6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.

Land Registration; Public Lands; Documentary Evidence; It is true that the notation by a
Land Titles; Land Registration; The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and
be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State.—The well-entrenched rule is that disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land’s classification.—We
all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the
The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December
application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
Same; Same; Public Land; The applicant for land registration must prove that the Respondent alleged that “the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary had approved the land metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that and classification of the land involved.” It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
through survey by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or public domain is not sufficient proof of the land’s classification. However, respondent should
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO).—It is not enough for the have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification.
PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan,
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of and the Geodetic Engineer’s certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in
the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal from the other certifications submitted by respondent.
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is Same; Ownership; The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. year.—The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax
Same; Documentary Evidence; The government officials who issued the certifications declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only
have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein.—Only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the
Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption
The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the Land Registration; Public Lands; Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the
issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private
alienable and disposable. corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.—The 1987
Documentary Evidence; Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides: Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court traced the law on disposition
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against
therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.—Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973
record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable domain.
and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Same; Same; The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked
Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. Section 23, Rule 132 of the on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive period.—What is determinative for the doctrine
Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the
are prima facieevidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30
latter. years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription
Same; The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.—The Court has also public domain. Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land
ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 (RA 9176) further amended the
constitute proof of the facts stated therein. Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent’s Public Land Act and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of
representative, identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31
certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot December 2020.
be given probative value. The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was Same; Same; In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right
incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications. Torres did not prepare higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right.—Under RA 9176, the
the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3,
verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12
alienable and disposable. hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an
individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since
respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 The Ruling of the Trial Court
hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private
corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of
right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 respondent.
hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of
case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years
respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997. or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. converted the land to private property.
The Solicitor General for petitioner. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
Roxas, Delos Reyes, Laurel and Rosario for private respondent. “WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court
CARPIO, J.: hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto.
The Case Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the
name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 21 August 2002 Decisionof the Court Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas,
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in totothe 16 December Makati City.
1999 Decisionof the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be
Registration Case No. T-635. issued.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred
The Antecedent Facts in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in
Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have
of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of been presented to corroborate Evangelista’s testimony.
564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11
November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20
September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794, and in the 18 October 1999 In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s
issue of People’s Journal Taliba, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Decision.
Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge of the possession and occupation
Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land. All of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because
adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelista’s failure to mention the
hearing. name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The
oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunato’s
represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelista’s statement that Fortunato took
an Order of General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner. over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy’s death. The Court of
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land
oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of
opposition. Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the succeeding additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the
hearings. In an Order dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General corroboration of the sole witness’ testimony.
Default. The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application for registration and that
witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondent’s Operations Manager and its respondent acquired the land from Porting.
authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision. Petitioner raises the
of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II following grounds in its Memorandum:
of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City. The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to
The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang applicant corporation despite the following:
Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an 1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an
Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio 2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land.
gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial The Issues
Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero The issues may be summarized as follows:
Dimayuga (Porting). On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent. 1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
 2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, 5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an public infrastructure projects.
owner since June 1945 or earlier; and Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Public Land Act. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
The Ruling of this Court approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
The petition has merit. registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
Respondent Failed to Prove established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by
presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before
failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain. the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly
presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable alienable and disposable.
rests with the applicant. Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Evidence as follows:
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, certified that “lot 10705, bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925.” The second entered therein.
certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a),
Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated “that the when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The
Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582.” CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues “Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents consisting of entries in public
certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.”
hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the
for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The certifications do not reflect “entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, public officer,” such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship
as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable captain in the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
and disposable. reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 certifications are not even records of public documents. The certifications are conclusions
to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications
FMS-DENR: cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan; The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits; Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
infrastructure projects; and therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers. the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR: facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan; facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers; The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits; witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein. Here, Torres, a private individual
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared and respondent’s representative, identified the certifications but the government officials who
areas for public infrastructure projects; and issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value. The contents of the certifications are hearsay the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of
because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the respondent’s acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his
certifications. Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS- knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where
DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area he obtained his information.
classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only
the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the
the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 Land Application by a Corporation
December 1985. Respondent alleged that “the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise
location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein and does not in any way certify
the nature and classification of the land involved.” It is true that the notation by a surveyor- Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the
geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain in this case.
land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land’s classification. However, respondent We agree with petitioner.
should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the “Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer’s certification were faithful reproductions of the classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
plan was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent. twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.”
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of
lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres conditions therefor.”
was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelista’s statement that the possession of The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court traced the
the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no
title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution
held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
alienable and disposable. Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino
We agree with petitioner. citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind
Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family of alienable land of the public domain. The Court explained in Chavez:
owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy’s land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that “The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
Evangelista’s knowledge of Kabesang Puroy’s possession of the land stemmed “not only from corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors.” The Court Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the
of Appeals observed: public domain only through lease.
“In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not [I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have
difficult to understand that people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire.
because of such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more
disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not
an event became of public knowledge to them.”33 more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.”
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the
that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would
between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista’s testimony is contrary to the factual finding inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would
of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation
succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonio’s children. Antonio was to the next.
not even mentioned in Evangelista’s testimony. In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain.
witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelista’s uncorroborated Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable
testimony insufficient to prove that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An
individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain. Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through
only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain but private property.”
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate
removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever- applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already
growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years
intent is to grant or sell alienable lands ofthe public domain only to individuals. This, it would had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on
seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.” to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of
In Director of Lands v. IAC, the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square from acquiring lands of the public domain.
meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the
issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land
proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private Act and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020.
not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already private land when Thus:
Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended
the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding to read as follows:
1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares. Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of
possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does
the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled: designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply
“Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not
public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this Chapter at any
express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) “x x x shall time prior to the period fixed by the President.
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x.” No proof being admissible to overcome a treated as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares,
at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only
and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in
but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the
required period of possession became complete. excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land
[A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in- registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land,
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law.
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
the time no prohibition against said corporation’s holding or owning private land. ” (Emphasis G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
supplied) Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the “land x x x registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme.” In this case, SO ORDERED.
respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-
in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the
land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable
and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had
already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open,
continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years
since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared:
“Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in
question had already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the