SUBJECT: Criminal Law 1

PROFESSOR: Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang

MODULE 7: MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (Article 13)

1. Bacabac v. People, G.R. No. 149372, 11 September 2007

Facts:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted the petitioner of two counts of murder. The petitioner
argues that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense should apply. On
December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato, Eduardo Selibio, and Melchor Selibio left a dance hall and
encountered Jonathan Bacabac and Edzel Talanquines, leading to a misunderstanding. Witness Jesus
Rosadio saw Melchor hit Edzel with a stick during the altercation. Later, when Quidato and Selibio were
heading home, they encountered the petitioner, Ricardo Bacabac, and the two accused, Edzel and
Jonathan. The petitioner and Jose Talanquines Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, while Edzel and Jonathan
carried a revolver and a piece of wood. Despite the victims’ apology for mistaking Edzel and Jonathan for
others, the petitioner fired his armalite into the air, and Jose fired his rifle, killing Quidato instantly and
Selibio two hours later.

Issue: Whether or not there's mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense.

Ruling:
No. Art. 13, par. 5 provides that the act should "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree." SC said that the offense committed on
Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick, according to Jesus, a bamboo pole, according to Edzel. By Edzel's
own clarification, " he was hit at his ear, not on [his] head." That act would certainly not be classified as
"grave offense." Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree"
contemplated in Article 13, par. 5.

2. US v. Hicks, G.R. No. 4971, 23 September 1909

Facts:
For 5 years, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and his mistress Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman,
were illicitly living together. However, Sola quitted living with Hicks. A few days later, she contracted a
new relationship with Corporal Wallace Current, another negro, who then went to live with her in the
house of her brother-in-law.One evening, Hicks, with soldier Lloyd Nickens, went to the said house. He
shooked hands and started conversing with Current.But, Current told Hicks that Sola did not want to live
with Hicks anymore, which promted Hicks to pull out his revolver and fired at Sola who was close by in
the sala. The bullet hit the left side of her breast.Hicks gave himself up to the police even before the
police received the information of the killing.He pleaded not guilty. His defense was that when he fell
backward when Current seized him, his revolver wen off hitting the deceased. The trial court convicted
him with the crime of murder with the penalty of death.

Issue: Whether or not Hicks can avail of himself of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
when he killed Sola, his former mistress?

Ruling:
The only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which
originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
passions.Likewise, the crime was committed with the presence of treachery(alevosia), as Sola was
unexpectedly fired at close range while she was unarmed and unprepared at a time she was just listening
to a conversation. The presence of other aggravating circumstances, such as premeditationand the fact
that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased. Premeditation was proven when Hicks
asked a leave to be absent from work and that he was carrying a loaded revolver when he had lunch that
day. It was also testified that Hicks was heard that the time of Sola had come.

MODULE 8: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (Article 14)

1. People v. Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 136164-65, 20 April 2001

Facts:
At around 2:00 in the morning, Honorata Ong, who was sleeping inside her house with her three
daughters, was awakened by the sound of the door opening and saw a man with his pants and briefs
down, armed with a knife, standing by her feet. The man poked the knife at her, ordered her to stand up,
and made her lie down on the adjacent sofa, where he sexually assaulted her. After satisfying his lust, he
demanded money, prompting Honorata to hand over the only money she had—several bills amounting to
₱500. That afternoon, Honorata, along with her husband, reported the incident to the barangay captain,
and during a confrontation at the barangay hall, she positively identified the suspect, later revealed to be
accused-appellant Edgar Legaspi y Libao, as the perpetrator. Legaspi was subsequently detained by the
police and charged with the crimes of rape and robbery in two separate Informations, which were later
consolidated for joint trial. The trial court found Legaspi guilty of rape aggravated by dwelling and
nighttime, sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death, and of robbery aggravated by dwelling, for
which he was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months to nine years of imprisonment.

Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime properly considered in
determining the penalty for the crime of rape?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding Edgar Legaspi y Libao guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of both rape and robbery. However, the Court modified the penalty for rape, reducing it
from death to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, the Court mandated the payment of civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages to the victim, Honorata Ong. Furthermore, while the trial court had
considered the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, these factors were not alleged in the
Information, thus could not be used to impose the death penalty. The ruling underscored the importance
of due process, which requires that all aggravating circumstances be explicitly stated in the charges.
Consequently, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the Court awarded civil indemnity and
moral damages to the victim, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence regarding compensation in cases of
rape.

2. People v. Capalac, G.R. No. L-38297, 23 October 1982

Facts:
The case of People vs. Capalac (G.R. No. L-38297) was adjudicated by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on October 23, 1982. The incident that led to this case transpired on September 20, 1970,
around 2:00 PM, within a licensed cockpit located in Iligan City. The victim, Jimmy Mag-aso, allegedly
attacked Moises Capalac, the brother of the appellant, Mario Capalac. In response to this assault, Mario,
accompanied by his deceased brother Jesus Capalac and two unidentified individuals, confronted Mag-
aso as he attempted to flee the scene. Despite Mag-aso signaling his surrender by raising his hands,
Mario struck him with a pistol, and Jesus then proceeded to stab him multiple times. This brutal attack
resulted in Mag-aso's death due to hemorrhagic shock caused by a stab wound to the heart. The lower
court subsequently convicted Mario Capalac of murder, determining that the act was committed with
evident premeditation and treachery, and imposed the death penalty. The charges against Jesus were
dismissed due to his death before the trial could commence. In appealing his conviction, Mario contended
that the lower court had erred in its assessment of conspiracy and in the application of both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.

Issue: WON the aggravating circumstances proven beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's determination that the crime constituted murder, qualified
by treachery. However, it found that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and taking
advantage of official position were not sufficiently established. The Court acknowledged the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. As a result, the death penalty was deemed
inappropriate, and the Court modified the sentence to a term of imprisonment ranging from ten years and
one day to seventeen years, four months, and one day.

In its decision, the Supreme Court articulated that the crime was indeed murder, as the element of
treachery was evident; Mag-aso was defenseless at the moment of the attack. The Court confirmed the
existence of conspiracy, noting the coordinated actions of the Capalac brothers and their companions,
which were motivated by a shared intent to avenge their brother. Nonetheless, the Court stressed that
aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It concluded that the actions of
Mario and Jesus were impulsive, stemming from a moment of anger rather than premeditation, thereby
negating the presence of evident premeditation. The Court also clarified that Mario's status as a police
officer did not automatically imply that he exploited his position during the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, the Court recognized the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication, as the assault
was a direct reaction to the grave offense committed against Moises, resulting in a modification of the
penalty to appropriately reflect this consideration.

MODULE 9: ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES AND PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE

I. Alternative Circumstances (Article 15)

1. People v. Atop, G.R. No. 124303-05, 10 February 1998

Facts:
Alejandro Atop, also known as "Ali," was charged with three counts of rape and one count of attempted
rape. The incidents occurred on October 9, 1992, sometime in 1993, and December 26, 1994, in Sitio
Tambunan, Barangay Sta. Rosa, Municipality of Matag-ob, Province of Leyte, Philippines. The victim,
Regina Guafin, was 11 years old at the time of the first incident and lived with her grandmother, Trinidad
Mejos, and the accused, who was the common-law husband of her grandmother. The trial court found
Atop guilty of three counts of rape, sentencing him to two terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two
counts and to death for the third count, while acquitting him of the attempted rape charge due to
insufficient evidence. The trial court also considered nighttime and relationship as aggravating factors in
its decision. The case was appealed and automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not nighttime and relationship as aggravating circumstances in the imposition of the
penalty for the rape incidents can be appreciated?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for nighttime to be considered an aggravating circumstance, it must be
deliberately sought by the offender to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery. The prosecution failed
to prove that nighttime was deliberately sought by Atop. Additionally, the relationship between Atop and
the victim did not fall within the scope of relationships defined by law to aggravate the penalty. The law
specifies relationships such as spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or
sister, or relative by affinity within the same degrees. Atop, being the common-law husband of the victim's
grandmother, did not fit into these categories. Therefore, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
relationship were not applicable.

2. US v. McMann, G.R. No. L-2229, 1 July 1905, 4 Phil. 561

Facts:
Robert McMann, a packer at Camp Vicars, Mindanao, was tasked with overseeing mules about 1.5 miles
from the camp. His friend, McKay, was nearby and unarmed. McKay visited the house of a Moro, Amlay
Pindolonan, seeking matches for his cigar while carrying a revolver. Pindolonan denied him entry. Shortly
after, McMann arrived at the same house, armed with a revolver. A Moro named Master, who was
present, carried a bolo, which McMann forcibly seized, injuring himself in the process.

While McKay and Pindolonan were seated nearby, McMann shot McKay in the back of the head, killing
him instantly. He then attempted to shoot Pindolonan, who escaped but sustained injuries. Both McMann
and McKay were intoxicated during the incident. McMann claimed the shooting was accidental and that
he had no intention of killing McKay. The trial court convicted McMann of murder.

Issue: Whether McMann's habitual drunkenness or alleged alevosia (treachery) affect his culpability for
the murder of McKay.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction, ruling that McMann intentionally shot McKay. The
court dismissed the claim of accidental shooting based on clear eyewitness testimony. It held that
habitual drunkenness did not mitigate McMann's culpability as evidence showed it was habitual rather
than occasional intoxication. The court further found alevosia (treachery) present, as McKay was shot
from behind without warning or provocation. The deliberate nature of the act, absence of struggle, and
intent to kill were evident. While McMann and McKay were friends, the lack of a clear motive did not
absolve McMann of responsibility. The court upheld the lower court’s ruling with costs against McMann.

II. Principals (Article 17)

1. People v. Yanson-Dumancas, G.R. No. 133527-28, 13 December 1999, 320 SCRA 584 5.
Facts:
After Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transaction and hence losing
P352,000, the group of Dominador Geroche, Rolando Fernandez, Jaime Gargallano, Edwin Divinagracia,
Teody Delgado, Mario Lamis, and Moises Grandeza kidnapped Rufino Gargar Jr. and Danilo
Lumangyao, who were subsequently shot and killed (while blindfolded and handcuffed) by Gargallano
and Geroche using a baby armalite and .45 cal. Pistol, respectively, allegedly acting upon the inducement
of Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas. The group of men planned and succeeded in kidnapping Gargar and
Lumangyao. Col. Torres of the PNP was also involved. On August 6, 1992, Jeanette ordered Geroche to
take care of the two (Lumangyao and Gargar) and reiterated this order on the same day.

Issue: Whether or not Jeanette may be convicted as a principal by inducement.

Ruling:
The SC held that the remark of accused Jeanette to "take care of the two" did not constitute the words of
command that may be considered sufficient basis to convict her as principal by inducement. The
utterance that was supposedly the act of inducement should precede the commission of the crime itself.
In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged (kidnapping for
ransom with murder), has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told Geroche to "take care of the
two." Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the crime charged in this
case.

Moreover, in order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be
present: (1) the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and (2)
such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor. In relation to this,
there are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii)
by causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all the witnesses of the prosecution, the
SC found nothing to conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the
other accused-appellants. From the factual findings of the trial court, the plan to abduct and kill the victims
was without Jeanette's involvement or participation whatsoever. Therefore, Jeanette was acquitted.

2. People v. Maluenda, G.R. No. 115351, 27 March 1998

Facts:
On August 19, 1992, Engr. Resus and Dr. Bernardita Resus were confronted at their home/clinic in
Surigao del Sur by Raul Mondaga (alias Commander Bobong), Rodrigo Legarto, and Daniel Maluenda,
who posed as members of the NPA. They demanded money and medicines for injured rebels,
threatening the couple’s family and clinic. The next day, Mondaga forced Engr. Resus to drive him to
Andanan, where he was held hostage and demanded ₱300,000 for his release. Dr. Resus could only
provide ₱10,000. Legarto played a role by delivering ransom notes, returning the victim's car, and using
part of the ransom money to pay for his motorcycle.
The trial court convicted Mondaga, Legarto, and Maluenda of kidnapping, sentencing them to *reclusion
perpetua*. The court found Mondaga to be the mastermind of the crime, with Legarto and Maluenda as
co-principals.

Issue: Whether Legarto’s actions warranted a conviction as a co-principal or merely as an accessory to

the crime of kidnapping.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conviction of Maluenda and Mondaga, maintaining their guilt
as co-principals in the kidnapping. However, the Court modified Legarto’s conviction, ruling that his
involvement in the crime did not constitute indispensable cooperation, which is required for a co-principal.
Legarto’s actions, such as delivering ransom notes and using the ransom money for personal purposes,
were seen as accessory acts rather than essential to the crime’s commission. As a result, Legarto was
found guilty only as an accessory to the kidnapping and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 2
years, 4 months, and 1 day of *prisión correccional* as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of *prisión mayor*
as maximum.

III. ACCOMPLICES (Article 18)

1. Abejuela v. People, G.R. No. 80130, 19 August 1991

Facts:
Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman, entrusted his savings account passbook to his close friend, Glicerio
Balo Jr., an employee of Banco Filipino. Balo wanted to deposit checks, purportedly from his father’s
insurance policy, into Abejuela’s account. Despite Abejuela’s advice to deposit them in his own account,
Balo insisted, claiming he was disqualified from doing so. Balo continued to deposit and withdraw money
using Abejuela’s passbook. Eventually, the bank discovered discrepancies in the records, revealing that
Balo had posted fictitious deposits. After admitting to the fraudulent activity, Balo and Abejuela were
charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents.

Issue: Whether petitioner Abejuela is guilty as an accomplice in estafa through falsification of commercial
documents.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court acquitted Abejuela, ruling that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove that Abejuela had knowledge of Balo’s
fraudulent scheme. Abejuela’s negligence in lending his passbook and gullibility were insufficient to
convict him as an accomplice. The Court emphasized that for conviction as an accomplice, there must be
intentional cooperation in the crime, which was not shown in this case. Knowledge of the criminal intent of
the principal, Glicerio Balo Jr., is essential for petitioner Abejuela to be convicted as an accomplice in the
crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. To be convicted as an accomplice, there
must be cooperation in the execution of the offense, either through prior or simultaneous acts. However,
the law punishes only assistance that is rendered knowingly or intentionally. Such assistance cannot be
considered as existing without prior knowledge of the offense that was intended to be committed.
Therefore, Abejuela was acquitted.

2. People v. Doble, G.R. No. L-30028, 31 May 1982

Facts:
On June 13, 1966, ten armed men, including Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble, and Antonio Romaquin,
set out to rob the Prudential Bank & Trust Co. in Navotas, Rizal, which operated from midnight to 8 AM.
Upon reaching the bank, eight men disembarked, fired at the ceiling and vault, and escaped with
P10,500. Several people, including law enforcement, were killed or injured in the process. Five of the ten
suspects were tried, with two acquitted. Doble, Doble, and Romaquin appealed the charges of robbery,
multiple homicide, frustrated homicide, and assault.

Issue: Whether Simeon Doble was guilty of participating in the robbery and whether Cresencio Doble and
Antonio Romaquin were guilty of the charges as principals or accomplices.

Ruling:
Simeon Doble was acquitted due to insufficient evidence. His mere presence at a meeting to discuss the
robbery did not establish that he participated in the execution of the crime or conspired with the others.
There was no evidence that he took direct action or cooperated in the commission of the robbery.
Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin were found guilty as accomplices. Cresencio was in charge of
the banca but had no knowledge of the concrete plan or execution of the crime, and Romaquin was
coerced at gunpoint and did not voluntarily participate. As accomplices, they were sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 5 years, 4 months, and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.

IV. ACCESSORIES (Articles 19 and 20)

1. People v. Talingdan, G.R. No. L32126, 6 July 1978, 84 SCRA 19

Facts:

On June 24, 1967, Bernardo Bagabag was murdered in his home in Abra by five individuals: Talingdan,
Tobias, Berras, Bides, and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife. However, Teresa could not be charged
with parricide as no proof of marriage was presented. The murder was witnessed by Corazon, the eldest
child of Bernardo and Teresa, who testified to the crime. Teresa denied the allegations, claiming there
was no illicit affair between her and Talingdan and that she loved her husband. She also contested
Corazon’s testimony, asserting that she was cooking dinner at the time of the murder and not involved in
any quarrel. Teresa further claimed that her in-laws used their daughter to testify against her and that her
husband had enemies. The accused also provided alibis, stating they were at Mrs. Bayongan’s house at
the time of the crime. The prosecution argued that Corazon’s testimony was truthful and that Teresa,
despite denying involvement, was conspiring with the other accused in the crime.

Issue: Whether Teresa Domogma was an accessory to the murder of Bernardo Bagabag.

Ruling:

The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, and Bides guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to death. The court ruled that two aggravating
circumstances—treachery and evident premeditation—were present, and no mitigating circumstances
offset the severity of the crime.

As for Teresa Domogma, the court found her guilty as an accessory to the murder. Teresa was not
considered a principal in the crime but was deemed to have actively cooperated with the other accused
after the murder. Her actions, such as concealing the crime and assisting in the escape of the principals,
made her liable as an accessory under Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code. She was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as the minimum and 8 years of
prision mayor as the maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.

2. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, 11 July 1994

Facts:
Teodoro Encarnacion’s house was ransacked by armed robbers, who stole jewelry, cash, and other
personal properties. Later, he was informed that some of the stolen items were located in the Chinatown
area, based on an informer’s tip. An entrapment operation was set up on February 14, 1988, with
Teodoro and his wife posing as buyers. They visited a stall run by Norma Dizon-Pamintuan, where they
recognized several of the stolen items: a diamond-studded earring and ring worth P75,000, a set of
diamond earrings worth P15,000, and a gold chain with a crucifix worth P3,000. Pamintuan was invited to
the police precinct for questioning, and the recovered items were presented as evidence. The trial court
convicted Pamintuan of violating the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612).
Issue: Whether or not Norma Dizon Pamintuan should be held liable as an accessory or as a principal in
the crime of fencing

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Norma Dizon-Pamintuan should be considered a principal in the crime of
fencing. Prior to the enactment of P.D. No. 1612, fencing could only be prosecuted as an accessory to
robbery or theft. However, under P.D. No. 1612, fencing is treated as a separate and distinct crime. This
law creates a presumption of fencing when a person possesses stolen property, and it prescribes a
higher penalty depending on the value of the stolen goods. The Court clarified that the elements of
fencing are: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed, (2) the accused possesses or deals with
items derived from the proceeds of the crime, (3) the accused knows or should have known the items
were stolen, and (4) the accused intends to gain from the stolen property. In this case, all these elements
were proven, and the Court affirmed Pamintuan’s conviction as a principal in the crime of fencing.

MODULE 10: PLURALITY OF CRIMES

I. Compound crime (delito compuesto)

1. People v. Tabaco, G.R. No. 100382, 19 March 1997

Facts:
Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, was shot and killed by Mario Tabaco at the Octagon Cockpit
Arena. Tabaco, sitting more than 3 meters from the Mayor, suddenly opened fire with an M-14 rifle, killing
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan, and Pat. Romeo Regunton. Regunton managed to
escape but was later found dead after being chased by Tabaco. Several others were injured, including
Sgt. Benito Raquepo and Jorge Siriban, who was killed when Tabaco pointed his gun at Raquepo.
Despite attempts to disarm him, the gun went off, injuring both Raquepo and Siriban. The trial court found
Tabaco guilty of all charges.

Issue:
Whether the killings of the victims should have been prosecuted under one Information.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that each death and injury caused by Tabaco was the result of separate
acts, not a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Despite the shots being fired in
quick succession, each victim’s death or injury was caused by an individual shot, making each act a
distinct offense. The Court emphasized that the doctrine from People v. Lawas does not apply, as the
individual deaths were clearly attributed to Tabaco. Thus, the four murders and injuries were separate
crimes, and Tabaco was sentenced to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.

2. People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 127663, 11 March 1999

Facts:
One evening, witness Amanda Tabion heard loud voices outside her house and went out to investigate.
She saw the four accused—Allan Valdez, Ludring Valdez, Itong Tabion, and Jose Taboac—surrounding
Eusebio Ocreto. Ludring repeatedly struck Eusebio on the head and body with large stones while the
others stood by. After Eusebio collapsed, the accused carried his body and placed it on a tricycle before
driving off. The following morning, Eusebio was reported missing, and his decapitated body was found
that afternoon. A postmortem examination revealed 13 stab wounds, indicating that two or more
assailants were involved. The headless body was found first, and two days later, the decapitated head
was discovered buried nearby. The four accused were charged with murder, with aggravating
circumstances of superior strength, nighttime, and cruelty, particularly due to the decapitation. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Ludring Valdez and Jose Taboac of murder, but Ludring Valdez
appealed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not there is cruelty to qualify the crime from homicide to murder.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision, affirming that the crime qualified as murder due
to the aggravating circumstance of cruelty. The Court agreed with the trial court that the killing involved
extreme cruelty because the victim was not only stoned and stabbed but also beheaded. The Court
explained that cruelty occurs when the victim suffers unnecessary physical pain that is not necessary for
the commission of the crime. In this case, the victim endured significant suffering before his death, which
included being stoned, stabbed, and decapitated, all of which contributed to the victim's prolonged pain.
Therefore, the Court ruled that the trial court properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty, qualifying the crime as murder rather than homicide.

II. Complex crime proper (delito complejo)

1. People vs. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L6025-26, 18 July 1956

Facts:
Hernandez and 31 other defendants were convicted by the lower courts for rebellion, which included
multiple charges of murder, arson, and robbery. The accused were affiliated with the Congress of Labor
Organizations, which was seen as an instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
HUKBALAHAP (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon), a communist insurgent group. They were accused of
taking up arms with the Huks and engaging in armed raids, ambushes, and attacks against police,
constabulary, army detachments, and innocent civilians. These actions also involved the commission of
other crimes such as murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and the planned destruction of both private
and public properties. The prosecution argued that the defendants should be convicted for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson, and robbery, which would warrant the death penalty. However, the lower
court sentenced the defendants to life imprisonment. The defense contended that rebellion could not be
complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

Issue: Whether or not there is complex crime rebellion with murder

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion. Rebellion is considered a single crime, even though it may involve the commission of other
crimes like murder, arson, and robbery in furtherance of the rebellion. The Court emphasized that the
main element of rebellion is the attempt to overthrow the government, and the other crimes committed in
furtherance of this goal do not transform the rebellion into separate crimes. The Court referenced the
"Hernandez Doctrine," which holds that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as
murder and the destruction of property committed in its furtherance. Thus, the Court upheld the conviction
for rebellion but clarified that it could not be complexed with the additional charges of murder, arson, and
robbery.
 2. Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, 5 June 1990

Facts:
The accused, a Moron native from Zamboanga, invited his common-law wife, Maxima, to accompany him
in gathering nipa for the repair of their house. However, Maxima was invited by Romana, another woman,
to go to her house to get palay, and she decided to go with Romana instead, refusing her husband's
request. This refusal greatly angered the accused, who, at the time, had already been harboring
suspicions that his wife was involved in an illicit affair with Fortunato, Romana's husband. The accused
believed that the child Maxima was carrying was the result of this affair. This incident set off a chain of
events where the accused, overcome by jealousy, went on a violent rampage, resulting in the deaths of
sixteen people and leaving several others wounded.

Issue: Whether the accused may avail of the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from jealousy.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the accused could not avail of the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation
arising from jealousy. The Court explained that the relationship between the accused and his common-
law wife was illegitimate, and the crime was not committed immediately after discovering the alleged
infidelity. Several days had passed since the accused learned of the supposed affair before he carried out
the killings. Moreover, the accused admitted that he had been planning his vengeance for some time
before he executed the crime, indicating premeditation rather than an impulsive act driven by momentary
jealousy. Therefore, the Court held that the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation due to jealousy did not
apply in this case.

III. Continuing crime (delito continuado)

1. People v. Madrigal-Gonzales, G.R. No. L-16688, 30 April 1963

Facts:
On August 23, 1956, Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was charged with malversation of public funds
amounting to 104,000 pesos. She was accused of misappropriating these funds over five occasions while
serving as the administrator of the Social Welfare Administration. Additionally, she, along with seven
others, was charged with falsifying public documents to make it appear that cash aids were distributed
and relief supplies were purchased when, in fact, they were not. A total of 27 separate charges for
falsification and one for malversation were filed against her. The prosecution sought to consolidate the
charges, arguing that the falsifications were committed to conceal the malversation.

Issue:
Whether there is a complex crime of falsification and malversation.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that the existence of a motive—specifically the intent to conceal the malversation—was
not enough to treat the falsifications and malversation as a complex crime. It emphasized that motive is
not an element of a crime but rather circumstantial evidence. The Court held that the criminal intent
behind each falsification was separate and distinct from the malversation. There was insufficient evidence
to show that the falsifications were made specifically to cover up each corresponding amount of
misappropriated funds. The Court explained that the falsifications were individual acts and could not be
treated as part of a single, continuing offense. Furthermore, the defense of double jeopardy, based on the
hypothesis that all falsifications were committed to conceal the malversation, was rejected. The Court
ordered the dismissal of the lower court’s ruling, which had granted the motion to quash based on double
jeopardy, and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the charges individually.

2. Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41054, 28 November 1975

Facts:
The case of "Gamboa v. Court of Appeals" (G.R. No. L-41054) was decided on November 28, 1975, by
the Philippine Supreme Court. The petitioners in the case were Jose L. Gamboa and Units Optical Supply
Company, while the respondents were the Court of Appeals and Benjamin Lu Hayco. The City Fiscal of
Manila had filed seventy-five (75) cases of estafa against Benjamin Lu Hayco, an employee of Units
Optical Supply Company, for various acts of defalcation committed from October 2, 1972, to December
30, 1972. Hayco was accused of collecting money from customers and misappropriating these funds by
depositing them into his personal account and subsequently withdrawing them. The lower court dismissed
Hayco's petition to consolidate the charges into a single case, but the Court of Appeals reversed this
decision, directing the City Fiscal to file a single information. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court's decision, holding that each act of conversion constituted a separate criminal offense.

Issue: Whether or not the seventy-five (75) cases of estafa filed against Benjamin Lu Hayco be
consolidated into a single case, or should each act of conversion be treated as a separate criminal
offense?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the charges of estafa against Benjamin Lu Hayco should be treated
as separate criminal offenses. The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld the
filing of one information for every single day of abstraction made by Hayco.

The Supreme Court's decision was based on the interpretation of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
which distinguishes between "ideal plurality" and "real plurality" of crimes. The Court held that each act of
conversion by Hayco constituted an independent criminal act with its own criminal intent. The Court
emphasized that the daily abstractions and diversions of funds were not the result of a single criminal
impulse but were separate acts committed on different dates. Therefore, each act of misappropriation
was a complete and independent crime of estafa. The Court also clarified that the concept of a
"continuous crime" did not apply in this case, as each defalcation was a distinct and consummated act.
The Court further noted that the similarity in the pattern of misappropriation did not affect the divisibility of
the acts into separate crimes. The ruling reinforced the principle that fraud is not an essential element in
estafa by conversion under Article 315, paragraph 1-b of the Revised Penal Code, and that the breach of
confidence involved in the conversion is sufficient to constitute the crime.
MODULE 11: PENALTIES

I. Principal Penalties (Capital Punishment – Article 40 and 47)

1. People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, 30 October 2006

Facts:

Alfredo Bon was charged with six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape against his minor
nieces, AAA and BBB, occurring over six years. The victims testified that Bon, their uncle, repeatedly
raped them under threats of violence. Medical and birth certificates supported their claims. Bon denied
the allegations, citing alibi and a family grudge. The RTC found him guilty, sentencing him to death for the
rapes and imposing lesser penalties for attempted rapes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
findings but reduced the two attempted rape charges to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of *prision
mayor* to seventeen years and four months of *reclusion temporal*. Bon further appealed, citing
inconsistencies in the victims' testimonies.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty for attempted qualified rape be computed from *reclusion perpetua*
instead of death, under Republic Act No. 9346?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that under Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty for attempted qualified rape should be
based on *reclusion perpetua* since the death penalty was abolished. The Court upheld Bon's conviction,
finding the victims’ testimonies credible and rejecting Bon's defenses of denial, alibi, and alleged family
grudge. The penalties for attempted rape were reduced to an indeterminate sentence of two years, four
months, and one day of *prision correccional* as minimum, to eight years and one day of *prision mayor*
as maximum. The Court also awarded civil, moral, and exemplary damages to the victims.

II. Reclusion Perpetua (Article 27)

1. People v. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172, 25 May 1994

Facts:
In "People vs. Lucas y Briones," decided on May 25, 1994, by Justice Davide, Jr., Conrado Lucas y Briones was
accused of attempted rape and rape by his daughter, Chanda Lucas y Austria. Chanda, then 17, alleged that her
father first raped her at age nine and continued the abuse. She filed complaints on February 19, 1991, with the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, leading to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-18465 (rape) and Q-91-18466 (attempted
rape).
During the trial, Chanda, her sister Cynthia, and Dr. Emmanuel Aranas testified, with Chanda detailing the abuse and
Dr. Aranas confirming physical evidence of sexual trauma. The defense claimed the charges were fabricated. The
trial court found Lucas guilty of both charges, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P30,000
in damages. Lucas appealed, arguing the trial court erred in believing the prosecution's witnesses and in convicting
him of a more serious offense than charged in one case.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua is divisible

RULING: No. Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible—and not a divisible—penalty. Prior to R.A. No. 7659,
the presence of modifying circumstances would not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua prescribed for
the crime of rape because such a penalty was then indivisible and under Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659, which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code,
reclusion perpetua has now a defined duration, i.e., from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years. There is, nevertheless, no corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the same Code for the
purpose of converting reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty with three specific periods—minimum,
medium, and maximum—It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua, it did not make explicit its intention to convert it into a divisible penalty.

2. People v. Latupan, G.R. No. 112453, 28 June 2001

Facts:

On April 29, 1991, in Tuao, Cagayan, Gerardo Latupan y Sibal, alias Jerry, attacked the family of Emilio
Asuncion with a knife, killing Lilia Asuncion and her nine-year-old son, Jose, and inflicting injuries on two
other children, Jaime and Leo. Latupan was arrested and charged with two counts of murder and two
counts of frustrated murder. During arraignment, Latupan pleaded guilty to the charge of multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder. The trial court convicted Latupan of the "complex crime of double murder"
and two counts of serious physical injuries. He was sentenced to "life imprisonment" for the double
murder and ten days of imprisonment for each count of physical injuries.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty of "life imprisonment" is proper instead of reclusion perpetua for
murder.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Gerardo Latupan for two counts of murder and two counts of
slight physical injuries but modified the penalties. The killings of Lilia and Jose Asuncion and the injuries
to Jaime and Leo Asuncion were distinct acts, not a complex crime, making the accused liable for
separate offenses. The trial court’s imposition of "life imprisonment" for murder was corrected to
"reclusion perpetua" under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as these terms differ in nature,
duration, and effects. Evident premeditation was not proven due to insufficient evidence of a deliberate
and prolonged plan. Without aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the proper penalty for each count of
murder is reclusion perpetua, along with accessory penalties. The award of P50,000 as death indemnity
per murder victim was affirmed, requiring no proof beyond the fact of death and the accused's liability.

III. Execution and Service of Penalites

A. General Rules - Article 47, 70, 78, and 86-88

1. In re Petition for Habeas Corpus, Pete Lagran, G.R. No. 147270, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 275

Facts:

Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for three counts of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (bouncing checks law). He was sentenced to one year of imprisonment for each
count, fined P125,000.00, and ordered to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. After his
appeal was dismissed for failure to file the appellant's brief, the trial court's decision became final and
executory. Lagran began serving his sentence on February 24, 1999, and was later transferred to the
New Bilibid Prison. On March 19, 2001, he filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming he had completed
his sentence. He argued that under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, penalties arising from one court
and one complaint should be served simultaneously.

Issue: Whether or not the sentences imposed on the accused be served simultaneously if they arise from
one court and one complaint

Ruling:
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows the simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the
nature of the penalties permits it. The penalties that may be served simultaneously include: (1) perpetual
absolute disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary absolute disqualification, (4)
temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to
keep the peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment of costs. Except for destierro,
these penalties can also be served simultaneously with imprisonment. However, penalties involving
deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously due to their nature. When an accused is sentenced
to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms must be served successively.

In the present case, the petitioner was sentenced to one year of imprisonment for each count of the
offense committed. The nature of this sentence does not allow the petitioner to serve all prison terms
simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service of sentences, the petitioner has not yet
completed serving his sentence, as he only began serving it on February 24, 1999. Therefore, his prayer
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.

MODULE 12: EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

A. Total - Article 89-93

1. Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, 14 June 1994

Facts:
Jose Sermonia was charged with bigamy on May 26, 1992, for contracting a second marriage with
Unson on February 15, 1975, while his first marriage with Nievera was still valid. Sermonia moved to
quash the case, arguing that the 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy began in 1975 when the second
marriage was registered with the Civil Registry. He claimed that Nievera had constructive notice of the
second marriage from that date, making 1990 the deadline to file charges. Since the information was only
filed in 1992, he argued that the case had prescribed. The prosecution countered that the prescriptive
period begins only when the complainant discovers the crime, not when it was committed.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution of Jose Sermonia for bigamy already prescribed?

Ruling:
No, the prosecution has not prescribed. The Supreme Court ruled that the prescriptive period for bigamy
begins upon the complainant’s discovery of the crime, not its commission or registration. Constructive
notice does not apply to bigamy because such marriages are often concealed to avoid detection, typically
occurring in places where the offender’s marital status is unknown. Although Sermonia’s second marriage
was registered, he misrepresented himself as "single," demonstrating an intent to conceal the crime. The
Court rejected his claim of no concealment and clarified that requiring individuals to verify marital statuses
through exhaustive record searches would impose an unreasonable burden. Since Nievera discovered
the bigamous marriage shortly before the charges were filed in 1992, the case was filed within the
prescriptive period, making the prosecution valid.

2. Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 585

Facts:

The case "Republic of the Philippines v. Desierto" involves a petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of
the Philippines against Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto and several private respondents, including
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara Lobregat, Rolando Dela Cuesta, Jose Eleazar,
Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Danilo Ursua, Narciso Pineda, and Augusto Orosa. The complaint, initiated by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on February 12, 1990, alleged violations of Republic Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Initially, the case was referred to the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and later to the Office of the Ombudsman, where it was
docketed as OMB-0-90-2808. The complaint accused Cojuangco and others of manipulating the Coconut
Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to benefit Cojuangco's corporation, Agricultural Investors, Inc. (AII),
resulting in significant financial losses to the government. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on
the grounds of prescription, citing that the offense had allegedly prescribed, and that the questioned
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) had received "legislative imprimatur" from President Marcos. The
OSG's subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to the present petition.

Issue:
Did the complaint for violation of RA No. 3019 prescribe?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Republic, reversed the Ombudsman's dismissal, and ordered a
preliminary investigation. The prescription period should be counted from the discovery of the offense, not
its commission. Acts during the Marcos regime were difficult to challenge due to the political climate. The
alleged "legislative imprimatur" did not shield the respondents from prosecution. The Ombudsman gravely
abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint without conducting a preliminary investigation.

B. Partial - Article 94-99

1. Cruz III v. Go, G.R. No. 223446, 28 November 2016

Facts:

Rolito T. Go was convicted of murder in 1993 and sentenced to *reclusion perpetua*, starting his
sentence on April 30, 1996. In 2008, he was granted colonist status, which entitled him to additional Good
Conduct Time Allowances (GCTA) under the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) Manual. Go filed a petition
for a writ of *habeas corpus* in 2014, arguing that his sentence, factoring in GCTA, preventive
imprisonment, and his colonist status, expired on August 21, 2013. The RTC granted the petition, ruling
that his life sentence was effectively reduced to 30 years under Articles 70 and 97 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Petitioners challenged this, arguing that only the President has the power to commute
sentences under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution. They claimed that Go’s continued detention
was lawful because the commutation lacked presidential approval.

---
Issue: Whether the Bureau of Corrections can validly reduce or partially extinguish criminal liability
through GCTA, colonist status, and preventive imprisonment without requiring presidential approval.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Go and upheld the RTC's decision. It held that partial reductions of
criminal liability under Articles 70 and 97 of the RPC are valid and do not require presidential approval.
The law allows the Bureau of Corrections Director to grant good conduct allowances, which once granted,
cannot be revoked (Article 99, RPC). Thus, Go had fully served his 30-year sentence by August 21, 2013,
and his continued detention was unlawful. The Court ordered his immediate release unless detained for
another lawful cause. The partial extinction of criminal liability through Good Conduct Time Allowances
(GCTA) and other lawful credits does not require the exercise of presidential clemency.

C. Civil Liability arising from criminal liability - Article 100-113

1. People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994

Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and convicted on June 19, 1991, in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. He was sentenced to imprisonment, and while his conviction was pending appeal,
Bayotas died on February 4, 1992, at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio-respiratory arrest,
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy caused by liver cancer. Following his death, the Supreme Court, in
its May 20, 1992 resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of his appeal. The Solicitor General contended
that Bayotas' death did not extinguish his civil liability, citing *People v. Sendaydiego*, and argued that
the appeal should still be resolved to address the civil liability stemming from the crime. On the other
hand, Bayotas’ counsel argued that his death before the final judgment of appeal extinguished both his
criminal and civil penalties, invoking the ruling in *People v. Castillo and Ocfemia*, which held that civil
liability in a criminal case is rooted in criminal liability and is extinguished if the accused dies before a final
judgment is rendered.

Issue: Whether Bayotas' death extinguished both his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling:

Yes, Bayotas' death extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code, death of the convict before final judgment terminates both criminal and pecuniary penalties. Since
the civil liability was linked to the criminal case, it was also extinguished upon his death. The Solicitor
General's reliance on *Sendaydiego* was misplaced, as that case dealt with civil liability arising from
other sources, not delicts.