Merritt vs Government of the Philippines

This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff
suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff
was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of
P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision
between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur;
and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was
going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten
to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern
intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of
turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said
avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly
and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from
the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby,
who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering
from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head,
while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain was
had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for
performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little
hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer
skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which
reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg
showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the
point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the
brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his
mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult
mental labor, eSPECIALly when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical
condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been
discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility,
energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of
wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work
because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before
done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to
dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from
making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and
he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the
plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a)
P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages
during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which
would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so
found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the
time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we
think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of
six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the
remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We,
therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government,
the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of
Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by
the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that
said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the
Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the
behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede
its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action
in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is
also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued
by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent,
and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two
questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be
decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the
time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a
result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If
not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the
United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose
and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says
Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S.
vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal
injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by
the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information
calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of
the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In passing upon the question of the
state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said:
 No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches,
or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269;
Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St.
Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on
Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises
out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which
authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha
County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised
for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George
Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan
Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River
and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state
for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is
difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit.
It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the
estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of
the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only
question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from
suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare
liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would
have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8
L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as
follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not
allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein
contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to
such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in
both it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where
none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have
existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158;
Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In
construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore
unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well
recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New
York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had
sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising
from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not
previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a SPECIAL agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or
negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated,
by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the
damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment
of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that
each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation.
Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law
can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and
contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or
negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down
that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence,
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who
directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an
identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors
of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their
own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however,
because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when
the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a
subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts
through the agency of a SPECIAL agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence,
which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902
respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or
negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of
the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet
said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an
executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of
certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
SPECIAL agent (and a SPECIAL agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he
is a SPECIAL official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof,
he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which
are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations."
(Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a SPECIAL agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the
claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the
payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of
Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the
above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when
they act as SPECIAL agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of
the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether
the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the
Legislature and not with the courts.
Philippine National Railways vs IAC (G.R. No. 70547;

The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR)
coming from San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which
was on its way to Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's
express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three
(53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its
passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn
the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against
defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as affirmative
defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's
bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
At the pre-trial conference held on June 23, 1976, the parties agreed on a partial stipulation of facts and issues
which as amplified at the continuation of the pre-trial conference, on July 12, 1976, are as follows:
1 That plaintiff is a duly constituted corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission engaged in the business of transportation and operating public utility buses for the
public with lines covering Manila, Caloocan City, Quezon City, Malabon, Rizal, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Nueva Ecija, and particularly from Manila to Hagonoy, Bulacan and return in the
month of August, l974 passing thru the town of Calumpit Bulacan, temporarily while the bridge
at Hagonoy, Bulacan was under construction;
2 That defendant Philippine National Railways is a purely government owned and controlled
corporation duly registered and existing virtue of Presidential Decree No. 741, with capacity to
sue and be sued, and is likewise engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by trains and
buses and that, it operates a train line between San Fernando, La Union and Manila particularly
Passenger Express Train with Body No. 73, passing along the intersection of Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan, in going to San Fernando, La Union from Manila and return;
3. That on August 10, 1974, at about 1:20 o'clock in the afternoon, a Baliuag Transit Bus with
Body No. 1066 and Plate No. XS-929 PUB-Bulacan '74 was driven by its authorized driver
Romeo Hughes and PNR Train No. 73 was operated by Train Engineer Honorio Cabardo alias
Honorio Cirbado and at the railroad intersection at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan, said
passenger train No. 73 hit and bumped the right mid portion of the plaintiff's passenger bus No.
1066, while the rear portion of said bus was at the railroad track and its direction was towards
Hagonoy, Bulacan at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon;
4. That at the time of the collision there was a slight rainfall in the vicinity of the scene of the
accident and that there was at said intersection no bars, semaphores, and signal lights that would
warn the public of the approaching train that was about to pass through the intersection and
likewise there was no warning devices to passing trains showing that they were about to pass an
intersection in going to Manila from San Fernando, La Union and back;
5. That on account of said collision, the Baliuag Transit Bus with Body No. 1066 driven by
Romeo Hughes was damaged and eighteen (18) of its passengers died and the rest who were
more than fifty three (53) passengers suffered physical injuries;
6. That after the investigation the Chief of Police of Calumpit, Bulacan, filed a criminal case of
Reckless Imprudence Causing Multiple Homicide with Multiple Physical Injuries and Damage
to Property against Romeo Hughes y Parfan, driver of the Baliuag Transit bus docketed under
Crim. Case No. 2392; while the train Engineer Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado was not
included as an accused in said case, although his train No. 73 was the one that hit and bumped
the right rear portion of the said bus;
7. That immediately after the said accident Major Manuel A. Macam, Chief of the Municipal
Police of Calumpit, Bulacan, together with some of his policemen conducted an investigation of
the accident;
8. That at the railroad crossing in Calumpit, Bulacan where the accident took place there is no
railroad crossing bar, however, during the pre-war days there was a railroad crossing bar at said
intersection; that, however, there was only one sign of railroad crossing "Stop, Look and Listen"
 placed on a concrete slab and attached to a concrete post existing at the approach of the railroad
track from the Highway going towards Hagonoy, Bulacan and that after the said railroad track
there was a designated jeep parking area at the right side in the direction from the Highway to
Hagonoy Bulacan;
9. That the train No. 73 driven by Train Engineer Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado
stopped after passing the railroad crossing at a distance of about 50 meters from the said
intersection after the collision on August, 1974;
10. That the expected time of arrival of said Train No. 73 in Manila was 2:41 P.M. and its
departure time from San Fernando, La Union was 9:00 A.M. and its expected arrival at
Calumpit, Bulacan was 1:41 P.M. with no stop at Calumpit, Bulacan.
SIMPLIFICATION OF ISSUES
11. That the principal issue in the instant case is who between the driver Romeo Hughes of
Baliuag Transit, Incorporated and the train engineer Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado of
the Philippine National Railways was negligent or whether or not both are negligent; that
likewise which of said companies was negligent at said railroad intersection;
12. That another additional issue is whether the Baliuag Transit Incorporated has exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
On the aspect of whether the Philippine National Railways enjoys immunity from suit, respondent court initially
noted that an exculpation of this nature that was raised for the first time on appeal may no longer be entertained
in view of the proscription under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, apart from the fact that the
lawyer of petitioner agreed to stipulate inter alia that the railroad company had capacity to sue and be sued. This
being so, respondent court continued, PNR was perforce estopped from disavowing the prejudicial repercussion
of an admission in judicio. Even as the laws governing the creation and rehabilitation of the PNR were entirely
mute on its power to sue and be sued, respondent court nonetheless opined that such prerogative was implied
from the general power to transact business pertinent or indispensable to the attainment of the goals of the
railroad company under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4156 as amended by Republic Act No. 6366:
Sec. 4 General Powers — The Philippine National Railways shall have the following general
powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation law.
in conjunction with Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 741:
(b) To own or operate railroad transways, bus lines, trucklines, subways, and other kinds of land
transportation, vessels, and pipelines, for the purpose of transporting for consideration,
passengers, mail and property between any points in the Philippines;
Thus, respondent court utilized the doctrine of implied powers announced in National Airports Corporation vs.
Teodoro, Sr. and Philippine Airlines, Inc. (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), to the effect that the power to sue and be sued is
implicit from the faculty to transact private business. At any rate, respondent court characterized the railroad
company as a private entity created not to discharge a governmental function but, among other things, to operate
a transport service which is essentially a business concern, and thus barred from invoking immunity from suit.
In brushing aside petitioners' asseveration that the bus driver outraced the train at the crossing, respondent court
observed that the bus was hit by the train at its rear portion then protruding over the tracks as the bus could not
move because another truck at its front was equally immobile due to a jeep maneuvering into a nearby parking
area. Under these tight conditions, respondent court blamed the train engineer who admitted to have seen the
maneuvering jeep at a distance (TSN, July 28, 1976, page 18) and had the last clear chance to apply the brakes,
knowing fully well that the vehicles following the jeep could not move away from the path of the train. Apart
from these considerations, it was perceived below that the train was running fast during the entire trip since the
train stopped 190 meters from the point of impact and arrived at Calumpit, Bulacan earlier than its expected time
of arrival thereat.
Moreover, respondent court agreed with the conclusion reached by the trial court that the absence of a crossing
bar, signal light, flagman or switchman to warn the public of an approaching train constitutes negligence per the
pronouncement of this Court in Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company (59 Phil 758 [1934]).
Concerning the exercise of diligence normally expected of an employer in the selection and supervision of its
employees, respondent court expressed the view that PNR was remiss on this score since it allowed Honorio
Cabardo, who finished only primary education and became an engineer only through sheer experience, to
operate the locomotive, not to mention the fact that such plea in avoidance was not asserted in the answer and
was thus belatedly raised on appeal.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but respondent court was far from persuaded. Hence, the petition before Us
which, in essence, incorporates similar disputations anent PNR's immunity from suit and the attempt to toss the
burden of negligence from the train engineer to the bus driver of herein private respondent.
The bone of contention for exculpation is premised on the familiar maxim in political law that the State, by
virtue of its sovereign nature and as reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is insulated from suits without its
consent (Article 16, Section 3, 1987 Constitution). However, equally conceded is the legal proposition that the
acquiescence of the State to be sued can be manifested expressly through a general or special law, or indicated
implicitly, as when the State commences litigation for the purpose of asserting an affirmative relief or when it
enters into a contract (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 edition, page 33; Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
Eleventh Edition, 1962, page 34). When the State participates in a covenant, it is deemed to have descended
from its superior position to the level of an ordinary citizen and thus virtually opens itself to judicial process. Of
course, We realize that this Court qualified this form of consent only to those contracts concluded in a
proprietary capacity and therefore immunity will attach for those contracts entered into in a governmental
capacity, following the ruling in the 1985 case of United States of America vs. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487 [1985]; cited
by Cruz, supra at pages 36-37). But the restrictive interpretation laid down therein is of no practical worth nor
can it give rise to herein petitioner PNR's exoneration since the case of Malong vs. Philippine National Railways
(138 SCRA 63, [1985]); 3 Padilla, 1987 Constitution with Comments and Cases, 1991 edition, page 644),
decided three months after Ruiz was promulgated, was categorical enough to specify that the Philippine National
Railways "is not performing any governmental function" (supra, at page 68).
In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en banc, declared:
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune
from suit under Act No. 1510, its charter.
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and
Presidential Decree No. 741, provides that the PNR is a government instrumentality under
government ownership during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the
President of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 6366 provides:
Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. — The Philippine National Railways, being a
factor for socio-economic development and growth, shall be a part of the
infrastructure program of the government and as such shall remain in and under
government ownership during its corporate existence. The Philippine National
Railways must be administered with the view of serving the interests of the
public by providing them the maximum of service and, while aiming at its
greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation must be ensured so that
service can be rendered at the minimum passenger and freight prices possible.
The charter also provides:
Sec. 4. General powers. — The Philippine National Railways shall have the
following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of
the corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the
Corporation Law. (This refers to Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on
railroad corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its
corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and
be sued in any court.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends (Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 353, 51 L. 3d 834).
The public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority
could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the use
and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the Government (The
Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed. 129). (at pp.
65-66).
To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR for the purpose
of engaging in transportation, Malong continued to hold that:
. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the
PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not
become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766
of the Civil Code on common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which
the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203,
206; Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593).
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in a
private or nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the State (81 C.J.S. 1319).
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed
to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain
corporations created by the State for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the State.
The latter is true, although the State may own the stock or property of such a
corporation, for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the
State divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implicating consents
to suits against the corporation. (81 C.J.S. 1319).
The foregoing rule was applied to State Dock Commissions carrying on business relating to
pilots, terminals and transportation (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. U.S., 27 Fed. 2nd 370)
and to State Highways Commissions created to build public roads and given appropriations in
advance to discharge obligations incurred in their behalf (Arkansas State Highway Commission
vs. Dodge, 26 SW 2nd 879 and State Highway Commission of Missouri vs. Bates, 296 SW 418,
cited in National Airports case).
The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation (Bank of the U.S. vs.
Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L ed. 244, cited in Manila Hotel Employees Association vs.
Manila Hotel Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388). The Manila Hotel case also relied on the
following rulings:
By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character,
so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations.
When the State acts in its proprietary capacity, it is amenable to all the rules of
law which bind private individuals.
There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject, but when the
sovereign engages in business and the conduct of business enterprises, and
contracts with individuals, whenever the contract in any form comes before the
courts, the rights and obligation of the contracting parties must be adjusted upon
the same principles as if both contracting parties were private persons. Both
stand upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is merged in the dealer,
contractor and suitor (People vs. Stephens, 71 N.Y. 549).
It should be noted that in Philippine National Railways vs. Union de Maquinistas, etc., L-31948,
July 25, 1978, 84 SCRA 223, it was held that the PNR funds could be garnished at the instance
of a labor union.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could
not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the
obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental
function.
Thus, the National Development Company is not immune from suit. It does not exercise
sovereign functions. It is an agency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary or
business functions (National Development Company vs. Tobias, 117 Phil. 703, 705 and cases
cited therein; National Development Company vs. NDC Employees and Workers' Union, L-
32387, August 19, 1975, 66 SCRA 18l, 184).
Other government agencies not enjoying immunity from suit are the Social Security System
(Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals,
L-41299, February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 707) and the Philippine National Bank (Republic vs.
 Philippine National Bank, 121 Phil. 26). (at pp. 66-68).
We come now to the question of whether respondent court properly agreed with the trial court in imputing
negligence on the part of the train engineer and his employer.
It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the pre-trial hearings held for the purpose of stipulating on
crucial facts that the bus was hit on the rear portion thereof after it crossed the railroad tracks. Then, too the train
engineer was frank enough to say that he saw the jeep maneuvering into a parking area near the crossing which
caused the obstruction in the flow of traffic such that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of herein
private respondent were not able to move forward or to take the opposite lane due to other vehicles. The
unmindful demeanor of the train engineer in surging forward despite the obstruction before him is definitely
anathema to the conduct of a prudent person placed under the same set of perceived danger. Indeed:
When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of reasonable diligence commensurate with the
surroundings it should be apparent, to the company that a person on its track or to get on its track
is unaware of his danger or cannot get out of the way, it becomes the duty of the company to use
such precautions, by warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be reasonably necessary to
avoid injury to him. (65 Am. Jur., Second Edition. p. 649).
Likewise, it was established that the weather condition was characterized with intermittent rain which should
have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead
of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30 kilometers
per hour. If the train were really running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it
would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place of the accident (page 10, Brief for
Petitioners). All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that the
train engineer was negligent who, moreover, despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis the weather
condition including the presence of people near the intersection, could have obviated the impending collision
had he slackened his speed and applied the brakes (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918]).Withal, these
considerations were addressed to the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, was in a better position to
assign weight on factual questions. Having resolved the question of negligence between the train engineer and
the bus driver after collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter thus commands great
respect especially so in this case where respondent court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the court of
origin (Co vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 198; 206 [1991]); Amigo vs. Teves, 50 O.G. 5799; Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Fifth edition, page 353).
What exacerbates against petitioners' contention is the authority in this jurisdiction to the effect that the failure of
a railroad company to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public
of the passing train amounts to negligence (Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 [1934]).

Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan (G .R. No. 61516;

It would appear from the evidences that on July 25, 1978, herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III,
CFI--Dagupan City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a
National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole
located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be
hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, from July 25 to August 3,
1978 (or for a period of 16 days). She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses to the tune of
P 8,053.65 (Exh. H to H-60) or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced;
during the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only
on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has persisted even after her
discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on October 9, 1978, to the present. Despite her discharge from
the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the Court has actually observed that she has
difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet
reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office,
located near the city hall in Dagupan City. She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary
and other means of income, but since July 25, 1978 up to the present she has been deprived of said income as
she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several pounds as a result
of the accident and she is no longer her former jovial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social,
and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident.
Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr.
Antonio Sison of the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal (Exh. I; see also
Exhs. F, G, G-1 to G-19) have confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the fracture
and injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the mishap. On the other hand, Patrolman
Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap
and they have confirmed the existence of the manhole (Exhs. A, B, C and sub-exhibits) on the
sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time of the incident on July 25, 1978 which was partially
 covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. long by 1 1/2 feet wide or 42
cms. wide by 75 cms. long by 150 cms. deep (see Exhs. D and D-1).
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway
Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted
the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in
front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in
Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found
along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan
City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they
are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera
(Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a maintenance Engineer. In his answer
defendant Tangco expressly admitted in par. 7-1 thereof, that in his capacity as ex-officio
Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over National roads,
including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened.
On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court 4 reversed the lower court findings on the
ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control
or supervision" over Perez Boulevard. 5
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not
under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits
that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer
which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.
After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the appellate court, as well as
the arguments presented by the parties, we agree with those of the trial court and of the petitioner. Hence, we
grant the petition.
In this review on certiorari, we have simplified the errors assigned by the petitioner to a single issue: whether or
not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer
for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective
condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability
to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
6
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through
the City Engineer who has the following duties:
Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-There shall be a city engineer,
who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a
salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the following duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all
sources of water supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in
accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use of all private
systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their
connection with the public sewer system.
xxx
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues
and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board . 7 Thus
the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open
drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or
property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt
the city, as in the case at bar.8
The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189
applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works." 9
The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits that he exercises control or supervision over the said road.
But the city can not be excused from liability by the argument that the duty of the City Engineer to supervise or
control the said provincial road belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry
of Public Highway than as a city officer. This is because while he is entitled to an honorarium from the Ministry
of Public Highways, his salary from the city government substantially exceeds the honorarium.
We do not agree.
Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Highway Engineer, as
Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official for
Dagupan City, receives the following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the
Ministry of Public Highways; P 100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096,
respectively." 10 This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to
the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.11 Although these
last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and
hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in
question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00 should be
reduced to the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. In
determining actual damages, the court can not rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as to the amount.
Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous. 12
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the
determination of the amount is discretionary on the court.13 Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral
damages are in the nature of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for some
reason can not be proven. However, in awarding moral damages, the following should be taken into
consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts.14
(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the factual
basis for damages.15
(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the
Civil Code. 16
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner were proven. Witnesses
from the petitioner's place of work testified to the degeneration in her disposition-from being jovial to depressed.
She refrained from attending social and civic activities.17
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive. Her handicap was not permanent and
disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish
existed to warrant the award of damages,18 the moderating hand of the law is called for. The Court has time and
again called attention to the reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis, 19 resulting
in exhorbitant amounts.20
Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court 21 under preceding
jurisprudence, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P 20,000.00.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed out the basis:
To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the Court, through this case,
should serve warning to the city or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and
responsibility to their constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction work or
when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which are uncovered, to immediately
cover the same, in order to minimize or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.22
Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives, the end is more important
than the manner in which the work is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details
as misplaced flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting
accidents.
Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the trial court to the appellate court, the petitioner was
able to secure an order for garnishment of the funds of the City deposited with the Philippine National Bank,
from the then presiding judge, Hon. Willelmo Fortun. This order for garnishment was revoked subsequently by
the succeeding presiding judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and became the basis for the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration which was also denied. 23
We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court pending appeal was premature. We do not find any
good reason to justify the issuance of an order of execution even before the expiration of the time to appeal .24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the respondent Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and
amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts
awarded:
(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of
P 15,924 (namely P 8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P 7,420.00 as lost income
for one (1) year and P 450.00 as bonus); P 20,000.00 as moral damages and P 10,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
The attorney's fees of P 3,000.00 remain the same.
Municipality of San Juan vs . CA (G.R. No. 121920

Under a "Contract For Water Service Connections"2 entered into by and between the Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System (MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks System Construction
(KC, for short), the former engaged the services of the latter to install water service connections. Article 11
(Scope of Work), paragraph 2.01 of the agreement provides:
2.01 The CONTRACTOR agrees to install water service connections, transfer location of tapping to the nearest
main, undertake separation of service connection, change rusted connections, within the service area of the
MWSS specified in each job order covered by this Contract, from the water main up to the installation of the
verticals. Tapping of the service pipe connection and mounting of water meter shall be undertaken exclusively or
solely by the MWSS;
On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect
excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the
laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the respective houses of water concessionaires.
That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its workers under Project Engineer Ernesto Battad, Jr. to conduct the
digging operations in the specified place. The workers installed four (4) barricades made up of two-inch thick GI
pipes welded together, 1.3 meters wide and 1.2 meters high, at the area where the digging is to take place. The
digging operations started at 9 o’clock in the morning and ended at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon. The
workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after which they refilled the excavated portion of the
road with the same gravel and stone excavated from the area. At that time, only ¾ of the job was finished in view
of the fact that the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for
the water connections to the concessionaires.
Meanwhile, between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her
Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of
Santolan Road towards the direction of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. With her on board the car and
seated on the right front seat was Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road was flooded as it was
then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier
made excavations. As a result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured.
Thereupon, Priscilla Chan contacted Biglang-awa’s husband who immediately arrived at the scene and brought
his wife to the Cardinal Santos Hospital.
Dispatched to the scene of the accident to conduct an investigation thereof, Pfc. Felix Ramos of the Traffic
Division of the San Juan Police Station, upon arriving thereat, saw Priscilla Chan’s car already extracted from
the manhole and placed beside the excavated portion of the road. According to this police officer, he did not see
any barricades at the scene when he arrived less than an hour later. A Traffic Accident Investigation Report3 was
thereafter prepared and signed by Pfc. Ramos.
At the hospital, the attending physician, after having performed a close reduction and application of abduction
splint on Biglang-awa, placed a plastic cast on her right arm. Barring complications, the injury she suffered was
expected to heal in four (4) to six (6) weeks, although she must revisit her doctor from time to time for check-up
and rehabilitation. After some time, the plastic cast was removed. Biglang-awa sustained no deformity and no
tenderness of the area of the injury but she could not sleep on her right side because she still felt pain in that
portion of her body. A Medical Certificate4 on her injuries was issued by Dr. Antonio Rivera.
Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila
a complaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal
officials.
Later, Biglang-awa amended her complaint twice. In her second amended complaint, she included KC as one of
the defendants.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa adjudging MWSS and the
Municipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her. Dated 29 February 1992, the decision 5 dispositively
reads in full, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila and the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff
[Biglang-awa]. Both defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the amounts of:
(a) ₱18,389.55, for actual damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) ₱15,000.00, for moral damages;
(c) ₱10,000.00, for exemplary damages;
(d) ₱5,000.00, for attorney’s fees; and
(e) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Unable to accept the judgment, both Biglang-awa and the Municipality of San Juan went to the Court of Appeals
via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which appeal was thereat docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
38906.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in a decision dated 08 September 1995, affirmed with
modification that of the trial court, to wit:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED but modified as
follows:
1. The Appellees KC and MWSS and the Appellant San Juan are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to
[Biglang-awa] the amounts of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages, ₱50,000.00 by way of exemplary damages
and ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees, without prejudice to the right of the Appellee MWSS for
reimbursement from the Appellee KC under the Contract, Exhibit "3-MWSS":
2. The counterclaims of the Appellees and Appellant San Juan and the cross-claim of the latter are DISMISSED.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket supplied).
Therefrom, petitioner Municipality of San Juan came to this Court thru the present recourse, on its submissions
that:
I.
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT
HEREFORE DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT.
II.
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
With no similar recourse having been taken by the other parties, the Court shall limit itself to the liability or non-
liability of petitioner municipality for the injury sustained by Biglang-awa.
In denying liability for the subject accident, petitioner essentially anchored its defense on two provisions of laws,
namely: (1) Section 149, [1][z] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1983; and (2) Section 8, Ordinance 82-01, of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Petitioner maintains that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government Code, 6 it is obliged to provide for
the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
bridges, parks and other public places. Ergo, since Santolan Road is concededly a national and not a municipal
road, it cannot be held liable for the injuries suffered by Biglang-awa on account of the accident that occurred on
said road.
Additionally, petitioner contends that under Section 8, Ordinance No. 82-01, of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, which reads:
In the event of death, injury and/or damages caused by the non-completion of such works and/or failure of one
undertaking the work to adopt the required precautionary measures for the protection of the general public or
violation of any of the terms or conditions of the permit, the permittee/excavator shall assume fully all liabilities
for such death, injury or damage arising therefrom. For this purpose, the excavator/permittee shall purchase
insurance coverage to answer for third party liability,
only the Project Engineer of KC and MWSS can be held liable for the same accident.
The petition must have to be denied.
Jurisprudence7 teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 8 of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a
province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof. This, we made clear in City of Manila vs.
Teotico, et al9 :
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach
that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision"
over said street or road. x x x
It is argued, however, that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government Code, petitioner has control or
supervision only over municipal and not national roads, like Santolan Road.
Sadly, petitioner failed to take note of the other provisions of Section 149 of the same Code, more particularly
the following:
Section 149. Powers and Duties. – (1) The sangguniang bayan shall:
(bb) Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes; the
building and repair of tunnels, sewers, drains and other similar structures; erecting of poles and the use of
crosswalks, curbs and gutters therein, and adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes,
live wires and other similar hazards to life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for persons
suffering from them; (Underscoring supplied)
Clear it is from the above that the Municipality of San Juan can "regulate" the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes within its territorial jurisdiction.
Doubtless, the term "regulate" found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can only mean that petitioner
municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over all excavations for the laying
of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory.
We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, supra, of the Local Government Code, the
phrases "regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes",
and "adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards
to life and property", are not modified by the term "municipal road". And neither can it be fairly inferred from
the same provision of Section 149 that petitioner’s power of regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned
applies only in cases where such activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the
municipality’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for
the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made
on a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within its territorial jurisdiction.
We are thus in full accord with the following pronouncements of the appellate court in the decision under
review:
While it may be true that the Department of Public Works and Highways may have issued the requisite permit to
the Appellee KC and/or concessionaires for the excavation on said road, the Appellant San Juan is not thereby
relieved of its liability to [Biglang-awa] for its own gross negligence. Indeed, Evangeline Alfonso, the witness
for the Appellant San Juan unabashedly [sic] admitted, when she testified in the Court a quo, that even if the
Department of Public Works and Highways failed to effect the requisite refilling, the Appellant San Juan was
mandated to undertake the necessary precautionary measures to avert accidents and insure the safety of
pedestrians and commuters:
xxx
The [petitioner] cannot validly shirk from its obligation to maintain and insure the safe condition of the road
merely because the permit for the excavation may have been issued by a government entity or unit other than the
Appellant San Juan or that the excavation may have been done by a contractor under contract with a public
entity like the Appellee MWSS.
Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported lack of knowledge of the excavation and the
condition of the road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30, 1988 when the accident occurred. It
must be borne in mind that the obligation of the [petitioner] to maintain the safe condition of the road within its
territory is a continuing one which is not suspended while a street is being repaired ( Corpus Juris Secundum,
Municipal Corporations, page 120). Knowledge of the condition of the road and the defects and/or obstructions
on the road may be actual or constructive. It is enough that the authorities should have known of the aforesaid
circumstances in the exercise of ordinary care (City of Louiseville versus Harris, 180 Southwestern Reporter.
page 65). In the present recourse, Santolan Road and the Greenhills area coming from Ortigas Avenue going to
Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila is a busy thoroughfare. The gaping hole in the middle of the road of
Santolan Road could not have been missed by the authorities concerned. After all, the [petitioner] San Juan is
mandated to effect a constant and unabated monitoring of the conditions of the roads to insure the safety of
motorists. Persuasive authority has it that:
It is the duty of the municipal authorities to exercise an active vigilance over the streets; to see that they are kept
in a reasonably safe condition for public travel. They cannot fold their arms and shut their eyes and say they
have no notice. (Todd versus City of Troy, 61 New York 506). (Words in bracket supplied).
Nor can petitioner seek shelter on Section 8 of Ordinance 82-01 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Concededly, Section 8 of the Ordinance makes the permittee/excavator liable for death, injury and/or damages
caused by the non-completion of works and/or failure of the one undertaking the works to adopt the required
precautionary measures for the protection of the general public. Significantly, however, nowhere can it be found
in said Ordinance any provision exempting municipalities in Metro Manila from liabilities caused by their own
negligent acts. Afortiori, nothing prevents this Court from applying other relevant laws concerning petitioner’s
liability for the injuries sustained by Biglang-awa on that fateful rainy evening of 31 May 1988.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the appellate court AFFIRMED.
Quezon City Gov't vs. Dacara (G.R. No. 150304;

The CA summarized the facts in this manner:

"Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and
owner of '87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic), while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a
pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon
City government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered
extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
"Indemnification was sought from the city government (Record, p. 22), which however, yielded negative results.
Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter referred to as FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of his minor son,
Jr., filed a Complaint (Record, p. 1) for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as
defendants, before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101, Quezon City,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-233. FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less than ₱20,000.00 actual
or compensatory damages, ₱150,000.00 moral damages, ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages, and ₱20,000.00
attorney's fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him.
"In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses (Record, p. 11), defendants admitted the occurrence of
the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a moun[d] of soil and barricaded with
reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident on February
28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the
diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the
diggings was precisely because of the latter's negligence and failure to exercise due care." 5
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 101, Quezon City, rendered its Decision 6 dated
June 29, 1990. The evidence proffered by the complainant (herein respondent) was found to be sufficient proof
of the negligence of herein petitioners. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, 7 the latter were held liable as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises above considered, based on the quantum of evidence presented by the plaintiff which
tilts in their favor elucidating the negligent acts of the city government together with its employees when
considered in the light of Article 2189, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to indemnify the
plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages, ₱10,000.00 as moral damages,
₱5,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees and other costs of suit." 8
In their appeal to the CA, petitioners maintained that they had observed due diligence and care in installing
preventive warning devices, and that it was in fact the plaintiff who had failed to exercise prudence by driving
too fast to avoid the diggings. Moreover, the lower court allegedly erred in using Article 2189 of the Civil Code,
which supposedly applied only to liability for the death or injuries suffered by a person, not for damage to
property.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage
suffered by respondent.9 Noting the failure of petitioners to present evidence to support their contention that
precautionary measures had indeed been observed, it ruled thus:
"x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to show that they placed sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the dangers to life and limb under the
circumstances. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the [petitioners], namely Engr. Ramir Tiamzon,
Ernesto Landrito and Eduardo Castillo, that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not
be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress and prove the sufficiency and
adequacy of said contention."10
Further upholding the trial court's finding of negligence on the part of herein petitioners, the CA gave this
opinion:
"x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of [petitioners] was clear based on the investigation report
of Pfc. William P. Villafranca stating to the effect 'that the subject vehicle rammed into a pile of earth from a
deep excavation thereat without any warning devi[c]e whatsoever and as a consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost
control of his driven car and finally turned-turtle causing substantial damage to the same.' As a defense against
liability on the basis of quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family which
[petitioners] failed to establish in the instant case." 11
Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death or physical injury, the CA ruled in
the affirmative:
"x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to death or personal injury only as argued by
appellants in the case at bar applying the foregoing provisions. For, injury is an act that damages, harms or hurts
and mean in common as the act or result of inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain,
distress, or impairment. Injury is the most comprehensive, applying to an act or result involving an impairment
or destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness, or loss of something of value." 12
Hence, this Petition.13
etitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of moral damage suit (sic) the amount of ₱10,000.00.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of exemplary damage sin (sic) the amount of ₱5,000.00 and
attorney's fee in the [a]mount of ₱10,000.00.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred and/;or (sic) had acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to hold that respondent's son in the
person of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was negligent at the time of incident." 14
Because the issues regarding the liability of petitioners for moral and exemplary damages presuppose that their
negligence caused the vehicular accident, we first resolve the question of negligence or the proximate cause of
the incident.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Negligence
Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs
to alert the public of a roadside construction. They argue that the driver (Fulgencio Dacara Jr.) of respondent's
car was overspeeding, and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. 15 Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.16
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis
for their conclusions.17 The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that
petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and
substituting these with our own. The function of this Court is limited to the review of the appellate court's
alleged errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over again the factual evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.18 Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. 19 They have
not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review.
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower
court's finding, which we quote:
"Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life
and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging
done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign
perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night
where darkness is pervasive.
"Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that
its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat,
how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted
again, none was found at the scene of the accident.
xxxxxxxxx
"Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the attending
circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care
required to be observed.
xxxxxxxxx
"The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government
relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to
negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result
thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and
neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable." 20 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when
he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets
with light traffic, when not designated 'through streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should
be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 218521 of the Civil Code.22
These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident from the records
that they brought up for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration 23
of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well-
settled that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered
on review or appeal.24 To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would
trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. 25
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record,
clearly point to petitioners' negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent's car. No
adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
Second Issue:
Moral Damages
Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable only in the instances specified in Article 2219 26 of the
Civil Code. Although the instant case is an action for quasi-delict, petitioners contend that moral damages are not
recoverable, because no evidence of physical injury were presented before the trial court. 27
To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury --
whether physical, mental, or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. 28
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or
omission caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in
physical injury.29 This rule was enunciated in Malonzo v. Galang30 as follows:
"x x x. Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions 'quasi-delicts causing physical injuries,' as an instance when
moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are
excluded, excepting of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219)."
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondent's son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son
testified that he suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had
been left in the open without any warning device whatsoever.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such as a
medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.'s bare assertion of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article
2219(2) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim of respondent that his moral
sufferings were due to the negligence of petitioners. The Decision of the trial court, which summarizes the
testimony of respondent's four witnesses, makes no mention of any statement regarding moral suffering, such as
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. 31 Intended for the restoration of the psychological
or emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered,
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent and substantial
proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation are definite findings as
to what the supposed moral damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty
rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered. 32
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether in a civil 33 or a criminal
case34 -- in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. 35 The award of moral damages
must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental
sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. 36
Third Issue:
Exemplary Damages
Petitioners argue that exemplary damages and attorney's fees are not recoverable. Allegedly, the RTC and the CA
"did not find that petitioners were guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their duty and
responsibilities."37
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. 38 While granting them is subject to the discretion
of the court, they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages.39 In the case before us, respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that
petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual or
compensatory damages. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. The
question that remains, therefore, is whether exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory
damages.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if
the defendant acted with gross negligence. 40 Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a
presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their
carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the
person or property of others. 41 The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or
property. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of both the CA and the trial court. We quote
from the RTC Decision:
"Sad to state that the City Government through its instrumentalities have (sic) failed to show the modicum of
responsibility, much less, care expected of them (sic) by the constituents of this City. It is even more deplorable
that it was a case of a street digging in a side street which caused the accident in the so-called 'premier
city.'"421avvphi1.zw+
The CA reiterated the finding of the trial court that petitioners' negligence was clear, considering that there was
no warning device whatsoever43 at the excavation site.
The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to
install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. Considering further that the street was dimly
lit,44 the need for adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By carrying on the road diggings without
any warning or barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Indeed, the February 28,
1988 incident was bound to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear that under the circumstances, there is
sufficient factual basis for a finding of gross negligence on their part.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious
actions.45 Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender. 46 It must be
emphasized that local governments and their employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance of
roads and streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate
precautionary measures.
Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is justified only by public
service. Hence, local governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public
foremost in their agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very
parties responsible for endangering the public through such a rash and reckless act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED. No costs.
Genson vs. Adarle (G.R. No. 73928;

This is a Petition for review which seeks to set aside the decision in CA-G.R. No. 00783 on the ground that the
findings of the respondent Court of Appeals are based on misapprehension of facts and conflict with those of the
trial court and that the conclusions drawn therefrom are based on speculations and conjectures.
Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of junk and other unserviceable
government property located at the compound of the Highway District Engineer's Office of Roxas City. Private
respondent Eduardo Adarle was hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away scrap iron from the said
compound with a daily wage of P12.00 or about 312.00 a month.
On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, on a Saturday and a non-working day, while the private
respondent was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck inside the premises of the compound,
and while the bucket of the payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket suddenly fell
and hit Adarle on the right back portion of his head just below the nape of his neck. Adarle was rushed to the St.
Anthony Hospital, Roxas City. According to the medical certificate issued by the attending physician, the private
respondent suffered the following injuries:
1) Comminuted fracture of the vertebral body of 13 with extreme Kyphosis of the segment by x-
ray.
2) Cord compression 2nd to the injury with paralysis of the lower extremity, inability to defecate
and urinate. (E Exh. A, Exhibits for the plaintiff-appellant, Original Records.)
The medical certificate also reported that:
The patient recovered the use of his urinary bladder and was able to defecate 2 months after
surgery. He is paralyzed from the knee down to his toes. He can only sit on a wheel chair. The
above residual damage is permanent 2nd to the injury incurred by Mr. Adarle, he is still confined
in the Hospital. (idem)
While still in the hospital, the private respondent instituted the action below for damages against Arbatin, his
employer; Buensalido, the payloader operator; Candelario Marcelino, the civil engineer; and petitioner, the
Highway District Engineer.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put up the defense that he had no knowledge of or participation in
the accident and that, when it happened, he was not present in the government compound. Apart from the fact
that it was a Saturday and a non-working day, he was in Iloilo. As part of his evidence, the petitioner presented a
memorandum directed to a certain Mr. Orlando Panaguiton ordering the latter to take charge of the district until
his return (Exh. 1).
The trial court found that, with the exception of the petitioner, all of the defendants were present at the
Highway's compound when the accident occurred. However, it still adjudged the petitioner liable for damages
because the petitioner was supposed to know what his men do with their government equipment within an area
under his supervision.
Thus, on January 19, 1982, the trial court rendered a decision finding all the defendants liable for damages under
Articles 1172 and 2176 of the New Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this court orders the defendants to pay to plaintiff the amounts stated in the
complainant's prayer as follows:
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of 312.00 monthly
from September 8, 1979 until his release from the hospital.
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P7,410.63 for
hospital expenses up to January 14, 1980 and an additional amount for further hospitalization
until the release of plaintiff from the hospital;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of at least P100,000.00
as actual and compensatory damages, considering that plaintiff Eduardo Adarle is totally
incapacitated for any employment for life;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum for exemplary damages which we leave to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees. (pp. 129- 130, Original Records).
The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court and
further ordered the defendants to pay P5,000.00 exemplary damages. Defendant Candelario Marcelino was,
however, absolved from liability.
In its decision, the appellate court ruled:
That payloader owned by the Government, as found by the lower court, should not have been
operated that Saturday, September 8, 1979, a Saturday, a non-working holiday. There is no
official order from the proper authorities authorizing Arbatin and plaintiff to work and
Buensalido to operate the payloader on that day inside the Highway compound. Thereabouts, we
can logically deduce that Arbatin and plaintiff went to the compound to work with the previous
knowledge and consent of Highway District Engineer Jose E. Genson. And allowed him,
probably upon the request of Arbatin. We have noted that Genson testified that his office does
not authorize work on Saturdays.
Genson testified that he was in Iloilo from September 9 and 10, 1979. The accident occurred on
September 8, in the morning. In his answer, Genson did not allege his presence in Iloilo on
September 9 and 10 ... .
We fully concur with the lower court's conclusions regarding the physical presence of appellants
inside the compound on that fateful day, pursuant to a previous understanding with Arbatin for
plaintiff to work on the scrap iron and for Buensalido to operate the payloader inside the
compound. Arbatin and plaintiff would not go to the compound on that Saturday, if there was no
previous understanding with Genson and Buensalido.
The liability of Genson is based on fault, intentional and voluntary or negligent (Eleano v. Hill,
77 SCRA 106; Jimena v. Lincallo, 63 O.G. 11,15, 8 C. A.R. 2567). He gave permission to
Arbatin, plaintiff and Buensalido to work on Saturday, a non-working day, in contravention of
his office' rules and regulations outlawing work on Saturdays.. (pp. 29-30, Rollo)
In this present petition, the petitioner contends that the appellate court committed a palpable error when it ruled
that the petitioner was present when the accident happened and that he had given permission to the other
defendants to work on a Saturday, a non-working day. The petitioner argues that considering these were the facts
relied upon by the said court in holding that he was negligent and thus liable for damages, such a conclusion, is
without basis.
The petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in not holding that the suit against the petitioner
was, in effect, a suit against the government and, therefore, should be dismissed under the principle of non-
suability of the state.
As regards the petitioner's second contention, we hold that the petitioner's Identification as the Highway District
Engineer in the complaint filed by the private respondent did not result in the said complaint's becoming a suit
against the government or state.
In Belizar v. Brazas, (2 SCRA 526), we ruled that "the fact that the duties and positions of the defendants are
indicated does not mean that they are being sued in their official capacities, especially as the present action is not
one against the Government." Furthermore, the accident in the case at bar happened on a non-working day and
there was no showing that the work performed on that day was authorized by the government. While the
equipment used belongs to the Government, the work was private in nature, for the benefit of a purchaser of
junk. As we have held in the case of Republic v. Palacio (23 SCRA 899,906).
xxx xxx xxx
the ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract, and it is a well-entrenched rule in
this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is
liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts
complained of outside of such agent's regular duties (Merritt v. Insular Government, supra;
Rosete v. Auditor General, 81 Phil. 453) There being no proof that the making of the tortious
inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made liable therefor.
Therefore, the defense of the petitioner that he cannot be made liable under the principle of non-suability of the
state cannot be sustained.
With regard to the main contention of the petitioner that the appellate court based its conclusions on an
erroneous finding of fact, we agree with him that the appellate court's finding that he was present within the
premises when the accident happened is not supported by evidence indisputably showing that he was indeed
there.
Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence when the payloader's bucket fell on the head of
Mr. Adarle, any liability on his part would be based only on his alleged failure to exercise proper supervision
over his subordinates (See Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263, 267-268).
According to the trial court, Mr. Genson authorized work on a Saturday when no work was supposed to be done.
It stated that the petitioner should know what his men do with their government equipment and he should neither
be lax nor lenient in his supervision over them.
The petitioner contends that:
1. No evidence on record exists that Genson gave authority to Adarle and Arbatin, either verbally
or in writing, to enter the work inside the Highways Compound on September 8, 1979;
2. Genson never knew or met Arbatin until the trial of the case. This fact was never denied by
Arbatin nor rebutted by Adarle. How then could Genson have ordered or allowed Arbatin to
enter the Highways Compound with Adarle?
3. Adarle himself repeatedly admitted that Arbatin, his employer, gave him the instructions to
enter the compound, thus:
Q. Now particularly on September 8, 1979, did Arbatin ask you to go to the
compound in the Highway?
A. Yes sr.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did he say that to you?
A. We went to the Highway compound for many times already and that was the
time when I met the incident.
Q. The particular day in question September 8. 1979, did you see Arturo Arbatin
and he asked you to go the compound on that day?
A. That date was included on the first day when "he instructed us to gather
scrap iron until that work could be finished." (pp. 25-26, tsn., October 10, 1980)
(Emphasis supplied)
Q. Who told you to work there?
A. "Through the instruction of Arturo Arbatin" (pp. 32, tsn., Oct. 10, 1980)
(Emphasis supplied) (pp. 12-13, Rollo).
Insofar as work on a Saturday is concerned, and assuming Mr. Genson verbally allowed it, we see nothing wrong
in the petitioner's authorizing work on that day. As a matter of fact, it could even be required that the hauling of
junk and unserviceable equipment sold at public auction must be done on non-working days. The regular work of
the District Engineer's office would not be disturbed or prejudiced by a private bidder bringing in his trucks and
obstructing the smooth flow of traffic and the daily routine within the compound. Obviously, it would also be
safer for all concerned to effect the clearing of the junk pile when everything is peaceful and quiet.
There is no showing from the records that it is against regulations to use government cranes and payloaders to
load items sold at public auction on the trucks of the winning bidder. The items were formerly government
property. Unless the contract specifies otherwise, it may be presumed that all the parties were in agreement
regarding the use of equipment already there for that purpose. Of course, it would be different if the junk pile is
in a compound where there is no equipment for loading or unloading and the cranes or payloaders have to be
brought there.
There is likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in tort law to apply. Buensalido was not
working overtime as a government employee. It is doubtful if the district engineer can be considered an
"employer" for purposes of tort liability who may be liable even if he was not there. No evidence was presented
to show that an application for overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's office was
ever filed. It is more logical to presume that Buensalido, the operator of the payloader, was trying to earn a little
money on the side from the junk buyer and that his presence in the compound on that Saturday was a purely
private arrangement. From the records of this case, we are not disposed to rule that a supervisor who tolerates his
subordinates to moonlight on a non-working day in their office premises can be held liable for everything that
happens on that day. It would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin brought his own payloader operator and
perhaps, his own equipment but we are not dealing with sound office practice in this case. The issue before us is
subsidiary liability for tort comitted by a government employee who is moonlighting on a non-working day.
This Court ruled in Dumlao v. Court of Appeals (114 SCRA 247, 251):
Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith, (Mindanao realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814) or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. (the Philippine Racing Club v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-11844, August
31, 1960) The question, therefore, is whether petitioner did act in any of the manner aforesaid.
Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of the respondent Court of Appeals, he was not
sued in his personal capacity, but in his official capacity. Neither was malice or bad faith alleged
against him in the complaint, much less proven by the evidence, as the respondent court made no
 such finding of malice or bad faith.
Examining the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the evidence it would indeed be
correct to say that petitioner was sued in his official capacity, and that the most that was imputed
to him is act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross indifference in the performance of his
official duties. Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is more was not
convincingly proven.
According to the respondent court, "Genson and Buensalido divested themselves of their public positions and
privileges to accomodate an acquaintance or probably for inordinate gain." (p. 31, Rollo).
There is no showing from the records that Genson received anything which could be called "inordinate gain." It
is possible that he permitted work on a Saturday to accomodate an acquaintance but it is more plausible that he
simply wanted to clear his compound of junk and the best time for the winning bidder to do it was on a non-
working day.
At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part of Genson to hold him liable for the acts
of Buensalido and Arbatin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint against Jesus Genson is DISMISSED.
Belizar vs Brazas (G.R. No. L-15992;

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar dated June 6, 1959, dismissing the
complaint filed before it.
On April 21, 1959, Pedro Ty Belizar filed a complaint against Florencio Brazas, Felix Hilario, Lucio Baldonilo
alleging that he is operating the Samar Express Transit; that defendants are being used in their capacity as
employees (of the Bureau of Public Highways); that due to their gross negligence in not providing the ferry boat
with safety devices, one of his auto-trucks, while being transported from one bank of the Taft River, Taft, Samar,
to the other, fell into the river and was submerged in water for over 30 hours; that as a consequence thereof, he
suffered actual and moral damages and had to hire counsel to prosecute this action. He therefore prays for
payment to him by the defendants of said damages and attorney's fees.
On May 14, 1959, defendant Felix Hilario, on his own behalf, filed his answer, denying the material allegations
of the complaint and alleging as special defense that he is working only under the instructions of his superiors.
On May 19, 1959, defendants Lucio Baldonilo, Felix Balato, Teodoro Balato and Todesco Cebuano filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that they are not the real parties
in interest. After an opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiff, the remaining defendant Florencio Brazas filed
another motion to dismiss on May 20, 1959, claiming that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the
defendants because they are being sued in their official capacities and therefore the claim for damages should be
directed against the State.
Acting upon the motions to dismiss, the lower court on June 6, 1959, dismissed the complaint, and against this
order, the plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal directly to this Court.
The only issue before this Court is the correctness of the order appealed from.
It is apparent from the records that although the Government is the one operating the ferry boat, from which
plaintiffs truck fell, because of the absence of safety devices, the plaintiff has elected to sue the defendant
employees personally for their negligent acts under the doctrine of quasi-delict. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
provides for the liability of an employer for the tortuous acts of his employees. This, however, does not exempt
the employees from personal liability, especially if there are no persons having direct supervision over them, or
if there is proof of the existence of negligence on their part. So the injured party can bring an action directly
against the author of the negligent act or omission, although he may sue as joint defendants such author and the
person responsible for him (7 Salvat 80, quoted in V Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1959 edition, p. 520). The provisions of Article 1733 of the Civil Code and the decision
in the case of the Manila Railroad Co. vs. La Compania Trasatlantica and Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil.
875, cited in the order appealed from refer to an order based upon a contract of transportation. The present action
being based on torts, said authorities are not applicable thereto.
The fact that the duties and positions of the defendants are indicated does not mean that they are being sued in
their official capacities, especially as the present action is not one against the Government.
In view of the foregoing we find that the dismissal of complaint is not justified, and for this reason, we hereby
set aside the order of dismissal appealed from and remanded the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings. With costs against the defendants-appellees.
Varela vs. Revalez, et al. (G.R. No. 171705;

Petitioner Eduardo G. Varela (Varela) was the mayor of Cadiz City. He created a reorganization committee. On
22 September 1998, he submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cadiz City the committee’s "Proposed
Reorganizational Structure and Staffing Pattern of Cadiz City." On the same day, 22 September 1998, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod approved without modification and without hearing the proposal. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 98-112 authorizing and appropriating funds for the reorganization of the city
government. Resolution No. 98-112 declared all positions in the city government vacant, except elective
positions and positions in the city and assistant city treasurer. On 15 October 1998, Varela signed Resolution No.
98-112.
On 10 November 1998, Varela gave notices of termination to the city government employees, informing them
that their employment would end at the close of business hours on 31 December 1998. The employees opposed
and questioned the legality of Resolution No. 98-112. Varela ignored them.
Varela created a placement committee with City Administrator Philip G. Zamora, "Delina, Negosa, Jimmy
Navarro, Jerry Batislaon and Napud" as members. The committee allegedly met three times.
On 31 December 1998, Varela again gave notices of termination to the city government employees, informing
them that their employment would end at the close of business hours on 31 December 1998. On 4 January 1999,
the employees tried to report for work but were barred from entering their offices.
Among those laid off was Community Affairs Officer IV Ramon Borromeo (Borromeo). His department, the
special services department, was replaced by the community and barangay affairs division. The head of the
community and barangay affairs division performed the same functions as the head of the special services
department. Three new positions were created in the community and barangay affairs division. The three new
positions were given to Oscar Magbanua (Magbanua), Moises Señoren (Señoren), and Santos Ortega (Ortega).
Magbanua, Señoren and Ortega were political supporters of Varela and defeated barangay captain candidates.
Around half of the 101 employees of the city health department were laid off. Those laid off were the same ones
who filed a case, involving the magna carta for health workers, against Varela. They were also perceived not to
have voted for Varela as mayor.
On 12 January 1999, Ma. Daisy G. Revalez and 40 other city government employees filed with the RTC a
complaint4 against Varela for the declaration of nullity of Resolution No. 98-112 and for damages. In a motion 5
dated 29 January 1999, 47 other city government employees intervened. In the complaint, the employees stated
that, "due to the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation." 6
The RTC’s Ruling
In its 20 June 2001 Decision, the RTC declared Resolution No. 98-112 void and ordered Varela to pay the
government employees ₱10,000 each for moral damages, ₱200,000 attorney’s fees, ₱20,000 litigation expenses,
and court appearance fees at ₱3,000 per hearing. The RTC found that Varela acted in bad faith. The Court held:
There is no question that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cadiz City is the legislative arm of the local
government unit and as such it possesses the power to enact the questioned resolution. Plaintiffs however
challenge the manner Res. 98-112 was enacted, and the "indecent haste" that accompanied its passage. The
proposal emanated from the office of defendant mayor and in a short time after its submission the measure was
passed. The requisite deliberations, if at all there was one, could hardly be considered adequate and could best be
described as perfunctory. The minutes of the SP say it all. The deliberations reflected a lackluster effort and a
wimpish attempt by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to justify the grant to the mayor of legislative
authority to carry out the reorganization. There absolutely was no public hearing. The proposal coming as it did
from the mayor, was a fait accompli, a done deal in a manner of speaking. x x x
xxxx
Careful examination of the evidence submitted by the defendant, however, would reveal a systematic
effort to purge the city government of personnel who opposed the mayor politically, or disagreed with him
in his policies. Furthermore, perusal of the minutes of the deliberations of the Sangguniang Panlungsod reveals
that the City of Cadiz was not in dire financial straits necessitating radical measures like mass lay-off of
personnel. x x x
x x x The City of Cadiz as of 1998, was not in financial extremis. It had the money, the resources to fund
the salaries of personnel. x x x [Varela] even ignored the concern of a city councilor who said that at that
time (1998) the City already lacked the required personnel, and so why abolish certain positions? The
defendant mayor simply gave the assurance that they can create any position when the need arises and the
city has the money. This statement betrayed the real intentions of the defendant insofar as the
reorganization is concerned.
x x x The Mayor did not even explain what basic services would be affected. As a matter of fact, the office
hardest hit and greatly affected by the mass layoff was the health services department where 50 or so of the 101
personnel complement were laid off. Does it mean that the delivery of health services is the least of the priorities
of Cadiz City? Or does it mean that health service from the point of view of the defendant city mayor is not a
basic service? The truth of the matter is that the health workers of Cadiz filed a case against the mayor for
his refusal to implement provisions of the Magna Carta for Health Workers. Talk of vindictiveness. The
poor health workers laid off were on the receiving end of the ire of the defendant mayor. There seemed to
be no rhyme or reason to the reorganization scheme.
xxxx
Was the reorganization of the Cadiz City government under Res. 98-112, done in good faith? The testimony of
Ramon Borromeo, which is uncontradicted, will show the true intent of the reorganization, and whether or not it
was done in good faith:
"Q (Atty. Lobrido) – What about your position, Mr. Witness?
A My position as Community Affairs Officer was abolished but instead an Executive Assistant IV was made
under the Division Head of the Community and Barangay Affairs Division.
Q What is the function of the Community and Barangay Affairs Unit?
A It performs the same function as that of the Community Affairs Unit of which I am the Division Head as
Community Affairs Officer IV.
Q Considering that you were laid off who took over your function?
A The Executive Assistant IV, but considering that the position is coterminous with that of the mayor, the
appointment of Executive Assistant IV was disapproved by the Civil Service Commission as head of the
Community Affairs Unit and the present situation as of now is that the community Affairs and Barangay Unit is
without a division head and that three new positions were created.
Q Who were appointed to the three new positions you mentioned a while ago?
A Those appointed are Oscar Magbanua, Moises Señoren, and Santos Ortega.
Q Why do you know these three persons?
A Because they are supporters of the defendant city mayor and also because they are barangay captains who
were defeated in the last barangay elections. (TSN-Cerbo, pp. 8-10, May 3, 2000).
From the afore-quoted testimony it is clear that the abolition of the office of Mr. Borromeo in the guise of
reorganization was not done in good faith. The abolition was done for "political reasons," (Arao vs. Luspo,
L-23982, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 722). As stated in Urgello, if the abolition merely resulted in placing another
person or appointee with a different designation or name but substantially the same duties, then it will be
considered a device to unseat the incumbent. Clearly the reorganization is not genuine and it is nothing but a ruse
to defeat the constitutionally protected right of security of tenure.
xxxx
Since all the offices of the personnel of Cadiz City were declared vacant, and notices of initial termination sent
on November 10, 1998, the placement Committee barely had twenty (20) days to submit a final report to
defendant mayor. With 741 personnel to be reevaluated and screened, plus other new applicants, the committee
did not have enough time to do their work as envisioned. The Committee had to screen and evaluate all
applications to about 649 positions included in the new plantilla. Notwithstanding time constraints, the
Committee did not meet until November 17, barely two (2) weeks from their deadline. Subsequently they met
three (3) times. On their first meeting, the report states, the placement Committee merely agreed to ask the
defendant mayor to turn over to the Committee all the application letters. Nothing by way of screening or
evaluation was done that day. On the second meeting November 18, the applications were "lumped" in bundles
or files, and segregated by department. Then they suggested to borrow the qualification standards from the
Human Resource Management Office. Due to time constraints, it was suggested that the screening should start
immediately, and they agreed to meet November 19, 1998. As of the second meeting the screening and
evaluation had barely began. On November 19, 1998 the committee met with Mr. Zamora suggesting that
qualification standards be used mainly eligibility performance rating, education and attainment, experience and
awards and training received. Mr. Napud suggested that the department heads be interviewed. As of November
19, the committee had not started its deliberations and screening, but lo and behold Mr. Zamora came up with a
complete list in time for the last meeting. On November 29, 1998, Mr. Zamora presented to the members of the
committee the list of employees selected by the Placement Committee. Then the list was submitted to the mayor.
These were reflected in Minutes of the meeting of the Placement Committee.
It seems incredulous that Mr. Philip Zamora, designated to represent defendant mayor, would not be able to
recall what transpired during the deliberations of the placement committee. Unless it is shown that Mr. Zamora
suffered severe bouts of amnesia, it would be the height of tomfoolery to accept that he would not be able to
recall the significant highlights of the meetings. Which can only lead this Court to the inescapable conclusion
that the minutes (Exhibits 15 to 15-C) were fabricated and contrived, and done after the fact. x x x
x x x Why would Philip Zamora present a list of employees selected to members of the Placement Committee
and tell them this is the result of their evaluation? Were not the members of the committee the ones who
evaluated and selected the employees? The logical manner that should have taken place would be that the
committee members themselves would submit the list to the chairman telling him that this was the result of their
evaluation and screening and they were ready to submit the list to the mayor. As it appears the list was a done
deal, a fait accompli, and the members were merely told to put their imprimatur to it. The truth of matter
however, as can be gleaned from Mr. Zamora’s testimony, is that no meetings were ever conducted by the
placement committee. Which explains Mr. Zamora’s memory lapses. Nothing of the sort happened. What
happened was that the minutes were hastily produced as an afterthought and later passed on as the real thing.
The entire proceedings was [sic] a sham, a rigmarole intended to put a stamp of legitimacy to what
otherwise was a well calculated, well planned scheme to rid Cadiz City of employees who were the political
opponents of the defendant mayor. The ploy was to use the law as a subterfuge to defeat the security of tenure
clause of the constitution. On top of this masquerade, the defendant city mayor did not show any
compunction or any hesitation to ram the reorganization down the throats of plaintiffs who resisted the
move and they actually complained. He did not give them the benefit of the doubt, nor listened to their
plea for justice. He simply ran roughshod over all of them discarding any pretense to uphold due process
of law. It was shocking no less to the 166 plaintiffs who become [sic] sacrificial lambs in the altar of
political convenience and expediency. This is anathema in a democratic system where the rule of law reigns
supreme.7 (Emphasis supplied)
Cadiz City Chief Executive Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., through the Office of the City Legal Officer, filed with
the RTC a motion8 to clarify who between Varela, in his personal capacity, and Cadiz City was liable for the
payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and court appearance fees. In its 26 July 2001
Order,9 the RTC held that, "it is the municipal corporation which is liable for the acts of its officers committed
while in the performance of official duties."10
Cadiz City, through the Office of the City Legal Officer, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In its 17 August 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC’s 20 June 2001
Decision. The Court of Appeals held that Varela was personally liable for the payment of moral damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and court appearance fees. It reduced the amounts of attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses from ₱200,000 to ₱100,000 and from ₱20,000 to ₱10,000, respectively, and deleted the
award of court appearance fees. The Court of Appeals held that:
OUR jurisprudence is replete with cases involving the issue of whether or not a public officer may be held liable
for damages in the performance of their [sic] duties, to quote:
"A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which,
being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions."
"Settled is the principle that a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction."
In addition, Book I, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides, to quote:
"Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. — (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. x x x"
In the case at bar, the court a quo found that bad faith attended the performance of the official acts of the
original defendant, Eduardo G. Varela. x x x
WE find no reason to disturb the finding of bad faith by the court a quo considering that the same was amply
supported by evidence.11
Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Varela raises as issue that, "THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE
PETITIONER PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
LITIGATION EXPENSES AS THE PETITIONER WAS SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL, AND NOT IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY."12 Varela states that:
All the proceedings in the lower court show beyond question that the petitioner was charged in his official
capacity as then mayor of the real party-defendant, the respondent City of Capiz.1awphil
This is expressly shown by the very title, caption and allegations of private respondents’ complaint dated January
12, 1999. The fact that petitioner was sued in his representative and official capacity was not contested, and, in
fact, admitted by the parties.13
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. In the complaint, the employees stated that,
"due to the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation." The State can never be the author of illegal
acts.
The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City. It did not categorically state that Varela was
being sued in his official capacity. The identification and mention of Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City did not
automatically transform the action into one against Varela in his official capacity. The allegations in the
complaint determine the nature of the cause of action.
In Pascual v. Beltran,14 the Court held that:
[I]n the case at bar, petitioner is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State,
can never be the author of any wrongful act. The Complaint filed by the private respondent with the RTC
merely identified petitioner as Director of the Telecommunications Office, but did not categorically state
that he was being sued in his official capacity. The mere mention in the Complaint of the petitioner’s
position as Regional Director of the Telecommunications Office does not transform the action into one
against petitioner in his official capacity. What is determinative of the nature of the cause of action are the
allegations in the complaint. It is settled that the nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to
be determined not by the claim of the party filling [sic] the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by
the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 17 August 2005 Decision and 27
February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73212.
Alzua vs Johnson (G.R. No. 7317;

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila sustaining a demurrer to the
complaint filed in this action on the ground that the facts stated therein do not constitute a cause of action.
A copy of the complaint, omitting the voluminous exhibits thereto Attached, is set out in full in the margin, and
for convenience will be identified as marginal note A.1
The complaint charges the defendant, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, with
corruption and misconduct in office of the gravest character. The damages which plaintiff Alzua seeks to recover
in this section are alleged to have resulted from the entry by the court of an alleged erroneous judgment in a
former action to which Alzua was a party defendant. The error which is alleged was committed by the court in
entering that judgment, is attributed to the alleged false and misleading statement of the facts of the case which
is set out in the written opinion upon which the judgment of the court was based. The complaint specifically
charges the defendant, the writer of that opinion, with having willfully, maliciously, and in bad faith, perverted
and misstated the facts set out therein for the purpose of deceiving the other members of the court to whom the
opinion was submitted for signature; and is further changed, that this was but one of series of malicious and
wrongful acts whereby the defendant succeeded in deceiving his associates, and induced them to sign the order
directing the entry of the alleged erroneous judgment. As necessary corollary to the surmises, conjectures, and
specific charges of wrongdoing set out in the complaint, if these surmises, conjectures, and specific charges are
well founded, the four members of this court whose signatures are attached to that opinion together with that of
the defendant, must have signed the opinion with no personal knowledge of the contents of the record submitted
to them for adjudication, and without having read the briefs of counsel, relying wholly upon the alleged false and
misleading statement of the facts prepared by the defendant as the basis for the judgment which it is alleged was
erroneously entered by the court.
We need hardly say that in sitting in judgment upon a complaint which thus boldly attacks the good name and
fame of one of our associates, and which indirectly reflects upon the credit and reputation of the whole court, we
keenly recognize the delicacy of our position; and that had we any discretion so to do, we would decline to take
part in the discussion and decision of the questions submitted on the appeal. But our duty, as members of the
court of last resort in these Islands, demands that in this case, as in all other cases duly submitted to us for
adjudication, we proceed, in the language of our solemn oath of office, to "administer to justice without respect
to persons, and with equal right to the rich and to the poor" and that we "faithfully and impartially discharge and
perform all the duties incumbent upon us, as members of the court, according to the best of our ability and
understanding, agreeably to the laws of the Philippine Islands."
We are, however, in some sort relieved of the extreme embarrassment to which we might otherwise be subjected
by the exceptional character of the allegations and charges set out in the complaint:
(1) By the knowledge that our action herein is subject to review by a higher court;
(2) By the fact that counsel, upon submitting the case on appeal, formally advised the court that it was
submitted for judgment without any object to the participation therein of any of the members of the court
 whose signatures are here to attached; and
(3) Because the case is before us in such form that we can fully and completely disposed off all the
issues involved, without being called upon to decide any difficult, doubtful or certain questions of fact;
and because, without any doubts or misgivings as to the correctness of our conclusions, we are
unanimously of opinion not only that the plaintiff has no legal right to maintain this action, even if the
truth of all her charges of official misconduct and wrongdoing on the part of the defendant be admitted;
but that an examination of the complaint, together with the exhibits incorporated therein, clearly
discloses that even if plaintiff could be permitted to maintain this action, she has no just claim against
the defendant; that she did not as alleged, suffer the damages complained of, or any damages whatever;
that the material and relevant facts well pleaded in the complaint do not sustain or justify the surmises,
conjectures, inferential allegation and specific charges of misconduct on the part of the defendant
contained therein: that on the contrary the complaint, read with the exhibits and court files which are
incorporated therein, clearly discloses facts which justify us in holding that the defendant was not guilty
of any misconduct or wrongdoing in connection with the entry of the judgment in question or the
litigation in the course of which it was rendered; that his intervention in the adjudication of the causes
mentioned in the complaint was had in the due and proper performance of his duty; that a failure or
neglect on his part to do each and all of the acts complained of substantially in manner and form as he
did in fact do them, would have rendered him liable to a well-founded charge dereliction in the
performance of the duties of his office as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands; and, finally, that the two separate final judgments entered by this court in the causes referred to
in the complaint, which are alleged to have been erroneously entered at the instigation of the defendant,
were justly and lawfully entered, and adjudicated the issues involved in each of them "according to the
very right of the cause" and agreeably to the laws of the Philippine Islands."
It is hardly possible that any one can be better informed than are we as to the truth in regard to the extended
litigation in this court which culminated in the alleged erroneous judgment. Certainly no one can be in better
position than are the members of this court to interpret correctly the various incidents of that litigation as they
are disclosed by our own records. Nevertheless, this case having been submitted to us for a review of the action
of the court below in sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, and that demurrer admitting, as it does, the truth of
all the material and relevant facts which are well pleaded; we have taken scrupulous care to decide the appeal
thus submitted, not upon any matter of our own knowledge which could not have been known to the court below,
but strictly upon the facts discloses by the complaint, aided only by those additional facts of which the court
below might and should be taken judicial notice.
Counsel for Alzua, the real plaintiff and appellant in this action, and who will be referred to hereinafter as the
'plaintiff," contend that the judgment of the lower court sustaining the demurrer should be reversed because, as
counsel contend, if the truth of the allegations contained in the complaint be admitted, it appears that she
suffered damages, actual and special, amounting to some P65,000 as the result of the entry of an erroneous
judgment against her for the sum of P12,000 by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in a certain action to
which she was a party defendant, to satisfy which she was compelled, as she alleges, to sell certain valuable real
estate at a great sacrifice; and because, as counsel contend, this erroneous judgment was rendered by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as a result of the unlawful and malicious intervention of the defendant
in the various proceedings had in this court leading up to its entry. The alleged unlawful acts of the defendant to
which the complaint directs the attention of the court consists of an alleged misstatement and perversion of the
facts developed by the record which is set out in his written opinion in the case wherein the alleged erroneous
judgment was entered, and a like misstatement of the facts developed in the record which is set out in his written
opinion in a prior case intimately connected therewith; also the striking out with pen and ink by the defendant of
the word "affirmed" and the substitution therefor of the word "revoked" in the original order directing entry of
judgment in the earlier case, and the issuance by him, at the same time, of directions to the clerk of the court to
suspend the execution of the order thus amended, until the further order of the court. The complaint charges that
the intervention by the defendant in these proceedings was actuated throughout by an intent to injure the plaintiff
in this action; that the statement of facts set out in the opinions written by him, upon which the judgments in
those cases were entered, were false, and made by the defendant knowing them to be false; that the amendment
made to the order directing to the entry of judgment in the first cause by striking out the word "affirmed" and
substituting therefor the word "revoked," was made by the defendant surreptitiously, unlawfully, without
consulting with associates, and with intent to injure the plaintiff in this action; that it constituted a willful and
deliberate falsification of the records of this court by the defendant in this action; and that the defendant, thus
unlawfully and maliciously intervening in the proceedings of the court upon the appeals in the two above-
mentioned causes, procured the entry of the erroneous judgment from which sprung the damages complained of
by the plaintiff in this action. Counsel contend that the truth of these allegation being admitted by the demurrer,
judgment should be rendered against the defendant for damages: P40,000 as actual damages, that being the
alleged value of the real estate which plaintiff Alzua was compelled to sell in order to satisfy the alleged
erroneous judgment against her for P12,000; P25,000 by way of special damages because of the loss of profits
from this property of which she was thus deprived from the date of its sale to the date of the institution of this
action; and P50,000 by way of punitive damages, which plaintiff claims, apparently on the ground of the
malicious character of the alleged wrong done her by the defendant.
We do not think that these contentions of counsel for appellant are supported by the facts well pleaded in the
complaint; and, on the contrary, we are unanimously of opinion, and so hold, that the demurrer to the complaint
was properly sustained by the court below. Our conclusions are based on several grounds, each of which is
sufficient in itself to sustain the action of the trial judge. We shall, therefore, set out the various grounds on
which our judgment rests very summarily in the fist place; and, thereafter, we shall examine each of them in
greater detail and under separate heads.
First. We hold that, admitting the truth of all the allegation set out in the complaint, and of all the surmises,
conjectures, inferenial allegations, and specific charges of official misconduct and wrong doing, and of malice,
bad faith, and intent to injure the plaintiff contained therein, the defendant, nevertheless, is not liable to respond
in a civil action for the damages which it is alleged were occasioned thereby.
Second. We hold the complaint itself, read together with the exhibits and court records which are incorporated
therein, clearly discloses that the judgment, out of which plaintiff claims that the alleged damages sprung, was
not erroneously entered as alleged in the complaint, and therefore that the plaintiff has no claim for damages
against the defendant; in other words, that the facts set out in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action.
Third. We hold that the complaint itself, read together with the exhibits and court records which are incorporated
therein, sets forth facts which clearly demonstrate that the surmises, conjectures, inferential allegations, and
specific charges of official misconduct and wrongdoing directed against the defendant in the complaint are not
well founded. We hold also, in this connection, that the allegations in the complaint of malice, bad faith, and
intent on the part of the defendant to injure the plaintiff are not sustained, and on the contrary are directly
controverted, by the specific averments of facts set out in the complaint when read together with the court
records specially referred to therein. We conclude, therefore, that proof of the material and relevant facts well
pleaded in the complaint would not sustain the charges of bad faith, malice, and wicked intent set out therein,
which on plaintiff's own theory of the case must be shown to exist she can establish a cause of action; or in other
words, that the facts set out in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action.
In the course of his argument, senior counsel for the plaintiffs formally requested this court, whatever action it
might take on his appeal, to set out in its opinion a plain statement of the facts connected with the litigation
under review in this action, as those facts are known to the court. As we understood him, however, later on in the
discussion and in colloquy with counsel for appellee, he withdrew, or rather undertook to qualify this request by
limiting the scope of the statement to the facts which he himself had set out in the complaint. Having in mind the
form in which this appeal was finally submitted to us, we have conceived it to be our duty to exercise the most
scrupulous care to exclude from this opinion, and from the reasoning upon which we base our judgment herein,
any fact not disclosed by the complaint and the records referred to therein, or of which the court below might not
and should not have taken judicial notice. But under all the circumstances, we think it not improper for us to say
that it is for this reason and this reason alone that we have not complied with the request of counsel, further than
to include his complaint as a marginal note attached to this opinion; and to add, each member whose signature is
hereto attached speaking for himself, that had we felt at liberty to set forth the facts as originally requested by
counsel, no fact known to this court or to any of its members would in any wise tend to weaken the force of the
conclusions herein set out, or detract from the force of the reasoning upon which these conclusions rest.
In this connection, however, some general observations as to the practice and procedure of this court in preparing
its opinions and filing its decisions may not be out of place, and will shed some light upon our interpretation and
treatment of some of the incidents set forth in the complaint, and of the contentions of counsel in relation thereto.
These observations, while not restricted to the facts alleged in the complaint, will be strictly limited to matters of
general knowledge in the courts of these Islands, and disclosed by public court records and the official reports of
the Attorney-General.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands annually disposes of some eight hundred cases, about equally
divided between the civil and the criminal dockets, in some five hundred of which written opinions are filed. In
addition, an exceptionally large number of motions and incidental matters are disposed of in minute orders; the
exceptionally large number of matters of this nature being due, in part at least, to the adoption in this jurisdiction
of an American procedural system, without any substantial modification of the substantive law of the Islands as
found in the codes of Spain. It is believed that a comparison of these figures with those of the half-hundred
courts of last resort in the United States will disclose that the volume of the output of this court, as a whole and
per capita of its membership, places it well within the rank of the first half dozen of those courts in this regard.
(See the reporters generally and data assembled by the West Publishing Company and published in the Docket.)
Furthermore it is to be remembered that in disposing of this large volume of business, this court, unlike the
appellate courts of the United States generally, is required, in all criminal cases and in ninety per cent of the civil
cases, to review the evidence (which is not required by law to be printed and comes up in the original transcript
of the stenographer's notes) so as to ascertain whether the judgment of the lower court are "sustained by the
weight of the evidence." This is a consequence of the absence of the jury system in the Philippines. Then, too, an
unusual number of difficult and doubtful questions present themselves in this jurisdiction, arising out of the
conflict of laws resulting from the introduction of new laws and new institutions under American sovereignty,
which must be interpreted and construed with due regard to the jurisprudence of both the old and the new
sovereign. And finally, the mere mechanical difficulties, and in some cases the delays, involved in the
preparation, submission, discussion and publication of the decisions of the court are notably increased by the fact
that the official language of the courts in the Philippines is Spanish, while four of the members of this court are
Americans, whose knowledge of that language has for the most part been acquired since coming to the Islands.
As might be expected, under conditions, it has not infrequently become necessary for the court, especially as to
cases decided just before adjournment for its annual vacation, to content itself with announcing its judgments in
short "memorandum" decisions, definitely adjudicating the rights of the parties to the litigation without setting
out the reasoning and authority upon which such judgments are based. In such cases the court usually reserves
the right to prepare and publish extended opinions at a later day, if the publication of such extended opinions
appears to be expedient or necessary. The purpose and object of this practice, is of course, to avoid unnecessary
and useless delay in the administration of justice. So far as the litigants in a particular case are concerned, it is
the judgment of the court, not the reasons on which the judgment is based, with which they are chiefly
concerned. And it is believed that the interests both the litigants and the public are best subserved in these cases
by the prompt adjudication of the of the issues involved in a memorandum opinion, and the publication, at a later
day, of a carefully prepared opinion, and the publication, at later day, of a carefully prepared opinion, setting out
the reasoning and authority therefore. (Cf. Ocampo vs. Cabañgis, 15 Phil Rep., 626.)
Another consequence of the mechanical difficulties involved in the preparation of the opinions, orders, and
judgments of the court in two languages, and of the necessity for the translation of those prepared in English into
the official language, before being submitted for signature, is that "eternal vigilance" on the part of each member
of the court, is the price which must be paid to avoid the clerical errors, mistakes, and misunderstandings which
otherwise would so readily creep into the proceedings; and under the circumstances, no one doubts the right of
this court, under the liberal doctrine of the American courts, to amend and correct clerical errors in the records of
it proceedings, when these records speak the truth. In practice such amendments and corrections are and always
have been very freely made.
The memorandum order which was provisionally amended by the defendant was filed on the day immediately
preceding the adjournment for the court vacation in the year 1907. Counsel for defendant insists that provisional
amendment was merely an attempt to correct a purely involuntary clerical error, which had crept into the
judgment in the haste of the adjournment proceedings. In support of his contention he refers to the above set out
minute order dated July 28, 1907, wherein the court expressly declared that the word "confirmamos" (affirm)
was "involuntarily" inserted instead of the word "revocamos" (reverse) in the original memorandum order. Of
course the right and the duty of the defendant and of the court itself to correct an "involuntary" clerical error
should not and would not be questioned under the circumstances. But we have not in any wise rested our
decision on this contention, because while it is true that this court solemnly declared in the minute order that the
amendment ratified by it was made to correct an "involuntary" error of this nature, we do not understand that the
plaintiff, by incorporating the record of those proceedings into his complaint, Formally admits that it was in fact
so made. As we understand the admissions of the complaint, they only go to the verity of the facts disclosed by
the records incorporated therein, and not to the truth or accuracy of the reasons assigned for the entry of the
orders, judgments and decrees contained in these records. Accordingly we have wholly disregarded this
contention of counsel for the defendant, and we have based our conclusions on the broader ground of the right of
the court to correct and amend errors of law or fact in its orders and judgments, before such erroneous judgments
and orders become final.
We here refer to this contention of counsel for defendant, merely in explanation of our action in this regard, and
to avoid the possibility that our silence on this point might be construed as in some sort a recognition of the truth
of plaintiffs' allegations that the original memorandum order confirming the judgment of the court below was in
fact entered in accord with the original vote and action of the court, and not as contended by counsel for
defendant, through an involuntary clerical mistake.
Senior counsel for plaintiffs having agreed in open court with counsel for defendant on the submission of the
case on appeal that if the complaint as submitted is subject to demurrer, it can not be amended so as to set forth a
cause of action, and that fact appearing on its face: the judgment of the court below, sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the complaint without day, should be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
So ordered.

Cadiz vs. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC (Br. 48), Puerto Princesa City, etal. (G.R. No. 178941;

Can the members of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines be held liable in damages
for prematurely recommending disbarment of a lawyer based on the position papers and affidavits of witnesses
of the parties?
The Facts and the Case
On February 23, 2003 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, then composed of petitioners
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Leonard S. De Vera, Romulo A. Rivera, Dante G. Ilaya, Pura Angelica Y. Santiago,
Rosario T. Setias-Reyes, Jose Vicente B. Salazar, Manuel M. Monzon, Immanuel L. Sodusta, and Carlos L.
Valdez, Jr. (the IBP Board), received an administrative complaint 1 filed by Lilia T. Ventura and Concepcion
Tabang against respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct, deceit, and gross dishonesty. The IBP
Board designated petitioner Lydia A. Navarro (Navarro) as Commissioner to investigate the case.
Commissioner Navarro summoned the parties to a mandatory conference and required them afterwards to submit
their position papers. Based on these, Navarro submitted her Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board for
its approval. Commissioner Navarro was herself a member of the IBP Board. After deliberation, the IBP Board
adopted Commissioner Navarro’s findings but increased the recommended penalty of six months suspension
from the practice of law to disbarment. The IBP Board then transmitted their report to this Court.
On September 29, 2004, however, the Court remanded the case to the IBP Board for further proceedings in order
to give the parties the chance to fully present their case. 2 The Court said the investigating commissioner should
have subpoenaed and examined the witnesses of the parties considering the gravity of the charge against Atty.
Gacott. Navarro rendered her report based solely on the position papers and affidavits of the witnesses.
While the IBP Board was complying with the Court’s directive, Atty. Gacott filed a complaint for damages
against the board’s sitting members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. 3
Answering the complaint, the IBP Board raised the affirmative defense of failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action and filed a motion to dismiss the case on that ground. On March 9, 2006 the trial court denied the
motion,4 prompting the IBP Board to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) on special civil action for
certiorari.5
On December 29, 2006 the CA denied the petition, pointing out that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. The IBP Board had other plain and speedy remedy, like proceeding to trial in the case and appealing
in the event of failure of the RTC to dismiss the action. The CA denied in its Resolution dated July 12, 2007 the
IBP Board’s motion for reconsideration, thus causing them to file the present petition.
The Issue Presented
The key issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that the Supreme Court’s remand of the
disbarment case to the IBP Board for examination of the witnesses, considering the gravity of the charge against
Atty. Gacott, cannot serve as basis for the latter’s complaint for damages against the members of that board.
Ruling of the Court
Atty. Gacott states in his complaint for damages before the RTC that Supreme Court’s remand of his case to the
IBP Board is an affirmation of the latter’s arbitrary abuse of its investigatory power. The IBP Board
recommended his disbarment based on the Commissioner’s report rendered to it without the benefit of
exhaustive hearing. This made its members personally liable for actual, moral, and corrective damages.
Essentially, therefore, Atty. Gacott anchored his complaint for damages on the result of the Court’s assessment of
the IBP Board’s report and recommendation and its remand of the case against him for further proceedings.
The petitioner IBP Board members are correct in claiming that Atty. Gacott’s complaint states no cause of action.
The IBP Commissioner and Board of Governors in this case merely exercised delegated powers to investigate
the complaint against Atty. Gacott and submit their report and recommendation to the Court. They cannot be
charged for honest errors committed in the performance of their quasi-judicial function. And that was what it was
in the absence of any allegation of specific factual circumstances indicating that they acted maliciously or upon
illicit consideration. If the rule were otherwise, a great number of lower court justices and judges whose acts the
appellate courts have annulled on ground of grave abuse of discretion would be open targets for damage
suits.1avvphi1
Parenthetically, Atty. Gacott submitted the disbarment case against him for resolution based on the position
papers that he and the complainants presented, without reservation, to the IBP along with the affidavits of their
witnesses. The IBP Board prepared its report and recommendation to the Court based on these papers and
documents.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision dated December 29, 2006 and
resolution dated July 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 94692, and ORDERS the complaint for
damages filed by respondent Glenn C. Gacott against petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Leonard S. De Vera,
Romulo A. Rivera, Dante G. Ilaya, Pura Angelica Y. Santiago, Rosario T. Setias-Reyes, Jose Vicente B. Salazar,
Manuel M. Monzon, Immanuel L. Sodusta, Carlos L. Valdez, Jr., and Lydia A. Navarro in Civil Case 4095 of the
Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
Marikina Autoline Transport Corp. vs. People (G.R. No. 152040;

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 16739 affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
42629 and Civil Case No. Q-93-16051, where Freddie Suelto was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
damages to property.
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon
City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus with
Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus. 2
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias
Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly
swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along
Kamuning Road.3 Upon Valdellon’s request, the court ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior Building Inspection
Officer of the City Engineer’s Office, to inspect the damaged terrace. Pontiveros submitted a report enumerating
and describing the damages:
(1) The front exterior and the right side concrete columns of the covered terrace were vertically
displaced from its original position causing exposure of the vertical reinforcement.
(2) The beams supporting the roof and parapet walls are found with cracks on top of the displaced
columns.
(3) The 6″ CHB walls at [the] right side of the covered terrace were found with cracks caused by this
accident.
(4) The front iron grills and concrete balusters were found totally damaged and the later [sic] beyond
repair.4
He recommended that since the structural members made of concrete had been displaced, the terrace would have
to be demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability of the building." 5
Photographs6 of the damaged terrace were taken. Valdellon commissioned Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. to estimate
the cost of repairs, inclusive of labor and painting, and the latter pegged the cost at P171,088.46.7
In a letter dated October 19, 1992 addressed to the bus company and Suelto, Valdellon demanded payment of
P148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt thereof, to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. 8 The bus
company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.9
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, an Information was filed with the RTC of Quezon City. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, being then the
driver and/or person in charge of a Marikina Auto Line bus bearing Plate No. NVC-849, did then and there
unlawfully, and feloniously drive, manage, and operate the same along Kamias Road, in said City, in a careless,
reckless, negligent, and imprudent manner, by then and there making the said vehicle run at a speed greater than
was reasonable and proper without taking the necessary precaution to avoid accident to person/s and damage to
property, and considering the condition of the traffic at said place at the time, causing as a consequence of his
said carelessness, negligence, imprudence and lack of precaution, the said vehicle so driven, managed and
operated by him to hit and bump, as in fact it hit and bump a commercial apartment belonging to ERLINDA V.
VALDELLON located at No. 31 Kamias Road, this City, thereby causing damages to said apartment in the total
amount of P171,088.46, Philippine Currency, to her damage and prejudice in the total amount aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. She prayed that
after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to issue a writ of preliminary attachment
against the defendants upon approval of plaintiff’s bond, and after trial on the merits, to render a decision in
favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay –
a) the total sum of P171,088.46 constituting the expenses for the repair of the damaged apartment of
plaintiff, with interests to be charged thereon at the legal rate from the date of the formal demand until
the whole obligation is fully paid;
b) the sum of not less than P20,000.00 each as compensatory and exemplary damages;
c) the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the sum of P1,000.00 for each appearance of plaintiff’s
counsel; and costs of suit;
PLAINTIFF further prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises. 11
A joint trial of the two cases was ordered by the trial court. 12
The trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the damaged terrace, where defendants offered to have it
repaired and restored to its original state. Valdellon, however, disagreed because she wanted the building
demolished to give way for the construction of a new one. 13
During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to the terrace of her apartment, and, in support thereof,
adduced in evidence a receipt for P35,000.00, dated October 20, 1993, issued by the BB Construction and Steel
Fabricator for "carpentry, masonry, welding job and electrical [work]." 14
Pontiveros of the Office of the City Engineer testified that there was a need to change the column of the terrace,
but that the building should also be demolished because "if concrete is destroyed, [one] cannot have it restored to
its original position."15
Engr. Jesus Regal, Jr., the proprietor of the SSP Construction, declared that he inspected the terrace and
estimated the cost of repairs, including labor, at P171,088.46.
Suelto testified that at 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, he was driving the bus on its way to Ayala Avenue, Makati,
Metro Manila. When he reached the corner of K-H Street at Kamias Road, Quezon City, a passenger jeepney
suddenly crossed from EDSA going to V. Luna and swerved to the lane occupied by the bus. Suelto had to
swerve the bus to the right upon which it hit the side front of the terrace of Valdellon’s two-door apartment. 16
Based on his estimate, the cost to the damage on the terrace of the apartment amounted to P40,000.00.17 On
cross-examination, Suelto declared that he saw the passenger jeepney when it was a meter away from the bus.
Before then, he had seen some passenger jeepneys on the right trying to overtake one another. 18
Architect Arnulfo Galapate testified that the cost of the repair of the damaged terrace amounted to
P55,000.00.19
On April 28, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment finding Suelto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property, and ordered MALTC and Suelto to pay, jointly and severally,
P150,000.00 to Valdellon, by way of actual and compensatory damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of
suit. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused FREDDIE SUELTO Y LIWAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR.
With respect to the civil liability, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Erlinda Valdellon and against
defendant Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation and accused Freddie Suelto, where both are ordered,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff:
a. the sum of P150,000.00, as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged
apartment;
b. the sum of P20,000.00, as compensatory and exemplary damages;
c. the sum of P20,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and,
d. the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.20
MALTC and Suelto, now appellants, appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that the prosecution failed to
prove Suelto’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They averred that the prosecution merely relied on Valdellon, who
testified only on the damage caused to the terrace of her apartment which appellants also alleged was excessive.
Appellant Suelto further alleged that he should be acquitted in the criminal case for the prosecution’s failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law,
negligent. Even if the appellate court affirmed his conviction, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him by
the trial court is contrary to law.
In its Brief for the People of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted that the
appealed decision should be affirmed with modification. On Suelto’s claim that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, the OSG contended that, applying
the principle of res ipsa loquitur, the prosecution was able to prove that he drove the bus with negligence and
recklessness. The OSG averred that the prosecution was able to prove that Suelto’s act of swerving the bus to the
right was the cause of damage to the terrace of Valdellon’s apartment, and in the absence of an explanation to the
contrary, the accident was evidently due to appellant’s want of care. Consequently, the OSG posited, the burden
was on the appellant to prove that, in swerving the bus to the right, he acted on an emergency, and failed to
discharge this burden. However, the OSG averred that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant to a straight
penalty of one year, and recommended a penalty of fine.
On June 20, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court, but the award for actual
damages was reduced to P100,000.00. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April 28, 1994, rendered by the court a quo is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the sum of P150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-
appellee for her damaged apartment be reduced to P100,000.00 without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same. 22
MALTC and Suelto, now petitioners, filed the instant petition reiterating its submissions in the CA: (a) the
prosecution failed to prove the crime charged against petitioner Suelto; (b) the prosecution failed to adduce
evidence to prove that respondent suffered actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00; and (c) the trial court
erred in sentencing petitioner Suelto to one (1) year prison term.
On the first issue, petitioners aver that the prosecution was mandated to prove that petitioner Suelto acted with
recklessness in swerving the bus to the right thereby hitting the terrace of private respondent’s apartment.
However, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden. On the other hand, petitioner Suelto was able to prove
that he acted in an emergency when a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA towards the direction of the bus
overtook another vehicle and, in the process, intruded into the lane of the bus.
On the second issue, petitioners insist that private respondent was able to prove only the amount of P35,000.00
by way of actual damages; hence, the award of P100,000.00 is barren of factual basis.
On the third issue, petitioner Suelto posits that the straight penalty of imprisonment recommended by the trial
court, and affirmed by the CA, is contrary to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
The petition is partially granted.
On the first issue, we find and so resolve that respondent People of the Philippines was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to
the terrace of private respondent’s apartment. Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it happened,
petitioner Suelto himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-16051, and when
he testified in the trial court.
Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right of the road causing it to hit the column of the
terrace of private respondent. Petitioners were burdened to prove that the damage to the terrace of private
respondent was not the fault of petitioner Suelto.
We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as ruled by the trial court and the appellate court,
petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger
jeepney into the lane of the bus he was driving.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted on an emergency, that is,
he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had
overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by
this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway:
SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. – Unless a different course of action is required in the interest of the
safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in
compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall
pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons
or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every
vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the highway.
Section 35 of the law provides, thus:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a
careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic,
the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor
vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed
greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead (emphasis
supplied).
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent.
However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Suelto’s defense, in light of his contradictory testimony vis-
à-vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation:
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial
apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly
improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude
that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger
jeepney." Such a conclusion finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA
118, where the Court stated that "physical evidence is of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a
hundred witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken immediately after the incident. The
damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding, he could
have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in driving,
he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less
severe.
In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-affidavit and his testimony in
court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the
passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to
avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his lane. Such glaring
inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter his credibility.
Furthermore, the variance between testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such
inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony as to his prudence and
diligence.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused
acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more
probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because
he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street. 24
Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the driver
of the offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.
Petitioner Suelto’s reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and his
civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.
On the second issue, we agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to prove that the
damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by
respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary computation of damage
made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB Construction and
Steel Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding,
and electrical works. Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its five-page decision,
the trial court awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual basis
for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the "sum of
P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment." The appellate court,
for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Thus, the
appellate court merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely
demolish the apartment in question considering the nature of the damages sustained as a result of the accident.
Consequently, appellants continue, the award of P150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee
for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.
The damaged portions of the apartment in question are not disputed.
Considering the aforesaid damages which are the direct result of the accident, the reasonable, and adequate
compensation due is hereby fixed at P100,000.00.25
Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a person already possesses (daño
emergente) and the other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that which would have pertained to him (lucro
cesante). As expostulated by the Court in PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 26
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair
the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based
on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already
possesses (daño emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained
to him (lucro cesante).27
The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. The
burden is to establish one’s case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole,
adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other. Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove
the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or
conjectures. As the Court declared:
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to
prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence available. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be
presented on either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the
evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot be
presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. 28
The Court further declared that "where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is
entitled to their value at the time of the destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to
pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case, damages for the loss of the use
during the period before replacement.29
While claimants’ bare testimonial assertions in support of their claims for damages should not be discarded
altogether, however, the same should be admitted with extreme caution. Their testimonies should be viewed in
light of claimants’ self-interest, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth. Such assertion should be buttressed
by independent evidence. In the language of the Court:
For this reason, Del Rosario’s claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00
should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported
by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private respondent corporation whatever
testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed
in the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment
installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity thereto.
However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo, and the vessel itself
should be accepted as gospel truth. We must, therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support
Del Rosario’s claim as regards the amount of losses. 30
An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice:
Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred.
It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.
Private respondents merely sustained an estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof of their subject
building. What is more, whether the necessary repairs were caused only by petitioner’s alleged negligence in the
maintenance of its school building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential
question that remains indeterminable.31
We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of
private respondent would amount to P55,000.00.32 Accordingly, private respondent is entitled to P55,000.00
actual damages.
We also agree with petitioner Suelto’s contention that the trial court erred in sentencing him to suffer a straight
penalty of one (1) year. This is so because under the third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
the offender must be sentenced to pay a fine when the execution of the act shall have only resulted in damage to
property. The said provision reads in full:
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period, to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would, otherwise, constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to
three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light
felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64 (Emphasis supplied).
In the present case, the only damage caused by petitioner Suelto’s act was to the terrace of private respondent’s
apartment, costing P55,000.00. Consequently, petitioner’s contention that the CA erred in awarding P100,000.00
by way of actual damages to private respondent is correct. We agree that private respondent is entitled to
exemplary damages, and find that the award given by the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, is reasonable.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we rule that private respondent Valdellon is entitled to only P20,000.00
by way of exemplary damages.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The joint decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioner Suelto is
sentenced to pay a fine of P55,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioners are
ORDERED to pay to Erlinda V. Valdellon, jointly and severally, the total amount of P55,000.00 by way of actual
damages, and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Pleyto vs. Lomboy (G.R. No. 148737; June 16, 2004

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated October 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
61300, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated June 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. 95-00724-D. The RTC ordered herein petitioners to solidarily pay
damages to respondents. Petitioners likewise assail the Resolution3 dated June 21, 2001 of the appellate court,
which denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL), with principal office at Tarlac City, Tarlac, is a public
carrier, engaged in carrying passengers and goods for a fare. It serviced various routes in Central and Northern
Luzon. Petitioner Ernesto Pleyto was a bus driver employed by PRBL at the time of the incident in question.
Respondent Maria D. Lomboy of Calasiao, Pangasinan, is the surviving spouse of the late Ricardo Lomboy, who
died in Pasolingan, Gerona, Tarlac, in a vehicular accident at around 11:30 a.m. of May 16, 1995. The accident
was a head-on collision between the PRBL bus driven by petitioner Pleyto and the car where Ricardo was a
passenger. Respondent Carmela Lomboy is the eldest daughter of Ricardo and Maria Lomboy. Carmela suffered
injuries requiring hospitalization in the same accident which resulted in her father’s death.
On November 29, 1995, herein respondents, as pauper-litigants, filed an action for damages against PRBL and
its driver, Pleyto, with the RTC of Dagupan City. In their complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-
00724-D, the Lomboys prayed that they be indemnified for the untimely death of Ricardo Lomboy, his lost
earnings, the medical and hospitalization expenses of Carmela, and moral damages.
The facts, established during trial and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:
At approximately 11:30 a.m. of May 16, 1995, PRBL Bus No. 1539, with Plate No. CVD 556, driven by
petitioner Pleyto, was traveling along MacArthur Highway in Gerona, Tarlac bound for Vigan, Ilocos
Sur. It was drizzling that morning and the macadam road was wet. Right in front of the bus, headed
north, was the tricycle with Plate No. CX 7844, owned and driven by one Rodolfo Esguerra.
According to Rolly Orpilla, a witness and one of the bus passengers, Pleyto tried to overtake Esguerra’s tricycle
but hit it instead. Pleyto then swerved into the left opposite lane. Coming down the lane, some fifty meters away,
was a southbound Mitsubishi Lancer car, with Plate No. PRS 941, driven by Arnulfo Asuncion. The car was
headed for Manila with some passengers. Seated beside Arnulfo was his brother-in-law, Ricardo Lomboy, while
in the back seat were Ricardo’s 18-year old daughter Carmela and her friend, one Rhino Daba. PRBL Bus No.
1539 smashed head-on the car, killing Arnulfo and Ricardo instantly. Carmela and Rhino suffered injuries, but
only Carmela required hospitalization.
In their Answer, petitioners PRBL and Ernesto Pleyto both claimed that the bus was running slowly at the time
of the accident. They pointed out that Bus No. 1539 had been inspected by driver Pleyto and examined by a
mechanic prior to the trip, in accordance with the company’s standard operating procedure. It was found in good
working condition. Pleyto claimed that while cruising along the highway at Gerona, Tarlac, he noticed
Esguerra’s tricycle and followed it at a safe distance after he was unable to overtake it. Suddenly and without
warning, the tricycle stopped in the middle of the road. Pleyto stepped on the brakes and the bus lost speed. But,
since it skidded towards the direction of the tricycle, he swerved the bus to the other lane to avoid hitting it, only
to collide with the Manila-bound Mitsubishi car.
On June 26, 1998, the trial court decided Civil Case No. 95-00724-D as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants ordering the defendants to pay solidarily the plaintiffs the following amounts:
1) ₱50,000.00 as indemnification for the death of Ricardo Lomboy;
2) ₱1,642,521.00 for lost earnings of Ricardo Lomboy;
3) ₱59,550.00 as actual damages for the funeral, wake, religious services and prayer for the soul
of the departed;
4) ₱52,000.00 for the medical treatment and medicine of Carmela Lomboy;
5) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages for the wife and children excluding Carmela Lomboy;
6) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for Carmela Lomboy; and
7) To pay costs.
The filing fee the plaintiffs should have paid is hereby ordered to be paid by the plaintiffs to the Clerk of
Court of this Court upon satisfaction of the foregoing amounts to the plaintiffs by the defendants.
SO ORDERED.4
In ruling for respondents, the RTC found Pleyto negligent and lacking in precaution when he overtook the
tricycle with complete disregard of the approaching car in the other lane. It found the testimony of Rolly Orpilla
credible and persuasive as against Pleyto’s self-serving and unbelievable testimony. The court found that Pleyto
should have been more prudent in overtaking a tricycle, considering that it was drizzling, the road was slippery,
and another vehicle was approaching from the opposite direction. The RTC found that Pleyto had clearly
violated traffic rules and regulations, and thus was negligent under Article 21855 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines because petitioner Pleyto failed to present any proof to rebut the presumption. The lower court
likewise held co-petitioner PRBL equally liable under Article 21806 of the Civil Code for its failure to show that
it had maintained proper supervision of its employees notwithstanding strict standards in employee selection.
Petitioners appealed the judgment of the trial court to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61300. The
appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court, with modification in the award of damages,
thus:
Wherefore, with the MODIFICATION that the award for actual damages is reduced to ₱39,550.00 for
funeral and religious services and ₱27,000.00 for medical expenses of Carmela Lomboy; and the award
for loss of earning capacity is accordingly corrected to ₱1,152,000.00, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC with respect to Pleyto’s fault and negligence. The
appellate court noted that this was evident in his overtaking Esguerra’s tricycle despite the drizzle, the slippery
road, and an oncoming car a mere fifty meters away. The court reasoned that the bus must have been speeding
since despite braking, the bus still hit the tricycle, and then rammed the car in the opposite lane with such force
as to throw the car off the road. The appellate court also found petitioner PRBL liable as owner of the bus and as
employer of Pleyto pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its failure to observe the required diligence in
its supervision of its employees and the safe maintenance of its buses. In modifying the award of damages, the
appellate court took note of the amounts that were duly supported by receipts only.
Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it.
Hence, the instant petition, premised on the following grounds:
A. THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS, NAMELY, THAT THE PRBL BUS OVERTOOK A TRICYCLE THUS CAUSING THE
ACCIDENT, SINCE IT WAS MADE IN DISREGARD OF FACTS UNDISPUTED BY THE PARTIES.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN VILLA REY
TRANSIT, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-25499, FEBRUARY 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 511,
WHEN IT ARBITRARILY PEGGED THE MONTHLY LIVING EXPENSES AT 50% OF GROSS
EARNINGS.8
At the outset, it appears that petitioners call for this Court to review the factual findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners assail the appellate court’s affirmance of the finding by the trial court that Pleyto
was negligent. The issue of negligence is factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages.9 But it is
well established that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law, not of fact, may
be raised before the Supreme Court. It must be stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its
function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties.10 Factual findings of the trial
court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the
evidence on record.11 In the present petition, no compelling reason is shown by petitioners whatsoever for this
Court to reverse those findings. Our examination of the records shows that the evidence clearly supports the
following findings of the appellate court:
The negligence and fault of appellant driver is manifest. He overtook the tricycle despite the oncoming car only
fifty (50) meters away from him. Defendant-appellant’s claim that he was driving at a mere 30 to 35 kilometers
per hour does not deserve credence as it would have been easy to stop or properly maneuver the bus at this
speed. The speed of the bus, the drizzle that made the road slippery, and the proximity of the car coming from
the opposite direction were duly established by the evidence. The speed at which the bus traveled, inappropriate
in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, is evident from the fact despite the application of the brakes,
the bus still bumped the tricycle, and then proceeded to collide with the incoming car with such force that the car
was pushed beyond the edge of the road to the ricefield (Paragraph 8, Affidavit of Rolly Orpilla marked Exh.
"D" and Traffic Report marked Exh. "E", Folder of Exhibits)....12
Indeed, petitioner Pleyto violated traffic rules and regulations when he overtook the tricycle despite the presence
of an oncoming car in the other lane. Article 2185 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
As found by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, petitioners failed to present any convincing proof
rebutting such presumption.
A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has
the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is
approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver
does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car
approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.13
The Court of Appeals found PRBL liable for Pleyto’s negligence pursuant to Article 2180 in relation to Article
217614 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an
employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that
employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the
care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.15
In fine, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family.16 Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required
to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.17
In the present case, petitioners presented several documents18 in evidence to show the various tests and pre-
qualification requirements imposed upon petitioner Pleyto before his hiring as a driver by PRBL. However, no
documentary evidence was presented to prove that petitioner PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of
its employees, including Pleyto. Citing precedents, the Court of Appeals opined,
"in order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed
sufficient and plausible, it is not enough for the employer to emptily invoke the existence of company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has
been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The
mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies without anything more is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. (Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. CA (223 SCRA
521). The trial court ratiocinated:
...
Indeed, the testimony of the said two witnesses of the PRBL would impress one to believe that
the PRBL has always exercised the strictest standard of selecting its employees and of
maintaining its vehicles to avoid injury or damage to the life and limb of people on the road
whether of its own passengers or pedestrians or occupants or other vehicles. It has not however,
shown to the satisfaction of the Court that it has maintained proper supervision of its employees,
especially drivers while in the actual operation of its buses. While it has a list of procedures and
testing when it comes to recruitment and another list of what should be done with its buses
before they are allowed to run on the road, it has no list of procedures and duties to be followed
by a driver while he is operating a vehicle to prevent injury to persons and damage to property.
Neither has it proved to the Court that there are people employed by it to supervise its drivers so
that it can be seen to it that all the safety procedures to prevent accident or damage to property or
injury to people on the road have been in place. It is in this aspect of supervising its employees
where this Court has found the defendant PRBL deficient." (Decision p. 29, Rollo)19
In our view, no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it sustained what the trial court
found after trial that PRBL had failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part. Said finding binds us
now in this review on certiorari.
Hence, the only remaining issue relevant for our resolution concerns the award to herein respondents for
damages as well as the loss of earning capacity of the victim, Ricardo Lomboy.
Petitioners argue that the award of loss of earning capacity to respondents is devoid of legal basis. They fault the
appellate court for pegging the monthly living expenses at 50% of gross earnings since, they claim, this runs
contrary to Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,20 which held that "the amount recoverable is not loss of
the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received."
Petitioners also point out that respondents failed to prove the gross income of the deceased Ricardo Lomboy,
thus, making the computations of the appellate court doubtful, to say the least.
Respondents counter that the deduction of 50% of the gross income as reasonable and necessary living expenses
by the appellate court is in accord with established jurisprudence, pointing to our decision in Negros Navigation
Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals.21
Petitioners, in our view, misread the Villa Rey Transit case, where we emphasized that:
"Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one’s estate for
his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, " less
the necessary expense for his own living". Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the
entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have
received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses."22
In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the net earnings, which is computed
by deducting necessary expenses from the gross earnings, and not the gross earnings, is to be utilized in the
computation. Note that in the present case, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court used net earnings, not
gross earnings in computing loss of earning capacity. The amount of net earnings was arrived at after deducting
the necessary expenses (pegged at 50% of gross income) from the gross annual income. This computation is in
accord with settled jurisprudence, including the Villa Rey case.
Petitioners’ claim that no substantial proof was presented to prove Ricardo Lomboy’s gross income lacks merit.
Failure to present documentary evidence to support a claim for loss of earning capacity of the deceased need not
be fatal to its cause. Testimonial evidence suffices to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and
reasonable estimate of the loss of earning capacity.23 Hence, the testimony of respondent Maria Lomboy,
Ricardo’s widow, that her husband was earning a monthly income of ₱8,000 is sufficient to establish a basis for
an estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the factors that should be taken into account in determining the
compensable amount of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have
lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence provides that the first factor,
i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second factor,
it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The
net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings.24 Thus, the formula used by this
Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x
(gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living expenses)].25
It was established that Ricardo Lomboy was 44 years old at the time of his death and is earning a monthly
income of ₱8,000 or a gross annual income (GAI) of ₱96,000.26 Using the cited formula, the Court of Appeals
correctly computed the Loss of Net Earning Capacity as ₱1,152,000, net of and after considering a reasonable
and necessary living expenses of 50% of the gross annual income or ₱48,000. A detailed computation is as
follows:
Thus, no reversible error may be attributed to the court a quo in fixing the loss of earning capacity at said
amount.
We likewise sustain the reduction of the award of actual damages from ₱59,550 for funeral and burial expenses
of Ricardo and ₱52,000 for medical expenses of Carmela Lomboy to ₱39,55027 and ₱27,000, respectively, as
only these latter amounts were duly supported by receipts.28 To justify an award of actual damages, there must
be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported
by receipts.29
However, while the award of ₱50,000 as moral damages to Carmela Lomboy is sustained, the award for moral
damages of ₱500,000 to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy should be reduced for being excessive.
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.30 However, we must stress that moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury and are not meant to enrich
complainant at the expense of defendant.31 Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason
of the defendant’s culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.32 Under the circumstances of this case, an
award of ₱100,000 to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy would be justified and in keeping with the purpose of the law
and jurisprudence in allowing moral damages.33
The indemnification award of ₱50,000 is also sustained.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61300 is AFFIRMED, with
the sole MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy is reduced from
₱500,000.00 to ₱100,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs.

Heirs of Completo and Abiad vs. Albayda, Jr. (G.R. No. 172200

Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, 527th Base
Security Squadron, 520th Airbase, Philippine Air Force, located at Villamor Air Base (VAB), Pasay City.
Petitioner Redentor Completo (Completo), now represented by his heirs, was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla,
bearing Plate No. PYD-128, owned and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad (Abiad).3 Albayda and
Completo figured in an accident along the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, VAB. Albayda filed a complaint
for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
1333.4
The amended complaint alleged that, on August 27, 1997, while Albayda was on his way to the office to report
for duty, riding a bicycle along 11th Street, the taxi driven by Completo bumped and sideswiped him, causing
serious physical injuries. Albayda was brought to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside
VAB. However, he was immediately transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center
(AFPMC) on V. Luna Road, Quezon City, because there was a fracture in his left knee and there was no
orthopedic doctor available at PAFGH. From August 27, 1997 until February 11, 1998, he was confined therein.
He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from February 23, 1998 until March 22, 1998. 5
Conciliation between the parties before the barangay failed. Thus, Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. On the
other hand, Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence against
Albayda. On January 13, 1998, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution, 6 recommending the filing
of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries against Completo. The counter-charge of
damage to property was recommended dismissed. 7
The case was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 45, where Albayda manifested his
reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioners Completo and Abiad. 8
Albayda alleged that the proximate cause of the incident which necessitated his stay in the hospital for
approximately seven (7) months was the negligence of Completo who, at the time of the accident, was in the
employ of Abiad. The pain he suffered required him to undergo medical physiotherapy for a number of years to
regain normality of his left knee joint, and he claimed that he incurred actual damages totaling Two Hundred
Seventy-Six Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱276,550.00), inclusive of his anticipated operations. 9
He further stated that aggravating the physical sufferings, mental anguish, frights, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation resulting from his injuries, his wife
abandoned him in May 1998, and left their children in his custody. He thus demanded the amount of Six
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱600,000.00) as moral damages. He likewise asked for exemplary damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) and attorney’s fees of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱25,000.00), plus One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000.00) per court appearance. 10
In his answer to the amended complaint, Completo alleged that, on August 27, 1997, he was carefully driving the
taxicab along 8th Street, VAB, when suddenly he heard a strange sound from the rear right side of the taxicab.
When he stopped to investigate, he found Albayda lying on the road and holding his left leg. He immediately
rendered assistance and brought Albayda to PAFGH for emergency treatment. 11
Completo also asserted that he was an experienced driver who, in accordance with traffic rules and regulations
and common courtesy to his fellow motorists, had already reduced his speed to twenty (20) kilometers per hour
even before reaching the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at a very high
speed, causing him to suddenly lose control of the bicycle and hit the rear door on the right side of the taxicab. 12
The deep indentation on the rear right door of the taxicab was caused by the impact of Albayda’s body that hit
the taxicab after he had lost control of the bicycle; while the slight indentation on the right front door of the
taxicab was caused by the impact of the bike that hit the taxicab after Albayda let go of its handles when he had
lost control of it.13
Completo maintained that Albayda had no cause of action. The accident and the physical injuries suffered by
Albayda were caused by his own negligence, and his purpose in filing the complaint was to harass petitioners
and unjustly enrich himself at their expense.14
After submission of the parties’ respective pleadings, a pretrial conference was held. On December 8, 1998, the
RTC issued a pretrial order. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 15
Albayda presented himself, Michael Navarro (Navarro), Dr. Rito Barrosa, Jr. (Dr. Barrosa), Dr. Armando Sta.
Ana, Jr., Dr. Ranny Santiago, (Dr. Santiago), and Dr. Manuel Fidel Magtira (Dr. Magtira) as witnesses in open
court.16
On direct examination, Navarro testified that, on August 27, 1997, at around 1:45 p.m., he saw a taxicab, with
Plate No. PYD-128, coming from 11th Street, running at an unusual speed. The normal speed should have been
twenty-five (25) kilometers per hour. He was at the corner of 9th and 8th Streets when the taxicab passed by
him. The side of the bicycle was hit by the taxicab at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets. He saw Albayda
fall to the ground, grimacing in pain. The taxicab at that moment was about ten (10) meters away from Albayda.
On cross-examination, Navarro reiterated that the taxicab was running quite fast. The bicycle ridden by Albayda
reached the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets before the taxicab hit it. 17
Dr. Santiago, the orthopedic surgeon who treated Albayda when the latter was admitted at AFPMC, testified that
the cause of the injury was "hard impact," and recommended an operation to alleviate the suffering. On cross-
examination, he said that there was a separation of the fragments of the proximal leg, the injured extremity,
called levia. They placed the victim on knee traction or calcaneal traction, 18 in order to avoid further swelling.
They bore the calcanean bone with a stainless steel pin so that they could put five percent (5%) of the body
weight of the patient to cool down the leg. He treated Albayda for three (3) months. He recommended surgery,
but the victim had other medical problems, like an increase in sugar level, and they were waiting for the
availability of the implant. The implant was supposed to be placed on the lateral aspect of the proximal leg or the
levia, the part with the separation. It was a long implant with screws. 19
Dr. Magtira testified that Albayda was readmitted at AFPMC on January 25, 1999 because of complaints of pain
and limitation of motion on the knee joint. Upon evaluation, the pain was caused by traumatic arthritis brought
about by malunion of the lateral trivial condial. An operation of the soft tissue release was conducted for him to
mobilize his knee joint and attain proper range of motion. After the operation, Albayda attained functional range
of motion, but because of subsisting pain, they had to do osteoplasty 20 of the malunion, which was another
operation. On cross-examination, Dr. Magtira testified that he rendered free medical service at AFPMC. 21
Albayda testified that he was thirty-six (36) years old and a soldier of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. On
August 27, 1997, at around 1:40 p.m., he was riding his bike on his way to the office, located on 916 Street,
VAB. He had to stop at the corner of 11th and 8th Streets because an oncoming taxicab was moving fast.
However, the taxicab still bumped the front tire of his bike, hit his left knee and threw him off until he fell down
on the road. The taxicab stopped about ten meters away, and then moved backwards. Its driver, Completo, just
stared at him. When somebody shouted to bring him to the hospital, two (2) persons, one of whom was Dr.
Barrosa, helped him and carried him into the taxicab driven by Completo, who brought him to PAFGH. 22
Upon examination, it was found that Albayda suffered fracture in his left knee and that it required an operation.
No orthopedic doctor was available at PAFGH. Thus, he was transferred that same afternoon to AFPMC, where
he was confined until February 11, 1998.23
At AFPMC, Albayda’s left leg was drilled on and attached to traction. When his leg was drilled, it was so painful
that he had to shout. After his release from the hospital, he continued to suffer pain in his leg. He underwent
reflexology and therapy which offered temporary relief from pain. But after some time, he had to undergo
therapy and reflexology again.24
On January 25, 1999, Albayda was readmitted at AFPMC and operated on. On June 24, 1999, he was operated
on again. Wire and screw were installed so that he could bend his knee. Nonetheless, he continued to suffer pain.
As of the date of his testimony in court, he was scheduled for another operation in January 2000, when the steel
that would be installed in his leg arrives.25
For his food, Albayda spent Thirty Pesos (₱30.00) each day during his six (6) months of confinement; for his bed
pan, One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000.00); for his twice weekly reflexology, Three Hundred Pesos (₱300.00) every
session since April 1997; for his caretaker, ₱300.00 per day for six months. He also asked for ₱600,000.00 in
moral damages because Completo did not lend him a helping hand, and he would be suffering deformity for the
rest of his life. He demanded ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and ₱1,000.00 for every court appearance of his
lawyer.26
On cross-examination, Albayda testified that, on the date of the incident, he was the base guard at VAB, and his
duty was from 2 p.m. to 8 p.m. That afternoon, he was not in a hurry to go to his place of work because it was
only about 1:45 p.m., and his place of work was only six (6) meters away. After the accident, he was brought to
PAFGH, and at 3:00 p.m., he was brought to the AFPMC. When he was discharged from the hospital, he could
no longer walk.27
Dr. Barrosa’s testimony during cross-examination emphasized that he was with 2 other persons when he carried
Albayda into the taxicab driven by Completo. He was certain that it was not Completo who carried the victim
into the taxicab. It was only a matter of seconds when he rushed to the scene of the accident. The taxicab backed
up fifteen (15) seconds later. Albayda lay 2 meters away from the corner of 8th and 11th Streets. 28
Completo, Abiad, and Benjamin Panican (Panican) testified for the defense. 29
Completo alleged that he had been employed as taxi driver of FOJS Transport, owned by Abiad, since February
1997. On August 27, 1997, he was driving the taxicab, with Plate No. PYD-128, from 10:00 a.m. At around 1:45
p.m., he was on his way home when a bicycle bumped his taxicab at the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets,
VAB. The bicycle was travelling from south to north, and he was going east coming from the west. The bicycle
was coming from 11th Street, while he was travelling along 8th Street. 30
On cross-examination, Completo testified that when Albayda hit the rear right door of the taxicab, the latter fell
to the ground. When he heard a noise, he immediately alighted from the taxicab. He denied that he stopped about
10 meters away from the place where Albayda fell. He carried Albayda and drove him to the hospital. 31
Panican testified that he worked as an airconditioner technician in a shop located on 8th Street corner 11th Street.
On the date and time of the incident, he was working in front of the shop near the roadside. He saw a bicycle
bump the rear right side of the taxicab. Then, the driver of the taxicab alighted, carried Albayda, and brought him
to the hospital.32
When questioned by the trial court, Panican testified that the bicycle was running fast and that he saw it bump
the taxicab. The taxicab already passed the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets when the bicycle arrived. 33
Abiad testified that, aside from being a soldier, he was also a franchise holder of taxicabs and passenger
jeepneys. When Completo applied as a driver of the taxicab, Abiad required the former to show his bio-data,
NBI clearance, and driver’s license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since the time he was
employed in February 1997. Abiad averred that Completo was a good driver and a good man. Being the operator
of taxicab, Abiad would wake up early and personally check all the taxicabs. 34
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, 35 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Albayda] and against the defendants
[Completo and Abiad]. Accordingly, the defendants [Completo and Abiad] are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
[Albayda] the following sum:
1. ₱46,000.00 as actual damages;
2. ₱400,000.00 as moral damages; [and]
3. ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Costs against the defendants [Completo and Abiad].
SO ORDERED.36
Completo and Abiad filed an appeal. The CA affirmed the trial court with modification in a Decision 37 dated
January 2, 2006, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 31
July 2000 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, in Civil Case No. 98-1333 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. the award of Php 46,000.00 as actual damages is DELETED;
2. temperate damages in the amount of Php 40,000.00 is awarded in favor of appellee;
3. moral damages in favor of appellee is REDUCED to Php 200,000.00;
4. appellants Redentor Completo and Elpidio Abiad are solidarily liable to pay appellee Amando C.
Albayda, Jr. said temperate and moral damages, as well as the attorney’s fees in the amount of Php
25,000.00 awarded by the trial court;
5. the temperate and moral damages shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the date of
promulgation of Our Decision;
6. upon finality of Our Decision, said moral and temperate damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of
12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per annum, until full payment. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.38
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners presented the following issues for resolution: (1) whether the CA erred in finding that Completo was
the one who caused the collision;
(2) whether Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family; and (3) whether
the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney’s fees to Albayda had no basis. 39
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
I. On Negligence
The issues raised by petitioners essentially delve into factual matters which were already passed upon by the
RTC and the CA. Conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. The fact
that the CA adopted the findings of fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this Court. Well-settled is
the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 40 To be sure, findings of fact of lower courts are deemed
conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court, save only for clear and exceptional reasons, 41 none of which is
present in the case at bar.
The instant case involved a collision between a taxicab and a bicycle which resulted in serious physical injuries
to the bicycle rider, Albayda. It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was
negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. 42
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the question of the motorist's
negligence is a question of fact.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in driving
the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the time he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was
the sole and proximate cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not slow down
even when he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets of VAB. It was also proven that Albayda had
the right of way, considering that he reached the intersection ahead of Completo.
The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway, and it
is fortified by the fact that usually more will be required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of
care to the other because of the physical advantages the automobile has over the bicycle. 43
At the slow speed of ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet per second, while a car traveling at
only twenty-five miles per hour covers almost thirty-seven feet per second, and split-second action may be
insufficient to avoid an accident. It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger of harm to a bicyclist
than vice versa. Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due
to the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required from the motorist to fully discharge the duty
than from the bicyclist.44 Simply stated, the physical advantages that the motor vehicle has over the bicycle
make it more dangerous to the bicyclist than vice versa. 45
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees, but the employers’ responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. If
the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other
words, the burden of proof is on the employer.46
The trial court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with Albayda at the
intersection of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of Completo, as driver, and his
employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. 47 The
civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing to his own
negligence in selecting and supervising his employee. 48 The civil liability of the employer attaches even if the
employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision. 49
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of employees, employers
should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. 50
Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he required the latter to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and
driver’s license. Abiad likewise stressed that Completo was never involved in a vehicular accident prior to the
instant case, and that, as operator of the taxicab, he would wake up early to personally check the condition of the
vehicle before it is used.
The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required under the law. Abiad’s evidence
consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad was
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of his
driver.
II. On Damages
The CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages by the RTC because Albayda failed to present
documentary evidence to establish with certainty the amount that he incurred during his hospitalization and
treatment for the injuries he suffered. In the absence of stipulation, actual damages are awarded only for such
pecuniary loss suffered that was duly proved.51
While the amount of actual damages was not duly established with certainty, the Court recognizes the fact that,
indeed, Albayda incurred a considerable amount for the necessary and reasonable medical expenses, loss of
salary and wages, loss of capacity to earn increased wages, cost of occupational therapy, and harm from
conditions caused by prolonged immobilization. Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. 52 Temperate damages must be
reasonable under the circumstances.53 Thus, the Court finds the award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as temperate damages reasonable under the circumstances.
Doubtless, Albayda suffered immeasurable pain because of the incident caused by petitioners’ negligence. The
CA explained:
The court vicariously feels the pain the plaintiff [Albayda] suffered a number of times. After he was bumped by
defendants’ cab, he cried in pain. When the doctors bore holes into his left knee, he cried in pain. When he was
tractioned, when he was subjected to an operation after operation he suffered pain. When he took the witness
stand to testify, he walked with crutches, his left knee in bandage, stiff and unfuctional. Pain was written [on] his
face. He does deserve moral damages.54
Moral damages are awarded in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. The permanent deformity and the scar left
by the wounds suffered by Albayba will forever be a reminder of the pain and suffering that he had endured and
continues to endure because of petitioners’ negligence. Thus, the award of moral damages in the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) is proper.
Finally, an interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum is due on the amount of ₱100,000.00, as temperate
damages, and ₱500,000.00, as moral damages, which we have awarded. The 6% per annum interest rate on the
temperate and moral damages shall commence to run from the date of the promulgation of this Decision. Upon
finality of the Decision, an interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall be imposed on the amount of
the temperate and moral damages until full payment thereof. 55
The award of attorney’s fees is hereby deleted for failure to prove that petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to
satisfy respondent’s just and valid claim.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated January 2, 2006 and the Resolution dated March
30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68405 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
viz.:
(1) The estate of the late Redentor Completo and Elpidio Abiad are solidarily liable to pay One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00), as temperate damages, and Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00), as moral damages;
(2) The temperate and moral damages hereby awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Decision. Upon finality of this Decision, an
interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum shall be imposed on the amount of the temperate and
moral damages until full payment thereof.
Costs against petitioners.
Guillang vs. Bedania (G.R. No. 162987
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was driving his
brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction sticker no. 54-DFT (car) along Emilio Aguinaldo
Highway (highway) in Cavite. Genaro, Antero Guillang (Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice (Dignadice),
and Alvin Llanillo (Llanillo) had all just left from Golden City, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and were on their way to
Manila. At the other side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania) was driving a ten-wheeler
Isuzu cargo truck with plate no. CAC-923 (truck) towards Tagaytay City. The truck was owned by respondent
Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva).
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn. When the
truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaro’s car hit the right portion of the truck. The truck dragged
Genaro’s car some five meters to the right of the road.
As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the De La Salle University Medical Center in
Dasmariñas, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero was later transferred to the Philippine
General Hospital. However, on 3 November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision.
The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.
On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero 5 instituted a complaint for
damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and de Silva.
On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found Bedania
grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due
regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly negligent in
the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania. The dispositive portion of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Rodolfo A. Bedania and Rodolfo de Silva,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs, as follows:
1. The sum of ₱508,566.03 representing the damage/repair costs of the Toyota to plaintiff Genaro M.
Guillang.
2. The sum of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Antero Guillang plus ₱185,000.00 for his burial expenses, to
the heirs of Antero Guillang.
3. For hospital and medical expenses as reflected in Exhibits E, E-1 to E-30 to plaintiffs Genaro M.
Guillang, Jose Dignadice and Alvin Llanillo.
4. The sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for the heirs of the deceased Antero Guillang.
5. The sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages each to plaintiffs Jose Dignadice, Alvin Llanillo and Genaro
Guillang.
6. The sum of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
7. The sum of ₱100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fess.
8. The costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.6
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 3 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of
the decision provides:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
of the herein appellees in Civil Case No. 95-73666 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The appellants’
counterclaims in the instant case are likewise DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. On 23 March 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
According to the trial court, there is a presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. 8 In this case, the trial court found that the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report (report), 9 corroborated by the testimonies of the witnesses, showed that the truck
committed a traffic violation by executing a U-turn without signal lights. The trial court also declared that
Bedania violated Sections 45(b),10 48,11 and 5412 of Republic Act No. 413613 when he executed the sudden
U-turn. The trial court added that Bedania violated another traffic rule when he abandoned the victims after the
collision.14 The trial court concluded that Bedania was grossly negligent in his driving and held him liable for
damages.
Moreover, the trial court found that Bedania did not make the U-turn at an intersection. According to the trial
court, vehicles trying to maneuver to change directions must seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver
and not recklessly make a U-turn in a highway. The trial court said Bedania should have observed extreme
caution in making a U-turn because it was unexpected that a long cargo truck would execute a U-turn along the
highway.
The trial court also said that Bedania’s gross negligence raised the legal presumption that de Silva, as Bedania’s
employer, was negligent in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial court said that, under
Articles 217615 and 218016 of the Civil Code, de Silva’s liability was based on culpa aquiliana which holds the
employer primarily liable for tortious acts of his employees, subject to the defense that he exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial court ruled that
de Silva failed to prove this defense and, consequently, held him liable for damages.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and said that the trial court overlooked substantial facts
and circumstances which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and alter the results of the
case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the testimonies of the witnesses and declared that they were "contrary to human
observation, knowledge and experience." The Court of Appeals also said that the following were the physical
evidences in the case:
1. It was not yet dark when the incident transpired;
2. The four-lane highway the appellees were cruising on was wide, straight, dry, relatively plain and with
no obstructions to the driver’s vision;
3. The point of impact of the collision is on the lane where the car was cruising and the car hit the gas
tank of the truck located at its right middle portion, which indicates that the truck had already properly
positioned itself and had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred;
4. Genaro Guillang was not able to stop the car in time and the car’s front portion was totally wrecked.
This negates appellees’ contention that they were traveling at a moderate speed; and
5. The sheer size of the truck makes it improbable for the said vehicle to negotiate a U-turn at a sudden
and fast speed – as appellees vigorously suggest – without toppling over on its side. 17 (Citations
omitted)
The Court of Appeals concluded that the collision was caused by Genaro’s negligence. The Court of Appeals
declared that the truck arrived at the intersection way ahead of the car and had already executed the U-turn when
the car, traveling at a fast speed, hit the truck’s side. The Court of Appeals added that considering the time and
the favorable visibility of the road and the road conditions, Genaro, if he was alert, had ample time to react to the
changing conditions of the road. The Court of Appeals found no reason for Genaro not to be prudent because he
was approaching an intersection and there was a great possibility that vehicles would be traversing the
intersection either going to or from Orchard Golf Course. The Court of Appeals said Genaro should have slowed
down upon reaching the intersection. The Court of Appeals concluded that Genaro’s failure to observe the
necessary precautions was the proximate cause of Antero’s death and the injuries of the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals also relied on the testimony of Police Traffic Investigator Efren Videna (Videna) that the
car was running at a fast speed and overtook another vehicle just before the collision occurred. 18 The Court of
Appeals concluded that Genaro did not see the truck as the other vehicle temporarily blocked his view of the
intersection. The Court of Appeals also gave weight to Videna’s testimony that it was normal for a ten-wheeler
truck to make a U-turn on that part of the highway because the entrance to Orchard Golf Course was spacious. 19
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals decide a question of substance in this case in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court?
2. Did the Court of Appeals depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
particularly when it revised, and recast the findings of facts of the trial court pertaining to credibility of
witnesses of which the trial court was at the vantage point to evaluate?
3. Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
rendered the palpably questionable Court of Appeals’ Decision that tampered with the findings of fact of
the trial court for no justifiable reason?
4. Is the Court of Appeals’ judgment and resolution reversing the decision of the trial court supported by
the evidence and the law and jurisprudence applicable? 20
The issue in this case is who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners. The trial court held Bedania and de
Silva, as Bedania’s employer, liable because the proximate cause of the collision was the sudden U-turn executed
by Bedania without any signal lights. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision
and held Genaro liable because the proximate cause of the collision was Genaro’s failure to stop the car despite
seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn.
The Ruling of the Court
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding
on this Court.21
However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court.22 Findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals may also be set
aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts’ conclusions are based on
a misapprehension of facts.23 Such is the situation in this case and we shall re-examine the facts and evidence
presented before the lower courts.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relations between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.24
There is no dispute that petitioners suffered damages because of the collision. However, the issues on negligence
and proximate cause are disputed.
On the Presumption of Negligence and Proximate Cause
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In Picart v. Smith,25 we held that the test of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is not supported by the evidence on record. In
ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals gave weight and credence to Videna’s testimony.
However, we find that Videna’s testimony was inconsistent with the police records and report that he made on
the day of the collision. First, Videna testified that the car was running fast and overtook another vehicle that
already gave way to the truck.26 But this was not indicated in either the report or the police records. Moreover,
if the car was speeding, there should have been skid marks on the road when Genaro stepped on the brakes to
avoid the collision. But the sketch of the accident showed no skid marks made by the car. 27 Second, Videna
testified that the petitioners came from a drinking spree because he was able to smell liquor. 28 But in the
report,29 Videna indicated that the condition of Genaro was "normal." Videna did not indicate in the report that
Genaro "had been drinking liquor" or that Genaro "was obviously drunk." Third, Videna testified that when he
arrived at the scene, Bedania was inside his truck. 30 This contradicts the police records where Videna stated that
after the collision Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims. 31 The police records also showed that Bedania
was arrested by the police at his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Cavite and was turned over to the police only on 26
October 1994.32
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report33 showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic
rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and
his truck.34 This is another violation of a traffic regulation. 35 Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania
was negligent at the time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck
had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. If the truck had fully made the U-turn, it should
have been hit on its rear. 36 If the truck had already negotiated even half of the turn and is almost on the other
side of the highway, then the truck should have been hit in the middle portion of the trailer or cargo
compartment. But the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals even declared, that the car hit the truck’s
gas tank, located at the truck’s right middle portion, which disproves the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
the truck had already executed the U-turn when it was hit by the car.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane where the car was cruising.
Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over the truck that was
making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon the car’s lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection. Again, this is not
supported by the evidence on record. The police sketch 37 does not indicate an intersection and only shows that
there was a road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near the place of the collision. Furthermore, U-turns are
generally not advisable particularly on major streets. 38 Contrary to Videna’s testimony, it is not normal for a
truck to make a U-turn on a highway. We agree with the trial court that if Bedania wanted to change direction, he
should seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal
lights and made sure that the highway was clear of vehicles from the opposite direction before executing the U-
turn.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that it was not yet dark when the collision occurred is also not supported by
the evidence on record. The report stated that the daylight condition at the time of the collision was
"darkness."39
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does not make it improbable for
the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial court’s decision did not state that the truck was traveling at a fast
speed when it made the U-turn. The trial court said the truck made a "sudden" U-turn, meaning the U-turn was
made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the truck’s signal lights were not turned on.
Clearly, Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and
injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 40 The
cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without
signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The
truck’s sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero
and the injuries of petitioners.
We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedania’s employer, is also liable for the damages suffered by
petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employees.
On the Award of Damages and Attorney’s Fees
According to prevailing jurisprudence, civil indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict is pegged at
₱50,000.41 Moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000 is also awarded to the heirs of the deceased taking into
consideration the pain and anguish they suffered. 42 Bienvenido Guillang (Bienvenido), Antero’s son, testified
that Sofia, Antero’s wife and his mother, became depressed after Antero’s death and that Sofia died a year
after.43 Bienvenido also testified on the pain and anguish their family suffered as a consequence of their father’s
death.44 We sustain the trial court’s award of ₱50,000 as indemnity for death and ₱50,000 as moral damages to
the heirs of Antero.
As to funeral and burial expenses, the court can only award such amount as are supported by proper receipts. 45
In this case, petitioners proved funeral and burial expenses of ₱55,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 1082, 46
₱65,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 1146 47 and ₱15,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 1064, 48 all issued by
the Manila South Cemetery Association, Inc., aggregating ₱135,000. We reduce the trial court’s award of funeral
and burial expenses from ₱185,000 to ₱135,000.
As to hospitalization expenses, only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the hospitalization of the victims will be recognized in court. 49 In this
case, the trial court did not specify the amount of hospitalization expenses to be awarded to the petitioners. Since
petitioners presented receipts for hospitalization expenses during the trial, we will determine the proper amounts
to be awarded to each of them. We award hospitalization expenses of ₱27,000.98 to the heirs of Antero, 50
₱10,881.60 to Llanillo,51 ₱5,436.77 to Dignadice,52 and ₱300 to Genaro53 because these are the amounts duly
substantiated by receipts.
We affirm the trial court’s award of ₱508,566.03 for the repair of the car. The Court notes that there is no dispute
that Genaro was driving a brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan and that, after the collision, the car was a total
wreck. In this case, the repair order presented by Genaro is sufficient proof of the damages sustained by the
car.541avvphi1.zw+
Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. 55 However, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the award of moral damages from ₱50,000 to ₱30,000 each to Llanillo,
Dignadice, and Genaro since they only suffered physical injuries brought about by the collision. 56
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 57 While the
amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded.58 In this case, Bedania was grossly negligent in suddenly making a U-turn in the highway
without signal lights. To serve as an example for the public good, we affirm the trial court’s award of exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.
Finally, we affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱100,000. Under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, attorney’s fees may be recovered when, as in this case, exemplary damages are awarded.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the 3 June 2003 Decision and 23 March 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69289. We REINSTATE with MODIFICATIONS the 5 December 2000 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila. We ORDER Rodolfo Bedania and Rodolfo de Silva, jointly and
severally, to pay the following amounts:
1. Funeral and Burial Expenses of ₱135,000 to the heirs of Antero Guillang;
2. Hospitalization Expenses of ₱27,000.98 to the heirs of Antero Guillang, ₱10,881.60 to Alvin Llanillo,
₱5,436.77 to Jose Dignadice, and ₱300 to Genaro Guillang; and
3. Moral damages of ₱30,000 each to Alvin Llanillo, Jose Dignadice, and Genaro Guillang.
SO ORDERED.

Cang vs. Cullen (G.R. No. 163078;

Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated
December 2, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69841. In the assailed Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20504, an action for damages.
The claim for damages was precipitated by a vehicular accident involving a taxicab bearing Plate No. GVG-672,
owned by petitioner Stephen Cang and driven by petitioner George Nardo, and a motorcycle owned by
respondent Herminia Cullen and driven by Guillermo Saycon.
On October 29, 1996, at about 3:10 p.m., Saycon was driving the Honda motorcycle, with Plate No. LLC-A-
4589, along P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, occupying the middle portion of the outer lane. The taxi, on the
other hand, was traveling on the inner lane and slightly behind, but to the left of, the motorcycle. Respondent
alleged that between Sikatuna and D. Jakosalem Streets, the taxi veered to the right and sideswiped the
motorcycle, then attempted to speed away. Peace officers near the scene flagged down the taxi. As a result of the
collision, Saycon was seriously injured.4
Petitioners, meanwhile, claimed that it was the motorcycle that bumped into the taxi. Nardo narrated that he was
driving the taxi on the inner lane (near the center island) along P. del Rosario St., moving towards the
intersection of D. Jakosalem St. When the "caution" signal of the traffic light flashed, he immediately slowed
down. It was at that point that the motorcycle bumped into the taxi’s rear. 5
Respondent, as employer, out of compassion, paid all of Saycon’s hospital and medical expenses amounting to
₱185,091.00.6 She also alleged that due to the injuries Saycon sustained, he was unable to work. For
humanitarian reasons, respondent had given Saycon an amount equivalent to his wages from October 31, 1996 to
May 30, 1997. She also gave Saycon ₱2,000.00 per month from June 1997 until he was able to return to work. 7
On July 3, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners praying that judgment be rendered
ordering the latter to pay, jointly and severally, ₱205,091.00 in actual damages; ₱2,000.00 per month from June
1997 up to the time Saycon would be able to return to work, with 6% per annum interest from the date of
extrajudicial demand; ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; 20% of the total amount by way of attorney’s fees;
₱10,000.00 as acceptance fee; ₱500.00 per court appearance, as appearance fee; ₱20,000.00 as litigation
expenses; and the cost of the suit.8
Petitioner Cang filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the complaint violated Presidential Decree No. 1508,
or the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The motion was dismissed on September 24, 1997. 9
Subsequently, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaims. Cang averred that Nardo was not driving the
taxi as the former’s employee, but that Nardo was leasing the taxi from him. 10 Petitioners also claimed that
Nardo did not sideswipe the motorcycle driven by Saycon, nor did the latter speed away after the incident. They
maintained that, at the time of the impact, Nardo’s taxi was on its proper lane and that it was the motorcycle that
veered into Nardo’s lane and bumped the taxi. 11 Further, they alleged that after the impact, Nardo drove the taxi
backward to where Saycon and the motorcycle were slumped on the road. He then alighted from the taxi.
Meanwhile, two traffic enforcers had crossed the street. After examining Saycon’s injuries, one of the enforcers
ordered Nardo to bring the former to a hospital. Nardo hesitated for a moment because he wanted the enforcers
to make a sketch of the accident first, to show the exact positions of the vehicles at the time of the accident.
However, he was prevailed upon by the traffic enforcers to bring Saycon to the hospital. Hence, it was not true
that Nardo attempted to speed away from the scene of the accident. Petitioner Cang also claimed that Saycon
was driving the motorcycle without any protective headgear and that the latter was not authorized to drive the
motorcycle since he only had a student’s permit. 12 Petitioner Cang prayed that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit, for lack of cause of action and for lack of legal capacity. He also prayed for the award of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱10,000.00 as acceptance fee, ₱30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, ₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses, and ₱1,000.00 per court appearance. 13
After trial, the RTC ruled in petitioners’ favor. In its Decision 14 dated January 31, 2000, the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs
(sic) complaint is hereby dismissed.
Defendants’ counterclaims are likewise denied.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Respondent appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. On December 2, 2002, the CA promulgated the assailed
Decision,16 reversing the RTC Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated January 31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu, Branch 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff-appellant, jointly and severally[,] the following:
1.) The sum of ₱166,197.08 as actual damages which were incurred for the hospitalization and other
medical expenses of plaintiff-appellant’s driver Guillermo Saycon; and
`2.) The sum of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioners are now before this Court on Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the CA Decision and its
Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. They argue that the CA erred in reversing the judgment
rendered by the trial court; in giving credence to the eyewitness’ testimony of Ike Aldemita, that petitioner Nardo
had overtaken the motorcycle driven by Saycon and, therefore, was the negligent party; and in awarding
damages to respondent.18
The petition is meritorious.
We note that the present Petition raises questions of fact. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of
fact which we cannot ordinarily pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law.19
However, although findings of fact of the CA are generally conclusive on this Court, this rule admits of the
following exceptions:20
(1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is mainly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; and
(8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Thus, when there are conflicting findings of fact by the CA on one hand and by the trial court on the other, as in
this case,21 the Court may give due course to petitions raising factual issues by way of exception and only in the
presence of extremely meritorious circumstances. 22
Contrary to the CA’s ruling, we find that the RTC correctly disregarded Aldemita’s testimony. Between the RTC
and the CA, it is the former’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility that should control. 23
The trial court gave little credence to Aldemita’s testimony, upon its finding that:
On the other hand, multicab driver Aldemita contended that he saw everything. He said that the motorcycle and
the taxi overtook him. He told the court during his testimony that the motorcycle was ahead of the taxi. He
further said that the motorcycle was nearer him (TSN, February 13, 1998, Savellon, p. 4). The court finds him
inconsistent. If both were ahead of him and the motorcycle was ahead of the taxi, then, the motorcycle could not
be nearer him. Because if the motorcycle was indeed nearer him, then, it could not have been ahead of the taxi.
But rather, the taxi was ahead of the motorcycle. But in a later testimony, he said that they were beside each
other (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p. 17).
He also said that both tried to pass the lane which would fit only two vehicles. He told the court that both
vehicles were running fast – at a speed of more than 30 kph – when the motorcycle was hit by the taxi. It would
seem to the court that both vehicles were racing each other. Aldemita further said that in trying to pass the
motorcycle, the taxi hit the left handle bar of the motorcycle. The handle bar was twisted and the motorcycle fell
down to the left side. But if the taxi was indeed to the left of the motorcycle and if it really swerved to the right
and hit the motorcycle – the law of force would tell us that the motorcycle would fall to the right after impact. It
is the most logical direction for the motorcycle to fall. If the taxi was indeed traveling at a fast speed when it hit
the motorcycle, the impact would not have only caused a mere twisted handle and the motorcycle would not
have only fallen on its side as claimed by Aldemita. High speed impact would have caused the motorcycle and
its driver greater damage and would have dislocated them much farther away than where it fell in this case.
He claimed that he was more or less ten (10) meters from the site of the accident when it happened (TSN, Feb.
12, 1998, p. 12). The court can, therefore, say that he was also quite far from the scene of the accident and could
not be that certain as to what really happened.
Aldemita also said that he signaled the taxi driver to stop (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p. 6). However, later
when asked, he said he signaled the "policeman" to stop the taxi driver or not (sic). He also claimed that he was
near (sic) the motorcyclist than the "policemen." He further claimed that he was there at the scene of the accident
to help but later said he never saw the driver of the taxi (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p. 17). The court finds
this highly unusual for somebody who claimed to be at the scene of the accident not to see the driver who came
out of his vehicle to reason out with the responding enforcers. He said he was the one who removed the
motorcycle which pinned its driver and then helped carried (sic) the driver to the taxi as told by the "policeman"
(TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon p. 7). But later, he said that somebody took his place in carrying the victim
because there were already many people (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p. 17). x x x.
xxxx
The court also cannot fail to notice the uncontroverted allegation of Nardo during his testimony that Aldemita
was not the person (the multicab driver) he saw during the time of the accident. He claimed that the person who
testified in court last February 12, 1998, was not the driver of the multicab who was at the scene of the accident
that fateful night (sic) of October 29, 1996 (TSN, Aug. 24, 1998, Pieras, p. 12). Allegations and claims like this
when not countered and disproved would certainly cast doubt on the credibility of the subject person and
consequently, on his testimonies, too.
Based on the points, the court cannot help but find Aldemita’s testimony as uncertain and filled with so many
inconsistencies. They contradicted with each other at many instances. The court believes in either of the two
possibilities -- Aldemita did not really actually and exactly see the whole incident or he was lying through his
teeth. Thus, the court cannot give so much weight to his testimony. 24
The CA failed to refute the trial court’s detailed analysis of the events leading to the accident and what transpired
thereafter. It merely said that the lower court should have considered Aldemita’s eyewitness testimony. 25 The
CA based its findings of the accident only on Aldemita’s account. It failed to consider all the other testimonial
and documentary evidence analyzed by the trial court, which substantially controverted Aldemita’s testimony.
In contrast, the trial court found Nardo more credible on the witness stand. Thus:
During his testimonies, Nardo appeared to be consistent, sincere and certain in his statements. He appeared to be
acknowledgeable (sic) in his work as a driver. He conveyed a definite degree of credibility when he testified. The
Court has decided to give more appreciation to his testimonies. 26lavvph!1
We are inclined to give greater weight to the trial court’s assessment of the two witnesses.
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect – even
considered as conclusive and binding on this Court 27 – since the trial judge had the unique opportunity to
observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. 28 Only
the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh of a witness, or his scant or full realization of an oath – all of which are useful aids for an
accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. 29 He can thus be expected to determine with
reasonable discretion which testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief. 30
Absent any showing that the trial court’s calibration of the credibility of the witnesses was flawed, we are bound
by its assessment.31 This Court will sustain such findings unless it can be shown that the trial court ignored, 32
overlooked, misunderstood,33 misappreciated,34 or misapplied35 substantial facts and circumstances, which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the case. 36
We find no such circumstances in this case. The trial court’s meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the facts of
the case is noteworthy. It succeeded in presenting a clear and logical picture of the events even as it admitted that
the resolution of the case was made more difficult by the "inefficiencies, indifference, ineptitude, and dishonesty
of the local law enforcers, and the litigants," 37 which left the court without an official sketch of the accident, 38
with no photographs or any other proof of the damage to the respondent’s motorcycle, 39 with an altered police
report,40 and with the baffling matter of the victim’s driver’s license being issued two days after the accident
took place – when the victim was supposed to be in the hospital. 41
These handicaps notwithstanding, the trial court methodically related in detail all the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented, and made the most rational analysis of what truly happened on the day of the
incident.
The trial court categorically found that it was not the taxi that bumped the motorcycle. It concluded that based on
the evidence presented before the court, it was the motorcycle that bumped the taxi. 42 It also found that at the
time of the accident, Saycon, the driver of the motorcycle, did not have a license but only had a student driver’s
permit. Further, Saycon was not wearing the proper protective headgear and was speeding. 43 Hence, the trial
court concluded:
It was really pitiful that Saycon suffered for what he did. But then, he has only himself to blame for his sad
plight. He had been careless in driving the motorcycle without a helmet. For speeding. (sic) For driving alone
with only a student permit. (sic) For causing the accident. (sic) If the driver was found violating traffic rules, a
legal presumption that he was negligent arises. 44
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, provides:
Sec. 30. Student-driver’s permit – Upon proper application and the payment of the fee prescribed in accordance
with law, the Director or his deputies may issue student-driver’s permits, valid for one year to persons not under
sixteen years of age, who desire to learn to operate motor vehicles.
A student-driver who fails in the examination on a professional or non-professional license shall continue as a
student-driver and shall not be allowed to take another examination at least one month thereafter. No student-
driver shall operate a motor vehicle, unless possessed of a valid student-driver’s permit and accompanied by a
duly licensed driver.
The licensed driver duly accredited by the Bureau, acting as instructor to the student driver, shall be equally
responsible and liable as the latter for any violation of the provisions of this Act and for any injury or damage
done by the motor vehicle on account or as a result of its operation by a student-driver under his direction. 45
Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the time of the accident. Corollarily, Article 2185 of the Civil
Code states:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. 46 Negligence, as it is
commonly understood, is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand. 47 It is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or doing something that a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 48
To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this Court laid down this test: Did defendant, in
doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. 49
Based on the foregoing test, we can conclude that Saycon was negligent. In the first place, he should not have
been driving alone. The law clearly requires that the holder of a student-driver’s permit should be accompanied
by a duly licensed driver when operating a motor vehicle. Further, there is the matter of not wearing a helmet
and the fact that he was speeding. All these prove that he was negligent.
Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
[w]hen the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
The trial court gave more credence to Nardo’s version of the accident that he was on his proper lane, that he was
not speeding, and that it was the motorcycle that bumped into his taxi. The trial court established that the
accident was caused wholly by Saycon’s negligence. It held that "the injuries and damages suffered by plaintiff
(respondent) and Saycon were not due to the acts of defendants (petitioners) but due to their own negligence and
recklessness."50
Considering that Saycon was the negligent party, he would not have been entitled to recover damages from
petitioners had he instituted his own action. Consequently, respondent, as his employer, would likewise not be
entitled to claim for damages.
Further militating against respondent’s claim is the fact that she herself was negligent in the selection and
supervision of her employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176
shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 51
When an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence
of a good father of a family. 52 Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.53
The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a student’s permit is, to our minds, proof enough that Cullen
was negligent – either she did not know that he only had a student’s permit or she allowed him to drive alone
knowing this deficiency. Whichever way we look at it, we arrive at the same conclusion: that she failed to
exercise the due diligence required of her as an employer in supervising her employee. Thus, the trial court
properly denied her claim for damages. One who seeks equity and justice must come to this Court with clean
hands.54
In sum, we hold that the trial court correctly found that it was Saycon who caused the accident and, as such, he
cannot recover indemnity for his injury. On the other hand, respondent, as Saycon’s employer, was also negligent
and failed to exercise the degree of diligence required in supervising her employee. Consequently, she cannot
recover from petitioners what she had paid for the treatment of her employee’s injuries.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 2,
2002 and the Resolution dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69841 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 22, in Civil Case No.
CEB-20504 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Tan vs. Jam Transit (G.R. No. 183198

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the
Decision2 dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89046 and the reinstatement of
the Decision3 dated December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna in
Civil Case No. SC-3838.
The antecedents are as follows—
In her Complaint, petitioner Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-type jitney
with plate number DKF-168. On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00 a.m., the said jitney figured in an accident at an
intersection along Maharlika Highway, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit
passenger bus bound for Manila, bearing plate number DVG-557 and body number 8030. The bus was driven by
Eddie Dimayuga (Dimayuga).
At the time of the collision, Tan’s jitney was loaded with quail eggs and duck eggs (balot and salted eggs). It was
driven by Alexander M. Ramirez (Ramirez). Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent, and
not observing traffic rules and regulations, causing the bus to collide with the jitney which was then, with care
and proper light direction signals, about to negotiate a left turn towards the feeder or barangay road of Barangay
Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna going to the Poblacion. The jitney turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the
cargo of eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized, incurring expenses for
medical treatment at the Pagamutang Pangmasa in Bay, Laguna. Tan prayed for damages in the amount of
₱400,000.00 for the damaged jitney, ₱142,210.00 for the destroyed shipment, ₱20,000.00 for moral damages,
attorney’s fees of ₱20,000.00 plus ₱1,000.00 per court appearance of counsel, and other reliefs warranted under
the premises.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc. (JAM) admitted ownership of the subject
passenger bus and that Dimayuga was under its employ. However, it denied the allegations in the Complaint, and
claimed that the accident occurred due to the gross negligence of
Ramirez. As counterclaim, JAM sought payment of ₱100,000.00 for the damages sustained by the bus,
₱100,000.00 for loss of income, and ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus ₱3,000.00 per court appearance of
counsel.
After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.
Tan proffered testimonial evidence, summarized by the RTC, and quoted by the CA, as follows:
LUZ PALANCA TAN, 47 years old, married, a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna and a businesswoman, testified to
the facts stated in the complaint that: She is engaged in the business of nets and ropes, and egg dealership based
[in] Santa Cruz, Laguna. She supplies her products to her customers [in] San Pablo and Lucena. On March 14,
1997, while at home, she was informed by her husband that one of their jeepneys, which was loaded with eggs,
was bumped by a JAM Transit bus when the latter overtook the jeepney. The vehicle was driven by one
Alexander Ramirez, who has one "Monching" as a companion. As a result of the accident, she incurred damages
in the amount of ₱650,000.00 based on the following computation: ₱400,000.00 as actual damage sustained by
the jeepney, from an estimate (Exhibit "D") furnished by Plantilla Motors; ₱142,000.00 for the lost value of the
egg shipment, based on a certification issued by the Calauan Police Station; and ₱15,000.00, for the
hospitalization and treatment of the driver and his companion. The jeepney is duly registered as evidenced by its
registration receipt (Exhibit "G"). On cross examination, she testified that Ramirez, the jeepney driver when the
accident occurred, was under her employ since 1993 and is still working for her.
On redirect, the plaintiff testified that prior to March 13, 1997, the day the accident happened, Ramirez has not
met any vehicular accident and that it was only in the aforestated date when he figured in one. On re-cross, she
testified that she has no knowledge of Ramirez’ prior experience as a driver. She did not ask Ramirez for his NBI
or police clearance prior to her hiring the said driver. On additional redirect, the plaintiff testified that she is
satisfied with the performance of Ramirez as a driver as he is kind.
ALEXANDER RAMIREZ, 35 years old, married, resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and a driver testified that: He
knows the plaintiff Luz Palanca Tan because she is his manager. He worked for her as a driver sometime in
1993. He sometimes drove a jeepney or a truck.
On March 13, 1997, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, he reported for work at his employer’s warehouse
located [in] Pagsawitan, Sta. Cruz. He got the passenger jeep loaded with salted eggs, "balot" and quail eggs for
delivery to Lucena City upon instruction of Tan. In going to Lucena City, he chose to drive on the Maharlika
Road at San Isidro, Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna because it is better than the road along Brgy. Dayap of the
same municipality. However, while at the Maharlika Road, he met an accident at around 5:00 a.m. The jitney
turned turtle.
PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES, 37 years old, married, resident of Calauan, Laguna, and a member of PNP-
Calauan, Laguna, testified that: He was on police duty as of March 14, 1997. On that day, he issued a
certification (Exhibit "B") pertaining to a vehicular accident which occurred earlier. He came to know of the
accident as relayed to their office by a concerned citizen. He proceeded to the place of the accident, which was at
Maharlika Highway, in an intersection at Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna for an investigation. Upon reaching
the place, as a rule followed by police officers, he inquired from some of the residents about the incident. As
relayed to him, the jeepney with Plate No. 168 was going towards the direction of San Isidro, followed by
another jeepney, a truck and then by a JAM Transit bus. The bus overtook the jeepney it was following then side
swept the jeepney (which figured in the accident) dragging it along ("nakaladkad") towards the sampaguita
gardens. [NOTE: The testimony of the witness regarding the information gathered was ordered by the Court to
be deleted.] Then, he went personally to the place where the incident happened.
He stated it was cloudy that day. He described the highway where the incident happened as having a double
straight yellow line which prohibits overtaking on both sides of the road. The said place is near the intersection
of Maharlika Highway and the barangay road leading to Brgy. San Isidro.
On cross examination, he stated he cannot remember if he was with other police officers during the investigation
of the incident but he can recall having interviewed a certain Mercy Ponteiros and one Rodel, who are both
residents of the place.
On redirect, he stated that the witness Mercy Ponteiros is still residing at Brgy. Bangyas[.]
On additional direct examination, he stated that the accident site is still fresh in his mind and he drew a sketch
(Exhibit "F" to "F-7") of the said place. He identified in the sketch the direction of the highway which leads to
Manila and to Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The road, per his approximation, was about 10 meters wide, with the shoulder
about 5 meters except that it was diminished to about 2 meters on account of some encroachment. The highway
has a painted crosswalk. It also has a yellow line without any cut which means no vehicle could overtake from
both sides of the road. He showed in the sketch the spot where the jitney and the bus were at the time of the
incident. Shown the photographs (Exhibits "E" to "E-6"), he stated that they are truly reflective of the scene of
the incident, the damages in both the jeepney and the bus, as of March 13, 1997.
On cross, he stated that what he saw was the situation after the incident. He came to learn of the accident at
around 5:10 in the morning from a report received by their office, as relayed by a concerned citizen. He
remembers that SPO4 Rogelio Medina, now retired, as one of his companions at the accident site. The site is
about a kilometer away from their police station. He can recall the scene of the incident because of the
photographs. The persons he investigated were the jitney driver, his "pahinante" (helper) and some people in the
vicinity. He could not remember the names of those persons but they were listed in the police blotter.
RODRIGO CONDINO, 38 years old, married, resident of Victoria, Laguna and a mechanic, testified that: He is
a mechanic of Plantilla Motors at Bubucal, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. He knows the plaintiff Luz Tan as he and his chief
(mechanic) repaired the jeepney owned by the latter after it figured in an accident on March 13, 1997. He came
to know of the accident when the said vehicle was brought to their motor shop. They made an estimate (Exhibit
"D") of the damage sustained by the said vehicle, which amounted to ₱450,000.00. 4
Tan also formally offered as exhibits the following documents:
Exhibit "A" - Articles of Incorporation of JAM Transit, Inc.;
Exhibit "B" - Certification issued by the Calauan Municipal Police Station regarding the vehicular
accident;
Exhibit "C" - PNP-Calauan Police Report regarding the jitney shipment;
Exhibit "D" - Estimate of damages sustained by the jitney, from A. Plantilla Motors Repair Shop;
Exhibit "E" - Six (6) photographs depicting the site of the vehicular accident;
Exhibit "F" - Four (4) pages of receipts representing hospital and medical expenses paid by the plaintiff
for injuries sustained by her driver and helper in the accident;
Exhibit "G" - Certificate of Registration of plaintiff’s jitney;
Exhibit "H" - Driver’s license of Eddie Dimayuga, defendant’s bus driver;
Exhibit "I" - Sketch of the site where the vehicular accident occurred. 5
On the other hand, JAM offered the following testimonial evidence –
EDGARDO DIMAYUGA, 49 years old, married, resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna and bus driver of JAM Transit
Inc., testified that: He has been a passenger bus driver since 1983. He was previously employed with the
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB). He was employed with JAM Transit since 1992. He has a
professional driver’s license, D-12-78-008462562.
On March 14, 1997, he reported for work. He met an accident while driving a bus. The other vehicle involved, a
jitney, belongs to Luz Palanca Tan and driven by Alexander Ramirez. The accident happened along the
intersection of Maharlika Highway, Brgy. Bangyas at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning. He was driving the
bus with a speed of 40 km/h when suddenly, a vehicle overtook the bus from the right side going to Calauan. He
was not able to evade the vehicle as there was no way for him to do so. The front portion of the bus and the
mirror were destroyed.
On cross examination, he stated that his route as of March 14, 1997 was Sta. Cruz-Lawton. He cannot recall the
bus conductor who was on Bangyas, Calauan. He stated he was not able to evade the jitney as there was no way
for him to avoid the situation, causing the jitney to be dragged to the side. Nothing else happened after the bus
hit the jeepney. He and other persons took the driver from the jeepney and brought him to a hospital.
On redirect, he stated that bus conductors change duties every two or three days. 6
JAM did not offer any documentary counter-evidence.
Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC found the JAM passenger bus driver at fault as he was then
violating a traffic regulation when the collision took place. Thus, the RTC ruled in favor of Tan and disposed as
follows—
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants who are hereby adjudged to pay the plaintiff
jointly and solidarily, the following:
1. actual damages of ₱142,210.00 for the lost and damaged cargoes; ₱400,000.00 for the destroyed
jitney; ₱1,327.00 medical expenses of the jitney driver and his companion, for a total amount of
[₱543,537.00];
2. ₱10,000.00 as moral damages;
3. ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
4. Costs of suit[.]
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, JAM appealed to the CA. The CA granted the appeal and dismissed the complaint on the ground that
there was nothing on record that supported the RTC’s finding that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking Tan’s
jitney. The CA noted that Ramirez only testified that, on March 14, 1997, he met an accident at around 5:00 a.m.,
while transporting eggs along Maharlika Road in San Isidro, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, causing the
jitney he was driving to turn turtle. The CA also observed that the Certification (Exhibit "B") made no mention
that the JAM passenger bus was overspeeding or that it was overtaking the jitney; and, thus, there was no
evidence as to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent in connection with the vehicular accident.
The CA held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct evidence is nonexistent or not
accessible. It further said that Tan had access to direct evidence as to the precise cause of the mishap, such that
the circumstances of the vehicular accident or the specific act constituting the supposed negligence of Dimayuga
could have been testified to by Ramirez or by the latter’s companion. The CA concluded that res ipsa loquitur
could not apply in this case because the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of establishing proof of
negligence.
Hence, this petition, with petitioner positing that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable given the
circumstances of the case.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." It is a
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may
permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing that caused the injury complained of
is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of
things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence -- in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant -- that the accident
arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. This rule is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary
human experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common knowledge that negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge.8
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not constitute an independent or separate
ground for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific
proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine do not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting plaintiff to
present, along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and thereby placing on defendant the burden of going
forward with the proof.9 Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. 10
Was petitioner able to establish the above requisites? We answer in the affirmative. We do not subscribe to the
finding of the CA that petitioner had direct access to the evidence surrounding the accident, but since she failed
to present it, the doctrine would not operate to apply. While Ramirez took the witness stand, he was only able to
testify that he drove along Maharlika Highway in San Isidro, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, Tan’s
passenger jitney loaded with salted eggs, balot and quail eggs for delivery at around 5:00 a.m. when he met an
accident, causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Obviously, Ramirez had no vivid recollection of how the passenger
jitney was actually hit by the JAM passenger bus. Further, for some unknown reasons, the other possible
eyewitnesses to the mishap were not available to testify. With the dearth of testimonial or direct evidence, should
petitioner now be left without remedy? The answer is NO.
We cannot agree with the CA when it said that how the incident happened could not be established, neither from
the photographs offered in evidence in favor of petitioner, nor from the Certification 11 that quoted an excerpt
from the records on the Police Blotter of the Calauan Municipal Police Station. The CA, likewise, discounted the
probative value of the Police Blotter because, although prepared in the regular performance of official duty, it
was not conclusive proof of the truth of its entries, since police blotters are usually incomplete and inaccurate;
and sometimes based on partial suggestion, inaccurate reporting and hearsay. 12
It is worth noting, however, that photographs are in the nature of physical evidence 13 -- a mute but eloquent
manifestation of truth ranking high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 14 When duly verified and shown
by extrinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the time in question, they are, in the
discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding of the evidence, the
situation or condition of objects or premises, or the circumstances of an accident. 15
The photographs16 proffered by petitioner indeed depicted the relative positions of her jitney and of the JAM
passenger bus immediately after the accident took place. An examination of the photographs would readily show
that the highway where the accident occurred was marked by two yellow continuous parallel lines at the center,
separating the right lane from the left. Based on evidence, the JAM passenger bus was moving along the
highway towards Manila, and the jitney was going along the same route, until it was about to turn left to the
barangay road towards the Poblacion. After the incident, the photographs would show that both vehicles were
found on the opposite lane of the highway. The front right portion of the bus was shown to have collided with or
hit the left portion of the jitney with such an impact, causing the latter to turn turtle with extensive damage,
injuring its driver and his companion, and completely destroying its cargo. 17
Although the person who took the pictures was not able to testify because he predeceased the trial, Senior Police
Officer II Daniel Escares (Escares) was recalled to the witness stand to authenticate the said pictures. He testified
that the pictures were faithful representations of the circumstances immediately after the accident. 18 Escares
also made an appropriately labeled sketch 19 of the situation after the collision, and testified as to the physical
circumstances thereof, including the width of the road and the road shoulder, especially the double yellow lines
at the center of the highway.20
As regards police blotters, it should be remembered that although they are of little probative value, they are
nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified
by other competent evidence.21 In this case, the Certification,22 whose entries were adopted from the police
blotter of the Calauan Municipal Police Station, the sketch 23 prepared by Escares, and the photographs, taken
together would prove that the jitney and the bus were going along the same way; that the jitney was about to
negotiate the intersection going to the left towards the feeder road in the direction of the Poblacion; and that the
bus hit the left-turning jitney causing the smaller vehicle to turn turtle.
Indeed, no two motor vehicles traversing the same lane of a highway with double yellow center lines will collide
as a matter of course, both ending up on the opposite lane, unless someone is negligent. Dimayuga was driving
the JAM passenger bus which, from the evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with
petitioner’s jitney. Driving the bus gave Dimayuga exclusive management and control over it. Despite the claim
of JAM to the contrary, no contributory negligence could be attributed to Ramirez relative to the incident on the
basis of the available evidence. Inevitably, the requisites being present, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
We, thus, quote with concurrence the findings of the RTC—
As both parties are asserting claim for the damages each has respectively sustained from the subject collision,
the negligence of either driver of the bus or of the jitney must be shown, and the burden to prove the negligence,
by preponderance of evidence, lies upon both who are alleging the other’s negligence. Preponderance of
evidence is "evidence as a whole which is superior to that of the defendant {or the other}" [Pacific Banking
Employees Organization vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495].
To prove negligence of the bus driver, plaintiff relies heavily upon the testimony of PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES,
who identified the police report of the incident [Exhibit "B"] as well as the sketch of the site [Exhibit "I"] and the
pictures taken as reflective of the scene of the incident [Exhibits "E" with sub-markings], invoking [in plaintiff’s
memorandum] the application of the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitor."
From the said exhibits, the plaintiff postulates that her jitney then being driven by Alexander Ramirez, as well as
the bus driven by defendant Dimayuga were heading the same direction towards Manila, but when the jitney was
about to negotiate the left side road intersection towards the feeder/Barangay road of Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan,
Laguna, it was bumped by the oncoming/overtaking bus driven by Dimayuga, that caused the jitney to turn turtle
at the road shoulder causing damages on the jitney, the cargoes and injuries to the jitney driver and his
companion. It was allegedly improper for the bus to overtake as the road bears a double yellow line at the middle
which prohibits overtaking.
On the other hand, the bus driver who is the lone witness/evidence for the defendant testified he was driving at
the Maharlika Highway at 40 km/hr when the jitney "overtook" from the right and that there was no way for him
to evade the latter so it was dragged to the side [TSN, May 18, 2006, p. 13]. In its memorandum, defendants
postulate that it was the jitney driver who was negligent as it overtook the bus from the right which is not proper.
Plaintiff allegedly could not claim damages for its failure to prove the bus driver’s negligence, and it was the
jitney’s own negligence that is the proximate cause of his injury.
No direct evidence was presented with respect to the exact road position of the bus and the jitney at the time of
the collision such that the same can only be inferred from the pictures of the colliding vehicles taken
immediately after the incident [Exhibits "E"].
At this juncture, it was established from exhibits "E-5" and "E-6" that the jitney’s left side portion was directly
hit by the front-right portion of the bus. This is consistent with the plaintiff’s theory that the jitney was then
negotiating the left portion of the road when it was hit by the oncoming bus causing the jitney to have a 90-
degree turn around. The bus and the jitney were almost perpendicular to each other when the collision took
place, with the bus directly hitting the jitney head on.
The statement of the bus driver that the jitney "overtook" from the right only presumes that at the point of
collision, the bus was at the left lane of the road overtaking the vehicle/s at the right. This scenario, in fact, was
affirmed by the police report of the incident [Exhibit "B"]. It is not quite logical that the jitney, in allegedly
overtaking the bus from the right came from the right shoulder of the road, a rough road merely 5 meters in
width [Exhibit "F"] and even diminished by two (2) meters because of the encroachment at the sides [TSN, 11-6-
02]. No evidence was shown that the jitney came from the right shoulder. The jitney then loaded with eggs for
delivery, was about to negotiate the left lane towards the feeder/barangay road intersection, and it would be
illogical in such a situation that the jitney driver would take the right shoulder. The foregoing suggest the fact
that the bus overtook the passing vehicles at the right lane and in the course thereof, the jitney in front that was
about to negotiate the left lane, was hit.24
Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking the vehicles running
along the right lane of the highway from the left lane, the available evidence readily points to such fact. There
were two continuous yellow lines at the center of the highway, which meant that no vehicle in the said area
should overtake another on either side of the road. The "double yellow center lines" regulation, which this Court
takes judicial notice of as an internationally recognized pavement regulation, was precisely intended to avoid
accidents along highways, such as what happened in this case. This prohibition finds support in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), Section 41(e). 25 Furthermore, it is observed that the
area of collision was an intersection. Section 41(c) 26 of R.A. No. 4136, likewise, prohibits overtaking or passing
any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any intersection of highways, among others. Thus, by
overtaking on the left lane, Dimayuga was not only violating the "double yellow center lines" regulation, but
also the prohibition on overtaking at highway intersections. Consequently, negligence can be attributed only to
him, which negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by petitioner. This prima facie finding of
negligence was not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by Dimayuga. Therefore, a finding that he is liable for
damages to petitioner is warranted.1avvphi1
The liability of Dimayuga is solidary with JAM, pursuant to Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which provides—
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the section (culpa in eligiendo)
or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. 27 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 28
In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not present any other evidence, whether
documentary or testimonial, in its favor. Inevitably, the presumption of its negligence as Dimayuga’s employer
stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the damages sustained by petitioner.
As regards the award for actual damages, we, however, concur with respondent that the award of ₱400,000.00
for the damage to the jitney is not warranted, considering that the evidence submitted to support this claim was
merely an estimate made by A. Plantilla Motors. The same reason holds true with respect to the amount of
damages for the destroyed cargo of eggs, considering that the document submitted by petitioner to support the
claim of ₱142,210.00 was merely a Certification, 29 as the information found thereon was supplied by petitioner
herself per the number of pieces of the different eggs and the corresponding price per piece.
To warrant an award of actual or compensatory damages for repair to damage sustained, the best evidence should
be the receipts or other documentary proofs of the actual amount expended. 30 However, considering that it was
duly proven that the jitney was damaged and had to be repaired, as it was repaired, and that the cargo of eggs
was indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts expended or lost were not proven, we deem it appropriate to award
₱250,000.00 by way of temperate damages. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. 31 We,
however, sustain the trial court’s award of ₱1,327.00 as regards the medical expenses incurred by petitioner, the
same being duly supported by receipts.32
The award of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit are sustained,
the same being in order and authorized by law. Although the basis for the award of attorney’s fees was not
indicated in the trial court’s Decision, we deem it justified as petitioner was compelled to litigate before the
courts and incur expenses in order to vindicate her rights under the premises. 33
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 89046 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3838 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION
that the award of actual damages is reduced to ₱1,327.00, and, in lieu of actual damages with respect to the
damage or loss sustained with respect to the passenger jitney and the cargo of eggs, the amount of ₱250,000.00
is awarded by way of temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty (G.R. No. 184905

On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue), corner Rajah Matanda
(Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate Number XDN
210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin ("Aquilino"), and a Ford
Expedition, owned by x x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"), with Plate
Number LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. She was
immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
(C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten
kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when
(Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the car’s right rear door and fender. With the force of the
impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to indict Rodel, the
driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. In the meantime,
petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the
hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting
(C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 33277, and subsequently raffled to Branch 42.
As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino,
(C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedan car
crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting
vehicles to pass through the intersection.
(Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.
Weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the MeTC rendered the Decision dated 1 March 2006
exculpating (Ramos) from liability, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Counterclaims of the defendant are
likewise DISMISSED for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED."
The aforesaid judgment did not sit well with (C.O.L. Realty) so that he (sic) appealed the same before the RTC
of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 215, which rendered the assailed Decision dated 5 September 2006, affirming
the MeTC’s Decision. (C.O.L. Realty’s) Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate as it was denied by the
RTC in its Order dated 5 June 2007.1
C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) dated November 30, 2004, such act is specifically prohibited. Thus:
This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of vehicles at Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has (sic) not allowed since January
2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the area. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street in order
to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless, Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue through
certain portions of the barricade which were broken, thus violating the MMDA rule. 3
However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos’ vehicle was moving at
high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction (the Katipunan Avenue-Boni
Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed into the rear door and fender of the passenger’s side of Aquilino’s car,
sending it spinning in a 180-degree turn.4 It therefore found the driver Rodel guilty of contributory negligence
for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.
Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision, 5 the dispositive portion of which
reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 5 September 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 is
hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo to pay
petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages. Petitioner C.O.L. Realty
Corporation’s claim for exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition, which raises the
following sole issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE SAME IS INSUFFICIENT.

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

There is no doubt in the appellate court’s mind that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident. Respondent
does not dispute this; in its Comment to the instant petition, it even conceded that petitioner was guilty of mere
contributory negligence.6
Thus, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that:
The Certification dated 30 November 2004 of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
evidently disproved (C.O.L. Realty’s) barefaced assertion that its driver, Aquilino, was not to be blamed for the
accident –
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of vehicles at
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has (sic) not
allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the area.

This certification is issued upon request of the interested parties for whatever legal purpose it may
serve."

(C.O.L. Realty) admitted that there were barricades along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah
Matanda Street. The barricades were placed thereon to caution drivers not to pass through the intersecting roads.
This prohibition stands even if, as (C.O.L. Realty) claimed, the "barriers were broken" at that point creating a
small gap through which any vehicle could pass. What is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly ignored these
barricades and drove through it. Without doubt, his negligence is established by the fact that he violated a traffic
regulation. This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code –
"Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if
at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation."
Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realty’s) negligence which resulted in the vehicular
mishap.7
However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodel’s contributory negligence in driving the Ford
Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection. On this score, the appellate court made the following
pronouncement:
As a professional driver, Rodel should have known that driving his vehicle at a high speed in a major
thoroughfare which was then subject of an on-going construction was a perilous act. He had no regard to (sic)
the safety of other vehicles on the road. Because of the impact of the collision, (Aquilino’s) sedan made a 180-
degree turn as (Ramos’) Ford Expedition careened and smashed into its rear door and fender. We cannot
exculpate Rodel from liability.
Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of negligence on the part of
his employer, (Ramos). For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee, an
employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and
supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was
incumbent on them.
(Ramos) feebly attempts to escape vicarious liability by averring that Rodel was highly recommended when he
applied for the position of family driver by the Social Service Committee of his parish. A certain Ramon Gomez,
a member of the church’s livelihood program, testified that a background investigation would have to be made
before an applicant is recommended to the parishioners for employment. (Ramos) supposedly tested Rodel’s
driving skills before accepting him for the job. Rodel has been his driver since 2001, and except for the mishap
in 2004, he has not been involved in any road accident.
Regrettably, (Ramos’) evidence which consisted mainly of testimonial evidence remained unsubstantiated and
are thus, barren of significant weight. There is nothing on the records which would support (Ramos’) bare
allegation of Rodel’s 10-year unblemished driving record. He failed to present convincing proof that he went to
the extent of verifying Rodel’s qualifications, safety record, and driving history.
So too, (Ramos) did not bother to refute (C.O.L. Realty’s) stance that his driver was texting with his cellphone
while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he knew that Katipunan Avenue was
then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded with barriers. The presumption juris tantum that there
was negligence in the selection of driver remains unrebutted. As the employer of Rodel, (Ramos) is solidarily
liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.1avvphi1
Certainly, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach
thereof. These, (Ramos) failed to do.8
Petitioner disagrees, arguing that since Aquilino’s willful disregard of the MMDA prohibition was the sole
proximate cause of the accident, then respondent alone should suffer the consequences of the accident and the
damages it incurred. He argues:
20. It becomes apparent therefore that the only time a plaintiff, the respondent herein, can recover damages is if
its negligence was only contributory, and such contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
It has been clearly established in this case, however, that respondent’s negligence was not merely contributory,
but the sole proximate cause of the accident.
xxxx
22. As culled from the foregoing, respondent was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Respondent’s vehicle
should not have been in that position since crossing the said intersection was prohibited. Were it not for the
obvious negligence of respondent’s driver in crossing the intersection that was prohibited, the accident would not
have happened. The crossing of respondent’s vehicle in a prohibited intersection unquestionably produced the
injury, and without which the accident would not have occurred. On the other hand, petitioner’s driver had the
right to be where he was at the time of the mishap. As correctly concluded by the RTC, the petitioner’s driver
could not be expected to slacken his speed while travelling along said intersection since nobody, in his right
mind, would do the same. Assuming, however, that petitioner’s driver was indeed guilty of any contributory
negligence, such was not the proximate cause of the accident considering that again, if respondent’s driver did
not cross the prohibited intersection, no accident would have happened. No imputation of any lack of care on
Ilustrisimo’s could thus be concluded. It is obvious then that petitioner’s driver was not guilty of any negligence
that would make petitioner vicariously liable for damages.
23. As the sole proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s own driver, respondent cannot claim damages
from petitioner.9
On the other hand, respondent in its Comment merely reiterated the appellate court’s findings and
pronouncements, conceding that petitioner is guilty of mere contributory negligence, and insisted on his
vicarious liability as Rodel’s employer under Article 2184 of the Civil Code.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his
own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action
against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury of which complaint is made.10
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via
Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of
the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as
a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. 11
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident
would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for.
Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had
reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan
Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to
have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s
contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever
damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages
in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner;
it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the proximate result of the
accident.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 99614 and its Resolution of October 13, 2008 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 dated September 5, 2006 dismissing for lack of
merit respondent’s complaint for damages is hereby REINSTATED.
Pestano vs Sumayang (G.R. No. 139875

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 21, 1999
Decision and the August 6, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 30289. The
questioned Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the aforesaid modification regarding the award of death
penalty."
The Resolution of August 6, 1999 denied reconsideration.2
The Facts
The events leading to this Petition were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"It appears from the records that at around 2:00 o'clock [o]n the afternoon of August 9, 1986, Ananias
Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with
him was his friend Manuel Romagos. As they came upon a junction where the highway connected with
the road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by [Petitioner] Gregorio Pestaño
and owned by [Petitioner] Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation (Metro Cebu, for brevity), which had tried
to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. Both Ananias
Sumayang and Manuel Romagos were rushed to the hospital in Sogod, where Sumayang was
pronounced dead on arrival. Romagos was transferred to the Cebu Doctors' Hospital, but he succumbed
to his injuries the day after.
"Apart from the institution of criminal charges against Gregorio Pestaño, [Respondents] Teotimo and
Paz Sumayang, as heirs of Ananias Sumayang, filed this civil action for damages against Gregorio
Pestaño, as driver of the passenger bus that rammed the deceased's motorcycle, Metro Cebu, as owner
and operator of the said bus, and Perla Compania de Seguros, as insurer of Metro Cebu. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6108.
"On November 9, 1987, upon motion of [Petitioner] Pestaño, Judge Pedro C. Son ordered the
consolidation of the said case with Criminal Case No. 10624, pending in Branch 16 of the same Court,
involving the criminal prosecution of Gregorio Pestaño for [d]ouble [h]omicide thru [r]eckless
[i]mprudence. Joint trial of the two cases thereafter ensued, where the following assertions were made:
'[Respondents] rely mainly on the testimonies of Ignacio Neis, Pat. Aquilino Dinoy and Teotimo
Sumayang, father of the deceased. Neis declared that he saw the incident while he was sitting on
a bench beside the highway; that both vehicles c[a]me from the North; that as the motorcycle
approached the junction to Tab[a]gon, the driver Ananias Sumayang signalled with his left arm
to indicate that he was taking the Tab[a]gon Road; that the motorcycle did turn left but as it did
so, it was bumped by an overspeeding bus; that the force of the impact threw Ananias Sumayang
and his companion Manuel Romagos about 14 meters away. The motorcycle, Neis continued,
was badly damaged as it was dragged by the bus.
'On the other hand, Pat. Dinoy testified that he was in the nearby house of Ruben Tiu [when] he
heard the sound or noise caused by the collision; that he immediately went to the scene where he
found Ananias Sumayang and Manuel Romagos lying on the road bleeding and badly injured;
that he requested the driver of a PU vehicle to take them to a hospital; that he took note of the
various distances which he included in his sketch (Exh. J) that the probable point of impact was
at the left lane of the highway and right at the junction to Tab[a]gon (Exh J-11); that he based his
conclusion on the 'scratches' caused by the motorcycle's footrest on the asphalt pavement; that he
described the damage caused to the motorcycle in his sketch (Exh J); that on the part of the bus,
the right end of its front bumper was bent and the right portion of the radiator grill was dented.
Pat. Dinoy acknowledged that he met at the scene Ignacio Neis who informed him that he saw
the incident.
'On the contrary, Pestaño blamed Sumayang for the accident. He testified that when he first blew
the horn the motorcycle which was about 15 or 20 meters ahead went to the right side of the
highway that he again blew the horn and accelerated in order to overtake the motorcycle; that
when he was just one meter behind, the motorcycle suddenly turned left towards the Tab[a]gon
[R]oad and was bumped by his bus; that he was able to apply his break only after the impact.
Pestaño's testimony was corroborated by Ireneo Casilia who declared that he was one of the
passengers of the bus; that the motorcycle suddenly turned left towards Tab[a]gon [R]oad
without giving any signal to indicate its maneuver; that the bus was going at 40 kph when the
accident occurred.
'To substantiate its defense of bonos pater familias [petitioner] [c]orporation recalled to the
witness box Gregorio Pestaño who explained how his driving experience and ability were tested
by the company before he was hired. He further declared that the management gave regular
lectures to drivers and conductors touching on various topics like speeding, parking, loading and
treatment of passengers, and that before he took to the road at 2:30 AM of that day he checked
together with the mechanic the tires, brake, signal lights as well as the tools to be brought along.
He did the same thing before commencing his return trip from Hagnaya, San Remegio later in
the day.
'The corporation also presented its maintenance supervisor, Agustin Pugeda, Jr., and its manager,
Alfonso Corominas, Jr. who corroborated Pestaño's testimony that his driving ability was
thoroughly tested, and that all drivers underwent periodic lecture on various aspects of safety
driving including pertinent traffic regulations. They also confirmed the thorough checkup of
every vehicle before it would depart and that the performance of the drivers was being
monitored by several inspectors posted at random places along the route.'
"In judgment, the lower court found [petitioners] liable to the [respondents], in the amounts of
P30,000.00 for death indemnity, P829,079 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Ananias
Sumayang, and P36,000.00 for necessary interment expenses. The liability of defendant Perla Compania
de Seguros, Inc., however, was limited only to the amount stipulated in the insurance policy, which [was]
P12,000 for death indemnity and P4,500.00 for burial expenses.
 "In so ruling, the lower court found [Petitioner] Pestaño to have been negligent in driving the passenger
bus that hit the deceased. It was shown that Pestaño negligently attempted to overtake the motorcycle at
a dangerous speed as they were coming upon a junction in the road, and as the motorcycle was about to
turn left towards Tabagon. The court likewise found Metro Cebu directly and primarily liable, along with
Pestaño, the latter's employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as [Petitioner] Metro Cebu failed to
present evidence to prove that it had observed . . . [the] diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. Nor has Metro Cebu proven that it had exercised due diligence in the supervision of its
employees and in the maintenance of vehicles."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed respondent's liability for the accident and for Sumayang's death. Pestaño was negligent when
he tried to overtake the victim's motorcycle at the Tabagon junction. As a professional driver operating a public
transport vehicle, he should have taken extra precaution to avoid accidents, knowing that it was perilous to
overtake at a junction, where adjoining roads had brought about merging and diverging traffic.
The appellate court opined that Metro Cebu had shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and in the
supervision of its employees. By allowing the bus to ply its route despite the defective speedometer, said
petitioner showed its indifference towards the proper maintenance of its vehicles. Having failed to observe the
extraordinary diligence required of public transportation companies, it was held vicariously liable to the victims
of the vehicular accident.
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the CA raised to P50,000 the granted indemnity for the death of the
victim. It also affirmed the award of loss of earning capacity based on his life expectancy. Such liability was
assessed, not as a pension for the claiming heirs, but as a penalty and an indemnity for the driver's negligent act.
Hence, this Petition.4
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues5 for our consideration:
1) The Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting the result of the case.
2) The Court of Appeals misapplied R.A. 4136 as regards the behavior of the deceased at the time of the
accident.
3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the award of damages representing income that deceased
could have earned be considered a penalty.
4) The Court of Appeals, contrary to Article 2204, Civil Code, raised the award of P30,000.00 damages
representing indemnity for death to P50,000.00.
5) The Court of Appeals used as basis for the loss of earning capacity, the life expectancy of the
[d]eceased instead of that of the respondents which was shorter."6
In short, they raise these questions: whether the CA erred (1) in applying Section 45 of RA 4136 when it ruled
that negligence in driving was the proximate cause of the accident; (2) in increasing the civil indemnity from
P30,000 to P50,000; and (3) in using the life expectancy of the deceased instead of the life expectancies of
respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Negligence
Petitioners contend that Pestaño was not under any obligation to slow down when he overtook the motorcycle,
because the deceased had given way to him upon hearing the bus horn. Seeing that the left side of the road was
clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic, Pestaño accelerated his speed to pass the motorcycle. Having given
way to the bus, the motorcycle driver should have slowed down until he had been overtaken.
They further contend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road nearest to the junction as found by
the trial and the appellate courts, but was on the inner lane. This explains why the damage on the bus were all on
the right side - the right end of the bumper and the right portion of the radiator grill were bent and dented.
Hence, they insist that it was the victim who was negligent.
We disagree. Petitioners are raising a question of fact based on Pestaño's testimony contradicting that of
Eyewitness Ignacio Neis and on the location of the dents on the bumper and the grill. Neis testified that as the
two vehicles approached the junction, the victim raised his left arm to signal that he was turning left to Tabagon,
but that the latter and his companion were thrown off the motorcycle after it was bumped by the overspeeding
bus.
These contentions have already been passed upon by the trial and the appellate courts. We find no cogent reason
to reverse or modify their factual findings. The CA agreed with the trial court that the vehicular collision was
caused by Pestaño's negligence when he attempted to overtake the motorcycle. As a professional driver operating
a public transport bus, he should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and
should thus have exercised extreme caution.
Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court. Petitioners
failed to demonstrate that this case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.7 Indeed, the issue of
negligence is basically factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages.
Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty speedometer and in implying that
the accident could have been avoided had this instrument been properly functioning.
This contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are
responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of
that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised
the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.8
The CA said that allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on the part of
Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to
here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestaño was
able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its
employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence
required by law.
Second Issue: Life Indemnity
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in increasing the award for life indemnity from P30,000 to P50,000, without
specifying any aggravating circumstance to justify the increment as provided in the Civil Code.9
This contention is untenable. The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged at P3,000,
based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code. However, the amount has been gradually increased through the years
because of the declining value of our currency. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at
P50,000.10
Third Issue: Loss of Earning Capacity
Petitioners cite Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,11 which held:
"The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis.
. . . The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor . . . "
They contend that the CA used the wrong basis for its computation of earning capacity.
We disagree. The Court has consistently computed the loss of earning capacity based on the life expectancy of
the deceased,12 and not on that of the heir.13 Even Villa Rey Transit did likewise.
The award for loss of earning capacity is based on two factors: (1) the number of years on which the
computation of damages is based and (2) the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs is fixed.14 The first
factor refers to the life expectancy, which takes into consideration the nature of the victim's work, lifestyle, age
and state of health prior to the accident. The second refers to the victim's earning capacity minus the necessary
living expenses. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the earnings of the deceased which
the beneficiary would have received — the net earnings of the deceased.15
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt
JONAS AÑONUEVO, Petitioner. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA,

The bicycle provides considerable speed and freedom of movement to the rider. It derives a certain charm from
being unencumbered by any enclosure, affording the cyclist the perception of relative liberty. It also carries some
obvious risks on the part of the user and has become the subject of regulation, if not by the government, then by
parental proscription.
The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of damages from the driver of the car which had
struck him. The argument is hinged on the cyclist’s failure to install safety devices on his bicycle. However, the
lower courts agreed that the motorist himself caused the collision with his own negligence. The facts are
deceptively simple, but the resolution entails thorough consideration of fundamental precepts on negligence.
The present petition raises little issue with the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 160, of
Pasig City, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Both courts adjudged petitioner, Jonas Añonuevo ( Añonuevo ),
liable for the damages for the injuries sustained by the cyclist, Jerome Villagracia (Villagracia). Instead, the
petition hinges on a sole legal question, characterized as "novel" by the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of the
New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation
at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles. 1
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the accident in question occurred on 8 February
1989, at around nine in the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong
(now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the
opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble
Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards
Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated
his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC.2 He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. 3 Trial on the civil
action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble
and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱150,
000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) for attorney’s fees, as well as legal costs. 4 Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision5 dated 8 May 1997, the Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto6 .
After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution7 dated 22 July 1997, Procter
and Gamble and Añonuevo filed their respective petitions for review with this Court. Procter and Gamble’s
petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November 1997. Añonuevo’s petition,8 on the other
hand, was given due course,9 and is the subject of this Decision.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. Among them:
that it was Añonuevo’s vehicle which had struck Villagracia; 10 that Añonuevo’s vehicle had actually hit
Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted fracture; 11 that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo
Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Añonuevo was "umaarangkada," or speeding as he made the left turn into
Libertad;12 that considering Añonuevo’s claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the
turn. Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed; 13 and that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary
precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided. 14 Notably,
Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made by the lower
courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged negligence of Villagracia. Añonuevo proffers no exculpatory
version of facts on his part, nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, the Court, which is not a trier of facts, 15 is not compelled to review the factual findings of the
lower courts, which following jurisprudence have to be received with respect and are in fact generally
binding.16
Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting questions for resolution. Añonuevo’s arguments are
especially fixated on a particular question of law: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by
analogy to non-motorized vehicles.17 In the same vein, Añonuevo insists that Villagracia’s own fault and
negligence serves to absolve the former of any liability for damages.
Its is easy to discern why Añonuevo chooses to employ this line of argument. Añonuevo points out that
Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal
ordinance.18 Nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same
ordinance. Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes. 19 Before this Court,
Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our attention instead
to the findings of Añonuevo’s own negligence.20 Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was
contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages. The Court
of Appeals likewise acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracia’s bicycle, but characterized the
contention as "off-tangent" and insufficient to obviate the fact that it was Añonuevo’s own negligence that
caused the accident.21
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install
safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The provision
reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil
Code.22 Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that the
law intended a broader coverage.
Still, Añonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles 23 . He points out
that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the number and types of vehicles
now in use far more numerous than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code,
the legislators "must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be
specifically mentioned," yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has "inescapably become
matter of public concern" so as to expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the times. 24
What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature, as embodied in Article
2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets, and not creates, the law. However, since the
Court is being asked to consider the matter, it might as well examine whether Article 2185 could be interpreted
to include non-motorized vehicles.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from
human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and
carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they
are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of
Article 2185 with the use of the term "motorized vehicles." If Añonuevo seriously contends that the application
of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument
contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in
1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming
such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Añonuevo’s characterization of a vibrant
intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the
present.
There is a fundamental flaw in Añonuevo’s analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today. He premises that the need
for the distinction between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of
these vehicles. The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these vehicles.
A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result
of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the
limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the
same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident
or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its
relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.
There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle. As far back as 1912,
in the U.S. v. Juanillo25 , the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of great speed, greater than that
of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, "and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country roads,
putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such roads." 26 In the same
case, the Court emphasized:
A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of
animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under
the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting
an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving,
or walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get out of the
way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that
the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An automobile driver must at all times use all
the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances. 27
American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between the motorist and the
cyclist. Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with bicyclists. 28 While
the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for
reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more is required from the former to fully
discharge the duty than from the latter.29
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached responsibilities of motorized
and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules
and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the
Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet,
that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within
the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed
on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards
applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by
analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt
Añonuevo’s thesis would unwisely obviate this distinction.
Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to Villagracia, this should not preclude any
possible finding of negligence on his part. While the legal argument as formulated by Añonuevo is erroneous, his
core contention that Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants serious
consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts were admitted by Villagracia himself.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. 30 However, the
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given
situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent. 31
Añonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed a municipal ordinance requiring
the registration of bicycles and the installation of safety devices thereon. This view finds some support if
anchored on the long standing principle of negligence per se.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a
matter of law, or negligence per se.32 In Teague vs. Fernandez,33 the Court cited with approval American
authorities elucidating on the rule:
"The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the
proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be
prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of
the injury." (65 C.J.S. 1156)
"The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter
of law, or, according to the decisions on the question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of
what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily
prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their
absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured
thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to
such standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse.
According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission
constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on the subject
or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from such violation. x
x x." (65 C.J.S. pp.623-628)
"But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed
limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough
that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the
hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to
prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has no
reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it,
since it is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court has applied these principles
to speed limits and other regulations of the manner of driving." (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
"x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury intervened between the
violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action
can be maintained. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their
character and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it
happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent." (38 Am Jur 841) 34
In Teague, the owner of a vocational school stricken by a fire resulting in fatalities was found negligent, base on
her failure to provide adequate fire exits in contravention of a Manila city ordinance. 35 In F.F. Cruz and Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals36 , the failure of the petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances
sufficed to support a finding of negligence. 37 In Cipriano v. Court of Appeals, 38 the Court found that the
failure of the petitioner to register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in accordance with the statute
constituted negligence per se, thus holding him liable for the damages for the destruction by fire of a customer’s
vehicle garaged therein.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an ordinance? It
cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to
promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value,
Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated.
Añonuevo argues that Villagracia’s violation should bar the latter’s recovery of damages, and a simplistic
interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate such an argument.
But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Añonuevo was
speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless
behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the
intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that
Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially
considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even
assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such
lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make
the left turn.
This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be
sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a
collision between a truck and a privately-owned Cimarron van caused the death of three of the van’s passengers.
The petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the Cimarron was committing multiple
violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code 40 at the time of the accident. Among these violations: the
Cimarron was overloaded at the time of the accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by four adults,
including the driver; and the van had only one functioning headlight. Similar as in this case, petitioner therein
invoked Article 2185 and argued that the driver of the Cimarron should be presumed negligent. The Court,
speaking through Justice Mendoza, dismissed these arguments:
[It] has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between
the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and
the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence consisting in whole
or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing
cause of the injury. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight
during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident," that because the Cimarron had only one headlight,
there was "decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded
"decreased its maneuverability." However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its
burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. 41
Sanitary Steam42 is controlling in this case. The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at
the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such
negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If
anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government,
which would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is not
determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative,
dependent upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular
circumstances reasonably require. 43 To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely
on the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the
contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts
leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in
adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a
standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when
in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law,
while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in
spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing
to the conduct of others.44
Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous enough so as to negate monetary
relief. In the absence of statutory requirement, one is not negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a horn,
bell, or other warning devise onto a bicycle. 45 In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not
constitute negligence as a matter of law 46 but is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights
played a causal part in producing a collision with a motorist. 47 The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at
night, as required by statute or ordinance, may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the
bicyclist is struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the collision; 48
however, the absence of such lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was well
illuminated by street lights, 49 if substitute lights were present which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible, 50 if
the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of lights thereon, 51 or if the motorist would have been
unable to see the bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights. 52 A bicycle equipped with defective or
ineffective brakes may support a finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist
where such condition was a contributing cause of the accident. 53
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety
practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a
causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds
affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the
proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. 54 Añonuevo had the burden of clearly
proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.
On this point, the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-worth citing:
[As] admitted by appellant Añonuevo, he first saw appellee Villagracia at a distance of about ten (10) meters
before the accident. Corrolarily, therefore, he could have avoided the accident had he [stopped] alongside with
an earlier (sic) jeep which was already at a full stop giving way to appellee. But according to [eyewitness]
Sorsano, he saw appellant Añonuevo "umaarangkada" and hit the leg of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30).
This earlier (sic) jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but Añonuevo at an unexpected motion
(umarangkada) came out hitting Villagracia (TSN March 9, 1990 p. 49). Appellant Añonuevo admitted that he
did not blow his horn when he crossed Boni Avenue (TSN March 21, 1990 p. 47). 55
By Añonuevo’s own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been
decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Añonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting
Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Añonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any
possibility that the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the accident. 56 A motorist has been
held liable for injury to or death of a bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into the bicyclist so as to cause
a collision.57
Neither does Añonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal connection between the safety violations
imputed to Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in
themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against Villagracia. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to
conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to
discharge his necessary burden of proving Villagracia’s own liability.
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence.1âwphi1 The leading case in contributory
negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf58 clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant "in conjunction with
the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury." 59 To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.60 To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a
causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal
sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition
for its occurrence.61
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as solely responsible for the
accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the
same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.
Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he could no longer claim
not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that Añonuevo was recklessly
speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped
with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car.
Moreover, it was incumbent on Añonuevo to have established that Villagracia’s failure to have installed the
proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that Añonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us
to consider such causal connection as not proven.
All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
Caedo vs Yu Khe Thai (G.R. No. L-20392

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his family were
injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial
Caedo, et al., the sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants. The
counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed, for lack of merits.
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the
plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of the total amount of the
plaintiffs' claim.
There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2) if it
was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the
first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily
liable with him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos
Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home
in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in
the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe
Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for
his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the
road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately
30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was
towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at
the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away.
This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side,
and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not
notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from
afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of
slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to
pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel,
wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the
oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however,
decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else
squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite
obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it
was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and
so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the
clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the
wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the
collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the
scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must
be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as
owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who
was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The
rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman
vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued
for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his
driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver
to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible
for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for
example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable
opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced
by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without
the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence,
makes his driver act his own.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible
of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or
damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937,
and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During
that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at
all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate
setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which
not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such
negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was
wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any
special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the
presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did
not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that
another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought
that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man
nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due
diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective.
Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many
cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because
they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the
relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a
negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how
to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly
equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum
level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be
entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness,
employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers'
services, would be effectively proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next
question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48,000 by way of moral
damages is itemized as follows
Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them also actual or
compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other hand
maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be reduced. We find no
justification for either side. The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their
injuries, other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual damages, to be
compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a
proper ground for granting moral, not actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:

It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral
damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe
Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against
the latter.