People vs Gonzales G.R. No.

80762
March 19, 1990

Facts:

Antecedence follows that Brgy. Captain Paja was awakened by spouses Gonzales,
who informed him that the lady Gonzales, in defense of her honor, had just killed their
landlord Peñacerrada from knife wounds. Per Paja’s instruction, the couple proceeded to
surrender to authorities. After been informed of the incident, police investigated the scene.

Grounded on the investigation of the police, the Prov. Fiscal filed a crime of murder
against four unknown companions and Spouses Gonzales, to which they pleaded not guilty.
Furthermore, prosecution presented a witness Huntoria, who claims that the elder
Gonzales, Custodio Sr. (appellant), was among the companions on the murder of the victim.
Huntoria further elaborated that the act was not a defense against honor, as what the
defense would like to present, but rather the defendants took turns in stabbing the victim,
even emphasizing that he clearly saw the murder as it was committed under the
illumination of the moonlight. However, he admitted that he cannot determine who
specifically performed the stabbing and as even the weapons used because apparently, the
defendants’ actions were too rapid to surmise.

Issue:

Whether or not the elder Custodio is guilty of murder.

Ruling:

No, elder Custodio is not guilty of murder.

Art. 4 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that
which he intended (Emphasis supplied). Furthermore, Art. 3 of the RPC provides how
felonies in general are committed: 1) there must be an act or omission, 2) which is
punishable by the RPC, 3) performed by deceit or fault.
Additionally, Art. 17 provides that principals are criminally liable when: 1) they take
direct part on the crime, 2) induce another to commit such; and 3) indispensably cooperate
of the crime’s accomplishment

In this case, Huntoria’s admission of his inability to conclude who did the stabbing
stands to fail the requisites of Art. 3 that a felony of murder has been committed by the
elder Gonzales to make the latter liable in accordance with Art. 4.
Additionally, prosecution has failed to show that the elder Gonzales is guilty by direct
participation, inducement, or indispensable cooperation.
 Soriano vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-3008
March 19, 1951

Facts:
Soriano was the duly appointed administrator of a certain Saenz, who owns the
building rented by Eagle Cinema Co. The leasing cinema company, represented by
Benedicto, charges Soriano of theft before the Court of First Instance for allegedly stowing
away a motor generator and a lantern slide projector, which he initially denied before the
owner and the police authorities, but were eventually found in his possession.
Subsequently, he interposed a question of law, where he reiterated that a crime of
theft requires that there be an intent to gain on part of the offender for him to be liable on
his taking. In addition, it was held true that the equipment of the theater, including those
he took possession, were under mortgage in favor of Saenz. Applying this logic in his case,
he cannot be held a thief of something already in his possession. Finally, he provided of the
power-of-attorney conferred upon Soriano by Saenz, where it partially provides that the
former may take anything of value of whatsoever kind as may be of due. It is undisputed
however that he did not take the consent of the theater when he took their equipment for
supposedly settling of their standing debt.

Issue:
Whether or not Soriano is guilty of theft.

Held:
Yes, Soriano is guilty of theft.

Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides that those who take personal property
without the latter’s consent with an intent to gain are guilty of theft. Furthermore, the
jurisprudence of US vs de Vera (43 Phil. 1000) states that delivery of a chattel does not
necessitate its juridical possession. Subsequently, the unconsented taking of the property
constitute the crime of theft. It is therefore presumed that intent to gain can be inferred.

In this case, though it is true the equipment were mortgaged in favor of Saenz, 1) the
things were not due and 2) they were never foreclosed. Finally, even conceding on the
argument that Soriano did physical possession of those equipment, it does not necessitate
any power to exercise any act of dominion over said chattels.
 US vs Mendoza G.R. No. 13818
September 26, 1918

Facts:
Defendant Mendoza was not on good terms with the victim Creason, for the latter
refused to stand as witness on the former’s daughter’s case of interest. One night, Mendoza
entered Creason’s household, the former insulting the latter with words. As the then-sickly
Creason was about to rise from his bed, Mendoza assaulted him with a pocket knife in his
abdomen. Struggle for the weapon ensued, with Creason calling for his father-in-law’s help
in the process. Before Creason’s in-law could even come to his defense, Mendoza already
makes his escape, leaving behind the pocket knife on the scene. Fortunately, Creason
remains alive, only to be injured for a little under a month.
Creason then filed before the Court of First Instace of Tarlac the crime of frustrated
murder for the felonious act of Mendoza, to which the court affirms. Such was appealed
before this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Mendoza is guilty of frustrated homicide.

Held:
No, Mendoza is not guilty of frustrated murder but only that of less grave physical
injuries.

In order that a crime may be classified as that of a frustrated homicide, it would be

necessary to prove that a felon have an intent to kill his victim. Furthermore, intent is
difficult to discover, it being a mental act. Such can only be deduced from the external acts
of a felon. When these acts produce a definite result, courts should not hold that other
results were intended without a clear and conclusive proof.

In this case, had Mendoza really intended to kill Creason, he should have not given
up during the struggle, as the conditions were still favorable to the former, with 1) him still
in possession of the pocket knife, 2) Creason was sickly, 3) Creason’s father-in-law has yet
to come in his aid.
 People of the Philippines vs Mabug-at G.R. No. L-25459
August 10, 1926

Facts:
Defendant Mabug-at had a sweetheart named Juana Buralo. One day, Mabug-at
invited Buralo for an afternoon walk, the former knowing the latter had been jealous to
another girl because of his frequent visits to the girl. Buralo excused herself from the walk.
Days after the incident, Buralo went to a certain Banyan’s house for devotion. Mabug-
at thereafter came, with a revolver in hand, asking a certain Abellon to ask Buralo to come
down; Abellon, however refused. Instead, he threatened that he will be the one to bring
Buralo outside and will kill anyone who tries to defend her.
Finally, Buralo came outside, along with her niece Perfecta. The girls went to the
direction of their house, with Mabug-at following behind. As Juana and Perfecta were
climbing upstairs, Mabug-at fired a shot at their direction, the bullet passing through her
neck and coming out of her left eye.
A case then was filed before the Court of First Instance of Negros against Mabug-at
for a crime of frustrated murder, to which the court affirms. Mabug-at alleges that he should
not be held for the crime of frustrated homicide, as it was not proven that there was an
intention to kill. If anything, the only crime that is validly proven was for a discharge of
weapon with injuries.

Issue:
Whether or not Mabug-at is guilty of frustrated murder.

Held:
Yes, Mabug-at is guilty of frustrated murder

Art. 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability may be incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which he
intended. Furthermore, the case of US vs Montenegro even concedes that intent to kill is
not conclusive at a mere discharge of the firearm or the act alone, but through the attendant
circumstances. Finally, in the case decided by the Supreme Court of Spain on May 7, 1885
provides that treachery, a qualifying circumstance for murder, pertains to employing means
to ensure commission of a crime without any risk from the offender arising from any
defense that might be made by the offended party.

In this case, it was very evident that Mabug-at aimed the gun at Juana, although the
bullet hit Perfecta. This does not however alter his criminal liability. Also, the act of aiming
the gun while the girls’ backs towards the accused goes to show that indeed the offended
party, should they be gunned down, would have no means to defend themselves; thus,
treachery was evident.
 People of the Philippines vs Sia Teb Ban G.R. No. L-31695
November 26, 1929

Facts:

Defendant Sia stole someone’s watch. However, through the offended party’s friend’s
ample reaction, he managed to subdue Sia, the watch retrieved from his possession.
The victim then filed a case in the municipal court of Manila for the crime of theft
against Sia, to which the court affirms, and to the subsequent affirmation of the Court of
First Instance upon Sia’s appeal. Upon appealing to this Court, he contends that animus
lucrandi has not been proved.

Issue:
Whether or not Sia is guilty of theft.

Held:
Yes, Sia is guilty of theft.

Fundamental doctrine of law provides that the act penalized by law is presumed to
be voluntary unless there is evidence to the contrary. The felonious act being freely and
deliberately executed, the presumption of criminal and injurious intent arises conclusively,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

In this case, Sia’s act of taking in possession of the offended party’s watch is a prima
facie evidence his criminal intent. Therefore, in absence of evidence to his misdeed,
presumption of criminal intent is standing.
 US vs Catolico G.R. No. L-4686
March 2, 1911

Facts:
Defendant Catolico was a justice of peace in their municipality in Cagayan. Before
him 16 civil cases of breach of contract was filed by a certain Canillas against 16
individuals. Catolico ruled in favor of Canillas on all 16 cases. To appeal the judgment, the
defendants on the cases filed by Canillas were required to each pay 16 pesos, along with a
bond amounting to 50 pesos. Canillas however alleged to Catolico that the securities of the
bonds presented by therein defendants were insolvent; thus Catolico moved that therein
defendants present new bonds within 15 days, lest the final judgment be executed. None
of therein defendants were able to present new bonds; the money deposited by therein
defendants attached in favor of Canillas.
After such attachment, therein defendants filed a complaint at the Court of First
Instance against Catolico, for a crime of malversation of public funds, to which the court
affirms and requires the return of the amount of 256 pesos back to therein defendants
from Canillas. Catolico appealed the judgment to the Court with respect to his conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not Catolico is guilty of malversation of public funds.

Held:
No, he is not guilty of malversation of public funds.

The legal maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea states that a crime is not
committed when the mind of the person performing an act is criminal. In addition,
presumption of criminal intent is standing in a criminal act unless there is evidence to the
contrary (Underscores supplied). Furthermore, Act No. 1740 provides that there is
malversation of public funds when “missing funds or property have been put to personal
uses” by the official allegedly involved.

In this case, Catolico was the justice of the peace. He had actual jurisdictions of the
actions filed before him. It was also his duty to require payment for the appeal of therein
defendants. It is however conceded that he may have exceeded his authority in dismissing
the appeal and delivering the deposited money to Canillas but it was a pure mistake of
judgment, and not a criminal intent at work. He has therefore sufficiently defeated the
presumption of criminal intent. In fact, the presumption never existed, as it was also
sufficiently proven, even by therein defendants that the money deposited by them was
delivered to Canillas and not to Catolico for his personal gain; his action therefore is not one
that is penalized by Act No. 1740.
 US vs Peñalosa G.R. No. 424
January 27, 1902

Facts:
Defendant Peñalosa married her codefendant Enriquez. The prevailing Penal Code
then provides imprisonment for minors contracting marriage without the consent of parents
or guardians. Unknown to Peñalosa, she was actually still a minor.
Subsequently, her father filed a complaint before this Court for the conviction of the
couple. Defendant Peñalosa avers that ever since her tender age, she was made to believe
by her parents that from the date she was born to the day she married, her age was
sufficient as to not violate the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not the couple are in violation of Art. 475 of the then-prevailing Penal
Code.

Held:
No they are not in violation of the provision.

Various legal commentators are in agreement that crime cannot exist without intent.
Jurisprudence prior to the case also are consistent: “it is indispensable that … in order to
constitute a crime, [it] should carry with all the malice which the volition and intention to
cause the evil…”

In this case, it was an honest mistake in part of Peñalosa that she was made to
believe that she was already at the age of majority when she married Enriquez. The fact
that the father, who made her understand of her age, did not argue of the statements of
the witness just shows that indeed she acted under a mistake of fact.
 People vs Taneo G.R. No. L-37673
March 31, 1933

Facts:
Defendant Taneo lived with her wife at his parent’s house in Leyte. When a barrio
fiesta came, their house accommodated a certain Tanner and Malinao. Early that
afternoon, Taneo went to sleep. While sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room with a
bolo at hand, and hacked 1) his wife, 2) the guests Tanner and Malinao, 3) his own father
before wounding himself.
Subsequently, a case of parricide was filed against him, to which he lost, and
appealed.
It was found out that prior to that day, Taneo had a quarrel over a glass of tuba with
a certain Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to fight. When Taneo was about to go
down, he was stopped both by his wife and his mother. The following morning, Taneo was
sad and weak, and by the early afternoon had experience severe stomachache which made
it necessary for him to go to bed.
While asleep, he dreamt that Collantes and Abadilla were aiming to kill him, the
former armed with bolo, the latter holding him down by grabbing his legs. He further that
the duo were inviting him to come down (of the house), he grabbed his bolo by the door and
started hacking anybody that came in his way, with him perceiving them as enemies that
have been multiplying.

Issue:
Whether or not Taneo is guilty of parricide.

Held:
No, Taneo is not guilty of parricide

The Court considered the special circumstances found in this case: 1) he dearly loved
his wife, 2) he is under the house and protection of his father, and 3) he personally invited
the injured guests in his home. Furthermore, a Dr. Serafica is of expert opinion that Taneo
acted under the influence of hallucination was not in his right mind.
 People vs Beronilla G.R. No. L-4445
February 28, 1955

Facts:
Defendant Beronilla was a military mayor of the guerilla force in La Paz, Abra during
World War II. Per directive of Lt. Col. Arnold, Beronilla was to appoint a 12-bolomen jury to
try persons accused of aiding the Japanese in the war. The list of those accused included
the name of the victim Borjal, elected mayor during Japanese occupation of La Paz. Borjal
was eventually detained by the men of Beronilla, the latter encouraging the residents to file
complaints against Borjal. Borjal was eventually put to trial, which conduct was that of any
regular court. The results of the trial, which found Borjal guilty, were sent to Lt. Col. Arnold,
who commended the impartiality of the said trial. Borjal eventually was executed.
Two years later, when the was already over, Beronilla was charged with murder, the
prosecution predicating its complaint principally on the existence of a radiogram from Col.
Volckmann, direct superior of Lt. Col. Arnold, which renders jury system illegal. In any case,
the message appeared to have not been received by Beronilla.

Issue: Whether or not Beronilla is guilty of murder.

Held:
No, Beronilla is not guilty of murder.
According to the legal maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person committing the act is not criminal.
It can be concluded that though the jury system he organized to try Borjal was illegal,
he cannot be guilty of an intentional felony of murder for 1) the arrest and trial were upon
direct orders to him, 2) the trial’s conduct, save for the execution, was that of any regular
court, 3) before execution was rendered, Beronilla had the results of the trial delivered to
Lt. Col. Arnold for further review. It can therefore be established that Beronilla did not have
any criminal intent in ordering Borjal’s execution.
 Magsumbol vs People
G.R. No. 20717 5, November 26, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner Magsumbol is a defendant in a theft charge against him.
Antecedence shows that he was commissioned to cut down coconut trees by a certain
Atanacio, who believes that the trees (which undoubtedly were within the boundaries of two
adjacent properties) were still his trees. Atanacio ensures it by marking X’s on the trunks of
those trees. Prior to all these, they sought permission to the Barangay before even counting
the trees.
Menandro, the adjacent lot owner, complained of the cutting. He tells that the trees
cut were within the muniments embedded on the land in favor of him. Atanacio, for his part,
offered to compensate Menandro for trees that could have been mistakenly cut in the
process, to which the latter refused. Menandro went straight to the Regional Trial Court to
file for such complaint.

Issue: Whether or not Magsumbol is guilty of theft.

Held:
No, Magsumbol is not guilty of theft.
According to the legal maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person committing the act is not criminal. Furthermore, Art.
308 of the Revised Penal Code essentially provides that for theft to exist, there must be an
intent to gain on the part of the offender.
In this case, criminal intent, specifically intent to gain, was wanting in this case.
Evidences show that 1) before they even did cutting the trees, they sought first permission
from the Barangay, 2) through Atanacio, they inform of the cutting of the trees, 3) were
there any mistake in cutting of trees that should be Menandro’s, Atanacio volunteered to
compensate Menandro which the latter refused. The Court even jests that it is beyond
reason for should they have a criminal mind to sought permission from the Barangay and
cut the trees in broad daylight and even ask compensation for mistakenly cutting the trees
were their aim was to steal them.
 US vs Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910

Facts:
Prior to the incident relevant to this case, Fort McKinley, where defendant and victim
were employed, was constantly hounded by incidents of robberies. Defendant for his part,
brought in his room a kitchen knife for protection. Speaking of his room, his room is of poor
quality: 1) a small window 2)and a door with no proper lock mechanism, with only a chair
against the door itself and a small hook from inside to secure it; and 2) the narrow porch
leading to his room was covered by a heavy growth of vines.
One night, when defendant was already on his sleep, he was suddenly awakened by
a loud sound as if someone trying to force himself on an already poorly-reinforced door. Ah
Chong called out twice on the one forcing himself in; no response was given. Finally, Ah
Chong gave a warning that should the anonymous person forces himself in, the former
would actually kill the latter (with the knife he kept). At that moment, the door was forcibly
opened. Thinking that it may well be another thief or robber attempting entry, Ah Chong
took a stab at the intruder, who turned out to be Pascual, his roommate.
He was charged with assassination (murder) but was found guilty of homicide by the
trial court; hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Ah Chong is guilty of homicide.

Held:
No he is not guilty of homicide.
As discussed by renowned Spanish jurist Pacheco, crimes are committed by persons
who are free, intelligent, and with intent to commit them. Furthermore, according to the
legal maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, a crime is not committed if the mind
of the person committing the act is not criminal.
In this case, Ah Chong, well believing that the imminent threat was coming from a
thief or a robber; that his life and the properties left in his charge are in peril, and he
committed the killing without criminal intent and in good faith. The intent to kill is not
present to warrant murder or even homicide.
 People vs Oanis
G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943

Facts:
Defendants Oanis and Galanta were police officers who were informed by their
superior Monsod that an escaped convict was on the loose on their jurisdiction. Monsod
furthers that should they be overpowered, they may shoot dead by the armed convict
named Balagtas.
Eventually, the defendants were tipped off of the possible whereabouts of Balagtas,
who was presumably living with a certain Irene. Oanis responded that he knew of a certain
Irene (which could well be a different one). When they were already certain of the
whereabouts of the Irene – who was with her paramour – that Oanis knew, the team of the
Police Constabulary of Cabanatuan, including Oanis and Galanta, springed into action. Upon
arriving Irene’s room, Oanis and Galanta saw a man sleeping with his back against them.
Without ascertaining as to the man’s identity, the duo immediately fired upon the man. The
man turned out to be a certain Tecson.
A charge of murder was filed against Oanis and Galanta. Though their testimonies
are in contradiction in a degree that one free himself from liability; the other held
responsible, they are in unison that it was an honest mistake of fact in the performance of
their duties.

Issue: Whether or not Oanis and Galanta are guilty of murder.

Held:
Yes, Oanis and Galanta are guilty of murder.
The case of Ah Chong provides that a defense of a mistake of fact is only tenable
when there is no fault or carelessness on the one committing an act. Furthermore, Art. Of
the Revised Penal Code, that treachery qualifies a killing.
In this case, when they killed the sleeping Tecson, they made no careful approach as
to ascertain his identity to be that of Balagtas; in fact, they made no qualms and quickly
shot Tecson. Defense of mistake of fact, therefore, is not appreciated. Finally, killing a man
on his sleep a form of treachery, and should constitute murder.
 People vs de Fernando
G.R. No. L-24978, March 27, 1926

Facts:
Defendant de Fernando was policeman passing by the house of a certain Remegio
Delgado when he was called by the latter’s daughter, Pacencia. De Fernando was called by
Pacencia, telling him that her father wished to see him. Upon coming up the house, Remigio
mentions of his concern to de Fernando of three suspicious looking persons lurking around
his house. Remigio furthers that they may well be some of the several prisoners that have
escaped the Penal Colony of Zamboanga. At around the night, the three were still in the
house, with Remegio in the kitchen; de Fernando and Pacencia presumably in the sala
when an anonymous person was starting to ascend the stairs, calling “Nong Miong,”
Remigio’s nickname. Both Pacencia and de Fernando does not recognize who it was.
Adding to the fact that the person was wearing dark clothes and wielding three bolos, de
Fernando started to be suspicious of his identity. De Fernando asked as to who was
climbing up; no response came. Sensing danger, de Fernando already fired a warning shot
in the air, with no response availing the man. The second shot then was pointed towards
the man, who was shot in the neck. Remigio then recognized the voice, then ran towards
the sala, taking hold of de Fernando’s gun. The man turned out to be Remegio’s nephew,
Buenventura.
A charge of murder has been filed against de Fernando for the death of Buenventura.

Issue: Whether or not de Fernando is guilty of murder.

Held:
No, however he is guilty of reckless negligence resulting to homicide.
The general rule in the criminal law, the legal maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea, a crime is not committed if the mind of the person committing the act is not criminal.
Furthermore, in case of Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan, in case of absence of criminal intent,
negligence and imprudence will take its place.
In this case, the facts show that there was no intent to kill on the part of de Fernando:
1) he promptly asked for the identity of Buenventura; and 2) he fired a warning shot before
shooting the victim. However, de Fernando failed to account that then Buenventura, who
was then anonymous, called Remegio with a title of endearment: Nong Miong. Defendant
should have took notice then that it was not one of those prisoners that were presumably
lurking in Remegio’s house, but someone who is familiar to Remegio; negligence on the
part of the defendant was evident.
 People vs Castro
G.R. No. L-22642, December 19, 1924

Facts:
Defendants are alleged to be involved in the falsification of public documents and
estafa through the same means.
Undisputed antecedence shows that the provincial board held meetings on the 19th
and the 21st of June, 1923. However, because of carelessness and bungling of the dates,
defendant Pacana, who was – as secretary of the provincial board – tasked with taking
down the minutes of the meeting, written off wrong dates on the two meeting, indicating
the 9th and the 16th of June, 1923 as the date of the actual meetings. Prosecution then
avers that 1) the “mistakes” were actually fabrications to find favor from the American
engineer, who was against with the prosecution; and 2) to illegally siphon funds from the
meeting through them.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants are guilty of falsification of public documents and
estafa by means of falsification of public documents.

Held:
No, they are not guilty of falsification of public documents and estafa by means of
falsification of public documents.
Ordinarily, evil intent must be united with an unlawful act for there to be crime, Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. However, negligence and imprudence may take the place
of criminal intent. Furthermore, in a case held by the Supreme Court of Spain on December
23, 1885, Don Augustin, who negligently wrote the incorrect dates of the proceedings, was
acquitted because 1) there was no criminal intent on the part of herein defendant, as
required on such crime; and 2) the truthfulness of the public document remains intact and
did not affect the integrity of the said documents; violation of public faith and destruction
of truth was wanting.
In this case, though it is true that negligence may take place of criminal intent, cases
filed upon herein defendants require the latter of the requisites. Besides, they have
sufficiently established that it was through defendant Pacana’s ineptitude that the wrongs
were committed. In fact, even if Pacana, did consciously aimed to write incorrect dates, the
undisputed truth that there were actual provincial meetings, along with their actual facts,
does not violate public faith and destroy truth of those events.
 People vs Guillen
G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950

Facts:
Defendant Guillen mapped out a plan to kill President Manuel Roxas by hurling and
planting hand grenades in the President’s location during a Liberal Party meeting in Plaza
Miranda.
Day of the meeting came; Guillen 1) planted one of the hand grenades on a plant pot
situated near the platform of the meeting, 2) concealed the second one in a paper bag,
covered in peanuts; and 3) took a seat near the meeting platform. As President Roxas was
about to close his speech, Guillen hurled the grenade in Roxas’ way. However, one of Roxas’
generals, Castañeda, was able to kick the grenade off the platform. Unfortunately, the
grenade blew up on another crowd off the stage, mortally wounding Valera, and injuring
among others.
Charges of murder and multiple frustrated murder was filed against him in the Court
of First Instance. Counsel of Guillen avers that the crime his client committed was only that
of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and less physical injuries to those injured.
However, Guillen was brazenly declared of his intent to kill President Roxas.

Issue: Whether or not Guillen be guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder.

Held:
No, however he is held guilty for the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder.
People vs Sara dictates that there is only criminal negligence when the act is
unintentional. Art. 4 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from
that which he intended. Finally, Art. 6 of the RPC states that a crime is only attempted when
the offender does not perform all acts of execution
In this case, indeed Guillen intended to kill the President by means of the hand
grenades. This act being felonious, Art. 4(1) dictates that even though he failed to kill the
President, he is still held fully liable for the death of Valera and attempting on the life of
those who were injured. Finally, it should only be attempted and not frustrated because the
Guillen was not successful in assassinating the President through reason other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
 US vs Catangay
G.R. No. L-9206, November 25, 1914

Facts:
Defendant Catangay and victim Ramos were friends bound for a night hunting in a
forest. With the three – including Ramos’ godson Abandia – on horseback, they proceeded
complete with their hunting gear: each having his own shotgun; victim Ramos taking the
lead with a lighted lantern fastened on his forehead.
Upon reaching the forest, as he spotted a deer, Ramos dismounted the horse, which
prompted the other two to dismount as well. Moments after, Ramos already started to take
his position and aim for the deer. However, Catangay felt the deer was about to take a slip
as Ramos was taking too much time on his aim; thus, the former took it upon himself to
take the shot. Approaching with due care the position of Ramos, Catangay started pointing
the gun at the deer. As he was switching the safety off from his shotgun, Catangay
accidentally tripped a hump between Ramos and him, unintentionally unloading the gun
on Ramos’ head, who died at that very instant.
A charge of reckless negligence resulting to homicide was filed against him.

Issue: Whether or not Catangay is guilty of reckless negligence resulting to homicide.

Held:
No, Catangay is not guilty of reckless negligence resulting to homicide.
It is well-settled rule in criminal law that negligence or imprudence may well replace
criminal intent in crimes. Also, in the case cited by US vs Barias, negligence is the want of
the care required by the circumstances. This however is not absolute, but relative to the
attending such circumstances.
In this case, Catangay sufficiently proved that 1) he was careful to approach Ramos’
position, 2) the gun was aimed only when he was about to shoot; 3) and he only switched
off the safety immediately after the aim. It can be concluded that Catangay exercised due
care when aiming for the deer. Alas, the hump caused him to trip and unintentionally
discharge it to Ramos. He cannot be guilty, therefore, of such crime.
 U.S. vs Go Chico
G.R. No. 4963, September 15, 1909

Facts:
Immediately after the Philippine–American War, the Philippines, being a colony of
the US, promulgated an Act No. 1696, which penalizes any flag or any mementos used by
the armed rebellion (primarily the Katipunan) against the US, to be displayed in any way,
from public view.
Around the 4th day of August 1908, defendant Go Chico was displaying several Emilio
Aguinaldo–engraved medallions and a flag similar to that used in the rebellion. He intended
those to be up for sale, after he purchased the questioned possessions in a public sale
made by the sheriff of Manila.
Subsequently, Go Chico was charged for the violation of the said Act. He argues that
he had no ill intent on displaying the mementos other than selling for profit.

Issue: Whether or not Go Chico is guilty of violating Act No. 1696.

Held:
Yes, Go Chico is guilty of violating Act No. 1696.
In Fiedler vs Darrin, a US jurisprudence, the case held that when an act is promulgated
as illegal, intent of the offender is immaterial.
In this case, even if it holds true that Go Chico has no ill intent in displaying the flag
other than selling profit, the Act need not hold account of defendant’s intent for him to be
guilty. It is quite clear that what is being penalized is not the intent of the person, but the
act itself which is declared illegal.
 People vs Bayona
G.R. No. L-42288, February 16, 1935

Facts:
During the the 1934 elections, the Election Law then enforced declares that
possession of firearms is not allowed within 50 meters of any polling place.
Defendant Bayona, who apparently violated this rule, by being within the gated area
of the polling place (and approximately 27 meters from the polling place). On the defense
of the defendant, he argues that 1) literal construction of the rule would be absurd as, for
example, any uniformed personnel would be held liable should they happen to pass by the
road directly adjacent to the polling place; and 2) if it should be ruled that he be within such
construction, it was not intention to violate the rule and that he was merely called by a
friend who happens to be within the fenced area of the polling place.

Issue: Whether or not Bayona is guilty of violating the Election Law.

Held:
Yes, Bayona is guilty of violating the Election Law.
In the case of People vs Urdeleon, it was held that the intention of the Legislature was
to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to influence in any way the free and
voluntary exercise of suffrage. Also, according to People vs Go Chico, in acts mala prohibita
or those offenses that arise from special laws, it is sufficient that the act is intentionally
done.
In this case, the gun ban contemplated by the Election Law is only to those who can
be seen brandishing their firearm near the polling place, and not those who merely pass by
within the 50-m limit by law. Furthermore, it is not immaterial if indeed Bayona had no
intent to violate the gun ban; the fact that he intentionally commit the act of wielding his
gun within 50 meters of the polling place is sufficient for him to be liable.
 US vs Siy Cong Bieng
G.R. No. L-8646, March 31, 1915

Facts:
The Pure Food and Drugs Act penalizes the selling of impure coffee by corporations,
companies, societies, associations, and other commercial or legal entities (all of which
embodied in the word “person”).
Defendant-appellant Siy Cong Bieng runs a store which sells, among other things,
coffee. The store attendant of Siy Cong Bieng is co-defendant Co Kong, who is tasked in
selling the merchandises, including coffee. However, it was revealed that the coffee Co
Kong was selling turned out to be an impure one. Thus, charges in violation of the Pure Food
and Drugs Act was filed against the two.
Siy Cong Bieng, the sole appellant, contends that 1) he was not aware of the impure
quality of the coffee they are selling; and 2) the selling, which he construes as the act
penalized, was only made by Co Kong and not him.

Issue: Whether or not Siy Cong Bieng is guilty in violation of the Pure Food and Drugs Act.

Held:
Yes, Siy Cong Bieng, is guilty in violation of the Pure Food and Drugs Act.
In the case of US vs Go Chico, the Court cited that courts have always recognized the
power of legislature to forbid acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard
to the intent of the doer. Furthermore, the Pure Food and Drugs Act states that “commercial
and legal entity” are included in those that may be held liable. It is then in the opinion of
the court “commercial and legal entity” may well include persons who makes use of agents
or employees in the conduct of their business (in this case selling of the coffee).
In this case, it can summarized simply that one 1) lack of knowledge by Siy Cong
Bieng of the impurities in the coffee his store is selling does not absolve him of his offense;
and 2) even if he did not directly sell the coffee themselves, it is of opinion that he is still
contemplated by the Act as an offender.
 People vs Estoista
G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953

Facts:
Republic Act No. 4 provides for penalties in case of illegal possession of firearms.
Defendant Estoista (Alberto) noticed that there were wild chickens scratching the
palay and corn plants within his family’s plantation. He resolved to ask the licensed rifle of
his father, Estoista (Bruno) to shoot off the chickens. His father took the rifle, which was
licensed to the same (and not Alberto), and gave it to Alberto, as Bruno noted that his son
shoots has always been a better shooter than him.
Alberto then proceeded to the plantation. Upon firing the rifle, he unintentionally shot
the victim Dima, a family laborer, instead.
A charge of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and a violation of Republic
Act No. 4 was filed against Alberto. He made appeal; however he only appealed to the
offense penalized by Republic Act No.4. His counsel argues that in the Case of US vs
Samson, carrying a gun by order of the owner does not constitute illegal possession of a
firearm. In lieu of this, Alberto must similarly be acquitted for he did not intend to possess
it for himself, but because of order by his father.

Issue: Whether or not Alberto is guilty in violation of Republic Act No. 4.

Held:
Yes, Alberto is guilty in violation of Republic No. 4.
Republic Act No. 4 provides penalty for persons illegally possessing of firearms.
Furthermore, in the case of US vs Samson, it was held that “possession” includes not only
intent to own, but also intent to use. Herein defendant was acquitted for it was proven that
intent to use was absent.
In this case, penalty for Republic No. 4 aptly applicable to Alberto’s case as he was
caught in illegal possession of it. Also, his case is not parallel to that of US vs Samson, as
unlike the facts in the cited case, Alberto deliberately used the rifle and not merely possess
it for his father.
 People vs Alviar
G.R. No. L-32276, September 12, 1974

Facts:
The body of victim Alviar (Dolores) floating near a bank of the Pasig River. Upon
performing an autopsy on the victim, the victim did not sustain any injury but probably
drowned.
A charge of parricide was filed against the husband of the victim, defendant Alviar
(Jose). To support the charge, the prosecution secured a score of witnesses to pin Jose as
the perpetrator. They aver that 1) prior to the incident, the spouses Alviar were not in good
terms, 2) that immediately before the incident, the spouses had a huge quarrel which led
to 3) Jose beating up Dolores; and finally 4) Jose, with a help of another man, dumped his
wife’s body at the Pasig River. It is to be noted how impeccable the testimonies of the
prosecution witness that they perfectly corroborate each other and the sharpness of their
memory down to the time and to the vital incidents constituting as circumstantial evidences
that point to Jose’s guilt. However, they were inattentive to incidental matters (e.g. what the
couple were wearing).
Jose, in his defense, pointed that her wife have these suicidal tendencies (which are
well-documented from her suicide letters) which stem from her jealousy. It too was
established that he had no, in any way, motive to kill his wife.

Issue: Whether or not Jose is guilty of parricide.

Held:
No, Jose is not guilty of parricide.
The Court held that (CITE CASE) such a close and minute agreement of the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution induces suspicion of confederacy and
fraud. Also, in (CITE CASE) where the proof of identification of the accused on the crime is
not convincing, the proof of motive is necessary.
In this case, suspicion must arise on how the witnesses perfectly corroborated each
other without any contradicting circumstances. Also, prosecution have failed to establish
any motive by Jose to kill his wife.
It needs to be mentioned that 1) the prosecution witnesses were inattentive to
incidental matters on the evidences, yet somehow they were very detailed at the occurrence
of the acts as to the time and the vital incidents prior to the death of Dolores, 2) Dolores
sustained no injuries, as shown in the autopsy, quite contrary to the claim that Dolores was
beaten by his husband, 3) the trial court completely ruled out the idea of suicide as
prosecution failed to prove that it was impossible for Dolores to kill herself; reasonable
doubt exists as to Jose’s guilt.
 People vs Murray
G.R. No. L-4467, April 30, 1959

Facts:
Victim Murray (George) married defendant Murray (Ester), the latter already having
four children prior to their meeting. The family were living in a three bedroom house (all of
which found on the second floor): the first by the couples themselves, second are for the
younger children, and the third by the elder children and their maid. The third room is usually
open.
Years after, George was having illicit relations with a certain Varga. Ester has known
of this fact, as positively testified by 1) the mother of Varga, 2) Tagle, the Murray’s family
driver, 3) Ester’s daughter Caridad; and 4) Snure and Pier, friends of the couple.
Furthermore, at the death of George, Ester ordered a certain del Rosario, owner of the
funeral where George’s body lies, to close the coffin. Subsequently, Varga tried to take a
glimpse of her dead lover; thus, del Rosario asked Ester’s permission. Ester refused,
remarking that Varga cannot as “[Varga] was the cause of all this trouble.”
One rainy early morning, Ester resolved to bring his son, who usually sleeps with Ester
herself, to the third room and asked the maid to let his son sleep beside her. She then
proceeded to close the door. Moments after 4 shots came from the room of the spouses;
George was found lying on the bed dead.
Charge of parricide was filed against Ester. She contends the possibility of a break-in
as 1) the window leading to the balcony were wide open, 2) the scattered clothes which
implies that a robber searched through the drawers of George for valuables. However, the
investigating police officer notes the impossibility of a break in as, 1) all possible entrances
on the first floor were properly locked and grilled 2) no mud stains, which implies a
malefactor climbed up through the balcony on that rainy morning; and 3) the lock from the
window opens from the inside.

Issue: Whether or not Ester is guilty of parricide.

Held:
Yes, Ester is guilty of parricide.
The Court held that, through citations of past cases, where the identity of a person
committing a crime is in dispute, the motive that may have impelled the commission is very
relevant.
In this case, it may well be established that the illicit relations incite the jealousy of
Ester, as evidenced by the witnesses’ testimonies; these may well establish the motive on
why Ester would kill his husband.
It should also be noted that police notes of the tight security in coming the residence
of the Murray’s and impossibility for the malefactor to come from the outside, and
supporting the claim that the perpetrator came from their house itself. Finally the closing
of the third room’s door, which is not the usual practice of the household, clearly indicates
an attempt to conceal the felonious act.
People vs Feliciano Jr.
 People vs Caballero – Boholst
G.R. No. L-23249, November 25, 1974

Facts:
Defendant Boholst was married to the victim Caballero. However, their marriage
turned sour sooner than later, marked by constant quarrels, frequently indulgent sprees by
Caballero on his vices, and worst, the maltreatment and the beatings done by Caballero to
Boholst. Eventually they separated, Boholst returned to her parents’ house; she was also
left to solely support for their only child.
During one night, nearing the end of the New Year season, Boholst went out caroling
with friends to earn money. When midnight came, and the proceeds of the caroling were
divided, she came across her infuriated husband, who was alleging that Boholst has gone
out just to prostitute herself, to which she retaliated that he had no business with her now
that Caballero already left her and her child. This angered Caballero even more, prompting
him to pin Boholst to the ground and put her into a chokehold. To defend herself, Boholst
managed to reach for her husband’s knife amidst the struggle, and stabbed him at the
back, just directly above the thigh. Caballero died from such wound.
Charge of parricide was filed against Boholst with a conflicting averment: that 1) she
herself called Caballero; and 2) upon responding to the call of Boholst, Boholst stabbed the
victim. Apparently, she was motivated when her husband left their family.

Issue: Whether or not Boholst is guilty of parricide.

Held:
No, Boholst is not guilty of parricide.
In the (CITE CASE) the Court noted that although motive in appellant is dispensable
to a conviction where identity of assailant is duly established, absence of such motive is
important in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic theories. Also, Art. 11(1) of
the Revised Penal Code that there is a valid self-defense when 1) there is an unlawful
aggression from the victim, 2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or
prevent an attack; and 3) lack of sufficient provocation on the defender.
In this case, it was duly established that 1) although they have separated, Boholst still
loved her husband, 2) although she was left to support for their child, she seemed to have
conceded such fate for months already prior the incident; 3) prosecution failed to establish
any motive that could have aroused Boholst to drive her into killing her husband. Lastly, it
was sufficiently established that 1) her husband was the one who initiated the aggression,
2) which resolved Boholst to stab her husband; 3) without her provoking him justifiably. She
therefore, merely acted in self-defense.
 People vs Melgar
G.R. No. 75268 January 29, 1988

Facts:
One night, witness Mata, a jeepney driver, was at jeepney “terminal” falling in line to
take passengers when he noticed that it was already too dark to wait for his turn, he decided
to go home. The move made passengers, whose destination would be passed by Mata, opt
to ride with him instead of waiting for jeepneys to be filled before going off. However this
angered defendant Melgar, who was the barker – those in charge of calling potential
passengers where they get a fee for every passenger they get – of the jeepneys. His anger
in fact directed to a passenger who opted to ride with Mata, victim Duque (seated at the
front seat), who seemed to not care of Melgar’s concern. This prompted Melgar to call
defendant Languisan, another barker, and somehow the former ask the latter to ride Mata’s
jeepney. Languisan sat somewhere at the back seat. At the end of Mata’s route, everybody
at the back seat manage to leave the jeepney save for Languisan, who stabbed Duque first
by the neck before hurrying off the jeepney. The victim was rushed at the hospital, before
dying the next day.
Charge of murder was filed against Melgar and Languisan. Languisan argues that he
cannot be involved in the charge as prosecution failed to provide any evidence as what
could be his motive to kill Duque. Mata, the driver, however positively identified Languisan
as the one who stabbed Duque.

Issue: Whether or not Languisan is guilty for the death of Duque.

Held: Yes, he is guilty for the death of Duque

In the case of People vs Anquillano, proof of motive is not essential in the face of the
positive identification by the witness.
In this case, in the light of Mata’s positive identification of Languisan, motive is not
essential for convicting the accused. Languisan may still well be a valid perpetrator to the
crime.
 Barrioquinto vs Fernandez
G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949

Facts: