SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2

T
his chapter discusses comprehensive architectural and
engineering design considerations (mitigation measures)
for the school site, from the property line to the school
building, including: land use, site planning, stand-off distance,
controlled access zones, entry control and vehicular access, sig-
nage, parking, loading docks and service access, physical security
lighting, and site utilities. The intent of this guidance is to provide
concepts for integrating mitigation strategies to the design basis
threats as identified during the risk assessment. Integrating secu-
rity requirements into a larger, more comprehensive approach
necessitates achieving a balance among many objectives such as
reducing risk; facilitating proper school building function; aes-
thetics and matching architecture; creating a school environment
conducive to learning; and hardening of physical structures be-
yond required building codes and standards for added security.

The design community must work closely with school districts

and school administrators to ensure that the optimal balance of
all these considerations is achieved; thus, coordination within
the design team is critical. Many school asset protection objec-
tives can be achieved during the early stages of the design process
when mitigation measures are the least costly and most easily
implemented. Planners, architects, and landscape designers play
an important role in identifying and implementing crucial asset
protection measures while considering land use; site selection; the
orientation of buildings on the site; and the integration of vehicle
access, control points, physical barriers, landscaping, parking, and
protection of utilities to mitigate threats.

It is important to remember that the nature of any threat is always

changing. Although indications of potential future threats may
be scarce during the design stage, consideration should be given
to accommodating enhanced protection measures in response to
future threats that may emerge. School protection objectives must
be balanced with other design objectives, such as the efficient use

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-1

 of land and resources, and must also take into account existing
physical, programmatic, and fiscal constraints.

2.1 LAND USE CONSIDERATIONS

Land use is a broad planning process that encompasses zoning
ordinances, subdivision regulations, and master planning. Regu-
lating land use development has been a common practice in the
United States for many years, with numerous regulations and
other tools in use by state and local governments to influence
the configuration of urban sites. Comprehensive planning can
encourage certain types of development, incentives, allocation
of resources, and capital improvement programs oriented to
improve the security of areas vulnerable to manmade disasters.
In most cases, sound site planning will increase the land area
needed for individual school buildings and maximize the protec-
tion measures to be adopted. Other potential terrorist targets
in the surrounding area should also be considered. Students
and teachers might be killed or injured by collateral damage
from a terrorist attack directed at another nearby facility. When
designing a school, the designer should consider external and
internal land use design concerns, including the characteristics
of the surrounding area (e.g., construction type, occupancies,
and the nature and intensity of adjacent activities), as well as the
implications of these characteristics for the protection of the stu-
dents, faculty, and staff on the school site under consideration.
The amount of land available on the site for stand-off and the
inherent ability of the school site to accommodate the imple-
mentation of natural and manmade antiterrorism and security
design features could help the designers to determine if other
measures such as hardening the school building should also be
considered.

It is important to recognize that conflicts sometimes arise be-

tween security-oriented site design and conventional site design.
For example, open circulation and common spaces (which are
desirable for conventional design) may be detrimental to certain
aspects of security.

2-2 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

When designing new school buildings or evaluating existing
schools, the designer should evaluate key protection measures to
ensure they are appropriate, desirable, and cost-effective in terms
of mitigating the risk of potential terrorist attacks. Security mea-
sures must be evaluated carefully to understand which measures
are truly beneficial and which are not practical.

When making decisions about site antiterrorism and security, de-

signers should consider the following:

❍ Adjacent land use and zoning plans for potential development

that would impact security within the school (assess by using
land use maps and Geographic Information Systems [GISs])

❍ Building footprint(s) relative to total land available

❍ Building location(s) or, if undeveloped, suitable building

location(s) relative to the site perimeter and adjacent land
uses; distance between the perimeter fence and improved
areas off site

❍ Access via foot, road, rail, water, and air; suitability to support
a secure perimeter

❍ Current and planned infrastructure and its vulnerabilities,

including easements, tunnels, pipes, and rights-of-way

❍ Infrastructure nodes that constitute single-point vulnerabilities

❍ Adjacent land uses and occupancies that could enable or

facilitate attacks or that are potential targets themselves and
thus present collateral damage or cascading failure hazards

❍ Proximity to fire and police stations, hospitals, shelters, and

other critical facilities that could be of use in an attack

❍ Presence of natural physical barriers such as water features,

dense vegetation, and terrain that could provide access
control and/or shielding, or suitability of the site for the
incorporation of such features

❍ Topographic and climatic characteristics that could affect the

performance of chemical agents and other weapons

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-3

 ❍ Observability from outside site boundaries; ability of vegetation
in proximity to building or site to screen covert activity

2.2 SITE PLANNING

The single most important goal in planning a site to resist ter-
rorism and security threats is the protection of life, property, and
operations. Decision-making in support of this purpose should
be based first and foremost on a comprehensive assessment of
the manmade threats and hazards so that planning and design
countermeasures are appropriate and effective in the reduction of
vulnerability and risk as described in Chapter 1. It is important to
recognize that a given countermeasure can mitigate one or more
vulnerabilities, but may be detrimental to other important design
goals. This section will highlight several aspects of site design and
will present some of the unique characteristics arising from their
application to antiterrorism and security.

2.2.1 Site Design

Because the economics of development dictate the construc-

tion of schools, security concerns should be evaluated carefully.
Conflicts sometimes arise between security site design and con-
ventional site design. For example, open circulation and common
spaces, which are desirable for conventional school design, are
often undesirable for security design. To maximize safety, security,
and sustainability, designers should implement a holistic approach
to site design that integrates form and function to achieve a bal-
ance among the various design elements and objectives. Even if
resources are limited, significant value can be added to a project
by integrating security considerations into the more traditional
design tasks in such a way that they complement, rather than com-
pete with, the other elements.

2.2.2 Layout and Form

The overall layout of a school site (e.g., the placement and form of
its buildings, infrastructures, and amenities) is the starting point
for development. Choices made during this stage of the design

2-4 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

process will steer decision-making for the other elements of the
site. A number of aspects of site layout and building type present
security considerations and are discussed below.

❍ Clustered versus dispersed functions. There is a strong

correlation between building functions and building
layout and forms. Typically, the former dictates the other
two. Depending on the site characteristics, the occupancy
requirements, and other factors, school buildings may cluster
key functions in one particular area or have these functions
designed in a more dispersed manner. Both patterns have
compelling strengths and weaknesses in terms of security.

Concentrating key functions in one place may create a target-

rich environment and increase the risk of collateral impacts.
Additionally, it increases the potential for the establishment
of more single-point vulnerabilities, such as indicated in
Figure 2-1. This figure shows several key functions grouped in
a particular area of the building (i.e., the mechanical rooms,
stairs, telephone switch room, and loading docks). If these areas
become a target, the school may be closed for a substantial
period of time, even if the attack is not severe and the rest of
the school remains unharmed. However, grouping high-risk
activities, concentrations of personnel, and critical functions
into a cluster can help maximize stand-off from the perimeter
and create a “defensible space.” This also helps to reduce the
number of access and surveillance points, and minimize the size
of the perimeter needed to protect the school areas.

In contrast, the dispersal of key functions reduces the risk

that an attack on any one part of the site will impact the other
parts. However, this could also have an isolating effect and
reduce the effectiveness of on-site surveillance, increase the
complexity of security systems and emergency response, and
create a less defensible space.

To the extent that site, economic, and other factors allow, the
designer should consolidate school designs that are functionally

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-5

Figure 2-1 Non-redundant critical functions collocated near loading dock

compatible and have similar threat levels. For example, visitor

areas and receiving/loading areas constitute a school’s innermost
line of defense, because they are the first places where people
and materials enter the school building. Logically, they should
be physically separated from other key functions such as the main
operational areas or where people concentrate.

❍ School building orientation. The orientation of a school

building can have significant impact on its performance, not
only in terms of energy efficiency, but also the ability to protect
occupants (see Figure 2-2). A school building’s orientation
relative to its surroundings defines its relationship to that
area. In aesthetic terms, a school building can open up to the
area or turn its back; it can be inviting to those outside, or it
can “hunker down” defensively. The physical positioning of a
building relative to its surroundings may seem more subtle,
but can be a greater determinant of this intangible quality than
exterior aesthetics. Nevertheless, the proximity of a vulnerable

2-6 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

 façade to a parking area, street, adjacent site, or other area that
is accessible to vehicles and/or difficult to observe can greatly
contribute to its vulnerability. This illustrates one way in which
protective requirements can be at odds with otherwise good
design. A strong, blank wall with no glazing will help to protect
students, faculty, staff, property, and operations within from a
blast, but the lack of windows removes virtually all opportunity
for the faculty and staff to monitor activities outside and take
appropriate protective actions in a timely manner. Designers
should consider such trade-offs early in the design process, in
an effort to determine an acceptable level of risk.

Figure 2-2
Clustering to enhance surveillance
opportunities while minimizing views
into buildings

SOURCE: WLC ARCHITECTS, INC.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-7

 ❍ Open space. The incorporation of open space into school
site design presents a number of benefits. First and foremost
is the ability to easily monitor an area and detect intruders,
vehicles, and weapons. Closely related to this benefit is the
stand-off value of open space; as discussed in Chapter 4, blast
energy decreases as the inverse of the cube of the distance
from the seat of the explosion, so every additional increment
of distance provides increasingly more protection. In addition,
pervious open space allows stormwater to percolate back
into the ground, reducing the need for culverts, drainage
pipes, manholes, and other covert site access and weapon
concealment opportunities. Also, if the open space is
impassible for vehicles (as in the case of a wetland or densely
vegetated area), it can provide not only environmental and
aesthetic amenities, but prevent vehicle intrusion as well.

❍ Infrastructure and lifelines. Providing power, gas, water,

wastewater, and communications services is one of the
most basic requirements of any school development. At
the site scale, all critical lifelines should have at least one
layer of redundancy, or backup. By eliminating single-point
vulnerabilities, designers will reduce the chance that service
will be interrupted if an attack damages or destroys a lifeline
either outside the school perimeter or on site. It is important
to note that collocating a backup lifeline with its primary
lifeline does not eliminate single-point vulnerability; only
physical separation can substantially increase the likelihood of
continuity of service.

Additionally, all controls, interconnections, exposed lines,

and other vulnerable elements of school infrastructure
systems should be protected from access and exploitation
by surveillance and/or physical countermeasures. Service
entrances and other secondary access points should be
monitored and access-controlled; special attention should also
be paid to any locations where multiple systems or primary
and backup systems come together, such as control rooms and
mechanical spaces. Again, these facilities should be designed

2-8 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

 for maximum observability, including the use of opportunity
reduction and target hardening strategies where appropriate,
and should be equipped with adequate lighting and
emergency communications capabilities wherever possible. For
additional information, see Sections 2.9 and 2.10.

2.2.3 Vehicular and Pedestrian Circulation

The movement of people and materials into, through, and out of a

school facility is determined by the design of its access, circulation,
and parking systems. Such systems should be designed to maxi-
mize efficiency while minimizing conflicts between vehicle and
pedestrian modes. Designers should begin with an understanding
of the school’s transportation requirements based on an analysis
of how the school will be used. This includes studying the number
and types of access points that are required, bus requirements, the
parking volume needed, where users need to go to and from, and
the modes of transportation they will use. Several aspects of trans-
portation planning can impact security and are discussed below.

❍ Roadway network design. Streets are generally designed to

minimize travel time and maximize safety, with the end result
typically being a straight path between two or more endpoints.
Although a straight line may be the most efficient course,
designers should use caution when orienting streets relative
to school buildings requiring high protection. Designers
should design a roadway system to minimize vehicle velocity,
thus using the roadway itself as a protective measure. This is
accomplished through the use of several strategies.

First, straight-line or perpendicular approaches to school

buildings should not be used in a school at high risk, because
these give vehicles the opportunity to gather the speed
necessary to ram through protective barriers and crash into or
penetrate buildings. Instead, approaches should be parallel
to the façade, with berms, high curbs, appropriate trees, or
other measures used to prevent vehicles from departing the
roadway. A related technique for reducing vehicle speeds is
the construction of serpentine (curving) roadways with tight-

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-9

 radius corners. Existing streets can be retrofitted with barriers,
bollards, swing gates, or other measures to force vehicles
to travel in a serpentine path. Again, high curbs and other
measures should be installed to keep vehicles from departing
the roadway in an effort to avoid these countermeasures.

Less radical than these techniques are traffic calming strategies,

which seek to use design measures to cue drivers as to the
acceptable speed for an area. These include raised crosswalks,
speed humps and speed tables, pavement treatments, bulbouts,
and traffic circles. In addition to creating a more pedestrian-
friendly environment, which increases “eyes on the street”
surveillance, designing roadways to physically limit speeds can
have the added benefits of increasing safety and, subsequently,
lowering liability. Designers should be aware, however, that many
of these techniques can have detrimental effects for emergency
response, including slowing response time, interfering with
en route emergency medical treatment, and increasing the
difficulty of maneuvering fire apparatus. They also may present
problems for snow removal, and their outer ends should remain
flat so that bicycles can proceed unimpeded.

❍ Parking. Surface lots can be designed and placed to keep

vehicles away from school buildings, but they can consume large
amounts of land and, if constructed of impervious materials,
can contribute greatly to stormwater runoff. They can also be
hazardous for pedestrians if dedicated pedestrian pathways are
not provided. For additional information, see Section 2.7.

2.2.4 Landscape and Urban Design

Designing to meet user needs while maintaining stewardship of

the natural and built environments becomes increasingly more
challenging when security requirements are factored in. Design
principles at the school site should include an emphasis on selec-
tion of low-impact development techniques and environmental
stewardship; compatibility of context and relationship with adja-
cent uses, forms, and styles; establishment of scale and identity

2-10 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

through aesthetic design; connectivity among buildings, uses, ac-
tivities, and transportation modes; resource conservation; cultural
responsiveness; and the creation of appealing public spaces. These
objectives are generally achieved through the work of two closely
related disciplines, landscape design and urban design. For the
purposes of this document, these two disciplines are virtually over-
lapping and will, therefore, be addressed together.

❍ Landscape design. Many landscape features can be used in

school design to enhance security. Landscape design features
should be used to create the level of protection without turning
the school into a fortress. Elements such as landforms, water
features, and vegetation are among the building blocks of
attractive and welcoming spaces, and they can also be powerful
tools for enhancing security. These features can be used not only
to define or designate a space, but also to deter or prevent hostile
surveillance or unauthorized access. Vegetative groupings and
landforms can even provide some level of blast shielding. Stands of
trees, earthen berms, and similar countermeasures generally cannot
replace setbacks, but they can offer supplementary protection.
However, landscaping can also have detrimental impacts for
safety and security, and designers should consider the unique
requirements of the school project to ensure that the landscape
design elements they choose will be appropriate and effective.

With careful selection, placement, and maintenance,

landscape elements can provide visual screening that protects
school gathering areas and other activities from surveillance
without creating concealment for covert activity. However,
dense vegetation in close proximity to a school building can
screen illicit activity and should be avoided. Additionally, thick
ground cover such as English ivy or vegetation over 4 inches
tall such as monkey grass can be used to conceal bombs and
other weapons; in setback clear zones, vegetation should
be selected and maintained with eliminating concealment
opportunities in mind. Similarly, measures to screen visually
detractive components such as transformers, trash compactors,
and condensing units should be designed to minimize
concealment opportunities for people and weapons.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-11

 ❍ Urban design. Numerous urban design elements present
opportunities to provide school security. The scale of the
streetscape should be appropriate to its primary users, and it
can be manipulated to increase the comfort level of desired
users while creating a less inviting atmosphere for users
with malicious intent. However, even at the pedestrian scale,
certain operational requirements must be accommodated. For
example, although efficient pedestrian and vehicle circulation
systems are important for school functions and operations,
they are also critical for emergency response, evacuation, and
egress, and must be able to accommodate vehicles up to the
largest fire apparatus in the community. Furthermore, despite
an emphasis on downsizing the scale of the streetscape, it is
critical to maintain the maximum stand-off distance possible
between vehicles and structures.

At the school perimeter, walls and fences used for space

definition may be hardened to resist the impact of a weapon-
laden truck; however, planters, bollards, or decorative
boulders could accomplish the same objective in a much more
aesthetically pleasing manner. Such an approach also creates
permeability, which would allow pedestrians and cyclists to
more easily move through the space.

Landscape and urban design inherently define the “lines of

sight” in a space. These techniques seek to deny aggressors a
“line of sight” to a potential target, either from on or off site. This
increases the protection of sensitive information and operations
by using stand-off weapons (see Figures 2-3 and 2-4). In addition
to the use of various types of screening options, anti-surveillance
measures (e.g., using building orientation, landscaping,
screening, and landforms) to block sight lines can also be used.

Depending on the circumstances, landforms can be either ben-

eficial or detrimental to anti-surveillance. Elevated sites may
enhance surveillance of the surrounding area from inside the
facility, but may also allow observation of on-site areas by adver-
saries. School buildings should not be sited immediately adjacent

2-12 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

SOURCE: U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTALLATION
FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE

Figure 2-3 Blocking of sight lines

SOURCE: U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTALLATION
FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE

Figure 2-4 Improper school siting and view relationships

to higher surrounding terrain, unsecured buildings owned by

unfamiliar parties, and vegetation, drainage channels, ditches,
ridges, or culverts that can provide concealment. For high-risk
school buildings, it may be necessary to provide additional pro-
tection by creating a clear zone immediately adjacent to the
structure that is free of all visual obstructions or landscaping (see
Figure 2-5). The clear zone facilitates monitoring of the imme-
diate vicinity and visual detection of attacks. Walkways and other
circulation features within a clear zone should be located so that
buildings do not block views of pedestrians and vehicles. If clear
zones are implemented, it may be necessary to implement other
anti-surveillance measures.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-13

 SOURCE: U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTALLATION FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE

Figure 2-5 Clear zone with unobstructed views

2.3 STAND-OFF DISTANCE

The most cost-effective solution for mitigating explosive ef-
fects on school buildings is to keep explosives as far away from
them as possible. The distance between an asset and a threat
is referred to as the stand-off distance as shown in Figure 2-6.
There is no ideal stand-off distance; it is determined by the type
of threat, the type of construction, and desired level of pro-
tection. The easiest and least costly opportunity for achieving
appropriate levels of protection against terrorist threats is to
incorporate sufficient stand-off distance into school designs.
Maximizing stand-off distance also ensures that there is opportu-
nity in the future to upgrade school buildings to meet increased
threats or to accommodate higher levels of protection. Stand-off
distance must be coupled with appropriate building hardening
as discussed in Chapter 3, to provide the necessary level of pro-
tection to the school.

2-14 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

 SOURCE: U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTALLATION
FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE

Figure 2-6 Concept of stand-off distance

For schools located in high-risk areas, additional considerations

follow:

❍ The first mode of site protection is to create “keep out zones”

that can ensure a minimum guaranteed distance between an
explosion (i.e., from a vehicle) and the school structure.

❍ The perimeter line is the outermost line that can be protected

by the security measures incorporated during the school
design process. It is recommended that the perimeter line
be located as far as is practical from the building exterior.
Many vulnerable school buildings are located in urban areas
where only the exterior wall of the building stands between
the outside world and the building occupants. In this case,
the options are obviously limited. Often, the perimeter line
can be pushed out to the edge of the sidewalk by means of
bollards, planters, and other obstacles. To push this line even
further outward, restricting or eliminating parking along the
curb often can be arranged with local authorities. In some
extreme cases, elimination of loading zones and the closure of
streets are an option.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-15

 ❍ “Keep out zones” can be achieved with perimeter barriers that
cannot be compromised by vehicular ramming. A continuous
line of security should be installed along the perimeter of
the site to protect it from unscreened vehicles and to keep all
vehicles as far away from the school as possible.

❍ The following critical building components should be located

away from main entrances, vehicle circulation, parking,
and maintenance areas. If this is not possible, harden as
appropriate:

• Emergency generator, including fuel systems, day tank, fire

sprinkler, and water supply

• Normal fuel storage

• Telephone distribution and main switchgear

• Fire pumps

• Building control centers

• Uninterrupted power supply (UPS) systems controlling

critical functions

• Main refrigeration systems if critical to building operation

• Elevator machinery and controls

• Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities

• Critical distribution feeders for emergency power

2.4 CONTROLLED ACCESS ZONES

For a school at high risk, one method to attain the appropriate
protection is with the creation of a controlled access zone. These
zones define minimum distances between a school building and
potential threats through the installation of barriers (such as
bollards, planters, fountains, walls, and fences). The barriers are
designed to withstand assaults by terrorist vehicles; however, their
placement must be designed to allow for access by fire and rescue
vehicles in the event of an emergency. Selection of barriers is

2-16 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

 based on operational considerations related to vehicle access and
parking. Good design principles for high-risk schools endorse the
complete surround of a school building with a stand-off zone that
has perimeters set at distances that consider threat levels, desired
level of protection, building construction, and land availability.
Entry into the controlled area should only be through an entry
control point.

When designing schools at high risk, controlled access zones may

be exclusive or non-exclusive, as shown in Figure 2-7. An exclusive
zone is the area surrounding a school building within the exclu-
sive control of the building. Anyone entering an exclusive zone
must have a purpose related to the building. A non-exclusive zone
is either a public right-of-way or a particular area related to the
main school building.
SOURCE: U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTALLATION FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE

Figure 2-7 Exclusive and non-exclusive zones

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-17

 The following are some security considerations applicable to con-
trolled access zones and enforcement:

❍ Design and select barriers based on threat capabilities.

❍ If the limited availability of land precludes the creation of an

exclusive zone, the use of screening surrounding the school
building is an alternative.

❍ Design and locate security devices to establish consistent

rhythm patterns within the site. Incorporate subtle and
aesthetically pleasing security measures to reach the desired
level of protection.

❍ Locate security measures so that they do not impede the free

access to school public entrances or internal pedestrian flow.
Miscellaneous decorative elements (e.g., flag poles, fountains,
pools, gardens, and similar features) may be located within
access ways to slow movement or restrict access.

❍ Use a combination of barriers. Some barriers are fixed

and obvious (fences and gates), while others are passive
(sidewalks far away from buildings, curbs with grassy areas,
etc.). See Figure 2-8.

Figure 2-8 Sample bollard applications

2-18 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

❍ Consider using landscape materials to create barriers that are
soft and natural rather than manmade where physical barriers
are required.

❍ Use vehicles as temporary physical barriers by placing them in

front of buildings or across access roads.

❍ Maintain as much stand-off distance as possible between

potential vehicular bombs and the school building.

• Provide traffic obstacles near entry control points to slow

down traffic.

• Consider vehicle barriers at building entries and drives.

• Offset vehicle entrances from the direction of a vehicle’s

approach to force a reduction in speed.

• Position gates and perimeter boundary fences outside the

blast vulnerability envelope, when possible.

• Provide a vehicle crash resistance system in the form of a

low wall or earth berm, if the threat level warrants it.

❍ Design entry control points (if provided) to screen the

building from vehicles entering it.

❍ Provide passive vehicle barriers to keep stationary vehicle

bombs at a distance from the school building.

• Use high curbs, low berms, shallow ditches, trees, shrubs,

and other physical separations to keep stationary bombs at a
distance.

• Do not allow vehicles to park next to perimeter walls of the

secured area. Consider using bollards or other devices to
keep vehicles away.

❍ Provide adequate lighting to aid in threat detection in

controlled access zones.

❍ Use CCTV to control entry points, the site perimeter, and

exclusive and non-exclusive zones.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-19

 2.5 ENTRY CONTROL AND VEHICULAR
ACCESS
In the case of a school, the objective of the design professional
is to save lives by mitigating building damages and reducing the
chances of a catastrophic collapse of the building at least until
it is fully evacuated. Although there are many forms of attacks
against a school, from the standpoint of school structural de-
sign, the vehicle bomb governs design because historically it has
been used on multiple occasions by terrorists. Where a school
perimeter barrier is required for security, it will be necessary to
provide points of access through the perimeter for school users
(i.e., students, faculty, staff, visitors, and service providers). An
entry control point or guard building serves as the designated
point of entry for site access. It provides a point for implementa-
tion of desired/required levels of screening and access control.
The objective of the entry control point is to prevent unauthor-
ized access to school grounds while maximizing the rate of
authorized access by foot or vehicle. These measures will not be
required for all schools; they may only be appropriate for schools
considered at high risk. Designs should be flexible to allow
implementation of increased security controls when schools are
placed in high alert and easing of controls at lower threat levels.
For a school considered to be at high risk, the following should
be considered in the design of entry control points:

❍ Design entry roads to schools so that they do not provide

direct or straight-line vehicular access to the main building.
Route major corridors away from key school areas and
functions.

❍ Design access points at an angle to oncoming streets so that is

difficult for a vehicle to gain enough speed to break through
them.

❍ Minimize the number of access roads and entrances into a

school.

❍ Provide a drop-off/pick-up lane for buses only.

2-20 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

❍ Minimize the number of driveways or parking lots that
students will have to walk across to get to the school building.

❍ Designate an entry to the school for commercial, service, and

delivery vehicles, preferably away from key school areas and
functions, whenever possible.

❍ Design the entry control point and guard building so that the
authorization of approaching vehicles and occupants can be
adequately assessed, and the safety of both gate guards and
approaching vehicles can be maintained when a school is
placed at high alert).

❍ Design (if they are required) traffic calming strategies and

barriers (road alignment, retractable bollards, swing gates,
or speed bumps) to control vehicle speed and slow incoming
vehicles before they reach the gate so that entry control
personnel have adequate time to respond to unauthorized
activities.

❍ Provide inspection areas that are not visible to the public.

Place appropriate landscape plantings to accomplish
screening.

❍ Provide pull-over lanes at site entry gates to check suspect

vehicles. Also, provide a visitor/site personnel inspection area
to inspect vehicles prior to allowing access to the school site.

❍ Consider providing a walkway and turnstile for pedestrians

and a dedicated bicycle lane.

2.6 SIGNAGE
Signs are an important element of school security. They are
meant to keep intruders out of restricted areas. Confusion over
site circulation, parking, and entrance locations can contribute
to a loss of site security. Signs should be provided off site and at
school entrances; there should be on-site directional, parking,
and cautionary signs for students, faculty, staff, visitors, service ve-
hicles, and pedestrians. Unless required, signs should not identify

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-21

 sensitive areas. A comprehensive signage plan should include the
following:

❍ Prepare entry control procedures signs that explain current

entry procedures for drivers and pedestrians.

❍ Prepare traffic regulatory and directional signs that control

traffic flow and direct vehicles to specific appropriate points.

❍ Consider using street addresses or building numbers instead

of detailed descriptive information inside the school grounds.

❍ Minimize the number of signs identifying high-risk areas;

however, a significant number of warning signs should be
erected to ensure that possible intruders are aware of entry
into restricted areas.

❍ Minimize signs identifying critical utility complexes (e.g.,

power stations and significant gas, water, and sewer). Post
easily understandable signs to minimize accidental entry by
unauthorized visitors into critical areas.

❍ In areas where English is one of two or more languages

commonly spoken, warning signs must contain the other
language(s) in addition to English. The signs should be
posted at intervals of no more than 100 feet and should not
be mounted on fences equipped with intrusion-detection
equipment.

❍ Locate variable message signs, which give information on

site/organization special events and visitors, far inside site
perimeters.

2.7 PARKING
Parking restrictions can help to keep potential threats away from
a school building. In urban settings, however, curbside or un-
derground parking is often necessary and sometimes difficult to
control. Mitigating the risks associated with parking requires cre-
ative design measures, including parking restrictions, perimeter
buffer zones, barriers, structural hardening, and other architectural

2-22 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

and engineering solutions. The following considerations may help
designers to implement parking measures for schools that may be
at high risk:

❍ Locate vehicle parking areas away from school buildings to

minimize blast effects from potential vehicle bombs.

❍ Provide separate parking areas for students, faculty, staff, and

visitors who may be going in and out during the school day.
(This allows the main student parking lot to be closed off
during the school day.)

❍ If possible, locate visitor or general public parking near, but

not on, the site itself.

❍ Locate general parking in areas that provide the fewest

security risks to school personnel.

❍ Consider one-way circulation within a school parking lot to

facilitate monitoring for potential aggressors.

❍ Locate parking within view of occupied school buildings while

maintaining stand-off.

❍ Prohibit parking within the stand-off zone.

❍ Request appropriate permits to restrict parking in the curb

lane for school vehicles or key employee parking only where
distance from the building to the nearest curb provides
insufficient setback, and compensating design measures do
not sufficiently protect the building from the assessed threat.
If necessary, use structural features to prevent parking.

❍ Provide appropriate setback from parking on adjacent

properties, if possible. Structural hardening may be required
if the setback is insufficient. In new designs, it may be possible
to adjust the location of the school building on the site to
provide adequate setback from adjacent properties.

❍ When establishing parking areas, provide emergency

communications systems (e.g., intercom, telephones, etc.) at
readily identified, well-lighted, CCTV monitored locations to
permit direct contact with security personnel.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-23

 ❍ Provide parking lots with CCTV cameras connected to the
security system and adequate lighting capable of displaying
and videotaping lot activity.

❍ If possible, prohibit parking beneath or within a school

building.

❍ If parking beneath a building is unavoidable, limit access to

the parking areas and ensure they are secure, well-lighted,
and free of places of concealment.

❍ Apply the following restrictions If parking within a school

building is required:

• Public parking with identification (ID) check

• School vehicles and school employees and students only

• Selected school employees only, or those requiring security

2.8 LOADING DOCKS AND SERVICE ACCESS

Loading docks and service access areas are commonly required for
a school building and are typically desired to be kept as invisible
as possible. For this reason, special attention should be devoted to
these service areas in order to avoid intruders. Design criteria for
school loading docks and service access include the following:

❍ Separate by at least 50 feet, loading docks and shipping and

receiving areas in any direction from utility rooms, utility
mains, and service entrances, including electrical, telephone/
data, fire detection/alarm systems, fire suppression water
mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.

❍ Locate loading docks so that vehicles will not be allowed

under the building. If this is not possible, the service area
should be hardened for blast. Loading dock design should
limit damage to adjacent areas and vent explosive forces to
the exterior of the building.

❍ If loading zones or drive-through areas are necessary, monitor

them and restrict height to keep out large vehicles.

2-24 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

❍ Avoid having driveways within or under school buildings.

❍ Provide adequate design to prevent extreme damage to

loading docks. The floor of the loading dock does not need
to be designed for blast resistance if the area below is not
occupied and or does not contain critical utilities. In certain
cases, significant structural damage to the walls and ceiling
of the loading dock may be acceptable; however, the areas
adjacent to the loading dock should not experience severe
structural damage or collapse.

❍ Provide signage to clearly mark separate entrances for

deliveries.

2.9 PHYSICAL SECURITY LIGHTING

Security lighting can be provided for overall school ground/
building illumination and the perimeter to allow security per-
sonnel to maintain visual-assessment during darkness. It may
provide both a real and psychological deterrent for continuous or
periodic observation. Lighting is relatively inexpensive to maintain
and may reduce the need for security personnel while enhancing
personal protection by reducing opportunities for concealment
and surprise by potential attackers.

Provide sufficient lighting at entry control points to ensure ad-

equate lighting for the area. Where practical, place lighting
elements as high as possible to give a broader, more natural light
distribution. This requires fewer poles (less hazardous to drivers)
and is more aesthetically pleasing than standard lighting.

The type of site lighting system used depends on the school’s

overall security requirements. Four types of lighting are used for
security lighting systems:

❍ Continuous lighting is the most common security lighting

system. It consists of a series of fixed lights arranged to flood
a given area continuously during darkness with overlapping
cones of light.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-25

 ❍ Standby lighting has a layout similar to continuous lighting;
however, the lights are not continuously lit, but are either
automatically or manually turned on when suspicious activity is
detected or suspected by the security personnel or alarm systems.

❍ Movable lighting consists of manually operated, movable

searchlights that may be lit during hours of darkness or
only as needed. The system normally is used to supplement
continuous or standby lighting.

❍ Emergency lighting is a backup power system of lighting that

may duplicate any or all of the above systems. Its use is limited
to times of power failure or other emergencies that render the
normal system inoperative. It depends on an alternative power
source such as installed or portable generators or batteries.
Consider emergency/backup power for security lighting as
determined to be appropriate.

2.10 SITE UTILITIES

Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to
the shock of an explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical
for safely evacuating people from the school building. Their de-
struction could cause damage that is disproportionate to other
building damage resulting from an explosion. To minimize the
possibility of such hazards, apply the following measures:

❍ Where possible, provide underground, concealed, and

protected utilities.

❍ Provide redundant utility systems (particularly electrical services)

to support school security, life safety, and rescue functions.

❍ Consider quick connects for portable utility backup systems if

redundant sources are not available.

❍ Prepare vulnerability assessments for all utility services

to the school, including all utility lines, storm sewers, gas
transmission lines, electricity transmission lines, and other
utilities that may cross the site perimeter.

2-26 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

❍ Protect drinking water supplies from waterborne
contaminants by securing access points, such as manholes.
If warranted, maintain routine water testing to help detect
waterborne contaminants.

❍ Minimize signs identifying critical utilities. Provide fencing to

prevent unauthorized access and use landscape planting to
conceal aboveground systems.

❍ Locate petroleum, oil, and lubricants storage tanks and

operations buildings downslope from all other occupied
school buildings. Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet
from buildings.

❍ Consider providing utility systems with redundant or loop

service, particularly in the case of electrical systems. Where
more than one source or service is not currently available,
provisions should be made for future connections. In the
interim, consider “quick connects” at the building for
portable backup systems.

❍ Decentralize a school’s communications resources, when

possible; the use of multiple communication networks will
strengthen the communications system’s ability to withstand
the effects of a terrorist attack.

❍ Place trash receptacles as far away from the building as

possible; trash receptacles should not be placed within 30 feet
of a building.

❍ Provide a school-wide public address system that extends from

the interior to the exterior of buildings.

❍ Conceal and harden incoming utility systems within schools

to provide blast protection, including burial or proper
encasement wherever possible.

❍ Locate utility systems at least 50 feet from loading docks, front

entrances, and parking areas.

❍ Route critical or fragile utilities so that they are not on

exterior walls or on walls shared with mailrooms.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-27

 ❍ Ensure that the redundant utilities are not collocated or do
not run in the same chases. This minimizes the possibility that
both sets of utilities will be adversely affected by a single event.

❍ Ensure backup systems are located away from the systems

components for which they provide backup.

❍ Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 31

pounds (14 kilograms) or more to minimize the likelihood
that they will fall and injure school occupants. Design
all equipment mountings to resist forces of 0.5 times the
equipment weight in any direction and 1.5 times the
equipment weight in the downward direction. This standard
does not preclude the need to design equipment mountings
for forces required by other criteria such as seismic standards.

❍ Ensure that access to crawl spaces, utility tunnels, and other

means of under school building access is controlled to limit
opportunities for aggressors placing explosives underneath
buildings.

❍ Screen, seal, or secure all utility penetrations of the

site’s perimeter to prevent their use as access points for
unauthorized entry into the school site. If access is required
for maintenance of utilities, secure all penetrations with
screening, grating, latticework, or other similar devices.

2.11 SUMMARY OF SITE MITIGATION

MEASURES
A general spectrum of site mitigation measures ranging from the
least protection, cost, and effort going to the greatest protection,
cost, and effort for a school site is presented below. Detailed
discussions of individual measures can be found earlier in the
chapter. This is a nominal ranking of mitigation measures. In
practice, the effectiveness and cost of individual mitigation mea-
sures may be different for specific applications. Table 2-1 can
be used by designers and school administrators to correlate the
mitigation measures described in this chapter to specific terrorist
threats and tactics.

2-28 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

 • Place trash receptacles as far away from the school building as possible.
• Remove any dense vegetation that may screen covert activity.
• Use thorn-bearing plant materials to create natural barriers.
• Identify all critical resources in the school area (fire and police stations, hospitals, etc.) for design consideration.
• Identify all potentially hazardous facilities in the area (nuclear plants, chemical labs, etc.).
• Use temporary passive barriers to eliminate straight-line vehicular access to areas of limited access.
• Use vehicles as temporary physical barriers during elevated threat conditions.
• Make proper use of signs for traffic control, building entry control, etc. Minimize signs identifying high-risk areas.
• Identify, secure, and control access to all utility services to the school.
• Limit and control access to all school crawl spaces, utility tunnels, and other means of under building access
to prevent the planting of explosives.
• Utilize GIS to assess adjacent land use.
• Provide open space inside the fence along the school perimeter.
• Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet from all occupied school buildings.
• Block sight lines through building orientation, landscaping, screening, and landforms.
• Use temporary and procedural measures to restrict parking and increase stand-off.
• Locate and consolidate high-risk land uses in the interior of the school site.
• Select and design barriers based on threat levels.
• Maintain as much stand-off distance as possible from potential vehicle bombs.
• Separate backup utility systems.
• Conduct periodic water testing to detect waterborne contaminants.
• Enclose the perimeter of the school. Create a single controlled entrance for vehicles (entry control point).
• Establish law enforcement or security force presence for schools facing high threats.
• Install quick connects for portable utility backup systems.
• Install security lighting in areas where needed.
• Install CCTV cameras in areas where needed.
• Mount all equipment to resist forces in any direction.
• Include security and protection measures in the calculation of school land area requirements.
• Redesign and construct parking to provide adequate stand-off for vehicle bombs.
• Position buildings to permit occupants and security personnel to monitor the site.
• Do not site the school building adjacent to potential threats or hazards.
• Locate critical school building components away from the main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, or
maintenance area. Harden as appropriate.
• Provide a site-wide public address system and emergency call boxes at readily identified locations.
• Prohibit parking beneath or within a school building.
• Redesign and construct access points at an angle to oncoming streets.
• Designate entry points for commercial and delivery vehicles away from high-risk areas.
• In urban areas, push the perimeter out to the edge of the sidewalk by means of bollards, planters, and other
obstacles. For even better stand-off, push the line even farther outward by restricting or eliminating parking
along the curb, eliminating loading zones, or through street closings.
• Provide intrusion detection sensors for all utility services to the school.
• Provide backup utility systems to support school security, life safety, and rescue functions.
• Conceal and/or harden incoming utility systems.
• Install active vehicle crash barriers.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-29

Table 2-1 Correlation of Mitigation Measures to Threats*

Waterborne Contamination
Stand-off Weapons Attack

Mail and Supplies Bombs

Stationary Vehicle Bomb

Airborne Contamination
■ The symbols indicate which of the protective

Moving Vehicle Bomb

measures shown in the left-hand column can be
effective in countering the types of threats indicated

Exterior Attack

Armed Attack
across the top of the chart.

Covert Entry
LAND USE CONSIDERATIONS
Locate high-risk land uses in the interior of the school site ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Consolidate high-risk land uses ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Include stand-off areas in land area requirements ■ ■ ■ ■
Consider effects of development off-property development ■ ■ ■ ■
SITE PLANNING
Maximize distance from perimeter fence and developed areas ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Site critical school facilities on higher ground ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Avoid areas with adjacent high terrain or structures ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Avoid areas with adjacent dense vegetation ■ ■ ■
Avoiding low-lying topographic areas ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Site school facilities within view of other occupied facilities ■
Create complexes to enhance surveillance opportunities ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Eliminate vehicle parking from interior of building complexes ■ ■
High surrounding terrain ■ ■ ■
Distance from non-school facilities ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Areas that provide concealment ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Earth berms ■ ■ ■ ■
Bodies of water ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Depressions ■ ■ ■
Vehicle access ■ ■
Dense thorn-bearing vegetation ■ ■
Vegetation screens ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Location of trash receptacles ■

2-30 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

Table 2-1: Correlation of Mitigation Measures to Threats* (continued)

Waterborne Contamination
Stand-off Weapons Attack

Mail and Supplies Bombs

Stationary Vehicle Bomb

Airborne Contamination
Moving Vehicle Bomb

Exterior Attack

Armed Attack

Covert Entry
STAND-OFF DISTANCE
Stand-off zone ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

CONTROLLED ACCESS ZONES

Exclusive zone/Non-exclusive zone ■ ■ ■
Clear zone ■ ■ ■
Fencing and physical barriers ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Active barriers ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Passive barriers ■ ■ ■ ■

ENTRY CONTROL AND VEHICULAR ACCESS

Minimize access roads ■ ■ ■ ■
Control points ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Active monitoring ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Provide enhanced protection at school entrances ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Include pull-over lanes at checkpoints to inspect vehicles ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Avoid straight-line vehicular access to high-risk areas ■ ■
Avoid straight-line entry approach roads ■ ■
Locate vehicle parking areas far from high-risk areas ■ ■
Provide separate service and delivery access ■ ■
Route major corridors away from high-risk areas ■ ■ ■ ■
Locate high-risk resources remote from primary roads ■ ■ ■ ■
Minimize directional identification signs ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Limit vehicular access to high-risk areas ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
SIGNAGE
Minimize signage ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-31

Table 2-1: Correlation of Mitigation Measures to Threats* (continued)

Waterborne Contamination
Stand-off Weapons Attack

Mail and Supplies Bombs

Stationary Vehicle Bomb

Airborne Contamination
Moving Vehicle Bomb

Exterior Attack

Armed Attack

Covert Entry
PARKING
View of parking ■
Parking under a building ■
Parking at interior of facility ■
Parking near high-risk areas ■
Parking in exclusive zone ■
One-way circulation ■ ■ ■ ■
LOADING DOCKS AND SERVICE ACCESS
Loading/unloading docks ■ ■
Driveways under facilities ■ ■
PHYSICAL SECURITY LIGHTING
Lighting ■ ■ ■
SITE UTILITIES
Provide protection at culverts, sewers, and pipelines ■ ■ ■
Provide protection at concrete trenches, storm drains, and duct
■ ■ ■
systems
Provide and check locks on manhole covers ■ ■ ■
Minimize signs identifying utility systems ■ ■ ■
Provide fencing at critical utility complexes ■ ■
Use landscape planting to conceal aboveground systems ■ ■
Install utilities underground ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Locate fuel/lube storage downslope and away from facilities ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Provide redundant utility systems and loop service ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Provide utility “quick disconnects” for portable backup systems ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

2-32 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

Table 2-1: Correlation of Mitigation Measures to Threats* (continued)

Waterborne Contamination
Stand-off Weapons Attack

Mail and Supplies Bombs

Stationary Vehicle Bomb

Airborne Contamination
Moving Vehicle Bomb

Exterior Attack

Armed Attack

Covert Entry
Decentralize communications resources ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Use multiple communications networks ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Conceal and protect network control centers ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Public address system ■ ■ ■ ■
Underground utilities ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Redundant utilities ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Quick disconnects ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Remote fuel storage ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

* ADAPTED FROM U.S. AIR FORCE INSTALLATION FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE.

2.12 CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (CPTED)
CPTED is a crime reduction technique that has several key ele-
ments applicable to the analysis of building function and site
design against physical attack. It is used by architects, city plan-
ners, landscape and interior designers, and law enforcement with
the objective of creating a climate of safety in a community by de-
signing a physical environment that positively influences human
behavior. Although CPTED principles are not incorporated into
the assessment process presented in this primer, it is useful to
briefly discuss CPTED because it is often entwined with terrorism
protection measures.

CPTED concepts have been successfully applied in a wide variety

of applications, including streets, parks, museums, government

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-33

 buildings, houses, and commercial complexes. The approach is
particularly applicable to schools, where outdated facilities are
common. Most schools in the United States were built 30 to 60
or more years ago. Security issues were almost nonexistent at
the time, and technology was dramatically different. As a result,
building designs are not always compatible with today’s more secu-
rity-conscious environment.

According to CPTED principles, depending upon purely conven-

tional physical security measures (e.g., security guards and metal
detectors) to correct objectionable student behavior may have
its limitations. Although employing physical security measures
will no doubt increase the level of physical security, in some cases
physical security measures employed as stand-alone measures
may lead to a more negative environment, thereby enhancing
violence. In short, employing stand-alone physical security mea-
sures may fail to address the underlying behavioral patterns that
adversely affect the school environment. CPTED analysis focuses
on creating changes to the physical and social environment that
will reinforce positive behavior.

CPTED builds on three strategies:

❍ Territoriality (using buildings, fences, pavement, sign, and

landscaping to express ownership)

❍ Natural surveillance (placing physical features, activities, and

people to maximize visibility)

❍ Access control (the judicial placement of entrances, exits,

fencing, landscaping, and lighting)

A CPTED analysis of a school evaluates crime rates, office-referral

data, and school cohesiveness and stability, as well as core design
shortcomings of the physical environment (e.g., blind hallways,
uncontrolled entries, or abandoned areas that attract problem be-
havior). The application of CPTED principles starts with a threat
and vulnerability analysis to determine the potential for attack
and what needs to be protected. Protecting a school from physical

2-34 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

attack by criminal behavior or terrorist activity, in many cases, only
reflects a change in the level and types of threats. The CPTED
process asks questions about territoriality, natural surveillance,
and access control that can:

❍ Increase the effort to commit crime or terrorism

❍ Increase the risks associated with crime or terrorism

❍ Reduce the rewards associated with crime or terrorism

❍ Remove the excuses as to why people do not comply with the

rules and behave inappropriately

The CPTED process provides direction to solve the challenges of

crime and terrorism with organizational (people), mechanical
(technology and hardware), and natural design (architecture and
circulation flow) methods.

CPTED concepts can be integrated into expansion or recon-

struction plans for existing buildings as well as new buildings.
Applying CPTED concepts from the beginning usually has min-
imal impact on costs, and the result is a safer school. Each school,
district, and community should institute measures appropriate
for their own circumstances because there is no a single solution
that will fit all schools.

Many CPTED crime prevention techniques for a school comple-

ment conventional terrorism and physical attack prevention
measures. For example, as part of the CPTED strategy of im-
proving territoriality, schools are encouraged to direct all visitors
through one entrance that offers contact with a receptionist who
can determine the purpose of the visit and the destination, and
provide sign-in/sign-out and an ID tag prior to building access.
These CPTED measures are similar to and complement physical
security entry control point stations.

However, in some cases, CPTED techniques can conflict with basic

physical security principles. The CPTED strategy of natural surveil-
lance calls for locating student parking in areas that allow ease

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-35

 of monitoring. A design that locates student parking close to the
principal’s office also reduces vehicle stand-off and could create
a vulnerability of the school structure to a vehicle bomb. In cases
where CPTED techniques conflict with security principles, de-
signers and school administrators should seek innovative solutions
tailored to their unique situation.

2-36 SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE