History of Logic
History of Logic
History of Logic
Moshe Y. Vardi
1 Trivia
The word trivial has an interesting entymology. It is
omposed of \tri" (meaning
\3") and \via" (meaning \ways"). It originally referred to the trivium, the three
fundamental
urri
ulae: grammar, rhetori
s, and logi
. Mastery of these sub-
je
ts was
onsidered essential before study
ould
ontinue with the quadrivium,
whi
h
onsisted of arithmeti
, geometry, musi
, and astronomy.
Why was logi
onsidered to be fundamental to one's edu
ation? To answer
this question, it is ne
essary to explain what we mean by the term \logi
".
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass:
1
So logi
deals with a set of rules for reasoning and arguing. Thus, it deals with
a fundamental problem in intelle
tual pursuits: how to distinguish what is true
from what is false, what is right from what is wrong.
2
The Surprise paradox. A logi
professor announ
es to his
lass that there will
be a test next week, but he won't tell whi
h day. He promises, \When
you get it, you'll be surprised.". The students dedu
e that the test
an't
be given on Friday: if it were, then,
ome Friday morning, they would
know it had to be given on that day, and, therefore, they wouldn't be
surprised. But sin
e they now know it
an't be on Friday, they reason that
it
an't be on Thursday either, sin
e they would no longer be surprised on
Thursday morning. Similarly, it
ouldn't be held on Wednesday, Tuesday,
or Monday, But on Tuesday, the professor does give the test, and the
students are very surprised.
These paradoxes, along with the ambiguities of natural language, eventually
led to the eort to formulate logi
in a symboli
language.
Unfortunately, Boole would sometimes take the analogy too far. For example,
he tried to nd a set operation analogous to division, even though no su
h
operation exists in logi
.
Soon to follow Boole's work was that of Charles Ludwig Dodgeson, known
as Lewis Carol, who published several texts on the subje
t, and developed Venn
Diagrams as a means of reasoning about sets.
It was also during this period that Ernst S
hroeder anti
ipated the impor-
tan
e of developing fast algorithms to de
ide various logi
al and mathemati
al
problems. In \The Algebra of Logi
" he writes:
\Getting a handle on the
onsequen
es of any premisses, or at least
the fastest method for obtaining these
onsequen
es, seems to me to
be one of the noblest, if not the ultimate goal of mathemati
s and
logi
."
On
e symboli
logi
matured, it be
ame tremendously useful in resolving many
serious problems developing in mathemati
s.
3
4 The 3rd Age of Logi
: Mathemati
al Logi
(late 19th to mid 20th Century)
As mathemati
al proofs be
ame more sophisti
ated, paradoxes began to show
up in them just as they did in natural language.
For example, in 1820: Cau
hy \proved" that for all innite sequen
es
( ) ( ) ( )
f1 x ; f2 x ; f2 x ;
( )=
f x
X1 i f (x)
i=1
was also
ontinuous. But in 1826 Abel found a
ounterexample!
To deal with issues su
h as these, in 1879, Frege proposed logi
as a lan-
guage for mathemati
s. This development was anti
ipated
enturies earlier by
Leibnitz, but it wasn't until the late 19th Century that the logi
al tools existed
to allow for it. The rigor of mathemati
al proofs in
reased dramati
ally. In
the eld of analysis, the now standard epsilon-delta denition of limits resolved
ambiguities su
h as the one above.
With the rigor of this new foundation, Cantor was able to analyze the notion
of innity in ways that were previously impossible. He
on
luded that, instead of
there being just one innity, there was a whole hierar
hy of them. His argument
was follows:
Consider the set 2N of all subsets natural numbers. Suppose, for a
ontra-
di
tion, that there is only one innity. Then this set, whi
h is innitely large,
must be of the same size as the natural numbers, whi
h is also innitely large.
Therefore, we
ould assign ea
h subset of N a distin
t n 2 N , forming an in-
nite sequen
e P0 ; P1 ; P2 ; : : : of subsets of N . Now
onsider the set Q of natural
numbers n su
h that n 62 Pn . Sin
e Q 2 2N , it must have been assigned some
number j . But then
onsider the question of whether j 2 Q:
j 2 Q , j 2 P j , j 62 Q
A
ontradi
tion.
Therefore, our original supposition is in
orre
t, and 2N is stri
tly larger than
N . (Note that this leaves open the question of the existen
e of other sets with
sizes falling in between these
onstru
ted sizes. See below.) We
ould further
N
devise an analogous argument that 22 is stri
tly larger than 2N , and so on,
forming an innite hierar
hy of innities.
So how do we determine the size of innite sets? Cantor dened the relative
size of two sets as follows:
Denition: jAj jBj i there exists a one-to-one fun
tion from A to
B.
4
This leads to a range of all possible sizes known as the
ardinal numbers. It
starts with a size for ea
h of the natural numbers, and then
ontinues with sizes
for innitely large sets. These new sizes are denoted with the symbol (read
as \aleph"). The rst su
h size (0 ) is the size of the natural numbers.
0; 1; :::0 ; 1 ; : : :
Then, at the turn of the 20th Century, David Hilbert, the most prominent
mathemati
ian of his time, proposed a grand program to devise a single formal
pro
edure that would derive all mathemati
al truth:
\On
e a logi
al formalism is established one
an expe
t that a sys-
temati
, so-to-say
omputational, treatment of logi
formulas is pos-
sible, whi
h would somewhat
orrespond to the theory of equations
in algebra."
The rst major stumbling blo
k
ame when Bertrand Russell dis
overed that
naive set theory, again like the natural language logi
s, led to paradoxes. Russell
wondered whether the
olle
tion of all sets is a set. He
on
luded that this leads
to the so-
alled Russell's Paradox: Consider the set
T = fS jS 62 S g
Then T 2 T , T 62 T (a
ontradi
tion).
Russell worked around this problem by reformulating mathemati
s in terms
of a hierar
hy of sets. Sets of a given hierar
hy
ould only
ontain sets from
lower hierar
hies. His work
ulminated in the Prin
ipia Mathemati
a, a joint
work with Alfred North Whitehead. This work formally proved (i.e., with sheer
symboli
manipulation) the bulk of the mathemati
al knowledge of its time.
In addition, mathemati
ians soon took advantage of the fa
t that symboli
logi
, being a formal system,
ould itself be the obje
t of mathemati
al investi-
gation. To the limited extent that logi
formed a foundation for mathemati
s,
the results of this investigation yielded results on the nature of mathemati
s
itself.
For example, a natural question that arose from Cantor's proof of higher
innities was: what is the relationship between 20 and 1 ? It was
onje
tured
that 20 = 1 . This was known as the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). Despite
many attempts to prove and disprove it, nobody su
eeded. Later, in the 1930's,
Kurt Godel proved that, within the framework of logi
and formal set theory
as the foundation of mathemati
s, supposing CH to be true will never lead to a
ontradi
tion. Then, in the 1960's, Cohen proved that supposing the negation of
CH wouldn't lead to a
ontradi
tion either. This established the independen
e
of CH from mathemati
s as based on set theory.
Although the analysis of logi
as a mathemati
al obje
t proved to be a very
powerful te
hnique, it was soon to yield two results that proved devastating to
Hilbert's Program:
1. Godel's First In
ompleteness Theorem. Kurt Godel proved that, in a
formal system powerful enough to form statements about what it
an
5
prove, there will always be true statements that the system
an express but
an't prove. These statements
ould be proven with even more powerful
systems, but these new systems
ould then express new statements that
they
ouldn't prove, and so on.
2. Godel's Se
ond In
ompleteness Theorem. Kurt Godel proved that a for-
mal system powerful enough to form statements about arithmeti
s
annot
prove its own
onsisten
y.
3. Alonzo Chur
h and Alan Turing showed that there are some problems that
no algorithm
ould ever solve. If su
h problems exist, then there
ould be
no hope of nding a single algorithm to produ
e all mathemati
al truth.
Despite these results, logi
ontinued to
ourish, not as the universally a
epted
ultimate foundation of all mathemati
s, but simply as another bran
h of it. Also,
various independent formal systems
ould still serve as the foundations for the
individual, well-dened, bran
hes of mathemati
s.
6
3. A
omputer has to be told what to do, in very pre
ise and formal way. An
appli
ation of this exa
t des
ription is SQL (Standard Query Language):
a language used for interfa
ing with databases. Although the syntax is
dierent, it is essentially equivalent to standard rst-order logi
.
4. Semanti
s: To make sure that dierent implementation of a programming
language yield the same results, programming languages need to have a
formal semanti
s. Logi
provides the tool to develop su
h a semanti
s.
5. Design Validation and veri
ation: to verify the
orre
tness of a design
with a
ertainty beyond that of
onventional testing. It uses temporal loi
.
The famous Intel bug of 1995, involving faulty
oating point divisions
ost
500 million dollars.
6. AI: me
hanized reasoning and expert systems. There are many domains
in whi
h expertise, a
quired by humans over de
ades,
an be des
ribed
with a formal system. The resulting system
an often yield results on
par with the human expert, and sometimes better. It tries to
apture
"
ommon-sense reasoning" in a formal way.
7. Se
urity: With in
reasing use of network, se
urity has be
ome a big issue.
Hen
e, the
on
ept of proof-
arrying
ode. If an applet
ame with it's own
proof of safety and
orre
tness, then it would be really ni
e.
As our understanding of
omputer s
ien
e, and logi
, improve, in
reasingly
deeper
onne
tions are made. As a result, logi
is sometimes des
ribed as the
\
al
ulus of
omputer s
ien
e". We will learn propositional and First-Order
Logi
, with appli
ations in Complexity, Database, and Veri
ation.