Ordering the “Crush Zone”:

Geopolitical Games in Post-Cold War Eastern Europe

John O’Loughlin1

Institute of Behavioral Science

University of Colorado

Campus Box 487

Boulder, CO. 80309-0487

Email: [email protected]

Word count: 8357

 Biography

John O’Loughlin is Director of the “Globalization and Democracy” graduate training program,

funded by the National Science Foundation, in the Institute of Behavioral Science at the

University of Colorado, Boulder. His research interests are in the diffusion of democracy, the

relationship between economic and political transitions in Russia and Ukraine, and the changing

identities of the peoples of the post-Soviet states. He is editor of Political Geography.

1
 Abstract

In the aftermath of the Cold War, no consensus has emerged in American political circles on a

replacement for the containment geopolitical code of the 1945-1990 era. Various geopolitical

paradigms are on offer, each emanating from a world-view that is heavily coloured by domestic

political ideologies. Seven of these paradigms are described and considered in light of the

momentous geopolitical decision in 1998 to expand NATO into Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe

has been considered a “crush zone” by political geographers for over a century and the region has

been intimately connected with the geopolitical re-orderings of this century. Strenuous avoidance of

geopolitical issues, including long-term relations with Russia, was notable during the NATO

expansion debates. The stark contrast of “chaos” (Russia and its neighbours in the former Soviet

Union) to “ cosmos” (the European Union and three new central members of NATO) dominated

the NATO enlargement debate. The end-consequence of recent NATO and U.S. foreign policy

decisions will be a re-drawing of the geopolitical divide across Europe from the eastern Baltic to the

Black Sea. Fear of being placed on the eastern side of this new “iron curtain” has caused many East

European states to re-discover their “European” credentials and claim entry to the West.

2
 “The mentality of the people in Central and Eastern Europe is characterized by a collective existential fear of a real or

imaginary threat of national destruction due to loss of independence, assimilation, deportation or genocide.” (Alexy

Miller)2.

Since 1989, one of the main regional foci of post-Cold War geopolitical debates has been Eastern Europe.3

After nearly five decades of ossification induced by the bi-polar bloc system that descended on Europe in the

late 1940s, the “crush zone” between the large states of Germany and Russia has once more become a zone

of contention. The new geopolitical quarrels within the Western strategic community and between pro-

NATO and pro-Russian commentators have spurred a renewed interest in the legacy of a debate that reaches

back to the end of the last century. At that time, separatist aspirations in the multi-national empires of

Austro-Hungary and Russia were growing and the great power rivalry between Germany, the United

Kingdom, Russia and the United States was reaching new levels of military spending. Though much has

changed in 100 years, especially the replacement of autocracies by democracies and the effacement of imperial

borders, three geopolitical issues of the late 20th century Eastern Europe would looked familiar to an

informed citizen of the late 1800s - great power rivalry, the correspondence between national territories and

state borders, and the delimitation of the eastern boundary of “Europe”.

Some of the earliest and most influential geopolitical writings by Sir Halford J. Mackinder, Rudolf

Kjellén and Karl Haushofer concerned the newly-independent states of Eastern Europe that emerged from

the battles, truces and forcible settlements of World War I. While these protagonists offered deeply

contrasting policies for their respective countries, they agreed that the region between Berlin and Kiev was a

lynchpin in the quest for control of Europe and that the Great Powers would continue vie for dominance in

this borderland. The continued strategic importance of Eastern Europe was echoed in the opinions of a later

generation of geopolitikers, writing in the chaos and aftermath of World War II. Then, American strategists

such as Nicholas Spykman, Robert Straus-Hupé and George F. Kennan had entered the geopolitical fray and

3
centred their attention on the “denial principle”, that Eastern Europe should not fall under the influence of a

power that was inimical to American interests. Despite their efforts, the Yalta agreement of 1943 sealed the

lines of dominance and Eastern Europe was firmly placed in the Soviet zone of influence and geopolitical

interest in the region waned as the superpower contest moved to the more chaotic domains of the Third

World.4 In 1989, the geopolitical game was renewed as a result of the unexpected collapse of the Communist

regimes and subsequently, by the blatant attempts by the new post-communist regimes to play their national

cards for the greatest territorial, economic and military advantage. We have thus re-entered an era of

geopolitical uncertainty as major domestic and international debates about issues such as NATO (North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation) expansion and Russia’s relations with her neighbours in the “Near Abroad”

(countries formed from the republics of the former Soviet Union) draw pundits from all perspectives.

In this paper, I will revisit a key debate of the early years of political geography – how to fit a place

into a geopolitical order.5 I will connect the geopolitical visions of external actors, in this case, that of

American policy-makers and commentators, with the specific development of foreign policies of

contemporary East-Central Europe. Earlier geopolitical study, like the writings of Mackinder, Bowman,

Haushofer and Fairgrieve, always connected the macro-perspective of geopolitics to the micro-scale policies

for borders and territories.6 Whilst not advocating a return to ethnocentric, state-centred geopolitical study,

the linkage of geopolitical critique and policy analysis must continue. This paper is a return to classic

geopolitical traditions without the national-patriotic baggage that has accompanied earlier as well as
7
contemporary works.

My review of the contemporary debates in American foreign policy indicates that controversies ebb

and flow according to the nature and emphasis of the domestic agenda. Other feedback effects emanate

from unanticipated developments in strategically important zones and in global economic relations. The

short debate from late 1996 to early 1998 in the United States about NATO expansion into Eastern Europe

helps to highlight current political positions and geopolitical perspectives on offer. One of the dramatic

features of the NATO debate was the relative lack of attention to historical antecedents and alternative

4
perspectives.8 Though Russian opposition to NATO expansion to the border of the former Soviet Union

was noted, the great diversity of opinion in that country was generally simplified or noted in a condescending

manner. Further, the geographic mosaic of Eastern Europe was simplified in the debate and a simple

dichotomy of qualifiers and non-qualifiers for NATO membership ended whatever attention was paid to the

diversity of countries, regions, peoples and politics in the zone between the German and Russian borders.

Geopolitical Controversies in the American World-View.

As the Western triumphalism of the post-1989 period wanes with growing recognition of territorial disputes

remained unresolved, a decade-long search for a new geopolitical paradigm in the United States has not yet

uncovered one capable of "ordering" a complex world-system. This complexity, hidden to U.S. strategists

and policymakers blinded by the ageographic lens of the Cold War paradigm, now stands revealed; the U.S.

establishment, despite a wish to reorder the post Cold War world, has not yet uniformly accepted a

geopolitical code. The kind of domestic political consensus that emerged in the late 1940s around the

“containment” strategy is not yet evident for any of the proposals for the post-1989 world. Various new

paradigms (e.g. Huntington's "civilizational" model)9 recognise global complexity and a new multi-polarity of

power but none have broad political support. U.S. geopolitics of the late 1990s resembles that of the 1920s

with indecision and uncertainty in the aftermath of a victory in World War I. Despite victory in the Cold

War, the realisation of expectations that have accrued and the limits on foreign policy activities posed by

domestic constraints (not the least of which is the disinterest of most Americans in the world outside the

borders of the U.S.) have complicated rather than clarified the U.S. role in the world.

In an attempt to distinguish and highlight current debates, seven “paradigms” are portrayed in Table

1. In my definition, a paradigm is a general world perspective that is moulded both by the strength and

variety of American domestic interests and by the state of international relations and the international political

economy. Moreover, a paradigm is associated with each presidential administration and becomes

personalised by the global visions that each holder of the highest office brings to power. Many of the

5
“mental maps” are strongly influenced by early personal experiences of Presidents, whilst others are changed

by unexpected global shifts.10 More than anything else, a paradigm offers a fairly-abstract blue-print for

dealing with international relations and determining the extent and level of U.S. engagement with the world

outside its borders.

In contrast to the general perspective, a geopolitical code is defined as “a set of strategic assumptions

that a government makes about other states in making its foreign policy.”11 Whilst highly ethnocentric and

oriented to the perceived needs and interests of the state, geopolitical codes are nevertheless worthy of

attention in the interpretation of foreign policy actions. Codes are the spatial expressions of geopolitical

efforts to transform a “global space into fixed perspectival scenes, and as a two-dimensional register of space

(they) would reveal some eternal truths about geography’s relationship to politics.”12 Thus, in order to

understand the actions of the U.S. in post-1989 Eastern Europe, we need to examine the place of the region

in the competing geopolitical codes of the U.S. Each of the respective geopolitical codes that are in vogue,

under discussion or recently debated in Washington has a clear implication for the nature of U.S. response to

changes in Eastern Europe consequent on the collapse of Communism in 1989. Though Brown notes how

post-war U.S. strategists like Dean Acheson, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Allen Dulles, Dwight Eisenhower,

Alexander Haig, George F. Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, Paul Nitze, and Walter Rostow were

influenced by geopolitical theories, a position also held by Sloan, the case for the influence of these theories

on U.S. policymaking or plans seems stretched, anecdotal and not yet subject to rigorous analysis.13 More

likely, the general Weltanschauung of the times influenced both the geopolitical theorists and the policy-makers

and generated a geopolitical code that seemed theory-based but was more strongly linked to the operating

paradigm in Washington.

The best-known geopolitical code is “containment” and because its use in Europe and the Middle

East in the early days of the Cold War is generally viewed as a success of American foreign policy,

containment’s legacy is powerful and capable of projection to other times and places.

Table 1: American Foreign Policy Paradigms and Geopolitical Codes in the late 1990s.

6
 Paradigm Geopolitical Code Policy

1. “noblesse oblige” Global reach with countries Promote U.S. principles (democracy and the market):
differentiated by U.S. military power and money.
need; idealist; e.g., JFK inaugural
address

2. “U.S. first” Identification of “rogue”states; anti- Highly differentiated world with big commitments to
globalization: isolationist; e.g., a few key allies.
Buchananism

3. “declinist” Shared effort with allies; careful Withdraw troops; local allies pay; consult and enlarge
selection of commitments; U.S. as the engagement;
“primus inter pares”; e.g., Clinton e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo

4. “contingency” U.S. as global balancing wheel; no Respond to crisis after it develops; e.g., Somalia or
geopolitical code; every situation Kosovo.
requires “ad hoc” response.

5. “Eagle triumphant” Globalist; force without diplomacy; “Be prepared”; continued high military expenditure.
world still dangerous; Cold War style
geopolitics; Pentagon view most
important.

6. “world of regions” Identify key regions; regionalist view; Focus on West and Central Europe; Middle East;
focus on places that are important to North-east Asia.
U.S. welfare; money, allies and troops.

7. “anti-imperialism” Focus on future power emergence; Continue containment of Russia and China; expand
exceptionalism; Russia as a threat; e.g., NATO.
NATO strategists

Paradigms are not as separate and non-overlapping as a simple list might suggest. Instead, one can

find examples of different paradigms in the speeches of policy-makers in the same U.S. administration and

over time, from the same politicians. Many foreign-policy speeches will contain elements of different

paradigms in order to try to bolster the public support for the action. President Ronald Reagan, for example,

combined the “eagle triumphant”, “world of regions”, “anti-imperialist”, and “noblesse oblige” paradigms in

his televised addresses in the 1980s that argued for support of the Nicaraguan Contras against the Sandinista

regime.

The first paradigm in Table 1, “noblesse oblige”, takes its title from a report of the Carnegie

Endowment National Commission on America and the World. "Twice before in this century, the United

7
States and our allies triumphed in a global struggle. Twice before we earned the right to be an arbiter of a

post-war world. This is our third chance."14 The general view of the American "great and good" (the Eastern

foreign policy establishment) is that "only the United States can do it"; ultimately, only the U.S. can save the

various peoples of the world from disasters of their own making. After a lot of dithering, the “noblesse

oblige” theme was prominent in President Clinton's 1995 national address at the time of the decision to send

troops to Bosnia; "it's the right thing to do".15 A similar perception seemed to have propelled the surprising

intervention of the Bush administration in Somalia at Christmas 1992. As trial balloons, some Clinton

appointees have suggested that there are some places of the world where the U.S. should not be taking the

interventionist lead (e.g. West Europeans should be in the vanguard in Bosnia and Kosovo) and only after the

allies have dropped the ball, should the U.S. step in. Current examples of the idealist paradigm in action are

the direct American promotion of peace negotiations in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and Kosovo.

The supreme example of this kind of “obligations and burdens” rhetoric and approach to world

affairs is President John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in January 1961 when he promised that the United

States would "pay any price, bear any burden" in defence of American values and support of "freedom".

Earlier, in February 1947, President Truman declared that the U.S. would help any anti-Communist

movements anywhere in the world that requested American help. The approach relies very much on the

notion of American exceptionalism and the support for programs and policies that expand the number of

countries that share American principles of free markets and free, democratic societies. Dick Arney

(Republican majority leader) in June 1995 (proposing a much reduced foreign aid bill) said "In the history of

the world, no nation has ever so much loved freedom that their nation's people have been willing to risk their

own peace to secure freedom for other nations.... We are willing to put some part of our treasury behind the

dream of freedom and peace for all the world's people" But rhetoric and reality frequently do not match. The

debate about foreign aid is a good example. Recent surveys show that American respondents believe that it

accounts (on average) for 15% of the federal budget. The actual figure is about 1% and interestingly, the

average level of support, according to the survey respondents, should be 5%.16

8
 In the U.S., the level of interest and concern with foreign questions is now at an all-time low since

World War II. Normally over 10% will cite a foreign policy issue as a response to the question "What do

you think is the most important problem facing the country today?" The most recent figure is 2%. On the

other hand, 65% of the respondents to a recent Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll believe that the

U.S. should play "an active role" in world affairs.17 Since the “obligations” can occur in any region of the

world, there is no specific geopolitical code associated with this paradigm. Instead, U.S. reach stretches to all

corners of the earth, even to previously invisible (in the U.S. public consciousness) states such as Somalia.

The second paradigm is often associated with Pat Buchanan, the right-wing Republican Presidential

candidate noted for his opposition to the North American Free Trade Area and other perceived

infringements on U.S. autonomy. We can ascribe this paradigm as “anti-internationalism” and its catch

phrase seems to be “no aid, no casualties”. With deep and wide support in the Republican party beyond the

right-wing, the world-view is deeply suspicious of international institutions and especially of the United

Nations. While some Americans, especially the militias, are rabidly suspicious of non-American agencies and

actors and can be stereotyped as "know-nothings", the paradigm goes beyond isolationism. As noted by

Lawrence Eagleburger, former Under-Secretary of State "Isolationism means a pox on both your houses,

don't get involved. I don't think that is what most (Americans) are. They have no real knowledge (of foreign

affairs). They don't care about it. They're focused on domestic problems".18 The suspicious basis of this

paradigm is well illustrated by the statement by Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX), a former Presidential candidate,

on foreign aid. "The U.S. is like a little rich kid in the middle of a slum with a cake, handing out slices yet

receiving in return resentment rather than gratitude." He proposed, instead, that the U.S. keep the cake but

share the recipe of democracy and market economics.

The liberal Democratic faction is also not immune from similar views. Another former presidential

candidate, Rev. Jesse Jackson, has complained of the cost to U.S. taxpayers of the stationing of American

troops overseas and how the money could be better used for domestic programs. One result has been the

successful pressure on countries to pay part of the costs of the stationing of troops in their country. The

9
practical geopolitical output of this approach to foreign affairs is strong loyalty to a few favourite states

(Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan) and neglect of the rest since either they do not register as

important places in the U.S. geopolitical orbit or they are rich enough to pay substantially for the stationing of

U.S. troops (Japan, S. Korea and Germany).

The third paradigm starts from a "declinist” view that sees the U.S. as having slipped from its

immediate post-war dominance, needing the support of allies to promote its global aims. Though the

evidence for decline is mixed and it is clear that the U.S. stands alone as the military hegemon,19 there is a

widespread perception that the U.S. can no longer afford the “burdens” that President Kennedy was willing

to assume in 1961. Consequently, the U.S. promotes a shared global leadership. As a leading paradigm in

Washington DC during the Clinton administration, it holds that the U.S. is still "primus inter pares". Since the

global conditions have changed with the growing relative parity of many of the U.S. allies and the collapse of

the Soviet Union, the paradigm holds that other countries of the Western camp must share in the global costs

of management of the world-system in the interests of democracy and free enterprise. The clearest

expression of this position was former Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s enunciation of four principles.

"First, America must lead. Second, we must seek to maintain productive political and economic relations

with the world's most powerful states. Third, we must adapt and build lasting institutions to enhance

cooperation. Fourth, we must support democracy and human rights to advance our interests and our

ideals."20 Like the “noblesse oblige” paradigm, the declinist perspective has no specific geopolitical code

though events in countries close to the U.S. and in Europe attract more attention.

The notion of "shared leadership" in a kind of regionalised world has been mentioned many times,

especially in connection to Bosnia. For over two years, 1993-1995, Clinton administration officials claimed

that this conflict was intrinsically a "European question" and the European states should take the lead in

resolving the conflict. In the US, idealists called for more U.S. actions to stop the fighting and for open

support for the Bosnian government at a time when the UN and European Union negotiators were trying to

ensure a cease-fire. The "declinist school" has been heavily criticised by the “American Firsters”, who believe

10
that this approach relies too heavily on "multilateral institutions" of whom they are deeply suspicious.

However, the overwhelming majority of Americans (74%) believe that "the U.S. should play a shared

leadership role." 21 The eventual cease-fire in Bosnia in 1995, propelled by U.S. air bombing and U.S.-

European ground troops, is typical of the approach to crises that will likely emanate from this paradigm.

The fourth paradigm does not start from a fixed position but treats each situation de nova. Each

situation is viewed as “contingent” and therefore, no geopolitical code can be predetermined. Dismissed as

“adhocery” by critics such as former Senator and Republican Presidential nominee, Robert Dole, it is partially

a result of the evident impasse in Washington DC as Congressional power in foreign affairs continues to

grow. Until World War I, Congress was hardly visible in foreign affairs as such issues were considered

essentially to be a presidential prerogative. After blocking U.S. entry to the League of Nations in the early

1920s, Congress began to become increasingly more assertive. Despite President Bush's claim of a “New

World Order” at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the current American administration is visibly dismayed by

the chaotic nature of the world system in all its varied regional manifestations. The foreign policy outcome is

thus a kind of "contingency" paradigm rather than an imposition of some sort of global vision on the

complex world mosaic. For the first two years of the Clinton administration, the President was focussed on

domestic affairs and so was the public. The phrase “It’s the economy, stupid” echoed through the 1994 re-

election campaign. Lawrence Eagleburger said it best in 1991, after the U.S. was victorious in the Gulf War,

"it (the U.S.) finished the war out of breath." The contingency paradigm can be considered as an extension of

the previous declinist view that assumes that local “policemen” will resolve regional issues and only after they

fail, will the U.S. step in when the conditions and events demand. Somalia and Bosnia are good examples of

this progression as these situations were viewed in the U.S. as humanitarian crises as a direct result of UN

failures. The U.S. came riding to the rescue after other options expired, and therefore, no geopolitical code is

needed. The actions of the U.S. in this regard are those of a “lite power, with a lot of airy rhetoric in its

diplomacy and not much kick.”22

11
 The fifth paradigm can be termed “eagle triumphant” and offers a globalist perspective on a

“dangerous world”. It portrays a continued Cold War-style geopolitics accompanied by high military

expenditures. It retains a classic “force without diplomacy" policy, which can be as ineffective as "diplomacy

without force", supposedly the dominant foreign policy instrument of the early years of the Clinton

administration. As a blunt foreign policy instrument, the globalist view is not now in vogue in Washington

and its most visible recent expression was the sounding of the “triumphalist” notes at the end of the Gulf

War (victory parades etc). The “Vietnam Syndrome” (the public opinion restraint on U.S. military actions)

was supposedly ended at the end of the Gulf War when President George Bush declared: "We have finally

kicked the Vietnam syndrome". But the Somalia episode questions whether the Vietnam syndrome has

indeed been kicked.23 Use of cruise missiles (as in the August 1998 attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan) is

especially attractive to the proponents of the globalist paradigm as it offers power projection without

casualties. The political instability in the former Soviet Union and continuing civil strife in over 40 locations

provides “evidence” for the dangerous world perspective. But without a clear and consistent presence of an

archenemy, like the Soviet Union during the five decades of the Cold War, this paradigm is hardly credible or

sustainable. The geopolitical code associated with the globalist paradigm is global in scope but differentiated

by the relative importance of the allies and foes of the United States. The geographic externalities of foreign

policy actors in these states are explicitly considered and the code does not differ much from that of the

Reagan presidency in the 1980s.

A sixth paradigm offers a regionalist alternative to the globalist view and identifies the key regions of

Europe, Middle East and North-east Asia as places most important to the United States. This regionally-
24
differentiated world view harks back to the perspective of George F. Kennan in his "X" article in 1947. It

is especially neglectful of the rest of the Third World and is motivated by the major concerns that were

identified in a recent national survey. Key threats to the U.S. were identified as nuclear attack (72% named

this item), high immigration (72%) and international terrorism (69%). Asked to identify the places where the

U.S. has a “vital interest”, respondents in 1994 listed Japan (85%), Saudi Arabia (83%), Russia (79%), Mexico

12
(76%), Canada (76%), Great Britain (69%) and China (68%) as the top seven countries whilst states such as

Egypt (45%), France (39%), Ukraine (35%) and Poland (31%) were well down the list. Four regions matter

consistently on the surveys - North-east Asia (the two Koreas, Japan, China); the Middle East (Saudi Arabia

above all other states including Israel); Europe, both Central (including Russia) and Western; and the

Caribbean, including Mexico.25 The rest of the world has little importance except as "emerging markets" for

U.S. products. Senator R. Dole expressed the linkage between important regional interests and U.S.

welfare.26 For him, the core interests of the U.S. are “preventing the domination of Europe by a single

power; maintaining a balance of power in East Asia; promoting security and stability in our hemisphere;

preserving access to natural resources especially in the energy heartland of the Persian Gulf; strengthening

international free trade and expanding U.S. access to global markets; and protecting American interests and

properties overseas.” The continued centrality of Europe, including Eastern Europe, in this paradigm is a

mainstay of a differentiated geopolitical code and recognises both global complexities and the varied

relevance of foreign places to the United States.

The final paradigm in Table 1 returns to a world of “great powers” and treats the United States as the

leader of the Western bloc coming into conflict with a resurgent Russia and an assertive China. In a sense, it

is a return to the bipolar world order of the Cold War years, but the identification of the “other” is not yet

revealed. In any case, it would require ringing the opponent with allies and a containment ring. With the

growing uncertainty of the success of the economic and political transitions in Russia and the growing belief

that Russia is a “third world country with nuclear weapons”, there is ample opportunity for a return of the

"anti-Sovietism" of the Cold War years. This scenario is even more plausible if the Russian leaders strongly

favoured by the U.S. (the cabal gathered around President Yeltsin) fail to win continued support of the

population and are replaced in an election or a coup d’etat. This alarmist view of Russia is predicated on the

belief that contemporary Russia is the inheritor of the expansionist Russian tradition of hundreds of years. It

is especially concerned to push NATO expansion to the borders of Russia despite the strong opposition of

Russians of all political stripes. It anticipates Cold War redux and has a geopolitical code based on a bipolar

13
and simple world order. In a return to containment, the U.S. should fit countries into a geopolitical code that

expresses again the half-moon of the Cold War distribution of American support and emphasis.

Various commentators trying to understand the foreign policy of the United States in the post Cold

War years have typically noted the lack of clarity and consistency. Examining the geopolitical codes of

Madeline Albright, Clinton’s second Secretary of State, Jan Nijman notes that, in comparison to American-

born policy-makers, those of European origin (Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Albright) have a

more nuanced, cynical and less idealist perspective.27 A British journalist, Martin Walker, dismissed the

Clinton administration’s foreign policy as the “geopolitics of casual sex” claiming that it involved the

“promiscuous and irresponsible use of U.S. military force without lasting commitment.” Force would only be

used in places where quick, casualty-free wins would be certain.28 Recent cruise missiles attacks on

Afghanistan and Sudan (“force without diplomacy or casualties”) supports Walker’s contention.

Major foreign policy debates have not been prominent in Washington or more broadly in the

American body politic since the end of the Cold War. Domestic issues have not only dominated political

debate but the sense of peace and security induced by lack of a visible and sustained threat to Americans at

home has not been undermined by terrorist threats to U.S. citizens and troops overseas or from so-called

“rogue states” such as Iraq, North Korea or Libya. While the military budget and overseas troop numbers

are down significantly in the past decade (a decrease of about one-third, from an expenditure of 375 billion

dollars (1995 dollars) to 260 billion dollars).29 U.S. force levels in East Asia (about 100,000 personnel, mainly

in Japan and South Korea) are to be maintained, as are those in Europe (nearly 100,000 plus amphibious

forces). The objective, however, remains to be “capable of prevailing in two nearly simultaneous regional

conflicts” in the words of the 1998 U.S. Department of Defense Budget Statement.

Geopolitical Codes and Eastern Europe.

14
As domestic events in the United States continue to dominate public attention, East Europeans jockey for

geopolitical positioning in international fora. The impending division of Europe into a “fast-track”

incorporation into the Western institutions of the European Union and NATO versus “the others”, who are

either put into long membership queues (the fate of Turkey for over a decade) or deemed not to have the free

markets and polities necessary for membership of the “West”, is widely anticipated. A recent visit by an East

European leader to the EU summit in Vienna clarifies the risks, strategies, options and obstacles inherent in

the pending classification of countries as eligible and ineligible. President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine, like

other East European leaders, sees EU membership as “an absolute priority for Ukraine” and wants Ukraine

to become an associate member of the EU immediately, an option that would reduce tariffs on Ukrainian

exports to the EU. For his part, Kuchma tried to portray Ukraine as making steady progress towards a

market economy. Significantly, Kuchma opposed a new visa regime on the Polish-Ukrainian border that

would treat Ukrainians in the same way as Belarussians and Polish border guards currently treat Russians.

Poland, already firmly in the queue for both EU and NATO membership, is evidently part of “Europe” and

Kuchma complained that “the trouble does exist and it troubles us from the point of view of this new

splitting of Europe”. Further, Kuchma emphasised Ukraine’s non-aligned status with respect to NATO

enlargement but believed that Ukraine must “move to Euroatlantic structures and the EU as the only

alternative to a return to the past.” 30

Fears and aspirations such as Kuchma’s are found from Tallinn to Sofia. To strengthen the case, the

depth and length of the European legacy of each country is stressed in the new history and geography texts
31
now appearing. In Ukraine, rapprochement with Poland and the other central European states is viewed as

an intermediate step towards incorporation into the West and towards separation from Russia. In contrast,

the states emerging from the former Austro-Hungarian empire stress their Western democratic credentials

and fear that the economic problems of the countries to the east might be contagious. Thus, they work to

preserve their differences with Ukraine.32 Overlooked in the triumphalism and joy that accompanied the

destruction of the Iron Curtain, the important boundary that separated the Soviet Union from the other East

15
European states remains largely intact, with barbed-wire fences and severe restrictions on the movements of

goods and people. The post-Soviet governments in Belarus and Ukraine have also maintained control of the

border bottlenecks to generate tariffs and customs duties and engaged in intensive struggles with local power

elites for control of the lucrative grey trade.33

For geopolitical students, of course, this debate about the character and orientation of the east

European states elicits an overwhelming sense of déjà vu. East Europe is a classic borderland in two senses.

At the macro-scale, “Europe’s” limits are generally believed to lie somewhere between the Vistula and the

Dnieper, as seen prominently in Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis.34 But at the meso-scale within the

region, there are almost innumerable limological uncertainties because of centuries of turmoil, settlement,

ethnic cleansing, state-formation and treaties.35 Applebaum, in a brilliant travel book, notes that at the peace

conferences after World War I, borders were to be rationally drawn through plebiscites, treaties, and border-

demarcation. In the end, however, “borders in the borderlands were drawn by force. During the five-year

course of the Russian civil war, no less than eleven armies…fought for possession of Ukraine.”36 The

linkage between the macro-geopolitics of great powers and the micro-geopolitics of contested territories was

clearly made by Karl Haushofer; promoting his notion of “moveable frontiers”. 37 He perceived borders as

temporary battle-lines that moved depending on the relative strengths of the competing neighbouring states.

Consequent on the weakening of empires (as happened to Germany and Russia in World War I), the

borderlands would be able to express their own cultures and identities. There now exists a “minority-free”

zone of states where minorities constitute less than five percent of national totals. The zone now covers 15

states (instead of six in 1910), and forms a compact region from the Netherlands to Hungary and from

Norway to Slovenia. Conversely, the number of minorities in the European states (Atlantic to Urals) is now

150, 40% higher than it was in 1910 as increasing numbers of states have generated more minorities left on

the wrong side of the boundaries.38

The apposition of land-powers to sea-powers has a century-long legacy in political geography, though

Halford Mackinder traced it back to classical writings of Greeks and Persians. Like Mackinder, (“who

16
commands eastern Europe commands the Heartland”39), Fairgrieve identified east Europe as a buffer zone.

Fairgrieve applied the “buffer zone” principle, developed by Lord Curzon, based on personal experience in

Central Asia and the principle of separating the Russian and British empires. Before and after World War I,

Eastern Europe was promoted as a buffer to separate the German and Russian empires. Popularised as the

“crush zone” by Fairgrieve, the zone of small states in eastern Europe, though separating the two big states,

was unstable and precarious after its own fashion. “With the organization of the heartland and the sea

powers, a crush zone of small states has gradually come into existence between them…. With sufficient

individuality to withstand absorptions, but unable or unwilling to unite with others to form any larger whole,

they remain in the unsatisfactory position of buffer states, precariously independent politically, and more

surely dependent economically. This zone of states… has included Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,

...the Balkan states….Central Europe, unorganized and broken into small and antagonistic communities,

essentially belongs to the crush zone, but organized and powerful is in a very different position.”40 Turning

the idea of the buffer zone on its head, Saul Cohen has recently argued that Eastern and Central Europe can

be an emerging Gateway region, a transitional zone that could facilitate contact and interchange between the

two realms (Maritime and Continental).41

The boundaries of “Europe” have been gradually moving to the east since 1900. The Russian

Empire first and the Soviet Union later were unable to make the imperial project stick in the Central

European area and the end result was a proliferation of small states west of Russia. “The territory of Russia
42
is now smaller than it has been at any time since the late seventeenth century.” Anticipating Huntington’s

“clash of civilizations”, the Germanophile geopolitiker, Rudolf Kjellén, referred to the divide between

Europe and Russia as the “Great Cultural Divide” and talked about a union of small Central European states

under German leadership (German-Slavic Union of States) sitting in opposition to the Russian empire.43 For

many westernised Russians, this sort of divide is particularly troublesome. Vladimir Lukin, former Chairman

of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma noted that “the already tense situation is

aggravated by the attempts of some presumptuous circles in the Ukrainian political elite to draw a new de facto

17
border between the West and the East – somewhere along the Don River as the ancient Greeks did – thus

making Ukraine into some kind of ‘front line of Western civilization.”’44

Various geopolitical models for ordering international relations have been proposed since the end of

the Cold War and assorted geopolitical codes emanate from their spatial expressions. Among the most

interesting is the replacement of the bipolar world of the Cold War by “a power-political hierarchy with its

centre in Brussels – or perhaps in several major West European capitals – with concentric circles extending

outwards from the central West European cosmos to the increasingly chaotic regions in the periphery. This

interpretation sees the “Friend-Foe” divide replaced by a “Cosmos-Chaos” divide separating the cosmos of

the EU or NATO from the chaotic Eastern Europe and Russia. In relation to the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), Russia also appears as a cosmos and Moscow as the centre, with concentric zones

of dominance and influence.45 Unlike the Cold War years, the “other” is not an implacable foe but “chaos”,

more threatening in many respects because the expectation and norms of the great power geopolitical games

do not apply. The geopolitical code of EU and NATO expansion is thus not territorial-aggrandisement, as is

normally the goal of geopolitical manoeuvrings, but instead promoted an economic and political agenda, to

be close to the centre – Brussels – and thus close to the favoured states of central and eastern Europe.

Russia, above all, constitutes the chaotic alternative and if Europe turns its back on the

Orthodox/Eurasian/Russian world, we move firmly to a “cold peace.”46

Viewed from the east, the debate over NATO membership and the associated delimitation of the

“West” has had the appearance of a one-sided discussion. Though the United States and the other NATO

states issued numerous assurances that enlargement was not directed towards containing Russia, Russian

public opinion was not convinced and the suspicions of NATO intentions have reached across the

ideological divides. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, one general perspective and four broad

geopolitical tendencies can be identified in Russia. The idea of Russia as a Eurasian country (a world onto

itself, neither east nor west) is growing beyond its traditional adherents.47 The grand debate in Russia about

whether Russia is part of the European-Western world or the centre of a separate Eurasian sphere has

18
generated four opinion blocks. The “westerners”, such as Vladimir Lukin, want to be part of the Atlantic-

European community though the opponents (nationalists) see westernism as the root of Russia’s problems

(“neo-democrats” in the language of Brzezinski and Sullivan). The perspectives of the centrists and

Communists are less dogmatic but veer towards the western and the Eurasian ideologies, respectively.48 A

shared belief that NATO enlargement institutionalises a new European wall and brings it closer to Russia’s

border links the otherwise-disparate perspectives.49

The western debate about NATO enlargement, short and cursory as it was, took little account of

Russian divergent opinions or the historical background of east-central Europe. Its proponents stressed the

benefits to the alliance and to the three countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) selected from

the list of applicants and would-be aspirants, while continuing to promise that other countries can join in the

future. A crystallisation of geopolitical codes was expected during the NATO enlargement debate, especially

in the United States, but the debate seems to have no lasting impact in an era of “parachute journalism.” As

will be argued in the next section, a strenuous avoidance of geopolitical metaphors in the U.S. limited the

NATO expansion debate to costs (economic and military), the support for new democracies, and new roles

for NATO. In a time of no obvious external threats to American citizens, it is difficult to gain the sustained

attention of the public and the politicians to foreign policy matters. The NATO enlargement vote in the

U.S. Senate was overwhelmingly positive but the legacy of the decision will extend significantly, far more than

the focus of the debate.

American Geopolitical Codes, the NATO Debate and the Legacy of Geopolitics.

As agreed by NATO members in 1995, prospective member states had to meet four criteria for admission,

including a) demonstrating adherence to democracy, b) accepting Alliance principles, including mutual

defence assistance, c) showing a capability and readiness to contribute to NATO’s security functions, and d)

bearing the responsibilities of NATO membership, including any necessary increases in military spending.

19
States were invited to apply for possible membership and eleven countries (Albania, the Czech Republic,

Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia

and Slovenia) entered into dialogue with the NATO partners. Ultimately, three states (Czech Republic,

Hungary and Poland) were accepted for membership in 1999.

In a report to the U.S. Congress in February 1997 on the “rationale, benefits, costs and implications”

of the enlargement of NATO, the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs of the State Department made

the case for NATO expansion into the “crush zone” of east-central Europe. Among the myriad of benefits

of expansion were listed “the broader goal of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe.” Other benefits

to the West that were specifically identified were “democratic reforms”, a “stronger defence capability”,

“improved burden-sharing”, a “better environment for trade, investment and economic growth”, and

“improved relations among the region’s states”. Of the total costs of expansion, European allies would be

expected to pay $18-$23 billion over 10 years whilst the U.S. would be expected to pick up about $9-$12

billion in additional costs. The report to Congress stressed the minimal costs to the American taxpayer of

NATO expansion and it also downplayed any extra financial burdens that might be placed on the applicant

countries. The report dismissed the opposition of the Russian government and people by stressing that the

expansion was not directed against any one country but was designed to assure the stability and democracy of

East-central Europe. “Thus far, Moscow has pursued a two-tracked policy. On the one hand, the Russian

government and political elite continue to voice opposition to enlargement. On the other hand, President

Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Primakov and other senior Russian officials are now engaging in an intensive

dialogue with the U.S., other key allies and NATO about the enlargement process and prospects for

developing the NATO-Russia relationship”.50 The report further asserted that Russian public opinion was

relatively indifferent to the issue of NATO expansion.

Fundamentally, the pro-enlargement argument was based on the “New Strategic Concept” for

NATO developed in 1991 which “moved beyond the Cold War NATO stress on positioned forward defense

to place a new emphasis on the development of multinational force projection, supported from extended

lines of communication and relying on deployable and flexible logistics support capabilities for crisis
20
management operations. Since then, NATO has taken steps to put these ideas into practice. It has led to the

military mission in former Yugoslavia”.51 Only a half-page in the report was devoted to the wider

geopolitical implications of the expansion under the heading “Putting geopolitical costs in perspective”. In

this section, the main emphasis was on the message that failure to expand would deliver to the NATO

applicants, including the assertion that such an action “would falsely revalidate the old and now-arbitrary

divisions of the Cold War at a time when Western policy is committed to overcome them. The resulting

sense of isolation and vulnerability would be destabilizing to the region.”52

Numerous critics in the West of NATO enlargement have also generally avoided a geopolitical

argument, emphasising instead the economic, cultural, military and strategic costs. Amongst the anti-

enlargement arguments were a) the increased nuclear danger because of the failure of the Russian Duma to

ratify the START II treaty, b) the increased military costs of forces’ integration to the new members (Czech

Republic, Hungary and Poland) and to the United States, c) confusion in the NATO mission as it switches

from a North Atlantic to a North American/West and Central European alliance, d) the alienation of

populations in countries not offered membership (Bulgaria, Rumania, the Baltic states), e) the strengthening

of the anti-West factions in Russia, and f) the further alienation of Russia as future NATO expansion is

planned in parts of the former Soviet Union. 53

The geopolitical argument, that NATO enlargement risks the delimitation of a new dividing line in

Europe, was made most forcibly by George F. Kennan. On one side of a new geopolitical divide would be

the 19 members of NATO and on the other side, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. With future expansion plans

for the Baltic states, this division could become even more controversial because of the presence of ethnic

Russians in these states and the growing sense of encirclement that would undoubtedly grow in Russian

political circles and the subsequent growing appeal of the anti-West blocs. Kennan called NATO expansion

the “most fatal error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.54 As Nijman argues persuasively, the

current U.S. administration under the leadership of Secretary of State Madeline Albright, a native of the

Czech Republic, has deliberately avoided a geopolitical quarrel and moved the debate instead to geography, that

21
the new members are part of a democratic, capitalist, historic Europe.55 What was most noticeable was the a-

historic nature of the NATO discussion in the United States and the stress on geopolitical traditions by the

pro-enlargement Central European émigrés, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, stood out

dramatically.56

As was pointed out earlier in this paper, the “crush zone” of East-Central Europe figured

prominently in the geopolitical codes of the great powers from the late nineteenth-century to 1945. After a

half-century of relative obscurity due to the clear domination of the Soviet Union in the region, the

geopolitical strategists once again have the chance to consider Mitteleuropa in all its regional dimensions.

Whilst Russian strategists and political leaders clearly want to keep Central Europe as a neutral or transition

zone, the West in the guise of NATO wants to incorporate the region firmly into the European world.

Rather than accepting or even debating the proposition that the area between the Oder and the Dnieper has

always been a “shatterbelt” or “crush zone”, Western leaders, like Madeline Albright, claim that NATO

expansion into this region returns it to Europe, in effect releasing the “occident kidnappé”, in Milan Kundera’s

phrase.57 The near-total avoidance of geopolitical language and concepts can be viewed as both clever and

short-sighted; historical geopolitical memories in the region may eventually undermine the anti-historic

decision to expand NATO or at least, throw up challenges sown by the geopolitical fragments that continue

to reside in the region.

22
 Conclusions

Gertjan Dijkink defines a geopolitical vision as “any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and

other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective

mission or foreign policy strategy.”58 Both Dijkink and David Campbell argue that there is a pervasive

connection in U.S. foreign policy between the fear of disunity at home and the fear of unrest abroad in

countries and regions in which the U.S. has a strategic interest.59 The end of the Cold War has clouded the

clarity of a divide between self and other. Conservative American commentators decry the resulting “hollow

hegemony” as the U.S has “lost faith in its own ideals.”60 To the average American, the world appears more

confusing, chaotic and unruly than ever before and no amount of U.S. foreign aid or military assistance

appears to be able to bring it to order.

For scholars writing in the critical geopolitical tradition, the foreign policy of the United States

provided an easy foil in the years of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War dilemmas posed by the bloody

events in Bosnia, Chechnya and other nationalist battlegrounds, the United States has been caught between

intervention, now promoted by humanitarians to prevent more “holocausts” and isolationism, supported by

most of the public who are fearful of another Vietnam-style “quagmire.”61 The lack of consensus is clearly

reflected in the menu of geopolitical codes that are currently on offer (Table 1). As a consequence of the

uncertain global role for the United States, critical geopolitical works have become less “critical” and more

speculative. As the foreign policy ground keeps shifting and geopolitical debate is assiduously avoided, critics

of U.S. foreign policy finds themselves with little recourse except either to bemoan the lack of attention to

foreign events on the part of a great power or to try to comprehend an erratic policy.

Classic geopolitical concepts, such as the “crush zone” or “shatterbelt”, do not change meaning or

location, except over the long haul. The absence of geopolitical memory, now endemic in the U.S. foreign

policy establishment, requires that political geographers explain the importance of geopolitical precedent and

regional legacies. No place has a more troubled and prominent history of local and international conflict than

23
Eastern Europe and the attempts to patch over the legacy of these wars through the extension of NATO to

the Polish eastern border does not resolve the issue of where Europe ends. With the Ukrainian establishment

clamouring that their country is (historically) an integral part of Europe and with future plans to extend

NATO to the Baltic states, a new geopolitical divide seems destined to appear on either the western or

eastern border of Ukraine. The future geography of “Europe” thus remains undecided and there appears

little chance that it will ever include the “unruly” Russia. In this historical debate, the U.S. administration has

avoided taking a stand whilst sweeping away out of sight the geopolitical debris of past wars and the

geopolitical challenges of contemporary foreign relations.

24
 NOTES

1
This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.

2
A. Miller, “Europe’s East or East of Europe.” (Vostok Evropa ili na vostok iz Evropa). Pro et Contra 3, no.

2 (1998), p.5. (in Russian).

3
In this paper, I will refer to the region between the Oder and the Dnieper by various names. Though the

term “Eastern Europe” is most-widely used in English to describe the area, other terms that are commonly

used include “East-Central Europe”, “Mitteleuropa” and “Central Europe”. By most accounts, the region

includes the former Communist countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,

Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania and the three Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania). Though

physically part of the Oder-Dnieper world, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad is typically not included in the

region and neither are the Balkan states of the former Yugoslavia and Albania.
4
The geopolitical maneuverings of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World during the

Second Cold War, 1979-1985, are described in J. O’Loughlin, “World-power competition and local conflicts

in the Third World.” In R.J. Johnston and P.J.Taylor (eds) A World in Crisis. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986),

pp. 289-332.
5
The concept of “geopolitical order” is elaborated in P.J. Taylor, “Geopolitical world orders.” In P.J. Taylor

(ed) The Political Geography of the Twentieth Century (London: Belhaven Press, 1993), pp. 33-61.
6
Among these studies are H.J. Mackinder. Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction.

London: Constable, 1919; K. Haushofer. Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung. Berlin: Karl

Vowinckel Verlag, 1927; I. Bowman. The New World. Yonkers on Hudson, NY: World Book Company, 1921;

and J. Fairgrieve. Geography and World Power. London: University of London Press, 1915.

25
7
For examples of state-centred geopolitical analysis, the reader can look at any issue of Strategic Review,

Journal of Strategic Studies or any of the main foreign affairs journals, like Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy,

Orbis, World Policy Journal, Washington Quarterly or International Organization.

8
George F. Kennan was a notable exception to this statement. In this opposition to NATO expansion,

Kennan emphasised the continuities of Russian fears of encirclement, a fear that he had first highlighted in

his famous “X” article, “The sources of Soviet conduct.” Foreign Affairs 25, 566-582.

9
For the thesis about the “clash of civilizations”, see S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the

Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

10
For studies of the “mental maps” of U.S. leaders, see A. Henrikson, “The geographical mental maps of

U.S. foreign policy makers.” International Political Science Review 1 (1980), 495-530 and J. O’Loughlin and R. J.

Grant “"The Political Geography of Presidential Speeches, 1946-87." Annals, Association of American

Geographers 80 (1990), 504-530.

11
The definition is from P.J. Taylor, Political Geography: World-system, Nation-state and Locality. 3rd ed. London:

Longman, p. 91. Taylor elaborates that a geopolitical code “will have to incorporate a definition of a state’s

interests, an identification of external threats to those interests, a planned response to such threats and a

justification of that response” (p. 64). This concept is similar to that of “image plans” as described by

Henrikson and the term “geopolitical code” was first used by J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1982.

12
The quote is from T. Luke and G. Ô Tuathail, “Global flowmations, local fundamentalisms, and fast

geopolitics: ‘America’ in an accelerating world order.” in A. Herod, G. Ô Tuathail and S. Roberts (eds) An

Unruly World?: Globalization, Governance and Geography. London: Routledge, pp. 72-94
13
S. Brown, “Inherited geopolitics and emergent global real.ities” in E.K. Hamilton (ed) America’s Global

Interests. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989, pp. 166-77 and G.R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy,

1890-1987. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988.

26
14
The quote is the opening lines of “Changing Our Ways: America and the New World” A report by the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, National Commission on America and the New World,

Washington DC, 1992.

15
For details on the dilemma facing the Clinton administration in Bosnia, caught between a “quagmire” and

a “holocaust”, see G. Ô Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. Minneapolis, MN:

University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

16
The figures are reported in S. Kull, “What the public knows, what Washington does’nt.” Foreign Policy no.

101 (Winter 1995-96), p. 109.

17
The figures are reported in J.D. Rosner, “The know-nothings know something.” Foreign Policy no. 101

(Winter 1995-96), p. 124

18
The Eagleburger quote is found in R.S. Greenberger, “Dateline Capitol Hill: The new majority’s foreign

policy.” Foreign Policy no. 101 (Winter1995-96), p. 162.

19
J. O’Loughlin, “Fact or fiction?: The evidence for the relative decline of the U.S., 1966-1991" in C.

Williams (ed) The Geography of the New World Order, London: Belhaven Press and New York: John Wiley, 1993,

pp. 148-180.
20
W. Christopher, “America’s leadership, America’s opportunity.” Foreign Policy no.98 (Spring 1995), p. 8.

21
According to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations poll cited in Kull, op. cit. In a similar poll by the

Wall Street Journal reported in the same article, 72% said that the U.S. should let other countries and the

United Nations take the lead in solving international crises and conflicts.

22
B. Buzan and G. Segal, “The rise of lite powers: A strategy for the postmodern state.” World Policy Journal

Fall 1996, 1-10.

23
Maybe it’s been replaced by a “Somalia syndrome” as a result of the death of 18 U.S. troops in a shootout

in Mogadishu in 1993. After this firefight, U.S. troops were pulled out immediately though the fact that U.S.

troops killed 3,000-5,000 Somalis in that conflict seemed lost on the public with its fetish on U.S. casualties.
27
As noted by Buzan and Segal, op.cit., p. 3 “the weakening of shared identity means that individuals are not as

prepared as in the past to die for their country, although they may be perfectly willing to risk their lives in

dangerous sports or by excesses of consumption” In recent military actions, “America’s impressive

demonstration of high-tech military power was offset by its equally impressive desire to avoid both casualties

and entanglement.” (Buzan and Segal, p. 8).

24
George F. Kennan, op. cit.

25
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys, 1990 and 1994 as reported in Kull, op.cit.

26
R. Dole presents his list in “Shaping America’s global future” Foreign Policy no. 98 (Spring 1995), p. 35.

27
J. Nijman “In search of Madeline Albright’s geopolitical vision.” Geojournal 44, 1999, forthcoming.

28
Cited in Ô Tuathail, op.cit., p. 206. In a similar vein, Ô Tuathail reports the jokes of a late-night television

comedian: ““we do deserts; we don’t do jungles. Or mountains.”

29
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) “Military Expenditure Database” SIPRI

Yearbook, Stockholm: SIPRI, 1998, Chapter 6.

30
The quotes from Leonid Kuchma are reported in N. Hodge, “Kuchma curries European favor, aid”. Kiyiv

Post, October 20, 1998, page 1.

31
V. Kolossov and J. O’Loughlin, “New borders for new world orders: Territorialities at the fin-de-siècle.”

Geojournal, 43, 4 (1999), in press. For a recent example of this kind of geographical placement, see O.

Subtelny, Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. This book firmly places Ukraine in

Europe and Russia in the east. For an example of the new geographical texts, see O. Shablij, Social-Economic

Geography of Ukraine (Sotsialno-ekonomicheskaya geografiya ukrain’i) L’viv: Svit, 1995(in Russian).

32
A. Moshes, “Ukraine’s geopolitical quest: Central and Eastern Europe in Ukraine’s foreign policy”

(Geopoliticheskie iskaniya Kieva: Tsentral’naya I vostochnaya Evropa v politike Ukrain’i) Pro et Contra 3,2

(Spring 1998), p.95-110. (in Russian).

33
T. Warner, “The second Iron Curtain.” Kiyiv Post, October 23, 1998, p. 5.
28
34
S. P. Huntington, op. cit.

35
For a very useful treatment and an analogy, see M. Foucher (ed.) Fragments d”Europe: Atlas de l’Europe

médiane et orientale. Paris: Fayard. 1993.

36
A. Applebaum. Between East and West: Across the Borderlands of Europe. New York: Pantheon Books, 1994, p.

xii.
37
Haushofer, op.cit.
38
V. Kolossov and A. Treivish, “The political geography of European minorities.” Political Geography 17,

1998, 523-24.
39
The full text of the famous Mackinder aphorism is “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;

who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World Island commands the World“. It

was first published in 1919 in Democratic Ideals and Reality.

40
J. Fairgrieve, Geography and World Power. London: University of London Press, 8th ed., 1941, pp. 329-331.

41
S.B. Cohen, “Global geopolitical change in the Post-Cold-War era.” Annals, Association of American

Geographers, 81, 551-580.

42
G. Parker. Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future. London: Pinter Publishers, 1998, p. 92

43
Kjellén, op cit.

44
V. Lukin, “Our security predicament.” Foreign Policy no. 88 (Fall 1992), p. 63.

45
O. Tunander, “Post-Cold War Europe: Synthesis of a bi-polar friend-foe structure and a hierarchic

cosmos-chaos structure?” in O. Tunander, P. Baev and V.I. Einagel (eds) Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe:

Security, Territory and Identity. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications, 1997, p.18.
46
Tunander, op. cit., p. 37. Also see O. Waæ ver, “Imperial metaphors: Emerging European analogies to

pre-nation-state imperial systems” in Tunander, Baev and Einagel, op. cit. p. 67 about the concentric circles

around Brussels.
29
47
See the articles in Z. Brzezinski and P. Sullivan (eds) Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States:

Documents, Data and Analysis. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, especially “Introduction: Last gasp or

renewal?” (pp. 3-9) by Z. Brzezinksi on the Eurasian tradition in Russia. Alexander Solzhenitsyn is a

prominent spokesperson for the Eurasianist perspective.

48
I.B. Neumann, “The geopolitics of delineating ‘Russia’ and ‘Europe’: The creation of the ‘other’ in

European and Russian traditions.” In O. Tunander, P. Baev and V.I. Einagel (eds) Geopolitics in Post-Wall

Europe: Security, Territory and Identity. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications, 1997, pp. 148-150. Brzezinski

and Sullivan use the terms, “neo-democrats”, “national-patriotic”, “pragmatists” and “left extremists” to

designate the same four geopolitical ideologies.

49
Neumann, op. cit., p.171. Y. Borko, “Possible scenarios for geopolitical shifts in Russian-European

relations.” In O. Tunander, P. Baev and V.I. Einagel (eds) Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and

Identity. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 206 reports that public opinion in Russia is highly

variable and is a contrasting mosaic. Most Russians are suspicious of plans for NATO expansion but 33%

were favorable to the EU, while 19% were neutral and only 7% had a negative attitude (Central and Eastern

Eurobarometer , no. 6, 1996).

50
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the

Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications. February 24, 1997, p.

19. The State Department also distributed a glossy 24 page brochure titled The Enlargement of NATO: Why

Adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security. Washington DC,

February 1998. The brochure prominently featured the most widely-known quote by Secretary of State

Albright: “ A larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not

happen.” (October 7, 1997).

51
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, op. cit. ð. 10

52
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, op. cit., p. 9.

30
53
For criticisms of the NATO enlargement, see A. Perlmutter and T.G. Carpenter, “NATO’s expensive trip

east.” Foreign Affairs, 77, no. 1, 1998, 2-6, M Brown, “The flawed logic of NATO expansion.” Survival 37, 34-

52, and P. Kennedy and M. Gorbachev, “The false pretence of NATO expansion.” New Perspectives Quarterly

14, no. 3, 1997, 62-64.

54
G.F. Kennan, “A fatal error.” New York Times, 5 February, 1997, A13.

55
J. Nijman, op. cit.

56
See Z. Brzezinski, “A geostrategy for Eurasia.” Foreign Affairs no. 76, no. 5, 50-71 and The Grand

Chessboard: American Primacy and the Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books, while an early statement on

NATO enlargement was provided by H. Kissinger, “Expand NATO now.” Washington Post, December 19,

1994, A.27.
57
M. Kundera, “Un occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale.” Le Débat 27, no. 11, 2-24.

58
G. Dijkink, National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain. London: Routledge, 1997, p. 11.

59
Dijkink, 1997, 49-57 and D. Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.

Manchester: Manchester University Press.

60
F. Zakaria, “Our hollow hegemony: Why foreign policy cannot be left to the market.” New York Times, 1

November, 1998, 44-45, 47, 74, 80.

61
G. O’Tuathail, op. cit., Chapter 6.

31