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    Explosion at Refinery

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    Anurag Ingle
    An explosion occurred at an ExxonMobil refinery in Torrance, California in 2015 during maintenance of a fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU). The explosion happened in an electrostatic precipitator when hydrocarbons were allowed to backflow during an attempt to isolate equipment for maintenance while the FCCU was idled. This incident was caused by weaknesses in the refinery's process safety management system, including a lack of defined safe operating limits for all modes of operation and reliance on safety devices that could not be verified. Lessons from this incident emphasize the importance of defining safe operating limits for all operating modes, robust management of change procedures, and considering non-routine operations in process hazard analyses.

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    Explosion at Refinery

    Uploaded by

    Anurag Ingle
    120 views1 page
    An explosion occurred at an ExxonMobil refinery in Torrance, California in 2015 during maintenance of a fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU). The explosion happened in an electrostatic precipitator when hydrocarbons were allowed to backflow during an attempt to isolate equipment for maintenance while the FCCU was idled. This incident was caused by weaknesses in the refinery's process safety management system, including a lack of defined safe operating limits for all modes of operation and reliance on safety devices that could not be verified. Lessons from this incident emphasize the importance of defining safe operating limits for all operating modes, robust management of change procedures, and considering non-routine operations in process hazard analyses.

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    An explosion occurred at an ExxonMobil refinery in Torrance, California in 2015 during maintenance of a fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU). The explosion happened in an electrostatic precipitator when hydrocarbons were allowed to backflow during an attempt to isolate equipment for maintenance while the FCCU was idled. This incident was caused by weaknesses in the refinery's process safety management system, including a lack of defined safe operating limits for all modes of operation and reliance on safety devices that could not be verified. Lessons from this incident emphasize the importance of defining safe operating limits for all operating modes, robust management of change procedures, and considering non-routine operations in process hazard analyses.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    120 views1 page

    Explosion at Refinery

    Uploaded by

    Anurag Ingle
    An explosion occurred at an ExxonMobil refinery in Torrance, California in 2015 during maintenance of a fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU). The explosion happened in an electrostatic precipitator when hydrocarbons were allowed to backflow during an attempt to isolate equipment for maintenance while the FCCU was idled. This incident was caused by weaknesses in the refinery's process safety management system, including a lack of defined safe operating limits for all modes of operation and reliance on safety devices that could not be verified. Lessons from this incident emphasize the importance of defining safe operating limits for all operating modes, robust management of change procedures, and considering non-routine operations in process hazard analyses.

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    News Letter _ Environment

    Explosion in FCCU_ ExxonMobil


    Refinery _Torrance, California_2015
    ExxonMobil Refinery FCCU Explosion: In 2015, Slide valve failure in FCCU led to incident.
    An explosion occurred in the Electrostatic Precipitator (ESP), a pollution control device in the FCC unit. Incident
    occurred when attempting to isolate equipment for maintenance while the unit was in an idled mode of operation;
    preparations for the maintenance activity led hydrocarbons to backflow through the process & ignite in the ESP.

    This incident occurred due to weaknesses in the refinery’s process safety management system. These weaknesses led
    to operation of the FCC unit without pre-established safe operating limits and criteria for unit shutdown, reliance on
    safeguards that could not be verified, the degradation of a safety-critical safeguard, and the re-use of a previous
    procedure deviation without a sufficient hazard analysis.

    Lessons for Learning:

     To identify & define safe operating limits for all modes of operation, operating parameters that only indirectly
    provide information on critical process parameters, can lead to the inability to identify an unsafe condition.
     When implementing a deviation from an existing procedure, it is critical that the company conduct a
    management of change to also verify and authorize the technical basis, the implementation time period, and
    identify any new or affected hazards and associated mitigation strategies. If the procedure deviation is saved
    for future use, before implementing the procedure the company should verify that the underlying conditions,
    activities & technical assumptions that were the basis for the initial authorization are in place & are still valid.
     It is essential to schedule and perform maintenance of safety-critical equipment so that the equipment is
    available to perform its safety-critical function.
     It is important to consider all modes of operation—including non-routine operations such as unit standby—
    when performing PHAs. Incident scenarios could be possible during non-routine modes of operation that may
    not have been considered when analyzing process hazards for normal, continuous operation.
     Companies should develop operating procedures for all modes of operation—including unit standby—that detail
    safe operating limits, consequences of deviating from those limits, and specified actions to implement in the
    event the process deviates outside of its safe operating limits.
     Robust management of change practices are needed when making changes to procedures. Similar to PHAs,
    conducting management of change as a multidisciplinary group—composed of individuals with different areas
    of expertise—can assist in identifying hazards introduced by the procedure change.
     Control valves typically should not be used as block valves because fluid flow through a partially open control
    valve can cause damage to the valve that can limit its ability to fully seal.
     Uncombusted hydrocarbons that are not accompanied by carbon monoxide have the potential to reach FCC
    unit electrostatic precipitators (ESPs). Refining companies should evaluate their FCC units to determine
    whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent an ESP hydrocarbon explosion.

     Full report Incident : http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/ExxonMobil_Report_FOR_PUBLIC_RELEASE.pdf


     This is only for internal circulation of HPCL & for awareness purpose only.
     Please share with all employees at your location & display on Notice Boards . Corporate HSE, ENLE - 28/2017-18/PSRAO

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