13

Title: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19

MALCOLM, J.
Subject Matter: TERRITORIALITY

Facts:

On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were on its way in the midst of the islands of
Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by 24 armed Moros. The said Dutch
boats were carrying men, women and children. At first, the Moros asked for food. But when they got on the
Dutch boats, they asked for themselves all the vessel’s cargo, attacked nearly all of the men and brutally
violated two of the women by methods too tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat,
except the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo,
who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there and
were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

Issue:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy alleged in this case.

Held:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a villainy not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It should be tried and punished in the sufficient tribunal of any country where the offender
may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no
territorial limits.
 14

People v. Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.

Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of felony

Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC

FACTS:
• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who
is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and
called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression) which
had been placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept
under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned
out, was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of
mischief was playing a trick on him
• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
• There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of
which took place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under
his pillow for his personal protection.
• trial court held it as simple homicide

ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake
as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act.

HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
 15
People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.

Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances

FACTS:
 Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly
called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
 The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector.
 Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and
.45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and
looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the
entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour.
 According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter
asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES.
 ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
 appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
 "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
 a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence
in making an arrest
 The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
 According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
 16

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

No. L-74324 17November1988

MEDIALDEA, J

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of
Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20
years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep
together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite.
Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and
they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and
poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set
Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours
after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal
responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to
commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the
scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only
for the act that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any
act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying
circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to
commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.
17
 18

GARCIA VS CA

GR 157171, MARCH 14, 2006

QUISUMBING, J

FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino Pimintel, Jr., was informed
that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the
candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes.
Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was acquited due to lack of evidence
except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the
votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.

Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no motive on her part to reduce
the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which falls
under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se.
(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of election inspectors or
board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any
member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to
overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers
in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of
canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.

The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction but
increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
 19
Manuel v. People
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Lesson: Felony, Bigamy, Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death, malice, good faith as a valid defense
 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea

Laws Applicable: Art. 3 par 2 RPC, Art. 349 RPC, Art. 41 FC

FACTS:
 July 28, 1975: Eduardo married Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati
o Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned
o Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her again
 January 1996: Eduardo met Tina B. Gandalera, 21 year old computer secretarial student, in Dagupan City while she looked for a friend during her 2 days stay
 Later, Eduardo visited Tina, they went to a motel together and he proposed marriage and introduced her to his parents who assures that he is single
 April 22, 1996: Eduardo married Tina before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City and they were able to build a home after
 1999: Eduardo only visited their home twice or thrice a year and whenever jobless Tina would ask for money, he would slap her
 January 2001: Eduardo packed his things and left and stopped giving financial support
 August 2001: Tina through inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila and was embarrassed and humiliated to learn that Eduardo was previously
married
 Eduardo claimed that he did NOT know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina
 RTC: Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and 10 months, as minimum, to 10 years, as
maximum and P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit
o Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy
 Eduardo appealed to the CA contending that he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent whereas under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there
must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony
 CA: affirming the decision of the RTC stating that Article 41 of the Family Code should apply that there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s
presumptive death as the absent spouse and modified minimum to 2 years and four months

ISSUE: W/N Eduardo is guilty of Bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit).

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. CA affirmed

 Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
o The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.
o Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts
easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
 For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
o (a) he/she has been legally married; and
o (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.
 The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage
 Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent
o Malice -a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act WITHOUT legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury
o When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional
o For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent.
 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
 GR: mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
 EX: ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
o Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
 burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard
from her for more than 20 years since 1975
o failed to discharge his burden since no judicial declaration as proof
 Article 41 of the Family Code amended the rules on presumptive death on Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which states that before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
 moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code for being against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society
 20

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46
(Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are
“related” for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999
Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at
modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed
stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald,
and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and
difficult to disprove
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can
be the crime?
Yes there is:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of
evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united
in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were
synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to
kill Modesto
There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how
Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery
cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless
during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not
constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical
superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.
HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE
(THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM
MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

21
 IVLER VS SAN PEDRO

GR 172716, 17 ,NOV 2010

CARPIO, J.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
16831. for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce's... vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second... punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.[4] Seven days later, the
MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.[5] Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion... remained unresolved.
whether petitioner's... constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
Issues:
whether petitioner's... constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
Ruling:
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine... the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes... and prosecution... s.[
Principles:
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,... its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine... the Penalty
 22
ARTICLE 3 - MALA PROHIBITA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.
GR NO L-42288, 16 FEBRUARY 1935

VICKERS, J.:

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of
the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty days
and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary,
contends that he stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of
Pilar for the purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag a revolver that the
defendant had taken that day from one Tomas de Martin, who had no license
therefor; that he did not know there was a polling place near where he parked
his motor car; that he was called by his friend, Jose D. Benliro and aligned his
automobile, he did not leave the revolver because there were many people in
the road and he might lose it; that he was sixty-three meters from the
electoral college when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E. Desiderio,
a representative of the Secretary of the Interior.

ISSUE: W/N the defendant is liable even without criminal intent.

HELD: Yes. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision,
and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded
that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the
law in any other way. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those
mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done.
"Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent
to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.
 23

US VS GO CHICO

GR 4963, 15 SEPTEMBER 1909

MORELAND, J.

Facts
: On or about the 4thday of August, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed in one of
the windowsand one of the show
cases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario, Manila, a number of
medallions, in the form of a small button, upon which were printed the
miniature faces of EmilioAguinaldo and the flag or banner or device used during
the lateinsurrection in the Phil.
Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On
the day previous to the one set forth above, the appellant had purchased the said medallion
sold at a public sale under the authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in
question, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them
to the public, and in doing so, he placed the medallions in his showcase and on one of the
windows of his store. The appellant was ignorant of any law against the display of such
medallions and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted.
The appellant has two propositions for his acquittal: first is that before a conviction can be
had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is directed against the use of identical banners,
devices or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed
rebellion against the United States.

Issue:
Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws.

Held:
The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. The
words “used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify
those in armed rebellion against the United States” mean not only the identical flags actually
used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The description refers not to a
particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an
absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature.
 24

PEOPLE V ILAGAN

GR NO. 75369, NOVEMBER 26, 1190

FERNAN, J.:

Article 4, Par. 1 of the RPC:

“
Criminal liabilityshall be incurred:

By any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
”
FA C T S :

August 4, 1980
After a barrio fiesta in Vinzons,Camarines Norte, Edmundo pushed aside thegroup of Esmeraldo Quinones, Jr., Zaldi
Asis,and Felix Lukban, and even prompted Zaldi tobox. Fernando brought out his bolo when he sawEdmundo on the
ground, hacked Zaldi butmissed. The group of Quinones was thenpursued by the three accused.

Upon seeing they were no longer being chased,Quinones invited the other two to his house sothat he could change to
his working clothes as abus conductor.

While the trio were walking along a nationalhighway towards the victim’s house, the threeaccused suddenly emerged on
the road side.That was the time when Fernando hackedQuinones, Jr. on his face, causing fatal injurieson the latter’s face
which resulted in his death.

The accused denied having perpetrated thecrime and stated that they were on theirrespective houses when the crime
occurred.

The lower court found that Iligan’s group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of the victim to vindicate
the boxing on theface of Edmundo. Fernando and Edmundo werethen charged with the crime of murder with aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.

ISSUES:

WON Fernando could be absolved of hiscriminal liability given that the victim wassubsequently run over by a vehicle

RULING:
1st i s s u e
: Denied.Based on the do c t r i n e
:
“el que es causa de lacausa es causa del mal causado” (he who is thecause of the cause is the cause of the
evilcaused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are:(a) that an i n t e n t i o n a l
felony has beencommitted, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the d i r e c t , n a t u r a l a n d l o g i c a l
c o n s e q u e n c e of the felony committed by the offender. These requisites are present inthis case. The intentional
felony was the hackingby Fernando.

The second requisite was also met. Given that the incident happened on a national highwaywhere vehicles are expected
to pass, Fernando’s hacking of Quinones’s head was the proximate, might not be direct, cause of the latter’s death. The
sequence of events from Fernando’s assault to the time Quinones was run over by a vehicle is one unbroken chain of
events. With that said, it did not really matter if he directly caused Quinones’s death or if heactually meant it. Having
triggered such events,Iligan cannot escape liability even though theautopsy indicated that the death was caused by a
vehicular accident.

Since treachery and evident premeditation werenot established, the lower court’s charge for Fernando was modified from
murder to homicide.

However, it was not clearly established thatEdmundo took any direct part in the hackingincident since mere
knowledge/approval of theact without cooperation is not enough to chargehim a co-principal. Therefore, he deserved
exoneration.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants,
FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; THROWS THE CASE OPEN FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL ERRORS AS MAY BE IMPUTABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT. — While the factual findings of
the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission,
as may be imputable to the trial court. (People v. Valerio, Jr., L-4116, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 208, 231) In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the
maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that
indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan
from liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES THEREOF, PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa
del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), (People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144) the essential
requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence
of the felony committed by the offender. (People v. Mananquil, L-35574, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 196, 207). We hold that these requisites are present in this case.

3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE, DEFINED. — The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial
by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault
was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head. (See: People v. Diana, 32 Phil. 344
[1915]). The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and
Zaldy Asis, running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him
to the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle. Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have been the direct
cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom. (Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181). In other words, the
sequence of events from Iligan’s assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken
chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.

4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY WITNESSES. — We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in
favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution witnesses. (People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988, 157
SCRA 71).

5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, WRONGLY APPRECIATED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — But we disagree with the lower court
with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view of the
suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. (People v. Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115
SCRA 559) There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself.
(People v. Crisostomo, L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47). In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was
a warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks
against them. (People v. Mercado, L-33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 455). The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this
case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA 46).

6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTITUTED BY MERE KNOWLEDGE, ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR AGREEMENT TO
COOPERATE NOR BY MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. — Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the
lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part
in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was
carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan,
Edmundo Asis must have known of the former’s criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People v.
Izon, 104 Phil. 690 [1958]) Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault
perpetrated by Iligan. (Orobio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316) Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.

7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW. — There being no mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within
the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized
income and therefore, the same is disallowed.

DECISION

FERNAN, J.:

In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1
convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amounts of
P30,000 for the latter’s death and P256,960 representing the victim’s unrealized income.

On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was filed against Fernando Iligan, Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog: chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality of Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused
Fernando Iligan armed with a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a sudden unexpected
manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., on his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latter’s face which resulted to (sic) the death of said Esmeraldo Quiñones.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." cralaw virtua1aw library

Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their arraignment on January 12, 1981 Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, the prosecution presented the following version of the commission of the crime. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto.
Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew,
Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused
that they had no desire to fight. 3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by
the three accused. They ran for about half an hour, passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing that they were no longer being chased. After
resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited the two to accompany him to his house so that he could change to his working clothes and report for work as a bus conductor. 4

While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly emerged on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr.
with his bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they
heard shouts of people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May nadale na." 6

On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his head busted. 7 They helped the brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him
to their house. 8

That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiñones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E.
Abas. The postmortem examination report which is found at the back of the death certificate reveals that Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained
the following injuries:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple fracture of the entire half of the frontal left, temporal, parietal and occipital bone of the head, with massive
maceration of the brain tissue.
"2. Other findings — Incised wound at the right eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4 cms. in length, 0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder
and right side of the neck." 9

The death certificate also indicates that Quiñones, Jr. died of "shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident." cralaw virtua1aw library

The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their respective houses at the time the crime was committed. chanrobles law library

Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his house to fetch his visitors at the dance hall. 10 Along the way, he met his nephew,
Edmundo Asis, whom he presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew to accompany him to the dance hall. However, they were not able to reach their destination because
Edmundo was boxed by somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11 Instead, Fernando Iligan brought his nephew home. 12 On their way, they were overtaken by Juliano
Mendoza whom Fernando Iligan invited to his house to help him cook. 13 After bringing his nephew home, Fernando Iligan and Juliano Mendoza proceeded to Iligan’s house and
arrived there between 1:30 and 2:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day. 14

Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligan’s testimony. He testified that while they were walking in front of the Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize
because there were several persons around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he addressed his apology boxed him on his left face. He fell down and Iligan helped
him. Later, Iligan accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15 After Iligan and Juliano Mendoza had left his house, he slept and woke up at 7:00 o’clock the following morning. 16

The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiñones, Jr. died because of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory,
however, the lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986, said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death have shown that the victim’s death was caused by a vehicular accident. To this,
notwithstanding, the Court cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of the alleged vehicular accident has not been fully established. Second, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr.,
(the) father of the victim, testified that Dr. Abas told him that if his son was hacked by a bolo on the face and then run over the entire head by a vehicle’s tire, then that hacking
on the face could not be visibly seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third, Exhibit ‘2’ (the photograph of the victim taken immediately after his body had been
brought home) is a hard evidence. It will attestly (sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that only half of the face and head,
was damaged with the wound starting on a sharp edge horizontally. There are contusions and abrasions on the upper left shoulder and on the neck while the body downwards
has none of it, while on the right forehead there is another wound caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is simple, that if the victim was run over by a vehicle, the other
half portion of his head and downward part of his body must have been likewise seriously damaged, which there are none." 17

The lower court also found that Iligan’s group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of the victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and imposed on
them the aforementioned penalty.

Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which they were convicted. For the second time, they attributed Quiñones, Jr.’s death to a
vehicular accident.

No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The defense relies on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that
the multiple fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident 18 which opinion was earlier put in writing by the same witness in the postmortem
examination. Dr. Abas justified his conclusion by what he considered as tire marks on the victim’s left shoulder and the right side of his neck. 19 He also testified that the incised
wound located at the victim’s right eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so superficial that it could not have caused the victim’s death. 20

Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity of the actual occurrence of the vehicular mishap. One such evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy
Asis that when he helped bring home the body of Quiñones, Jr., he told the victim’s father, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr. that "before Esmeraldo Quiñones (Jr.) was run over by a
vehicle, he was hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21 When asked why he mentioned an automobile, Zaldy Asis said that he did not notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it
"because his (Quiñones, Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis had actual knowledge of said accident but for understandable reasons
he declined to declare it in court. Defense witness Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo, also testified that when he went to the scene of the crime, he saw bits
of the brain of the victim scattered across the road where he also saw tire marks. 23

For its part, the prosecution, through the victim’s father, presented evidence to the effect that Iligan authored the maceration of half of the victim’s head. Quiñones, Sr. testified
that from their house, which was about five meters away from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding a "sinampalok" as he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog,
chased someone. During the second time that he saw the three accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan." 24 Hence, the lower court concluded that the victim’s head
was "chopped" resulting in the splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It should be emphasized, however, that the testimony came from a biased witness and it was
uncorroborated.

While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors,
by commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court. 26 In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the maceration of one half of the head of the victim
was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the
bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the
essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are present in this case.

The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside
the point. What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to
do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head. 29

The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30 where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy
Asis, running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to
the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle.

Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death.
Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." 31 In other words, the sequence of events from
Iligan’s assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having
triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.
chanrobles law library

We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the
prosecution witnesses. 32

But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by
the lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. 33 There must be
evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. 34 In this case, the hacking
of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants.
The group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. 35

The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of
sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 36

Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led
to his running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being
uncorroborated and coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the former’s criminal intent but mere
knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be
intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not
make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan. 38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.

There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the
award of P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized income and therefore, the same is disallowed. cralawnad

WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide for which he is imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

25
 PEOPLE v. VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO, GR No. L-35574, 1984-09-28

CUEVAS, J.:

Facts:

VALENTINA MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE

That on or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, that is, having
conceived and deliberated to... kill her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, with whom she was united in lawful wedlock, enter (sic)
the NAWASA building situated at Pasay City, where said Elias Day y Pablo was working as a security guard; and the said
accused, having in her possession a bottle containing gasoline... suddenly and without warning, poured the contents on
the person of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said Elias Day y Pablo suffered
burns and injuries which subsequently caused his death.

On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA Building at Pasay City where her
husband was then working as a security guard. She had just purchased ten (10) centavo-worth of gasoline from the Esso
Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which... she placed in a coffee bottle (t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry at her
husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all
the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she... knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was
opened, Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON" (t.s.n., p. 14,
id). The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the contents... thereof on the face
of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14 id). Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim aflame.

Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the Trinity General Hospital
at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p. 208, rec.) due to 'Pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2°...
secondary'.

In that... investigation, appellant categorically admitted having thrown gasoline at her husband and thereafter set him
aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statement

Issues:

whether or not appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given... whether or not the burns sustained by the
victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death.

Ruling:

The evidence shows that... pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the
immediate cause of death... this could not have resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It
concluded, and rightly... so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to the cause of death, merely
contributory

One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes immediately or immediately to the
death of such other

It is that every person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own... acts.

Principles:

Appellant's case falls squarely under Art. 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

"Art. 4. Criminal Liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended."... the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that
the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by
the offender.
 26
MELBA QUINTO v. DANTE ANDRES, GR NO. 155791, 2005-03-16
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Facts:

At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his
playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw
respondents Dante

Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with
them inside the drainage culvert.[1] Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated
in a... grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system.[2]

Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system which
was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.[3] After a while,
respondent

Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left[4] without saying a word. Respondent Andres
also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres
laid the... boy's lifeless body down in the grassy area.[5] Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene.
[6] For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and informed her that...
her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.[7]

CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.[9]

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS' CRIMINAL LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE
EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.

WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
WILSON QUINTO.

Ruling:

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury.

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a
consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes
cooperated in producing the factual... result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.

In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo.

In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant
evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the... respondents for damages.

He presented two possibilities: (a)... that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full
force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object:

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to fall
hard and hit his head on the pavement,... However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and
admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on... the person of the deceased. In this case, the
petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the
latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent

Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the latter's death:

Principles:

The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.

The... sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused

Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary... course of human life or events... logical" means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage

Proximate cause is that cause which... in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect being the
resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.
 27
PEOPLE v. JUAN QUIANZON, GR No. 42607, 1935-09-28
RECTO, J.:
Facts:

On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of a deceased person was being held in the house of Victorina
Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacidn, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of relatives
and friends. The incident that led... to the filing of these charges took place between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all
appearances, had the victuals in his care. Aribuabo was a sexagenarian and so... was Quianzon. It was the second or third
time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a
firebrand and applied it to the neck of the man who so pestered him. Aribuabo ran to the place where the people were...
gathered exclaiming that he was wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his
abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the tenth day after the incident.

ictim's statement immediately after receiving the wound, naming the... accused as the author of the aggression, and the
admission forthwith made by the accused that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded him,
besides, with a bamboo spit

"wound of the deceased was very serious and it was difficult... to determine whether he could survive or not."

Issues:

It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted the wound which resulted in
Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not
necessarily fatal and the deceased would... have survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had
placed to control or isolate the infection.

The possibility, admitted by said physician, that... the patient might" have survived said wound had he not removed the
drainage, does not mean that that act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal
consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of... pain does not alter the
juridical consequences of the punishable act of the accused.

Ruling:

"One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or
immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of
responsibility.

accused is wrong in imputing the natural consequences of his criminal act to an act of his victim.

Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any aggravating circumstances adverse to
him

Principles:

when a person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctor's orders, not
because of carelessness or a desire to... increase the criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his nervous
condition due to the wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime is homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply
because the doctor was of the opinion that the wound might have healed,in... seven days... one who inflicts an injury on
another will be held responsible for his death, although it may appear that the deceased might have recovered if he had...
taken proper care of himself, or submitted to a surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the
wound and contributed to the death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by
the condition of the wound.

The... principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and lies at the foundation of all criminal
jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of
his own acts.
 28

URBANO VS IAC

GR 72694, JANUARY 7, 1988

GUTIERREZ, JR., J

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded
with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw
Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and
Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and
Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed
to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected
the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial
court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who
stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death,
his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions,
with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote
cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

29

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
 30

Intod v. CA

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's
house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with
Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them
and that Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom
but there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together
with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs

• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with
bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability to punish
criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the
pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment - attempt to
commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime

31
PEOPLE v. PABLITO DOMASIAN, GR No. 95322, 1993-03-01
CRUZ, J.:
Facts:

in the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez,
Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical...
certificate.

Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan

The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying.
This aroused the suspicion of the driver,... Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his relationship with the boy. The
man said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical differences between the
two and the wide gap between their ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two... barangay tanods when his
passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy.

Somehow, the man managed to... escape, leaving Enrico behind.

fter Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of
Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed.

Agra thought the handwriting in the note was... familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the
note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination.

The test showed that it had been written by Dr. Samson Tan.

Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so he could identify the man who had detained him, and he
pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian.[5] Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnaping
with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon.

Issues:

that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not
punishable.

Ruling:

Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraph of the same article, which clearly applies to him, thus:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurre

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnaping with serious illegal detention had already been
committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or... ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue
of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his
liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the... penalty to death under the last
paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.

32
US VS. EDUAVE
GR NO L-12155 – February 2, 1917
Moreland

SUBJECT: Stage of punishable conduct: attempt; never passes subjective

Phase

FACTS: Defendant Protasio Eduave, who was the querido of the victim’s
mother, attacked the victim from behind using a bolo creating a gash of 8
and a half inches long and 2 inches deep because the latter accused the
defendant of raping her. Knowing that he has already killed the victim, he
threw the body into the bushes and left. Then, he gave himself up and
declared that he had killed the complainant.

ISSUE: In what stage of the crime of murder is committed by Eduave?

HELD:
The Accused is guilty of frustrated murder. The fact that Eduave attacked
the victim from behind, in a vital portion of the body, shows treachery
qualifying it as murder. In case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phased is
completely passed making the crime subjectively complete. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. Adueva did all that was necessary to
commit the crime but it did not result as a consequence due to something
beyond his control.The crime was not consummated because the elements of the crime’s
execution and accomplishment were not complete, as the victim did not die.
Neither was the crime an attempted one because the accused’s actions has
already passed the subjective phase, that is, there was no external force or
intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the
beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the
acts have been performed preventing defendant from performing all the acts
of execution necessary to commit the felony. That external force is the
essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony.
Consequently, the victim did not die because an external element has
prevented such death after Eduave has performed all the necessary acts of
execution that would have caused the death of the victim.

33
PEOPLE v. CEILITO ORITA, GR NO. 88724, 1990-04-03
MEDIALDEA, J.:
Facts:

The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case

Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar.

March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above?named accused with lewd designs and by the
use of a Batangas knife... he conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan
against her will and without her consent.

Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged.

filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision,

Issues:

As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:

1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses; and

2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused.

The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the same view.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of the crime of Frustrated
Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no
mitigating circumstance to... offset the same, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes
on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS
PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S.

ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay costs.

Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 102, Rollo):

"WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant found guilty of the crime of rape, and
consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000.00.

"show remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its
candor, truth and validity.

The allegation would have been meritorious had the... testimony of the victim ended there. The victim testified further that
the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression. This is a material part of the victim's testimony which
the accused conveniently deleted.

Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat on its face. Some were
not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We are convinced that the accused is guilty of rape.

However, We believe the subject matter that really calls for discussion is whether or not the accused's conviction for
frustrated rape is proper. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital
organ of the... victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his
purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is
left to be done by the offender,... because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony
is consummated. In a long line of cases

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim
in the amount of

P30,000.00.

34

People v. Campuhan

G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Lessons Applicable: Attempted rape

FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of
their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata
Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located
at the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's
room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants
were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled
up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus
prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan
who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down
causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death
• Thus, subject to automatic review

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

35
Title: Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188
TINGA, J.

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; Stages
of theft
Facts:
While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded
with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later
emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave
the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the
scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing
that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus
the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

Held:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present – (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the
property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already
ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.

36
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs LAMAHANG

G.R. No. L-43530 August 03, 1935

RECTO, J.:

FACTS:

 The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempted robbery.
 At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. F
uentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the
wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street.

 At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
  The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

ISSUE:

WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:

YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilty of attempted trespass to d
welling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to thre
e months and one day of arresto mayor.

37
PEOPLE VS SALVILLA
G.R. NO. 86163, APRIL 26, 1990
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:
ISSUE: WON ROBBERY IS CONSUMMATED?
WON VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE?

RULING: YES. ROBBERY SHALL BE DEEMED CONSUMMATED IF THE UNLAWFUL TAKING IS COMPLETE.
NO. THE SURRENDER OF THE ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING LIABILITY

38
LEONIDAS EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 157057 June 26, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS: On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo) and his cousin, Allan Perez (Allan), were walking to their
respective homes after spending time at the house of Crisaldo's father. Since the pavement going to Crisaldo's house
followed a narrow pathway along the local shrubs called banganga, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo
felt the piercing thrust of a bladed weapon on his back, which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround
and saw his attacker, petitioner, also known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit the
latter's left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry, he rushed to Crisaldo's side which caused petitioner to run away.
Allan then brought Crisaldo to his father's house where Crisaldo's wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was then
brought to the Peñaplata Hospital where he was given first aid and then transferred to the Davao Medical Center where
he stayed for three weeks to recuperate from his wounds.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
Petitioner's defense consisted mainly of denial. On July 5, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the petitioner.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA, which affirmed the decision in toto.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated murder.

HELD: No. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines whether a felony is
attempted or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the subjective phase in the commission of the offense.

In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is
mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries
on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used
in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim.

In the present case, the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt through the
unwavering testimony of Crisaldo on the manner of execution of the attack as well as the number of wounds he sustained.
Crisaldo was stabbed from behind by petitioner. When Crisaldo turned around, petitioner continued his assault, hitting
Crisaldo on the left arm as the latter tried to defend himself. The treacherous manner in which petitioner perpetrated the
crime is shown not only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim but also by the deliberate
manner in which the assault was perpetrated. Nonetheless, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution, because
Allan came to the aid of Crisaldo and petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not voluntarily desist from stabbing
Crisaldo, but he had to stop stabbing when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo and recognized petitioner. Thus, the subjective
phase of the crime had not been completed.

Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds sustained by Crisaldo. No
evidence in this case was introduced to prove that Crisaldo would have died from his wound without timely medical
attendance. It is well-settled that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused
and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.

39
 40
People vs. Ravelo
202 SRCA 655 (1991)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts:
Accused-appellants allegedly kidnapped by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano on May 21, 1984.
They then detained Reynaldo at the house of Pedro Ravelo, one of the accused. Accused-appellants
assaulted, attacked, and burned Reynaldo Gaurano and latter die as consequence thereof.

On May 22, 1984; the accused-appellants kidnapped by means of force Joey Lugatiman and was
brought to Ravelo's house where he was tortured. Lugatiman was able to escape.
Lugatiman reported what happened to him and to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC convicted
the accused-appellants of murder of Gaurano and frustrated murder of Lugatiman.

In this appeal, counsel contends that there can be no frustrated murder absent any proof of intent to
kill, which is an essential element of the offense of frustrated murder.

Issue:
Whether the statement by the accused stating that “Lugatiman” would be killed is sufficient proof of
intent to convict a person of frustrated murder.

Held:
No

Ratio:
In a crime of murder or an attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the
actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. A verbal expression is not sufficient to
show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a statement of the
aggressor, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow
while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself.

41

People vs Felipe Kalalo, et.al.

G.R. Nos. 39303-39305
March 17, 1934
DIAZ, J.

Facts:

On November 10, 1932, the appellants namely, Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo, and Gregorio Ramos, were
tried in the Batangas jointly with Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858, 6859
and 6860, the first two for murder, and the last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of the parties said three cases were
tried together and after the presentation of their respective evidence, the said court acquitted Alejandro Garcia, Fausta
Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, and sentenced the other appellants.

Issue:
W/O accused-appellants are liable of the crimes of murder and discharge of firearms?

Held:

The first case is, for the alleged murder of Marcelino Panaligan, to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the said deceased Marcelino
Panaligan in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.

The second case is, for the alleged murder of Arcadio Holgado, to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the aforesaid victim, the deceased
Arcadio Holgado, in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.

In the third case, that is, the court held that the crime committed was simply that of discharge of firearm, not frustrated
murder, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo was sentenced to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings. Felipe Kalalo and Juan Kalalo, as well as
their co-accused Fausta and Alipia Abrenica, Gregorio Ramos and Alejandro Garcia, were acquitted of the charges
therein.

In all other respects, the appealed sentences in the said three cases are hereby affirmed without prejudice to crediting the
appellants therein with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance
with article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. So ordered.

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POZAR VS CA
GR 62439, OCTOBER 23, 1984
GUERRERO, J.

FACTS:
ISSUES: WON PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF DIRECT BRIBERY

RULING: NO. THE COMPLAINANT DID NOT ACCEPT THE 1OO PESOS BILL. HENCE, THE CRIME IS ATTEMPTED CORRUPTION OF A
PUBLIC OFFICIAL

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EVANGELINE LADONGA VS PEOPLE
GR 141066, FEBRUARY 17, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS:

Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo
Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the
check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of
the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that
the account of the accused had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of Alfredo.

The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for
probation which was granted. On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is
not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

ISSUE:

a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by invoking art. 10 of RPC?

b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner as conspirator applying the suppletory character of the
RPC to special laws like BP 22 is applicable?

RULING:

A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special
laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws

B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision
in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the
recent case of Yu vs. People the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17
in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the present case,
the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not
by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P.
Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

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