7 1 Chase

DISCUSSIONS ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD IN
ANTIQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY COSMOLOGY
MICHAEL CHASE
CNRS, Paris
goya@vjf.cnrs.fr
ABSTRACT: This contribution continues the comparison between ancient and modern beliefs
on scientific cosmology which began in a previous article in this Journal (ΣΧΟΛΗ 5.2
[2011]). I begin with a brief survey of contemporary theories on Big Bang cosmology, fol-
lowed by a study of the cosmological theories of the Presocratic thinker Pherecydes of Syros.
The second part of my paper studies the ramifications of the basic Platonic principle that
bonum est diffusivum sui. I begin by studying the vicissitudes of this theory in the Patristic
thought of Origen, the Arians, and Athanasius. Following Willy Theiler, I suggest that simi-
larities between the views of Origen and the Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry of Tyre may
be traceable to Plotinus' teacher Ammonius Saccas. Finally, following Endress, I study the
way the Arabic translation of some propositions from Proclus' Elements of Theology were
accompanied by interpolated glosses derived from the Christian Neoplatonist John Phi-
loponus, which were designed to make Proclus' thought more acceptable to a creationist,
Monotheistic belief system such as Islam. Philoponus' theories of instantaneous creation
were taken up, thanks to al-Kindi, by the Neoplatonica Arabica, whence they exerted an im-
portant influence on the development of Islamic thought. An Appendix of texts with transla-
tion and bibliography completes the article.
KEYWORDS: creation, cosmology, Big Bang, Pherecydes, Origen, Athanasius, Plotinus,
Porphyry, Ammonius Saccas, Proclus, John Philoponus, al-Kindi, Neoplatonica Arabica.
ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) © M. Chase, 2013

www.nsu.ru/classics/schole
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 21
I. CONTEMPORARY COSMOLOGY AND THE PRESOCRATICS
Quid tamen ante hunc mundum fuerit, aut quid post

mundum erit, iam non pro manifesto multis innotuit.
Yet what existed before this world, and what will exist
after the world, still remains unclear to many.
Origen, De principiis, I Praef. 7, p. 94 Görgemanns / Kapp
In my contributions to these Workshops1 over the last two years, I've tried to give
some indications of the way in which ancient thinkers – philosophers, theologians
and mythologists – sometimes raised questions and provided solutions that paral-
leled those given by modern cosmologists.
The present article continues these studies. I'll start with a very basic and ama-
teurish sketch of contemporary cosmology, before moving on to discuss a potential
precursor to Plato's idea of creation of the world by the Demiurge, in the Presocratic
philosopher Pherecydes of Syros. I will then present a brief excursus into the philos-
ophy of the Christian Church Fathers, before finishing off with a short discussion of
some medieval Arabic texts known as the Plotiniana Arabica.
Here, to begin with, is a very schematic summary of what one might call contem-
porary mainstream views on the origin of the universe.
1. The Big Bang: a brief history

As it is well known, Albert Einstein developed his theories of relativity in the first
decades of the twentieth century (the special theory was published in 1905, the gen-
eral theory in 1915).2 In 1919, the general theory received a spectacular confirmation
when Sir Arthur Eddington travelled to an island of the coast of West Africa during
a total eclipse, and observed that starlight was indeed bent by the sun, just as Ein-
stein had predicted. As far as cosmology was concerned, however, Einstein believed
in an unchanging universe, neither increasing nor decreasing in size, and so, in 1917,
he included in his equations a quantity called the cosmological constant (or rather
“the cosmological term”), which allowed an unchanging universe to be derived
mathematically.3
1
At Novosibirsk University, Siberia, in the context of the project “ΤΕΧΝΗ, Theoretical
Foundations of Arts, Sciences and Technology in the Greco-Roman World”, organized by
the Centre for Ancient philosophy and the classical tradition and sponsored by the Higher
Education Support Program of the Open Society Institute. Cf. Chase 2012.
2
“Special relativity determines the motion of particles in space-time, while general
relativity describes the behavior of space-time itself” (Bojowald 2010, 78). This is not the
place for even a cursory survey of Einstein's theories. For popular-level accounts, see, for
instance, Thorne 1994, 59-129; Lockwood 2005, 23ff.; Davies 1995, 45ff. et passim; Carroll
2010, 67-118.
3
Davies 1995, 135-40; Frank 2011, 158ff. The cosmological constant, which Einstein later
discarded, calling it his ‘greatest mistake’, was to reappear over half a century later in the
22 Discussions on the eternity of the world
As we saw last year (Chase 2012), it was the Russian mathematician Alexander
Friedmann who, in 1922, discovered on the basis of Einstein's equations that the
curvature of the universe's space-time depends on the amount of matter it contains.
We'll see a bit later that this question has a crucial impact on the question of the uni-
verse's eventual destiny. But it was above all Edwin Hubble's discovery in 1929 that
the universe is in fact expanding4 that caused Einstein to withdraw his cosmological
constant and concede that the universe is not static after all. In fact, it was space itself
was expanding, “carrying the galaxies along with it like pennies glued to an expand-
ing rubber sheet”.5
The Belgian priest Georges Lemaître, building on the results of Einstein, Fried-
mann, and Hubble,6 soon developed a theory that led to the current standard view of
a universe emerging from a point7 of infinite density. As late as the 1950s, such
Cambridge cosmologists as Thomas Gold, Hermann Bondi and Fred Hoyle8 were
defending a steady-state theory in which, as Aristotle believed, the universe re-
mained much the same for eternity.9 Since then, the discovery of the cosmic micro-
wave background radiation by Penzias and Wilson in the mid-1960s,10 followed by
evidence obtained in 1998 for the acceleration of the expansion of the universe,11
guise of dark energy; cf. Wilczek 2008, 105ff., and Appendix.

4
Hubble made this discovery thanks to the powerful new Hooker telescope, based on the
red-shift of distant stars (stars moving toward earth would display light near the blue end of
the spectrum; those moving away would display red-shifted light, since the frequency of a
departing light source moves toward the red end of the spectrum: Bojowald 2010, 249).
Hubble concluded that all galaxies were moving away from each other, with their velocities
increasing as a function of their distance from us. Cf. Davies 1995, 130ff.; Carroll 2010, 45-48;
Frank 2011, 152ff.
5
Frank 2011, 166.
6
On Friedmann and Lemaître, see for instance Davies 1995, 135ff.; Luminet 2010;
Hooper 2006, 142f.; Frank 2011, 182ff.
7
Or rather, in Lemaître's terms, a “primeval atom”; cf. Carroll 2010, 54.
8
Penrose 2010, 68. Hubble's initial observations confirming the expansion of the
universe, which convinced Einstein to drop the cosmological constant he had introduced to
guarantee an unchanging universe, predicted an age for the universe of only about 1.8 billion
years (Davies 1995 132ff.). The steady-state theorists were reacting, among other factors, to
this erroneous estimate. Cf. Eccles 1979, 12-13 (and note that when Eccles was writing some
thirty years ago, the communis opinio held that the universe was “about nineteen billion years
according to the best estimates” (ibid.).
9
Carroll 2010, 54-55; Panek 2011, 13ff.; Frank 2011, 202f. This theory postulated the
continuous creation of matter, in the form of hydrogen molecules at the rate of one atom per
cubic meter per billion years.
10
In 1990, the Cobe satellite (Cosmic Background Explorer) determined the temperature
of this cosmic backround raditaion to be 2.725 degrees Kelvin, or about -270.4 degrees
Celsius (Hooper 2006, 153). This temperature was remarkably homogeneous throughout
space.
11
Greene 2011, 128ff. The story of this discovery, made jointly by the Supernova
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 23
have led to the widespread acceptance of the Big Bang theory, although still not all
scientists are convinced. In particular, this theory presupposes infinite values or sin-
gularities at its very beginnings, and singularities or infinite results in equations are
usually the sign that something's wrong with a theory. The theory of relativity also
predicts that if we made a film of the evolution of the universe and ran it backwards,
time itself would come to an end at the Big Bang.12 These and similar considerations
have led some influential theorists13 to prefer some version of a cyclical model in
which the universe expands, ceases its expansion after about a trillion years and un-
dergoes a turnaround, contracts, and finally, when a certain bounce temperature
value is reached, undergoes expansion once again, with the process as a whole re-
peating itself ad infinitum.14 Ironically, some contemporary theorists who posit the
existence of a multiverse, or virtually infinite number of universes eternally coming
into existence, have recently come up with what has been described new kind of
steady-state model.15
Recent commentators have not failed to point out the similarities between such
contemporary cosmologies and Neoplatonic theories, aligning Simplicius with the
steady-state theorists and Philoponus with the Big-Bang theorists. Let's briefly re-
view the basic similarities and differences (Table 1).
Simplicius, following Aristotle, believes the world was never created. It had neth-
er a beginning nor end, but has always existed in precisely its present state and will
always continue to do so. If Plato in the Timaeus appears to say the world was creat-
ed by the Demiurge, he is speaking allegorically, and really means to refer only to the
fact that the world is ontologically dependent on a higher principle. If we take the
Timaeus literally, as Philoponus did,16 we have a universe that has a beginning but no
end. Philoponus, for his part, believes the word was created instantaneously by God
Cosmology Project and the High-Z Supernova Search Team, is recounted in Panek 2011.
12
Bojowald 2010, 31. The same conditions may occur inside black holes, which produce
“an apparent tear in the fabric of space-time” (Frank 2011, 256), but this is not the place to
deal with this fascinating subject, on which see, for instance, Thorne 1994; Susskind 2008;
Bojowald 2010, 178ff.; Carroll 2010, 259ff.
13
For instance, Roger Penrose, Lee Smolin, Robert P. Kirshner, Paul H. Frampton, Paul J.
Steinhardt, Neil Turok. Loop quantum gravity proposes to eliminate the singularity problem
by postulating a discrete or quantized time and space. cf. Bojowald passim. Sean Carroll, for
his part, prefers a model in which the Big Bang represents an eternally-recurring phase
transition between states of empty space and new “baby universes”, which go on to expand
and produce new universes, which in turn evolve into a state of empty space.
14
Frampton 2010, 96-97; Frank 2011, 251ff.
15
Frank 2011, 290. Sean Carroll, perhaps the most prominent advocate of such views,
defends a model in which the Big Bang – or rather our Big Bang, since there are an infinity of
them, and ours has nothing special about it – represents an eternally-recurring phase
transition between states of empty space and new “baby universes”, which go on to expand
and produce new universes, which in turn evolve into a state of empty space ...
16
Particularly in his Against Proclus on the eternity of the universe. Cf. Chase, in press.
some 6000 years prior to his epoch, and will end whenever God chooses to end it,
although God will then create a superior, permanent world in its place. Time, as Pla-
to stated in the Timaeus, and Philoponus agrees, was created simultaneously with the
world, and God created matter from nothing. A final possibility was defended by the
Stoics: the world alternates eternally between destruction in a fiery conflagration
(ekpurôsis) at the end of a Great Year, followed by its periodic recreation.17
What's now popularly known as the Big Bang Theory18 postulates that the uni-
verse came into being some 13.7 billion years ago. Starting out from an initial singu-
larity in which matter was infinitely dense and the geometry of spacetime was of in-
finite curvature,19 the universe is supposed to have gone through roughly the
following stages (Table 2)20:
1. Since their temperatures were too high to be reproduced in a laboratory envi-
ronment,21 not much is known about the initial phases. Of these, the first is known
as the Planck epoch (down to 10-43 seconds post Big Bang), when it is presumed that
the four fundamental forces – Gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak
nuclear forces – were united.
2. The second phase (10-43 to 10-36 seconds PBB) witnessed the separation of these
forces, by means of the process of symmetry breaking.22 The first to separate were
the strong and the electroweak forces23 (i. e., the combination of the electromagnetic
17
Cf., for instance, D. Sedley 2007, ch. VII, with further literature. It is no accident that
the theory introduced by J. Khoury, B. Ovrut, P. Steinhardt and N. Turok, according to
which our universe periodically collides with another one that is situated within a space-time
of more than four dimensions, has been baptised as the ekpyrotic scenario. See Steinhardt &
Turok 2007 passim; Bojowald 2010, 88; 245.
18
The term was introduced by Fred Hoyle in 1949 in order to make fun of the theories of
Lemaître, then adopted, minus its pejorative connotations, by George Gamow (Luminet 35;
Penrose 2010, 253).
19
Brax 75; Penrose 2010, 64.
20
There is, of course, much disagreement among experts on virtually all these facts and
dates, and they may all be rendered obsolete within a very short time indeed.
21
The temperature at the time of Grand Unification may have reached 1029 degrees; but to
reproduce such a temperature experimentally would require a particle collider the size of our
solar system (Hooper 2006, 94). Temperatures of over 1012 degrees have been recorded at the
Brookhaven relativistic heavy ion collider (RHIC) (Wilczek 2008, 93), and this figure will
certainly be surpassed in the near future.
22
Thought to occur when temperatures reach about 1027 degrees (Steinhardt & Turok
2007, 83; Lockwood 2005, 99).
23
The strong nuclear force governs interactions between nucleons (protons, neutrons,
and quarks), binding quarks and gluons together to form protons, neutrons, and other
hadrons, and binding protons and neutons to one another within the atomic nucleus
(Penrose 2010, 141; Seife 2003, 122-123; Wilczek 2008, 239), while the weak forces are
responsible for nuclear decay, changing up quarks to down quarks, or neutrinos into
electrons (Seife 2003, 265).
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 25
force and the weak force). Once the temperature had cooled to about 1015, the elec-
troweak force then separated into the electromagnetic and weak forces.24
3. Beginning about 10-36 seconds after the Big Bang and lasting a mere 10-30 sec-
onds,25 the universe is thought to have undergone a period of inflation,26 or exponen-
tial growth, during which it expanded by a factor of between 1030 and 10100, if not
more, doubling in size every 10-32 seconds. Although global inflation ceases after a
very brief time, current versions of the theory predict that it continues in some iso-
lated regions, thus giving rise eternally to a practically infinite number of universes.27
According to Alan Guth and his followers, inflation is nothing other than a phase
transition,28 like the freezing of ice or the curdling of milk, analogies which, we re-
member, Philoponus and his predecessors and successors used to describe God's
creation of the universe. Yet we may also recall from last year29 that Simplicius main-
tained that such phase transitions or instantaneous changes were not really instanta-
neous; they happened bit by bit, albeit very rapidly. Similarly, Guth and his col-
leagues supposed the early universe was pervaded by a field of energy known as the
“false vacuum”, a field that was inherently unstable and would at some point30 have
to decay, in a phase transition like the appearance of bubbles in a boiling pot of wa-
ter,31 into a real vacuum, releasing a tremendous amount of energy in the process.
24
Lockwood 2005, 99-100.
25
Cassé 91; Penrose 2010, 66; Hooper 2006, 196.
26
Inflation was first proposed the Soviet cosmologist Alexei Starobinsky in the 1970s
(Lockwood 2005, 100), and then, independently, by Alan Guth in 1981, with refinements by
A. Linde, P. Steinhardt and A. Albrecht (Luminet 2010, 39; Greene 2010, 44). The theory of
inflation has recently been called into question (Luminet 2010, 41; Magueijo 2003; Penrose
2010; Frampton 2010; Steinhardt & Turok 2007). It remains popular, however, because it
seems to solve several outstanding cosmological problems: the flatness problem, or why the
universe is so flat when it could very easily have been curved; the horizon problem (cf.
Bojowald 2010, 151-152), or how it can be that parts of the universe so distant that they can
never have interacted causally still display very similar features, such as CMB temperature;
and the magnetic monopole problem, or why these types of particles, which should have been
created in abundance when the electromagetic, strong, and weak forces emerged from the
single Grand Unified Force, have never been observed. On these issues cf. Lockwood 2005,
99-100; Hooper 2006, 189 ff.; Carroll 2010, 320ff.; Panek 2011, 127ff. Inflation also solved the
apparent improbability of the large-scale homogeneity and isotropy of the universe (Panek
2011, 144; Frank 2011, 245 f.). For parallels between the inflationary model and the theories
of Anaximander, cf. Bojowald 2010, 246.
27
Hooper 2006, 199. Compare this with the number of universes predicted by string
theory, which is in the order to 10500, that is, 1 followed by five hundred zeroes (Hooper 2006,
184; Frank 2011, 273; 277ff.).
28
Carroll 2010, 325ff.; Panek 2011, 127; Frank 2011, 280f.
29
Chase 2011, 142.
30
A point determined by random fluctuations at the quantum level, at least in subsequent
elaborations of Guth's theory (cf. Lockwood 2005, 10).
31
Frank 2011, 281.
This energy would assume the form of a kind of anti-gravity, ripping apart the fabric
of space-time and causing, almost instantaneously, the exponential expansion of the
universe. Even more radically, in developments of the theory pioneered by Alexan-
der Vilenkin and Andrei Linde,32 such inflation is always taking place someplace in
the universe, giving rise to a multiverse containing a virtually infinite number of
universes, some of which would be in a state of false vacuum, and others, like ours,
would have already decayed to a real vacuum state.
In our universe, at any rate, inflation is supposed to have been followed by a
number of subsequent periods:
4. From about 10-30 seconds after the Bang, the universe was dominated by radia-
tion and consisted of an opaque plasma made up of radiation, matter, and antimat-
ter. As the universe expanded and cooled, the particles of matter and antimatter an-
nihilated each other, leading to a surplus of matter which coalesced into electrons
and quarks.33 This phase was then succeeded by another, in which
5. As the universe's temperature dropped to about 108 Kelvin,34 the period of nu-
cleosynthesis began at about one second PBB. It was characterized by nuclear fusion,
in which protons and neutrons combined to form stable atomic nuclei. The first el-
ements to form in this way were the lighter ones: hydrogen, helium, deuterium, and
lithium, in that order.35 This phase signals the beginning of domination by matter
instead of radiation.36 This phase was followed by
6. A period known by various names: as the phase of decoupling,37 recombina-
tion, or the surface of last scattering, occurring some 379,000 years PBB, when the
temperature had dropped to 3000-4000 K. At this point, increasingly cool tempera-
tures allowed electrons to be captured by protons to form hydrogen and helium at-
oms. The ubiquitous photons emitted by the hot big bang, which had previously
been absorbed almost instantaneously, now no longer interacted with matter in the
guise of the newly-formed atoms, and were free to travel unimpeded throughout the
cosmos, forming the cosmic microwave background radiation that was to be discov-
ered by Penzias and Wilson in the 1960s. Finally, we come to
32
Frank 2011, 283 ff.
33
Steinhardt & Turok 2007, 58. Why matter and antimatter did not annihilate each other
completely is still something of a cosmological mytery (Bojowald 2010, 160f.).
34
That is, some 10,000 times the surface temperature of the sun (Greene 2011, 38).
35
Bojowald 2010, 161.
36
As Carroll points out (2010, 58), in a cosmological context matter simply means “any
collection of particles, each of which is moving much more slowly than the speed of light”.
Conversely, particles moving at or near the speed of light are considered radiation.
37
The decoupling in question is that between matter (in the form of atoms) and radiation,
made possible by the fact that the newly formed atoms, now electrically neutral, no longer
interacted with the photons (Greene 2011, 38-39; Panek 2011, 45; Hooper 2006, 149f.; Frank
2011, 206).
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 27
7. the last phase, the one in which we now live, characterized by accelerated ex-
pansion and dominated by a fluid-like entity called “dark energy”,38 whose precise
nature remains unknown. This period has witnessed the formation of stars and gal-
axies (about one billion years PBB), and finally of our own solar system (9 billion
years ago) and the earth (about 4.5 billion years ago).
2. Back to the future

As far as the question of the universe's future is concerned, that is, whether its exist-
ence is or is not (spatio-)temporally infinite,39 it has, since Friedmann and Lemaître,
been linked to the question of the geometry of space (Table 3).40 If the cosmological
constant is taken to be zero, we have the following three possibilities:
a. A universe with positive curvature, which contains enough matter to eventually
cause the universe, through the force of gravity, to stop expanding, implies finite
time and space; that is, a universe beginning with the Big Bang and ending with a Big
Crunch. In this model, then, the universe is closed, finite, unbounded, and hy-
perspherical.41
b. A universe with hyperbolic geometry with negative curvature, in which the an-
gles of a triangle add up to less than 180° and there is relatively little matter, implies a
saddle shaped universe infinite in time and space. On this hypothesis, the universe
will expand forever at an increasing rate, eventually leading to an empty world. As-
tronomers have dubbed this option the Big Chill.
c. Finally, a zero-curvature universe with Euclidean geometry, such as seems to be
the universe we live in now, in which the total matter density is precisely the critical
level,42 also implies an universe that expands forever. Here, however, the rate of ex-
pansion slows down, so that expansive and gravitational energies are in perfect, and
delicately unstable, balance,43 so much so that it has been called the Goldilocks uni-
38
Dark energy, a repulsive force associated with or perhaps identical to Einstein's
cosmological constant (Penrose 2010, 254) which accounts for the universe's accelerated
expansion, makes up about 70-75% of the current universe (Lesgourgues 19; Luminet 40,
Vannucci 61, Brax 83, Vanhove 127). A figure of 72% was confirmed by the WMAP satellite
in 2003 (Frampton 2010, 63). See Appendix.
39
Or rather perpetual (Greek aidion), since all the Friedmann-Lemaître possibilities
assume the world has a beginning in time, at the singularity of the Big Bang.
40
Friedmann's assumption that the universe is homogeneous – that is, that it has the same
density of matter everywhere, which implies that the universe's curvature should also be
identical everywhere – basically restricts the possibilities of the universe's shape to three
(Magueijo 2003, 89).
41
Lockwood 2005, 95-96.
42
The critical density of matter is approximately 2 X 10-29 grams per cubic centimeter of
space, equivalent to six hydrogen atoms per cubic meter (Greene 2011, 23-24), or one gram
per hundred trillion cublic kilometers of space (Hooper 2006, 162).
43
Magueijo 2003, 89ff.; Penrose 2010, 62ff.; Panek 2011, 58; Frank 2011, 164. Frampton
verse, because, like the famous bowl of porridge, it is “just right”. The universe, on
this hypothesis, would be infinite and flat.
This, at any rate, was the status quaestionis up until 1998, when the discovery of
the accelerated expansion of the universe, which began some seven billion years
ago44, led to the hypothesis of dark energy.45 The future of the universe now seems to
depend crucially on what is called the equation of state (ratio of pressure46 to energy
density, which cosmologists designate as w) of dark energy. We now find ourselves
faced by two main possibilities (Table 4).
1. If the equation of state is equal to -1, there should be a specific amount of ener-
gy per unit of volume of space, and that density should not change over time.
2. If w is other than -1, dark energy would turn out to be quintessence, its density
grows with time, and the scale factor of the universe47 soon becomes infinite. Some
ten billion years from now, time ends and everything is torn apart at the Big Rip by
the repulsive gravitational force of dark energy.
As of early 2010, the WMAP results gave an equation of state of -0.98, which is
close enough to -1 to mean that dark energy does indeed appear to be a cosmological
constant. It also reported that some 72.8 per cent of the universe consists of dark
energy, another 22.7 per cent of dark matter, and only about 4.56 per cent in the
form of baryonic matter,48 or the matter to which we have become so accustomed,
that which is made up of atoms.
We thus appear to be living in a world that is not going to end anytime soon,
thanks to an almost miraculous fine-tuning49 of the ratios between the elements that
constitute it.
2010, 25, 72f. specifies that the universe currently matches this point of “critical density”
within a margin of 2%. On the experimental findings confirming the flatness of our universe,
notably those of the BOOMERANG experiment in April of 2000 and the WMAP experiment
a few years later, see for instance Bojowald 2010, 137-141; Hooper 2006, 183 f.
44
Greene 2011, 139-140.
45
In 2001, the cosmologist Michael Turner went so far as to say that in a universe with
dark energy, “the creation between geometry and destiny is severed” (quoted in Panek 2011,
208). On dark matter and dark energy, see Appendix.
46
Here, pressure means the negative change in energy divided by the change in the
volume enclosing the energy amount (Bojowald 2010 146).
47
That is, the relative distances of the galaxies from one another (cf. Greene 2011, 134).
48
Figures differing by 2-3% are given by Frank 2011, 248.
49
This notion of fine-tuning raises important and complex questions of Intelligent Design
and the Anthropic Principle, which we cannot go into here.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 29
II. PHERECYDES OF SYROS
One can find among the Pre-Socratics most of

the elements of modern cosmology.
Martin Bojowald50
It has often been claimed, including by me last year,51 that the Demiurge in Plato's
Timaeus represents the first appearance in Greek thought of what might be called a
creationist cosmology, that is, a scheme according to which, as the Aristotelian
commentators were to say, the world came into existence or was generated after not
having existed.52
I now believe that assertion is mistaken. It fails to take into account the tradition
of Pre-Socratic philosophy, and even if one may hesitate to agree with David Sedley,
who finds instances of creationism throughout Presocratic philosophy, I believe that
at least two trends or figures from the Presocratic period deserve serious considera-
tion as precursors to the Platonic Timaeus in this regard. One is the so-called Orphic
texts, where the doctrine of creation from an egg (ab ovo) by some kind of a demiur-
gic figure seems securely attested. The other is represented by the meagre remains of
Pherecydes of Syros, the shadowy sixth-century philosopher whom some claimed
was the student of Pittakos53 and teacher of Pythagoras,54 and whom others, with
perhaps a greater claim to verisimilitude, have identified as the first Greek author to
50
Bojowald 2010, 248.
51
Cf. Chase 2011, quoting Cornford, who, writing in 1937, wrote that in the Timaeus
“Plato is introducing into philosophy for the first time the image of a creator god”. Along the
same lines, cf. Classen 1962.
52
This was the last of the seven meanings of the Greek word genêtos enumerated by
Porphyry; cf. Baltes, 1976, 105-121. According to Simplicius (In Phys., CAG 10, p. 1154, 3ff.),
this is the sense in which Aristotle used the term genêtos, while Plato used it to designate that
which, like the sensible world, has its being in becoming and subsists as a result of some
external cause, rather than on its own. These correspond to Porphyry's meanings 3 and 4,
which he took over from Calvisius Taurus.
53
On this isolated tradition (Diogenes Laertius I, 116), cf. Goulet 2001, who supposes a
mistake on the part of Diogenes Laertius. Pittakos of Mytilene, one of the Seven Sages, was
said to have died c. 570-569.
54
Porphyry, VP 55. For additional attestations cf. Schibli 1990, 11 & n. 24; Breglia 2000, p.
162 n. 11, and especially Goulet 2001.
write in prose.55 The title of his only known work, as attested by the Suda, seems to
have been “The seven nooks, or The mixture of the gods, or Theology”.56
1. The cosmology of Pherecydes

In view of the paltry number of fragments of and testimonies to his work that have
come down to us, not all of the details of Pherecydes' cosmogony can be reconstruct-
ed with certainty. This much seems reasonably clear, however57: in the beginning
were three everlasting58 divinities: Zas, Chronos,59 and Chthonie. Chronos then pro-
duces from his own semen,60 perhaps by masturbation,61 the three elements fire,
55
Schibli 1990, 2-4; Laks 2007; 2009. Pherecydes' only serious rival for this honor is
Anaximander, who may have been a few years older and who some (Diels, Von Fritz) consider to
have influenced Pherecydes. Schibli however (loc. cit.), followed by Laks (2007, 257 n. 42) argues
for the chronological priority of Pherecydes over Anaximander. Cf. Scofield in the Routledge
History of Philosophy, vol. 1 (London-New York 1997), p. 73 n. 20, for whom Pherecydes' case to
be the first prose author is “stronger [sc. than that of Anaximander] if not overwhelming”.
56
Fr. 2 Schibli = A2 Diels-Kranz : Ἑπτάμυχος ἤτοι Θεοκρασία ἢ Θεογονία. Since there
seem to be only five nooks in Pherecydes' cosmology, West (1971, 13), following Preller et
multos alios, proposes to emend the Suda's text to read pentamukhos, “the five nooks”.
Contra : Schibli 46 n. 105. A substantial part of the notice on Pherecydes in the Suda may go
back to the Philosophos Historia of Porphyry. See A.-Ph. Segonds, “Les fragments de
l'Histoire de la philosophie”, in E. des Places., ed. & trans., Porphyre, Vie de Pythagore, Lettre à
Marcella, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982, 163-197, fr. 6 at p. 181.
57
Cf. Schibli 1990, 14ff.; 128ff.; Breglia 2000, 178ff.
58
einai aei fr. 60 Schibli = A8 D.-K. = Damascius, De princ., 1, 321 Ruelle = vol. II, p. 164,
17ff. Westerink-Combès; êsan aei fr. 14 Schibli = A1, B1 D.-K. = Diogenes Laertius 1, 119
(where, however, êsan is only Diels' conjecture – albeit probably a good one – for the mss.
readings hês, eis, and heis; cf. R. Lamberton, Ancient Philosophy 12. 2 [1992], 384). For Laks
(2009, 638), it is this eternity Pherecydes assigns to his divinity/principles that provides the
“quelque chose de philosophique” partly explaining why Aristotle (Metaph. N, 4, 1019a33ff.
= fr. 81 Schibli) classes Pherecydes among the “mixed thinkers”, halfway between mythology
and philosophy. Cf., however, Schwabl 1962, 1463, who points out that that idea of the
eternity of primary forces is “zumindest im Orient uralt”. The other reason for Aristotle's
classification is Pherecydes' revolutionary use of prose rather than verse; cf. Laks 2009, 641.
59
Fr. 60 Schibli = Damascius, De princ., 1, 321 Ruelle = vol. II, p. 164, 17ff. Westerink-
Combès. On this reading, see below.
60
West 1983, 199-200 suggests that in the Orphic cosmogony (OF 66; 70), Chronos may
likewise produce the World-Egg from his seed.
61
As is frequent in Near Eastern traditions; cf. West 1971, 28ff.; 1983, 103ff.; Schibli 1990, 37f.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 31
breath or spirit (pneuma),62 and water. Deposited in five “realms” or “nooks”
(mukhoi), these elements then somehow give rise to a second generation of gods.63
Another series of fragments tells of the preparations for a wedding between Zas
and Chthonie. Zas weaves a robe (pharos) for his bride-to-be, on which he embroi-
ders Earth, Ogenos (Ocean),64 presumably understood as a great river surrounding
the habitable earth, and the palace or halls (dômata) of Ogenos. When Chthoniê ac-
cepts the robe, in a gesture that founds the Greek custom of the anakaluptêria,65 her
name is changed to that of Gê.
Other Pherecydean fragments are harder to situate within the narrative's logic: we
are told, for instance, that Zas, when about to carry out his acts of creation (mellonta
dêmiourgein), transforms into Eros,66 and that the robe constituting Zas' wedding
gift to Chthonie was, at a stage of the story that is hard to determine, hung upon a
winged oak.67 Also at some point or another,68 Chronos' sovereignty is challenged by
the serpentine Ophioneus and his army69: those who are toppled into Ogenos are to
62
Wind, according to West 1983, 199. Modern commentators usually neglect Testimony
A5 Diels, according to which Pherecydes distinguishes two kinds of pneuma in man, divine
and earthly. An exception is Gomperz 1928, 24f. Schibli (109-113) is sceptical of this
tradition, but cf. Lamberton 390.
63
Fr. 60 Schibli = A8 Diels = Damascius, De princ., I, 321 Ruelle: ex hôn [sc. the elements]
en pente mukhois diêirêmenôn pollên allên genean sustênai theôn. Schibli supposes that
Chronos forms the gods by mixing the elements in various proportions.
64
On the form of the word ôgênos, see the references given by von Fritz 1948, 2029, 52ff.,
and especially West 1971, 50. Gomperz' etymologizing explanation (1928, 21), that the river
surrounds gê like an O, is picturesque.
65
The groom did indeed give gifts to the bride on the third day of ancient Greek wedding;
cf. Diels 1897, 149.
66
fr. 72 Schibli = B3 Diels.
67
Diels (1897) thought Zeus hung the pharos on the oak tree as soon as he finished
weaving it, then handed the whole kit and caboodle over Chthonie as a wedding gift: while
not impossible, this scenario seems somewhat grotesque. There is no agreement among
modern commentators as to what the symbol of the winged oak might mean. It may refer to
the loom on which the pharos is woven (Gomperz 1929, 22; Contra: Schwabl 1962, 1463); or
to the ship's mast on which Athena's peplos was hung in the Panathenaic procession (Diels
1897); it may personify Chthonie (Jaeger 1947, 69-70), perhaps as “substructure of the visible
earth” (Granger 142); or else it may take her place (West 1971, 20; 59); or else there may be
no particular connection between Chthonie and the oak (Kirk-Raven-Schofield). Finally, the
winged oak may simply personify Zas, and be winged because this god is not subject to the
constraints of temporal reality (Breglia 2000, 187). Most recently, Saudelli (2011) interprets
the winged oak as the body of the universe, while the pharos (which she translates as “veil”)
represents the visible surface of the universe.
68
Probably after the marriage of Zas and Chthonie (Schibli; Breglia 179), although
Vernant (see below, n. 70) placed the battle before the wedding, as does Gomperz (1929, 21)
and Schwabl (1962, 1462).
69
Granger (2007) maintains that Zeus' peace-loving proclivities kept him out of the fight,
be declared the losers, while the winners gain possession of Olympus (fr. 78 S. = B4
D.-K). Chronos wins the battle and is crowned victor (fr. 82 S. = B4 D.-K.), but Zeus
may later have taken over sovereignty from Chronos70, if we can judge by the fact
that it is Zeus, not Chronos, who has the power to banish evildoers to Tartarus
(fr. 83 S. = B5 D.-K.).71 It may be after this victorious struggle that Zeus assigns to the
gods their various realms of jurisdiction.72
Despite the uncertainty of the details, it seems more or less certain that Phere-
cydes has a notion of a double creation,73 taking place against the background of and
in contrast with the three everlasting deities Zas, Chronos, and Chthonie. In the first
stage, as we have seen, Chronos creates the three elements fire, pneuma and water,
from his own seed. After they have somehow been distributed into five nooks or
realms, these elements give rise to another plentiful generation of gods (fr. 60 S. = A8
D.-K.). A second stage, which may represent the creation of living, organic beings,74
seems to be represented by Zas' demiurgic activity, which is envisaged as equivalent
to his weaving the pharos and presenting it as a wedding gift to Chthonie.
It is the relation between these two stages, phases, or accounts of cosmogony that
we must understand in order to gain an adequate grasp of Pherecydes' philosophy,
and hence judge the extent to which his thought may be considered to constitute a
precursor to Plato's figure of the Demiurge. First, however, it seems appropriate to
take a closer look at the notion of time in Pherecydes.
2. Time and Eternity in Pherecydes

The mention of Chronos as one of Pherecydes’ three everlasting principles has led to
a great deal of controversy over the past century or so. Fr. 60 Schibli, taken from
Damascius' On first principles, gives the unambiguous reading Χρόνον,75 but Zeller76
although this author seems to deduce, bizarrely, that Zeus is “peace-loving” merely because
he is an amorous weaver. Schibli, for his part (1990, 97-99), supposes Zeus engages in a
monomakhia with Ophioneus. The figure of Ophioneus is echoed in Orpheus' song in the
Argonautica of Apollonius of Rhodes (I, 502ff.); cf. also the Scholiast to Aristophanes' Clouds
247, who speaks of a first race of gods under Ophion and Euronyme.
70
Vernant (Les Origines de la pensée grecque, Paris 1962, 107-108), assumes that Zeus
replaces Chronos as the result of an “assault” and a “conquest”. Schibli (1990, 68) disagrees,
arguing the takeover was peaceful.
71
Cf. Schwabl 1962, 1463; Schibli 1990, 40.
72
Schibli 1990, 178.
73
Cf. Bojowald 2010, 236: in myth, “primary creation provides a reason for the emergence
of the world itself, secondary creation for the world as we find it now”.
74
Diels 1897, 155; Von Fritz 1948, 2031.
75
Vol. III, p. 164, 17 Westerink-Combès. Schibli's apparatus criticus, reproduced from
Wehrli (Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar. 8, Eudemos von Rhodes,
Basel/Stuttgart 19692, fr. 150, p. 70) is inaccurate here. The reading of the Marcianus Graecus
246 (Ruelle's ms E), unique witness to the works of Damascius, is not “χθόνον Eac” but
“χθόνον Epc”. Mss BFW all depend on this correction of the Marcianus.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 33
and Wilamowitz77 argued that a personified figure of time was too abstract for a
thinker of the sixth century, for which reason Wilamowitz wished to emend the
manuscript reading to Κρόνον.78 Yet Diels had already argued strongly against such
an emendation,79 pointing out that the figure of a personified Time was frequent in
archaic Greek thought.80 Perhaps the most interesting examples of this tendency
come from the Plato's uncle Critias, who, in his drama Peirithoos, described Chronos
as an imperishable stream that generates itself,81 while in his Sisyphos82 Critias spoke
of “the starry skin of the heavens, fine embroidery of Chronos, that clever crafts-
man”. Note that the word tektôn, here used to qualify Chronos, is for all intents and
purposes a synonym of dêmiourgos.
Quite apart from what one might call the “mainstream” of Greek archaic thought,
the notion of a personified time is far from absent83 in at least two contexts that may
76
Zeller-Mondolfo 1932, 187-188 n. 4.
77
S.-Ber. Akad. Berl. 1929, 41: “Ich halte einen Urgott Zeit im 6. Jahrhundert für
undenkbar”. But cf. West 1971, 28, for whom such a view is “based on a misjudgement of the
capabilities of pre-philosophical speculation”.
78
H. Fränkel (Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens, München 19602, 19) also
defended the emendation to Cronos. He was followed by Lesky (Geschichte der griechischen
Literatur, München 19993, 192 n. 2), and Schwabl (1962, 1459ff.), who nevertheless concedes
that the notion of eternal creative principles is well attested in Near Eastern and other
contexts. He cites inter alia the birth of the gods from Kumarbi in Hittite mythology; the self-
generation of the Egyptian god Atum, from whom the other gods derive; the self-generation
of the Phoenician god Ulomos, etc. As “parallel Oriental Time-gods”, West (1983, 198f.)
adduces the Egyptian Re‘, the Iranian Zurvān, and the Indian Kāla. Cf. West 1971, 10; 29-36;
Schibli 1990, 17 & n. 9. Brisson (1985, 50), who also inclines toward the emendation to
Cronos, seeks to derive the Orphic Chronos from Zurvān, but for the possibility that Zurvān
may instead derive from the Chronos of Pherecydes, cf. M. Boyce, A History of
Zoroastrianism, vol. II (Leiden 1982), 152.
79
Diels 1897, 151, emphasized that Diogenes Laertius and Damascius (who in turn
depends on Eudemus, two testimonies that are clearly independent of one another), read
Chronos, not Cronos, as occurs in the Stoic-influenced testimonies of Probus and Hermias.
It is not hard to imagine, Diels argued, that an author of the Orphic period should have
placed a personified Time at the origin of his cosmology. Quite apart from the Orphics, he
continued, one need only think of the Aion of Heraclitus, or the personifications of time in
the near-contemporary works of Greek tragic and lyric poets.
80
More examples were soon adduced by Nestle and Gomperz: Pindar Ol. II, 19;
Simonides 531.5 Page; Sophocles fr. 280 Nauck; Euripides Heracleid. 900, fr. 304, 3; Heracl.
776 ff.; Solon fr. 36, 3 West, Anaximander fr. 9 Diels. Schibli (1990, 29 n. 39) adds further
references.
81
Fr. 3 Snell = D.-K. 88B18: ἀκάμας τε χρόνος περί τ’ ἀενάῳ / ῥεύματι πλήρης φοιτᾷ
τίκτων / αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν.
82
fr. 19 Snell = D.-K 88b25, 33-34: τό τ’ ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας, / Χρόνου καλὸν
ποίκιλμα, τέκτονος σοφοῦ.
83
Von Fritz 1948, 2029, citing Zeller-Nestle I6, 104.
well have been influential on Pherecydes: the Orphic poems and the mythologies of
the Near East. The latter have been thoroughly discussed by West, so that we can
leave them aside here, but we will return to the Orphics shortly.
Given that some sources attest that Pherecydes identified elements and the (mod-
ified) divinities of Greek religion,84 many scholars have subscribed to one version or
another of a hypothesis first set forth by Diels (Table 5). For Diels, Pherecydes' five
mukhoi are to be identified with the five elements aether, fire, air, water, and earth.
Here, the two extreme terms Zas and Chthonie, considered as eternal, are identified
with aether and earth respectively, while the three elements produced by Chronos85 –
fire, air and water – are temporal, and hence subject to change, generation, and cor-
ruption. In Pherecydes, then, at least according to Diels, we have a clear distinction
between a realm of eternity, represented by Zas and Chthonie, and world of time,
represented by the other three elements.86 Chronos would thus be responsible for
heavenly phenomena, while all phenomena of life on earth result from the hieros
gamos between Zeus and Chthonie. Variations on this theme were proposed by most
subsequent scholars, most of whom subscribed to Diels' fundamental distinction
between an eternal and a temporal realm of gods/elements.
Finally, Schibli, in a complex scheme that has not been well received by scholars,87
distinguishes between the five nooks (mukhoi) in which Chronos deposits his seed,
and where the second generation of gods are born, from seven regions (moirai) at-
tributed to divinities – all members of the pentemukhos genea that emerged from the
elements ejaculated by Chronos – that inhabit and rule over each of them. Schibli
seems to want to recognize the existence in Pherecydes of both a kind of proto-time
and a kind of proto-space.88 One may find such notions too metaphysical for a sixth-
84
Probus, In Buc., 6, 31, fr. 65 S. = A9 D.-K.: Zen = fire, Chthon = earth, Cronos = time;
Hermias, Irrisio gentilium philosophorum, 12, fr. 66 S. = A9 D.-K.: Zen = aithêr, Chthonie =
earth, Cronos = time. On the identification of Zeus with aither, cf. the references in Schibli
43-44 n. 90.
85
By Zeus, rather than by Chronos, since Diels, following Kern and Nestle, emends the
heautou of fr. 60 S. into autou, so that its meaning is that Chronos creates the elements out of
the seed of Zeus. This emendation has been rejected by most subsequent scholars (Zeller I 16,
105 n. 2; Gomperz 18 n. 10; von Fritz 2031; Schwabl 1461; West 1971, 12; Schibli 18 n. 11;
Westerink-Combès, vol. III, 233-234 n. 4).
86
Cf. Von Fritz 2031.
87
See, for instance, Breglia 2000, 178-179, and the reviews by D. Sider, BMCRev 1 (1990)
80-81, and especially R. Lamberton, AncPhil 12 (1992) 383-39.
88
The mukhoi, as “dark, womb-like hollows” (Schibli 1990, 22), perhaps situated within
the body of Chthonie/Earth, are in some sense not fully real until Chronos deposits his
elemental seed in them. After the gods are born from them, “the mukhoi too assume a reality
of their own as specific areas of the cosmos” (p. 23). Prior to this stage of the cosmogony,
however, the mukhoi “defy definition” (p. 25). They are, although Pherecydes may not have
been aware of this fact, “spatial concepts”, or more precisely “pre-existent space(s)” (ibid.), or
“spatial principles necessary for creation” (p. 26) albeit represented metaphorically, and in
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 35
century thinker, and indeed, Schibli all but admits these ideas are to be found in
Pherecydes only implicitly. Nevertheless, in the figure of Chronos who “steps out of
eternity to create”, Schibli finds a foreshadowing of Plato's distinction between time
and eternity in the Timaeus.89
3. Pherecydes and the Orphics

Scholars have long called attention to similarities between the cosmogonies of
Pherecydes and that of the Orphics.90 These rapprochements went somewhat into
abeyance, however, when, in the wake of the hypercritical work of Wilamowitz and
this sense they can be compared with the khôra of Plato's Timaeus 49a (p. 25 n. 28). Similarly,
Chronos, as the personification of time, exists prior to the creation of the universe only as a
“time-principle” (p. 28 n. 38). Cf. Plutarch's interpretation (Platonic questions 8, Mor. 1007c)
of Timaeus 38b: prior to the creation of the heavens, there was no time, “but an indefinite
motion, like a shapeless, formless matter of time”. Yet Pherecydes' proto-time, according to
Schibli, like pre-cosmic space, does not become “actual, measured time” until the creation of
the cosmos (ibid). But the creation of the cosmos, at least in its first stage, is identical with the
creation of the mukhoi, so that time and space are “actualized” together (p. 29). Confusingly,
Schibli adds in the very next sentence that Chthonie becomes “the actual earth” when she is
invested with the robe. According to Schibli's own schema (p. 16), however, the
creation/actualization of the mukhoi constitute the “first creation”, while Zas' bestowal of the
robe upon Chthonie represents the second creation, of earth proper. Perhaps what Schibli
has in mind, although he does not formulate it with sufficient clarity, is that there is a
continuum of actualization and/or realization throughout Pherecydes' cosmogony, at each
stage of which (Chronos' emission of the elements, their distribution into the mukhoi, the
emergence of the second generation of gods, Zas' wedding with Chthonie, etc,) the universe
becomes increasing real/actual/concrete. This would indeed seem to qualify as a plausible
interpretation of Pherecydes' cosmogony.
89
Writing a decade or so after Schibli, L. Bregli Pulci Doria takes for granted that
Pherecydes did indeed distinguish, not merely between time and eternity, but also between a
sensible and an intelligible world. This would explain Pherecydes' disconcerting habit of
giving different names to his divinities: in our sources, for instance, the name Chronos
appears alongside Cronos, Zas alongside Zeus, etc. The difference in names, Breglia argues, is
quite intentional, and is intended to distinguished these divinities on an a eternal/intelligible
and a sensible/temporal level. Thus, it is when Chronos carries out his act of generation,
thereby becoming “full time” (p. 182), that he comes to be known as Cronos. Granger (2007,
147) draws a parallel here with the Orphics, who also do not hesitate to speak of divinities
changing their names (OF 145; 168-9).
90
Gruppe 1851, 23ff.; Diels 1897; Zeller-Mondolfo 1932, 186ff.; West 1971; 1983; and
Schibli passim. The essential testimonies on the Orphic demiurge were discussed by G.
Wobbermin 1896, 73ff. Diels assumed that Pherecydes had been influenced by the Orphics,
as does, for instance, Breglia 2000, 193. Yet Schibli (35ff.) has mustered a number of
arguments in favor of the view that the influence ran in the other direction: it would have
been Pherecydes, elaborating upon Near Eastern cosmogonies, who exercized a determinate
influence on the Orphics.
Linforth, it became fashionable to doubt the antiquity and even the existence of most
central Orphic doctrines. Today, however, although a few diehards continue to
maintain that most of these doctrines are late Neoplatonic interpretations and inter-
polations, this position has become a good deal harder to defend since the discovery
of the Derveni papyrus, which shows that an Orphic cosmogony quite similar to that
found in the Rhapsodies was already in existence in the late fifth century BCE. The
scholarly communis opinio – again, with some notable exceptions – thus appears to
have come full circle and to have returned to what it was when Diels wrote in 1897:
people calling themselves Orphics did indeed exist in Archaic Greece, they were
roughly contemporaries of Pherecydes, and they maintained cosmogonic doctrines
quite comparable to his in several respects.
The most striking of these similarities is no doubt the role of the hypostasized
time-god Chronos.91 In Pherecydes, this eternal divinity produces the three elements
fire, air and water by parthenogenesis, thus beginning a two-stage process of creation
that will be completed when Zeus weaves a robe depicting the inhabitable earth and
grants it to Chthonie as a wedding-gift, thereby transforming her into Gê. In the Or-
phic Rhapsodies, which may date from Hellenistic times (1st century CE ?) in their
present form, but contain many ancient motifs, ageless Chronos produces Aether
and Chaos, then forms a great white egg in the Aether, from which leaps forth the
enigmatic being known by a variety of names: Phanes, Protogonos, Erikepaios, Eros,
and Metis. We recall that Eros also played a role in the cosmogony of Pherecydes,
although the lacunary state of our sources makes it hard to specify exactly what that
role may have been.
Finally, I would like to return to a similarity that most modern commentators
have passed over in silence. We have seen that in Pherecydes, Zeus' creation of the
inhabitable world is symbolized by his wedding gift to Chthonie of a robe on which
he has embroidered the earth, the ocean, and the palaces of ocean. But the Orphic
tradition knows a similar theme. In a myth that may have appeared in a lost Orphic
work entitled Peplos, Persephone is depicted as weaving at her loom when she is in-
terrupted and carried off by Hades, leaving her work unfinished. According to some
late sources,92 her weaving, like that of Zas, depicted the inhabitable world as well as
the birds, beasts and fish that dwell upon it. In Neoplatonic exegesis, the fact that
Persephone was forced to leave her work unfinished became an explanation for the
existence of evil in the sensible world.93
91
There is no reason to believe, of course, that Pherecydes' Chronos assumed the bizarre
appearance of Chronos in the Orphic Rhapsodies, with his wings, two sets of sexual organs,
and heads of a lion, ram, bull, and snake, or, in the theology of Hieronymus and Hellanicos,
the heads of a man, a bull, and a lion; cf. Brisson 1985, 39; 41.
92
Claudianus, De raptu Persephonae I, 246 ff.; Proclus, In Tim. 41b-c, vol. III, p. 223
Diehl.
93
See the texts collected by Kern as OF 192 = fr. 286 Bernabé. See also Eisler 1910, 1, 247-
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 37
4. Conclusion: does Pherecydes' demiurgic Chronos foreshadow
the Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus?
What, then, of our original subject, in which we sought to determine the extent to
which Pherecydes' cosmogony might be considered a predecessor of that set forth in
Plato's Timaeus?
I believe the parallels are quite striking, although the differences are also consid-
erable. In Pherecydes, we have a trio of eternal deities, one of whom, Chronos, cre-
ates three of the elements, apparently a se, if not ex nihilo. It is not clear how these
elements are distributed into the five (or seven) mukhoi, nor precisely what these
mukhoi are, nor exactly how they give rise to a second generation of gods. All we can
be reasonably sure of is that a second creation then seems to occur, as the eternal but
amorphous Earth is rendered inhabitable and inhabited by the life-creating demiur-
gy of the weaving Zas.
In Plato, by contrast, a single, apparently immortal divinity creates the world
while following an eternal intelligible model: the world of Forms or Ideas. This crea-
tion does not occur ex nihilo, but the Demiurge limits himself to setting in order a
pre-existent kind of proto-space (khôra), nursemaid (tithênê) or receptacle, which is
moving in a disorderly way, agitated by the traces of proto-elements.94 He thus cre-
ates the soul and body of the universe, using a kratêr or mixing-bowl for the former:
we may recall, at this juncture, that one of the alternative titles of Pherecydes' work
was Theokrasia, or mixing of the gods.95 Finally, when the Demiurge sets about the
creation of living beings (41aff.), he delegates the task to a second generation of cre-
ated gods; here we are inevitably reminded of Pherecydes, where a similar generation
of created gods is generated, in ways that are by no means clear, from the elements
emitted by Chronos.
Finally, we noted above that Zas' weaving of a pharos depicting the inhabitable
earth seems to have close parallel in Orphic traditions of Persephone weaving a simi-
larly-decorated peplos. Are there traces of such a conception in Plato? Perhaps: at
any rate, later commentators96 liked to refer to the Demiurge's construction of the
World soul by means of mathematical proportions and musical intervals as a “weav-
ing”, and this tradition may be reflected in certain Islamic sources,97 who ascribe to
Plato the invention of the art of “brocade” (Arabic al-dibāj).
248; Bernabé 2003, 178-180; West 1983, 9ff., 97, 245f.

94
Sturz, writing in 1845, was probably thinking of this passage from the Timaeus (as well
as of Gen. 1:10) when he interpreted Zas' wedding gift to Chthonie/Ge as a motion by which
Chaos, previously confused, was brought into order. Cf. Schibli 1990, 42 n. 84.
95
Schibli 1990, p. 20 n. 15.
96
Particularly Macrobius. Cf. Commentary on Scipio's dream, II, 3, 15: ad imaginem
contextionis animae.
97
Notably the anonymous Book of the Secret of Secrets (Sirr al-asrār), book II, p. 85 Badawi. Cf.
Ibn Abī Uৢaybi‘a, ‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ‫ܒ‬abaqāt al-a‫ܒ‬ibba’ (Sources and information on the generations
of physicians), vol. I, p. 43 Müller. These texts are the subject of M. Chase, in press.
To sum up, many features of Plato's Demiurge have significant parallels both in
Orphic traditions of Chronos and in the scant remains of Pherecydes' lost work,
which seems, perhaps for the first time in Greek philosophy,98 to portray a demiurgic
Zeus who creates the world as an artefact. Yet while the former kind of parallels have
been extensively studied, the parallels between Pherecydes' demiurgic Zeus and the
demiurge of Plato's Timaeus have not.99 I believe an in-depth study of these parallels
might be worthwhile.
Now that we have seen something of Pherecydes' ideas concerning the creation of
the cosmos, let's fast forward 2500 years or so and see to what extent they may, or
may not, have been on the right track.
Clearly, no one in his right mind is going to claim today that there was a divinity
named Chronos who produced the elements of which the world is made up by ejacu-
lation, whereas another divinity then changed the earth into an inhabitable place by
weaving a robe for it on which the world was depicted. Then again, chances are that
Pherecydes didn't mean his mythical accounts to be taken literally either. They were,
in all likelihood, intended, not as allegories but as symbols.100
If that's the case, what elements in Pherecydes' thought in particular, and ancient
speculation in general, might present analogies with current cosmological theories?
We've seen that the paradigm of weaving was important for Pherecydes, Plato,
and his commentators as a way of making comprehensible the origin of the world we
live in. Perhaps it's just a coincidence that one of Brian Greene's works, in which he
popularizes the conclusions of string theory, is entitled the Fabric of the Cosmos.101
One of the reasons for this title is Einstein's discovery of a four-dimensional space-
time that has elastic properties. Breaking with Newton, who thought of gravity as a
force acting instantaneously between two massive objects, Einstein thought of the
fabric of space-time as a kind of stretchable surface that can be bent and curved by
massive objects, as if one placed a bowling ball on a rubber sheet.102 Greene is also
alluding to the nature of string theory itself, according to which the many kinds of
particles known to contemporary physics, instead of being point-like, are in fact tiny
strings of non-zero length, whose apparently different properties are due to the way
they vibrate.
98
Schibli 1990, 54ff.
99
It is highly likely that Plato was familiar with Pherecydes' work. Plato's suggestion
(Timaeus 55d) that there might be five kosmoi certainly looks like a definite allusion to
Pherecydes' pentemukhos kosmos; cf. Schibli 1990, 22 & n. 18.
100
I assume, with Henry Corbin, that an allegory describes a state of affairs that could be
described otherwise, i.e. literally, while a symbol could not be stated in more explicit terms.
101
2004. See also David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality, New York: Penguin, 1997.
102
According to Bojowald 2010, 32, the equations of relativity “visualize space-time as a
curved and wrinkled sheet, albeit in four dimensions”. Cf. Frank 2011, 137: “in Einsteins's
theory, as elaborated by Minkowski, the whole of creation was nothing more than a web of
events situated in space and time”, “....Mass-energy caused the distortions of space-time's
fabric” (ibid. 141).
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 39
But it's no doubt in loop quantum gravity, a theory that envisages an atomic
structure of space and time and an eternal alternation between phases of expansion
and contraction of the universe, that the metaphor of weaving plays the most im-
portant role. According to the cosmologist Martin Bojowald103:
everything – space, time, and matter – is a fluctuating discrete mesh whose internal relations
are what we perceive as change (...) This picture is entirely different from that usually re-
ferred to in general relativity: the fabric of space is not made of rubber, but woven from
threads. One can view the space of loop quantum gravity as some kind of woven structure.
Pherecydes' vision of the woven fabric of the universe may thus have been on the
right track, although it would take prolonged studies by more qualified scientists
than I to confirm this suggestion.
APPENDIX: DARK MATTER AND DARK ENERGY
1. Dark matter
In 1933, Fritz Zwicky had suggested that the speed with which distant galaxy clusters
rotated seems to imply the presence of much more matter than was contained in the
stars. In the 1950s, the American astronomer Vera Rubin took up Zwicky's idea, de-
termining the velocity of galaxies or groups of galaxies by the frequency of light
emitted by hydrogen atoms. She hypothesized that clusters of galaxies might by ro-
tating around a central point, which would have to contain an enormous quantity of
mass, greater than the mass of all the stars in the galaxy in question. This led her to
propose, in her master's thesis, that some kind of invisible matter was also present in
large quantities. It took thirty years for Rubin's conclusions to be verified and ac-
cepted by most astrophysicists, but this had occurred by the 1980s, and the existence
of dark matter became a scientific commonplace.
What precisely that dark matter might be is quite another question. It's been pro-
posed that it may consist of MACHOS (massive compact halo objects); that is, main-
ly dead stars such as white dwarfs, brown dwarfs, neutron stars, and black holes. Yet
calculations of the presence in the universe of such light elements as hydrogen, lithi-
um, helium and deuterium show that the amount of matter in the universe that con-
sists in protons and neutrons must be much less than the amount of dark matter,
which cannot consist in protons, neutrons, atoms, or molecules.
The next suggestion was that dark matter may be made up of neutrinos, a particle
postulated by Wolfgang Pauli and confirmed experimentally by Enrico Fermi in
1934. The various types of neutrinos discovered are examples of WIMPS (weakly
interacting massive particles), but they are what's known as hot dark matter – they
move at speeds close to that of light – and so could not have led to the galaxy for-
mation we witness in our universe.104
103
Bojowald 2010, 85; 96-97.
104
On cold vs. hot dark matter, cf. Panek 2011 189ff.; Hooper 2006, 77ff.
Finally, according to a theory known as supersymmetry, there are seven candi-
dates for the role of dark matter: these include three sneutrinos (supersymmetric
partners of the three kinds of neutrino), as well as the supersymmetric partners of
the photon (called the photino), the Z boson (called the zino), and the two kinds of
Higgs boson (called Higgsinos). These latter four together are known as the neutral-
inos. The lightest of these neutralinos is the current favourite candidate for the role
of dark matter.
Of the many other candidates for the existence of dark matter, perhaps the
most interesting has been provided by string theory. This theory, which first
emerged in the 1960s and has undergone many revisions and metamorphoses
since then, predicts, among other things, that instead of the three or four dimen-
sions of which we are aware, there are many more dimensions – between 10 and
26 – most of which are too small for us to see. If there were particles travelling in
these extra dimensions, they would appear to us to be slow-moving and extremely
massive. It's been suggested that such particles, known as Kaluza-Klein states, may
be responsible for dark matter.
2. Dark energy
Dark energy, the mysterious force responsible for the acceleration of the expansion
of our universe, has often been considered as equivalent to Einstein's cosmological
constant. But perhaps a more interesting way to envisage it is as the power or density
of empty space, which physicists refer to as vacuum energy or zero-point energy. Its
effect is the opposite of that of gravity: it pushes matter apart, and its density always
remains fixed, no matter how much the universe may be diluted by its expansion.
This means that at the beginning of the universe, when the density of matter was
huge, the relative quantity of dark energy was insignificant. As the relative density of
matter became diluted by the Universe's rapid expansion, however, the quantity of
dark energy became more important, eventually overcoming the force of gravity.
When this occurred seven to five billion years ago – and here again we appear to
have something akin to a phase transition105 – the rate of the universe's expansion
began to accelerate, and we are still in the midst of this period of acceleration today.
An alternative to the interpretation of dark matter as a cosmological constant is
that it may be not constant, but a quintessence106 or dynamic dark energy, whose
effect varies over time. The particle responsible for it would have begun to act when
matter achieved dominance over radiation in the early history of the universe.
III. FROM THE CHURCH FATHERS TO ISLAM

In my last talk, I corrected some of what I said last year, when I claimed that the de-
bate over whether the world is eternal or created originated in Plato and Aristotle.
105
Panek (2011, 180) refers to this transition as the universe's “turning over”.
106
On quintessence cf. Hooper 2006, 178f.; Panek 2011, 208f.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 41
We have now seen that at least in Pherecydes of Syros and the Orphics, and quite
possibly in other Presocratics, what has often been seen as a Platonic innovation –
the notion of the world as created by a Demiurge – may go back to at least the sixth
century BCE. These sixth-century thinkers, in turn, may well have been inspired by
Oriental myths that were very ancient indeed.
Not all of what I said last year was false, however. We did see that Aristotelian doc-
trines of motion and change played a key role in ancient discussions of whether the
world is eternal or created. This, as we saw, could be described as a case in which a
Christian thinker tried to use the weapons of Greek philosophical thought – in this
case, those of Aristotelian natural philosophy – to defeat some key tenets of Greek phi-
losophy itself, such as the eternity of the world. Another Christian approach to this
issue was, however, equally possible. It started out more from Plato than from Aristo-
tle, and the solution it arrived at was rather theological than strictly philosophical.
In this part of my contribution, then, we'll begin by studying how pagans and es-
pecially Christians responded to Plato's explanation in the Timaeus of why the Dem-
iurge created the world, before moving on to a brief discussion on the way this prob-
lem was taken up in the world of Arabo-Islamic philosophy.
1. Plato on why God creates

As we saw last year, in the Timaeus (29e1-30a2), Plato gives a brief account of why
the Demiurge undertakes the creation of the world. Basically, Plato's explanation
could not be simpler: The Demiurge is good, and what is good desires to share that
goodness with others.107
As often in the history of Western philosophy, however, the simplest of proposi-
tions may conceal wide-ranging implications. In the course of the Late Classical and
Hellenistic periods, philosophers pored over every word of Plato's writings, trying to
tease out their deepest meaning. In this particular case, as they reflected on Plato's
axiom, they came up with some rather troubling questions: if the Demiurge creates
because he is good, does it follow that his essence or his being consists in his good-
ness? If so, then does his goodness consist in his creativity? If this is the case, howev-
er, what is the Demiurge's moral and ontological status when he is not creating the
world? What was he doing before then? Was he idle? If so, wasn't he behaving in a
manner contrary to his essence? But how could God be God without being good, i.e.
without creating the world?
To make a very long story very short, most Platonists concluded that God's creative
activity is necessary and eternal (cf. Text A): if God must create in order to fully realize
His essence, then there can never be a time when he does not create (Text C; D).
107
Cf. Plotinus, Ennead II 9, 3, 7ff.: “Each must give of what it has to something else, or else
the Good will not be Good”; Porphyry ap. Procl., In Tim., I, 368, 15 ff.: the demiurge's goodness
(agathotês) is the main principle (kuriôtatê arkhê) for the world's existence; cf. Baltes 1976, 145
n. 233. Hierocles of Alexandria also held that the Demiurge's only motives for creation are his
will and his goodness (De prov., in Photius, Library 214.4; In carm. aur. I, 13).
When it comes to the question of the origin of the world, these considerations seem to
rule out the possibility that the world was created at a specific moment in time, since it
is hard to accept the notion that God was ever idle prior to that moment. Creation
must be a continuous process, precisely because God must always create.
Some of these conclusions were bound to come into conflict with emerging
Christian orthodoxy. According to Biblical tradition, God's creation of the world was
a one-shot affair: it took place just once and it did so within time. Equally important-
ly, for this tradition the Creation was the result of a freely willed act on God's part,
but if God creates necessarily and automatically, like a body gives rise to its shadow
(Text D), then there seems to be no room left for God's creative will. On the Neopla-
tonic account of things, God seems to have no choice but to create, or as the Scholas-
tics would put it later, he lacks libertas contradictionis vel exercitii. Some Christians
also argued that the automatic nature of creation ruled out divine providence. If God
creates the world like a body casts a shadow, then why should He care about the
world's destiny? Who has ever wanted to adorn or purify his shadow?108
Many Christians nevertheless remained convinced that Plato's axiom was fun-
damentally true,109 even though this belief sometimes led them to what the Church
defined as heresy. The great church father Origen (c. 184-253 CE), for instance,
concluded that since God's goodness can never be inactive, his creative activity
must be without beginning or end (Text E).110 Thus God the Father eternally gen-
erates the Son111 ; but he also eternally creates rational beings,112 as well as an infi-
nite number of worlds, one after the other.113 The creation is thus co-perpetual
(sunaidios) with God.
108
Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus, cited by Wacht 1969, 81.
109
Augustine, for instance, wrote that as far as the reason for the existence of the world is
concerned, “there is no better cause than that the good should be created by a good God.
Plato, too, says this is most just cause for establishing the world: that good works should
come from a good God” (civ. Dei X1, 21). Cf. Origen., De princ. II, 9, 6, p. 169, 24ff.
Koetschau: Hic cum “in principio crearet” ea, quae creare voluit, id est rationabiles naturas,
nullam habuit aliam creandi causam nisi se ipsum, id est bonitatem suam.
110
Cf. Origen, De princ., I, 2, 10, p. 42, 12f. Koetschau: Ei de ouk estin hote pantokratôr
ouk ên, aei einai dei tauta, di' ha pantokratôr esti.
111
Cf. Origen, De princ., I, 2, 4, p. 33, 1 f. Koetschau, who speaks of the generation of Son
from the Father as aeterna generatio sicut splendor generatur ex luce. Compare, with Theiler
1966, p. 99, Plotinus V 1, 6, 28 on the Intellect as eternally engendered (aei gennômenon) by
the supra-essential Father, like sunlight from the sun.
112
Origen, De princ., 1, 2, 10; 1, 4, 3 K.; In Jeremiah, Homily 9, p. 70, 20ff. Klostermann.
113
Unlike in the Stoic theory, these worlds are not identical; cf. Origen, De princ., 119, 6ff.
K.; c. Cels 5, 21, p. 22, 28; 4, 67, p. 337, 6ff. In the new world, all differences between rational
beings cease to exist, so that, as Jerome sarcastically says (Letter 84, p. 129, 4): “After many
ages and the one restitutition of all things, Gabriel will be identical to the devil, Paul to
Caiphas, and virgins to prostitutes”.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 43
These views left Origen open to a number of accusations114 which eventually result-
ed in his being condemned as a heretic (as was John Philoponus).115 Origen was ac-
cused of having made God dependent on his own creation, and of having made Christ
the Son, identified with Sophia or the divine wisdom in which the Platonic Forms or
Ideas are recapitulated,116 subordinate to God the Father.117 To make Christ the Son
subordinate to God the Father was, of course, the heresy of Arianism, and last year we
saw Simplicius making the same reproach to Philoponus, when the latter claimed that
everything after the First, presumably including Christ the Son, is created.118
Other Church Fathers119 found other answers to Plato's requirement – or rather,
the doctrine deduced from Plato – that God's creative activity must be unceasing, by
maintaining that the world was already present in God's mind prior to its creation,
so that God was never inactive. Zacharias of Mytilene (PG 85, 1088), for instance,
solved the problem by claiming that prior to the creation of the world, God was busy
creating angels. Aeneas of Gaza, for his part, restricts God's eternal creativity to in-
ner-Trinitarian processes (production of the persons of the Trinity, creation of spir-
itual beings).
When Christian orthodoxy came to be codified – first at the first Council of Ni-
caea in 325, and then, with increasing rigor, in the doctrines of Athanasius – the Pla-
tonic principle was enshrined that God is always and naturally good, and is therefore
always generative.120 There was no time, it was decreed, when God did not generate
the Son, second person of the Holy Trinity.121 God created the world, which previ-
ously did not exist, out of nothing by a unique act of His will. Athanasius thus agreed
with the Platonists that God always had to be creative, yet he came up with an ingen-
ious distinction between two kinds of divine creativity. God's production of the Son
was a gennêma,122 which took place eternally and by nature (phusei), not by will.123
114
As early as 310 CE, Origen's student Pamphilus, the teacher of Eusebius, combined a
list of nine accusations raised against Origen, many of them mutually contradictory. Cf. PG
17, 578-579.
115
Origen was condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople, in 553.
116
Cf. Origen, De princ., p. 30, 7; 36, 5 Koetschau. Augustine holds the same view.
117
Cf. Origen, Contra Cels., V, 39, p. 43, 16ff. Koetschau: Χριστιανοί (...) τιμᾶν ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ
θεοῦ γεγενημένην καὶ οὖσαν υἱὸν θεοῦ (...) Κἂν δεύτερον οὖν λέγωμεν θεόν etc. Origen can
therefore refer to Christ as a ktisma or dêmiourgêma, cf. c. Cels 5, 37; De princ., 4, 4, 1; In Joh.
1, 20. The Arians also considered Christ to be a ktisma; cf. Athanasius, c. Ar. II, 28.
118
Chase 2011, 126 f.
119
Methodius; Gregory of Nazianzen, Carm. 1, 4, 55ff.; Eznik of Kolb Against Erroneous
Teachings 3, 17; Zacaharias of Mytilene, PG 85, 1068B; 1096C.
120
Athanasius, De inc. verbi, ch. 3 (with citation of Plato's Timaeus 29e); C.G. 41, De Inc. 42.
121
Athanasius, c. Ar. 3, 66, PG 26, 464B: hôsper agathos aei kai têi phusei, houtôs aei
gennêtikos têi phusei ho patêr. Athanasius inherits this concept from Origen; cf. Simonetti
1975, 271, n. 52.
122
Athanasius, c. Ar. 1, 16.
123
According to Athanasius, admitting that the Son was generated by the Father's will is
His production of the world, in contrast, was a poiêma, which took place in time, out
of nothing (ex ouk ontôn = ex nihilo), and was the result of an act of will (ek
boulêseôs).124 The Athanasian distinction between poiêma and gennêma can be
summed up as follows (Table 5).
As a result of this doctrine, Athanasius was able to show, against the Platonists,
that the existence of the world is contingent rather than necessary, and that it can
therefore have a temporal beginning-point of its existence. Although God cannot be
said to be a father in the absence of his Son, he can perfectly well be said to be Crea-
tor (poiêtês) even before the world was created. If a captious interlocutor were to ask
Athanasius why God, who is capable of always creating, does not always do so, he
can answer that the impossibility of eternal creation depends not on God but on his
Creation. By definition, created things come from nothing and did not exist before
they came into being: therefore, they cannot be eternal. Such things cannot, there-
fore, always co-exist with God, who is eternal in the full sense of the term.
My choice of mentioning Origen is not accidental. We recall, I hope, from last
year that we were able to trace back some of the doctrines John Philoponus used
when combatting Proclus' arguments in favor of the eternity of world to the works of
Plotinus' student, the Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry of Tyre. Thus, it seems to
have been Porphyry who first argued for the instantaneous nature of the creation of
the world, claiming it's analogous to the snapping of one's fingers or the appearance
of a flash of lightning. According to Porphyry, God brings the universe into exist-
ence just by thinking it, and simultaneously with his thought (hama noêmati).
What's more, Porphyry, building on the doctrine of the Chaldaean Oracles, seems to
have taught that god created matter,125 so that we can quite legitimately cite him as a
defender of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.126
Now Porphyry (ca. 235-c. 310 CE) was, of course, a student of Plotinus (c. 204-
270) who in turn was a student of a mysterious figure named Ammonius Saccas. Ac-
cording to some sources, including Porphyry, the Church Father Origen (c. 185-251)
equivalent to saying that there was a time when the Son did not exist (c. Ar. 3, 59, PG 26,
448A; 3, 66, 464A-B, cf. Ep. ad ep. Aeg. et Lib. 12, PG 25, 55). To say that the Son comes into
being through God's will amounts to saying that the Son is also a creature.
124
Athanas. c. Ar. 2, 24: monon êthelêke, kai hupestê ta panta; 3, 64: ta poiêmata boulêsei
(...) hupestê. Cf. Augustine, who speaks (c. Fel. 2, 18), of quod de se deus gennuit (Logos) -
quod fecit non de se, sed ex nihilo (viz., the world). For Athanasius (c. Ar. 3, 59, 26, 449C), to
identify gennêma and poiêma, as did the Arian Asterius, is the greatest of impieties.
125
Cf. Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus, p. 45, 4ff., Colonna, 51 Boissonade, quoted by
I. Hadot 2004, p. 18 n. 55: “Matter is thus neither unengendered nor without a beginning;
this is what the Chaldaean Oracles and Porphyry teach you. He entitles «On the Descent of
the Soul» the book which makes public the Chaldaean Oracles, in which the fact that matter
is engendered is strongly defended, and while interpreting Plotinus’ book entitled «On the
origin of evils », he says somewhere that matter is not unengendered, and that the affirmation
according to which it must be counted among the principles must be rejected as atheistic”.
126
Cf., however, the qualifications set forth by I. Hadot 2004, 23.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 45
was also a student of Ammonius, whom Porphyry claims was originally a Christian
who later converted to Christianity. If this is so – and there is a tremendous amount
of controversy on this point – then it's not impossible that both Origen and
Porphyry are reflecting the teachings of Ammonius when they maintain such doc-
trines as that of continuous creation. According to Willy Theiler, at any rate, Am-
monius already taught the doctrine of continuous creation, including matter, by the
Demiurge, and he backs up this view with evidence like our Text F, taken from Hi-
erocles of Alexandria, who quoted Ammonius. Theiler goes so far as to suggest that
where Porphyry differs from his master Plotinus, he is often returning, as a reaction
against Plotinus' innovations, to the views of Ammonius, for whom the highest prin-
ciple seems to have been not the One,127 as in Plotinus' metaphysics, but the Demiur-
gic Intellect, as it was in Middle Platonism.128 This, in turn, might help to explain the
fact, which scholars have often noted, that several aspects of Porphyry's thought
seem more akin to Middle Platonism than to Neoplatonism.
2. Proclus and the Plotiniana Arabica

In this second part of my presentation, I'll continue the discussion of the way the
debate over whether the world is created or eternal was transmitted from Greek to
Arabic sources. Here, I'll be concentrating on the relationship between the Neopla-
tonic philosopher Proclus (c. 412-485 CE) and a group of Arabic philosophical writ-
ings probably composed in the first half of the ninth century CE, and known collec-
tively as the Plotiniana Arabica.
The group of texts known as the Plotiniana Arabica includes the so-called Theol-
ogy of Aristotle,129 the Sayings of the Greek Sage,130 and the Treatise on Divine Science,
all of which consist primarily in translated extracts from books IV-VI of the Enneads
of Plotinus. Another group, which I won't have time to discuss here, is represented
by the Book of the Pure Good or Book of Causes,131 a work put together from adapta-
tions of several propositions from Proclus' Elements of Theology. The Plotiniana
Arabica, which “completed” Aristotelian metaphysics by ascribing to the Stagirite a
127
This point too is controversial; denied by Saffrey and Schwyzer, it is affirmed by Weber
and Baltes; cf. Schibli 2002, 52 n. 39.
128
And as it was for Origen the Christian, who denied the existence of any God higher
than the world-creator (De princ., 4, 2,1, p. 308, 5 Koetschau). Cf. Weber 1962, 106.
Hierocles, although he often speaks of the Demiurge as the highest principle in the two
partially preserved works that have come down to us, in fact knows several principles higher
than the Demiurge; cf. Hadot 1979; 2004.
129
Uthūlūjiyā wa-huwa qawl ‘alā-l-rubūbiyya. The manuscripts indicate the work is the
result of a commentary by Porphyry, and was translated by ‘Abd al-Masīত ibn Nā‘ima of
ণims; Scholars tend to dismiss the former assertion (rightly or wrongly) and accept the latter.
The guiding force behind this translation activity, which also included authentic works of
Aristotle and Alexander, was the great Islamic philosopher al-Kindī (ca. 801-873).
130
al-Šay‫ ې‬al-Yūnānī.
131
Kitāb (al-Ī‫ڲ‬ā‫ )ۊ‬fī Ma‫ ڲۊ‬al-‫ې‬air.
Neoplatonist-style system of emanation, were influential – tremendously so – on the
development of Islamic thought, but their main component, the Theology of Aristo-
tle, was not translated into Latin until the 16th century.132 The Book of the Pure Good,
by contrast, translated into Latin as the Liber de Causis, came to be very important
for Latin Scholasticism. It was commented upon, for instance, by Albertus Magnus
and his student Thomas Aquinas, and I think it could be shown that the interpreta-
tion of Aristotle proposed by Thomas, and maintained to this day by many Thomis-
tic philosophers, is unimaginable and incomprehensible unless one takes into ac-
count the influence of the Liber de Causis.133
It was a moment of tremendous importance in the study of Islamic philosophy
when, in 1973, Gerhard Endress published his Proclus Arabus. This book was devot-
ed to a study of the Arabic translation, probably carried out in the first part of the
ninth century,134 of 22 propositions135 from the Elements of Theology by the fifth-
century Neoplatonist Proclus, although the manuscript that preserves them an-
nounces that it contains “What Alexander of Aphrodisias has excerpted from Aristo-
tle's book ‘Theology’, i.e. On the Divinity”.
Without further ado, I'd like to draw your attention to one of these propositions,
Proclus' Elements of Theology, proposition 76 (our Text H). The two left-hand col-
umns give E. R. Dodds' Greek text with his English translation (which I've slightly
modified), while the two on the right give a transliteration of Endress' Arabic text,
together with my English translation.
Proclus' original Greek text is relatively straightforward: Things that come into
being or are generated from an unmoved cause are unchanging, while things that
derive from moved causes are changeable. He proves this by using a characteristic
Neoplatonic doctrine that was to be extremely important for Arabic philosophy:
unmoved causes produce their effects autôi tôi einai, by their very being.136 It follows
that their effects last as long as they do. The first cause always exists, therefore its
effect also always exists. Moving causes, in contrast, produce changeable effects. This
must be so, otherwise a cause would be mightier137 than its effect, which goes against
Neoplatonic principles.
132
1519, to be exact; cf. Zimmermann 112 & n. 15.
133
I refer mainly to the interpretation that for Aristotle, God is the Creator/efficient cause
of the world. This is not the only factor, of course. In the Arabic tradition on which Thomas
was partially dependent, Aristotle was already perceived through the filter of sometimes
tendentious translations and works of dubious authenticity, such as Alexanders' On the
principles of the All (fī-l-mabādi‘ al-kull). Cf. Endress 1997.
134
Endress 1973, 242.
135
Specifically, Propositions 1-3, 5, 15-17, 21, 54, 62, 72-74, 76, 78-80, 86, 91, and 167.
136
D'Ancona (2011, 195) speaks of creation autôi tôi einai as an “idea tipicamente post-
procliana e ‘dionusiana’”, but in fact it is already typical of the thought of Porphyry, more
than a century before Proclus. See, for instance, Porphyry, Commentary on the Timaeus, Text
A above.
137
Literally “stronger”, “more powerful” (kreittôn). For the Neoplatonists, being steadfast,
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 47
We have here one of the foundational statements of the doctrine of continuous
creation. Another formulation of it, also by Proclus, is part of Text D, which we have
already studied. In this text, Proclus, like all Neoplatonists, starts out implicitly from
Plato's explanation of creation in the Timaeus (29E): why did the Demiurge create
the world? The answer, as we have seen, is that he did so because he was good, and
therefore he wanted to share his goodness with other things to the greatest possible
extent. Note, by the way, that Proclus' argument seems to tread a fine line between
freedom and necessity on the Demiurge's part. On the one hand, mention is made of
his will (bouletai), but on the other the Demiurge's creation, motivated by his good-
ness, seems to be an almost automatic process, like the sun's heating or fire's warm-
ing.138 Yet Proclus here puts his finger on what was, as we have also seen, to become
a sore spot for Christian and Islamic apologists: if God is always good, and creation
is the natural, necessary, or inevitable activity of what is good, then surely God must
always create. Why, as Abrahamic Scripture claims, would he set about doing so one
fine day in history, say, six thousand years ago?139 What was He doing before then?
Was He idle? If so, wasn't he behaving in a manner contrary to His essence? But how
could God be God without being good, i.e. without creating the world?
Returning to the Arabic version of Proposition 76, we find that the opening
statement of the proposition is a faithful Arabic translation of the Greek. Before we
come to Proclus' proof, however, the Arabic interpolates a passage that has nothing
corresponding to it in the Greek. Nor is one likely to find anything corresponding to
this interpolation in any pagan Greek text with the possible exception of Porphyry –
because it introduces nothing other than the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, which
seems to contradict the fundamental principle of Greek thought that nothing comes
from nothing. According to the interpolator, what is created from or by the Highest
Cause – that is, God – is generated without change in anything prior to it: in other
immobile and unchanging was a sign of power.

138
Cf. Theology of Aristotle 8.143 (275) = p. 112 Dieterici (translation Zimmermann 237-8
n. 346): “The cause of time is not under time; no, it exists in a higher and loftier manner, like
the relation between the shadow and the object casting a shadow” (wa-‘illa al-zamān lā takūn
ta‫ۊ‬ta al-zamān, bal takūn bi-naw‘in a‘lā wa-arfa‘ ka-na‫ۊ‬w al-ܲill min ‫ڴ‬ī al-ܲill). On this text,
which the editor/translator has interpolated in his version of Plotinus, Ennead V 1, 6, 20, see
D'Ancona 2011, 158 & n. 48. The image of creation as similar to the casting of a shadow may
go back to Porphyry; cf. Sallustius, De diis et mundo 7, 2; Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus, p. 52
Boissonade; Zacharias of Mytilene, Ammonius, p. 105 Boissonade; Philoponus, De aet. mundi
14, 28 Rabe. Cf. Theiler 1966, 178f.; Wacht 1969, 73f. Interestingly, according to Aeneas the
Platonists deny that the body's production of its shadow is a case of making or creation (ou
pepoiêken): instead, the shadow is consequent upon the body (all' ekeinê toutôi
sunêkolouthêsen).
139
This was basically already Aristotle's (Phys. 8.1) reproach to Anaxagoras, who believed
in the periodic formation of worlds. As Ross comments (Aristotle's Physics, Oxford 1936,
689), “Anaxagoras merely introduces motion at one particular point of the world's history
without suggesting why it should have begun then rather than sooner or later”.
words, God does not change when He creates. Instead, such things come into being
from nothing (min lā šay’). In contrast, things that come into being from the sec-
ondary cause, otherwise known as Nature, do not come from nothing, but from a
change in something preceding them; in other words, in a pre-existent substrate.
In short, the doctrine contained in our interpolated passage can, I think, be re-
sumed as follows. When God creates, He does so ex nihilo.140 When Nature creates,
she does so from something pre-existent, in other words, from a substrate.
The brief text of this interpolation in the Arabic translation of one of the proposi-
tions of Proclus' Elements of Theology seems to me symptomatic of several of the key
features of the way Greek Neoplatonic texts were taken up and adapted in Arabo-
Islamic philosophy and theology. First there is the question of pseudonymy: the
manuscript presents the author of this text not as Proclus, the pagan Neoplatonist
who wrote books arguing for the eternity of the world, but as Alexander of Aphro-
disias, the greatest and most orthodox exegete of the greatest of the Greek philoso-
phers, Aristotle, whom the Arabs knew, at least since the time of Avicenna, as “the
First Teacher” (al-mu‘allim al-awwal). It was precisely this process of pseudonymous
attribution that led to the constitution and adoption of several Arabic texts that were
profoundly important, not only for Islamic philosophy and theology but also for the
Medieval West: foremost among these were the aforementioned Plotiniana Arabica
and the Liber de Causis.
The second significant element is, of course, the philosophical doctrine of our in-
terpolated passage. What could have led our translator to insert the doctrine of crea-
tio ex nihilo, so far from the beliefs of the historical Proclus, but also foreign to the
genuine views of both Aristotle and Alexander – into a translation/adaptation of a
proposition from Proclus' Elements of Theology?
The answer can be found, I think, in some of the texts we looked at last year. As
we saw, Proclus had also written a work entitled On the eternity of the world, in
which he presented a series of eighteen arguments against the Middle Platonic and
Christian doctrine that the world was created in time. This work is lost in the origi-
nal Greek, and preserved only by quotations made of it by the Christian Neopla-
tonist John Philoponus, when, around 529 AD, he set out to refute it in his On the
Eternity of the world against Proclus. Proclus' work was, however, translated into Ar-
abic,141 as was Philoponus' refutation of it.142 The fourth of Proclus' arguments, as
reproduced by Philoponus, is Text H on your handout.
We can see right away that this argument is merely an expanded version of propo-
sition 76 of the Elements of Theology, or rather an application of it to the question of
140
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (lā min šay’) appears in the so-called Long Version of
the Theology of Aristotle (cf. Zimmermann 178f.; 196ff.), and plays a crucial role in the
thought of al-Kindī and the Pseudo-Fārābī.
141
In at least two versions, once by the great translator Isতāq ibn ণunain; cf. Endress
1973, 15-17.
142
Endress, loc. cit., 17-18.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 49
whether the world is eternal or was created in time. Starting off from the conclusion of
prop. 76 – that an unmoved cause produces unchanging effects, and does so by its very
being (autôi tôi einai) – Proclus adds additional considerations. The Demiurge cannot
change from producing the world to not producing it, since if he did he would be
moved (change being a kind of motion), and the Demiurge has been supposed to be
unchangeable. An unmoved cause, like the Demiurge, must therefore produce the
world either always or never: Proclus does not discuss this second alternative here, but
we can assume it's ruled out by the Demiurge's goodness and lack of jealousy (Plato's
axiom in the Timaeus, as we saw earlier). Proclus now goes on to add a proof of why
the Demiurge must be unmoved. He adduces two arguments: the first uses the Aristo-
telian and Peripatetic axiom that motion is an incomplete actuality,143 in order to claim
that to impute motion or change to the Demiurge is to attribute to him incompletion
or imperfection. We saw in our Text E that Origen also rejects this possibility. The
second argument uses the unstated premise that all motion takes place in time, to ar-
gue that if the Demiurge moved or changed, he would need to do so in time. But ac-
cording to Proclan metaphysics, the Demiurge produces time, so he cannot require it
in order to move or change. It follows, Proclus concludes, that if someone intends to
honour the Demiurge by claiming, as the Christians do, that He is everlasting but the
world is not, then that person is in fact dishonouring God, imputing to him change,
and hence imperfection and a need for time.
Philoponus, as a Christian, is not buying Proclus' arguments. He does not deny
the Aristotelian premises that all motion takes place in time, or that motion is an
imperfect actuality. What he does deny, as we saw last year, is that God's creative
activity can correctly be called a motion. According to Philoponus, God's creative
activity, by which He produces all things through His will alone,144 outside of time
and space, cannot be a motion. Whereas all motions (Greek kinêseis) are activities
(energeiai), not every activity is a motion. Indeed, Philoponus argues, there are two
kinds of activity145: on the one hand, there is motion (kinêsis), which is a transition
from initial potentiality to the acquisition of a state (Greek hexis). Examples might
include my studying Greek, or losing weight: these processes, which have their goal
outside themselves, take place in time and are necessarily imperfect or incomplete
until they have achieved their goal. Once I've learned Greek, or lost weight, the re-
143
Aristotle, Physics 3, 1, 210a10ff.
144
We saw in Text F that Hierocles, Proclus' contemporary, also holds that the Demiurge
creates by his will alone.
145
As Hasnawi has shown, this distinction is derived from Themistius (In Phys., 3, 1,
p. 68, 30ff. Schenkl), whom Philoponus copies out word for word in his Commentary on the
Physics (CAG 16, p. 341, 22f. Vitelli). This commentary was translated into Arabic, and
extracts from it were integrated into Iৢতāq ibn ণunain's Arabic translation of the Physics.Yet
the ultimate source seems to have been Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestio I, 21, p. 34, 30-35,
15 Bruns, a work that was translated into Arabic under the title “On form and the fact that it
is the perfection and accomplishment of motion according to Aristotle”.
sult, according to Aristotelian thought, is a hexis, characterized by full actuality and
the elimination of all potentiality. Now that I have learned Greek, when I actually
read or write it – that is, when I actualize my hexis – this process is instantaneous: it
takes place outside of time, and therefore cannot be described as a motion or a
change.146 As Philoponus puts it, such instantaneous “projections” (Greek probolê)
from a hexis take place en tôi nun, that is, in the now, that indivisible instant which is
not time, according to Aristotle, precisely because it is the limit of time.
In books 9 and 11 of his Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World, Philoponus
came up with other arguments to prove that God's creation of the world was instan-
taneous, and took place ex nihilo. He recycled some of these arguments in another
work, entitled Against Aristotle,147 fragments of which are preserved by Simplicius in
his own Commentary on Aristotle's Physics 8 (Text J).
Here, Philoponus emphasizes the difference between the modes of creation of Nature
and God. Nature, which requires a substrate, must produce what she produces out of
things that already exist (ex ontôn). But this is not true of God, whose transcendence
means he does not require any pre-existent material to carry out his creative activity.
Indeed, if God is to be any different from nature (and Philoponus, as a Christian, clearly
thinks He must), then He must not create in the same way Nature does. Unlike Nature,
God creates not only the forms that give shape to matter, thereby creating the visible
world, but He also creates matter itself.148 It follows that the old Greek saw that ex nihilo
nihil fit is wrong: creating ex nihilo is precisely what God does.
There is, moreover, another crucial difference between the creative activity of
God and of Nature. Nature needs time and the process of generation (kai khronou
kai geneseôs) in order to create: here we may think of the way Nature guides the de-
velopment of an embryo into an adult living being. God, in contrast, gives existence
to things timelessly and without any process of generation or development
(akhronôs kai aneu geneseôs), and He does so by His will alone.149
Once again, a number of things are interesting about this text. First, a version of
it was translated into Arabic, where it was attributed (once again) to Alexander of
Aphrodisias and circulated under the title “Treatise by Alexander of Aphrodisias,
refuting the doctrine that affirms that nothing comes about from nothing, and estab-
lishing that everything only comes about from nothing”.150 Second, it was taken up
146
Cf. Philoponus, In de an., p. 297, 2-3: ἐνέργεια δέ ἐστιν ἡ τελεία προβολὴ τῆς ἕξεως
μηδὲν τῆς ἕξεως௎ἀλλοιοτέρας γινομένης.
147
Philoponus, Against Aristotle, fr. 115 Wildberg = Simplicius, In Phys., 1141, 10ff.
148
We have seen is reason to believe that Philoponus may have picked up this doctrine
from Porphyry, the arch-enemy of Christianity; cf. Chase 2011, 145ff.
149
Note the slight shift in emphasis here: whereas for most post-Plotinian Neoplatonists
God creates by being alone (autôi tôi einai), for Philoponus God creates by willing alone
(arkei (...) autôi monon to thelein). Hierocles, as we have seen, is an exception to this rule.
150
Maqālatu al-Iskanadari al-Afrūdīsī fī ib‫ܒ‬āli qawli man qāla innahu lā yakūnu šay’un
illā min šay’in wa i‫ܔ‬bāti anna kulla šay’ innamā yakūnu lā min šay’in. This important
discovery is due to Ahmad Hasnawi (1994).
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 51
and used by al-Kindī, the early Islamic philosopher who was the driving force behind
the redaction of the Plotiniana Arabica and the Liber de Causis, as we can see from
our Text K. Here, al-Kindī argues, very much like Philoponus, that since God is
powerful enough to create without matter – that is, ex nihilo – he also does not re-
quire time to create the world. Probably owing to its adoption by al-Kindī, the doc-
trine of instantaneous creation also found its way into the Theology of Aristotle, as we
can see in our Text L. Here, Plato is praised for having claimed that God is the Crea-
tor of the intellect, soul, and nature, but although Plato may appear to be claiming
that this creation takes place in time, this mode of expression was merely for peda-
gogical purposes. In fact, God's creation takes place outside of time, and is simulta-
neous with its effect: in other words, it is instantaneous.
Most importantly for our present purposes, Philoponus' text is clearly the origin
of the interpolation in our Proclus text from which we started out. As we recall, the
interpolator stated there that the highest cause, i.e. God, creates from nothing, while
nature creates “from the change of something previous to it”, i.e. from a substrate.
We now know, I submit, where the interpolator got this doctrine from: Phi-
loponus' work Against Proclus on the eternity of the world (although he may well
have thought he was reading a treatise by Alexander). Proposition 76 of Proclus' El-
ements of Theology was thus transmitted to the Arab world already provided with a
correction by Proclus' adversary Philoponus.151
Most important of all, I think, we are now in a position to understand the doctri-
nal motivations behind our interpolation. If our interpolator corrected Proclus by
means of Philoponus, it is because he knew that Proposition 76 of the Elements of
Theology could be and in fact was used to argue against the Abrahamic dogma of
God's freely willed creation within time. If God is to be unmoved, He must always
create by His very being, and therefore the world, as His creation, must always exist.
The alternative, according to Proclus, is to allow that God is moved or changed, but
this would entail two unacceptable consequences. First, since motion is an incom-
plete or imperfect activity, it would mean attributing imperfection or incompleteness
to God. Second, since all motion takes place within time, it would mean that God,
who is to be considered the Creator of time, would stand in need of time in order to
carry out his creative activity. God must therefore always create, and the world is
therefore eternal, or rather perpetual: it cannot have been created at a specific mo-
ment in time, after not having existed.
The way Philoponus tried to refute these Proclan objections was, as we have seen,
rather ingenious. Yes, he says, God carries out a creative activity (energeia), but Proclus
is wrong to conclude from that one can attribute a motion (kinêsis) to God. Not all
151
It may well be the case that our interpolation started out as a marginal gloss by an
Islamic scribe, reader, translator or editor who knew this Proposition had been used (by
Proclus himself!) to argue against the creation of the world in time, and also knew that
Alexander/Philoponus' modification could be used to defuse Proclus' objection and render
Proclus' thought compatible with a creationist theology such as that of Islam.
energeiai are kinêseis. Kinêseis are necessarily imperfect and take place in time: they
characterize a process in which a thing has not yet reached its goal. But there is anoth-
er kind of energeia, characteristic of things that have already achieved their goal. This
kind of perfect or complete energeia is a projection from or activation of an acquired
state (hexis): when I read or write Greek after learned it, such activation does not bring
about any motion or change in me, but is simply the full realization of what I already
am. What is more, such activation of a hexis does not take place in time: like such
phase transitions as the freezing of water152 or the curdling of milk, or activities of our
senses such as seeing or touching, they take place en tôi nun, in the instant, or athroôs,
all at once. In other words, they are instantaneous.153 Likewise, for Philoponus, God's
creation of the world is the instantaneous activation of His hexis as Creator: it takes no
time and implies no change on His part. Creation is merely the realization of God's
essence qua benevolent Creator.
We have here, in conclusion, an example of the transmission of Greek thought to
Islamic philosophy that exhibits several features that are typical of this process, not
least of which is its complexity. Ideas developed by the Christian John Philoponus have
been found to be interpolated into a paraphrastic translation of a text by the anti-
Christian pagan Proclus; the resulting text is attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias,
and similar themes wind up in the Theology of Aristotle, a text based on a paraphrastic
translation of Plotinus but attributed to Aristotle.
Despite the complexity of this process of transmission and adaptation, and the ob-
scurity of many of its details, the end result is reasonably clear. Thanks to the Theology
of Aristotle, the Liber De Causis, and other similar apocrypha, Islamic thought was
henceforth provided with a Neoplatonizing supplement to Aristotle's Metaphysics,
which taught a system of emanation of all reality from the highest good, combined
with Creationist tendencies that rendered it compatible with a monotheistic religion,
while harmonizing the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Whatever one may think of
the philosophical value of such a project, it cannot be denied, I think, that it was a
tremendous success, deeply influencing subsequent thought in both Sunni and
Shi‘ite Islam, in Medieval Jewish thought, and in Western Scholasticism.
152
Cf. Aristotle, Physics 8, 3, 253b6-26, De sensu; 6, 446b28-447a13.
153
Cf. Croese 1998, 51 et passim; Chase 2011. Al-Kindi and his circle of translators, who
were responsible for the constitution of the Plotiniana Arabica and the Liber de Causis,
eagerly adopted Philoponus' doctrine of instantaneous change, so much so that when Kindi
came to discuss the Aristotelian list of types of motion or change (transportation, generation,
corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration), he added a new type: the motion of
creation (al-‫ۊ‬arakatu al-ibdā‘), which differs from generation in that the motion of creation
does not take place out of a preexistent substrate. Cf. Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī, in Abū
ণayyān al-Tawতīdī, al-Imtā‘ wa-l-mu’ānasa, vol. 3, p. 133 Amin/al-Zayn, quoted by Rashed
2008, 53 (cf. Altmann-Stern 1958, 69-70).
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 53
TABLES
Table 1. Does the universe have a beginning and an end?
Beginning End Periodicity
Simplicius No No No
Philoponus Yes Yes No
Plato (Timaeus inter- Yes No No
preted literally)
Stoics Yes Yes Yes
Table 2. Timeline of the universe

Period Time after the Big Bang Characteristics
1. Planck epoch 0 to 10-43 seconds Fundamental forces (electro-
magnetic, strong and weak)
united.
2. Grand unification epoch 10-43 to 10-36 seconds Fundamental forces separate
into strong and weak force.
Temperature: 1028-1015 Kelvin.
3. Inflation 10-36 and 10-32 seconds
Exponential growth.
-30
4. Quark-gluon plasma 10 seconds – 1 second Predominance of radiation;
quarks and gluons condense
into protons and neutrons.
Temperature 1012 K.
5. Nucleosynthesis 1 – 100 seconds Predominance of matter; pro-
(nucleus-electron plasma) tons & neutrons to form
atomic nuclei (deuterium,
helium, lithium).154 Light
trapped in the plasma soup.
Temperature 108 K.
6. Recombination 379,000 years Protons, electrons bind to-
gether to form hydrogen at-
oms; photons released; de-
coupling, surface of last
scattering; origin of CMB.
Temperature 4x103K.
154
The distribution of these elements, predicted by George Gamow in 1948 and
subequently confirmed experimentally, played an important role in the acceptance of the Big
Bang theory.
7. Formation of stars and 9-12 billion years ago
galaxies, including our so-
lar system
8. Predominance of 5 billion years ago – Accelerated expansion.
dark energy present
Table 3. The geometry and curvature of space155
Geometry Type Curva- Omega Spatio- Angles of Universe's future

of space- of uni- ture (ΩM ΩM)156 temporal a triangle
time verse dimen-
sions
Spheri- >180° Big Crunch
cal157 closed positive > 1158 finite parallel (cosmic density of
lines matter > critical den-
converge sity; gravity triumphs
over expansion).
Hyper- Expansion continues
bolic/ open nega- <1 infinite <180°; forever, leading to
pseudo- tive parallel empty world
sphere lines drift (cosmic density of
(saddle- apart matter < critical den-
shaped) sity; expansion tri-
umphs over gravity).
Eucli- Expands forever, but
dean159* flat zero 1 infinite 180° rate of increase
(table top) parallel gradually slows
lines re- down (cosmic densi-
main ty of matter = critical
parallel density; expansion
and gravity are in
equilibrium).
155
Friedmann's assumption that the universe in homogeneous – that is, that it has the
same density of matter everywhere, which implies that the universe's curvature should also be
identical everywhere – basically restricts the possibilities of the universe's shape to three
(Magueijo 2003, 89).
156
ΩM designates the matter content of the universe, or more precisely the ratio between
the universe's gravitational energy and the energy of its expansion (Magueijo 2003, 94; Panek
2011, 128). The critical density, at which the universe is neither open nor closed, is estimated
at one gram per hundred trillion cublic kilometers of space (Hooper 2006, 162).
157
It should be recalled that the sphere in question is three-, not two-dimensional.
158
In a closed universe, the universe's gravitational energy exceeds its kinetic energy.
159
Current data appears to be consistent with this alternative (cf. Grain 153; Penrose
2010, 66; Frampton 2010, 79).
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 55
Table 4. Dark energy equations of state
Equation of state Dark matter Dark energy density Results
density
Constant, = -1 Dark energy dominates as
(= Einstein's cosmo- declines remains constant time goes by, universe con-
logical constant) tinues to expand, never con-
tracts.
Constant, > -1 increases Universe's scale factor (size)
soon becomes infinite, cos-
mological time ends ; Big Rip
(everything torn apart by
repulsive gravitational force)
Table 5. Pherecydes on time and the elements
Zeus
(ether)
fire
air
Eternal water Temporal
Chthonie
(earth)
Table 6. Athanasius on the generation of the Son and the creation of the world
Type of creation Relation to Relation to God's will Relation to time
God's essence
poiêma (world) outside divine essence dependent in time
gennêma (Son) idion tês ousias not dependent eternal
gennêma/ex autou
phusei gennômemon
TEXTS
Text A: Porphyry, In Tim., fr. 50, p. 36, 3ff. Sodano = Proclus, In Tim., I, 393, 1-13 Diehl
αὖθις δὲ μεταβαλλόμενοι λέγουσιν εἶναι καὶ Shifting ground once again, they [sc. the
ἄνευ τοῦ δημιουργεῖν τὸν θεόν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο followers of Atticus] say that god exists even
εἰδότες, ὅτι αἱ ἀληθεῖς δυνάμεις αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι without creating; but they do not even know
ἐνεργοῦσι, καὶ ἡ αὐξητικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἡ that true powers act by their very being (autôi
θρεπτικὴ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι τρέφει τὸ σῶμα καὶ tôi einai): both the power of growth and the
αὔξει. οὕτω δὴ οὖν καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ψυ- (5) χοῖ καὶ nutritive power feed and increase the body
ζῳοποιεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ ὄργανον ἑαυτῆς· οὐ γὰρ by their very being. Indeed, this is how the
προελομένων ἡμῶν αἰσθάνεται ἢ σφύζει τὸ soul animates, (5) vitalizes and moves its
σῶμα, ἀλλ’ ἡ παρουσία μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς instrument, for the body does not sense nor
ἀποτελεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ταύτας. does the pulse beat as the result of our pre-
vious choice, but it is the soul's mere pres-
ence that carries out these activities.
ἔτι τὸ πᾶν πρός τι πεφυκὸς ἀεὶ κατ’ Further, there is the fact that everything
οὐσίαν ἔχει ἐκείνην τὴν δύναμιν, τὸ δὲ that naturally tends toward something has
ἄλλοτε ἄλλως μεταβαλλόμενον ἐπίκτητον. that power by essence (kat'ousian), while
(10) εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ δημιουργεῖ, that which changes in various ways at differ-
σύμφυτον ἂν ἔχοι τὴν δημιουργικὴν δύναμιν· ent time is adventitious (epiktêtos). (10) If,
εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπίκτητον. then, god always creates, his creative power
will be innate (sumphutos); if not, it will be
adventitious (epiktêton).
Text B: Porphyry, In Tim., fr. 47, p. 30, 9-32, Sodano = Philoponus, De aet. mundi 6, 14,
p. 164, 12 - 165, 16 Rabe
‘οὐκ ἔστιν ταὐτὸν κόσμου ποίησις καὶ The creation of the world and the subsistence
σώματος ὑπόστασις οὐδὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ of bodies are not the same thing, nor are the
σώματός τε καὶ κόσμου, ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὲν κόσμος principles of body and world the same, but in
γένηται, δεῖ σώματα (20) εἶναι καὶ θεὸν εἶναι, order for the world to be generated, bodies
ἵνα δὲ σώματα, δεῖ ὕλην εἶναι καὶ θεὸν καὶ τὸ and (20) god must exist, and in order for bod-
ἐπιγινόμενον ἄλλο μέν, ἵνα σωματωθῇ ὕλη, ies <to be generated>, there must be matter
ἄλλο δέ, ἵνα τὰ σωματωθέντα ταχθῇ. and god, and what supervenes: one <super-
vening> thing for matter to be turned into
bodies, and another for the things turned into
ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἅμα γίνεται πάντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ bodies to be ordered. But all these always take
διηρ (165) τημένα, ἀλλ’ ἥ γε διδασκαλία place at the same time, and are not separated
ἀναγκαίως διαιρεῖ, ἵνα διδάσκῃ ἀκριβῶς τὸ (165) by time, but pedagogy necessarily sepa-
γιγνόμενον· σώματος μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ θεὸς μὲν rates them, so that it can accurately teach what
γεννῶν, ὕλη δὲ καὶ τὰ σχήματα, ἃ προϊὼν happens. For the principles of body are god
ἡμᾶς διδάξει, ὡς ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν τὰ (who generates), matter, and the figures,
σώματα γεννηθέντων ἀπὸ θεοῦ, κόσμου δὲ about which he will teach us later,160 in the
160
That is, the geometrical figurs, ultimately triangles, out of which the universe is
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 57
τὰ ἤδη ὑποστάντα (5) σώματα ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ sense that that from which bodies came into
θεὸς ὁ ταῦτα τάσσων’· being were generated by god, but the <princi-
ples of> the world are the (5) bodies that have
already been brought into being by god, and
god, who sets them in order.
Text C: Proclus and Porphyry apud Philoponus, De aet. mundi, p. 224, 12ff. Rabe
ἅπερ δὲ ὁ Πρόκλος ἐν τῷ πολλάκις ....what Proclus postulates in the work on the

μνημονευθέντι ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τιμαίου πρὸς Timaeus against Aristotle, which we have
Ἀριστοτέλην λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν Πορφυρίου πάλιν often mentioned, once again copying (20)
μεταγραψά- (20) μενος τίθησιν ἐκ περιόδων Porphyry, trying to show on the basis of
δεικνύειν πειρώμενος, ὡς ἄναρχον εἶναι τὴν <cosmic?> periods that Plato thought the
τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν ὁ Πλάτων ᾤετο, διότι τε becoming of the world is beginningless, be-
τὸ τοῦ κόσμου παράδειγμα αἰώνιον εἶναι cause he says the model of the world is eter-
λέγει καὶ διότι αἰτίαν εἶναί φησιν τῆς τοῦ nal, and because he says the cause of the
κόσμου ὑπάρξεως τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθότητα world's existence is god's goodness (“For he
(‘ἀγαθὸς (225) γὰρ ἦν’, φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, was (225, 1) good”, says Plato, “and no jeal-
‘ἀγαθῷ δ’ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ousy with regard to anything ever comes to
ἐγγίνεται φθόνος’), ἐξ ὧν ὁ Πρόκλος be within what is good”. From this, Proclus
συνάγει, ὅτι, εἰ τὸ τοῦ κόσμου παράδειγμα concludes that if the model of the world al-
ἀεί ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τοῦ παραδείγματος ways exists, then the image of the model, viz.
εἰκόνα τὸν κόσμον ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ ὅτι, εἰ ἀεὶ the world, must always exist, and that if god
ἄφθονος ὁ θεός, (5) ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ ἀγαθός, ἀεὶ is always free of jealousy, (5) since he is al-
καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἔσται ἤ, εἰ μὴ ἀεί ἐστιν ὁ ways good, then the world will always exist,
κόσμος, δυνάμει εἶναι καὶ τὸν τούτου or, if the world does not always exist, its cre-
δημιουργὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτελῆ καὶ χρόνου ator would be in potency and therefore im-
δεόμενον. perfect and in need of time.
Text D: Porphyry, In Tim., fr. 46, p. 29, 15 ff. Sodano = Procl. In Tim., I, 366, 20-368, 1 Diehl
ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἁπάντων συνελεῖν ῥᾴδιον, (20) From all these considerations it is easy to
ὅτι καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς αἰωνίως ποιεῖ, καὶ ὁ conclude (20) both that the demiurge creates
κόσμος ἀίδιός ἐστι κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν eternally, and that the world is perpetual in
χρόνον ἐκτεινομένην ἀιδιότητα, καὶ ὡς ἀεὶ the sense of that perpetuity that extends
γίγνεται τεταγμένος καὶ ὡς ἄφθαρτος οὐκ throughout all time, and that it always comes
ἔστιν ἀεί, γίνεται δὲ ἀεὶ ἀγαθυνόμενος, ἀλλ’ into being in an ordered state, and that qua
οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἀγαθὸς ὤν, ὡς ὁ γεννήσας imperishable, it does not always exist, but it
αὐτὸν πατήρ· πάντα γὰρ ἐν (25) αὐτῷ comes into being by being always rendered
γινομένως ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὄντως ὡς ἐν τοῖς good, not being good at the outset, like the
αἰωνίοις. (...) Father who engendered it. For everything in
(25) it exists in the mode of becoming, not in
the mode of being, as is the case in eternal
πότερον οὖν οὐ δημιουργεῖ μὴ βουλόμενος ἢ things. (...) Does he fail to create, then, be-
μὴ δυνάμενος; εἰ μὲν δὴ φήσομεν, ὅτι μὴ cause he does not wish to do so, or because
ultimately constituted in the Timaeus.

βουλόμενος, λανθάνομεν αὐτοῦ τὴν he is not able ? If we say it is because he does
ἀγαθότητα ἀναιροῦντες· εἰ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος, not so wish, then we unwittingly eliminate
ἄτοπον τὸ ποτὲ μὲν δύναμιν ἔχειν, (5) ποτὲ his goodness161. If it is because he is not able,
δὲ ἀδυναμίαν αὐτόν· ἀφαιρήσομεν γὰρ τὸ then it is absurd for him to sometimes have
αἰώνιον. (...) the power (5) and sometimes impotence; for
thus we would eliminate his eternity. (...)
καὶ διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον, ὅτε εἶδε καλὸν ὂν And why did he not <set it in motion> earli-
τοῖς γιγνομένοις τὸ γίνεσθαι, εἴπερ καὶ τότε er, when he saw that coming into being is
ἀγαθὸς ἦν καὶ ἠβούλετο πάντα αὐτῷ good for things that come into being, since
γενέσθαι παραπλήσια; συνήρτηται ἄρα τῇ he was good then too, and wished everything
μὲν ἀγαθό- (15) τητι τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ τῆς to become like himself? Therefore, the exten-
προνοίας ἐκτένεια, ταύτῃ δὲ ἡ τοῦ sion of providence (15) is closely related to
δημιουργοῦ διαιώνιος ποίησις, ταύτῃ δὲ ἡ the Father's goodness, and closely related to
τοῦ παντὸς κατὰ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον this extension is the Demiurge's everlasting
ἀιδιότης, γιγνομένη οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑστῶσα creation, and closely related to this is the
ἀιδιότης, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ταύτην τε universe's perpetuity throughout infinite
ἀναιρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἀγαθότητα τοῦ πεποιηκότος· time, a perpetuity that is coming-into-being
εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ἀεὶ ὁ δημιουρ- (20) γός, ἀεὶ and not steadfast, and the same argument
βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ πᾶσιν· eliminates it and the Creator's goodness. For
if the Demiurge is always (20) good, he al-
ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος ἐν ὅσῳ ἐστί, πάντα ways wishes good to all things. For as the sun
καταλάμπει, καὶ τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει—κατ’ illuminates all things insofar as it exists, and
οὐσίαν γάρ ἐστιν ὃ μὲν φωτιστικός, τὸ δὲ πῦρ fire heats – for it is by essence that the former
θερμαντικόν—οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ ὂν ἀγαθὸν ἀεὶ illuminates and the latter heats – so that
βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθά· which is always good always wills good things.
Text E: Methodius, On generated things, ap. Photius, Library, 302a30ff
Ὅτι ὁ Ὠριγένης, ὃν Κένταυρον καλεῖ, ἔλεγε That Origen, whom he [sc. Methodius] calls
συναΐ- (30) διον εἶναι τῷ μόνῳ σόφῳ καὶ the Centaur, said that the universe is co-
ἀπροσδεεῖ Θεῷ τὸ πᾶν. Ἔφασκε γάρ· εἰ οὐκ (30) perpetual with God, who alone is wise
ἔστι δημιουργὸς ἄνευ δημιουργημάτων ἢ and without need. For he said: if there is no
ποιητὴς ἄνευ ποιημάτων, οὐδὲ παντοκράτωρ creator without creation, or maker without
ἄνευ τῶν κρατουμένων (τὸν γὰρ δημιουργὸν things made, or all-ruler without things to
διὰ τὰ δημιουργήματα ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν be ruled over (for the creator must be called
ποιητὴν διὰ τὰ ποιήματα καὶ (35) τὸν creator because of his creations, and the
παντοκράτορα διὰ τὰ κρατούμενα λέγεσθαι), maker because of what he makes, and (35)
ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ the all-ruler because of the things ruled),
γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ μὴ εἶναι χρόνον ὅτε οὐκ ἦν they must have been brought into existence
ταῦτα. Εἰ γὰρ ἦν χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἦν τὰ by God from the beginning, and there must
ποιήματα, ἐπεὶ τῶν ποιημάτων μὴ ὄντων not have been a time when these things did
οὐδὲ ποιητής ἐστιν, ὅρα οἷον ἀσεβὲς not exist. For if there were a time when the
ἀκολουθεῖ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσ- (40) θαι καὶ things made did not exist, since there is no
μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον maker if the things made do not exist, see
161
Again, we say the influence of Plato's postulate: God's goodness necessarily entails his
constant creation.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 59
συμ- (302b) βήσεται Θεόν· what impieties follow. But it will also (40)
result that the unchanging and unalterable
God will be altered (302b) and changed. For
εἰ γὰρ ὕστερον πεποίηκε τὸ πᾶν, δῆλον ὅτι if he created the universe later, it is clear that
ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν μετέβαλε. he changed from not creating to creating; but
Τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον μετὰ τῶν προειρημένων. this is absurd after what has been previously
Οὐκ ἄρα δυνατὸν λέγειν μὴ εἶναι ἄναρχον said. It is therefore impossible to say that the
καὶ συναΐδιον τῷ Θεῷ τὸ πᾶν. universe is not beginningless and co-
perpetual with God.
Text F: Hierocles apud Photius, Library, cod. 251, p. 461b6-9

Ὅτι δημιουργὸν θεόν, φησί, προϋφίστησιν ὁ That Plato, he says, makes a demiurgic god
Πλάτων ἐφεστῶτα πάσης ἐμφανοῦς τε καὶ pre-exist, who is in charge of the entire visi-
ἀφανοῦς διακοσμήσεως, ἐκ μηδενὸς ble and invisible order, which did not come
προϋποκειμένου γεγενημένης· ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τὸ into existence out of anything pre-existent.
ἐκείνου βούλημα εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὄντων. For his will is sufficient for beings to come
into existence.162
Text G: Hierocles, On Providence, Book II, ap. Photius, Library, cod. 251, p. 463 b 30ff. Bek-
ker, vol. VII, p. 198 Henry = Dörrie-Baltes V, Baustein 141.3, p. 472-4
Ὅτι φησί, κατ’ οὐσίαν ἐκεῖνα λέγεται ποιεῖν The author writes: those things of which it is
ὅσα μένοντα ἀτρέπτως ἐν τῇ αὑτῶν οὐσίᾳ said that they act according to their essence
καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ (30) μηδὲν ἑαυτῶν are those that remain immutable in their
ἀπομερίζοντα μηδὲ κινοῦντα πρὸς τὴν τῶν own essence and in their activity, without
γεννωμένων ὑπόστασιν, κατ’ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ (30) detaching anything from themselves,
εἶναι ὅ ἐστι παράγει τὴν τῶν δευτέρων without setting themselves in motion in or-
γένεσιν. Οἷς ἕπεται μήτε ὕλῃ προσχρῆσθαι der to bring about the existence of engen-
μήτε ἀπὸ χρόνου ποιεῖν μήτε εἰς χρόνον dered beings, but which, merely according to
παύεσθαι μήτε ἔξω τῆς τοῦ ποιοῦντος the very being which they are,163 bring about
ἐνεργείας κεῖσθαι (35) τὸ γινόμενον· ταῦτα the generation of secondary things. It follows
γὰρ πάντα τῇ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνεργείᾳ that they do not utilize matter in addition,
παρέπεται ἐπὶ τοῦ οἰκοδόμου καὶ τῶν that they do not act from a moment in time,
ὁμοίων. that they do not cease to act at a moment of
time, and that that which comes into being
does not exist outside (35) of the activity of
what produces it. Indeed, all things of this
kind accompany the activity which is acci-
dental, as in the case of an architect and in
other similar cases”.
162
Cf. Hierocles, Commentary on the Golden Verses, 20, 12: τὰ ὄντα πάντα ταῖς ἀϊδίοις
αὐτοῦ βουλήσεσιν ὑφέστηκε,
163
κατ’ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι refers to the neuter plural subject: this turn of phrase is
intended to designate that being which remains purely being. For the expression, cf. Proclus,
El. Theol., prop. 174.
Text H:
Proclus, Elements of theology prop. 76, p. 72, Proclus, Fa‫܈‬l fī al-‘illa al-awwal wa-l-ma‘lūl
5 ff. Dodds al-awwal, p. ˻̀ Endress (from ms. C = Is-
tanbul, Carullah 1279, no. IX 7, 9th/15th
cent., foll. 65a27ff.)
(76.) Πᾶν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ All that comes into Kull mā kāna min All that comes from
ἀκινήτου γινόμενον being from an un- ‘illa lā tata‫ۊ‬arraku an unmoved cause is
αἰτίας ἀμετάβλητον moved cause has an fa-‫ڴ‬ālika-l-šay’ kāna without alteration164
ἔχει τὴν ὕπαρξιν· πᾶν unchangeable exist- bi-lā isti‫ۊ‬āla wa bi- and change, and all
δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ ence. All that <comes lā taghyīr, wa kull that comes from a
κινουμένης, into being> from a mā kāna min ‘illa moved cause is ac-
μεταβλητήν. cause that is in mo- muta‫ۊ‬arrik fa- companied by
tion has a changeable ‫ڴ‬ālika-l-šay’ kāna change and modifi-
<existence>. bi-isti‫ۊ‬āla wa cation.
taghyīr.
aqūl inna kull I say: everything
mukawwin kāna generated from the
min al-‘illa al-ūlā, highest cause is
fa-‫ڴ‬ālika kāna min without alteration
ghayri isti‫ۊ‬āla min on the part of some-
šay’ ā‫ې‬ar qablahu thing previous to it,
bal innamā kāna but rather it comes
min lā šay’, wa kull from nothing, and
mukawwin kāna everything generated
min al-‘illa al- from the secondary
‫ܔ‬aniyya a‘nī al- cause, I mean na-
‫ܒ‬abī‘a, fa-‫ڴ‬ālika lam ture, does not come
yakun min lā šay’ about from nothing,
<bal> innamā kāna but from the change
min isti‫ۊ‬āla šay’ of something previ-
ā‫ې‬ar qablahu. ous to it.
εἰ γὰρ ἀκίνητόν ἐστι For if what creates is
πάντῃ τὸ ποιοῦν, οὐ entirely unmoved, it
διὰ κινήσεως, produces what
ἀλλ’αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι comes second out of
παράγει τὸ δεύτερον itself not by motion
ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ· εἰ δὲ but by its very being.
τοῦτο, σύνδρομον But if this is so, it has
ἔχει τῷ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι what derives from it
τὸ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ· εἰ δὲ as concomitant with
τοῦτο, ἕως ἂν (5) ᾖ, its being. But if this is
παράγει. ἀεὶ δὲ ἔστιν· so, it produces as
ἀεὶ ἄρα ὑφίστησι τὸ long (5) as it exists.
μετ’ αὐτό· ὥστε καὶ But it always exists.
164
On the equivalence of isti‫ۊ‬āla to the Greek alloiôsis, cf. Endress 230.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 61
τοῦτο ἀεὶ γίνεται Therefore, it always
ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι, brings into existence
τῷ ἐκείνου ἀεὶ κατὰ what comes after it.
τὴν ἐνέργειαν Thus, the latter al-
συνάψαν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ways come into be-
κατὰ τὴν πρόοδον ing from thence, and
ἀεί. always exists, having
joined its <being>,
which is always in
the mode of proces-
sion, to <the being>
of that one, which is
always in the mode
of actuality.
εἰ δὲ δὴ κινεῖται τὸ But if the cause is in
αἴτιον, καὶ τὸ ἀπ’ motion, what comes
αὐτοῦ γινόμενον into being from it
ἔσται μεταβλητὸν will also be essential-
κατ’ οὐσίαν· ᾧ γὰρ τὸ ly changeable. For
εἶναι διὰ κινήσεως, that which has its
τοῦτο τοῦ (10) being through mo-
κινουμένου tion changes its be-
μεταβάλλοντος ing (10) when what
μεταβάλλει τὸ εἶναι. is in motion changes.
εἰ γὰρ ἐκ κινήσεως For if, being pro-
παραγόμενον duced through mo-
ἀμετάβλητον αὐτὸ tion, it itself re-
μένοι, κρεῖττον ἔσται mained
τῆς ὑποστησάσης unchangeable, it
αἰτίας. ἀλλ’ would be stronger
ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα than the cause that
ἀμετάβλητον ἔσται. brought it into exist-
μεταβαλεῖ ἄρα καὶ ence. But that is im-
κινήσεται κατ’ possible. It will
οὐσίαν, τὴν therefore not be un-
ὑποστήσασαν αὐτὸ changeable. It will
κίνησιν μιμούμενον. therefore change and
be in motion essen-
tially, imitating the
motion that brought
it into existence.
Text I: Proclus, On the Eternity of the World, apud Philoponus, aet. mundi, p. 55, 22 ff. Rabe,
trans. Lang & Macro 2001, p. 51
The Fouth Argument of Proclus the Succes- Πρόκλου διαδόχου λόγος τέταρτος.
sor. Fourth. All that is generated from a “Τέταρτος· πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἀκινήτου γινόμενον
cause that is unmoved (25) according to its αἰτίου (25) κατὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν·
substantial reality is unmoved. For if the εἰ γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν (56) ἀκίνητον,
maker (p. 56, 1 Rabe) is unmoved, he is un- ἀμετάβλητόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀμετάβλητον, αὐτῷ
changeable, and if unchangeable, then he τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐκ τοῦ ποιεῖν εἰς
produces by virtue of his very being, given τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν μηδὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ
that he shifts neither from making to not ποιεῖν· μεταβαῖνον γὰρ ἕξει μεταβολὴν
making nor from not making to making. For αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκ θατέρου μετάβασιν εἰς
if he shifts, he will undergo change in the θάτερον, εἰ δὲ ἕξει μεταβολήν, οὐκ ἂν (5) εἴη
very transition from the one to the other, ἀκίνητον.
and if he undergoes change, he would (5) not
be unmoved. If therefore something is un-
moved, it will either never make or always
make, lest it be moved by virtue of making at εἴ τι ἄρα ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν, ἢ οὐδέποτε ποιήσει
some point in time. Therefore, if something ἢ ἀεί, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὸ ποτὲ ποιεῖν κινῆται. ὥστ’,
unmoved is a cause of something, causing εἴ τι ἀκίνητον αἴτιόν ἐστίν τινος, οὔτε
neither never nor at some point in time, then οὐδέποτε αἴτιον ὂν οὔτε ποτέ, εἴη ἂν ἀεὶ
it is always a cause, and if so, it is the cause of αἴτιον, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀιδίου ἐστὶν αἴτιον.
something perpetual.
If, however, the cause of the all (10) is εἰ τοίνυν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ παντὸς (10)
unmoved — for if it were moved, it would be ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ κινούμενον ἀτελὲς ᾖ
earlier incomplete and later complete (since πρότερον ὕστερον δὲ τέλειον (πᾶσα γὰρ
all motion is incomplete actuality) and lest, if κίνησις ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἀτελής) καὶ ἵνα μὴ
it were moved, it, which produces time, κινούμενον χρόνου δέηται χρόνον παράγον,
would be in need of time — then the all must ἀνάγκη τὸ πᾶν ἀίδιον εἶναι ἀπὸ αἰτίου
be perpetual, since it comes to be from an ἀκινήτου γιγνόμενον. ὥστε, εἴ τις εὐσεβεῖν
unmoved cause. Therefore, if someone, in- οἰόμενος εἰς (15) τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ παντὸς
tending to pay respect to (15) the cause of ἐκεῖνον λέγοι μόνον ἀίδιον τὸν δὲ κόσμον
the all, should say that the cause alone is per- οὐκ ἀίδιον, τοῦτον λέγων οὐκ ἀίδιον ἐκεῖνον
petual and the cosmos is not perpetual, by ἀποφαίνει κινούμενον ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀκίνητον·
stating that the latter is not perpetual he as-
serts that the former is moved rather than
unmoved. By calling the cause moved rather κινούμενον δὲ λέγων καὶ οὐκ ἀκίνητον οὐκ
than unmoved, he says that it is not always ἀεὶ λέγει τέλειον ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ἀτελῆ διὰ τὸ
complete but is at one time incomplete, be- πᾶσαν εἶναι κίνησιν (20) ἐνέργειαν ἀτελῆ καὶ
cause every motion (20) is incomplete actual- ἐνδεᾶ τοῦ χείρονος (λέγω δὴ τοῦ χρόνου) δι’
ity and so needs something inferior (I mean αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ἀτελῆ λέγων καὶ
time) by the very fact of its being moved ; yet οὐκ ἀεὶ τέλειον καὶ ἐνδεᾶ τοῦ χείρονος
because he says it is sometimes incomplete ἀσεβεῖ διαφερόντως·”
and not always complete, i.e., needing some-
thing inferior, he in fact shows exceptional
impiety.
Text J: Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, fr. 115 Wildberg = Simp-
licius, In Phys., p. 1141, 12-30 Diel
“ ....even if nature produces what it fashions “πρῶτον μέν, λέγων, εἰ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐξ ὄντων
out of existent things, by virtue of the fact ποιεῖ τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς δημιουργούμενα διὰ τὸ καὶ
that it has both its substance and its activity τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 63
in a substrate, without which it is not capable ὑποκειμένῳ ἔχειν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνου μήτε
either of being or of acting, it is not neces- εἶναι μήτε ἐνεργεῖν δύνασθαι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη
sary for God, whose substance and activity καὶ τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐξῃρημένην ἔχοντα τῶν
are transcendent of all beings, to create (15) ὄντων ἁπάντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν
out of existent things. For in that case, He ἐνέργειαν (15) ἐξ ὄντων δημιουργεῖν. οὕτω
would be no better than nature, although γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕξει πλέον τῆς φύσεως, καίτοι γε
God creates not only the forms of the things οὐ μόνον τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀμέσως ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ
that are fashioned directly by Him, but it is δημιουργουμένων ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ καὶ
believed that He produces and fashions mat- αὐτὴν τὴν ὕλην παράγειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν
ter itself; for only what is first is ungenerated πεπίστευται· μόνον γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγένητόν
and uncaused. If, then, God gives existence ἐστι καὶ ἀναίτιον. εἰ οὖν καὶ τὴν ὕλην (20) ὁ
(20) to matter as well, but matter does not θεὸς ὑφίστησιν (οὐ δεῖται δὲ ἡ ὕλη ἑτέρας
require another matter in order to exist, for ὕλης εἰς ὕπαρξιν· αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον
it is the first substrate of all natural things, ἁπάντων τῶν φυσικῶν ὑποκείμενον)· οὐκ
then it is not the case that everything that ἄρα πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐξ ὄντος γίνεται.
comes into being does so out of something
that exists. For whether matter comes into εἴτε γὰρ ἀεὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ γίνεται ἡ ὕλη εἴτε ποτέ,
being from God always or at a given mo- οὐ δεήσεται δήπουθεν ἑτέρας ὕλης, αὐτὴ τὸ
ment, it will certainly have no need of anoth- πρῶτον οὖσα τῶν σωμάτων ὑποκείμενον·
er matter, since it itself is the first substrate
of bodies. If what is generated by nature does οὐκ ἄρα, εἰ τὰ γινόμενα ὑπὸ φύσεως ἐξ
so out of what exists, therefore, it is not nec- ὄντων γίνεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἀμέσως ὑπὸ
essary that the things that are generated by θεοῦ γινόμενα ἐξ ὄντων γίνεσθαι, εἴπερ ἡ
God do so out of what exists, (25) since na- (25) μὲν φύσις καὶ χρόνου δεῖταί τινος καὶ
ture needs both some time and <the process γενέσεως, ἵνα ἕκαστον δημιουργήσῃ τῶν
of> generation in order to fashion each natu- φυσικῶν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἀχρόνως καὶ ἄνευ
ral thing, while God gives existence to what γενέσεως, τουτέστι διαπλάσεως τῶν κατὰ
comes into being directly by him timelessly μέρος καὶ διαμορφώσεως, τὰ ἀμέσως ὑπ’
and without generation, that is, without αὐτοῦ γινόμενα ὑφίστησιν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῷ
forming and shaping the particulars. For it is μόνον τὸ θέλειν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων (30)
enough for him to will, in order to bring οὐσίωσιν.”
about the substantification (30) of realities”.
Text K: Al-Kindi, On the quantity of Aristotle's books, p. 375, 9 ff. Abū Rīda
Then Aristotle said (...) that God, may He be ‫ܔ‬umma qāla (...) innahu, jalla ‫ܔ‬anā’uhu, lā
praised, does not need a period of time for ya‫ۊ‬tāju ilā madda l-ibdā‘ihi mimmā abāna,
His creation, in reason of what he made li-annahū ja‘ala « huwa » min « lā huwa »,
clear, since he established ‘it’ out of ‘not it’; fa-inna man balaġat qudratihi anna ya‘milu
so that he whose ability reached such a point ajrāmā min lā ajrām, fa-a‫ې‬raja aysa min
as to produce bodies out of no bodies and to laysa, fa-laysa ya‫ۊ‬tāju — i‫ ڴ‬huwa qādir ‘alā-
extract being out of not-being, he does not l-‘amal min lā ‫ܒ‬īna — anna (15) ya‘milu fī
need, since he has the power of producing zamān, li-annahu, i‫ ڴ‬kāna fi‘l al-bašar lā
out of no matter, (15) to produce in time. For yumkinu min ġayr ‫ܒ‬īna, kāna fi‘l man lā
since the human act is impossible without yu‫ۊ‬tāju fī fi‘l mā yaf‘alu ilā ‫ܒ‬īna lā ya‫ۊ‬tāju ilā
matter, the act of the one who does not need zamān.
matter in order to produce what he produces
does not need time.
Text L: Theology of Aristotle, p. 27, 7 ff Badawi = p. 237 d'Ancona et al. = p. 14 Dieterici;

trans. Lewis I, §§ 44-58, p. 231
How well and how appropriately does this wa mā a‫ۊ‬san wa a‫܈‬wab mā wa‫܈‬afa al-
philosopher [sc. Plato] describe the Creator faylasūfu al-bāri’a ta‘ālī i‫ ڴ‬qāla: innahu ‫ې‬āliq
when he says: “He created mind, soul, na- al-‘aql wa-l-nafs wa-l-‫ܒ‬abī‘ati wa-sā’ir al-
ture, and all things else”, but whoever hears ašyā’ kullihā, ġayr annahu lā yanbaġī li-sāmi‘
the philosopher's words must not pay atten- qawli al-faylasūf anna yanܲaru ilā lafܲihi fa-
tion to the letter of his words and imagine yatawahhimu ‘alayhi annahu qāla inna al-
that he said that the Creator created the crea- bāri’a ta‘ālī innamā ‫ې‬alaqa-l-‫ې‬alq fī
tion in time. If anyone imagines that from zamānin. fa-innahu wa-in tuwuhhimu ‫ڴ‬ālika
his mode of expression, he merely expressed min lafܲihi wa kalāmihi fa-innahu innamā
the will to follow the custom of the ancients. lafaܲa bi-‫ڴ‬ālika irādata anna yatbi‘u ‘āda al-
The ancients were compelled to mention awwalīna. fa-innahu innamā u‫ܒڲ‬urra al-
time in connection with the beginning of awwalūna ilā ‫ڴ‬ikr zamānin fī bad’ al-‫ې‬alq li-
creation because they wanted to describe the annahum arādū wa‫܈‬fa kawn al-ašyā’ fa-
generation of things,165 and they were com- u‫ܒڲ‬urrū ilā anna yad‫ې‬alū al-zamān fī wa‫܈‬fi-
pelled to introduce time into their descrip- hum al-kawn wa-fī wa‫܈‬fihum al-‫ې‬alīqa al-
tion of becoming and into their description of latī lam takun fī zamānin al-battata. wa-
the creation — which was not in time at all — innamā u‫ܒڲ‬urra al-awwalūna ilā ‫ڴ‬ikr al-
in order to distinguish between the exalted zamān ‘inda wa‫܈‬fihum al-‫ې‬alīqa li-
first causes and the lower secondary causes yumayyazū bayna al-‘ilal al-awwalī al-‘āliya
wa bayna al-‘ilal al-‫ܔ‬awānī al-safliya (...) wa
(...) But it is not so: not every agent performs laysa ‫ڴ‬ālika ka-‫ڴ‬ālika, a‘nī annahu laysa
his action in time, nor is every cause prior to kull fā‘ilin yaf‘alu fi‘lihi fī zamānin, wa lā
its effect in time. kull ‘illa qabla ma‘lūlihā bi-zamānin.
165
This was already the view of Taurus, for whom Plato's allegorical description of the
creation of the world in the Timaeus was intended for the masses, unable to understand the
notion of causation in a non-temporal sense.
M. Chase / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) 65
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DISCUSSIONS ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD IN

ANTIQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY COSMOLOGY

ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 7. 1 (2013) © M. Chase, 2013

Quid tamen ante hunc mundum fuerit, aut quid post

1. The Big Bang: a brief history

guise of dark energy; cf. Wilczek 2008, 105ff., and Appendix.

2. Back to the future

One can find among the Pre-Socratics most of

1. The cosmology of Pherecydes

2. Time and Eternity in Pherecydes

3. Pherecydes and the Orphics

248; Bernabé 2003, 178-180; West 1983, 9ff., 97, 245f.

APPENDIX: DARK MATTER AND DARK ENERGY

III. FROM THE CHURCH FATHERS TO ISLAM

1. Plato on why God creates

2. Proclus and the Plotiniana Arabica

immobile and unchanging was a sign of power.

Table 2. Timeline of the universe

Table 3. The geometry and curvature of space155

Geometry Type Curva- Omega Spatio- Angles of Universe's future

Table 5. Pherecydes on time and the elements

ἅπερ δὲ ὁ Πρόκλος ἐν τῷ πολλάκις ....what Proclus postulates in the work on the

ultimately constituted in the Timaeus.

Text E: Methodius, On generated things, ap. Photius, Library, 302a30ff

Text F: Hierocles apud Photius, Library, cod. 251, p. 461b6-9

Text L: Theology of Aristotle, p. 27, 7 ff Badawi = p. 237 d'Ancona et al. = p. 14 Dieterici;

2. Contemporary cosmology / Big Bang

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