An Approach to Dam Safety Assessment

David A. Willms, P.Eng.

Max J. Cronk, P.Eng.
Harvey N. McLeod, P.Eng., P.Geo.
Leonard M. Murray, P.Eng., P.E.

Klohn Crippen Berger Ltd.

Abstract
Following the tailings dam failures at Mount Polley and Fundão, major mining companies have conducted
systematic reviews of their tailings facilities worldwide. KCB has approached several of these assignments
using systematic dam safety assessments. The objective of these dam safety assessments was to strike a
balance between sufficient depth of review to provide positive confirmation on the presence of catastrophic
hazards, and the need to prioritize a large number of dams with varying risk profiles. This paper discusses
the general approach, the protocols, the level of detail, and the rationale for each. Although these
assessments do not replace a dam safety review, they contain many of the same elements and could be
thought of as in-between an audit and a comprehensive dam safety review.

Key elements include: a comprehensive checklist review of dam safety and governance systems, a review
of consequence classification informed by a semi-quantitative dam break calculation, a review of the design
criteria, and simplified calculations to check if the facilities meet the design criteria for stability and water
management.

One of the benefits of approaching a large portfolio of dams in a systematic way, is that it provides the
owners with a baseline to compare and prioritize across multiple sites, and to better put into context the
multiple dam safety inspections and reviews which are typically prepared by a multitude of different
consultants.

A suggestion for improvement of the general tailings facility engineering practice is the development of
design record reports for dams which have a consequence classification equal to or greater than “High”.
The design record report should document the basis for the dam consequence, design criteria, strength
parameters, seismicity, flood parameters, and geochemistry. The consequence classifications should be
informed by a dam break study and the stability analyses for the dams should be updated. The report should
contain key reference information such as site investigation data and cross sections with best known
conditions of the dams.
INTRODUCTION
Following the tailings dam failures at Mount Polley and Fundão, major mining companies have conducted
systematic reviews of their tailings facilities worldwide. This represents a shift in the industry approach,
with a focus on continual improvement, and stewardship facilities that carry environmental and safety risks.
Industry standards of operation in BC and have increased and more attention is being paid to the potential
risks posed by tailings facilities.

The companies who are taking proactive approaches to tailings management should be recognized for their
responsible behaviour; however, for this discussion, the companies are not named due to the many
stakeholders, and sensitive information involved.

KCB has approached several of these assignments using systematic dam safety assessments. The objective
of these dam safety assessments was to strike a balance between sufficient depth of review to provide
positive confirmation on the presence of catastrophic hazards, and the need to prioritize a large number of
dams with varying risk profiles.

There are guidelines for carrying out a comprehensive Dam Safety Review (DSR) in BC published by
APEGBC (now EGBC) in 2014, and in Canada published by the Canadian Dam Association in 2016. There
are also guidelines for carrying out a Dam Safety Inspection (DSI). Guidelines for DSI’s in BC are
published by the Ministry of Energy and Mines (now the Ministry of Mines, Energy, and Petroleum
Resources) in 2013.

RATIONALE / BENEFITS TO INDUSTRY

• Provide a baseline to compare and prioritize across multiple sites.
• Put DSIs and DSRs into context, see the different levels of detail applied and look for ways to
improve them to a common standard.
• Globally track a large portfolio of dams.
• Provide assurance, or confirmation on risk identification and management.

GENERAL APPROACH
A major mining company will typically have a portfolio of water dams and tailings dams, documentation,
and management systems. For a dam safety assessment of the portfolio of dams, the first step is to identify
the scope of the reviews, which for a portfolio of multiple sites, could be organized by region, by site, by
commodity, or by other means. The second aspect of the scope is the focus of the review. E.g., High
consequence dams only, or comprehensively assess all dams. Scope of assessment (how comprehensive,
and what should be assessed).

After confirming the scope, the next step would be to systematically review and catalogue all the available
information for each dam. The catalogue can be used to support the dam safety assessment and can prove
to be a useful tool for dam owners after the assessment is complete.

The next step is to review the geotechnical and hydrotechnical assessments completed to support the dam
design, including slope stability, liquefaction, internal erosion, and flood routing. In parallel with this step,
a data gaps analysis should be completed.

Perform preliminary checks of the geotechnical and hydrotechnical assessments. Use sensitivity analyses
to understand the significance of data gaps and allow for them to be prioritized.

The level of detail can vary, but generally should include a checklist, backed by preliminary or simplified
calculations to provide depth, but without getting overly detailed. Detailed work should be included as
recommendations for future work. For assessments of multiple TSFs over a relatively short timeline, the
individual assessments could be described as “DSR light” or somewhere between and DSI and
comprehensive DSR.

The systematic review process should follow a general pattern of review, site visit, assessment, and follow-
up. For some sites, depending on the owner’s requirements or the risk profile, it may be appropriate to
conduct desktop reviews; however, in our experience, it is usually better for all parties to include a site visit.
This has benefits such as quicker and improved understanding of the site, better communications between
the team members, less effort required to review the documentation.

The approach can be summarized as follows:

• Screening out low risk structures. Decide on a consequence or risk criteria to select dams to review
in more detail. Can use CDA consequence classification or a combination of CDA and owner
specified consequence.
• Semi-quantitative consequence assessment.
• Simplified checks of water management and stability.
• Presenting findings? Observations – set against criteria or protocol vs. the DSR principles.
• Base data review
Review available information and catalogue the information based on discipline for easy future
reference.
Review existing geotechnical and hydrotechnical assessments and designs for comparison with
current state of practice.
Prepare a data summary and reference list.
• Data gap analysis
Compare available data to expectations for the facility.
Assess gaps in understanding of the facility.
• Preliminary analyses
Complete preliminary analyses (high-level) to assess the existing conditions of the structures.
Use sensitivity analyses to assess the importance of the various data gaps.
• Assessment Report
Review the OMS, ERP, and Dam Safety Management Plan (DSMP).
Complete a site visit, interview staff, and review inspection records.
Review consequence classification if available. Complete preliminary consequence
classification if it hasn’t been done yet.
Summarize recommendations.
• Verification Report
Confirm that corrective actions have been completed. Could be visual confirmation and/or
review of documentation.

PROTOCOLS
The checklist or protocols will vary between different engineers and owners, but will generally cover
similar topics. The following sections are an amalgamation of the protocols, workbooks, and checklists that
were used for different evaluations of tailings dam portfolios.

The review should assess the following:

• Design – design basis and adequacy of design, based on available information, designer expertise,
foundation conditions, detailed design and geotechnical stability controls, including water
management and spillway controls.
 • Environment – geochemistry and control of surface water and groundwater discharges to the
environment, and design for risk mitigation on closure.
• Construction (and modification) – materials investigations, specifications, construction completion
reports (QA/QC, as-built drawings, verification testing, construction completion certification),
build timeline and photographs.
• Operation and maintenance – operating and surveillance manuals, operating limits, and
maintenance and inspection procedures.
• Monitoring – instrumentation, adequacy of coverage of dam failure indicators, functionality and
effectiveness, data analysis, reconciliation of actual performance against design.
• Risk profile – the adequacy of the risk assessment to ensure that the causes of failure and required
controls are appropriate given the plausible potential of catastrophic failure modes and that the risk
appropriately reflects the potential consequence of failure and the risk rating.
• Governance – the governance framework for the facility associated with the design, construction,
operation, maintenance and closure of the dam facilities. It includes roles, competencies and
accountabilities, risk assessment reviews, corrective action and incorporates the environmental and
social context.

Governance for Tailings Storage Facility

• The facility and possible expansion areas should be owned or leased by the mine.
• This site should follow and comply with all permits and approvals pertinent to their area.
• The key mine personnel should understand the governing legislation as it applies to them.
• Human, physical and financial resources essential to implementing the tailings facility management
should be defined and allocated.
• There should be a TSF registry to include all tailings dams whether operational or closed.
• The facility should have a management plan for the TSF.
• Each TSF should have a Closure Plan.
• There should be a responsible person for dam safety and to manage the TSF.
• There should be an assigned engineer responsible for the design and safety of the dam.
• Information on dam management should be available, records are maintained, appropriate
information is available for training.
• Procedures are in place to ensure that personnel employed in dam management are competent,
understand the requirements of the facility as it pertains to its risk, controls and impacts.
• Stakeholders (internal and external) are engaged at an appropriate frequency around material risks
and controls associated with the dam.
• Processes are in place to ensure dam integrity is maintained and changes do not introduce new,
unacceptable, and/or unmanaged risks.
• Review processes are in place, consistent with the level of risk.
• Incidents related to dam safety should be reported and acted upon.
• DSRs should be conducted with the frequency dependent on the classification of the dam and the
risk profile.

General for Tailings Storage Facility

• The tailings characteristics/ properties should be understood. This included the geotechnical and
geochemical properties.
• All waste streams that will impact the tailings facility should be included in the design.

Risk Management For the TSF

• An engineering and design risk assessment should be conducted on the dam. This should include a
discussion of critical controls.
 • The potential for human failure associated with catastrophic hazards should be identified.

Failure and Consequence and Dam Classification

• Each dam should have a dam failure impact assessment.
• A dam breach analysis should be conducted for high consequence dams. This is dependent on the
complexity of the topography, does not necessarily have to be a numerical inundation model.
• The dam should be classified in accordance with appropriate guidance (typically CDA).

Closure Plan for the TSF

• The closure plan should address the long-term dam safety and environmental aspects.

Design Standards and Criteria for the TSF

• The jurisdictional requirements and appropriate guidelines should be used for design of the facility
and dams. In some cases, local guidelines are less stringent, in which case, international standards
should be considered.
• The dam consequence should be identified.
• The design criteria should be based on dam consequence classification.

Design for the TSF - Hydrotechnical and Water Management/Treatment

• Appropriate hydrotechnical engineering should be conducted for each TSF.
• A Site-wide water balance should be in place.
• The TSF should have a water treatment system, if required.

Environmental and Groundwater

• Appropriate environmental assessments should be conducted.
• The site should have a surface water monitoring program.
• The site should have a groundwater monitoring program.
• Groundwater seepage through and beneath the dam that could have an adverse effect on the
environment should be prevented.
• If there is contaminated water seeping into the groundwater or surface water, the dam should have
a seepage collection and pump back system.
• The site should have a dust control plan.
• The tailings geochemistry should be understood

Operations and Maintenance for the TSF

• The facility should have an Operations, Maintenance, and Surveillance (OMS) manual/procedures
for the dam.
• For active deposition, the facility storage and dam raising plan should be reconciled on an annual
basis.
• The critical controls for dam safety should be documented and actively implemented.
• There should be a maintenance plan for the dam and supporting equipment (pumps, decant,
spillways, etc.).
• There should be a change management system to address potential changes in the operation.

Public Safety for the TSF

• Public safety measures around the TSF should be implemented and may include: fencing and
signage, security gates, and monitoring/inspections.
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan for the TSF
• The site should have an emergency preparedness and response plan (EPRP).
• The EPRP should be linked to specific dam failure modes.
• The site should test parts of the emergency response plan.

Design of the Dam – Geotechnical

• A thorough geotechnical characterization of the foundation for the dam should be completed.
• The dam design should meet the appropriate key design criteria.
• Detailed design reports to support construction should be prepared for each dam.
• A Data Record report or database of all geotechnical information should be maintained.

Construction of the Dam

• Issued for construction drawings and specifications should be available.
• Appropriate monitoring and supervision should be conducted during construction.
• An as-built/construction records report should be prepared after dam construction is complete that
documents the geotechnical conditions.

Surveillance of the Dam

• There should be a routine surveillance program.
• If there is an instrumentation program, it should be developed and implemented effectively. The
purpose and trigger levels for each instrument should be clearly documented.
• Critical parameters with respect to dam safety are to be monitored
• The monitoring results should be incorporated into designs
• There should be a tracking system to monitor dam safety recommendations.
• The annual DSI should be completed by a qualified person.

SIMPLIFIED CALCULATIONS
The assessments should check the design using simple calculations, and recommend more detailed work if
appropriate.

Stability
The physical stability should be based on the most representative cross sections. The assessment should
include a review of stability, especially in the case of upstream dams, high seismic areas, weak foundations,
and where there has been heavy reliance on assumptions (i.e., lack of site data) regarding the dam cross
section, piezometric surface or the strength of the fills and foundations.

Water Management
Water management – simple calculation of flood volumes based on catchment sizes is a reasonable first
step to assess is the water management design of the facility is adequate. There should be a review of the
capacity of the TSF to manage the design flood. The calculations could be simplified flood routing, spillway
capacity, and freeboard calculations.

Dam Break Assessment

Dam Break Assessment – Fairweather and Flood-Induced Failure modes. Assume the dam fails, but the
mechanism must be credible. Consider conceptual, semi-quantitative dam break assessments as a starting
point. These assessments should not be expected to substitute for quantitative dam breach assessments but
rather illustrate the possible path and potential flows for a dam break, and identify downstream communities
and environment which might be impacted. In general, this can be based on the following simplifying
assumptions:
 1. The water release could have the potential to transport up to 1 m3 of tailings for each m3 of
water. This is based on a similar response due to the Mount Polley failure (2014) in Canada, and
other dam failures. The volume of assumed tailings transport should be reduced for failure
scenarios where there is little opportunity for the water to erode the tailings (e.g., natural
depressions in the ground, limited tailings near the dam, armoured beach surfaces, etc.).
2. Assume a one-hour or half-hour time frame to estimate the average flood flow during the breach,
assuming compacted earth fill dams, and less for sand dams.
3. The tailings slurry would not be constrained due to the progressive erosion and the transport of
tailings by the water. The silty water would flow down existing stream channels and could travel
many kilometers.
4. The runout path will depend on which dam breaches and the local topography. For these
assessment, estimate paths based on satellite imagery (Google Earth) and topographic plans.
5. A residual “mud flow” of saturated tailings could extend several hundred meters downstream
from the dam, typically at a slope of 5%.
6. Liquified tailings, if released, is assumed to flow at a slope of 5%.

FOLLOW-UP ON RECOMMENDATIONS
The assessments generally result in a list of recommendations. These recommendations should be
prioritized, and appropriate actions taken by the mine sites. In most cases, the mine sites should be
encouraged to develop their own corrective actions in response to dam safety recommendations.

Key dam safety issues should be tracked by the owner of the dam portfolio and tracked through a
verification process. Other issues and suggestions for improvement may be better left to the individual sites
to manage. The review consultant should conduct a verification assessment to confirm that the corrective
actions have been implemented properly.

For managing a large portfolio of international dams, it is helpful to have robust tracking systems, and some
companies have developed custom applications to facilitate this. Having good systems takes effort but is
generally worth it for the risk management rewards.

DESIGN RECORD REPORT

A typical problem with legacy dam structures is a lack of design and construction records. This introduces
uncertainty to the owner and the engineers. A suggestion for improvement of the general tailings facility
engineering practice is the development of design record reports that include the known conditions of the
dams and the uncertainties.

Since this requires engineering effort, it may be prudent to prioritize dams which have a CDA (2013)
consequence classification equal to or greater than “High”.

The design record report should document the basis for the dam consequence, design criteria, strength
parameters, seismicity, flood parameters, and geochemistry.

The consequence classifications should be informed by a dam break study and the stability analyses for the
dams should be updated. The report should contain key reference information such as site investigation data
and cross sections with best known conditions of the dams.

CHALLENGES
There are many challenges for mining companies who are managing a large portfolio of dams. These
include:
• Lack of documentation, legacy structures, lack of site investigation.
• Different organization? structures. Often influenced by previous ownership.
 • Different engineering practices between consultants.
• Different engineering practices between regions and countries.
• Different regulatory regimes, need to compare the risks in a consistent way.

REFERENCES
Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of British Columbia (APEGBC)
Professional Practice Guidelines. 2014. “Legislated Dam Safety Reviews in BC” version
V2.0, March 2014.
BC Dam Safety Regulation, (BC Reg 40/2016).
BC Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM). 2013. Guidelines for Annual Dam Safety Inspection
Reports.
Canadian Dam Association (CDA). 2013. Dam Safety Guidelines 2007 – Revised 2013.
Canadian Dam Association (CDA). 2014. Technical Bulletin: Application of Dam Safety
Guidelines to Mining Dams.
Canadian Dam Association (CDA). 2016. Technical Bulletin: Dam Safety Reviews.