FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 173294. February 27, 2008.]

RENNE ENRIQUE BIER , petitioner, vs . MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

DECISION

CORONA , J : p

This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the March 20, 2006
decision 2 and July 3, 2006 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
66952.
Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier through his
sister. Their courtship, which blossomed as a result of the exchange of long distance
calls between them, lasted six months. Back then, petitioner observed respondent to be
a very sweet and thoughtful person. This, he said, made him fall in love with her.
On July 26, 1992, six months after their rst meeting, they were married at the
UST Santissimo Rosario Parish Church. Everything went well for the rst three years of
their marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner could hope for in a wife — sweet,
loving and caring. She also took good care of the house. As petitioner was based in
Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician at Saudia Airlines, the parties decided to
maintain two residences, one in the Philippines and another in Saudi Arabia. They took
turns shuttling between the two countries just so they could spend time together.
The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage.
According to petitioner, respondent ceased to be the person he knew and married. She
started becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more time with her friends
than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent reason.
She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her
husband's needs and the upkeep of their home, and became an absentee wife. After
being gone from their home for days on end, she would return without bothering to
account for her absence. As a result, they frequently quarreled. Finally, on April 10, 1997,
respondent suddenly left for the United States. Petitioner has not heard from her since.
On April 1, 1998, petitioner instituted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 89, a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to ful ll her essential marital obligations
to petitioner. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33993.
Per sheriff's return, summons was served through substituted service as
personal service proved futile. Respondent, however, did not file an answer.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua to
investigate if there was collusion between the parties and to intervene for the State to
see to it that evidence was not fabricated. Assistant City Prosecutor Paragua
manifested that, since both parties failed to appear before him, he was unable to make
a ruling on the issue of collusion and determine if the evidence was fabricated.

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 After petitioner led his pre-trial brief, Prosecutor Paragua led a second
manifestation stating that petitioner had appeared before him and that, after
investigation, he was convinced that there was no collusion between the parties and
that the evidence was not fabricated.
At pre-trial, only petitioner appeared. As respondent failed to attend the same,
the RTC declared her to have waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Again, respondent did not take part in the proceedings.
Petitioner filed a written offer of exhibits which was admitted by the trial court.
The O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) led a certi cation and manifested its
disfavor towards declaring the marriage null and void. It argued that no persuasive
evidence was presented warranting the grant of the petition, specially since petitioner
failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in Republic v. CA and Molina 4 (Molina).
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment 5 granting the petition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as VOID, based upon the respondent's psychological incapacity, the
marriage contracted on July 26, 1992 between Renne Enrique E. Bier and Ma.
Lourdes A. Bier. As such, their property relations shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. Henceforth, their
property relations shall be governed by the regime of complete separation of
property.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General,
National Census and Statistics O ce and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
ordering them to attach a copy of this Decision to the Marriage Contract of
herein petitioner and respondent on file with respective office.
With costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, appealed the decision
of the RTC to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66952. The CA held that petitioner
failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in Molina as the root cause of
respondent's psychological incapacity was not medically or clinically identi ed. Worse,
the same was not even alleged in the petition filed in the court a quo. As such, it granted
the appeal and reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision 6 read:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED . The
Decision dated 06 March 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33993, which declared as void the marriage
between appellee and respondent, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The
marriage of Renne Enrique E. Bier and respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier remains
valid and subsisting . No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision. The same was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner contends that the guidelines enunciated in Molina, speci cally its
directive that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identi ed as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained, and that it must be
proven to be existing at the inception of the marriage, need not be strictly complied
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 with as Molina itself stated the guidelines were merely "handed down for the guidance
of the bench and bar" and were not meant to be a checklist of requirements in deciding
cases involving psychological incapacity. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that
the Molina doctrine should be applied, the RTC erred in ruling that he failed to comply
therewith.
The petition must fail.
Preliminarily, we must pass upon petitioner's argument that the nding of the
trial court on the existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity is nal and
binding on us absent any showing that its factual ndings and evaluation of the
evidence were clearly and manifestly erroneous. 7 Petitioner's position is of course the
general rule. In the instant case, however, it is the exception to the general rule which
must be applied; the court a quo clearly erred in granting the petition. It stated in the
body of its decision that:
While this Court agrees with the observation of the O ce of the
Solicitor General that the juridical antecedence of the psychological
disorder and its root cause were not established, the same will not
serve as a hindrance for the Court to declare that respondent is indeed
suffering from a psychological incapacity . The failure of the
Psychological Report to identify the root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity is not a fatal aw that will prevent the Court from declaring a
marriage a nullity based on psychological incapacity. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this Court has been consistent
in holding that if a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given
due course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at
the time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved. 8 As early as Santos v.
CA, et al., 9 we already held that:
[P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability . The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
. . . This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
These must be strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity must be con ned only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signi cance to the marriage. 1 0 This is specially so since the
Family Code does not de ne psychological incapacity. The determination thereof is left
solely to the discretion of the courts and must be made on a case-to-case basis. 1 1
Also, even if Molina was never meant to be a checklist of the requirements in
deciding cases involving Article 36 (psychological incapacity) of the Family Code, a
showing of the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the party's
psychological incapacity and its existence at the inception of the marriage cannot be
dispensed with. In Marcos v. Marcos (Marcos) , 1 2 a case cited by petitioner to support
his argument that the totality of evidence presented was enough to prove the existence
of respondent's psychological incapacity, this Court reiterated that:
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 The [ Molina ] guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals :
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability . The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a nding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
xxx xxx xxx

[t]he totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological

incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable . (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the 2005 case of Republic v. Iyoy 1 3 held that even if Marcos (2000)
relaxed the rules such that the personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of
the alleged psychological incapacity. Failure in this regard will spell the failure of the
petition.
From the foregoing, one can conclude that petitioner's insistence that Marcos
effectively overturned the need to present evidence on the aforesaid requirements has
no merit. Thus, unless the law itself or the Court provides otherwise, these
requirements must be established before a petition for nullity of the marriage based on
psychological incapacity can be granted.
We hold that the trial court's decision to declare the parties' marriage void ab
initio by reason of respondent's psychological incapacity was clearly and manifestly
erroneous as it overlooked the need to show the gravity, root cause and incurability of
respondent's psychological incapacity and that it was already present at the inception
of the marriage.
Be that as it may, the main question that begs to be answered in the instant case
is whether the totality of the evidence presented was enough to establish that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations. We rule in the negative.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.
14 He failed to discharge it.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and that of his
brother, Roderico Bier. He also presented as evidence a psychological report written by
Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who also testi ed on the matters contained
therein.
Dr. Tayag's report, which found respondent to be suffering from psychological
incapacity, particularly a narcissistic personality disorder, relied only on the information
fed by petitioner. This was admitted by petitioner in his petition for review on certiorari
and memorandum led in this Court. In both instances, petitioner reasoned out that the
personal examination of respondent was impossible as her whereabouts were
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 unknown despite diligent efforts on his part to nd her. Consequently, Dr. Tayag's
report was really hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged
facts she was testifying on. Her testimony should have thus been dismissed for being
unscientific and unreliable. 1 5
Furthermore, as already stated, the report also failed to identify the root cause of
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. It merely concluded that:
This extremely egocentric attitude manifest a person suffering
Narcissistic Personality Disorder that is considered to be severe, incurable and
deeply rooted with her functioning. Thus, making herself psychologically
incapacitated so as to comply with the essential marital functions.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist (as a
condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the psychological
incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
16

In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish that respondent was remiss in
her duties as a wife and had become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to
her husband's needs and who eventually abandoned him. However, the totality of her
acts, as testi ed to by petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a
psychological incapacity, as petitioner would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism,
chain-smoking, failure or refusal to meet one's duties and responsibilities as a married
person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do not su ce to nullify a marriage on
the basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological (as
opposed to physical) illness. 1 7
The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to petitioner's own evidence,
was off to a good start. According to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving and
caring wife who took good care of him and their home. She even willingly consented to
the di cult living arrangement of taking turns in going back and forth between the
Philippines and Saudi Arabia just so they could be together. Perhaps it was this unusual
arrangement which took a heavy toll on their relationship. They barely saw and spent
time with each other. Respondent could have gotten used to petitioner's absence. And
although absence can indeed make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well
be true: out of sight, out of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell
out of love with petitioner.
Nevertheless, we agree with the CA that the change in respondent's feelings
towards petitioner could hardly be described as a psychological illness. It was not
enough that respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in
respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying
with her essential marital obligations, 1 8 had to be shown. This petitioner failed to do.
Consequently, we are unconvinced that respondent's condition was rooted in some
incapacitating or debilitating disorder.
Even if we assume the correctness of petitioner's contention that the Molina
guidelines are not set in stone, there is still no reason to disavow the same as the facts
and circumstances in this case do not warrant a deviation therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 20, 2006 decision and
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 July 3, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate

Justices Renato C. Dacudao (retired) and Lucas P. Bersamin of the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 17-38.
3. Id., pp. 39-40.
4. 335 Phil 664 (1997).
5. Rollo, p. 47.
6. Id., p. 36.
7. Tuason v. CA, 326 Phil 169, 182 (1996).
8. Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 121, 127-128;
Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, 28 February 2007, 517 SCRA 123, 133;
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 526; Carating-
Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 433 and 438;
Dedel v. CA, 466 Phil 226, 232-233 (2004); Choa v. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, 26 November
2002, 392 SCRA 641, 650-651; Hernandez v. CA, 377 Phil 919 (1999); Republic v. CA and
Manila, supra note 4; and Santos v. CA, 310 Phil 22, 39 (1995).
9. Santos v. CA, supra.
10. Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, 17 July 2006, 495 SCRA 396, 401, citing
Santos v. CA, supra, at 40.
11. During the Congressional Hearing before the Senate Committee on Women and Family
Relations on February 3, 1988, Justice Eduardo Caguioa stated that:

[a] code should not have so many definitions, because a definition straight-jackets the
concept and, therefore, many cases that should go under it are excluded by the
definition. That's why we leave it up to the court to determine the meaning of
psychological incapacity.
12. G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 764.
13. Supra note 8, at 526.
14. Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 376, citing Republic
v. CA, supra note 4, at 676.
15. Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, supra note 8, at 133, citing Choa v. Choa, supra note 8, at
655.
16. Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, supra.
17. Id., p. 135, citing Republic v. CA, supra note 4, at 674.
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 18. Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, supra note 8, at 129-130.

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