Stress analysis

Pipeline Engineer,

Copyright@2009 IBC Energy Academy. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or part
without permission of IBC Energy Academy or the speaker is prohibited.
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PIPELINE STRESS DESIGN

HOT PIPELINE DESIGN
OPERATIONAL STRESS ANALYSIS
PIPELINE FAILURE TYPES
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ASME B31.8 - GAS TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION PIPING SYSTEMS

ASMEB31.4 ■ PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS FOR LIQUID HYDROCARBON
PIPELINES
CSA Z 6 6 2 - OIL AND GAS PIPELINE SYSTEMS (CANADIAN STANDARDS ASSOCIATION)
NEN 3 6 5 0 - REQUIREMENTS FOR PIPELINE SYSTEMS {DUTCH STANDARD)
AS 2885.1 - PIPELINES—GAS AND LIQUID PETROLEUM PART 1: DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION (AUSTRALIAN STANDARD)
SNIP 2.05.06-45* TRUNK PIPELINES {RUSSIA, DEVELOPED BY VNIIST)
VSN 51-3-85 DESIGN OF STEEL FIELD PIPELINES (RUSSIA, DEVELOPED BY VNIIGAZ)
BS EN 1594 - GAS SUPPLY SYSTEMS B PIPELINES FOR MAXIMUM OPERATING
PRESSURE OVER 16BAR - FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
IGE-TD/1 EDITION 4 - RECOMMENDATION ON TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
PRACTICE - STEEL PIPEUNES FOR HIGH PRESSURE GAS TRANSMISSION, MAY 2001
PD 8010 - CODE OF PRACTICE FOR PIPEUNES
IS013623/ EN 14161 - PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRIES — PIPELINE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

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# PIPELINE HAS STRENGTH TO MEET THE FOLLOWING

REQUIREMENTS
• BURST
• COLLA PSE / BUCKLING
• FA TIGUE
• FRA CTURE
♦ PREVENT OVALISATION (MAY BECOME UNPIGGABLE)
♦ RESISTANCE TO DAMAGE
* LIMIT DISPLACEMENTS
* PREVENT FAILURE / ENSURE PIPELINE IS INSPECTABLE
 CONSTRUCTION
> PIPE LIFTING/ HANDLING
> PIPE STACKING
> PIPE LAYING / LOWERING IN CALCULATIONS
> HORIZONTAL DIRECTIONAL DRILL
> HYDROSTATIC TEST WATER (ABOVE GROUND SECTIONS /
SUPPORT DESIGN)
> HYDROSTATIC TEST PRESSURE
> ELASTIC BENDING
> COMPACTION

U&irlAL-sS
■~a»i
■«.■

OPERATION
> PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE (FLUCTUATIONS)
> ROAD CROSSINGS
> RAIL CROSSINGS
> RIVER / STREAM CROSSlONS (BED AND
BANKS, BANK EROSION, BED MORPHOLOGY
> GROUND MOVEMENT /GEOHAZARDS/ MINING
AREAS /VIBRATIONS
> OVERBURDEN/ROCK AREAS
> PERMAFROST
> WEAK SOILS/SETTLEMENT/SUBSIDENCE/
HIGH WATER TABLE
> BLASTING
> SURGE
> VACUUM
> ELASTIC BENDING
F^

PHASE NO LOAD CASE LOAD LIMIT STATE STRESS/ STRAIN TIME

COMB LIMIT
TRANSPOHTATIOH 1 ACCIDENTAL IMPACT DENTING/GOUGING STRESS N
TRANSPORTATION 2 CYCLIC BENDING FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH STRESS Y
TRANSPORTATION 3 STACKING WEIGHT OVAUSATION STRESS N
CONSTRUCTION 4 COLD FIELD BENDING LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN N
CONSTRUCTION 5A BENDING DURING PLASTIC COLLAPSE STRESS/STRAIN N
INSTALLATION
CONSTRUCTION SB BENDING DURING LOCAL BUCKLING STRESS /STRAIN N
INSTALLATION
CONSTRUCTION 8A DIRECTIONAL DRILLING/ GIRTH WELD TENSILE STRAIN N
TENSION AND BENDING FRACTURE
CONSTRUCTION 6B DIRECTIONAL DRILLING/ LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN N
TENSION AND BENDING
CONSTRUCTION TA HYDROSTATIC TEST EXCESSIVE PLACTIC STRESS N
DEFORMATION
CONSTRUCTION 73 HYDROSTATIC TEST BURST OF DEFECT FREE PIPE STRESS N
CONSTRUCTION TC HYOflOSTATlCTEST BURST AT DENT GOUGE STRESS N
DEFECT
CONSTRUCTION 7D HYDROSTATIC TEST BURST AT SEAM WELD STRESS/STRAIN N
DEFECT

H U E = TIME DEPENDENCE

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■:.,-M ^Kv',
pms& PHASE NO LOAubAsE LUHJ uniiT a " ATE 3I)1C»( TIME
COMB STRAIN
LIMIT
OPERATION 8A INTERNAL PRESSURE EXCESSIVE PLASTIC DEFORMA TIONS STRESS N
OPERATION SB INTERNAL PRESSURE BURST AT CORROSION DEFECT STRESS Y
OPERATION sc INTERNAL PRESSURE SMALL LEAK AT CORROSION DEFECT STRESS Y
OPERATION SD INTERNAL PRESSURE BURST AT ENVIRONMENTAL CRA CK (SCC) STRESS Y
OPERATION BE INTERNAL PRESSURE SMALL LEA K AT ENVIRONMENTAL CRA CK STRESS Y
(SCC)
OPERATION 8F INTERNAL PRESSURE BURST OF A MANFACTURING DEFECT STRESS Y
OPERATION 8G INTERNAL PRESSURE SMALL LEAK AT MA NUFA CTURING STRESS Y
DEFECT
OPERATION 9A OVERBURDEN AND SURFACE B BURST OF A WELD DEFECT STRESS Y
LOADS
OPERATION SB OVERBURDEN AND SURFACE B SMALL LEAK OF A WELD DEFECT STRESS Y
LOADS
OPERATION DC OVERBURDEN AND SURFACE 8 PLASTIC COLLA PSE STRESS N
LOADS
OPERATION SD OVERBURDEN AND SURFACE 8 OVAUSATION STRESS N
LOADS
OPERATION 10A GRAVfTY LOA DS ON A BOVE 8 FORMATION OF MECHANISM BY YIELDING STRESS N
GROUND SPANS
OPERATION IOB GRAVfTY LOADS ON ABOVE a LOCAL SUCKLING STRESS N
GROUND SPANS
OPERATION 10C GRAVITY LOADS ON ABOVE 8 GIRTH WELD TENSILE FRACTURE STRESS N
GROUND SPANS

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PHASE NO LOAD CASE LOAD COMB LIMIT STATE STRESS/ TIME
STRAIN
LIMIT
OPERATION 11A ABOWEGBOUND SPAN SUPPORT a, 10 LOCAL BUCKLING STRESS Y
SETTLEMENT
OPERATION 118 ABOVEGROUND SPAN SUPPORT 8,10 GIRTH WELD TENSILE STRESS Y
SETTLEWEHT FAILURE
OPERATION 12A WIND ON ABOVEGROUND SPANS B,10 ECESSIVE VIBRATION STRESS N
OPERATION 1SB WIND ON ABOVEGBOUND SPANS ■,10 BURST OF CRACK BY STRESS Y
FATIGUE

OPERATION 13A SLOPE INSTABILITY / GROUND 8,1*. IS LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN Y

MOVEMENT
OPERATION 13B SLOPE INSTABILITY 'GROUND 8,14,1S GIRTH WELD TENSILE STRAIN Y
MOVEMENT FRACTURE
OPERATION 14A SIESMIC LOAD S,fI,130H1SOR1T LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN N
OPERATION 148 SIESMIC LOAD MS.13OR1S0R17 GIRTH WELD TENSILE STRAIN N
FRACTURE
OPERATION ISA RESTRAINED THERMAL EXPANSION 8 LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN N
OPERATION tSB RESTRAINED THERMAL EXPANSION 8 UPHEAVAL BUCKLING STRESS N
OPERATION 16A FROST HEAVE a, 14,15 LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN Y
OPERATION 16B FROSTHEAVE B, 14,15 GIRTH WELDTENSLE STRAIN Y
FRACTURE
OPERATION 17A THAW SETTLEMENT 8,14, IS LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN Y
OPERATION 17B THAW SETTLEMENT 8, 14,15 GIRTH WELO TENSILE STRAIN Y
FRACTURE

TBI E • TIME DEPENOEHCE

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PHASE NO LOAD CASE LOAD COMB LIMIT STATE STRESS/ TIME

STRAIN
UMIT
OPERATION 18A LOSS OF SOII. SUPPORT (EG 8, IB EXCESSIVE PLASTIC STRESS Y
SUBSIDENCE) DEFORMATION
OPERATION 138 LOSS OF SOIL SUPPORT (EG 8,15 LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN Y
SUBSIDENCE)
OPERATION 1SC LOSS OF SOIL SUPPORT {EG ME GIRTH WELD TENSILE STRESS/ Y
SUBSIDENCE) FAILURE STRAIN
OPERATION 19A RIVER BOTTOM EROSION S, 15,20 DYNAMIC INSTABILITY STRESS Y
OPERATION 19B RIVER BOTTOM EROSION 8, IS, 20 FORMATION OF STRESS N
MECHANISM BY YIELDING
OPERATION 19C RIVER BOTTOM EROSION 8,15,20 LOCAL BUCKLING STRAIN N
OPERATION ISO RIVER BOTTOM EROSION 8,15,20 GIRTH WELD TENSILE STRAIN N
FRACTURE
OPEHATMDN ZO BUOYANCY MS FLOTATION STRESS N
OPERATION 21A OUTSIDE FORCE 8 DENTING STRESS N
OPERATION 21B OUTSIDE FORCE S PUNCTURE STRESS N
OPERATION 21C OUTSIDE FORCE s BURST OF A GOUGED STRESS N
DENT
OPERATION 21D OUTSIDE FORCE a SHALL LEAK OF A STRESS N
GOUGED DENT
OPERATION 22 SABOTAGE a PUNCTURE STRESS N

1SIE * 1BIEDCPENCENCE
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LONGITUDINAL STRESS
* POISSON STRESS
• THERMAL STRESS

BENDING STRESS
- CURVA TURE
• OVERBURDEN/ A » A W LONGITUDINAL
* OVALISATION (LIMITED TO
2% TO 5%) /-
/
♦ STRESSES FROM
EXTERNAL LOADS HOOP

* TORSIONA L STRESS

* Operating pipelines are also subjected to longitudinal stress which results

from a combination of the Poisson effect (associated with internal
pressure) and thermal expansion or contraction. Other loads may also
contribute a component to longitudinal stress, eg bending, weight.
♦ For totally restrained sections, the longitudinal tensile stress resulting
from temperature or pressure change alone is:
S L =[E.a.(T a -T 1 )]-v.S h

■> For unrestrained sections, the longitudinal tensile stress resulting from
temperature or pressure change alone is:

,.1 \
SL 2
K +1 Z * (~l
SSBpiiK... :..._-. ■ > i ^ w : v . ... ■■-'; ^...-T^^ag . ■ .. i ^

# Equivalent stress can be calculated using von Mises theorem, and is

usually restricted to 90% of the pipe SMYS:

^S,2+SL2~Sh.Sl+3r2

/ sh / \
/ *+ /
/ 7
Y
s 4~L
U V*
+•*
\ "^x \ /

V i V y
Stresses acting on pipe wall

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« At the ends olthe pipeline and near bends, the pipeline is not fully
restratfted-bysoi! friction, and will expand. This expansion may be
sufficient to damage adjacent pipework, for example at pig traps.
» Excessive expansion may either be accommodated by the use of
expansion loops or offsets, or eliminated by the use of anchors. In
either case, a detailed model of the pipeline approach must be
developed and analysed, taking account of pipe-soil interaction, to
ensure that allowable displacement and stress limits are not
exceeded.
#■ The axial compressive force (anchor force) required to fully restrain
the pipe at these points is:
F.^lPA-^-Aj+tE-A^aft-T,)]

* The use of sophisticated pipe stress analysis software enables the

pipeline stress engineer to quickly evaluate a range of solutions.
 Buried pipeline restrained by pipe-
soil friction alone:

Ground Suifoca

Buried pipeline restrained by

pipe-soil friction and anchor

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Blasting is of concern to pipeline engineers for two reasons:
- existing or planned pipelines may be affected by blasting
required for third party construction, mining or quarrying.
- trench preparation for new pipelines may require blasting in
rocky areas that affects neighbouring structures or services.
Pipeline stresses due to blasting can be calculated using the AGA
method for stand-off distances up to 30m, and the Morris method
greater stand-off distances.
To assess the impact of blasting new pipeline trenches on existing
structures, it is usual to calculate the peak particle velocity {PPV}:

PPV
 .:-<^>

♦ RIVER CROSSINGS ARE A SPECIAL CASE FOR STRESS ANALYSIS,

ESPECIALLY BY DIRECTIONAL DRILL.
♦ RIVER BED SCOUR AND BANK STABILITY MUST ALSO BE
CONSIDERED TO ENSURE THAT THE PIPELINE DOES NOT BECOME
EXPOSED.

• INSTALLATION LOADS AND STRESSES

• PULLING LOAD CALCULATION
METHOD
DRILLED PATH ANALYSIS
River Crossing Usirq a Horizontal Directional Dnll
PULLING LOADS
Uniiing Hlg
OPERATIONAL LOADS Ppe--a

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ROAD AND RAIL CROSSING DESIGN

MUST ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF SOIL AND TRAFFIC LGA D.NQ JCOVEH DEPTH r o r o p OF P!PE
BOTH THE ROAD / RAILWAY AND THE ;i5fl-!!0i»e*-rwiiaBij*ajrKi «^&i
PIPELINE. _
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mfliCBKfil,:!)
THE PIPE MUST WITHSTAND THE
k
K#»

DIRECT VEHICULAR LOADS, PLUS 1 15-XD

THE FATIGUE EFFECTS DUE TO I 1240 —— —
CYCUC TRAFFIC.
._..
ANALYSIS IS PERFORMED USING
Jl." -
COMPLEX ROUTINES, NORMALLY 2SQ0

BASED ON API RECOMMENDED

PRACTICE 1102, TO DETERMINE THE
OPTIMUM DESIGN IN TERMS OF
WALL THICKNESS, BURIAL DEPTH
AND INSTALLATION TECHNIQUE.
INCREASING DEPTH WILL DECREASE
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PIPELINE TRAFRC LOAD, BUT INCREASE SOIL LOAD.
FAILURE AT A CROSSING CAN THERE IS AN OPTIMUM LOAD AS SHOWN IN
RANGE FROM VERY EXPENSIVE (EG SKETCH ABOVE.
DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS BENEATH A
HIGHWAY) TO CATASTROPHIC.
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•WHERE A PIPEUNE IS BURIED, FLUID AND GROUND TEMPERATURES IS

THE MOST IMPORTANT.
•CONSIDERATION OF AMBIENT TEMPERATURE IS REQUIRED FOR A
PIPELINE WHOLLY OR PARTIALLY
•CONSIDERATION SHA LL BE GIVEN TO THE EFFECT OF TEMPERATURE
DIFFERENTIAL DURING INSTALLATION, OPERATION AND MA INTENA NCE
{IF EXPOSING THE PIPELINE).
•WHERE A PIPELINE IS ABOVEGROUND, THE TEMPERATURE RESULTING
FROM THE COMBINED EFFECT OF AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND
SOLAR RA DIA TION SHOULD BE ANALSYED FOR BOTH OPERATING AND
SHUT-IN CONDITIONS (TEMPERATURE BUILD UP)
•SPECIAL CONSIDERATION MAY BE REQUIRED WHERE THE
TEMPERATURE OF THE FLUID IS CHANGED BY PRESSURE REDUCTION,
COMPRESSION OR PHASE CHANGE.

•DESIGN TO MITIGATE AGAINST HIGH TEMPERATURE

•TEMPERATURE AFFECTS:
•AXIAL/ LONGITUDINAL STRESS
•FRACTURE CONTROL
•MATERIAL STRENGTH/MATERIAL DERATING/TOUGHNESS INCREASE
•COATING PERFORMANCE/COATING DEGRADATION
•CORROSION CRACKING
•FLUID/PHASE CHANGES

•LIMITS IN STANDARDS
•NO LIMITS IN SOME STANDARDS
•CSA Z662 = -70C TO +270C
•ASME B31.8 = -29C TO +232C
•AS 2885.1 = -30C TO 200C

10
 .,:■ . ^ J A . -

■-• ONSHORE PIPELINES ARE BEING INCREASINGLY REQUIRED TO OPERATE AT

HIGH TEMPERATURES
* THIS RESULTS IN HIGH AXIAL/ LONGITUDINAL STRESSES
* PIPEUNE DESIGN TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50degC ARE DEEMED TO BE "HOT"
* ONSHORE SULPHUR PIPELINES DESIGNED TO 150 degC

FJgur* 1 Trend in pfp*Stac Inlot design tempvratur

OFFSHORE PIPELINES EXAMPLE, BUT ONSHORE

PIPELINES FOLLOWING SIMILAR TRENDS

* SMYS DE-RATING AFFECT WALL THICKNESS

* OPERATIONAL STRESSES
* UPHEAVAL BUCK LING
> PIPELINE WALKING /AXIAL RATCHETING
* ANCHOR /EXPANSION
:■ STRESSES AT BENDS {HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL)
* PROFILE CURVATURE
* FLUID FLOW (LOW VISCOSITY) - BASING DESIGN ON HOT DESIGN
TEMPERATURES COULD BE MISLEADING
* COOLDOWN / RE-START
* INTERNAL CORROSION
* EXTERNAL COATINGS
* CATHODIC PROTECTION

11
 841.116A Temperature Derating Factor,
r, far Steel Pipe
T e m p c m c M EtarMlnj
linipeattjffc T
r*tt« r
3 SO of lew 1.000
300 0.947
J SO 0.933
w 0.900
450 0567

GEHERAltffiTE; f&&teai\e&t&etmtetiVM±.itietp<iiitfaf<ieia-

est

0.W .

TEUPERATURE(<«agC)

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Lad Condition Eftod

A nremalpre»«ur«tead Hocp stress {^HJraling, hydcaos^

(including aurg#)
Expansion dua to presi UTB

Suatiinai toad S»!l«dj

Sati weight

Bending

Changs in walsr iabia ihydrodynsmej

C Tharmal lead Eipansion i o i d i

CifflpiBision ^ottds

0 Livo load VoNcSa toad)

Waight cf iranspofled lluktj sr.g (cadi caussd by Ts&ot veliiolB traffic a :-»ad
cawingj

£ Envitof,mB3ai lajd» Thermal trtoeli en p)pfna.eipo«dioBi»sttii

F Occasional IcmJi Earthquake

Wind toad*

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The allowable stress limits for steel pipelines for longitudinal, expansion, effective and equivalent stress are summarised in
the table below. The allowable stress limits are expressed as a percentage of SMYa
LortCoftdBHi LDtd ASMEftliJ-WOI ASMS S 3 1 . ) - 2 « a
EonlAvUvi

rijumm I W I M KHCBrt
U w 1MI
ana*

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% Sc s~, ' 3-
DttiGft j * i t u u 4 * 72V'> 72%<* •
HJR»WBB5T«M A 0CF*« W
£ 3 t f t f t ! 4 d PrpMn* A.B.C 7«,<" jG^ia 7V&P> SOS*' SCt"*

OnmSjin»d P S B B ™ A.8.C 7S%»i 51%I« 7SW* 7 ^ ^ 75%'" > -

Ptpsim&iraB A.B.C 72W» S«.l« 72%>« 73N.W 75*i"l

Bamcaana A.B.C, W ' l M%"> J2%*> 72*<" T5W"»

RudCrcua^ A.&.C.Q 73%!" 93%^ r«i» - ?2%i.=t

& * n « ^ c u r e pifwA ufc *,a,o,£ ?w> «*!" MSI" 7»<" 75*""

6aaiqut*j/Wrid n.a.o,f 72%''* *e*« 72*0 100*,JI

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Rafar to paragraph 402.3.1 of ASME B31.4-HM6

Rafar t o paragraph 9.4.3 of A PI 5L-20M
Rafar t o p a n g n p h 413.6.4(b) o( ASME B31.4-2006
Rafar to paragraph 419.6.4(c) of A SME B31.4-2006
Rafar to paragraph 402.3.1(a) of A SME 631.4-2006
Rafar to paragraph 4Q13.3(a} of ASME B31,4-2006
RafartoTa6fa841.114AofASMEB31>2003.
Rafar t o paragraph 851.12.1(a) of ASME B31.3-2003
Rafar t o paragraph 633.3(D) of ASME 8 3 1 * 2 0 0 3
Rafar t o paragraph 833.4(b) o f ASME 831.8-2903
Rafarto paragraph 833.6(h) of A SME B31.S-2003
Rafar t o Taola 841.114B for daslgn factor.
Rafar to paragraph B33.4<c) of ASME B31.6-2003

^ilt»b^^ ?Ci
•VERTICAL FIELD BENDS ARE POTENTIA L UPHEA VA L BUCKLING POINTS
•IF INCLUDED, SHOULD BE ANALYSED
•BENDS OF 0.5deg ANGLE ARE SUSCEPTABLE TO UPHEAVAL BUCKLING

14
^ J T ^ G g ^ i M f ^ p f i i J ^ ^ y ? ^ ^ : ' \ ;, _...g
"Cr. - _ L d ^ : : : .■:

BOTH CONTINUOUS AND

DISCRETE FOUNDA TIONS
SHOULD BE CHECKED FOR
UPHEAVAL BUCKILNG

LOOSE FOUNDATION COU LD BE

MORE CRITICAL THAN
CONTINUOUSLY SU PPORTED
FOUNDATION AND MIGHT
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL
DOWNLOAD

,-' ~//J * * ( m**

^>-.*-^%5t «fe'-:. ... . .:-:-f4*s^ : ■ ; > : > . . . . ■

Prop Type Feature

Resistance - q{x) + El d 4 w/dx 4 = - Peff d 2 w/dx 2 - Driving

Effective Force Peff = N +peAe - pjA,-

The download required to prevent upheaval buckling for an

overbend with imperfection height, d, is:

1.16-4.1 M R.
5.^
E.l

15
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START UP OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

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* POST INSTALLATION ANALYSIS MUST BE ALLOWED FOR

o SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN WORKSCOPE
* NEED TO ENSURE THAT WE ASK FOR THE CORRECT AS-
BUILT INFO
^PROFILE (X.Y.Z)
^LOCATION OF FIELD BENDS {HORIZONTAL AND
VERTICAL)
>P!PE BOOKS (WITH TIE-IN DATES, TEMPS, WELDS,
PIPE NOs)
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PROFILE ANALYSIS TO CHECK AS-BUILT CONDITION PRIOR TO OPERATION

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CSA 2662 - OIL AND GAS PIPELINE SYSTEMS

(CANADIAN STANDARDS ASSOCIATION)

17
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7? -■"fc: ■■

* Failures, when they occur,

can have catastrophic effects,
with the possibility of many
fatalities.
» Public tolerance of
environmental pollution and
accidents is decreasing.
» Risks from crude oil pipelines
are primarily those relating to
environmental pollution.
* Risks from products pipelines
affect both public safety and
the environment.
* Risks from flammable and
toxic gas and volatile liquid
pipelines primarily concern
public safety.
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•t?.75inODp'pelir;e
•i :odegC design temperature

SSSCffE".

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A fiery explosion killed a worker and burned

hundreds of acres of land.
A bulldozer digging a ditch for a new pipeline
project hit an existing underground pipeline
Fire burned for more than an hour
' "J***1
-1

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-- I ■ 1

-2*

19
 AN AIR TEST
THAT WENT
WRONG

THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED

DURING A PRESSURE TEST OF
THE EQUIPMENT.
CAUSED BY A SUDDEN
FLANGE FAILURE WHILE
THE WORKERS WERE
CONDUCTING
PNEUMATIC TESTING OF
A 38 INCH DIAMETER
LINE
THE TESTING PRESSURE
WAS15.6MPA(2,262PSI),
AND THE EXPLOSION
OCCURRED WHEN THE
SYSTEM PRESSURE
REACHED 12.3 MPA
(IJMPSQ.

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