FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916.]

E. MERRITT , plaintiff-appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE

Crossfield & O'Brien for plaintiff.

SYLLABUS

1. DAMAGES; MEASURE OF. — Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff
was wholly incapacitated for six months it is an error to restrict the damages to a
shorter period during which he was confined in the hospital.
2. SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE SUED;
CONSTRUCTION. — The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled
after the federal and state governments of the United States' the decisions of the high
courts of that country may be used in determining the scope and purpose of a special
statute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The state not being liable to suit except by its express
consent, an act abrogating that immunity will be strictly construed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no
liability not previously existing unless it is clearly expressed in the act.
5. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LIABILITY FOR THE
NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES. — The Government of
the Philippine Islands in only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and
employees when they are acting as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the Civil code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a
special agent.

DECISION

TRENT , J : p

This is an appeal by both partied from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the
costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general
damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the
complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two
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 months and twenty-one days and xing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666,
instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred:
(a) in nding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b ) in holding that the
Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of
the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of
P14,741.
The trial court's ndings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as
follows:
"It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the
plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre
Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles and
hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern
intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said
avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so
that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance
and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was
already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post placed there.
"By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured
that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he
was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left
parietal region, a wound in the same place and in beck part of his head, while
blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
"The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that
the grey matter and brain mass had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the
night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse
was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he
would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to
the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the wound
would be expose to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.
"At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby
notice that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a
curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture.
Examination of his head revealed a notable re-adjustment of the functions of the
brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a slight weakness
in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed
when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he
attempted to use his memory for mathematical calculations.
"According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the
plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and
that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical
condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility,
energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of
the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half
of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of
his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb
up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.
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 "As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his
work as a contractor, he had to dissolve the partnership he had formed with the
engineer, Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical
calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties,
and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco
building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the
effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in
question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the amount awarded for permanent injuries, and
(b ) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff
was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We fund nothing in the record which
would justify us in increasing the amount of the rst. as to the second, the record
shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were
worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and
twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually con ned in the hospital. In this we
think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly
incapacitated for a period of sex months. The mere fact that he remained in the
hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months
was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore,
nd that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part,
is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or
employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is
legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear
in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine
Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March
twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it
possible to determine the amount of damages, if any , to which the claimant is
entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
recommend that an act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to
bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said questions may
be decided: Now, therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine
Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision,
and the attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
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 directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to
defend said Government at the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it
cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or
extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against the
Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely
voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and
render judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order
to x the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr.
E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions
submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said
questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we
have also xed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that
amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal
and state Governments in the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high
courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by
its of cers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative
enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the delity of the of cers or agents whom it employs, since
that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, dif culties and
losses, which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne,
103 Minn., 491, citing U.S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs.
State, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State ( 121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the negligence of
the state of cers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for the
purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information
calculated to educate and bene t the industrial classes; and to advance to educate and
bene t the industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of
the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In passing
upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its of cers or agents,
the court said:
"No claim arises against any government in favor of an individual, by
reason of the misfeasance, laces, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its
officers or agents." (Citing Gibbons vs. U.S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86
N.C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep.,
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 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203;
Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state
where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract, the rule is stated in 36
Cyc., 915, thus:
"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense."
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16,
1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
"SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the
town of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or
courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling
and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorizes officers and agents, relative to the mill property
of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State Wisconsin on the Bark
River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka
Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake,
all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin."
In determining the scope of this act, the court said;
"Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted
liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now
stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the
act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit.
It simply gives authority commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the state. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion
that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question
to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass
upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the
absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to
change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the
part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference
but would have done so in express terms. (Murdoc Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth,
152 Mass., 28; 24 N. E., 854; 8 L. R.A., 399)"
In Denning vs. state (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon
and considered, are as follows:
"All persons who have, or shall hereafter have claims on contract or for
negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners, are
hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit
thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in
civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise provided."
And the court said:
"This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases,
arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did not
create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before,
but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have
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 existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43
Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)"
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court
"jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with
an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this statute the court, in
Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
"The statute we are discussing discloses no intention to create against the
state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention
to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be
adjudicated."
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the
terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the
management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger
remarks; "It must be conceded
that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its
agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the
substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its of cers,
agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding
article shall be applicable."
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3,
Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence,
takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It
follows therefrom that the state by virtue of such provision of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to
their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the
appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the
general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these
latter and the state therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil
law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of
acquiring rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7,
1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
"That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations
which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first articles thereof, No.
1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act
or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of
the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following article
refers to third persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who
maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the
damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil
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 caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal
presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph
of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons
mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called up[on to
answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the
mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or director of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through
the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault
or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be
presumed to lie with the state.

"That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general
principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to
private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by
branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of
the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of
its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said
to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the
exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain
property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein
it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words
are employed, is one who receives a de nite and xed order or commission, foreign to
the exercise of the duties of his of ce if he is a special of cial) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof he executed the trust con ded
to him. this concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the
active administration and who in his own responsibility performs the functions which
are inherent in and naturally pertain to his of ce and which are regulated by law and the
regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the
principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a
damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a
public official charge with some administrative or technical office who can be
held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing
the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second
class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code." (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146)
It is, therefore, evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is
only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for
the acts of its agents, of cers and employees when they act as special agents within
the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally
liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by
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 reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating suf cient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This
matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

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