G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. CHI CHAN LIU A. K. A.

CHAN QUE AND HUI LAO CHUNG A.K.A. LEOFE SENGLAO, Appellants.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. CHI CHAN LIU A. K. A. CHAN QUE AND HUI LAO CHUNG
A.K.A. LEOFE SENGLAO, Appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court’s consideration is the Decision1 dated January 9, 2009 and Resolution2 dated April 24, 2009
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. R. CR HC No. 00657 affirming the Decision3 dated June 21, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. Z-1058,
finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section
21 (a), Article IV of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by RA No. 7659.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon, the officers-on-duty
at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the
Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious looking boat was seen
somewhere within the vicinity of said island.4 Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards
the specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, one of which resembled a
fishing boat and the other, a speedboat. They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2)
on board the speed boat who were transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to
the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the strong waves, the police officers were prevented
from chasing the same and instead, went towards the speed boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine
trouble. On board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan Que and Hui
Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic bags containing a white, crystalline
substance they instantly suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as “shabu.” They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants failed to
do so.5 Thus, the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed
appellants’ speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the
police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them “big, big amount of money”
which they ignored.6 chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with the bags containing the
crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence of the appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo
Telebrico, they conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were forty-five (45) in number, weighing
about a kilo each.7 Again, SPO3 Yuson requested proper documentation from the appellants as to their
identities as well as to the purpose of their entry in the Philippine territory.8 However, the appellants did not
answer any of SPO3 Yuson’s questions.9 Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to their
superiors, PNP Provincial Command in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp
Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his
arrival the following day.10 cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived together with Colonel Damian on a helicopter. They talked with
Mayor Telebrico and the arresting officers and then brought the appellants with the suspected illegal drugs
to Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further investigation.11 There, the appellants and the suspected
prohibited drugs were turned over to Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and Investigation
Division, PNP, Regional Office IV, who attempted to communicate with the appellants using “broken”
English. According to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only kept saying the phrase “call China, big
money,” giving him a certain cellular phone number.12 He allowed appellants to call said number in which
they spoke with someone using their native language, which he could not understand.13 Because of this
difficulty, Inspector Culili sought the assistance of Inspector Carlito Dimalanta in finding an interpreter who
knew either Fookien or Cantonese.

On December 5, 1998, the interpreter arrived. With the assistance of said interpreter, Inspector Culili
informed and explained to the appellants their rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the right to remain
silent, the right to counsel, as well as the right to be informed of the charges against them, and the
consequences thereof.14 Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to ask the appellants whether they
wanted to avail of said constitutional rights. However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase “big money,
call China.” Apart from their names, aliases and personal circumstances, the appellants did not divulge any
other information.15 Inspector Culili, with the assistance of the arresting officers, then prepared the Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report of the appellants, requested for their physical and medical examination, as well as
the laboratory examination of the white, crystalline substance in the bags seized from them.16 He also
assisted the arresting officers in the preparation of their affidavits.17 According to Inspector Culili, moreover,
he was able to confirm that the appellants are Chinese nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier
intelligence report that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine
of Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province.18 chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic Chemist/Physical Examiner assigned at
the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna conducted an examination of
the white, crystalline substance in the forty-five (45) bags seized from the appellants.19After performing
three (3) tests thereon, she positively confirmed in her Chemistry Report that the same is, indeed,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu.”20 chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed an
Information21with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, against appellants for violation of Section 14,
Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA No. 7659, committed
as follows:chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary

That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 3, 1998 at the coast of Brgy. Tambo, Ambil
Island in the Municipality of Looc Province of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then the persons not authorized by law conspiring
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously import and bring
through the use of sea vessel into the above-mentioned place, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as
Shabu contained in forty-five (45) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags having a total weight of 46,600
grams (46.60 kilograms) placed inside another forty-five (45) separate self-seling (sic) transparent plastic
bags which is prohibited by law, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, where the
facts earlier stated were testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution, specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan,
SPO3 Yuson, Police Inspector Culili, and Police Inspector Geronimo.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and Fernando Oliva, both residents
of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former Supervising Crime Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo
de la Fuente Robles, a Member of the Looc Municipal Council, essentially maintain that the subject
crystalline substance was merely recovered by the apprehending police officers from the house of Barangay
Captain Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat the appellants were on.22 chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its Decision dated June 21, 2004, the
dispositive portion of which reads: chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, finding both accused CHI CHAN LIU @ “CHAN QUE” AND HIU LAO CHUNG @ “LEOFE SENG
LAO” GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21
(a), Article IV as amended by R. A. 7659 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, the
Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA and
to each pay the FINE of One Million (Php1,000,000.00) Pesos Philippine Currency, with cost de officio.

SO ORDERED.23

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated January 9, 2009. On April
24, 2009, it further denied the appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent
reason to make any revision, amendment, or reversal of its assailed Decision. Hence, the present appeal
raising the following issues: cha nro blesvi rtual lawlib rary

I.

WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF IMPORTATION OF REGULATED DRUGS
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 14, ARTCILE III, IN RELATION TO SECTION 21 (A), ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC
ACT 6425, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7659, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. cralawred

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. cralawred

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES CAN
PREVAIL OVER THE GUARANTEES ENSHRINED AND KEPT SACRED BY THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION IN
THIS CASE. cralawred

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IS VALID. cralawred

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.24

Appellants maintain that there is no importation of regulated drugs in the instant case since the elements of
the crime of importation, namely: (1) the importation or bringing into the Philippines of any regulated or
prohibited drug; and (2) the importation or bringing into the Philippines of said drugs was without authority
of law, were not established herein. Appellants assert that unless there is proof that a ship on which illegal
drugs came from a foreign country, the offense does not fall within the ambit of illegal importation of said
drugs. Thus, considering the prosecution’s failure to prove the place of origin of the boat on which
appellants were apprehended, appellants cannot be convicted of the crime charged herein.

Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the corpus
delicti of the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs subject of this case was not
sufficiently established. In addition, they emphasize the irregularities attendant in their arrest and seizure of
the illegal drugs in violation of their constitutionally protected rights. Appellants further call attention to the
invalidity of their arraignment for they were not represented by a counsel of their choice.

This Court finds merit on appellants’ first argument.

The information filed by the prosecutor against appellants charged appellants with violation of Section 14,
Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659, which provide: chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary

ARTICLE III
Regulated Drugs

Section 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one
day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any regulated drug into the Philippines.
xxxx

ARTICLE IV
Provisions of Common Application to Offenses Penalized
under Articles II and III

xxxx

Section 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the commission of the
offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases:

a) importation of dangerous drugs;

On the basis of the foregoing provisions, the crime of importation of regulated drugs is committed by
importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by law. According to
appellants, if it is not proven that the regulated drugs are brought into the Philippines from a foreign origin,
there is no importation. In support of this, they cite our ruling in United States v. Jose,25 wherein We said
that:chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

There can be no question that, unless a ship on which opium is alleged to have been illegally
imported comes from a foreign country, there is no importation. If the ship came to Olongapo
from Zamboanga, for example, the charge that opium was illegally imported on her into the port
of Olongapo, i.e., into the Philippine Islands, could not be sustained no matter how much opium
she had on board or how much was discharged. In order to establish the crime of importation as
defined by the Opium Law, it must be shown that the vessel from which the opium is landed or
on which it arrived in Philippine waters came from a foreign port. Section 4 of Act No. 2381 provides
that:ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, or assist in
so doing, shall be punished . . . .
It is clear that a breach of this provision involves the bringing of opium into the Philippine
Islands from a foreign country. Indeed, it is a prime essential of the crime defined by that
section. Without it, no crime under that section can be established. 26

Moreover, the Black’s Law Dictionary defines importation as “the act of bringing goods and merchandise into
a country from a foreign country.”27 As used in our tariff and customs laws, imported articles, those which
are brought into the Philippines from any foreign country, are subject to duty upon each
importation.28 Similarly, in a statute controlling the entry of toxic substances and hazardous and nuclear
wastes, importation was construed as the entry of products or substances into the Philippines through the
seaports or airports of entry.29 Importation then, necessarily connotes the introduction of something into a
certain territory coming from an external source. Logically, if the article merely came from the same
territory, there cannot be any importation of the same.

The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated: chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellants were, indeed, guilty of
importing regulated drugs into the country in violation of aforesaid law. Appellants were caught by police
authorities in flagrante delicto on board a speedboat carrying forty-five (45) plastic bags of shabu. The
drugs seized were properly presented and identified in court. Appellants’ admission that they were
Chinese nationals and their penchant for making reference during custodial investigation to
China where they could obtain money to bribe the police officers lead this Court to no other
reasonable conclusion but that China is the country of origin of the confiscated drugs. All elements
of the crime of illegal importation of regulated drugs being present in this case, conviction thereof is in
order.30

We disagree. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as their penchant for making
reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the apprehending officers does not necessarily
mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily came from China. The records only bear the fact that the speed
boat on which the appellants were apprehended was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality
of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. But it could have easily come from some other locality within the country, and
not necessarily from China or any foreign port, as held by the CA. This Court notes that for a vessel which
resembles a speed boat, it is rather difficult to suppose how appellants made their way to the shores of
Occidental Mindoro from China. Moreover, an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on board
extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province,
does not sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs in the
country from an external source. This, notwithstanding, had the prosecution presented more concrete
evidence to convince this Court that the prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source outside of the
Philippines, the importation contention could have been sustained.

Appellants’ exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs under Section 14, Article III of RA No.
6425 does not, however, free them from all criminal liability for their possession of the same is clearly
evident.

At the outset, appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United States v.
Jose,31 possession is not necessarily included in the charge of importation and thus, they cannot be held
liable thereof, to wit: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed the question whether, in case the charge of
illegal importation fails, the accused may still be convicted, under the information, of the crime of illegal
possession of opium. We, therefore, have not had the aid of discussion of this proposition; but, believing
that it is a question which might fairly be raised in the event of an acquittal on the charge of illegal
importation, we have taken it up and decided it. Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that:ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

The court may find the defendant guilty of any offense, or of any frustrated or attempted offense, the
commission of which is necessarily included in the charge in the complaint or information.
As will be seen from this provision, to convict of an offense included in the charge in the information
it is not sufficient that the crime may be included, but it must necessarily be included. While, the
case before us, the possession of the opium by the appellants was proved beyond question and
they might have been convicted of that offense if they have been charged therewith,
nevertheless, such possession was not an essential element of the crime of illegal importation
and was not necessarily included therein. The importation was complete, to say the least, when the
ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium be discharged or that it be taken
from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a
boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with
intent to discharge its cargo. That being the case it is clear that possession, either actual or
constructive, is not a necessary element of the crime of illegal importation nor is it necessarily
included therein. Therefore, in acquitting the appellants of the charge of illegal importation, we
cannot legally convict them of the crime of illegal possession.32

However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish,33 this Court held that possession is inherent in
importation. In that case, the accused, who was suspected of being the owner of sixty-five (65) large boxes
of blasting caps found aboard a ship of American registry docked inside Philippine territory, was charged
with illegal importation of the articles under Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code and illegal
possession of the same articles under Section 1 of Act No. 3023, in two (2) separate informations. Ruling
that double jeopardy exists in view of the fact that possession is necessarily included in importation, this
Court affirmed the dismissal of the information on illegal importation, in the following wise: cha nrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and
after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
With reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps, it seems plain beyond
argument that the latter is inherent in the former so as to make them juridically identical. There
can hardly be importation without possession. When one brings something or causes something
to be brought into the country, he necessarily has the possession of it. The possession ensuing
from the importation may not be actual, but legal, or constructive, but whatever its character,
the importer, in our opinion, is a possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to criminal
prosecution. If he parts with the ownership of interest in the article before it reaches Philippine territory,
he is neither an importer nor a possessor within the legal meaning of the term, and he is not subject to
prosecution for either offense under the Philippine Laws. The owner of the merchandise at the time it enters
Philippine water is its importer and possessor. He who puts merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the
title thereto while it is in transit does not incur criminal liability. Possession on ownership of a prohibited
article on a foreign vessel on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines does not constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country. (U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil., 573).34

As We have explained in our more recent ruling above, there is double jeopardy therein since the offense
charged in the information on possession is necessarily included in the information on importation in view of
the fact that the former is inherent in the latter. Thus, this Court sustained the dismissal of one of the two
informations which charged the accused with importation to avoid the implications of double jeopardy for
possession is necessarily included in the charge of importation.

Applying the aforequoted ruling, this Court finds that while appellants cannot be held liable for the offense of
illegal importation charged in the information, their criminal liability for illegal possession, if proven beyond
reasonable doubt, may nevertheless be sustained. As previously mentioned, the crime of importation of
regulated drugs is committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being
authorized by law. Indeed, when one brings something or causes something to be brought into the country,
he necessarily has possession of the same. Necessarily, therefore, importation can never be proven without
first establishing possession, affirming the fact that possession is a condition sine qua non for it would rather
be unjust to convict one of illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in possession
thereof.

At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession when the information filed
against them charges the crime of importation does not violate their constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation brought against them. The rule is that when there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved included in that which is charged.35 An offense charged necessarily includes that which
is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter.36
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib rary

Indeed, We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused, charged with the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal possession thereof. In those cases, this Court upheld the
prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal possession thereof except if
the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered
by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably intended for
some future dealings or use by the accused.37 Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is therefore an element
of and is necessarily included in illegal sale. Hence, convicting the accused with the former does not violate
his right to be informed of the accusation against him for it is an element of the latter.

In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an element of and is necessarily included
in illegal importation of dangerous drugs, convicting appellants of the former, if duly established beyond
reasonable doubt, does not amount to a violation of their right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them. Indeed, where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not
only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.38 chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal
importation of regulated drugs, this Court shall determine appellants’ culpability under Section 16,39Article
III of RA No. 6425.

The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a regulated drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the regulated drug.40 chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession of the bags containing the
regulated drugs without the requisite authority. As mentioned previously, on the date of appellants’ arrest,
the apprehending officers were conducting a surveillance of the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of
Looc, Occidental Mindoro, upon being informed by the Municipality’s Barangay Captain that a suspicious-
looking boat was within the vicinity. Not long after, they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, the
persons on which were transferring cargo from one to the other. Interestingly, as they moved closer to the
area, one of the boats hurriedly sped away. Upon reaching the other boat, the police officers found the
appellants with several transparent plastic bags containing what appeared to be shabu which were plainly
exposed to the view of the officers. Clearly, appellants were found to be in possession of the subject
regulated drugs.

Moreover, this Court is not legally prepared to accept the version of the appellants that they had nothing to
do with the incident and that they were being framed up as the drugs seized from them were merely planted
by the apprehending officers. At the outset, this Court observes that appellants did not provide any
explanation as to how the apprehending officers were actually able to plant forty-five (45) bags of regulated
drugs weighing about one (1) kilo each in the speed boat of appellants in the middle of the ocean without
their knowledge. Also, as the trial court noted, they did not even give any explanation as to the purpose of
their presence in the coast of Ambil, Looc, Occidental Mindoro. More importantly, aside from saying that the
confiscated bags of regulated drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat, they did not provide the
court with sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. In the words of the lower court: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

Moreover, the story of defense witnesses Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo Robles that the
subject shabu were taken only by the police authority from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza
taxes only one’s credulity. Their testimonies appear to be merely a product of an [afterthought]. They have
not executed any prior affidavit on the matters concerning their testimonies unlike the prosecution witnesses
SPO3 Yuson and SPO2 Paglicawan who executed their joint affidavit almost immediately after their arrest. It
is so apparent from the testimonies of these three (3) above-named defense witnesses that they [did not]
know anything about the case. What is even worse is that Atty. Evasco, the former counsel of the accused,
procured the testimonies of Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo Reyes. Clear enough their intent
or motivation is not for the truth to come out but for the monetary consideration in exchange of their
testimony.41

This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This defense has been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can
easily be concocted. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong
and convincing evidence.42 Without proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to
appellants the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and
the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect,
deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-serving claims of frame up by appellants.43 chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

Going now to appellants’ arguments that their criminal liability is negated by certain irregularities in the
proceedings of this case. First and foremost, appellants allege a violation of their constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Due to the absence of probable cause, their warrantless arrest
and consequent search and seizure on their persons and possession is unjustified and hence, the confiscated
bags of regulated drugs therefrom are inadmissible against them.

Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A settled exception, however, to the above guaranteed right is an arrest made during the commission of a
crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant, under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer of a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
This Court has ruled that for an arrest to fall under the above exception, two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.44
chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the apprehending officers in
flagrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on the date of their arrest, the apprehending
officers, while acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain, spotted appellants transferring cargo from
one boat to another. However, one of the boats hastily sped away when they drew closer to the appellants,
naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers. Soon after, the police officers found them with the illegal
drugs plainly exposed to the view of the officers. When they requested appellants to show proper
documentation as to their identity as well as their purpose for being there, appellants refused to show them
anything much less respond to any of their questions. In fact, when the officers were transporting
appellants and the illegal drugs to the shore, the appellant Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the
arresting officers “big, big amount of money.” Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding the arrest
of appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were actually committing a crime within the
view of the arresting officers, who had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.

In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure conducted on appellants
unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain view of the
arresting officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a search
warrant.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.45 It applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view
the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.46 chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

In the case at hand, the apprehending officers were performing their duty of ascertaining whether a criminal
activity was indeed happening at the time and place reported by the Barangay Captain. In broad daylight,
appellants were seen in the act of transferring bags of illegal drugs from one boat to another and thereafter
caught in possession of the same, which became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the point of
view of the arresting officers. It is undeniably clear, therefore, that the seizure of illegal drugs conducted by
the officers falls within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine. Consequently, the confiscated drugs are
admissible as evidence against appellants.

As to appellants’ assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to substantiate beyond reasonable
doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs was not sufficiently
established, the same cannot be sustained as a review of the records of the case provides otherwise. From
the time of appellants’ arrest, the seized bags of regulated drugs were properly marked and
photographed. Proper inventory was also conducted in the presence of the appellants and Mayor Telebrico,
who signed a receipt evidencing that the confiscated drugs were turned over to the PNP Regional
Headquarters.47 There, the evidence was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office for an
examination which yielded positive results. The laboratory report, photographs, and receipts were all
made part of the records of this case. In fact, the bags containing the crystalline substance were presented
before the trial court during the hearing held on October 12, 1999 which was identified by SPO3 Yuson, the
officer who confiscated the same. Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated drugs was
established by the prosecution.

Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged in an Information on
December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after their arrest on December 3, 1998, beyond the thirty-six (36)-hour
period in Article 12548 of the Revised Penal Code. But while the law subjects such public officers who detain
persons beyond the legal period to criminal liability, it must be remembered that the proceeding taken
against the detained persons for the act they committed remains unaffected, for the two acts are distinct
and separate.49 This Court is nevertheless mindful of the difficult circumstances faced by the police officers
in this case, such as the language barrier, the unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact that one of the
days fell on a Sunday, as well as the disparity in the distances between the different offices. But even
assuming that the police officers intentionally delayed the filing of the Information, appellants should have
taken steps to report or file charges against the officers. Unfortunately, they cannot now rely on
administrative shortcomings of police officers to get a judgment of acquittal for these do not diminish the
fact that illegal drugs were found in appellants’ possession.50 chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Anent appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for during custodial
investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they provided with one, this deserves scant
consideration since the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction.51 In this case, neither one of the appellants
executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show, appellants barely even spoke and
merely kept repeating the phrase “call China, big money.” The trial court convicted them not on the basis of
anything they said during custodial investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants’ constitutional right to counsel during
custodial investigation.

In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in saying that during their
arraignment, they were not represented by a counsel of their choice but were merely represented by a
court-appointed government lawyer. Appellants assert that the trial court likewise appointed a special
interpreter, who merely understood a little Chinese language. As such, considering the absence of any
assurance that the interpreter was able to explain to appellants the charges against them in the language
they understood, appellants therefore did not validly enter their plea.

The facts borne by the records of the case, however, militate against the contention of the appellants. This
Court does not find a violation of appellants’ right to counsel for even in their own narration of facts,
appellants stated that when they appeared without counsel when the case was called for arraignment on
January 19, 1999, the trial court gave appellants time to secure the services of counsel of their choice. It
was only when appellants again appeared without counsel on February 23, 1999 that the court appointed a
counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office.52 It is clear, therefore, that appellants had ample opportunity to
secure the services of a counsel of their own choice. They cannot now assign error in the proceedings
conducted by the trial court for the fact remains that they were appointed with counsel in full compliance
with the law.

In much the same way, appellants had every opportunity to secure the services of a Chinese interpreter
with such competence at par with their standards. As pointed out by the CA, the trial court gave appellants
the authorization to seek, through their counsel, the Chinese Embassy’s assistance for purposes of procuring
a Chinese interpreter.53 Appellants were even given time, through several postponements, to properly
secure the services of one. If appellants were unsatisfied with the competence of the court-appointed
interpreter, it should have taken the opportunities given by the trial court. In this relation, the trial court’s
observations are worth mentioning, to wit: chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify on their own behalf, the defense is
trying to justify for want of Chinese interpreter. The instant case has been filed in Court since December 8,
1998 or six years more or less until now. It is highly unbelievable that for such period of time that
this case has been pending in court, accused could not still secure the services of a Chinese
interpreter when as borne out by the records, they were able to secure the services of several
lawyers one after the other. The accused on two (2) occasions have even submitted written requests in
English (Exhibit “N” and Exhibit “O”) which were granted by the Court allowing them to call their relatives
but still they failed to secure the services of an interpreter. To the mind of the Court, accused can also
understand English as proven by their letters. x x x 54

Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court as to appellants’
guilt of the offense charged against them, especially when such findings are adequately supported by
documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on reason and
experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that
it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest
determination of the witnesses’ deportment during the trial.55 chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Moreover, in view of the well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the
appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a
modification or reversal of the outcome of the case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the
above findings.56 It is clear, therefore, that based on the findings of the courts below, appellants were, in
fact, in possession of regulated drugs without the requisite authority.

As to the penalty imposed on appellants, Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. 7659, amending RA No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, provide: c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

Sec. 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, is amended to read as follows: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.

xxxx
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -
The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

xxxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have possessed forty-five (45) kilograms of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is more than the two hundred (200) grams stipulated above, the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as “An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.” As regards the fine, We find that the amount
of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for each appellant imposed by the RTC is proper, in view of the
quantity seized from them. chanro bles la w

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 9, 2009 and
Resolution dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00657
is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION that appellants herein are found GUILTY of the crime of illegal
possession of regulated drugs.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-18.

2
CA rollo, p. 281.

3
Penned by Presiding Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue, id. at 8-19.

Rollo, p. 4.
4

5
CA rollo, p. 9.

6
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 2-12; and TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 12-24.

7
CA rollo, p. 10.

8
TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 13.
9
Id.

10
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 12-14; and TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 24-26, 28.

11
Id., citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 14-15; 26-29.

12
Id., citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 5-14.

13
CA rollo, p. 11.

14
Id.

15
Rollo p. 5, citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 14-17.

16
Id., citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 17-25.

17
CA rollo, p. 12.

18
Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, May 20, 1999, p. 36.

19
Id. at 6, citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 7-28.

20
Id., citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 38-73.

21
CA rollo, p. 6.

22
Id. at 16.

23
Id. at 19.

24
Rollo, pp. 63-64.

25
G.R. No. L-11737, August 25, 1916.

26
United States v. Jose, supra. (Emphasis ours)

27
http://thelawdictionary.org/importation/ (last accessed November 11, 2014).

28
Section 101, Title 1 of Book 1, Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as “An Act to Revise and Codify
the Tariff and Customs Laws of the Philippines.”

29
Section 5(d)Republic Act No. 6969, otherwise known as “An Act to Control Toxic Substances and
Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for Other Purposes,” October
26, 1990.

30
Rollo, pp. 13-14. (Emphasis ours)

31
United States v. Jose, supra note 23.

32
Id. (Emphasis ours)

33
People v. Elkanish, G.R. No. L-2666, September 26, 1951.

34
Id. (Emphasis ours)

35
RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, Sec. 4.
36
RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, Sec. 5.

37
People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013 and People v. Hong Yeng E, G. R. No. 181826,
January 9, 2013, citing People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 561.

38
People v. Noque, G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010, citing People v. Villamar, 358 Phil. 886, 894 (1998).

39
Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months
and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription.

People v. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100, 121 (1997).

41
CA rollo, p. 18.

42
People v. Amansec, G. R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 574, citing People v. Lazaro,
Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 250, 269.

43
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187047, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 286, citing People v. Chua,416 Phil. 33, 56
(2001).

Miclat v. People, G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 539, 550, citing People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil.
44

752, 775 (2003).

45
Fajardo v. People, G. R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 194, 209, citing People v. Go, 457 Phil.
885, 928 (2003), citing People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 597, 610 and Harris
v. United States, 390 U.S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927)

46
Id., at 209-210, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 633-634 (1999).

47
CA rollo, p. 11.

48
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties
provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain
any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities
within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.

49
People v. Cadley, 469 Phil. 515, 528 (2004), citing People v. Mabong, 100 Phil. 1069, 1071 (1957).

50
Id., citing People v. Tejada, 252 Phil. 515, 525-526 (1989).

51
Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 624, and People v. Vinecario, G. R.
No. 141137, January 20, 2004, citing People v. Buluran, 382 Phil. 364, 372 (2000).

Rollo, p. 59.
52

53
Id. at 15.

54
CA rollo, p. 18. (Emphasis ours)

55
Sy v. People, G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 2011, citing People v. Dilao, 555 Phil. 394, 407 (2007).

56
Id. at 439.