M. M.

TRIVEDI

C I T S U K H A ' S VIEW ON S E L F - L U M I N O S I T Y

To the Advaitins the function of knowledge is to reveal the real nature of

things. The fundamental feature of knowledge is that it does not depend
on human notions. It depends on the thing itself.l In spite of this uniformity
in the nature of knowledge, they distinguish the universal knowledge from
the particular knowledge. Safikara calls it the distinction between Nirvi~e.sa
Vijfi~na and Vi~e.sa Vijfifina. 2 The particular knowledge or Vi~e.sa Vijfifina
presents the reality as limited by name and form. It is the knowledge of the
Absolute Reafity as infected by division and discrepancy) It gives us the
knowledge of the changing objects, not having their being in and through
the Absolute, but enjoying an independent existence. It provides the false
cognition of things. 4 The knowledge of reality in its Absolute and infinite
aspect is the universal knowledge or Nirvi~e.sa Vijfi~ina. It is the absolutely
perfect knowledge. The Advaitins describe it as self-luminous experience
and, like the Upanisadic view, identify it with Brahman or Atman. Saflkara
also supports this view and stresses that the effulgence of Brahman is original
which illumines all objects but is itself illumined by no other light, s The
reason for serf-luminosity as given by gaflkara is that Brahman can never
become an object of knowledge. 6 As regards self-luminosity, he is of the
view that had Atman not been there, the activities of the mind and senses
would have been impossible. The light of .Z,tman pervades the whole body,
senses and mind.
The problem before the post-Saflkara Advaitic philosophers was to provide
a more solid ground to the Advaitic view of serf-luminosity in order to save
it from the attacks of the opponents. Citsukha takes upon himself this task
and excels other Advaitins in accomplishing it, for the others simply repeat
his arguments. Ingenuity of his arguments has earned wide admiration of
many modern scholars. His contribution lies in giving the most suitable
definition and proofs for self-luminosity. Its cogency must draw our attention
The fact that Citsukha begins his most learned work the Tattva-pradfpikd
with a discussion of self-luminosity shows the significance of this notion.
While defining self-luminosity he has suggested as many as eleven possible

Journal oflndian Philosophy 15 (1987) 115- 123.

© 1987 by D. ReidelPublishing Company.
1 16 M. M. TRIVEDI

definitions. He shows logical fallacies in all of them which the Naiyfiyikas

and other critics of the philosophy of Advaita may point out to prove that
self-luminosity is indefinable. He agrees to the criticism of these definitions
but for that of the last one. The possible definitions of self-luminosity are
luminosity which is itself its own nature or luminosity by and of itself or
the incapability of being illumined by homogeneous light or the absence
of non-manifestation in its own existence or luminosity which is the cause
of its empirical usage or the nature of being the non-object of knowledge
or the nature of being comprehended immediately while remaining the
non-object of knowledge or the nature of being the non-object of cognition
while remaining the object of empirical usage or the quality of being non-related
in its empirical usage to other homogeneous cognition or the nature of being
an object of immediate experience in empirical usage while remaining the
non-object of cognition or the capability of being called immediate in empirical
usage while remaining at the same time a non-object of knowledge. 7
An opponent of the philosophy of Advaita may point out that the first
definition is too wide. Since an object of knowledge will also become self-
luminous, it will be unacceptable to the Advaitins also. The second definition
means that knowledge is both the subject and object simultaneously which
is self-contradictory. The third definition is also fallacious, since per
definition the sun, pot etc. will become self-luminous because they are also
not illumined by homogeneous light. But the Advaitins would never accept
them as self-luminous as they are the objects of knowledge. The fourth
definition is also over-pervasive because it applies to pleasure and pain which
do not lack luminosity at the time of their being felt. For the same reason
the fifth definition also is to be condemned. The sun and lamp also are the
causes of the empirical usages of their knowledge. For example, when the
sun rises, we say that 'the sun is rising'. Thus, this definition denotes even
non-self-luminous objects as self-luminous. The sixth definition that the
non~bject of cognition is self-luminous, is impossible because nothing as
such can exist in this world. The Advaitins also support this view because
they opine that even the knowledge of the self is the object of scriptural
and inferential cognition. Seventh and eighth definitions are also impossible
because they are qualified by the term 'the non-object of cognition'. Ninth
definition is too wide because it includes lamp, pot etc., which are in the
empirical usage of their knowledge independent of homogeneous cognition
but are not self-luminous because they are objects of knowledge. Tenth
 CITSUKHA'S VIEW ON SELF-LUMINOSITY 117

definition is impossible because being unknowable, knowledge ceases to be

the object of proof. In such a situation all debates consisting of 'I and thou'
will come to an end. Naiyfiyikas may criticize the eleventh definition that
if the capability for empirical usage is an attribute of the self, there is
non-pervasion of this definition because the self does not possess any attribute
at the time of release. Moreover, this definition is inconsistent because the
Advaitins hold the view that the self is attributeless. Besides, if the capability
is the nature of the self, it will reduce the self to the status of a relative
existence which will contradict the Advaitic view. s
To meet the objections against the eleventh definition Citsukha's reply
is that 'the capability of being called immediate in empirical usages' is an
attribute, but it does not mean that it is perpetually present in the self.
Though the aforesaid capability does not exist in the self at the time of
release, it belongs to the self in some other state, i.e., the state of transmigra-
tion in which it is not absolutely absent in the self. It means that the self
is the non-locus of the absolute non-existence of the aforesaid capability,
just as the Naiyfiyikas have defined substance as the non-locus of the absolute
non-existence of qualities. Hence the definition is not non-pervasive. It is
not even inconsistent with the Advaitic view that the self is attributeless
because Citsukha says like Sure~var~chrya and Paficap~dikfic~rya that we
can assume the intended attributes in the self in some other state than that
of release. Thus, the self is the non-locus of the absolute non-existence of
attributes. 9 This definition does not create the flaw of relativity in the self
also, since the capability is not different from the self. This contention
is corroborated by his argument to prove that the self is self-luminous. His
proof for the self-luminosity of the self is that the self is of the nature of
consciousness (cidr~patv~t). 1° In his opinion, there is no relation between
consciousness and the self because relation implies difference between the
terms and there is no difference between them. Thus, the self is self-luminous
which is tantamount to saying that the self and self-luminosity are not different
It follows from this discussion that this definition does not contradict the
Advaitic view.
Pointing out the relevance of every part of the eleventh definition, Citsukha
says that self-luminosity cannot be defined only as the nature of being not
an object of knowledge (Avedyatva). If it is accepted as the definition, it
will be over-pervasive definition because it includes merit and demerit also
which are non-objects of perceptual cognition. In order to remove this flaw
118 M.M. TRIVEDI

there is in the definition the qualification, "the capability of being called

immediate in empirical usage". H It is worth noticing that he has not chosen
the word immediate alone to be supplemented. The reason is that the word
immediate is used even for the objects of sense. But they are not really
immediate as they are projected by ignorance. It is the self alone that is
fit to be called immediate. In order to avoid confusion with the objects of
sense, he has given the above mentioned qualification. Thus, in his opinion
self-luminosity can be def'med in a flawless manner by accepting the eleventh
def'mition, i.e., "the capability of being called immediate in empirical usage
while remaining at the same time the non-object of knowledge." t2
Citsukha anticipates the objections that can be raised by the Naiyfiyikas
and other critics against his proofs for self-luminosity. Citsukha gives the
following proof for self-luminosity: "Experience is the luminosity that
causes the empirical usages of experience because it is experience. What
is not like that, is not like this, e.g., pot. ''13 In this Kevalavyatireki type
of inference the major term (S~dhya) is 'the luminosity that causes the
empirical usage of experience', the minor term (Pak.sa) is 'experience', and
'because it is experience' is the middle term (Hetu). The objection that
a critic may raise against this inference is that if the middle term is not
present in positive (Sapak.sa) instances as it happens in Kevalavyatireki
inference and if there is no occurrence of the middle term in negative (Vipak.sa)
instances as the Advaitins stress it, there arises the fallacy known as As~dtfira.na
Anaik~ntikatL 14 Pointing out another fallacy a question may be asked if
the term 'the cause of the empirical usage of experience' is the adjective or
accidental property (Upalaksana) of luminosity. Adjective is interpreted as
intrinsic quality and accidental property is non-intrinsic quality. If it is
meant for an adjective, it will be lacking at the time of release which is
devoid of all the properties. And if it is taken for the accidental property,
the term 'the cause of the empirical usage of experience' cannot form the
part of the major term, and luminosity alone remains as the major term.
But there is no polemic about luminosity because it is found in reflective
cognitions, and only a polemical matter happens to be the major term.
Hence luminosity alone cannot become the major term. One may criticise
on this ground that Kevalavyatireki Anum~na given by Citsukha is invalid.tS
The critic may further question the nature of the minor term (Pak.sa)
which is 'experience' here. Does it contain literal meaning (V~cy~rtha) or
indicative meaning (Lak.sy~rtha)? If the Advaitins accept that experience
 CITSUKHA'S VIEW ON SELF-LUMINOSITY 119

is the literal meaning of the minor term, they will be contradicting themselves
by accepting a non-object of the term as self-luminous. The other alternative
is equally undesirable. If the Advaitins accept that th~ term indicates
experience, they will be accepting something unique and devoid of all the
properties as self-luminous which will not be acceptable to the Naiy~yikas.
All this proves that the minor term is unreal and the middle term cannot
be present in it. Hence the fallacy of.~ray~siddha occurs. 16
In order to prove self-luminosity, all the possible criticisms against it must
be removed. Citsukha takes up the task of safeguarding the proofs from
the fallacies. He sticks to the above mentioned Kevalavyatireki inference
which is expressed by him again as: "Experience is self-luminous because
it is experience. What is not like that, is not like this, e.g., pot. ''17
Defending his proofs, Citsukha says that one may erroneously fred out
the fallacy of Aprasiddha-Vi~e.sa.nat~ in the inference. He remarks that
experience possesses the adjective 'the quality of being not an object
of knowledge' which is real and its association with experience is also
flawless. In order to prove the reality of the adjective, he adds an argument:
"Knowability is counter-correlate of total absence existing in anything
because it is a quality like whiteness. ''18 It means that whiteness is a quality
which is totally absent in the black things. Similarly, knowability must also
be somewhere absent, and that will be the non-object of knowledge (Avedya).
Thus, the reality of the adjective has been proved, and therefore there cannot
occur Aprasiddha-Vi~e.sanat~ in his proof.
There is yet another proof for self-luminosity expressed in his following
words: "This pot is different from the non-locus of knowledge of an object
other than this pot because it is an object like cloth. ''19 In this inference
'this pot', which is the minor term, is the non-locus of knowledge of anything
other than this pot. Cloth is the locus of knowledge of anything other than
this pot, and is different from the non-locus of knowledge of anything other
than this pot. The instance, i.e., cloth is associated with the major term because
it is qualified by being 'an object other than this pot' (Etadga.t~nyatva). But
the major term remains unassociated with the minor term, that is, pot because
it is not 'an object other than this pot'. In Mah~vidy~ Anumfina, which
has been presented here by Citsukha, the ways in which the major term
is associated with the minor term and the instance differ from each other.
To associate the minor term with the major term, there is need to presume
'an object other than this pot' and that thing must be 'the non-locus of
120 M.M. TRIVEDI

knowledge' (Avedya). The pot will certainly be different from 'the non-locus
of knowledge'. Thug, 'the non-locus of knowledge' has been established, and
with it the experience tl~at is to be qualified by it has also been established.
Hence the fallacy of Aprasiddhavige.syat~ cannot occur.
It is evident from the above discussion that 'experience' is not an unreal
term. Since it is the minor term, it can become the locus of the middle
term. Hence the fallacy of ~,gray~siddha does not occur. Svarfip~siddha
also cannot make the inference fallacious because the class of Anubhfititva
is accepted. In so far as there is no room for the conditioned middle term,
Vy~pyatv~siddha also cannot get any place. AnubhStitva is not a contradictory
middle (Viruddha) because it does not persist in knowable objects. Middle
term is also not too wide because it does not have any negative instance
(Vipak.sa Vrtti). Thus, the inference is immune from the fallacy of Shdh~rana
Anaik~tikatL There is not the case of As~dh~ra0.a Anaik~ntikat~ also
because in absence of the occurrence of the middle term in negative instances,
there arises no question of its being too narrow.
The Naiy~yikas may also condemn the middle term as contradicted
(B~dhita) because the empirical usage like 'Pot is known' shows that
'experience' is an object of knowledge. Citsukha refutes that objectivity
is not the adjective of 'experience', but it really qualifies pot. Moreover,
such empirical usages like 'Pot is known' can occur even if we accept self-
luminosity of experience. Therefore, the middle term is not contradicted. 2°
The opponent of self-luminosity of experience may also argue that
knowledge is always knowable as an object. That is why it is wrong on the
part of the Advaitins to posit self.luminosity of experience. There is scarcity
of contradictory argument (Vipak.sa bfidhaka Tarka) to negate the contention
of the opponent. Hence, the fallacy of Sarhdigdha Anaik~ntikatfi vitiates
the inference of the Advaitins. Refuting this argument, Citsukha says that
any conversation about the knowable experiences is impossible unless we
accept an unknowable experience to distinguish the knowable experiences
from it. Denial of self-luminosity of experience can create the undesirable
flaw of infinite regress. Citsukha is now able to form the contradictory
argument to negate the objectivity of knowledge. He remarks that "if
experience is knowable, it will lead to infinite regress. ''~1 Besides, the
contention of the objectivity of knowledge tends to eliminate the possibility
of knowledge itself. If everything is knowable, the chain of knowing one
thing by the other will continue endlessly. We will never get the experience
 CITSUKHA'S VIEW ON SELF-LUMINOSITY 121

by the luminosity of which everything can be known, and the whole world
will remain unknown (Jagad~ndhya Prasafiga). 22 The main stress of this
argument is that there must be some self-luminous experience. What is
evident from this discussion is that there is no scarcity of the contradictory
argument. Hence, Sarhdigdha Anaik~ntikat~ too cannot take place.
The last objection against self-luminosity of experience begins with a
dilemma. If self-luminosity has a proof, it becomes an object of knowledge;
and if there is no proof for it, it remains unproved. Either it has a proof
or it has no proof. Therefore, either it becomes an object of knowledge or
it remains unproved. One may criticise that since Citsukha has given proofs
for it, it. becomes an object of knowledge and the concept of self-luminosity
is contradicted. In order to remove this objection, two answers have been
given, one by Citsukha himself and the other by the supporters of his views
in modern times. Citsukha's answer is that experience is self-luminous, not
because of being non-object of any proof, but because of being non-object
of knowledge. In spite of being proved experience cannot become an object
of knowledge. The reason given by him is that though in order to remove
ignorance investing experience, its pervasion by the psychosis 23 or the
modification of the internal organ (Vrttivyfipyat~) is needed, it cannot
become an object of the reflection of intelligence (phala or cidfibh]sa).
Moreover, self-luminosity of experience becomes authentic by being an
object of the psychosis. 24 Thus, he concludes that self-luminous experience
remains uncontradicted. His argument for the refutation of the above
mentioned criticism bears the closest semblance with the view of Sad~anda
expressed in the Vedantasdra. Sad~nanda also supports the view that Brahman
is an object of the psychosis because there arises the psychosis assuming the
form of the indivisible within the qualified person and the ignorance, the cause
of all effects, is removed. But Sad~nanda denies the need of the pervasion
of Brahman by the reflection of intelligence because the light of intellect
being unable to illumine self-luminous Brahman is not employed. 2s The
second answer is found in a brilliant article of Professor T. R. V. Murti
published in the Studies in Indian Thought in which he defends Citsukha's
views from the linguistic point of view.26 Differentiating various types
of languages, he says that the Advaitins speak of self-luminous Brahman.
But instead of using literally meaningful language, they choose negative
language expressible in the form of 'Not this' 'Not this'. Since such a type
of language does not possess any objective referent as its meaning, its use
122 M. M. TRIVEDI

by the Advaitins does not render experience an object of knowledge. Prof.

Murti's hint at the use o f negative type of language by Citsukha prompts
us to trace the place where Citsukha has used it. In our opinion it is to be
found in Kevalavyatireki type of inferences adduced by Citsukha which
helped him to prove self-luminosity of experience.
Thus, the credit goes to Citsukha for having raised and discussed the
problem of self-luminosity which other Advaitins had only hinted at. He
has successfully proved that experience is self-luminous which illumines
the multiplicity of objects superimposed by ignorance.

Department o f Philosophy,
University o f Gorakhpur,
Gorakhpur

NOTES

x "Vastu Tafltrameva Tat". Safikara, Commentary on the Brahma Satra, 1, 1, 2.

2 Ibid.,i,3,19.
3 Ibid.,i,1,12.
4 Saflkara, Commentary on Ch~ndogya Upanisad, VIII, 5,4.
s Sankara, Commentary on the Brahma S(*tra, 1, 3, 22.
6 Sahkara, Commentary on B.rhaddran.yaka Upani.sad, IV, III, 7.
7 "Atha Koayam Svaprakfiga§abdfirthah? Kirn (1) Sva§c~sauPrak~a§ca Svaprak~§a.h? (2)
Svasya Svayameva Prak~a Iti vfi? (3) Sajfitiyaprakfi~prakfi§yatvam vfi? (4) Svasattfiy~m
Prakfi~a Vyatirekavirahitatvam vfi? (5) Svavyavah~rahetuprakfi~atvam vfi? (6) Jfi~n[vi-
sayatvam vfi? (7) Jfifinfivi.sayatveSatyaparok.satvam vfi? (8) Vyavah~ravi.sayatve Sati
Jfifinfivisayatvam v~? (9) Svapratiboddhavyavah~re Sajfitiyapar~napek.satvam v~? (10)
Avedyatve Satyaparok.savyavah~ravisayatvam vfi? (11) Tadyogyatvam vfi?" Citsukha,
Tattva-Prad[pikd, pp. 4-5.
8 Ibid., pp. 5-9.
9 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
to Ibid., p. 38.
ll Ibid., pp. 17-19.
t2 Ibid., p. 16.
13 "Ath~nubhfitiranubhfitivyavahfirahetupral~§o AnubhOtitv~t Yannaivam Tannaivam
Yathfi Gha.ta.h". Ibid., p. 10.
t4 Ibid., p. 10.
is Ibid., pp. 12-13.
16 Ibid., p. 15.
17 "Anubhfatih. Svayamprakfi~ Anubhfititv~dyannaivam Tannaivam Yathfi Gha.tah".
Ibid., p. 21.
18 "Vedyatvam KinchinnisthfityantSbhfivapratiyogi Dharmatv~t Sauldyavaditi". Ibid.,
p. 21.
 C I T S U K H A ' S VIEW ON S E L F - L U M I N O S I T Y 123

19 "Ayarh Gha.ta Etadghatfinyatve Sati Vedyatvfinadhikara.minya.h Pad,~rthatwitpa.tavat".

1bid., p. 24.
2o Ibid., p. 32.
21 Ibid., p. 28.
22 Ibid., p. 32.
23 The word psychosis has been used for Vrtti on the authority of its use by Dr.
T. M. P. Mahadevan in The Philosophy ofAdvaita, p. 13.
24 Citsukha, Tattva-Prad~ptTcd, pp. 35-36.
2s Sad~nanda, Vedanta Sdra, Para. 28.
26 Harold Coward (ed.), Studies in lndian Thought (Collected papers o f Prof. T. R. V.
Murti), pp. 109-110.

REFERENCES

Citsukha, (1974). Tattva-Prad~pikd, in Swfimi Yogindr~manda (ed.), Varanasi: Sad

Dax~ana Prakfigana Pratisthfina, (2rid ed.).
Coward, H. (ed.), (1983). Studies in Indian Thought (The Collected papers of Prof
T. R. V. MurtO, Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass.
Mahfidevan, T. M. P. (1938). The Philosophy of Advaita, Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1957
(2nd ed.).
Sadgnanda (1979). Veddnta Sdra, translatedby Achfirya Badari Nath Shukla. Delhi:
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Mfidhavfinanda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, (4th ed.).
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