3Republit of tbe llbilippine~

~upreme QCourt MAY I l 2019

~aguio QCitp

THIRD DIVISION

MARY CHRISTINE C. GO-YU, G.R. No. 230443

Petitioner,
Present:

PERALTA, J., Chairperson,

LEONEN,
- versus- REYES, A., JR.,
HERNANDO, and
CARANDANG,* JJ.

Promulgated:
ROMEO A. YU,

x-------------------------~~~~~-~~~~~~----------~~~-------x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court are the Decision 1 and the Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), promulgated on January 13, 2017 and March 6, 2017,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 05780-MIN. The assailed CA Decision
reversed and set aside the following: (1) the June 20, 2013 Order3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 12, in Civil Case No.
33,083-09, which denied herein respondent Romeo A. Yu's Demurrer to
Evidence in the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property which petitioner Mary
Christine C. Go-Yu filed against respondent; and (2) the July 31, 2013
Order4 of the RTC denying respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.

Designated' as additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 49-56. Penned by Associate Justice Ronaldo 8. Martin, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Oscar V. Badelles.

cl
2
Id at 57-58.
Id. at 82-83. Penned by Judge Pelagio S. Paguican.
4
CA ro/lo, Vol. l, p. 32.
Decision -2- G.R. No. 230443

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On October 21, 2009, herein petitioner filed with the RTC of Davao
City, Branch 12, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property5 against herein
respondent, alleging that: she was a child who was well provided for and
taken care of by her parents; she grew up to become a self-assured,
independent and confident person; after finishing college at the University of
British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, she came back home to the
Philippines, worked in various companies, eventually joined their family
business where she started as a secretary and worked her way to become the
Senior Vice President who is in charge of the day-to-day operations of the
company which has in its employ at least 700 personnel; she and respondent
were casually introduced by the former's mother; several months after their
first meeting, respondent asked her out on a date and, after a few months of
dating exclusively, they got married on June 11, 1999; thereafter, they
stayed at respondent's family home where petitioner had to contend with the
constant meddling of her mother-in-law, as well as the latter's intrusion into
their privacy; when she complained, respondent promised her that they will
eventually move out; however, his promise was never fulfilled; petitioner
had to make a lot of adjustments which entailed a lot of sacrifice on her part;
she gave up some of the luxuries she had gotten used to when respondent's
financial resources dwindled; she limited her social life and became
withdrawn, maintaining only a small circle of friends; she took on the
responsibility of single-handedly running their household and making all
decisions as respondent was too busy in his involvement with his personal
and social activities outside their house; after their wedding, the parties'
sexual activity decreased considerably; petitioner was unable to conceive
and even tried to convince respondent that she undergo in vitro fertilization
but the latter refused; as a result, the parties grew apart as a married couple
leading them to live separate lives even though they stay under the same
roof; petitioner was eventually diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was found to exist before the parties' marriage; and the fact
that petitioner is comfortable with her behavior and sees nothing wrong
with it or the need to change renders treatment improbable. Petitioner
sought the dissolution of the parties' absolute community of properties
claiming that their marriage is governed by the provisions of the Family
Code and that they did not enter into any prenuptial agreement.

In his Amended Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses,

respondent denied the material allegations of petitioner's Petition and
contended that: he offers his love and affection for petitioner and he desires
for them to reconcile and save their marriage in the spirit of love,
forgiveness and Christian values on marriage; and petitioner is not suffering
from psychological incapacity and personality disorder, instead, her problem

Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 91-99.

cl
Decision -3- G.R. No. 230443

is behavioral in the sense that she has difficulty adjusting to married life and
in dealing with respondent's relatives, especially his mother. As to the
dissolution of the parties' absolute community of properties, respondent
claimed that the properties adverted to by petitioner in her Petition are not
properties of the parties' absolute community as these are merely held by
respondent in trust· for his siblings and relatives; in fact, petitioner had
executed an attestation admitting that the properties she mentioned in her
Petition are owned by respondent's siblings and other relatives.

Subsequently, the case proceeded to trial where petitioner presented

her documentary and testimonial evidence, the latter consisting of the
testimonies of petitioner, her friend, her secretary, and the psychiatrist who
examined her.

After petitioner has rested her case, respondent filed a Demurrer to

Evidence6 claiming that petitioner's alleged Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, which supposedly renders her psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations, is not supported by clear evidence.

In its Order7 of June 20, 2013, the RTC denied respondent's Demurrer
to Evidence by holding that petitioner has adduced substantial evidence to
show that she is suffering from a personality disorder and that there is,
therefore, a need for respondent to adduce controverting evidence.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 but the sarrie was denied in
the Order9 of the RTC dated July 31, 2013.

Respondent then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Orders of the R TC which
denied his Demurrer to Evidence and his subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration. 10

In its assailed Decision dated January 13, 201 7, the CA reversed and
set aside the June 20, 2013 and July 31, 2013 Orders of the RTC and granted
respondent's Demurrer to Evidence, thereby· dismissing the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute
Community of Property filed by petitioner.

The CA held that the evidence presented by petitioner, through the

psychological report and all supporting testimonial evidence, failed to
establish any proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively

6
Id. at 140-153.

9
IO
Supra note 3.
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 84-88.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 59-8 l.
cJI
Decision -4- G.R. No. 230443

incapacitated her from complying with her essential marital obligations. The
CA further ruled that, if at all, what petitioner has admitted to be afflicted of
or materially manifesting in her marriage with respondent is an obvious
refusal, if not neglect, to perform her marital obligations. The CA concluded
that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge to have
denied the demurrer to evidence and require respondent to controvert
petitioner's evidence which is patently lacking and, thus, unduly impose
unwarranted burden on respondent and his resources, and, most especially,
the docket of the courts.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in

its Resolution dated March 6, 201 7.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the

following grounds:

I.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY HA VE

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED, OR
REFUSED, TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING NEW AND
SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, THAT:

A. RESPONDENT'S PETITION WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, WHICH IT GRANTED
IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION, HAS IN FACT ALREADY
BEEN MOOTED AND OVERTAKEN BY THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE TRIAL COURT, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT
ORDERED THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE SUBMITTED FOR DECISION,
AFTER RESPONDENT HAD SUBMITTED HIS OWN
CONTROVERTING EVIDENCE AND RESTED HIS CASE.

B. CONTRARY TO ITS RULING WHICH ADMITTEDLY WAS

BASED ONLY ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED THUS FAR
AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE, THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PETITIONER WAS NOT AT ALL "PATENTLY
LACKING" AS IN FACT IT HAS SATISFACTORILY
SUPPORTED THE CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE, AND WHICH WAS NOT EVEN
EFFECTIVELY CONTROVERTED BY RESPONDENT'S OWN
EVIDENCE.

II.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS TO RULE THAT PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME. 11 d
II
Id. at 11-12. (/'
Decision - 5- G.R. No. 230443

The petition lacks merit.

In her first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent's

petition for certiorari filed with the CA was rendered moot by reason of the
continuation of the proceedings before the R TC where respondent was able
to present his own controverting evidence and rested his case. Petitioner also
argues that, contrary to the assailed ruling of the CA, the totality of evidence
she presented before the trial court was not patently lacking but, in fact, has
satisfactorily supported the case for declaration of nullity of the parties'
marriage.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court is an original action, independent from the principal
action, and not a part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the
rendition of the judgment complained of. 12 It "is intended for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." 13 As a consequence, "a petition for certiorari pending before a
higher court does not necessarily become moot and academic by a
continuation of the proceedings in the court of origin." 14 Hence, in the
instant case, the special civil action for certiorari which respondent filed
with the CA is independent from the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by petitioner. Being independent from the principal action,
the petition for certiorari may not, thus, be rendered moot by the mere
continuation of the proceedings in the RTC.

It is true that under Section 7, 15 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a

petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the
case. However, despite the absence of a temporary restraining order or a writ

12
Yasuda v. Court ofAppeals, 386 Phil 594, 602 (2000).
13
Tagle v. Equitable PC/ Bank, et al., 575 Phil. 384, 395-396 (2008); citation omitted.
14
Sps. Diaz v. Diaz, 387 Phil. 314, 334 (2000).
15
Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition is filed may
issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (IO) days from the filing of
a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may
be a ground for an administrative charge.

(JI
Decision -6- G.R. No. 230443

of preliminary injunction which enjoins the RTC from further proceeding

with the case,, it appears that the R TC has chosen to follow the rule on
judicial courtesy. Indeed, while the RTC continued in holding trial and, in
fact, allowed the parties to complete the pres~ntation of their evidence, it
stopped short of rendering its decision on the petition even if the same has
been submitted for resolution as early as July 1, 2015.

In this regard, this Court has noted instances where even if there is no
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a
higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to
suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. As this Court
16
explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court ofAppeals:

Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the
Intermediate Appellate Court to prevent it from taking any action with
regard to its resolutions respectively granting respondents' motion to
expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to dismiss and denying
the latter's motion to reconsider such order, upon learning of the petition,
the appellate court should have refrained from ruling thereon because its
jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition for
certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the
above-mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and
practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate
court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking
cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before
this court[.] 17

In the subsequent cases of Go v. Judge Abrogar 18 and Rep. of the

Phils. v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 19 this Court has qualified and limited
the applicatiori of the principle of judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy
of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court by holding that the principle of
judicial courtesy applies only if there is a strong probability that the issues
before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of
the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. Thus, the principle of
judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule.

In the instant case, the Court finds that the R TC correctly adhered to
this principle because there is a strong probability that the issue raised before
the CA - of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondent'. s Demurrer to Evidence, which issue ultimately lies in
the determination of whether or not petitioner's evidence is patently and
utterly insufficient to prove her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
- would be rendered moot as a result of the continuation of the proceedings
in the lower court.
16
17

18
19
247 Phil. 387 (1988).
Id. at 394.
446 Phil. 227, 238 (2003).
525 Phil. 804, 809-810 (2006).
rJI
Decision -7- G.R. No. 230443

Petitioner further insists that the issue of the presence or absence of

psychological incapacity on the part of petitioner is a factual matter which
requires the examination and determination of the totality of evidence
presented and, as such, the trial court should have primacy in the
determination thereof.

It bears to remind petitioner, however, of the nature of a demurrer to

evidence.

"A demurrer to evidence is defined as 'an objection or exception by

one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which
his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to
make out his case· or sustain the issue.' The demurrer challenges the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon
the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt." 20 Moreover, "[t]he grant or
denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a
grave abuse of such discretion." 21

As to whether or not a trial court's denial of a demurrer to evidence

may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, this Court, in the case of Ong, et al. v. People of the Philippines, 22
held as follows:

Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie
to review a trial .court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or
to acquit), which is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the
prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case. An order
denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not appealable.
Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari (Tadeo v. People,
300 SCRA 744 [1998])."

However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the
demurrer to evidence), appeal in due time is the proper remedy, not
certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise ofjudicial authority."

Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended

by grave abuse of discretion, the denial may be assailed through a petition
for certiorari. This exception was explicitly recognized by the Court in
Cruz v. People (303 SCRA 533 [1999]), where we stated that:

The general rule that the extraordinary writ of

certiorari is not available to challenge (the denial of the

20
21
22
Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 183 (2002); citations omitted.
Te v. Court ofAppeals, 400 Phil. 127, 139 (2000); citation omitted. ·
396 Phil. 546 (2000).
I
Decision -8- G.R. No. 230443

demurrer to evidence) may be subject to· exceptions. When

the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of
certiorari lies.

Likewise, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 365 [1999]),

we declared that "the rule is not absolute and admits of an exception. Thus
where, as in the instant case, the denial of the motion to dismiss by the
trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the order of denial
on certiorari."

The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort
to the remedy of certiorari, the trial court judge having committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
petitioners' demurrer to evidence. A demmTer to evidence is an objection
by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain. a verdict. The court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is
merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. 23

In the instant case, consistent with petitioner's contention, the trial

court was given the opportunity and the primacy in the determination of the
merits of respondent's demmTer to evidence. In other words, the RTC was
given precedence in determining whether petitioner's evidence was enough
to sustain the' issue. In fact, the RTC has ruled in petitioner's favor by
denying respondent's Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that petitioner
has adduced substantial evidence to show that she is suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Hence, petitioner may not claim that, in
ruling against respondent's Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC was not given
the chance to make an independent assessment of the merits of the case,
albeit sans the evidence presented by respondent. But again, as previously
discussed, in a demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict.

In the present petition, this Court is confronted with the main issue of
whether or not the CA correctly held that the R TC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied herein respondent's motion to dismiss on demurrer
to evidence. Stated differently, this Court has to rule whether herein
petitioner was able to produce sufficient evidence before the trial court to
make out her case or to sustain a verdict.

In her petition filed with the RTC, petitioner contends that her
marriage to respondent is null and void from the beginning by reason of her

. e odg;nal. ~
Decision -9- G.R. No. 230443

psychological incapacity. However, the Court agrees with the CA that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's Demurrer
to Evidence because petitioner was unable to present sufficient evidence to
show that she has the right to the relief she seeks.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition. and reiteration of settled

jurisprudence in Castillo v. Rep. of the Phils., et al., 24 on what constitutes
psychological incapacity as construed under the law, is instructive, to wit:

Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has

been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insehsltivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c)
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Jvfolina, this Court

laid down the more definitive guidelines in the disposition of
psychological incapacity cases, viz.:

xx xx

(1) The burden 9f proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. x x x

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage.xx x

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the

a
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles

68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well

24
Decision - 10 - G.R. No. 230443

Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. x x x

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.xx x

xx xx

The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be

based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations.

As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it

is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of
parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat
such opiinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining
the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must
always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by
the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
the proceedings.

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence

to show the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same
would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as
in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely
on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. 25

In the i.nstant case, this Court quotes with approval the discussion
made by the CA with respect to the merits of the psychiatric evaluation
made by petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Agnes S. Borre-Padilla, pertinent
portions of which read as follows:

x x x A close scrutiny of Dr. Padilla's seventeen (17) page

psychological report (Annex "F") would show that she devoted a mere one
(1) page discussion, if it could be called that, of the purported Narcissistic
Personality Disorder of [herein petitioner]. Go-Yu. The supposed
discussion part of the report was in actuality nothing but an

25
Id. at 219-221 ; citations omitted, emphasis and italics in the original. {1
Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 230443

incomprehensible enumeration of the manifestations of an alleged

disordered behavior with nary an explanation 01: detailed factual narration
of events in the life of [petitioner] Go-Yu to support the good doctor's
questionable observations.

Also, it would appear that the good psychiatrist mainly relied on

the accounts as relayed to her by [herein petitioner] Go-Yu herself even if
she had the good sense to state through a belated one ( 1) sentence footnote
at the very end of her report that she ostensibly interviewed a variety of
sources. However, it could never be deduced from the report from who did
the psychiatrist actually obtain any particular information as the report is
full of ge~eralizations detailing only the life story of the estranged couple.

The Supreme Court has on several occasions spoke of credibility

or reliability gaps when it comes to expert opinion evidence in petitions
for nullity of marriage cases. In the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the High
Court ruled that "other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the
psychologist's report and the testimony simply provided a general
description of Angelito's purported anti-social personality disorder,
supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave, and
incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the
bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report,
and neither can they be found in her testimony."

As previously stated, the psychological report in this case is

wanting in material facts, acceptable discussion and analysis, to support
the supposed expert opinion of the psychiatrist that one of the parties is
suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder. As ruled in the Suazo v.
Suazo case, the methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required
depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not
the psychological report that the Court can rely on as a basis for the
conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

What makes matters worse is the fact that it is the [herein

petitioner] Go-Yu herself who claims to be the person psychologically
incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. Hence, whatever she had
to say was inherently self-serving and should be held. to the strictest
standard of scrutiny. Towards this end, [herein petitioner] Go-Yu
miserably failed. 26

The Court likewise notes and agrees with the observations and
accompanying discussions of the Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG) in its
Comment to petitioner's petition for certiorari filed with the CA, to wit:

What is clearly patent in the Petition for certiorari is that [herein

petitioner] Go-Yu has made several allegations in her petition for nullity
of marriage that she claims to prove her psychological incapacity. The
evidence 'she presented however fails to persuade (sic) the existence of a
narcissistic personality disorder that is in fact incurable and which exists
even prior to her marriage with [herein respondent] Yu. What is baffling is

26 - - - - - - - - a t i o n s om;tted. rJ"Y
Decision - 12 - G.R. No. 230443

that despite the many positive and admirable traits raised by [herein
petitioner] Go-Yu in her petition to describe herself, these same
characteristics had been the basis of her witness, Dr. Padilla, to conclude
that she is suffering from a psychological disorder.

Apart from the opinion raised by Dr. Padilla, there appears to be no

other competent and credible proof that the alleged disorder is in fact
grave enough to bring about the disability and that said disorder is
permanent or clinically incurable. The testimony of Dr. Padilla, who is
supposed to be the expert witness of [herein petitioner] Go-Yu, at large,
merely established that the parties are having great marital difficulties,
which, however, do not warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage.
Worse, the [bases] for Dr. Padilla's conclusion were mere interviews with
several individuals, including [herein petitioner] Go-Yu, who was never
even referred to any psychological testing for a clearer and more reliable
evaluation. 27

Indeed, contrary to petitioner's claim that she is psychologically

incapacitated to perform the ordinary duties and responsibilities of a married
woman, the Court agrees with the observation of the OSG, as well as the
respondent, that petitioner's documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence
prove otherwise - that she is, in fact, fully aware of and has performed the
essential obligations of a married individual. The following instances prove
such capacity: first, petitioner expressed concern over the decrease in their
sexual activity after their wedding, that she also has needs and that, unlike
her and respondent, it is normal for married couples to have a healthy sexual
relationship; 28 second, she wanted to have a baby with respondent because
she believes and understands that one of the purposes of marriage is
procreation29 and she also thought that having a baby could somehow save
their marriage; 30 third, she made adjustments and sacrifices by giving up
luxuries she had gotten used to when her husband's financial resources
started to dwindle; 31 and fourth, she helped her husband manage their
finances and run their household. 32 During her cross-examination, she
testified thus:

Q So, is it fair to say that when you noticed that there was a decrease
in sexual activity, that something was 'wrong with your marriage
with Romeo Yu?

A Yes because it's really not normal.

Q So, in a way you fully understand that as husband and wife there
must be a healthy sexual relationship?

27

28
29
A Yes, now, I know that now.

CA rollo, Vol. I, p . .393.

See rollo, Vol. I, p. 95.
/1
CA rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1432-1433.
30
Id.
31
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 94; see Psychological Report, rollo, Vol. I, p. 117.
32
Id at 94-95.
Decision - 13 - G.R. No. 230443

Q And you.mentioned that you confronted Mr. Yu about that?

A I discussed with him?

Q Yes you discussed it with him?

A Yah.

Q And how did you discuss it with him?

A Oh I would bring it up and say that this is not normal, I also have
my needs. That's it.

Q And what is the response of Mr. Yu?

A He would go to sleep.

ATTY. POLINAR:

Q Now, do you agree Ms. Witness that one of the expression oflove
is the sexual activity?

WITNESS:

A Do I believe that?

Q Yes?

A Yah.

Q In fact during your marriage with Mr. Yu, you also wanted to have
a baby?

A No, no, no, I think you got it wrong. I said at the last year or
something, I said maybe we should give it a try but I'm not saying
that the whole time I wanted to have a baby.

Q So, during that moment when you said that both of you must have
at least give it a try, you mean at that point in time you wanted to
have a baby from your husband of course?

A Obviously.

Q So, you also fully understand that wanting to have a baby is part of
the purpose of marriage which is to procreate, is that correct?
Procreation is one of the purposes of marriage?

A Do I understand?

ATTY. POLINAR:

Q Do you [agree] with that?

WITNESS:

A Do I believe in it?

Q Yes, that one of the purposes of marriage is procreation?

rJI
Decision - 14 - G.R. No. 230443

A Yes, I believe it's right.

Q So when you say right, [w ]hat do you mean right?

A When you read all the books, when you talk to all the priest, yes
it's right, but some people get married mot just to have a child.

Q Apart from the other purposes of marriages you will agree with me
that, apart from all purposes of marriage, one of which is somehow
to have a child with your husband?

A No.

Q So, what was then your intention when you said that you wanted to
give it a try to have a baby with your husband?

A Because I thought it would give him focus because there was no

focus. He was having his own life. He was too busy having his
own life. I thought that somehow, maybe, just maybe having a
child would somehow save what we have, would get us together
again and give us focus.

Q When you say to save what we have, you mean to save your
marriage, is that correct?

A Yes, perhaps.

xx xx

ATTY. POLINAR:

Q And in fact in paragraph 18 [of your affidavit], you stated that and
I quote: "I then found myself having to make a lot of adjustments
which entailed a lot of sacrifice on my part," is that correct?

WITNESS:

xx xx
A Ahyah.

Q You also stated that "I gave up some luxuries I had gotten used to
when his financial resources started to dwindle", correct?

A Yes.

Q You also stated that "I limited my · social life and became
withdrawn, maintaining only a small circle of friends, you stated
that, correct?

A Yes.

Q "I took on the responsibility of single-handedly rµnning the

household and making all decisions, you stated that in your
affidavit?

A Yes.
ff
Decision - 15 - G.R. No. 230443

xx xx

Q So, is it fair to say that you shared some responsibilities with your
husband with respect to these matters?

A It was not responsibility, it was just work.

xx xx

Q But is it not a fact Ms. Witness that in paragraph 18 of your

affidavit you said that "I took on the responsibility of single-
handedly running the household and making all decisions", is that
correct?

A Yes, the household.

Q And in fact you said and I quote: "I also took over all his financial
concerns", is that correct?

A Yes.

xx xx

A When I mean I took over all his financial concerns, there was a
period that he didn't have any money. The price of coconut was
down. So he would go to my office practically every week he
would borrow money from me just to fund his account. He
borrowed from my own money.

Q And you also lent him of course?

A I lent him. Yes because he was begging, his brothers wouldn't lend
him.

Q Next question. Did you get frustrated with all these sacrifices like
taking all the responsibilities, and single-handedly running the
household and making all decisions? Did it frustrate you during
your marriage?

A Partially.

xx xx

Q You did not think that Mr. Romeo Yu was performing his duties as
partner to a marriage?

A As the man in the house.

Q When you say man in the house, what do you mean?

A The man in the house is the one suppose to face the problem first
not me. face his problem. The man in the house, you know in the
old days, he is supposed to go fishing and the wife is suppose to
cook the fish[.] I'm not supposed to do the fishing.

ATTY. POLINAR:
Q Can you ·tell the court what is the role of the wife. in the mamagt:f
Decision - 16 - G.R. No. 230443

WITNESS:

A She is suppose to cook the fish, and if she happens to be the

fisherman herself then well and good. Then there is more fish in
the house but I don't believe the guy should stop fishing and stick
from the wife's fish that she earn.

Q Now, in paragraph 19, you stated that and I quote: "After our
wedding, our sexual activity considerably decreased in frequency."

A Yes.

Q You also stated that respondent and I quote "did not seem to want
to be intimate with me anymore", is that correct?

A Gradually.

xx xx

Q Now, you said x x x that you were partially frustrated having to

take over some of the responsibilities, household responsibilities.
Is it not a fact that because of your frustrations with him that you
do not want anymore [to] live with him, with Mr. Romeo Yu?

A Am I driven by frustrations?

Q Yes?

A What's the question?

Q Did your frustrations somehow reached the point that you cannot
live with him anymore?

A Live with as [i]n[?]

Q One house with him?

A In the same house?

Q Yes as couple?

A As a couple in a marriage?

Q Yes.

A No, it is. not just frustration, it's discovering that you don't have
. m
anyt hmg . common at a 11 .33

All the foregoing clearly show that petitioner unquestionably

recognizes both spouses' obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, render mutual help and support, provide for the support
of the family, and manage their household. The fact that she gradually
became ovenvhelmed by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment

33
Id. at 337-365.
(JV
Decision - 17 - G.R. No. 230443

toward her husband and their marriage is not a sufficient ground to have
such marriage declared null and void.

Petitioner claims to be afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder,

which is defined as a mental condition in which people have an inflated
sense of their own importance, a deep need for excessive attention and
admiration, troubled relationships, and a lack of empathy for others. 34 The
psychiatrist who examined petitioner confirmed this definition by stating
that in layman's terms, a person who is suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder is one "who is self-centered and [who] has prioritized
[his/]her needs over the other or significant person." 35 Based on the above
definitions al<?ne, how can petitioner claim that she is suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder when, as previously discussed, through her
own statements and admissions in her petition and in her testimony in court,
she has displayed full knowledge and understanding of her and her
husband's obligations and has, in fact, committed positive acts towards
building and sustaining a family?

As to petitioner's contention that respondent admitted in his original

Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses the allegations in the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, suffice it to say that respondent's
original Answer has been amended. Settled is the rule that "pleadings
superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as
pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions." 36 ''Where an amended
answer is complete in itself, it supersedes the original answer, which no
longer remains a part of the record." 37 Moreover, even granting that
respondent admitted that petitioner was indeed suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, such admission may not be used as basis for the
court's judgment because under Article 48 of the Family Code, in all cases
of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, "no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment." Stated
differently, notwithstanding any admission made by respondent, it is still
incumbent upon petitioner to prove the nullity of their marriage by evidence
other than such admission. Having failed to do so, this Court agrees with the
CA in ruling that:

Indeed, it was capricious for [the RTC] to deny the demurrer to

evidence and require [herein respondent] to controvert evidence totally
wanting and m;1duly impose unwarranted burden on the part of the
[respondent] and his resources and most especially to the docket of the
courts. 38

34
35
36
37
38
Ching v. Court ofAppeals, 387 Phil. 28, 45 (2000).
Reynes v. Compaiiia General de Tabacos, 21Phil.416, 420 (1912).
(j
<https ://www. m avocl in ic. orgldis eases .. ./narciss is tic-personality-disorder/. ..!~vc-2 0 3 666>.
CA rollo, Vol. III, p. 1257.

Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 55.

Decision - 18 - G.R. No. 230443

The Court understands and commiserates with petitioner's frustration

over her marital woes. However, "[t]o be tired and to give up on one's
situation and on one's [spouse] are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the
remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their
separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our
laws. Ours is x x x a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific
situation - ct relationship where no marriage could have validly been
concluded because the parties, or [where] one of them, by reason of a grave
and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was
celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could
not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court
is powerless to provide any permanent remedy." 39

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. This Court

has repeatedly stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Resultantly,
it has always been held that mere irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. 40

Lastly, our Constitution "set out a policy of protecting and

strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was
the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected
by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence pres1;!nted clearly reveals
a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered
into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness
existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of th~ marital tie." 41 This is the case here.

Finally, having ruled that the CA did not err in reversing and setting
aside the assailed June 20, 2013 Order of the RTC and in consequently
dismissing petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property, the Court no longer
finds any need to discuss the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
39
So v. Valera, 606 Phil. 309, 335-336 (2009).
40
Alcazar v. Alcazar, 618 Phil. 616, 632 (2009), citing Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
41
Mal/;/;n v. Jamesolamln, et al., 754 Phn. 15 8, 184 (2015). ~
Decision - 19 - G.R. No. 230443

promulgated on January 13, 2017 and March 6, 2017, respectively, in CA-

G.R. SP No. 05780-MIN are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Decision - 20 - G.R. No. 230443

WE CONCUR:

I
Associate Justice

. !fJ.u ~µ__.
ANDRE, B REYES, JR. RAMON PAULL.HERNANDO
Associ e Justice Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

~\)~
DIOSDADO~ PERALTA
Associiat Justice
Chairperson, T ird Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

cFl{i;.lFIED rRllE COPY

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