Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the
judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
66, finding him guilty of transporting, without appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance
methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15,   Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
1

otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by R.A. No. 7659,  and 2

sentencing him to "die by lethal injection." In view thereof, the judgement was brought to this Court
for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7659.

In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid
(hereafter CID), as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the
Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29
March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite
(hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted. According to ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the boats
ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID and six
of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded
forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with ALMOITE. CID then observed that the
speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic
places when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his men to take up positions thirty meters
from the coastline. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands,
carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time,
ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms,
became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing
the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right
arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking
in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus
tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed "sign
language;" he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently
understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag,
which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the
latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and
escorted the latter to the police headquarters.

At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial features of the man, that he was
probably Taiwanese. CID then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain
silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, CID ordered his
men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an enterpreter. In the meantime,
BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets containing yellowish
crystalline substance which he and CID suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan,
finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." The police
authorities were satisfied that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite
their uncertainty as to what language was spoken. But when the policemen asked the man several
questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua
Ho San printed thereon. CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at

1
Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime,
CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. 1âwphi1.nêt

Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the
Philippine National Police, Region I, received a letter request  from CID — incidentally her husband
3

— to conduct a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a

multicolored strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-025-95,  she stated that her qualitative
4

examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC
which docketed the case as Criminal Case No. 4037. However, pursuant to the recommendation of
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, La Union, that the facts of the case could support an
indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information was subsequently amended to
allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine
[h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to transport the same" in violation
of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659.

At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC was satisfied that
CHUA understood the amended information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking
interpreter, Thelma Sales Go.

Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a Taiwanese Interpreter through the
auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA.

Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to establish the above narration of facts
which were culled chiefly from the testimony of CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn,
was substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.

Experts witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her chemistry report in that the contents
of the 29 plastic packets weighing 28.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure,
unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She also explained that they were
unwashed, hence they appeared yellowish.

For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven Yu. He disclosed that
he hails from Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March
1995, he was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latter's 35-
tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port, Mainland China where they would buy fish. Upon
arrival at their destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the fish, but with two bags, the
contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG then showed to CHUA a document
purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the
Philippines and reached Dagupan, Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they
disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG brought with him from China. While,
sailing, RONG made several phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard RONG asked the
person on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they were riding. Apparently, the
person on shore could not see them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when
finally, low on fuel and telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA anchored the boat while
RONG carried the bags to shore. The tasks completed, RONG left to look for a telephone while
CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. A child thereafter pointed out
to him that one bag was missing much to RONG's dismay when he learned of it. When a crowd
started to mill around them, the police arrived. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be
found. The police immediately approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures
and hand movements, they escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a
chair. Later, the police, led by an officer who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the
motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to him, opened it, inspected and
weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methaphetamine hydrochloride.

CHUA denounced the prosecution's story as a distortion of the truth. He denied he was ever favored
with an interpreter or informed of his "constitutional rights," particularly of his right to counsel.
Consequently, his arrest was tainted with illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in
the bag should have been regarded inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID never
graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao beach. BADUA certainly
never prevented him from running away, as such thought failed to make an impression in his mind.

2
Most significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag, emphasizing that
RONG alone exercised dominion over the same.

Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member, recalled that on the date in
question, he arrived at the beach with the police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He
also remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach that CHUA arrived with a
companion and a certain policeman Anneb had chased the latter's car. He additionally claimed that
when the crowd became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to police headquarters. There, the
mayor took charge of the situation — he opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police, he
called for a forensic chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag, and he
ordered his officials to find an interpreter. Throughout the proceedings, photographers were busy
taking pictures to document the event.

Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of Tammocalao who narrated that he was
standing with CHUA on the beach when two men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a bag
situated near CHUA when they detected the arrival of the local police. They quickly disappeared.
CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and PARONG at the beach but not CID.

In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully
discharged its burden of proving that CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Invoking People v. Tagliben  as authority, the RTC
5

characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the
admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted the futility
of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, considering the language barrier and the
observation that such irregularity was "rectified when accused was duly arraigned and . . .
(afterwards) participated in the trial of this case." The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details
which did not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on the
testimonies thus delivered.

The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged employer RONG and the
Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with
several other members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic. Such
predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive portion, to wit:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and established by

convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused had conspired and acted in
concert with one Cho Chu Rong, not to mention Chen Ho Fa, the Skipper of the 35-
tonner ship they used in coming to the Country from China and Taiwan, this Court
finds the accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 as charged in the Information, and considering the provisions of Sec. 20 of R.A.
No. 7659 that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the quantity
sold/possessed/transported is "200 grams or more" in the case of Shabu, and
considering, further that the quantity involved in this case is 28.7 kilograms which is
far beyond the weight ceiling specified in said Act, coupled with the findings of
conspiracy or that accused is a member of an organized syndicated crime group, this
Court, having no other recourse but to impose the maximum penalty to accused, this
Court hereby sentences the said accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San to die by
lethal injection; to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); and to pay the
costs.

The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the Philippine National
Police to immediately form an investigating Committee to be composed by [sic] men
of unimpeachable integrity, who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding
this case to determine whether there was negligence or conspiracy in the escape of
Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who approached the accused in
the seashore of Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La Union, and attempted to take the
remaining bag from accused, as well as the whereabouts of the other bag; and to
furnish this Court a copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to show
compliance herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

3
 The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methaphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu is
ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in
accordance with the law.

The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government and to be turned over to the Philippine National Police, La Union
Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat operations against all illegal seaborne
activities.

SO ORDERED.  6

Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as competent evidence the 29
plastic packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits;" (2)
granting weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite glaring
inconsistencies on material points; and in (3) appreciating conspiracy between him and an organized
syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged in the information.

The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the search was licitly
conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately
preceding to and comtemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police action;
and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches
and seizures since he consented to the search.

We reverse the RTC.

Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy home and person. It explicitly ordains
that people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.  Inseparable, and not
7

merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings. 8

The Cosntitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable
search in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.  Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body,
9

personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued
in compliance with the procedure outlined on the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court;
"otherwise such search and seizure become "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
aforementioned constitutional provision."  This interdiction against warrantless searches and
10

seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been
deemed permissible by jurisprudence  in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in
11

plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search),  and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search
12

and seizure pursuan to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid wararnt of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot
pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.  13

This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest, search and seizure
conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute a valid exemption from the warrant
requirement. Expectedly and quite understandably, the prosecution and the defense painted
extremely divergent versions of the incident. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and
his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.

In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant,
arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have
personal knowledge of such facts  or as recent case law  adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
14 15

circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. The term probable cause
had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged.  Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
16

circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense

4
has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.   In People v. Montilla,  the Court acknowledged that "the evidentiary measure for the
17 18

propriety of filing criminal charges, and correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been
reduced and liberalized." Noting that the previous statutory and jurisprudential evidentiary standard
was "prima facie evidence" and that it had been dubiously equated with probable cause, the Court
explained:

[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima

facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set aright, at least on the
issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which
provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender as well founded belief" as to
the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. It
has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same
Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial,"
or where "a probable cause exists." It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the
right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized."
(emphasis supplied) 19

Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive
or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred
police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to
such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that was "accused was caught red-
handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. At
least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that compelling reasons
(e.g., accused was acting suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant that accused was
transporting prohibitive drug, and the urgency of the situation) constitutive of probable cause
impelled police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest. In the case at bar, the Solicitor
General proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable cause — persistent reports of
rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's
illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUA's
suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent
ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the
high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.

This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug,  confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug
20

and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same,  suspicious demeanor or
21

behavior   and suspicious bulge in the waist  — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a
22 23

warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would
disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to
shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. And despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA attempted to
flee, ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious to any attempt at
conversation when the officers approached him. This cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the
claim, thus:

Q: How far were you when the accused put the bag on his sholder?

A: We were then very near him about three meters away from the
male person carrying the bag.

Q: To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his

shoulder?

A: To the east direction.

Q: In relation to you, where were you.

A: With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached

the accused and when Maj. Cid went near him, he spoke in

5
 Tagalong, English and Ilocano which accused did not understand
because he did not respond.

Q: When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the accused doing at that
time?

A: He was walking.

Q: To what direction he was walking?

A: He was walking to the east direction. (sic)

Q: He was walking away from you or going near you?

A: He was going away from us. That is why Sgt. Reynoso held the
right arm of the accused.

Q: Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused?

A: Yes sir and he stopped. 24

True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was not obvious to the police. But
gossamer to the officers' sense perception and view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat,
CHUA walking casually towards the road, and CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag. These acts
did not convey any impression that he illegally entered Philippine shores. Neither were these overt
manifestations of an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUA's criminal behevior as clearly
established in CID's testimony, thus:

Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced

yourselves:

A No, sir.

Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach the accused

because he was not doing anything wrong?

A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the person and if ever or
whatever assistance that we can give we will give. 25

The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous

search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements
used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate
control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy,  a valid arrest
26

must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the

validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 27

To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and
the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court  as 28

already shown. Fom all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. It is
worth mentioning here that after introducing themselves, the police officcers immediately
inquired about the contents of the bag. What else could have impelled the officers from
displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a
felony had indeed been committed by CHUA — in effect to "retroactively establish probable
cause and validate an illegal search and seizure."

The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a consented search, a legitimate
waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to

6
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right.  CHUA never exhibited that he knew, actually or
29

constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same.
This can be inferred from the manner by which the search performed, thus:

Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what was the first thing that
you did when you approached him (CHUA)?

A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.

Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce yourselves?

A That is normal practice in our part, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q If it is possible. Okey (sic) now, after introducing yourselves what

did you do?

A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word,

Q When he did not utter any word. What else did he do?

A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir.

Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to

open his bag?

A No, sir, there is no answer.

Q No answer?

A Yes, sir, no answer.

Q And when there was no answer what did you do next?

A I used sign language sir.

Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you

demonstrated that sign language of opening the bag mr. (sic)
witness?

A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like this
sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

SHERIFF:

The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and then
manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag moving his
right hand from left to right or from the opening to the end of the
zipper.

COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the end
of the zipper.

Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like this.

(The witness repeating the motion described on record.)

7
 COURT: Did you open that personally?

WITNESS:

A No, your honor.

Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the accused to open
the bag?

A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir.

Q Why, why was it — no, I reform my question your honor. Is it

normal procedure for you to examine anybody or to request anybody
to open his bag?

A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also our duty to inspect
the baggage, it is our routine duty of a police (sic), sir.

Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to

open his bag?

A yes, sir.

Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr. (sic) witness, to open
his bag?

A No, sir.

Q But you simply requested him to open the nag?

A Yes, sir. 30

CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and overwhelmed him. The police
officers already introduced themselves to CHUA in three languages, but he remained completely
deadpan. The police hence concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the three languages. When
CHUA failed to respond again to the police's request to open the bag, they resorted to what they
called "sign language." They claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand motions and gestures.
This Court disagrees. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he
understand the police's "sign language." More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his
alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived
his right against such an intrusive search. This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity
of consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to
search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no
room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instances, the accused
even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and
consequences of such request. 31

It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated subtance. But this is a trifling
matter. If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming
initial information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous trees  how much more of
32

"forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case —
because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the
regulated substance as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and
ineffectual to sustain CHUA's conviction.

Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot
be quickly dispelled. But the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be so carelessly disregarded, as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do.
Fealty to the Constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise
their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. "There are those who
say that . . . 'the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.'. . . In some cases this
will undoubtedly be the result. But . . . 'there is another consideration — the imperative of judicial

8
integrity . . . The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of
the charter of its own existence."
33

As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the posecution witnesses, this Court
considers them trivial as they refer to insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the
case. On a passing note, this Court calls the attention of the trial court regarding its erroneous
appreciation of conspiracy. This aggravating circumstance is without question unsupported by the
records. Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in the pleadings or proceedings of
the trial court. It is also fundamental that conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal
accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt. 34

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, San
Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged,
the evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.