G.R. No. 186639. February 5, 2014.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ, respondent.

Civil Law; Land Registration; Applicants for original

registration of title to land must establish compliance with the
provisions of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529.—Applicants for original
registration of title to land must establish compliance with the
provisions of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently
provides that: Sec. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
Same; Same; Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title; Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.—
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.
“Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration
of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”
Same; Same; In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus
Corporation, 503 SCRA 91 (2006), the Supreme Court clarified
that, the applicant must at the very least submit a certification
from the proper

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
 417

government agency stating that the parcel of land subject of the

application for registration is indeed alienable and disposable.—
In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation, 503 SCRA
91  (2006), the Court clarified that, the applicant must at the very
least submit a certification from the proper government agency
stating that the parcel of land subject of the application for
registration is indeed alienable and disposable, viz.: It must be
stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. In the present case, the only evidence to prove the
character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said
properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly
the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative
act or statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the lands applied
for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the
Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers
only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in
the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the
nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration
are indeed alienable and disposable. 
Same; Same; An applicant in a land registration case cannot
just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application
but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing
the alleged ownership and possession of the land.—Other than his
bare claim that his family possessed the subject property since
time immemorial, Cortez failed to present any evidence to show
that he and his predecessors-in-interest indeed possessed the
subject property prior to 1946; it is a mere claim and not factual
proof of possession. “It is a rule that general statements that are
mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration
case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the
application but must impress

418
thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged
ownership and possession of the land.”
Same; Same; Acquisitive Prescription; As Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529 categorically provides, only private properties may be
acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the
Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use,
public service or intended for the development of national wealth,
are considered private.—That Cortez and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property for fifty-
seven (57) years at the time he filed his application for
registration in 2003 would likewise not entitle him to registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws. “As Section
14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529] categorically provides, only private
properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles
420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not
for public use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private.”
Same; Same; Same; Patrimonial Properties; There is nothing
in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor
is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule.—In Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 (2009), the Court
however clarified that lands of the public domain that are
patrimonial in character are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription and, accordingly, eligible for registration under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz.: The Civil Code makes it clear
that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article
1113, which states that “[a]ll things which are within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription,” and that
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.” There are two
modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired
under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in
good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is
completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing
in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring
patrimonial property of the State through ordinary
acquisitive prescription, nor is

419

there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the

same time, there are indispensable requisites — good faith and
just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application
of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code, provisions that more or less speak for themselves. 
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court further stressed that
the period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from
the time that the State officially declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for
the development of national wealth.—The Court nevertheless
emphasized that there must be an official declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
use, public service, or for the development of national wealth
before it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere declaration
by government officials that a land of the public domain is already
alienable and disposable would not suffice for purposes of
registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The Court
further stressed that the period of acquisitive prescription would
only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
use, public service, or for the development of national wealth.
Same; Same; Same; It is not the notorious, exclusive and
uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to
patrimonial. The indispensability of an official declaration that
the property is now held by the State in its private capacity or
placed within the commerce of man for prescription to have any
effect against the State cannot be overemphasized.—The Court
finds no evidence of any official declaration from the state
attesting to the patrimonial character of the subject property.
Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to
run against the State, much less that he has acquired title to the
subject property by virtue thereof. It is of no moment that Cortez
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
subject property for 57 years at the time he applied for the
registration of title thereto. “[l]t is not the notorious, exclusive
and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to
patrimonial. The indispensability of an official declaration that
the property is now held by the State in its private capacity or
placed

420

within the commerce of man for prescription to have any effect

against the State cannot be overemphasized.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for petitioner.
   Telan, Hipe, Flores, Telan and Associates for
respondent.

 
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside the Decision[2] dated February 17, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87505. The CA
affirmed the Decision[3] dated February 7, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in
LRC Case No. N-11496.
 
The Facts
On February 28, 2003, respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez
(Cortez) filed with the RTC an application[4] for judicial
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at
Barangay (Poblacion) Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros,
Metro Manila. The said parcel of land has an area of 110
square meters and more particularly described as Lot No.
2697-B of the Pateros Cadastre. In support of his
application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following
documents: (1) tax declarations for

_______________
[1] Rollo, pp. 13-25.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of
this Court), with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and
Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; id., at pp. 28-40.
[3] Issued by Judge Santiago G. Estrella; id., at pp. 55A-60.
[4] Id., at pp. 44-48.

421

various years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the
property, with the annotation that the property is classified
as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the
property, with a certification issued by a geodetic engineer;
(4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of
estate dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject
property to Cortez; and (6) escritura de particion
extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject
property to Felicisima Cotas — Cortez’ mother.
As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of
General Default and Cortez was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte.
Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a
portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot
No. 2697 was inherited by his mother from her parents in
1946; that, on March 21, 1998, after his parents died, he
and his siblings executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate over the properties of their deceased parents and
one of the properties allocated to him was the subject
property. He alleged that the subject property had been in
the possession of his family since time immemorial; that
the subject parcel of land is not part of the reservation of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Cortez likewise adduced in evidence the testimony of
Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has known the family
of Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
subject property since he came to know them.
On February 7, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,[5]
which granted Cortez’ application for registration, viz.:

_______________
[5] Id., at pp. 55A-60.

422

WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious, the Court

DECLARES, CONFIRMS, and ORDERS the registration of the
applicant’s title thereto.
As soon as this Decision shall have become final and after
payment of the required fees, let the corresponding Decrees be
issued in the name of the applicant, Emmanuel C. Cortez.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General, Land Registration Authority, Land
Management Bureau, and the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
SO ORDERED.[6]

 
In granting Cortez’ application for registration of title to
the subject property, the RTC made the following
ratiocinations:

From the foregoing, the Court finds that there is sufficient

basis to grant the relief prayed for. It having been established by
competent evidence that the possession of the land being applied
for by the applicant and his predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse possession, under claim
of title and in the concept of owners, all within the time
prescribed by law, the title of the applicant should be and must be
AFFIRMED and CONFIRMED.[7]
 The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA,
alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for
registration despite the failure of Cortez to comply with the
requirements for original registration of title. The
petitioner pointed out that, although Cortez declared that
he and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession of
the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, no
document was ever presented that would establish his
predecessors-in-interest’s

_______________
[6] Id., at pp. 59-60.
[7] Id., at p. 59.

423

possession of the same during the period required by law.

That petitioner claimed that Cortez’ assertion that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse, and
continuous possession of the subject property for more than
thirty (30) years does not constitute well-neigh
incontrovertible evidence required in land registration
cases; that it is a mere claim, which should not have been
given weight by the RTC.
Further, the petitioner alleged that there was no
certification from any government agency that the subject
property had already been declared alienable and
disposable. As such, the petitioner claims, Cortez’
possession of the subject property, no matter how long,
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
On February 17, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed
Decision,[8] dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and affirmed
the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006. The CA ruled
that Cortez was able to prove that the subject property was
indeed alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the
declaration/notation from the BFD.
Further, the CA found that Cortez and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession of the subject property for more than 30 years,
which, under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529,[9] sufficed to convert it to private property. Thus: 

It has been settled that properties classified as alienable and

disposable land may be converted into private property by reason
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.
Such property now falls within the contemplation of “private
lands” under Section 14(2) of PD 1529, over which title by
prescription can be acquired. Thus, under the second paragraph of
Section 14 of PD 1529, those who are in possession of alienable
and

_______________
[8] Id., at pp. 28-40.
[9] Property Registration Decree.

424

disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as

open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the
right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their
possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945. x x x
xxxx
While it is significant to note that applicant-appellee’s
possession of the subject property can be traced from his mother’s
possession of the same, the records, indeed, show that his
possession of the subject property, following Section 14(2) [of PD
1529], is to be reckoned from January 3, 1968, when the subject
property was declared alienable and disposable and not way back
in 1946, the year when he inherited the same from his mother. At
any rate, at the time the application for registration was filed in
2003, there was already sufficient compliance with the
requirement of possession. His possession of the subject property
has been characterized as open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.
[10] (Citations omitted) 

Hence, the instant petition.

 
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the
CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated February 7,
2006, which granted the application for registration filed by
Cortez.
 
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court notes that the RTC did not cite
any specific provision of law under which authority Cortez’
appli-

_______________
[10] Rollo, pp. 35, 38.

425
cation for registration of title to the subject property was
granted. In granting the application for registration, the
RTC merely stated that “the possession of the land being
applied for by [Cortez] and his predecessor-in-interest have
been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse
possession, under claim of title and in the concept of
owners, all within the time prescribed by law[.]”[11] On the
other hand, the CA assumed that Cortez’ application for
registration was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Nevertheless, Cortez, in the application for registration he
filed with the RTC, proffered that should the subject
property not be registrable under Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529, it could still be registered under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), or the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073[12] in relation to
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the Court deems it
proper to discuss Cortez’ application for registration of title
to

_______________
[11] Id., at p. 59.
[12] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073,
provides that:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.

426

the subject property vis-à-vis the provisions of Section 14(1)

and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Applicants for original registration of title to land must
establish compliance with the provisions of Section 14 of
P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently provides that:
 
 Sec. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
x x x x 

After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the

Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the legal
requirements for the registration of the subject property
under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land
acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073. “Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529],
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the
427

same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”[13]
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To
prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez adduced
in evidence a survey plan Csd-00-000633[14] (conversion-
subdivision plan of Lot 2697, MCadm 594-D, Pateros
Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Oscar
B. Fernandez and certified by the Lands Management
Bureau of the DENR. The said survey plan contained the
following annotation:

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29,
classified as alienable & disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development on Jan. 3, 1968.

However, Cortez’ reliance on the foregoing annotation in

the survey plan is amiss; it does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that
the subject property remains part of the inalienable public
domain. In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus
Corporation,[15] the Court clarified that, the applicant
must at the very least submit a certification from the
proper government agency stating that the parcel of land
subject of the application for registration is indeed
alienable and disposable, viz.: 

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be

presented to establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of
the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in
the Advance Plan stating in effect

_______________
[13] See Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA
516, 523.
[14] Records, p. 231.
[15] 534 Phil. 181; 503 SCRA 91 (2006).

428

that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However,

this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing
the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of
the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of
the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a
certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
[16] (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) 

Similarly, in Republic v. Roche,[17] the Court declared

that: 

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the

burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the
Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is
within the approved area per verification through survey
by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must
present a

_______________
[16] Id., at pp. 194-195; p. 102.
[17] G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 116.

429

copy of the original classification approved by the DENR

Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. These facts must be established by
the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied
for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public
domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical
description of the land which bears no information regarding the
land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the status of
the land by any certification from the appropriate government
agency.
Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for
registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.[18] (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours) 

The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez

is not the kind of evidence required by law as proof that the
subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. Cortez failed to present a
certification from the proper government agency as to the
classification of the subject property. Cortez likewise failed
to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary
had indeed classified the subject property as alienable and
disposable. Having failed to present any incontrovertible
evidence, Cortez’ claim that the subject property forms part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
must fail.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court
finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the same.
Cortez failed to present any evidence to prove that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Cortez was
only able to present oral and documentary evidence of his
and his mother’s

_______________
[18] Id., at pp. 121-122.

430

ownership and possession of the subject property since

1946, the year in which his mother supposedly inherited
the same.
Other than his bare claim that his family possessed the
subject property since time immemorial, Cortez failed to
present any evidence to show that he and his predecessors-
in-interest indeed possessed the subject property prior to
1946; it is a mere claim and not factual proof of possession.
“It is a rule that general statements that are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land
registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of
law to embellish the application but must impress thereto
the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged
ownership and possession of the land.”[19]
Further, the earliest tax declaration presented by Cortez
was only in 1966. Cortez failed to explain why, despite his
claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since time immemorial,
it was only in 1966 that his predecessors-in-interest started
to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
That Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the subject property for fifty-seven (57)
years at the time he filed his application for registration in
2003 would likewise not entitle him to registration thereof
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original
registration of lands acquired by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws. “As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No.
1529] categorically provides, only private properties may be
acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421
of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
public use, public

_______________
[19] Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634
SCRA 610, 622-623, citing Mistica v. Republic, G.R. No. 165141,
September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 401, 410-411 and Lim v. Republic, G.R.
Nos. 158630 and 162047, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 247, 262.
 431

service or intended for the development of national wealth,

are considered private.”[20]
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,[21] the Court
however clarified that lands of the public domain that are
patrimonial in character are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription and, accordingly, eligible for registration
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz.:

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the

State may be acquired by private persons through prescription.
This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that “[a]ll
things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription,” and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.”
There are two modes of prescription through which
immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is
ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under
Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years.
There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from
acquiring patrimonial property of the State through
ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any
apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time,
there are indispensable requisites — good faith and just title. The
ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles
526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,
provisions that more or less speak for themselves.[22] (Citation
omitted and emphasis ours) 

The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be

an official declaration by the State that the public dominion

_______________
[20] Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA
92, 106.
[21] G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
[22] Id., at p. 207.

432

property is no longer intended for public use, public service,

or for the development of national wealth before it can be
acquired by prescription; that a mere declaration by
government officials that a land of the public domain is
already alienable and disposable would not suffice for
purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529. The Court further stressed that the period of
acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the
time that the State officially declares that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public use,
public service, or for the development of national wealth.
Thus: 

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a

declaration by the President or any duly authorized government
officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public
domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be
converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
“[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State.” It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property “which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth” are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the
State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is “intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.”

433

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by

the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.[23] (Emphasis supplied) 

In Republic v. Rizalvo,[24] the Court deemed it

appropriate to reiterate the ruling in Malabanan, viz.:

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for

application for registration because his claim of ownership and
possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30)
years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty
(30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section
14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the
State expressly declares that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. x x x.[25] (Citation
omitted and emphasis ours)

_______________
 
[23] Id., at pp. 202-203.
[24] G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516.
[25] Id., at p. 526.

434

Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that

are considered patrimonial may be acquired by prescription
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive
prescription could commence, the property sought to be
registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable; it must also be declared by the State that it is
no longer intended for public use, public service or the
development of the national wealth. Thus, absent an
express declaration by the State, the land remains to be
property of public dominion.[26]
The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration
from the state attesting to the patrimonial character of the
subject property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive
prescription has begun to run against the State, much less
that he has acquired title to the subject property by virtue
thereof. It is of no moment that Cortez and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
subject property for 57 years at the time he applied for the
registration of title thereto. “[l]t is not the notorious,
exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of
an alienable and disposable public land for the mandated
periods that converts it to patrimonial. The
indispensability of an official declaration that the property
is now held by the State in its private capacity or placed
within the commerce of man for prescription to have any
effect against the State cannot be overemphasized.”[27]
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 87505, which affirmed the Decision
dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 68, in LRC Case No. N-11496, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for
Registration of Emmanuel C. Cortez in LRC Case No. N-
11496 is DENIED for lack of merit.

_______________
[26] See Republic v. Ching, G.R. No. 186166, October 20, 2010, 634
SCRA 415, 428.
[27] See Republic v. Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 198585, July 2, 2012, 675 SCRA 439, 446.

435

SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,

Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. 

Notes.—An applicant for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title must prove compliance with Section 14 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree. (Republic vs. Rizalvo, Jr., 644 SCRA 516 [2011])
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title
must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third,
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier. (Ibid.)
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