. The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban
was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private
respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have
avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of petitioner.

PLDT and Barte contends that the independent contractor placed signs on the road and that it was
the fault of Mr. Esteban because he did not diligently drive the jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly
swerved from the outer lane thereby hitting the earth mound. SC finds no error in the findings of
the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which befell private respondents was
due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent
omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The findings clearly show that the negligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but
goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and
thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The presence of warning signs could not have
completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the
public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which
caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.

2. KIM vs. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI, CO., 58 Phil. 838 (1933) BATTAD
Unavailable
B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Cases:
1. M.H. RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, G.R. No. L-
1719, January 23, 1907 BELINO

M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
The plaintiff, one of the laborers of the defendant, was transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Two handcars and rails have secured to
the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. The defendant was
walking beside the handcar. Then the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the
 rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the
knee.
This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident happened through the negligence of
the defendant. It was admitted that there were no side pieces or guards on the car; that where no
ends of the rails of the track met each other and also where the stringers joined, there were no fish
plates. the defendant has not effectually overcome the plaintiff's proof that the joints between the
rails were immediately above the joints between the underlying stringers.
The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate
occasion of the accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is found piling under the stringer by the
water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. The superintendent of the company attributed it to the
giving way of the block laid in the sand. No effort was made to repair the injury at the time of the
occurrence.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is contributory negligent to his own accident.
Yes. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the
accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was
the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving
occasion for damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an
element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the
event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his
own imprudence.
It conclusively appears from the evidence that the plaintiff, before the accident happened, knew the
exact condition of the track and was informed and knew of the defect which caused the accident.
There was no promise on the part of McKenna to repair the track.
Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court, fixing the damage incurred by
the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United States money, we deduct
therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the resulting sum of 2,500 pesos, with cost of both instances, and
ten days hereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for proper action

2. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, G.R. No. L-
65295, March 10, 1987 CARINO

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO
(G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987)

FACTS: At about 1:30 a.m. of November 15, 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way
home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. He had taken "a shot or two" of
liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car when his car headlights (in his allegation)
 suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford
dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by
and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked on the right hand
side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked
askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street,
partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early
warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump
truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its
regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to
be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a
collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including
some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.

ISSUE: Whether or not the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked
or by respondent’s own negligence.

HELD: The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the
wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked. The collision of
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence. The collision between the dump truck and Dionisio’s car would
in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without
any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created
an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for
having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible.

The Court held that Dionisio's negligence was only contributory. That the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care". The damages
therefore that he will recover is subject to mitigation by the courts.

C. FORTUITOUS EVENT

Cases:
1. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, et al. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, et al., 222 SCRA 415, G.R. Nos. 103442-45, May 21, 1993
DEL AYRE

NAPOCOR vs Court of Appeals, Rayo

G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993

FACTS: The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, sought to recover actual and
other damages for the loss of lives and destruction to property caused by the inundation of
the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978. The flooding was purportedly
caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the
Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). In said complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that
defendant NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat
River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Another defendant named Benjamin Chavez, on the
other hand, was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident in question. Despite the
defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon
"Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam.
When the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the
typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's
spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the
Angat River. As a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with
their animals, drowned, and their properties were washed away in the evening of 26
October and the early hours of 27 October 1978. NAPOCOR, on the other hand, alleged
that they acted with due care and diligence in the operation and maintenance of the
hydroelectric plant. As proof of their diligence, they even mentioned that written notices
were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the
impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and
advise them to take the necessary precautions. They further alleged that the damages
incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and
are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. The Trial Court dismissed the
case for lack of sufficient and credible evidence. The CA, however, reversed the ruling of
the Trial court. HENCE THE PETITION.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the damage suffered by private
respondents was not damnum absque injuria.
RULING: To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for
a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause
of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event
must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor
must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. It has
been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a
loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the
damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of
God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or
damage may have been occasioned. In the case at bar, despite such knowledge of an
incoming typhoon, defendants-appellees maintained a reservoir water elevation even
beyond its maximum and safe level, thereby giving no sufficient allowance for the
reservoir to contain the rain water that will inevitably be brought by the coming typhoon.
Clearly, there was negligence on the part of NAPOCOR.
2. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et l., G.R. No. 126389,
July 10, 1998 ESMILLA

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE INC. v.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO,
REMEDIOS DIMAANO, CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO
[G.R. No. 126389, July 10, 1998]

FACTS:
The Dimaano family are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while
Southeastern College owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. On
October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, typhoon "Saling" hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by
very strong winds, the roof of petitioner's building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing
on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents' house. After the typhoon, an
ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by city building official, Engr. Jesus L.
Reyna. The city engineer said that one of the factors that caused this is the formation of the
building in the area and the general direction of the wind. There is almost U-shaped formation of
4-storey building. With the strong winds, the general formation of the building becomes a big
funnel-like structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the
strong winds. The most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofing structural trusses is the
improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The engineer recommended that "to
avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity,"
the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a "structural hazard."
The Dimaanos, in asking for damages based on culpa aquiliana, alleged that the
damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in
others' houses. The petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several
devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof
giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building,
which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is "in tip-top condition"; and
furthermore, typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond human control" such
that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence
on its part.

RTC: While typhoon "Saling" was accompanied by strong winds, the damage to private
respondents' houses "could have been avoided if the construction of the roof of [petitioner's]
building was not faulty." This was based on an ocular inspection made by the city building
official.
a) P117,116.00, as actual damages, plus litigation expenses;
b) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees;
d) Costs of the instant suit.

CA: Affirmed with modification the trial court's disposition by reducing the award of moral
damages from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damage on the roof of the building of the Dimaanos resulting from
the impact of the falling portions of the school building's roof ripped off by the strong winds of
typhoon "Saling", was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event
RULING: Yes, the damage was due to fortuitous event.
1. Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
2. The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines
it as "an event which takes place by accident and could not have been
foreseen." Escriche elaborates it as "an unexpected event or act of God which could
9

neither be foreseen nor resisted." Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that "[f]ortuitous
events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes,
storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed
invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc."
3. In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he
be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may
have been occasioned. When a person's negligence concurs with an act of God in
producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damages or injury was a fortuitous
event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man -
whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act - the whole occurrence
is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
4. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. The relationship of
cause and effect must be clearly shown. In the present case, other than the said ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial
unroofing of petitioner's school building. Nor did they conclusively establish that the
construction of such building was basically flawed.
5. On the other hand, petitioner elicited from the city building official that the original plans
and design of petitioner's school building were approved prior to its construction. In like
manner, after construction of the building, a certification must be secured from the same
official attesting to the readiness for occupancy of the edifice. Having obtained both
building permit and certificate of occupancy, these are, at the very least, prima
facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school building.
6. Furthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon
"Saling", the same city official gave the go-signal for such repairs - without any deviation
from the original design - and subsequently, authorized the use of the entire fourth floor
of the same building. These only prove that subject building suffers from no structural
defect, contrary to the report that its "U-shaped" form was "structurally defective." Having
given his unqualified imprimatur, the city building official is presumed to have properly
performed his duties.
7. In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who
testified that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of subject school building
were regularly undertaken.
8. The city building official admitted that no complaint regarding any defect on the same
structure has ever been lodged before his office. It is a matter of judicial notice that
typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school building's roofing
was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years
and several typhoons even stronger than "Saling."
9. The petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon "Saling" was the
proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.
 10. The claim for actual and moral damages as well as attorney's fees must fail. Petitioner
cannot be made to answer for a purely fortuitous event. More so because no bad faith or
willful act to cause damage was alleged and proven to warrant moral damages.

D. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Requisites
Kinds:
a. Express Waiver of the Right to Recover
b. Implied Conditions
Cases:
1. TRANSPORTO vs. MIJARES (1961) ESPINOSA
2. Unavailable

E. PRESCRIPTION

Computation of Period
Article 1146, NCC

V. CAUSATION

A. PROXIMATE CAUSE

a. Definition
Cases:
1. Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 83, 1998)
BAYAWA
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. C.A. and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (G.R. No. 130068, October 1,
1998)

Facts: A ship, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila. Senen Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for
the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself
in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel reached the landmark of the Port, Gavino ordered the engine stopped and the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief
conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the
commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Kavankov likewise
noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right
anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing damage to the pier. Consequently, a petition was filed against the herein Defendants-Appellants to
which the decision was in favor of the herein private respondent. FESC imputed that the CA seriously erred
in not holding Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association as the parties solely responsible for the resulting
damages sustained by the pier and in holding that the master, Kavankov, had not exercised the required
diligence demanded from him by the circumstances at the time the incident happened.

Issue: WON the owner of the vessel be likewise liable for the damage caused to the port due to the concurring
negligence of the master and the pilot.

Ruling:
Yes. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY is likewise liable for the damage sustained by the Port. On
compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. It can only be absolved
from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided it has exercised prudence
and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. However, in this case, it was not only the pilot who was
negligent in the matter, master was also found to be in error. Under the law, any damage caused to a vessel or
to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and
liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master.

Accordingly, it is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where
several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would
not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of
them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the
injury.

In addition thereto, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to act when the perilous
situation should have spurred him into quick and decisive action as master of the ship. In the face of imminent
or actual danger, he did not have to wait for the happenstance to occur before countermanding or overruling
the pilot. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot. Kavankov was fully aware of the bulk and
size of the vessel and its cargo as well as the weight of the vessel. There was thus a need for the vessel to move
“full-astern” for the vessel to avoid hitting the pier. Kavankov refused to act even as Gavino failed to act. Even
as Gavino gave mere "half-astern" order, Kavankov supinely stood by. By his own admission,
Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavino's decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he decided not
to countermand any of the latter's orders. Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.
 Therefore, even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the
negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. Thus, the owners of the vessel are
responsible to the injured party for the acts of the pilot, Gavino, and the negligence of Kabankov.

2. Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 243 SCRA 619(1991)
BATTAD
Singapore Airlines v. CA, 243 SCRA (1995)
Facts:
Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the Arabian
American Oil Company (Aramco). As part of Aramco's policy, its employees returning to
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts paid for
excess baggage of up to 50 kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt.

On April 1980, Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new
assignment, with a 50-kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed
said amount upon presentation of the excess baggage ticket.

In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several employees being investigated
by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately asked his wife to seek a written confirmation
from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, SIA's
manager, Johnny Khoo, notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification requested
because their records showed that only three kilograms were entered as excess and accordingly
charged. SIA issued the certification requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after
its investigation of the anomaly and after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer, threatened it with a lawsuit.
This delay caused Rayo’s contract with Aramco not being renewed.

Rayo sues SIA. SIA blames PAL, SIA claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because
the tampering was committed by its handling agent, Philippine Airlines (PAL). SIA files a 3rd
party complaint against PAL. PAL answers that the tampering was Singapore’s fault. Judge rules
for Rayo on the main case, and for Singapore in the 3rd party complaint. Judgment for Rayo
became final. PAL appeals the 3rd party complaint claiming for the first time that Rayo was not
entitled to damages from Singapore because his contract with Aramco was not renewed because
of his unsatisfactory performance.

Issues:
1. Whether or not PAL can validly assail for the first time on appeal the trial court's decision
sustaining the validity of Rayo’s complaint against SIA if PAL did not raise this issue in
the lower court.

2. Whether or not PAL is solely liable for the satisfaction of the judgment.

Held:
1. Judgment for Rayo being final, PAL may not question it. A 3rd-party defendant is allowed
to set up in his answer the defenses which the 3rd-party plaintiff (original defendant) has
or may have against the original plaintiff's claim. However, he must do so in his 3rd party
 answer, and not raise it for the 1st time on appeal. PAL should have raised in its 3rd party
answer everything that it may conceivably interpose by way of its defense, including
specific denials of allegations in the main complaint which implicated it along with
Singapore.

2. While the trial court found that the proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos'
employment contract with Aramco was the tampering of his excess baggage ticket by PAL's
personnel, it failed to consider that the immediate cause of such non-renewal was SIA's delayed
transmittal of the certification needed by Rayos to prove his innocence to his employer.

SIA was informed of the anomaly in December 1980 but only issued the certification four months later
or, more specifically, on April 8, 1981, a few days before the expiration of Rayos' contract. Surely,
the investigation conducted by SIA could not have lasted for four months as the information
needed by the Rayoses could easily be verified by comparing the duplicate excess baggage tickets
which they and their handling agent, PAL, kept the record purposes. The fact that the Rayos
spouses had to be assisted by counsel who threatened to file a damage suit against SIA if the
certification they urgently needed was not immediately issued only strengthens the suspicion that
SIA was not dealing with them in utmost good faith. The effect of SIA's mishandling of Beatriz
Rayos' request became instantly apparent when her husband's contract was not renewed in spite of
his performance which was constantly "highly regarded" by the manager of Aramco's equipment
services department.

In an action upon a tort, the defendant may file a third-party complaint against a joint tort-
feasor for contribution."
The non-renewal of Rayos employment contract was the natural and probable consequence
of the separate tortious acts of SIA and PAL. Under mandate of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, Rayos is entitled to be compensated for such damages. Inasmuch as the
responsibility of two or more persons, or tort-feasors, liable for a quasi-delict is joint and
several, and the sharing as between such solidary debtors is pro-rata, it is but logical, fair,
and equitable to require PAL to contribute to the amount awarded to the Rayos spouses
and already paid by SIA, instead of totally indemnifying the latter.

3. Syjuco vs. Manila Railroad Company, CA- G.R. No. 22631-R, December 17,
1959
BEJARIN Unavailable
4. Prospero Sabido vs. Carlos Custodio, 124 Phil. 516, 1966
BELINO
PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA, Petitioners, v. CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN
PROMACABUHAY CUSTODIO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Facts: In Barrio Halang, Lumban, Laguna, two trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to
Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido,
going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Agripino Custodio, a passenger of LTB bus,
who was hanging on the left side as truck was full of passengers was sideswiped by the truck driven by
Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino Custodio was injured and died
 CFI ruled that both drivers were negligent. It appears clear from the evidence that Agripino Custodio was
hanging in the left side of the LTB Bus. Otherwise, were he sitting inside the truck, he could not have
been struck by the six by six truck driven by Aser Lagunda. This fact alone, of allowing Agripino
Custodio to hang on the side of the truck, makes the defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for
damages. For certainly its employees, who are the driver and conductor were negligent. They should not
have allowed Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that manner. Aser Lagunda was equally negligent as
Nicasio Mudales. Belen testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus.
Lagunda did not care to exercise prudence to avert the accident simply because to use his own language
the canal ‘is not a passage of trucks.’

Issue: W/N the bus driver should be held solely liable for the death of the victim.

Ruling : No. SC ruled that although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, to its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate
cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two (2) would not have
produced this result without the negligence of petitioners’ herein. What is more, petitioners’ negligence
was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier’s bus sometime before
petitioners’ truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners’ truck had the last
clear chance.

"According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission
of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might
not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-
feasor. . .
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners herein. It
is so ordered.

5. Fransisco Vinluan vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29,
1966
CARINO
VILUAN V CA
(G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966)

FACTS:

Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La Union when a
passenger bus on which they were riding caught fire after hitting a post and crashing against a tree.
The bus, owned by petitioner and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino, came from San Fernando, La
Union and was on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur.
It appears that, as the bus neared the gate of the Gabaldon school building in the
municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio
Hufana tried to overtake it but that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus
and raced with the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post,
crashed against a tree and then burst into flames.
 The heirs of those who died sued petitioner and the latter's driver, Aquino, for damages for
breach of contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured, also sued petitioner and the
driver for damages.
Petitioner and her driver blamed respondent Gregorio Hufana for the accident. With leave
of court, they filed third party complaints against Hufana and the latter's employer, Patricio
Hufana.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner and respondent should have been held equally liable in the damage suits
since the proximate cause of the accident was found to be the concurrent negligence of the drivers
of the two buses

HELD: YES. The fact that the respondents were not sued as principals but were brought into the
cases as third party defendants should not preclude a finding of their liability.

In this case the third party complaints filed by petitioner and her driver charged respondents with
direct liability to the plaintiffs. It was contended that the accident was due "to the fault, negligence,
carelessness and imprudence of the third party defendant Gregorio Hufana". It should make no
difference therefore whether the respondents were brought in as principal defendants or as third-
party defendants. Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner springs from
contract while that of respondents arises from quasi-delict.

In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was
riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles
are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the view
that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.

b. Tests of Proximate Cause

Cause-In-Fact Tests
Cases:
1. Consolacion Gabeto vs. Agaton Araneta, 42 Phil. 252 (1921)
CUARESMA
CONSOLACION GABETO VS AGATON ARANETA
G.R. L-15674 October 17, 1921
FACTS:
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit.
When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated,
the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his hands on the
reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called
this carromata first. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the
control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to the
 looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it
was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to
get out, which he did, in order to find the bridle.
While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the bit, became
disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata
up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few years further the side
of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk,
upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that
he set out at full speed up the street. Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano,
had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso
Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded
up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell
from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Araneta’s acts were the cause of Gayetano’s death
RULING:
No. The mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse
in the manner stated would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano; because
it is admitted by Julio Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the carromata and went to the
horse's head to fix the bridle.
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the
street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the
horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the
defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the
horse thereafter.
The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was
probably so weak as to be easily broken.
Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that the defendant is not legally responsible for
the death of Proceso Gayetano; and though reluctant to interfere with the findings of fact
of a trial court when there is a conflict of testimony, the evidence in this case so clearly
preponderates in favor of the defendant, that we have no recourse but to reverse the
judgment.

2. Pilipinas Bank vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 435, 1994
DELAYRE
Pilipinas Bank v Hon. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 105410. July 25, 1994

FACTS: As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes
issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation for P20,927.00 and Vicente Tui, for
P11,419.50, with due dates on October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively. To cover the face value
of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested PCIB Money Shop's manager Mike
Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his savings account therein and have it
 deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then Filman Bank), Biñan Branch.
Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit. Mike Potenciano then inquired from the
teller of Pilipinas Bank the current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit
slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current
account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name FLORENCIO
REYES. Nothing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi,
then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for Florencio Amador who
owned the listed account number. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not NOT
NOTICING THAT THE DEPOSITOR’S SURNAME IN THE DEPOSIT SLIP WAS REYES. When
the time of payment came, all the delivered checks were dishonored due to lack of funds.
Furious over the incident, Florencio Reyes immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an
immediate verification of his account. Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The
P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador was immediately transferred to
the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in
the amount of P32,000.00. On the basis of these facts, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay to
the private respondent: (1) P200,000.00 as compensatory damages; (2) P100,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and (4) the costs of suit. CA affirmed the ruling of
RTC. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: WON Respondent Court of Appeals erred on a matter of law, in not applying Article
2179, New Civil Code, in view of its own finding that respondent Reyes' own representative
committed the mistake in writing down the account number
RULING: In determining the proximate cause of the injury, it is first necessary to determine if
defendant’s negligence was the cause in fact of the damage to the plaintiff. If defendant’s
negligence was not a cause-in-fact, the injury stops, but if it is a cause-in-fact, the injury shifts to
the question of limit of liability of the defendant. If the injury stops, the plaintiff cannot recover
damages. In this case, the cause is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously
posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a
similar first name. The bank employee, deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care
required in the performance of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash
deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is the same Florencio
stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which
was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount
involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which is
the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the
plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored by the bank because the ledger of
Florencio Reyes indicated a balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks.
JUDGEMENT OF CA AFFIRMED. PETITION DISMISSED
Cause and Condition
Cases:
1. Phoenix Construction vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
ESMILLA
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners, vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-65295, March 10, 1987, FELICIANO, J.]

FACTS:
1. On 15 November 1975, 1:30 a.m., Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home to Bangkal, Makati a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two"
of liquor.
 2. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets in Bangkal, Makati when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away
from his car.
3. The dump truck was owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. It was parked on the right hand side of
General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to
the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic. There were no lights nor any "early warning" reflector devices. The dump truck had earlier
that evening been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer
Phoenix.
4. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late
and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.
5. Dionisio filed an action for damages in the CFI of Pampanga claiming that the legal and proximate
cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries
was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.

CFI: In favor of Dionisio:

1. To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and the replacement of
the lost dentures of plaintiff;
2. To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income for
plaintiff brought about the accident in controversy and which is the result of the negligence of the
defendants;
3. To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as moral damages for the unexpected
and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a marketing man; mental anguish,
wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched reputation, feeling of economic
insecurity, and the untold sorrows and frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his family since
the accident in controversy up to the present time;
4. To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as damages for the wanton disregard of
defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff before the filing of this case in court for a
smaller amount.
5. To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for attorney's fees; and
6. The cost of suit.

IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages:
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced to P6,460.71, the latter being the
only amount that the appellate court found the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was reduced to P100,000.00, basically because
Dionisio had voluntarily resigned his job such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his loss of
income "was not solely attributable to the accident in question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the appellate court as excessive and
unconscionable and hence reduced to P50,000.00.
a. The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs
remained untouched.

ISSUE: Whether or not the skewed parking of the truck was the proximate cause of the accident

FACTS:
 1. There are four factual issues that need to be looked into:
a. whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful
night;
b. whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck;
c. whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or
whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision;
d. whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

2. As to the first issue, no curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the
accident nor was any found in his car. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced
his curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew
pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such
a pass during that night.
3. On the second issue, people who had gathered at the scene of the accident, said that Dionisio's car
was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. We think that an automobile speeding down a street
and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke
spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time.
4. Third, Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to
be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away
from the intersection.
5. A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The
evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio
smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in
an unconscious condition.

6. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful —
or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked.
7. The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that
consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather
than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.
a. Even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners
would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make this quite
clear: Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and
the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of
causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in
producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone
before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily
affect liability. It is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of
the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
b. The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car
would in probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices.
c. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the
chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the
juris vinculum of liability.
 8. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate
and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
9. Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer
Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its
truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in
which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in
vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
10. We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on
a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private
respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who
shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs
shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.

2. Rodrigueza, ET AL. VS. The Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. 15688, November 19,
1921
ESPINOSA
REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-15688 November 19, 1921
FACTS: The defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in the
municipality of Albay. On January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said line, a great
quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby
communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively, and the same
were entirely consumed. All of these houses were of light construction with the exception of the
house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with
nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind
was blowing at the time. It does not appear either in the complaint or in the agreed statement whose
house caught fire first, though it is stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first
communicated to the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the others.
It was alleged that the Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of
said fire, in the following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper supervision over the
employees in charge of the locomotive; secondly, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these
sparks to be operated without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks;
thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior quality
which, upon combustion, produces sparks in great quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio Rodrigueza stood
partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant company, though exactly how far away
from the company's track does not appear. It further appears that, after the railroad track was laid,
the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the company and to remove it
from its exposed position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to
put an iron roof on his house, which he never did. Instead, he changed the materials of the main
roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this fact it is
contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio
Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad Company, and that for this
 reason the company is not liable. This position is in our opinion untenable for the reasons which
we shall proceed to state.
ISSUE: WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio Rodrigueza in having his
house partly on the premises of the Railroad Company.
RULING:
With respect to the case of Remigio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred that his house stood upon this
ground before the Railroad Company laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no proof
that this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the act of building his
house. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the defendant company, and so long as his house
remained in this exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have
resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with
ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from
the unlawful negligent acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself
against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use
the care of the ordinarily prudent manIn the situation now under consideration the proximate and
only cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire.
The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant
company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent
condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed
to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition
was not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the toleration,
and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the
house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near Remigio Rodrigueza's
house, had requested or directed him to remove it, did not convert his occupancy into a trespass,
or impose upon him any additional responsibility over and above what the law itself imposes in
such situation. In this connection it must be remembered that the company could at any time have
removed said house in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.

Efficient and Intervening Cause

Definition and Concept
Cases:
1. McKee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (211 SCRA 517)
GADRINAB
MCKEE
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck, owned by private respondents, and driven by
Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose
Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
The cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos,
was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila.
 The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the
northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew
the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could
do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the
opposite lane, on the said bridge
Ruben Galang was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of charge "Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property". Conviction was affirmed by CA
and SC.
On the other hand, two separate Civil cases were filed for the death of Koh and Kim and injuries to
and were later consolidated. Respondent filed a counterclaim asserted that it was the Ford Escort car
which "invaded and bumped the lane of the truck”. The court dismissed the case and awarded moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees to the respondent.
The CA reversed the decision of RTC and awarded damages to the the plaintiffs.
ISSUES:
WON reversal is correct.
RULING:
No. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh’s negligence
that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence
for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck’s lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. No
negligence can be imputed to Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running
over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite
lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the
opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give
way to the oncoming car.

Proximate Cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

Galang’s negligent act of not slowing down or stopping and allowing the Escort to return to the right lane was the sufficient
intervening cause and the actual cause of the tragedy (failure to take the necessary measures and the degree of
care necessary to avoid the collision) o “The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in
the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road,
which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full
speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is
7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean
that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge
has a level sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in
the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.” o Negligence of Galang
apparent in the records: “He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the
bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185
of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation.”

2. Vda. De Bataclan, et al. vs. Mariano Medina, 102 Phil. 181 (1957)
ILAGAN Unavailable
3. Mercedes M. Teague vs. Elena Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181 (1973)
JUSAYAN
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, et.al vs CA
G.R. No. L-39019 January 22, 1988

Facts:
To recover the damages due to embarrassment, humiliation, hurt pride, and wounded feelings
inflicted by MERALCO and Yambao during the disconnection of the Chavez family’s electrical
service; the Chavez family filed a complaint at CFI-Manila.
Private respondents Isaac Chavez and Juana O. Chavez, husband and wife, filed the complaint for
damages, together with their children, Isaac O. Chaves, Jr. and Rosendo O. Chaves. Isaac Sr. and
Isaac Jr. and Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac, Sr. and Isaac, Jr. were practicing
lawyers and Rosendo was a Legal Officer at the Agricultural Productivity Commission. Juana O.
Chaves was a public school teacher.
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric
power for the consumption of the general public in Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a
bill collector of MERALCO.
Plaintiff Isaac Chavez became a customer of defendant MERALCO in the year 1953 when he and
his family were residing in Manila. On February 12, 1953, Chavez deposited the sum of P5.00
with defendant MERALCO in connection with the contract for electrical service.
At or about the end of March, 1965, defendant Pedro Yambao went to the residence of plaintiffs
and presented two overdue bills, one for January 11 to February 9,1965, for the sum of P7.90 and
the other for February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the amount of P7. Juana O. Chaves, however,
informed Yambao that these bills would be paid at the MERALCO main office.
Unfortunately, Isaac went to the main office only to pay the bill of P7.90 leaving the other bill
unpaid. Thus, in the afternoon of April 21, 1965, MERALCO caused the electric service of the
Chavez family to be disconnected and the power line cut off.
Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice given to herein respondent.
They contend that in the absence of bad faith, they could not be held liable for moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees. The failure to give a notice of disconnection to private
respondents might have been a breach of duty or breach of contract, but by itself does not constitute
bad faith or fraud; it must be shown that such a failure was motivated by in or done with fraudulent
 intent. They also maintain that ‘private respondents were in arrears in the payment of their
electricity bills when their electric service was connected, no moral damages may be recovered by
them under the ‘clean hands’ doctrine.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the absence of bad faith in disconnecting the service to Chavez family,
MERALCO and Yambao could be held liable for damages.
Held:
YES, MERALCO and YAMBAO CAN BE HELD LIABLE.
There is no abuse of discretion in the part of the CA in affirming the assailed decision of the CFI
Manila. The right to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer shall be accompanied
by a given notice 48 hours in advanced as provided for in Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1
of the Public Service Commission which provides as follows:
Section 97. Payment of bills. — A public service, may require that bills for service be paid within
a specified time after rendition. When the billing period covers a month or more, the minimum
time allowed will be ten days and upon expiration of the specified time, service may be
discontinued for the non-payment of bills, provided that a 48 hours’ written notice of such
disconnection has been given the customer: Provided, however, that disconnections of service shall
not be made on Sundays and official holidays and never after 2 p.m. of any working day: Provided,
further, that if at the moment the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of the
unpaid bill to the agent or employee of the operator who is to effect the disconnection, the said
agent or employee shall be obliged to accept tender of payment and issue a temporary receipt for
the amount and shall desist from disconnecting the service.
In accordance with the previous rulings, failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort. And
since, MERALCO and Yambao in this particular case disregarded the rule on 48-hour notice prior
to disconnection which is protected by law, MERALCO and Yambao can be held liable for
damages according to Article 1170 of the civil code, therefore, the Chavez family was entitled to
claim damages.

4. The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company vs. The Government of the Philippine
Islands, G.R. No. L-4195, February 18, 1908
MERCADER
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-4195 February 18, 1908

FACTS
July 24, 1905, the plaintiff entered into a contract with a representative of the defendant to do the work
on the Luneta Extension, consisting of the construction of a rock and timer bulkhead, the dredging and
filling of the space behind it with not to exceed 400,000 cubic yards of dredging material, the constructing
of a riprap foundation for the extension of the breakwater and of a concrete foundation for a light-house.
 That on the said 1st day of May, 1906, and while the said improvements were in a condition as provided
for in said contract, plan, and specifications, a section of about 200 feet in length of the said bulkhead and
rock revetment was displaced by the pressure from the inside fill and moved a distance of about 20 feet
into the waters of the Bay of Manila, and that through the opening thus caused there escaped into the
bay a large quantity of the fill that had been pumped behind the said bulkhead.
The plaintiff proceeded as rapidly in the repairing of the said bulkhead and revetment as it was permitted
to do by the officer in charge representing the defendant, and in strict and immediate compliance with
the orders received from the said officer in charge in that behalf; that thereafter and on the 18th day of
May, 1906, before the aforesaid break in the bulkhead and revetment had been or could have been
repaired, a severe typhoon occurred in the Bay of Manila; that the said bulkhead and rock revetment,
being without support of the inside fill, which had escaped through the said break, were greatly damaged
and completely destroyed for a distance of about 1,800 feet by the pressure of the rock revetment and
the wind and waves from the outside acting against the bulkhead and revetment, which, because of the
escape of the heretofore-noted fill, was without support from the inside; that during and after the
destruction of the bulkhead and revetment, caused as aforesaid, a large additional quantity of the inside
fill escaped into the Bay of Manila.
ISSUE
Whether or not the typhoon is the proximate cause of the true cause of the giving way of the bulkhead.

HELD
No, the typhoon is not the proximate cause.

The proximate cause of the damage was not the typhoon one of the contingencies provided against in the
contract but rather the overpressure of the fill, producing the escape of material and the weakness of the
bulkhead, which rendered the destruction by the typhoon possible. But when we come to consider the
effect of the counter undertaking of the company, we find the terms of the obligation and the relation of
the parties changed. Between this primary cause and its ultimate effect, they have chosen to interpose
an independent cause. Storms, typhoons, and external wave pressure are not left as foreseen
contingencies to which other agencies might be attributed as causes, but are constituted in themselves
independent causes of any damage that may result, for the consequences of which the contractor
expressly agrees to be responsible

Plaintiffs have made themselves responsible for the damage by the typhoon and cannot recover in this
action.

5. Filomeno Urbano vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964,
January 7, 1988
NADORA

FILOMENO URBANO, URBANO,

vs.

HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about
100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Javier admitted that
he was the one who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal. Urbano then got angry and
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued, Urbano unsheathed his
bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, and on the left leg with the back
portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury,
his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio, Emilio, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters
away from where the incident happened.

Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, but the Medico legal Report was prepared by Dr. Padilla, which
indicated that the incapacitation due to the wound is from (7-9) days period.

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as
charged.

Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the
hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended
to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence
of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

Afterwards, An information was filed against urbano. the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged.

IAC affirmed. Urbano filed a petition for new trial based on the affidavit of Solis which stated that
Marcelo Javier died of tetanus.

ISSUE

w/n Tetanus infection is the proximate cause of javier’s death

RULING

Yes, The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
 the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Definition
Plaintiff’s Negligence is the Cause
Compound Cases
Part of the Same Causal Set
Defendant’s Negligence is the Only Cause

C. LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Elements and Conditions of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine

Cases:
1. PLDT vs. CA
OCAMPO Unavailable
2. Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al., G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989
RONDRIGUEZ Unavailable
3. Phoenix Construction, Inc. Vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65295,
March 10, 1987
ROXAS Unavailable
4. Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Maricar Bascos Baesa, et al., G.R. Nos. 79050-
51, November 14, 1989
SAY Unavailable
5. LBC Air Cargo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 619 (1995)
VILLAGONZALO
LBC AIR CARGO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 101683, 23 February 1995

FACTS
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred at about 11:30 in the morning of
15 November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his
Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road in
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo
Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction
on its way to the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC
Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. When Tano was approaching the
vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each
other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing
vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely bad. Instead of
waiting for the dust to settled, Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards the airport
road. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by
Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the right side of
the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he sustained.

ISSUE
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable.

RULING
No, the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.

The doctrine means that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recover
of damages of supervening negligence of another if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of diligence.

In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed
to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from the
moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact that could have afforded the victim
a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.

When Doctrine is Not Applicable