CASE NO.

1: In Re Investigation of Angel Parazo for Alleged Leakage of Questions in Some Subjects in

FACTS:

The defendant, Angel Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general
publication wrote in the front page of a newspaper where it states in bold letters- ―CLAIM LEAK IN LAST
BAR TEST‖ followed by another in slightly small letters- ―Applicants in Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed:
One School Favored‖. According to this article, the leakage in some subjects in the recent bar
examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part of the test to the Star
Reporter. Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had mimeographed questions on said
subject fully one week before the tests. The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter
claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this
private university holding around the city. Thereafter, Justice Padilla, by the authority of the court,
instructed Mr. Jose Dela Cruz with assistance of Mr. E. Soriano to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning. In
September 18, 1948, the investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted, on which he testified under oath.
He admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story in good faith and in a
spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information was given to him in
confidence and his informants did not wish their identities revealed. The investigators urged Mr. Parazo
to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in the position to start and
conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against
the party or parties responsible for this alleged irregularity, if found true, but Parazo consistently
refused to make the revelation. In the meantime, Justice Montemayor issued a resolution dated
October 7, 1948 authorizing Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the
court requires him to reveal the source of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his
refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court. Because of the
seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and if he
need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his
paper, he could be given an extension. On October 15, 1948, Mr. Parazo appeared before the court but
still declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court
take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first
obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney
Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53,
the first section provides that The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper,
magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-
report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher,
editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the interest of the state.

ISSUE/S:

WON the court can compel Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants

HELD:

Yes, the court may demand the respondent to reveal the sources of his information, in refusing to make
the revelation which the Court required of him, he committed contempt of court. The court orders his
immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of 1 month. RATIO: RA No. 53 provides immunity
to be accorded to a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute that under no
circumstances could he be compelled to reveal his source of information or news report. The committee
however, inserted an amendment by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause ―unless the court
finds such revelation is demanded by public interest‖. The court is satisfied with that the present case
easily comes under the phrase ―interest of the state.‖ Under Article VII, section 13 of the Constitution,
the SC takes charge of the admission of members of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme Court and the
Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic
preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers
themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end
is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest,
possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by
this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. And one
important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the
Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the
Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or
insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general
interest and national importance.

CASE NO. 2: PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ

FACTS:

Pacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). Multitel was
besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment
schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the
shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to Precedent.

Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a
religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then on, they
constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and
Precedent’s relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare
standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established
between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time. There was an
attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didn’t push through.

After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for the return
and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopez’s clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that she
had to send it so that her clients – defrauded investors of Multitel – would know that she was doing
something for them and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about.

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands
made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first 900,000; then
1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even when Pacana went to the states, they continued communicating
and he continued sending her money for the case.

Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his family to hire
another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer.

------------

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as
his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work
differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work.

-----------

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him
the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST
me! ----

Candy

When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as attorney’s fees
and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never happened though.
Lopez also ignored Pacana’s repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him.

Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopez’s disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests.

HELD:

Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for
engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Ratio: Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana, who, at that
time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions
by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly
accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was
already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was either to
advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing
parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for
complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and
violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacana’s hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and,
later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that
she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to
absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon
her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money
they invested with Multitel.

CASE NO. 3: OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ

FACTS:

Overgaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services of Atty. Valdez. They entered into a retainer
agreement, providing that for 900K, Valdez would represent Overgaard as counsel in 2 cases filed by him
(Estafa and a mandamus case) and 2 cases filed against him (Other Light threats and violation of the
Anti-Violation against women and their children act).

Overgaard sent $16, 854 to Atty. Valdez via telegraphic bank transfer. 4 months after, Overgaard
demanded for a report on the status of his cases. In spite of many phone calls and emails, Valdez
couldn’t be reached. Hence, Overgaard inquired on his own, and discovered that Valdez didn’t file his
entry of appearance in any of the cases, that a counter-affidavit was required from him, and that the
criminal cases against him have already been arraigned and warrants were issued for his arrest. He was
constrained to find a new lawyer.

Overgaard then wrote again and tried to locate Valdez to demand the return of documents entrusted to
the latter, as well as the $16K payment. No word was heard from Valdez. Overgaard filed a case with
the IBP for Valdez’s dismissal for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful
conduct.

The IBP required Valdez to file an answer, but he did not comply. He also failed to attend the hearing
and was declared in default. Later, a clarificatory hearing was set, but Valdez never showed. IBP found
him guilty of violating canons 1, 15, 16, 17, and 18 and his penalty was a 3-year suspension and he was
ordered to return Overgaard’s money.
HELD:

SC agrees with the findings of IBP, but declared that Valdez be disbarred for falling below the standards
required of lawyers.

Canon 18 provides that a lawyer must serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03
requires a lawyer to not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence will make him liable.
Valdez should indeed be liable because he was not just incompetent, he was useless; not just negligent,
he was indolent; and rather than helping his client, he prejudiced him. He abandoned his client and left
him without any recourse. It was a clear evasion of duty. Also, his failure to act on the disbarment case
against him, without any explanation, is a clear evidence of negligence on his part.

Rule 18.04 requires that a lawyer keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within
reasonable time to the client’s request for information. Despite Overgaard’s efforts, Valdez avoided his
client and never bothered to reply. Clearly, the rule was violated.

CASE NO. 4 CAYETANO V. MONSOD

FACTS

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Aquino for the position of COMELEC
Chairman in 1991. This nomination was opposed by petitioner Cayetano on the ground that Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10
years. Apparently, the Constitution requires that the COMELEC Chairperson be a member of the
Philippine Bar who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Despite Cayetano’s
opposition, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination. Thus, Cayetano filed an
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, basically challenging the confirmation by the CA of
Monsod’s nomination.

ISSUE

Is Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson?

HELD

YES.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law under modem
conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys.

The SC, in order to arrive at its decision, presented a brief history of Monsod’s
employment. After passing the bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. From
1963 to 1970, he worked for the World Bank Group, where he was assigned as operations officer in
Costa Rica. His job involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic and project work of the bank. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive of an investment bank and a business
conglomerate. By 1986, he rendered his services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant and he also worked as a Chief Executive Officer. He was also the Secretary-General and
National Chairman of NAMFREL in 1986-1987. His position in NAMFREL required his knowledge in
election law. Also, he sat as a member of the Davide Commission in 1990.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

There are several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law."

1. Habituality

2. Compensation

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls or legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term "practice of law”.

4. Attorney-client relationship.
CASE NO. 5: Re: Letter Of The Up Law Faculty Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The Faculty
Of The University Of The Philippines College Of Law On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And
Misrepresentation In The Supreme Court," A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011

FACTS:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors in response
to the Resolution directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the
Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The ponencia of
Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary was promulgated. The
counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel Regalado
Bagares filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where they posited their charge of plagiarism
claiming that "in this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but
also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the
assailed Judgment for denying the Petition. A statement entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" was submitted by Dean Leonen to the Court. The Ethics
Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature
pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the
actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have
signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme
Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza as represented in the previous copies of the Statement
submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit signed the
Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted
to the Court. Dean Leonen was directed to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
violation of Canon 10 for submitting, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a
true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement. Dean Leonen‘s predicament is the fact
that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to the Court and,
instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn
out, according to Dean Leonen‘s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages
due to lapses of his unnamed staff. "Restoring Integrity I" bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP
College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members
subject of the Show Cause Resolution while "Restoring Integrity II" does not bear any actual physical
signature, but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with
the notation "(SGD.)". In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was
not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at
the text or the body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and
Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and
evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He believes that he had not
committed any violation of Canon 10 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents
of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their
desire to be signatories to, the Statement.
ISSUE/S:

WON Dean Leonen violated Canon 10, Rules 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

Yes. In due consideration of Dean Leonen‘s professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to
admonish the former for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as
required under Canon 10. RATIO: CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court. Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite
as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved. To begin with, the Court said that live public manifesto or not, the Statement was
formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories
at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of
the persons who have signed it, since the Statement‘s persuasive authority mainly depends on the
reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Dean Leonen has not offered any
explanation why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II.
There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its
blanks and unsigned portions. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile
that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in LEGAL ETHICS|
ATTY. GUZMAN| CASE DIGESTS| CANONS 7-22| YEAR I BLOCK 2|32 itself a display of lack of candor.
Contrary to Dean Leonen‘s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to the Court
that a person or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not. The Court is
surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of
intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he
allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was
a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only
hearsay information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly
determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, the court sees no reason
why he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement
had in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was
truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for
abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to
secure.

CASE NO. 6: ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO

FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but
it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not
involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also
published.

An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and
recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of
Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued
that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:

Yes!

The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and
money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration
of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.

Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the
sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise
disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.

Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with
the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a
reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper,
magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar.

CASE NO. 7: In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Facts:

This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-
Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of
being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his
rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.

Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the
respondent.
Held:

The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an
official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of
carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions
assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police
power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of
Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

CASE NO. 8: CASE 62: In re Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970

FACTS:

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. The trial court, after due
hearing, rendered judgment against his client, but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He
notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said
motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as
it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an
appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which also denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
Almacen called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a
petition to surrender his lawyer‘s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing
his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to
pay P120, 000 without knowing the reasons why and that he became ―one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy.‖ He also stated ―that justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.‖ The Supreme Court did not immediately
act on Almacen‘s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate.
Almacen did not surrender his lawyer‘s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to.
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted ―to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.‖ He said he preferred this considering
that the Supreme Court is ―the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.‖ Almacen was however
unapologetic.

ISSUE/S: WON Almacen should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. He was suspended indefinitely.

RATIO: The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court
cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court
would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court
is to decide ―only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.‖ It should be remembered that a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully explain the court‘s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals‘ opinion. On Almacen‘s attack against the Supreme Court,
the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by
the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty
of respect to courts. In the case at bar, Almacen‘s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should
have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost.

CASE NO. 9: CUI V. CUI

Facts:

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act
gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the
spouses deed of donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one
of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent
administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into
between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of
either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the
office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court
ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUE

Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD

Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed
the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in
1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of
the Hospicio.

The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws
but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A
Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as
evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has “successfully
completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary
of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an
administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession
would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of
administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality
and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the
office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less
than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to
the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped
out.