VI

THE METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSION

OF ANTISTHENIC PHILOSOPHY
AND SOME PLATONIC REACTIONS
AGAINST HOMERIC CRITICISM

Claudia Mársico

The tradition that emerged in the context of the Homeric saga was
an important factor in the intergenerational transmission of knowl-
edge and it occupied a curious place in ancient philosophical dis-
course. Homer called Odysseus πολύτροπος at the beginning of his
work about the return of the hero to Ithaca. This line triggered a long
dispute whether this epithet was critical or laudatory. Alongside with
this, in Iliad (IX,313) Achilles condemned “polytropic” utterances
and advocated for a language without delusions. Later on, Antis-
thenes took part in the discussion on this issue and devoted great
efforts to homeric literary criticism. Plato also made an explicit judg-
ment on that point in the Hippias Minor and addressed this issue in
the Ion and Republic, if only his works of the first and second peri-
ods are taken into account. Intrasocratic discussions reveal persistent
concerns about this matter which suggest disagreements between
different lines which were close in their origin but remote because
of their dissimilar foundations and methods. First, I will consider the
central points of antisthenic position about the relationship between
methodology and the works of Homer. Afterwards, I will examine
the traces of dialogical tension between Antisthenes and Plato in
works such as Hippias Minor, Ion and Republic within the frame-
work of homeric literary criticism in order to examine its scope and
limits.

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

1. Foundations and method of Antisthenes’

philosophy
Far from the tragic ambivalence that language has in Platonic phi-
losophy, insofar as it is a pathway to the truth but is also the vehicle
of mistake, or from the Megarian pessimism, which raises an incom-
mensurable gap between language and reality, Antisthenes chooses
a strict correlation between these levels. According to this philoso-
pher, although this correlation may be darkened in the actual use of
names, its structure can be restored through the methodology of “in-
vestigation of names” (ἐπίσκεψις ὀνομάτων). Antisthenes tests and
applies the power of his method on the texts of Homer, as far as it
can be conjectured from the rescued fragments of his works. A quick
look at the antisthenic catalog transmited by Diogenes Laertius clear-
ly shows the proliferation of works devoted to this topic.1 Therefore,
it is necessary to clarify the relationship between the methodological
model proposed for his philosophy and the use of homeric material.
Let’s start by a framework of antisthenic issues related to meth-
od. Three notions are relevant: ἐπίσκεψις ὀνομάτων, “investigation
of names”, χρῆσις ὀνομάτων, “use of names”, and διαλέγειν κατὰ
γένη, “class distinction”. The notion of ἐπίσκεψις evokes the socratic
use of ἐξετάζειν, on which, according to the platonic Socrates, the
meaning of human life lies: an unexamined life is not worth living.2
According to Epictetus’ testimony, Antisthenes added that “the inves-
tigation of names is the principle of education (ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως)”
(Diss. I,17,10–12 [SSR VA 160; FS 979]). In fact, the ἐπίσκεψις
ὀνομάτων plays a clear role as principle and foundation of learning
processes in the methodological dimension.

1 About the works of Antisthenes, see A. Patzer (Antisthenes der Sokra-

tiker) and G. Giannantoni (Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, IV, p. XX).
References on anthistenic texts follow SSR (Socratis et Socraticorum Reli-
quiae, ed. G. Giannantoni) and FS (Filósofos Socráticos: Testimonios y frag-
mentos, II: Antístenes, Fedón, Esquines y Simón, Introducción, traducción
y notas de C. Mársico.
2 Plato, Apol. 37a. About this notion, see A. Brancacci (Oikeios logos),
C. Mársico (Antístenes y la prehistoria de la noción de campo semántico) and
D. Perrone (El análisis antisténico de los nombres. Un modelo nominalista,
pp. 31–43).

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The first approach to its content comes from the category of

ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων, “rectitude of names”. It is not surprising that this
topic is associated with discussions about the relationship between
language and ontology in the field of sophistry, insofar as some
sources link Antisthenes with Gorgias and Prodicus. Plato mentions
Prodicus in Euthydemus, 277e–278a, as a practitioner of ὀρθότης
ὀνομάτων who tried to reveal the exact match between ὄνομα and
πρᾶγμα. This practice is also portrayed in Protagoras, 337a–c (DK
84 A 13) through a semantic analysis of similar terms so that confu-
sion about their meaning can be avoided. In fact, Antisthenes seems
to have radicalized Prodicus’ approach. He replaced the notion of
ὀρθότης by the notion of ἐπίσκεψις, because ὀρθότης implies that
the correspondence between name and thing is not always clear and
successful, so it must be verified or restored  – that is, it must be
corrected by means of a theoretical analysis. However, Antisthenes’
approach implies a) that the correlation always exists; b) that, if it is
not explicit enough, an analysis (ἐπίσκεψις) must be done in order
to show the intrinsic relationship between language and reality. This
is expressed in the antisthenic formula ἕν ἐφ’ ἐνός, “one (name) for
one/every (thing)”, which forms the basis of the theory of οἰκεῖος
λόγος that ensures the adequacy of language and reality. Aristotle
reports both formulations in Metaphysics, V,29,1025:
“And it is for this reason that Antisthenes entertained a silly opin-
ion when he thought that nothing could be expressed except by its
proper notion (οἰκεῖος λόγος) – one term always for one thing (ἕν
ἐφ’ ἐνός). From this it would follow that there can be no contra-
diction and almost no error.” (SSR VA 152; FS 960)
It is noteworthy that the notion of οἰκεῖος λόγος is associated with
the formula ἕν ἐφ´ ἑνός. Nevertheless, “one name for one thing” can
not be the grammatical antecedent of οἰκεῖος λόγος, insofar as such
reading of the text raises a gender incompatibility between λόγος,
a masculine term, and ἕν, a gender-neutral term. It has been said that
this incompatibility is an indication of the importance of this phrase
in the thought of Antisthenes and could be linked to a gender-neutral
word relevant in the linguistic field: ὄνομα, “name”.3 The semantic

3 See N. Cordero (L’interprétation anthisthénienne de la notion plato­

nicienne de ‘forme’ (eidos, idea), p. 323 ff.).

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

horizon of οἰκεῖος λόγος implies that there is an ὄνομα for each thing
(or class of things), so that language not only shows reality but lies
on an unambiguous correlation with reality. Therefore in a case of
polysemy, while Prodicus tried to restore the pattern one name-one
thing, Antisthenes considered linguistic polysemy as a fact that does
not require any action. It was necessary just to determine the field
of application of the word, i.e. the χρῆσις ὀνομάτων, through lex-
ematic analysis, and this will show that language has a complete and
organized structure, so that a name actually belongs to each thing.
It is worth noting that this approach can be compared with that of
Trier, which holds that lexical meanings are a “mosaic” without gaps
or overlaps, where each unit can only belong to a field.4 Language
is a kind of “assemblage” of lexical units, so that each thing has its
own name. The modern concept of semantic field is a useful element
to think about the position of Antisthenes. Its origins date back to the
nineteenth century, although its central development corresponds to
the twentieth century, through the works on associative relations by
Saussure and Bally.5 The notion of Begriffsfeld postulated by G. Ip-
sen in his Der Alte Orient und Indogermanen6 prompted the studies
in this area. Among these studies the proposals of Trier, Pottier and
Coseriu are relevant. Coseriu defines “semantic field” as a lexical
paradigm which emerges from the division of a continuum of lexical
content in different words, among which an opposition is created by
means of distinctive features of content.7
The importance of this notion goes beyond linguistics, because
lexematic groups are linked to “semantic microuniverses” that play
a role in many areas of philosophy.8 So, it is not necessary to fall into

4 For the concept of language as a mosaic with its component piec-

es matching perfectly, see J. Trier (Kleine Schriften und Sonderdrucke der
Sprachwisseneschaft, p. 419). The foundational work of G. Ipsen (Der Alte
Orient und Indogermanen) already mentions the metaphor of the mosaic.
5 See W. T. Gordon, Approaches to Semantics in the 19th and the First
Third of 20th Century.
6 G. Ipsen, Der Alte Orient und Indogermanen, p. 225.
7 See E. Coseriu, Principios de semántica estructural, p. 40.
8 See A. J. Greimas – J. Curtés, Semiótica. Diccionario razonado de
la teoría del lenguaje, p. 49.

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 Claudia Mársico

the procedure that Q. Skinner called “mithology of prolepsis” and

say that Antisthenes proposed a methodology of lexematic analysis
in terms of semantic fields. This would be clearly anachronistic. But
it might be suggested that antisthenian position about language and
ontology can be better understood with these parameters, which are
used in contemporary thought. It may seem striking that linguistics
is the way to explain this relationship, especially because this is
a discipline forged in the denial of metaphysical and ontological
problems. However, the tendency to asumme a correlation between
words and things is present in theories about semantic fields. For
instance, Pottier’s theory, which uses the notion of “sema” as a fea-
ture of signification, has been criticized because it does not appeal
to meanings but realia, that is, things or properties of things. This
reveals a correlation name-thing which, in some way, repeats the
kind of approach has been shown in Antisthenes’ theory.
The method and its link between ἐπίσκεψις and χρῆσις ὀνομάτων
is clear in the testimonies that come to us through Porphyry. Regard-
ing the initial passage of the Odyssey, Antisthenes is convened to
evaluate the epithet πολύτροπος, “multifaceted”, in order to unravel
whether Homer considered Odysseus a liar or otherwise.9
“Antisthenes says that Homer is not praising Odysseus in call-
ing him πολύτροπος any more than he is blaming him. Now he
has not represented Agamemnon or Achilles as πολύτροπος, but
as straightforward and noble. Nor is even wise Nestor tricky and
shifty in his character, but is straightforward in his associations
with Agamemnon and the rest of the army, not holding back if he
has anything good to advice. Achilles was so far from this quality
as to say that he hates like death ‘the man who says one thing and
keeps another hidden in his heart’.” (Porphyry, Schol. ad Od. I,1
[SSR VA 187])
This text shows the procedure in the case of the term πολύτροπος.
Antisthenes proposes an alternative hypothesis: “Did not he call him
[i.e. Odysseus] like this because Odysseus was wise?”. This hypoth-
esis is supported by ἐπίσκεψις ὀνομάτων. Antisthenes isolates the

9 See A. Brancacci (Dialettica e retorica in Antistene, pp. 359–406) and

M. T. Luzzato (Dialettica o retorica? La polytropia di Odisseo da Antistene
a Porfirio, pp. 275–357).

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

constituent τρόπος and points that it is associated with character,

but also with speech, because “τρόποι of discourses are the varied
styles”. Thus, πολύτροπος means to say the same in many ways so
that speech suits the needs of the audience:
“Now Antisthenes solves the problema this: ‘What? Is it to be sup-
posed that Odysseus is wicked because he was called πολύτροπος,
and not rather that it is as being skillful (σοφός) that he is so des-
ignated? Well, perhaps ‘turn’ (τρόπος) refers both to character and
to the use of language. For a ‘well-turned’ (εὔτροπος) man is one
disposed to do well: and ‘turns’ of speech are its various shap-
ings (πλάσαι). Indeed, Homer uses τρόπος in connection with the
voice with quick turns (τρωπώσα) (Od. XIX,521). If the skillful are
very clever at conversation, they also understand how to say the
same thought in many ways (τρόποι), and, understanding the many
‘turns’ of speech, they would be ‘of many turns’. And the skilled
are good. For this reason Homer calls Odysseus skilled in saying
he is πολύτροπος, because he knew how to get along with people.’”
(Porphyry, Schol. ad Od. I,1 [SSR VA 187; FS 1011])
Indeed, in this example there is a procedure of lexical analysis in or-
der to clarify the meaning of the word πολύτροπος. The term τρόπος
is studied as the basic item, and three senses are identified: the first
within the scope of ethics, the second related to rhetoric and the third
is associated with music. In the first case, the explanation is etymo-
logical and requires the addition of two terms: τρέπω and εὔτροπος.
Τρόπος is linked with τρέπω, “to turn”, so that εὔτροπος is someone
who is oriented toward the good (εἰς τὸ εὖ τετραμμένος). In the sec-
ond case, the explanation is semantic and relies on the relationship of
meaning between τρέπω and πλάσσω, “to model”, “to build”. From
this explanation the third case, in which styles are applied to sounds,
must be inferred. Although this definition is not radically different
from the second, it reintroduces the category of multiplicity involved
in the term πολύτροπος: the variety – ἐξαλλαγή – of melodies and
sounds variously modulated – πολυεχέα φωνήν. Thus, insofar as this
last turn sends us back to the first component of πολύτροπος, it can
be safely established that the notion of τρόπος may be associated
with the idea of multiplicity without thereby necessarily implying
a negative sense. If this is so, then it is possible that the epithet
of Odysseus is not derogatory but complimentary, in the sense of

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“wise”, σοφός. The argumentation suggests that his wisdom was to

get along with people.
The figure of Pythagoras and his four speeches on his arrival at
Crotona, separately targeted to children, women, young and old men,
points to the traditional wisdom on which Antisthenes installed his
speech:10
“So Pythagoras, it is said, when he needed to speak to children, ad-
dressed them in speech adapted for children, women in speech suit-
able for them, archons in archintic style, and ephebes in ephebic. To
find for everyone the appropiate kind of wisdom is itself wisdom,
but it is characteristic of ignorance to employ a single manner of
speech (χρῆσθαι μονοτρόποι) for different people. Medicine also
depends on the correct use of its art, in that the ‘turning of the
many’ for an experienced treatment is what happens through the
variegated constitution of those being cared for.” (Porphyry, Schol.
ad Od. I,1 [SSR VA 187])
If it is ignorance to use a single mode of speech with those who are
dissimilar, so the element πολύς in the compound πολύτροπος is
positive. This seems to contradict the idea of ​​a correspondence be-
tween name and thing, which is, as seen above, a basic assumption
of antisthenic philosophy. Notwithstanding, it must be noted that
this basic correspondence does not constitute an obstacle regarding
poetic and rhetorical dimensions, but it is a basic element in order to
avoid mistake. Antisthenes’ πολυτροπία is the poetic ground and the
justification for his lengthy work of literary writing.
The final part of the passage argues that “the simple, because
it is not suitable for different audiences, makes what is varied, for
different reasons, to be useless speech for the majority”. This idea
provides elements to infer that the notion of πολυτροπία justifies the
use of diverse forms of argumentation, which would entail a criticism
towards rigid methods. It should be noted that, from Antisthenes’
perspective, Platonic dialectic should be an exemple of rigidity.

10 About this passage and the relationship with Antisthenes and Pythag-
oreanism, see C. Riedweg (Pythagoras: Leben, Lehre, Nachwirkung; eine
Einführung, p. 27), L. Zhmud (Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans,
p. 46ss.) and especially P. Horky (Plato and Pythagoreanism, pp. 88–89).

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

This treatment also appears in the Hippias Minor, where Plato

explicitly takes up the question of πολυτροπία regarding the epithet
of Odysseus. The contrast reveals the tension between these two
socratic approaches at this point. On one hand, from Plato’s per-
spective, Antisthenes uses improperly Homeric criticism instead of
developing a strictly argumentative research method. On the other
hand, from Antisthenes’ perspective, the Platonic approach, which
in the Hippias Minor is shown through the hypothetical method, is
affected by a rigidity that weakens its explanatory force, insofar as
requires a type of receiver that supports the intricacies of dialectical
argumentation.11 In this ἀγών between methods, Antisthenes would
have brandished the advantages of plasticity.
The existence of a zone of dialogical tension around this issue
becomes clear if the testimony of Porphyry regarding the episode of
Calypso is taken into account. In an allusion that may go back to the
On Odysseus and Penelope mentioned in the catalogue of Diogenes
Laertius as a work of the eighth volume of the works of Antisthenes,
Porphyry states that Antisthenes held that the wisdom of Odysseus,
which is connected, as shown, with πολυτροπία, made him under-
stand that
“lovers often lie and promise imposible things. He also indicates
the cause, the reason on account of which this [his refusal of Ca-
lypso’s offer] was done”. (Porphyry, Schol. ad Od. XXIII,337 [SSR
VA 188; FS 1012])
This suspicion was on the basis of his choice for Penelope instead of
Calypso, as emerges in the appellation “reflective” (περίφρων) asso-
ciated with the wife when she is compared with the nymph.
“As that godess was pround of her bodily beauty and stature and
valued her qualities higher than Penelope’s, Odysseus agreed and
equated Calypso’s promise to the unknown –for it was unknown
to him whether he would become inmortal and ageless- while he
indicated that he was searching (ζητεῖ) for his wife because she was
full of sense (περίφρωνα), so that he would neglect even her if she

11 About hypothetical method in the Hippias Minor, see our commentary

in Mársico (Platón: Hippias Mayor e Hippias Menor: Introducción, 4.2.1).

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 Claudia Mársico

were adorned and beautiful only in her body.” (Porphyry, Schol.

ad Od. XXIII,337 [SSR VA 188; FS 1012])
It should be noted, then, that homeric literary criticism, πολυτροπία
and use of lies are three antisthenic topics that we see reappear in
Plato’s works. This recurrence is an indication of the distance be-
tween their ideas about the role of language and its semantic and
pragmatic dimensions.
A third example provided by Porphyry offers the case of the Cy-
clops. Homer says that they are creatures “arrogant and lawless”
(ὑπερφίαλοι καὶ ἀθέμιστοι). Antisthenes wants to get rid the group
of this trait and sustains that “only Polyphemus is unfair”.12 In this
context, he displays an  application of the method of ἐπίσκεψις
ὀνομάτων. The mechanism starts with the term ὑπερφίαλοι, which
in the Homeric text involve the negative sense of pride. Then, he
examines some uses of the preposition ὑπέρ trying to show that it
does not involve excess but superiority, as in ὑπεροχή, “excellence”:
“Antisthenes says that only Polyphemus is unjust, for he genuinely
has no concern for Zeus. The rest, then, are just – this is why, he
says, the earth gives them all things spontaneously; and not work-
ing the earth is the work of the just.” (Porphyry, Questions on Ho-
mer’s Od. 94,26–95,3 Schrader [SSR VA 190])
This analysis provides the framework of a semantic field that, from
the lexical point of view, is based on compounds bearing the prepo-
sition ὑπέρ. Thus, it is said that someone is ὑπερφίαλος because of
the ὑπεροχή in his body, and Polyphemus is ὑπερφίαλος because he
is ὑπερόπτης regarding Zeus. Shortly after, the Cyclops are compared
with the ὑπέρθυμοι giants and later this idea reappears when it is

12 About “unrealistic” or utopian projects in Antiquity, see R. Illarraga

(Primeras aproximaciones al estudio comparado de las propuestas políticas
utópicas en la Ilustración Helena: conexiones entre el Busiris de Isócrates
y los libros II y V de República and Una lectura integral de República y el
Timeo de Platón. Sobre la posibilidad de un estadio basal del pensamiento
político platónico), D. Dawson (Cities of the Gods, Communist Utopias
in Greek Thought), C. Gill (The Genre of the Atlantis Story), K. Morgan
(Designer History: Plato’s Atlantis Story and Fourth-Century Ideology)
and M. Schofield (Saving the City, Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical
Paradigms).

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

said that only Polyphemus is ὑπερέφανον καὶ ἄδικος, “presumptuous

and unjust”. In this case, compound lexemes arise through the basic
lexeme of this semantic field – “excess” –, which is represented by
the preposition ὑπέρ. Within semantic analysis it is possible to un-
derstand the term ὑπερφίαλος, which has negative connotations, as
‘superb’, with other neutral or even positive meanings, as ὑπεροχή,
‘superiority’, ‘excellence’, that connote ‘power’, but not ‘excess’.
This outline allows to affirm that the other Cyclops were ὑπερφίαλοι
in the latter sense. The negative meaning, however, applies strict-
ly to Polyphemus, which is ὑπερφίαλος in the sense of ὑπερόπτης,
‘dismissive’, ‘disparaging’ about Zeus, just as the Giants of Odyssey,
VII,59 who were ὑπέρθυμοι, ‘arrogant’, and because of their vice
they were destroyed.
This type of linguistic analysis is clearly philosophical. It is not
possible to determine conclusively the origin and horizon of its de-
velopment, but it may have been part of a study on the best way of
life, in the context of the large number of “unrealistic” political pro-
jects developed during V–IV B.C.13 There are elements to infer that
Antisthenes held an extreme naturalist position where people must
live with minimum requirements, to the extent that it is plausible
that Plato had criticized this antisthenic idea in the passages about
the healthy πόλις in Republic, II,368a–373a.14

13 Some authors understood the relationship between Plato and Antis-

thenes as a construct where the first bases his philosophy in the criticism of
the latter. See, for instance, M.  Guggenheim (Antisthenes in Platons Po-
liteia) and F. Dümmler (Antisthenica). The opposite idea was sustained by
G. Rodier (Note sur la politique d’Antisthene: le mythe du Politique), who
gives priority to the internal exegesis of the texts. The connection between
utopical issues in Plato’s Republic, II and Politicus were recognized by Zeller
(Die Philosophie der Griechen, I,1, p. 324). See also P. Vidal-Naquet (Plato’s
Myth of the Statesman, the Ambiguities of the Golden Age and of History,
pp. 132–41).
14 See R. Illarraga (Utopía ciclópea, utopía de cerdos. Una reconstruc-
ción del pensamiento político de Antístenes a la luz de la sociedad de los
cíclopes (LFS, I, 1014 = SSR, V.A.189) y la ciudad de los cerdos de Repú-
blica, II, pp. 59–66) and C. Mársico (Sobre los cerdos. Aspectos de la phúsis
en Antístenes). Both works study the points which establish and intertextual
relationship between the approaches of Antisthenes and Plato.

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Considerations of this point are vital for understanding the dis-

tance between Plato’s position and that of his classmate Antisthenes.
The latter joins παιδεία and homeric heritage, to the point of framing
the novelty of his approach with traditional practice. This assort-
ment may have seemed forced to Plato, who denounced the two
ingredients of the mixture. On one hand, the texts of Homer are not
able to provide a basis to assist philosophical thought. Thus, what
Husserl would have called “natural attitude” becomes an obstacle
to be overcome and is never considered an aid for the philosopher.
Furthermore, the antisthenic practice of research through ἐπίσκεψις
ὀνομάτων and their application to the texts of Homer is a dead end
that grants authority to failed attempts of a contradictory materialism.
The poetic devices of language serve truth diction, in a context of
epistemic optimism, so that to explain error becomes a challenge.15
We can infer from this reaction that poetic word, either in Homer-
ic format or in his tragic legacy, was concived by Antisthenes as
the privileged way of philosophical expression. It is understandable,
then, that Plato devoted great efforts to outline ways to limit an in-
fluence which he considered a threat to the deployment of dialectic.

2. The Hippias Minor and the blinders

of Homeric criticism
We find these features in the Hippias Minor. Let us consider briefly
the issue of authenticity. Hippias Minor, as almost the entire pla-
tonic corpus, has been suspected. Aristotle mentions in Metaphy-
sics, V,29,1025a, the argument developed in Hippias Minor, 375d
ff. and this situation has supported the thesis of authenticity, unlike
Hippias Major, on which there are more doubts.16 Nevertheless, in

15 It is said that Antisthenes “having seen that Athenians celebrated loud-

ly in the theatre <the verse> ‘what is shameful, if it does not seem so to
those who use it’, throwing himself un reservedly <said>: ‘what is shameful
is shameful, if it seems so or if does not seem so’” (Plutarch, How Young
people shoud listen to poets, XII, 33c [SSR VA 195]).
16 On the authenticity of Hippias Major, see the discussion between
G. Grube and D. Tarrant in G. Grube (On the Authenticity of the Hippias
Maior, pp. 134–148), D. Tarrant (The Authorship of the Hippias Maior, pp.
82–87) and (1928), G. Grube (The Logic and Language of the Hippias Major,

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

19th century Schleiermacher and Ast refused Platonic autorship of

this dialogue, and promoted the defenses of Stalbaum, Socher and
Burges.17 In this context, it is interesting for us the opinion of August
Winckelman. In the Preface to Volume VI of his edition of Plato’s
Works which he co-edited with Johann Baiter and Johann Kaspar
Orelli and which contains Hippias Minor and Cratylus, Baiter men-
tions in the short prologue that “Winckelmannus noster” holds that
the autor of the first of these dialogues is Antisthenes.18 What follows,
rather than the reasons of this opinion is an excuse: Winckelmann,
co-author of the work, is very overwhelmed by domestic issues and
has no time to develop their arguments. (!) This silence, however,
can be supplemented by some inferences. In fact, this scholar pub-
lished in 1842 his Antisthenis Fragmenta, written by the same period
when he published with Baiter and Orelli, between 1839 and 1842,
the edition of the Platonic works. Probably he linked the topic about
πολυτροπία with Antisthenes: when he saw this issue replicated in
the Hippias Minor inferred Antisthenes should be his author. An al-
ternative hypothesis did not surfaced in these analyses. Indeed, our
epoch prefers the opposite approach. For example, Silvia Montiglio
(2011:59) states that the issue of πολυτροπία must have been a “hot
topic” in the Socratic circle. In fact, we are dealing with a zone of
dialogical tension that revealed traces of certain topics discussed in
this intelectual group.
The investigation of this point requires a revision of the symbolic
role that Odysseus had in ancient discussions, and an assessment of
the material emerging from the antisthenic discourses Ajax and Odys-
seus.19 Our purpose here is more specific and restricted to the links

pp. 369–75). See also D. Tarrant (On the Hippias Major) and G. Grube (On
the Authenticity of the Hippias Maior) and the revitalization of the theme in
Ch. Kahn (The Beautiful and the Genuine, pp. 261–287).
17 See these traditional positions in Schleiermacher (Platons Werke, II,
pp. 296–296, and V, pp. 399–403; F. Ast (Platons Leben und Schriften, pp.
457–464); G. Stallbaum (Platonis Opera Omnia, IV, pp. 145–150, and 227–
235); J. Socher (Ueber Platons Schriften, p. 144 and 215) and G. Burges (The
Works of Plato).
18 See A. Winckelmann et al. (Platonis Opera Omnia, VI, p. 1).
19 On this last issue, see G. Romeyer-Dherbey (Les deux discours de
la guerre d’Antisthène) and V. Suvak, in this volume.

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between the proposition about πολυτροπία and the Hippias Minor,

a work in which Socrates himself embodies a polytropic behaviour
and suits the type of discourse his partners need. Hippias is clearly
a difficult case. It is so difficult that the Hippias Major displays one
of the more complex strategies of the entire corpus in order to avoid
the partner exit the dialog. In the style of the rules which the theory
of argumentation in the New Rhetoric recommend, the focus seems
to be not no break dialogue.20 The polytropic behaviour ensures the
ability to achieve this purpose.
Odysseus is the wanderer hero par excellence. Ten years he spent
away from his homeland in the middle of a war largely alien and ten
years more took him to rediscover the way back after being lost and
go through many dangers. In this dialogue Socrates adopts and atti-
tude somewhat similar about his wandering, with his vacillating walk
between issues equally or more pressing than Scylla and Charybdis.
Socrates, the new Odysseus, runs through the stormy seas of ideas
to find his land.
Moreover, Odysseus is the champion of πολυτροπία. His gift
of speech and persuasion catapults him to the forefront of Greek
leaders. Similarly, Hippias says he is skilled with words, though the
deployments of argumentation and literary criticism show that the
polytropic character is actually Socrates. Plato clearly enjoys dis-
playing powerful characters to destroy them soon after with Socratic
attitude. Socrates shows expertise in handling alien methodologies,
as happens in the Protagoras regarding the poem of Simonides, or
in the Phaedrus regarding the speeches that emulate that of Lysias.
This strategy places him as a master on dialectic that chooses this
methodological option while recognizing and managing others.
Porphyry’s testimony about πολυτροπία, addressed in section 2,
reveals a striking number of contact points with several passages in
Plato’s Hippias Minor. First, it points directly to the meaning of the
term πολύτροπος to unravel whether it implies a negative judgment
or not. Thus a duality arises which merges cognitive and ethical is-
sues: Odysseus may be evil or wise. The tension between these two
areas is essential also in this platonic dialogue.21

20 See C. Plantin (L’ Argumentation, passim).

21 This issue es associated with the problema of the manifestation of

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

Secondly, the list of mentions in the text about Antisthenes in-

cludes Odysseus, Nestor and Achilles, as well as the group of “sim-
ple and generous” heroes, who were the most respected in the mythic
tradition, such as Agamemnon and Ajax. Negative judgments must
be suspended, although Ajax and Oddyseus staged one of the most
violent duels in the traditional stories. The trilogy Odysseus–Achil-
les–Nestor also appears in Hippias Minor, 364c, and then is reduced
to the opposition Odysseus–Achilles, the protagonists of the foun-
dational texts of the Western tradition.
Thirdly, the argument in both contexts follows common param-
eters, as shown in the textual basis to which they refer. Porphyry’s
testimony on Antisthenes and Hippias Minor, 369e, shares the same
reference to Iliad, IX,313, where Achilles declares to Odysseus that
he will make explicit his position unambiguously by his rejection
of the behaviours linked with πολυτροπία. What this passage shows
as the constancy of Achilles, in Socrates’ intervention is confronted
with passages where Achilles contradicts himself, and this allows
to introduce the voluntary and involuntary of falsehood, i.e. lie and
error.22
Fourthly, the association of πολυτροπία with the ability to say the
same thought in many ways precisely matches with the strategy of
Socrates in the Hippias Minor, where he uses refutations that combine
dialectical argumentation with approaches derived from literary criti-
cism. In fact, the complete mechanism of the Hippias Minor, in which
Socrates is behind an alter ego, could be interpreted as an exercise of
πολυτροπία. Just as there would be a way to speak to children, women,
leaders or youth, would also be a way to talk to sophists, according
to the recommendations of the passage about lovers of spectacles.23
Socrates is openly “polytropic” in both Hippias, either splitting into

beauty in different things, wich is a central topic in Hippias Major.

22 This is an important issue also in other contexts of Plato’s work, as in
the passage about the “true lie”, in Republic, II,382b. It is worth noting the
dual aspect of the term ψεύδος, “mistake” and “lie” or something inaccurate
on purpose, so that the true lie corresponds to the first sense, while fiction
is associated with the second and can be justified. The myth of the metals,
the founding story that unifies the body of citizens in the πόλις is a good
example.
23 See T. Blackson (Philosophers Against Lover of Spectacles, pp. 64–98).

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two people and hiding himself behind that split, or surrounding his
partner with the same thesis presented in multiple ways in order to
force him to accept all the corrollaries.
This comparison, which could even be deepened, indicates that
Plato and Antisthenes are facing and issue that divided the Socratic
circle. Hippias Minor is not, certainly, a direct answer to Antisthenes,
although this hypothesis has been raised. Antisthenes said that Hom-
er did not consider Odysseus a liar, but Platonic Hippias states the
opposite. Instead of choosing either hermeneutic approach, it can be
said that both works are part of a larger group of texts which have
these issues as a central topic but were not well preserved. From
the Platonic perspective, the whole antisthenic approach is worthy
of suspicion. Indeed, in the Hippias Minor Plato examines the issue
of πολυτροπία as a starting point to challenge the use of traditional
poetic elements as in the guise of a material suitable to apply his
philosophical methodologies. In this framework, the character Hip-
pias could have taken any other basis, even ordinary conversation, to
apply his approach. He should have done so, since his fragmentary
appeal to tradition obscures the real mechanism that governs philo-
sophical reflection.
The criticism of this kind of approach is that intellectual posi-
tions, such as Antisthenes’ view, which are based on these devel-
opments, would be condemned insofar as they look at phaenomena
through the deforming crystals of the texts of Homer. Hippias Minor
shows the advantage of abandoning those limits. This can be inter-
preted as the main point in 365c–d, where Socrates states that he is
talking to Hippias and not to Homer, because it is impossible to know
what he was strictly thinking when he composed a given verse. So,
Homeric criticism is not a reliable method. The “theoretical wander-
ing” advocated in this platonic dialogue is a legitimate way of seek-
ing knowledge in unknown lands, unlike the mechanical repetition
of traditional topics manipulated like puzzle pieces to make them say
what an author chooses.

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3. The Ion, Antisthenes’ stupidity and the poets

in Republic
The tension regarding inherited tradition is also present in the Ion,
where Homeric poetry plays as the foreground through the figure of
the bard, who can not only recite the text, but also explain it, insofar
Socrates’s interlocutor is here a bard. This twist brings it closer to
the antisthenic activity, which was examined in the previous sec-
tions. Great similarities between this platonic dialogue and the works
examined above can be pointed out. For example, the problem of
Homeric exegesis and the topic of wisdom. The claim that the per-
son who knows can recognize when something right or wrong has
been stated occupies a central role. This point creates an intertextual
bridge with the problem of lies, which is important in the Hippias
Minor through the association between πολυτροπία and lies and the
construction of Odysseus as the paradigm of deception and cheating.
Indeed, if we look at the particular case of Ion, new traces of
tension with the practitioners of methods that make use of Homeric
criticism can be found. Ferdinand Dummler received his doctoral
degree with a thesis on Antisthenes. In this work he emphasized the
connection between Antisthenes and some Platonic developments
that were traditionally seen as attacks on poetry.24 In the case of the
Ion, he says, Plato criticizes Antisthenes’ claims about the privileged
place of the poets, especially Homer. Thus, the ironic passage in
which Ion falls asleep when someone is talking about another author
who is not his favourite, is probably a joke on Antisthenes’ exegesis
which is limited to the texts of Homer.25 This idea was later rejected
on weak bases, as in the case of Meridier, who argues that it could
not be an allusion to Antisthenes because there are no references to
allegorical interpretation in the Ion.26 The problem with Meridier’s
argument is its arbitrary assumption that Antisthenes would have
been devoted to allegorical composition has in fact no textual basis
at all. On the contrary, ἐπίσκεψις ὀνομάτων involves a hermeneutic

24 See F. Dummler (Antisthenica).

25 See Ion, 532b–c.
26 See L. Méridier (Platon: Ion, Introduction).

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approach based on semantic fields, with a focus on the language of

the works of Homer.
It could be added to this objection that Antisthenes was not asso-
ciated with rhapsodic activity. However, against this, the passage of
Xenophon’s Symposium where Antisthenes asks how Niceratus can
be proud to know by heart the works of Homer, like a rhapsode, that
is the stupidest human model can be mentioned.27 Insofar as all peo-
ple accepted this characterization, this fact may be taken as an indi-
cation that it was a common idea. The framework of the Ion could be
interpreted as an instrument to reduce the value of antisthenic theory
comparing it with the bum pride of a more or less ignorant bard. If
the Antisthenes of Xenophon’s work says rhapsodes are stupid, Pla-
to’s Socrates returns this criticism on Antisthenes, making ἐπίσκεψις
ὀνομάτων a variant of the rhapsodic thechnique.
Let us consider a final passage of the platonic corpus. Republic
is a work full of references to the cultural climate of its time. In its
pages many traces of dialogical tensions between intellectual fig-
ures of the Socratic environment can be glimpsed. Among them, the
passage Republic (X,595a ff.) has been matter of discussion. There
three levels of entitative quality are shown: Forms which are real,
perceptual objects which are the first level of copy, and images of
perceptual objects which have the depreciated status of second level
copy. Because of this passage Book X has received criticism of all
sorts, including the opinion of Julia Annas, who nearly expresses her
wish that this monstrous book as a wholed would not have been by
Plato.28
Indeed, in first place, this passage outlines a characterization of
imitation. Plato undertakes an analysis of painting and the ontolog-
ical levels involved: the craftman copies the Form, while the paint-
er copies the object, so that painting is three grades removes from
truth and reality (Resp. X,597a ff.). If painters do not grasp Forms,
they do not produce knowledge. The scheme is connected with the
simile of the line, in VI,509d–511e, where we find again the levels
images–objects–Forms. The major drawback in this argument lies in

27 See Xenophon, Symp. 3,6.

28 J. Annas consider Book X as a work “gratuitous and clumsy, and it is
full of oddities” (An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, p. 335).

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

the criterion to infer Forms and in the choice of the bed as example.
The passage X,596a is the only one which reduces Forms to univer-
sals: “we establish a Form for each multiplicity of things to which
we give the same name”. Only this passage argues that Forms were
made by a divinity and suggests there is no difficulty in grasping
the eidetic level, since it is available in language. At the same time,
the bed is an artifact, which according to the testimony of Aristotle
has a problematic status among platonic philosophers.29 This scheme
even seems at times to suggest most extravagant shapes, like the
Form of shoemaker that has been inferred from X,598b. Let us note
briefly that the strangeness on this passage and its problematic choice
of the bed as example can hide an intertextual link with Antisthenes.
Antisthenes’ methodology involved homeric criticism and therefore
a positive epistemic evaluation of poetry. Poetry is plainly the origin
of knowledge. Furthermore, ἐπίσκεψις ὀνομάτων involves the thesis
of οἰκεῖος λόγος or οἰκεῖον ὄνομα, a name for each type of thing,
which clearly reminds this allusion to universals.
The characterization of the theory of Forms through the exam-
ple of the bed, a man-made object that it is far from having the
traits of typical instances of Plato’s middle dialogues, creates the
feeling that in these passages there is something strange. The solu-
tion which claims that we are facing a formidable lapsus of Plato
coexists with varied ways of making sense of the passage, some of
them with high degree of plausibility. The proposal Stählin stated in
1901, in order to fill out Dummler suggestions can be added to the
many puzzles which the text itself combines.30 In this perspective,
Antisthenes would have argued that poetic knowledge is the copy
of individuals, which is the only reality according to his corporeist
model. On this basis, Plato would have taken this view and inserted
it into a scheme where individuals are themselves copies of an in-
stance of greater reality. With this, he would be saying that the whole

29 There is an argument about this issue in the fragments of Aristotle’s

On Ideas. See G. Fine (On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of
Forms).
30 See Stählin, Die Stellund Der Poesie in Der Platonischen Philosophie,
p. 26.

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antisthenic theory is a vain effort to project intelligibility in a derived

ontological domain.
The criticism against Stählin interpretation indicates that Antis-
thenes would not be affected, because he did not accept the existence
of inteligible entities. However, this is not very important, since the
challenge of an opponent’s position in the context of symbolic strug-
gle for primacy within an intellectual field or a zone of tension is not
limited to the model of rebuttal where the advesary surrenders. On
the contrary, such a strategy aims at weakening different positions
turning them marginal, so that finally the system itself emerges as
the most plausible. Thus an area of discussion involving a reliable
reconstruction of the adversary thesis is willingly avoided and wat
remains of it are only traces.
Something interesting which gives a more complex version of
Stählin’s thesis can be suggested. An allusion to Antisthenes could
explain the choice of the example, considered by many authors as
a mistake and a blunder. If Plato had been building independently
a justification for his position regarding mimetic arts, the choice of
a bed and its inteligible model deserves most of the criticism that has
traditionally received. However, if we consider that he intended to
discredit the antisthenic model, then the choice of this type of objet is
less surprising. Antisthenes believed that there is only τὸ ποιόν, “the
qualyfied thing”. A real thing must be a body that can be touched,
such as a bed. From this perspective, it makes sense that the alter-
native locus which is usually quoted in order to support the choice
of the bed as an example is the case of the shuttle and its intelligible
model in Cratylus, 388b. Without going here into details, it should
be noted that the Cratylus is a dialogue with controversial contacts
respect to antisthenic philosophy.31 An alleged inconsistency of Plato
might be, rather, a strategic and momentary approach to a strange on-
tology, in order to get away quickly and put on record the superiority
of his own philosophy.
In connection with the method of homeric criticism, this approach
on the problem of poetry serves to discredit this method on a new
basis. In this case not only is inadmissible the practice of homeric
criticism, as a variant of ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις, but the textual base is

31 See our introduction in Mársico, Platón: Crátilo.

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 VI. The methodological dimension of antisthenic philosophy

anchored in ontological commitments that hinder an effective epis-

temic progress. This criticism should also be interpreted as an indica-
tion of a dialogical tension between antisthenic and platonic thesis. In
this framework, the director of the Academy was committed to a pro-
gram of suport of his own version of dialectic, and tried to prevent
confusion with the methods of its peers, who were also exponents of
Socratic dialogue as a textual format of philosophical expression. So,
the recovery of Antisthenes as a central figure of classical philosophy
is essential to prevent readings that skip the conflictive background
of the theoretical discussions in this foundational period.

245