MERRITT VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

 It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of
Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft t Avenue and when he
was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning
toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the
Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue,
without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point
or from the post placed there.
 By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a
wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely, unconscious.
 According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent.
and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he
had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident
 As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolve the partnership he had
formed with the engineer, Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his
leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building.
 We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
 The Legislature passed Act No. 2457 effective February 3, 1915 enabling the plaintiff to file suit against the government. However the
government cannot be sued without its consent.

 Act No. 2457:

An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit.

Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;

Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the
claimant is entitled; and

Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E.
Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:

SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government
of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General
of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant
said Government at the same.

SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.”

 Both parties appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741,
together with the costs of the cause.

- Plaintiff said:

A. that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed
in the complaint," and
B. (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly
in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."’

- Defendant said:
A. the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital
was due to the negligence of the chauffeur;
B. (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur;
C. (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
Issues:

1. Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if
it exists.

Ruling:

1. All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant
case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our
duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly. The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against
the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, * * *." The Act of 2457 was
passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur,
who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also -fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
the collision.
2. The Court also found that the trial court erred in calculating the amount to be paid for the plaintiff’s loss of wages. There are two items
questioned that constitute the P14,741 (the original total amount to be given to the plaintiff):
A. P5,000 for permanent injuries. The Court found no justification to increase this amount.
B. P2,666 for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. According to records,
the plaintiff’s services as contractor amounted to P1,000 per month. However, the trial court limited the actual time only to the
time the plaintiff was confined which was 2 months and 21 days. The Court said it was clear that the plaintiff was incapacitated for
6 months, 2 of which was spent in the hospital and the remainder at his home. Thus, the amount of damages is P18,075.
3. It was also established that the government can only be made liable for the acts of its officers and employees when they act as special agents.
The chauffeur of the ambulance was not a special agent. The Supreme Court of Spain in defining the scope of Paragraph 5:

“It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state… (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)

That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first
article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly
or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain
fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations
the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held
in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct
and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only
in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state…

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the
sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties
of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)”

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself
legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by
legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature
and not with the courts. (The Court ruled that Legislature is responsible in finding whether the government is legally liable for the amount of damages.)