CALALANG VS WILLIAMS

Facts: The National Traffic Commission (NTC) recommended the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30
pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of
the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila
Mayor and the acting chief of police. Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its
constitutionality.

Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringes upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice

Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC

Facts:Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land claimed that he
had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years. Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification, issued by the CENRO-DENR,
which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the... manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since
the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only
on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of
the period of possession.

Issues: Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

Ruling: The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG
notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers
to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands."

It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application
for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further
submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should
be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership
over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations they presented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended
for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the
Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

SECRETARY OF THE DENR vs. YAP

Facts: The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition for declaratory relief filed
by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes for the land they have been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Later in 2006,
President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

Issue: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents,
and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.

Ruling: The SC ruled against Yap et al. and Sacay et al.

Yes, because the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public
domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. The Regalian Doctrine dictates
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act
No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable
and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. Where the land
is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.

It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926,
mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable
and disposable.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
The private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to
prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.

DEL ROSARION VS DELOS SANTOS ET ALL

FACTS: Two petitions were filed by now-respondents Victorino de los Santos and Tomas de los Santos
before respondent Court of Agrarian Relations on April 28, 1961, manifesting their desire, as tenants of
herein petitioner-landowner, Ernesto del Rosario, to take advantage of Section 14 and to adopt the
leasehold system provided, thus changing their previous status as tenants. In the answer submitted on
May 5, 1961, the validity of the above legal provision was challenged.

ISSUE: assail the validity of Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955,[1] which
empowers a tenant "to change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to the leasehold tenancy
and vice versa and from one crop-sharing arrangement to another of the share tenancy.

RULING: This Court, through Justice Labrador, spoke of the objective of the law thus: "The purpose of this
Act, according to Section 2 thereof, is 'to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and
tenants upon the principle of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and
landlords, to insure an equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-
farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their economic
position and to encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural
communities.'

The opinion in the De Ramas decision, after setting forth that the legal question posed was whether there
was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of an existing contract, explained why the answer must
be in the negative. Thus: "Obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power
when such power is exercised, as in this case, to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted
are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are not arbitrary or oppressive." The
De Ramasdecision was subsequently followed in several cases.

Then in Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations in sustaining once again the validity of the above Section 14,
this Court, in an opinion by the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, declared: "We find no cogent
reason to depart from the view we have so far adhered to, which is in consonance with our consistent
jurisprudence on the police power of the State." As distinguished from the De Ramas holding, the objection
to the validity of Section 14 in this case was premised not only on the alleged impairment of an existing
obligation but likewise on the transgression to the freedom of contract concept which is embraced in the
liberty safeguarded by the due process clause. Its validity then as a police power measure is now beyond
question.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES V. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF

AGRARIAN REFORM
FACTS: Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions. They will be subject
to one common discussion and resolution.

G.R. No. 79777: The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-hectare riceland worked by
four tenants and Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They
question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants
were declared full owners of the mentioned lands.

G.R. No. 79310: Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental
and Planters’ Committee Inc., with 1400 planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit the
implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

A motion for intervention was filed by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000
members). It was granted by the court.
A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners.
It was granted by the court.

G.R. No. 79744

Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation
Land Transfer accusing the then Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the requirement for just
compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the private respondents who then refused to
pay lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and cancellation of these certificates.

Petitioner claims his petition was denied without hearing.

A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were
issued which rendered his motion moot.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power
Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated

RULING
P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella. President
Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.

The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the Congress was formally convened and took
over legislative power.

Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its principal purpose and therefore is not
required to conform to the requirements.

R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law.

It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the
matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.

The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control
the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific
action.

It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of just compensation unlike in
the exercise of police power wherein confiscation of property is not compensable.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and
the lawful method. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution
itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity
of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment.
The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.

It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment, other modes of payment shall be
permitted as compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the just compensation is not
always required to be made fully in money, they find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands
expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are likewise available
to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock,
LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of
just compensation.

(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this
issue. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved
at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades.
We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing
the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent
in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we

The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

ROXAS AND CO., INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: This case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these by the government under RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
9188. Petitioner Roxas and Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas,
namely Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway. The events of this case occurred during the incumbency
of then President Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987,
Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229
providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program. Congress passed Republic Act
No. 6657; the Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before
the law’s effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to the provisions of EO No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under
compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate
acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL. Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993,
petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-
agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despite petitioner’s application for conversion,
respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The Land Bank of the Philippines
trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP
bonds. On October 22, 1993, from the title of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land
Ownership Award No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA’s were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. On
December 18, 1991, the LBP certified certain amounts in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as
compensation for petitioner’s land in Hacienda Banilad. On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion
of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the
government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner,
through its President, Eduardo Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its
VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the
reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed
respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
Respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from
agrarian reform.

On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted a case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board praying for the
cancellation of the CLOA’s issued by respondent DAR in the name of the farmers. Petitioner alleged that
the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the
land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified
the land to non-agricultural. Respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of
whether the property was subject to agrarian reform; hence, this question should be submitted to the Office
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.
Petitioner filed a petition with the CA. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and
the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the
three haciendas was denied. Petitioner’s petition was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this recourse.

Issue: Whether or not the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were valid and in accordance with
the law.

Held: No, for a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required first the Notice of
Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of
the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties and second, the Notice of Acquisition
sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance of the first notice, the Notice of
Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They
are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of
the CARL is an exercise of the State’s police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that
the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation,
the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking
under the power of eminent domain. In this case, respondent DAR claims that it sent a letter of invitation to
petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico but he was not
authorized as such by the corporation. The SC stressed that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with
the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give the SC the power to nullify the
CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. The Court said, to assume the power is to short-circuit
the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the
chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's
were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been
cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these
people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. The petition is granted in part and the acquisition
proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101,
November 22, 2011

HACIENDA LUICITA INC VS PARC

FACTS: the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI
and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan
(SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the
right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects,
consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to
manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks,
as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco),
and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November
21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10,
1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11,
1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita
to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita
to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered
its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to
the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also
applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of
laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences
that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of
HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011
decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and
homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the
lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer
one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it
made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was
no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards
the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate
under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands
originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA
6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive –
considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered
commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that
may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in
adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases.
In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB,
and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area
with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda
Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the
separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of
the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the
sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to
the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date
when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess
the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November
21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On
the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s
revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled
to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock
distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC
acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with
finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed
on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda
Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award
(CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant
case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance
of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should
the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all
efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be
transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given
the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI
capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as
HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the
formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101
shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by
the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
GABINO ALITA VS CA
FACTS: The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents'
predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to
vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).

Private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister
of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then
defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders
issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.

Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.

Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the
lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which
the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.

The then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial
Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion
to enjoin the defendants was denied.

Plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January
10, 1983.

Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration
but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained.

ISSUE: W/N lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.

HELD: NO
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation,
a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such
contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,

The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy
citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is
necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their
homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a
right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the
welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v.
Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)

In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over
the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:

Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public
domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands
covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,

Section 6. Retention Limits. …

... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.'
Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
225 SCRA 278 (1993)
Facts:
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. is the owner of a 125.0078-ha land set aside by Presidential Proclamation
No. 1637 (1979) as townsite area for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Estate Developers and Investors
Corporation (EDIC), the developer of the area, was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances
by the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) for the establishment of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision therein. In November 1990, a Notice of Coverage was issued by DAR on the undeveloped
portion of the landholding. The developer filed its objections and filed this case imputing grave abuse of
discretion to respondent DAR for including the undeveloped portions of its landholding within the coverage
of CARP.
Issue:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, and approved by HLURB and its
precursor agencies prior to 15 June 1988, covered by RA 6657?
Held:

Sec. 4 of RA 6657 states that the CARL covers "regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private and agricultural lands" and as per the transcripts of the Constitutional
Commission, "agricultural lands" covered by agrarian reform refers only to those which are "arable and
suitable lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands." The land subject of the
controversy has been set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation by Proclamation No. 1637 prior to
the effectivity of RA 6657 and in effect converted these lands into residential use. Since the Natalia lands
were converted prior to 15 June 1988, DAR is bound by such conversion, and thus it was an error to include
these within the coverage of CARL.

LUZ FARMS V. SECRETARY OF DAR

Facts: RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be
adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it
prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among
others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That the
land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments
of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal factor or
consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657
which covers “agricultural lands”.

Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its definition of
“Agriculture” the livestock and poultyr industry?

Ruling:

The Court held YES.

Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word “agriculture”, it
showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.

Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the term “farmworkers” rather than
“agricultural workers” in the said law is because “agricultural workers” includes the livestock and poultry
industry, hence, since they do not intend to include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have distinction.

Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan applied to “corporate farms”
in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being consficatory and violative of the due process of Law.

DAR vs SUTTON
FACTS: The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been
devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian
reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

A new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farm used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, this Court
ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultryraising are not included in the definition of agricultural land.
Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock
farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.

In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their
VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattleraising and thus exempted from the coverage of
the CARL.

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents
land and found that it was devoted solely to cattleraising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR
Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the
return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private
agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded
from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following
retention limits, viz: 1:1 animalland ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by
the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall
likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and
irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is
exempted from the CARL.

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the
application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined
in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and
a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding
to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should b exempted as
it is devoted exclusively to cattleraising. Their motion was denied.
They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President
affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter
to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. Provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is
being used for cattleraising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the
determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993,
void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from
the land reform program of the government.

ISSUE: W/N DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of
lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.

HELD: NO.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultryraising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultryraising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of
livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural,
activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as:
animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies,
antipollution equipment like biogas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds,
deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS DARAB

FACTS:CMU is an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need
for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who
planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines.
Pres. Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU.
In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of
agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership
of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that
what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.

In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees.
This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program the faculty and staff combine
themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training
and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice
project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits
participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated
land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a
multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people
in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the
confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the Agri-
Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some
CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued.
Another project was launched o develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-
reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment
the income of the faculty and the staff. This has the same nature as of the Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program
with an express provision that there would be no tenant-landlord relationship.

The contract expired. Some were renewed, some were not. The non-renewal of the contracts, the
discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation
from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the
filing of the complaint.

DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under
the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and
contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified
beneficiaries.

Complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants
claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complainants are tenants of CMU, hence, beneficiaries of CARP
Whether or not CMU is subject to CARP
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of
Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP

HELD:
First Issue:
We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written
agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the
faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of
the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use
participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again,
the agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not
share in the produce of the participants' labor.

Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very
responsible position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while
Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own
no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof
whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.

In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot
qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.

The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was
leased long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing Corporation was not
a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the Philippine
Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program, with the direct participation of
faculty and students. Said projects were directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the CMU as
an educational institution.
DAR VS DECS
FACTS: In controversy are lands located Negros Occidental donated by the Esteban Jalandoni to
respondent DECS. It leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years
subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years. Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming
to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. MARO
Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS. It appealed the case to the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.

ISSUE: whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage

RULING: Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage
of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
c)Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites
and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes, . . . , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. 13
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must
be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the purpose is "for school
sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes."
The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary" cannot
be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and
technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or
verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless
farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth,
and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means towards a
viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain: "landless farmers
and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation
toward sound rural development and industrialization."

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs CA

Fact: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Petitioner passed Resolution authorizing the Provincial
Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site. The San Joaquins
failed to appear at the hearing of the motion, moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy
of the price offered for their property. The trial court denied the motion and authorized the Petitioner to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court, The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order,
authorizing the Petitioner to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to
dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.

the San Joaquins petitioned before the Court of Appeals, In its answer to the petition, the Petitioner claimed
that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. The Solicitor General stated there
was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Petitioner of the right of
eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Petitioner must first secure
the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for
use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents’ lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to
dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Petitioner
shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the
classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue: Whether the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use?

Held: Yes, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public purpose” or “public
use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. Under the new concept, “public use” means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. The expropriation
of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of
Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information
and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose
requirement of the Constitution.

ROXAS v. DAMBA-NFSW
Facts:Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,
Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas.

Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.

Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to
sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were later placed... under compulsory acquisition by ... DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to
the Secretary of ...DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
Batangas allegedly authorized the... reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-
agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543 nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP)
1520 which was issued on November 28, 1975 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.
The PP reads:
WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite
Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism value... hereby declare the area comprising the
Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a...
tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)

The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value,...
Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from argricultural to non-
agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a
tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses.

Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No.
6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares,... the subject of G.R. No. 167505.
The application for conversion of Roxas & Co. was the subject of the above-stated Roxas & Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals which the Court remanded to the DAR for the observance of proper acquisition
proceedings. As reflected in the above-quoted statement of facts in... said case, during the pendency before
the DAR of its application for conversion following its remand to the DAR or on May 16, 2000, Roxas & Co.
filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program
(CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994[3]
which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity
of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

It bears mentioning at this juncture that on April 18, 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu enacted
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 (Nasugbu MZO No. 4) which was approved on May 4, 1983 by the
Human Settlements Regulation Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Issues:
Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-
agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.'s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage
Whether Nasugbu MSO No. 4, Series of 1982 exempted certain lots in Hacienda Palico from CARP
coverage
Whether the partial and complete cancellations by the DAR of CLOA No. 6654 subject of G.R. No. 167505
is valid

Ruling:
I. PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THE THREE
MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING NASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone,
reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.
The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the [three
Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the
segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose.
Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism
areas are.
In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA,[9] the Court made it clear that the "power to determine
whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage
of the [Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law] lies with the [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court.
The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order of October 22, 2001, the
application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it... finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify
all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses. I... t appears that the PTA had not yet, at
that time, identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending... tourism
development projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops.[11]
Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,[12] came up with clarificatory
guidelines and therein decreed that
B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or
peninsulas as tourist zones that merely:
(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas
(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general area declared as tourist
zone... could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land area
declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation into some
specific use and "providing for the manner of... their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government
Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan."
A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area
declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone
for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said... proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within
the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural.
C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect
before June 15, 1988, could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein
from CARP coverage x x x x.
The DAR's reading into these general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost consideration, more
especially in the present petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely
recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas... within the general area declared as tourism
zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.
Even so, Roxas & Co. turns to Natalia Realty v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde to support its position. These
cases are not even closely similar to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543. The only time that
these cases may find application to said petitions is... when the PTA actually identifies "well-defined
geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value."
II. ROXAS & CO.'S APPLICATION IN DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 FOR CARP
EXEMPTION IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 179650 CANNOT BE GRANTED IN VIEW
OF DISCREPANCIES IN THE LOCATION AND IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF
LAND.
Since PP 1520 did not automatically convert Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad and Palico into non-agricultural
estates, can Roxas & Co. invoke in the alternative Nasugbu MZO No. 4,... which reclassified in 1982 the
haciendas to... non-agricultural use to exclude six parcels of land in Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage?
By Roxas & Co.'s contention,... n, the affected six parcels of land which are the subject of DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 and nine parcels of land which... have been reclassified to non-
agricultural uses via... n, the affected six parcels of land which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case
No. A-9999-142-97 and nine parcels of land which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-
008-98 involved in G.R. No. 167505, all in
Hacienda Palico, have been reclassified t... ural uses via Nasugbu MZO No. 4 which was approved by the
forerunner of HLURB.
Roxas & Co.'s contention fails.
To be sure, the Court had on several occasions decreed that a local government unit has the power to
classify and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL.
The DAR Secretary[26] denied the application for exemption of Roxas & Co., however,... [A] review of the
titles, however, shows that the origin of T-49946 is T-783 and not
T-985. On the other hand, the origin of T-60034 is listed as 59946, and not T-49946. The discrepancies
were attributed by [Roxas & Co.] to typographical errors which were "acknowledged and initialled" [sic] by
the ROD. Per verification..., the discrepancies . .
. cannot be ascertained.
In denying Roxas & Co.'s motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary held:
The landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification dated February 11,
1998 of the [HLURB] , the Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, and the Certifications... dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the
National Irrigation Authority. The certifications were issued for Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34. Thus, it
was not even possible to issue exemption clearance over the lots covered by TCT Nos. 60019 to 60023.
Furthermore, we also note the discrepancies between the certifications issued by the HLURB and the
Municipal Planning Development Coordinator as to the area of the specific lots.[
In affirming the DAR Secretary's denial of Roxas & Co.'s application for exemption, the Court of Appeals
But these certifications contain nothing to show that these lots are the same as Lots 125-A, 125-B, 125-C,
125-D and 125-E covered by TCT Nos. 60019, 60020, 60021, 60022 and 60023, respetively. While [Roxas
& Co.] claims that DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24 and
31 correspond to the aforementioned TCTs submitted to the DAR no evidence was presented to
substantiate such allegation... oreo
Moreover, [Roxas & Co.] failed to submit TCT 634 which it claims covers DAR Lot Nos. 28, 32 and 24.
....a... scrutiny of the said Ordinance shows that only Barangays Talangan and Lumbangan of the said
municipality were classified as Industrial Zones...Barangay Cogunan was not include
Its foregoing findings notwithstanding, the appellate court still allowed Roxas & Co. to adduce additional
evidence to support its application for exemption under Nasugbu MZO No. 4.
In granting the application, the DAR Secretary[30] examined anew the evidence submitted by Roxas & Co.
which consisted mainly of certifications from various local and national government agencies.
Even as the existence and validity of Nasugbu MZO No. 4 had already been established, there remains in
dispute the issue of whether the parcels of land involved in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97
subject of G.R. No. 179650 are actually within the said zoning... ordinance.
The Court finds that the DAR Secretary indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when he ignored the
glaring inconsistencies in the certifications submitted early on by Roxas & Co.
Notably, then DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, on one hand, observed that the "landholdings covered by
the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification dated February 11, 1998 of the [HLURB], the
Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Municipal Planning... and Development Coordinator,
and the Certifications dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Authority."
On the other hand, then Secretary Hernani Braganza relied on a different set of certifications which were
issued later or on September
19, 1996.
In this regard, the Court finds in order the observation of DAMBA-NFSW that Roxas & Co. should have
submitted the comprehensive land use plan and pointed therein the exact locations of the properties to
prove that indeed they are within the area of coverage of Nasugbu MZO
No. 4.
III. ROXAS & CO.'S APPLICATION FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-
008-98 FOR THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 167505
SHOULD BE GRANTED.
The Court, however, takes a different stance with respect t... nine parcels of land... in Hacienda Palico,...
Location and vicinity maps of subject landholdings;
Certification dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia, Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that the subject parcels of
land are within the Urban Core Zone as specified in Zone A. VII of
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC), now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), under Resolution No.
123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;
Two (2) Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo Tan II, Director, HLURB, Region IV,
stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be within the Residential cluster Area as specified in Zone
VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4,... By Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR Secretary granted the
application for exemption b
DAMBA-NSFW moved for reconsideration but the DAR Secretary denied the same
IV. THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-9999-008-98 SUBJECT OF
G.R. No. 179650 TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES INVOLVING THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN
HACIENDA PALICO MUST BE CANCELLED.
Turning now to the validity of the issuance of CLOAs... ssuance of CLOAs in Hacienda Palico vis-à-vis the
present dispositions: It bears recalling that in DAR Administrative Case Nos. A-9999-008-98 and A-9999-
142-97 (G.R. No. 179650), the Court ruled for Roxas & Co.'s grant of exemption... in DAR Administrative
Case No. A-9999-008-98 but denied the grant of exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-
97 for reasons already discussed. It follows that the CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 must be... cancelled.
But first, the Court digresses. The assertion of DAMBA-NSFW that the petitions for partial and complete
cancellations of the CLOAs subject of DARAB Case Nos. R-401-003-2001 to R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-
239-2001 violated the earlier order in Roxas v. Court of Appeals does... not lie. Nowhere did the Court
therein pronounce that the CLOAs issued "cannot and should not be cancelled," what was involved therein
being the legality of the acquisition proceedings.
gs. The Court merely reiterated that it is the DAR which has primary jurisdiction to rule on the... validity of
CLOAs.
Unlike courts of justice, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body, is not bound to strictly observe rules of
procedure and evidence. To strictly enforce rules on appeals in this case would render to naught the Court's
dispositions on the other issues in these consolidated... petitions.
In the main, there is no logical recourse except to cancel the CLOAs issued for the nine parcels of land
identified as Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering
45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico
(or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). As for the rest of the CLOAs, they
should be respected since Roxas & Co., as shown in the discussion in G.R. Nos. 167540, 167543 and
167505, failed to prove that the other lots in Hacienda Palico and the... other two haciendas, aside from the
above-mentioned nine lots, are CARP-exempt.
ANINAO VS ASTURIAS
FACTS:
Subject of this case are several parcels of land situated in Brgys. Baha and Talibayog, Calatagan,
Batangas, and formerly owned by Ceferino Ascue (Ascue).
Emancipation patents (EPs) covering the disputed lands were issued to 323 agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 and/or Executive Order
(EO) No. 228
MARO sent a ‘Final Notification’ letter to the heirs of Ascue relative to the payment of their land transfer
claim
DAR Region IV Office requested the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to open a trust account in favor of
Ascue in an amount corresponding to the valuation of his agricultural property.
The heirs of Ascue, with the approval of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Balayan, Batangas handling the
settlement his estate (sic), sold to Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc. (“Asturias”) the 807 hectares of land
referred to at the outset.
Years later, Asturias was disturbed by the initial activities undertaken by the DAR to place its remaining
landholding under CARP
Asturias made it known that its Calatagan landholding could no longer be considered for CARP coverage,
it having “already been declared as mineral land pursuant to a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(‘MPSA’) between the government and Asturias” and that “an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
[has already been] issued …for the establishment of a cement plant within the area”
DAR Regional Director issued a certificate of exemption over the remaining 284.9323 hectares of land of
Ascue, now owned by Asturias. The exemption order was based on the findings that “only fifteen (15)
hectares, more or less, are planted with crops such as upland rice, bananas, corn and coconut while the
rest, with an area of 284.9323 hectares, are undeveloped, slopes of more than 18%, rocky, swampy, and/
or mangrove areas and therefore not suitable for agricultural purposes.”
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) issued Res. No. 02 urging the
Registry of Deeds – Nasugbu, Batangas to cancel/consider null and void the land transaction between
Ascue and Asturias if proven that it was concluded in violation of existing laws.
PARO of Batangas formed the Task Force o ascertain if the standard operating procedures were followed
in accordance with the policies and guidelines of PD 27 and CARL; to determine whether the property was
planted to rice /corn as of 1972 and to verify the existence of tenancy relationship.
Asturias formally protested the OLT coverage of portions of its Calatagan property and the threatened
cancellation of its titles . . . . The grounds cited for the protest fall under these headings: (1) “The Asturias
Landholding is NOT AND NEVER WAS a RICE and CORN farm”; and (2) The issuance of the alleged 818
EPs and the coverage of the Asturias property under PD # 27 is ERRONEOUSAND WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS.”
DAR sustained the protest of Asturias and recalled/nullified the coverage of the property in question under
OLT. The ruling was predicated on the following premises: (a) the landholding is not primarily devoted to
rice/corn production; (b) the existence of tenancy relations has not been clearly established; and (c) the
property had long ceased to be agricultural: it has become mineral land.
Subsequently, two (2) groups, each claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries, separately moved for
reconsideration. These were denied
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ petition for review for “being insufficient in form for failing to
comply with the requirements under Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.”

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property

HELD:
No.
As may be noted, EPs were issued to petitioners as agrarian reform beneficiaries or successors-in–interests
pursuant to the OLT program under P.D. No. 27. To come within the coverage of the OLT, there must be
showing that the land is devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system of share-crop or lease
tenancy obtaining therein when P.D. No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972.[18] If either requisite is absent,
exclusion from the OLT coverage lies and EPs, if issued, may be recalled.
In the case at bench, it has been peremptorily determined by OP and, before it, by the DAR, acting on
investigations reports of its provincial (Batangas) office, as reviewed and validated by its regional office,
that the OLT coverage of the disputed landholdings was erroneous, it being established that the lands
covered are not primarily devoted to rice and corn and that the tenancy relationship has not been clearly
established. Absent palpable error by both agencies, of which this Court finds none, their determination as
to the use of the property and/or to the dubious status of petitioners as de jure tenants is controlling.
In the matter of petitioners’ non-compliance with the procedural requirement on forum shopping, we find no
reversible error in the appealed dismissal action of the appellate court. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the requirements on the filing of a certification against forum shopping should be strictly complied with.
It bears stressing that a petition involving two or more petitioners must be accompanied by a certification
of non-forum shopping accomplished by all petitioners, or by one who is authorized to represent them;
otherwise, the petition shall be considered as defective and, under the terms of Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court, may be dismissed.