People vs.

Onarosa (Reservation of Civil Liability when accused dies before conviction)

Facts/Issue/Held: Considering that accused-appellant Aurelio Onarosa died on January 26, 1984 and the findings of facts
and of accused-appellant's guilt by the defunct Court of First Instance of Samar were confirmed by this Court in its
Decision of February 29, 1984 [which could not produce any legal effect insofar as the accused-appellant's criminal
liability is concerned by virtue of his prior death], the Court nevertheless resolved to exercise jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability [People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120] since it has been duly established beyond reasonable
doubt that said accused-appellant "was the assailant and the one responsible for the death of Juan Balagasay" [Decision,
page 11], and the victim's heirs not having reserved the right to file a separate civil action, it would be a superfluity to
compel them, at this late stage, to still litigate or file another suit for indemnity for his death.
ACCORDINGLY, in the interest of justice and in fairness to the heirs of the deceased-victim, Juan Balagasay, the accused-
appellant's estate is hereby sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Juan Balagasay in the sum of P30,000.00.
People vs. Palmones (Admission of Dying Declaration in Evidence)
Facts: Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones were convicted with murder by the RTC of
Kidapawan, Cotabato accepting in evidence the alleged dying declaration of the victim as testified by his nephew. He
testified that upon seeing his uncle in the emergency room, the witness went near him and asked him what had
happened to him. His uncle answered that he had been waylaid. The witness then asked the victim who the
perpetrators were and the victim answered that it was Juany and Tony Palmones which were the nicknames of the
two accused-appellants. He claimed that while he was talking with his uncle, there were attendants, nurses, and other
bystanders whom he did not know present inside the emergency room. A few minutes after he talked with the victim, a
certain Dr. Aguayo arrived and examined the wounds of his uncle. About and hour later, he saw Police Inspector
Alexander Tagum arrive and he heard him ask his uncle who had shot him. The witness then heard his uncle positively
answer the policeman that his assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones.
On cross-examination, he testified that he was able to talk with his uncle for about one hour and that the most
important part of their conversation was the identification of his uncles assailants. He stated that it did not occur to his
mind to immediately report to the police what his uncle had told him as his mind was troubled at that time. It was only
after the burial of his uncle on April 28, 1997 that he told Insp. Tagum that it was Tony and Juany Palmores who had shot
his uncle.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration of the victim as an exception to the hearsay
rule
Held: No, From the records of the case, the conviction of the two accused-appellants was based largely on the alleged
dying declaration of the victim made to two witnesses of the prosecution and the apparent weakness of their defense of
alibi. As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay, and is inadmissible as evidence.[48] This is pursuant to Rule 130, section
30 of the Rules of Court which states:
Sec. 30. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules.
There are several exceptions however to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the first one of which is the
admissibility of dying declarations given under the circumstances specified in Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Sec. 31. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death,
may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death
As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are:
(a) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, murder or parricide win which the decedent was the
victim.

People vs. Lariosa (Dying Declaration)
Facts: Cristituto Lariosa alias Totot appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte
convicting him of the crime of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Lariosa shot the victim, Tivo, while the
latter was leaving the rice field. The wounded victim told Adaro (who run to him from the rice field) that he was shot by
Totot, and in addition, he said Bay, maybe I will be dying of these wounds. Adaro saw at once that Primitivo James
sustained wounds on his arms and on his abdomen. Immediately, Adaro helped Tivo go to the national road and they
met Eleno Solarte, the barrio captain of Sinaman, Dipolog City, Adaro and the barrio captain then loaded the victim on a
motorcab and brought him to the clinic of Dr. Ames. The victim also told Eleno Solarte that probably he would die of his
wounds, and that he was shot by Cristituto Lariosa. The police also arrived and took the ante-mortem statement of Tivo
pointing to Lariosa as the perpetrator.
Issue: WON the trial courts assessment of the evidence particularly the ante-mortem declaration of the deceased must
be given credence
Held: Yes, Equally strong evidence against the appellant, if not even stronger, is the ante-mortem declaration of the
deceased, in which he named appellant as his assailant, which is the document to which was reduced his statement first,
to Adaro, to whom he said with his wounds, he was going to die, next to Barangay Captain Solarte, then to Dr. Ames,
and finally, to the Deputy Chief of Police, as he progressively neared death, that appellant was the person who shot him.
Thus, even as mere res gestae, the declaration would be of similar probative value. Hence, it is evidently futile for
appellant to assail the dying declaration of the deceased with his assertion that it was motivated by the victims hatred
against him for having taken his daughter as a common-law wife and his desire to put an end to the disgraceful
relationship.
In the first place, the deceased was not shown to have done anything before the fatal shooting incident against
appellant indicative of the existence of the alleged motive against him by the deceased. That the relationship came into
being at all would rather show that the victims attitude towards said relationship was one of the passive indifference,
not of active disapproval or determined opposition that could nurse a motive as that appellant would attribute to the
deceased.
In the second place, having made the declaration at the point of death, the truth thereof can hardly be disputed with the
well-known verity that truth lies in the lips of a dying man. And even if a grudge dwelt in his heart against appellant,
forgiveness would instantly replace it to generate the sentiment and wish to speak nothing but the truth as one closes
his eyes in death.