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Model code of safe practice
Part 19
Fire precautions at petroleum refineries

and bulk storage installations
3rd edition

EI MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE PART 19:

FIRE PRECAUTIONS AT PETROLEUM REFINERIES
AND BULK STORAGE INSTALLATIONS
3RD EDITION
NOVEMBER 2012
Published by
ENERGY INSTITUTE, LONDON
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EI MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE PART 19: FIRE PRECAUTIONS AT PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND BULK STORAGE INSTALLATIONS
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword...................................................................................................................................... 8
Key technical changes............................................................................................................... 10
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................... 12
Key principles............................................................................................................................. 13
Overview.................................................................................................................................... 14
1Introduction..................................................................................................................... 16
1.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 16
1.2 Scope ................................................................................................................. 16
1.3 Application............................................................................................................... 16
1.4 Risk-based fire and explosion hazard management (FEHM)....................................... 17
1.5 Legislative trends in FEHM assessment and provision of fire risk reduction measures. 18
1.6 International application........................................................................................... 19
1.7 Risk drivers............................................................................................................... 20
1.7.1 Legislation................................................................................................. 20
1.7.2 Life safety................................................................................................. 20
1.7.3 Environmental impacts.............................................................................. 20
1.7.4 Asset loss.................................................................................................. 22
1.7.5 Business interruption................................................................................. 22
1.7.6 Reputation................................................................................................ 22
1.7.7 Insurance.................................................................................................. 22
2Hazards............................................................................................................................. 23
2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 23
2.2 Fire-related properties of petroleum and its products................................................ 23
2.3 Combustion of petroleum and its products............................................................... 24
2.3.1 General..................................................................................................... 24
2.3.2 Fires.......................................................................................................... 25
2.3.3 Explosions/boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion................................ 25
2.4 Smoke and gases from fire....................................................................................... 27
2.4.1 General..................................................................................................... 27
2.5 Fire and explosion scenarios...................................................................................... 27
2.5.1 General..................................................................................................... 27
2.5.2 Scenarios.................................................................................................. 27
2.5.3 Unignited product releases........................................................................ 29
2.5.4 Pool fires................................................................................................... 29
2.5.5 Atmospheric storage tank fires.................................................................. 30
2.5.6 Jet fires..................................................................................................... 32
2.5.7 Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions................................................ 32
2.5.8 Vapour cloud explosions............................................................................ 32
2.5.9 Flash fires.................................................................................................. 34
2.6 Consequences.......................................................................................................... 34
2.6.1 General..................................................................................................... 34
3
2.6.2 Thermal flux - consequence assessment.................................................... 34

2.6.3 Overpressures................................................................................. ...........35
2.6.4 Flammable/toxic vapour clouds.................................................................. 36
2.6.5 Blast effects/missiles.................................................................................. 37
2.7 Fire and explosion modelling.................................................................................... 37
2.7.1 General..................................................................................................... 37
2.7.2 Types of model.......................................................................................... 38
3FEHM process................................................................................................................... 40
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 40
3.2 Fire scenario analysis................................................................................................. 40
3.2.1 Identification of major fire scenarios, hazards and hazard characteristics.... 41
3.2.2 Typical scenarios for various installations/areas........................................... 42
3.2.3 Design/credible scenario selection.............................................................. 45
3.2.4 Fire and explosion modelling..................................................................... 48
3.3 Risk reduction options.............................................................................................. 48
3.4 FEHM policy............................................................................................................. 51
3.5 Implementation........................................................................................................ 52
3.5.1 Practices and procedures........................................................................... 52
3.5.2 Fire systems integrity assurance................................................................. 52
3.5.3 Inspection and testing of fire systems........................................................ 52
3.5.4 Fire response pre-planning........................................................................ 53
3.5.5 Competency development........................................................................ 53
3.5.6 Monitoring................................................................................................ 53
4Fire prevention................................................................................................................ 54
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 54
4.2 Control of flammable substances.............................................................................. 54
4.2.1 General principles..................................................................................... 54
4.2.2 Liquid releases........................................................................................... 55
4.2.3 Flammable atmospheres............................................................................ 55
4.2.4 Isolation/depressurisation.......................................................................... 56
4.2.5 Flammable gas/vapour dispersion.............................................................. 56
4.3 Atmospheric monitoring........................................................................................... 56
4.4 Control of sources of ignition................................................................................... 57
4.4.1 General..................................................................................................... 57
4.4.2 Static electricity......................................................................................... 58
4.4.3 Lightning.................................................................................................. 59
4.5 Permit-to-work systems............................................................................................ 59
4.6 Maintenance practices.............................................................................................. 60
4.6.1 General..................................................................................................... 60
4.6.2 Hot work.................................................................................................. 61
4.6.3 Electrical equipment used for maintenance............................................... 61
4.6.4 Hand tools................................................................................................ 61
4.6.5 Chemical cleaning..................................................................................... 62
4.6.6 High pressure water.................................................................................. 62
4.7 Housekeeping.......................................................................................................... 62
4.8 Installation layout..................................................................................................... 63
4.8.1 General..................................................................................................... 63
4.8.2 Boundaries................................................................................................ 64
4.8.3 Storage tank layout/secondary containment.............................................. 64
4.8.4 Process plant layout.................................................................................. 66
4
4.8.5 Fire-fighting access.................................................................................... 66

4.8.6 Drainage systems and tertiary containment............................................... 67
4.8.7 Fire protection and other safety critical equipment.................................... 69
4.8.8 Pipework/flanges....................................................................................... 69
4.9 Buildings fire precautions.......................................................................................... 69
5Fire, liquid and flammable gas detection...................................................................... 71

5.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 71
5.2 Principles of fire and flammable gas detection - Options, applications and design .
issues....................................................................................................................... 71
5.2.1 Flammable gas detection........................................................................... 71
5.2.2 Toxic gas detection.................................................................................... 76
5.2.3 Liquid leak detection................................................................................. 76
5.2.4 Fire detection............................................................................................ 77
5.2.5 General design guidance........................................................................... 84
5.3 Control system executive actions.............................................................................. 84
5.4 Fire/Gas alarm and warning systems......................................................................... 85
6Fire protection................................................................................................................. 86
6.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 86
6.1.1 Passive and active fire protection............................................................... 86
6.2 Passive fire protection - Options, applications and design issues................................ 87
6.2.1 General..................................................................................................... 87
6.2.2 Applications and design issues.................................................................. 88
6.2.3 Maintenance of PFP.................................................................................. 89
6.3 Active fire protection................................................................................................ 90
6.3.1 General..................................................................................................... 90
6.4 Extinguishing media................................................................................................. 90
6.4.1 General..................................................................................................... 90
6.4.2 Water........................................................................................................ 90
6.4.3 Foam........................................................................................................ 91
6.4.4 Dry powder (dry chemical)......................................................................... 98
6.4.5 Gaseous agents......................................................................................... 99
6.5 Fixed system - options, applications and design issues............................................. 101
6.5.1 General................................................................................................... 101
6.5.2 Fire water systems................................................................................... 101
6.5.3 Water spray systems................................................................................ 102
6.5.4 Fixed monitors........................................................................................ 103
6.5.5 Sprinkler systems..................................................................................... 103
6.5.6 Water mist systems................................................................................. 103
6.5.7 Foam systems.......................................................................................... 104
6.5.8 Dry powder (dry chemical) systems.......................................................... 112
6.5.9 Gaseous systems..................................................................................... 112
7Response strategies and options................................................................................. 115

7.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 115
7.2 Incident response strategies.................................................................................... 115
7.2.1 Unignited gas release.............................................................................. 115
7.2.2 Flammable liquid pool fire....................................................................... 118
7.2.3 Gas/liquid release, flash fire and jet fire................................................... 120
7.2.4 Unconfined/semi-confined vapour cloud explosions................................. 121
7.2.5 Fireball/boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion................................... 122
5
7.2.6 Controlled burn (CB)............................................................................... 122

7.3 Occupational fire brigades...................................................................................... 123
7.3.1 Overview................................................................................................. 123
7.3.2 Options for installation fire response....................................................... 123
7.4 Organisation of occupational fire brigades.............................................................. 128
7.5 Competency standards for installation emergency responders (ERs)........................ 128
7.6 Fire response equipment......................................................................................... 128
7.6.1 Fire-fighting equipment........................................................................... 128
7.6.2 Emergency responder (ER) personal protective equipment....................... 133
7.6.3 Inspection and maintenance.................................................................... 135
7.6.4 Critical equipment and resources, vulnerability and siting........................ 135
8Maintaining FEHM policy.............................................................................................. 137

8.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 137
8.2 Organisation of emergency procedures................................................................... 137
8.3 Incident pre-planning............................................................................................. 137
8.4 Recognition of hazards........................................................................................... 138
8.5 Control of incidents................................................................................................ 138
8.6 Training of personnel.............................................................................................. 139
8.7 Pre-fire plans.......................................................................................................... 140
8.8 Scenario-specific emergency response plans (ERPs)................................................. 141
8.9 Maintaining incident response................................................................................ 142
8.9.1 Training and emergency response plans (ERPs)......................................... 142
8.9.2 Dynamic risk assessment......................................................................... 143
8.9.3 Fire systems integrity assurance............................................................... 143
Annexes:
Annex A Relevant UK and European legislation............................................................ 145
A.1 Nature of legislation............................................................................... 145
A.2 Seveso II Directive and COMAH Regulations........................................... 145
A.3 Complementary regulations................................................................... 147
A.4 Licensing and enforcement.................................................................... 151
Annex B Fire-related hazards of petroleum and its products....................................... 152

B.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 152
B.2 Boiling points (or ranges), flash points and ignition temperatures of ...
petroleum and its products..................................................................... 152
B.3 IP classification of petroleum and its products......................................... 153
B.4 Flammable limits of petroleum and its products...................................... 154
B.5 Typical substances with potential to form a large vapour cloud in event of ...
an atmospheric storage tank overfill....................................................... 154
Annex C Typical installations/areas - Fire and explosion hazard management .

(detection and protection)................................................................................ 156
C.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 156
C.2 Storage tanks......................................................................................... 156
C.3 Process areas.......................................................................................... 159
C.4 LPG storage installations........................................................................ 160
C.5 LNG installations.................................................................................... 160
C.6 Marine facilities...................................................................................... 161
C.7 Buildings................................................................................................ 162
6
C.8 Road tanker loading racks/gantries......................................................... 165

C.9 Rail tanker loading racks/gantries........................................................... 165
Annex D Typical application rates................................................................................... 166

D.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 166
D.2 Cooling using water............................................................................... 166
D.3 Control of burning using water.............................................................. 167
D.4 Extinguishment using water................................................................... 168
D.5 Storage tanks......................................................................................... 168
D.6 Water supply.......................................................................................... 171
D.7 Foam application rates........................................................................... 171
D.8 Pool fire foam application...................................................................... 172
D.9 Tank fire foam application...................................................................... 173
D.10 Gaseous systems.................................................................................... 177
D.11 Incident experience................................................................................ 178
Annex E Emergency response team competence.......................................................... 182

E.1 Introduction............................................................................................ 182
E.2 Example ER competency mapping profile................................................ 186
Annex F Classification of fires......................................................................................... 195

F.1 Introduction............................................................................................ 195
F.2 Class A – Fires involving solid materials.................................................... 195
F.3 Class B – Fires involving liquids or liquefiable solids.................................. 195
F.4 Class C – Fires involving gases................................................................. 195
F.5 Class D – Fires involving metals................................................................ 195
F.6 Class E – Fires involving electrical equipment........................................... 196
F.7 Class F – Fires involving cooking oils........................................................ 196
F.8 Other classification schemes.................................................................... 196
Annex G Example installation-specific emergency response plan (ERP)...................... 197

G.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 197
G.2 Explanatory notes to text aspect of installation-specific ERP.................... 197
G.3 Effects maps.......................................................................................... 201
G.4 Radiant heat examples........................................................................... 201
Annex H Glossaries of terms and abbreviations............................................................ 202

H.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 202
H.2 Terms..................................................................................................... 202
H.3 Abbreviations......................................................................................... 214
Annex I References, Bibliography and further information......................................... 217

I.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 217
I.2 Key publishers of FEHM publications...................................................... 217
I.3 Codes of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.......... 218
I.4 Industry organisations............................................................................ 231
I.5 Other safety organisations..................................................................... 234
I.6 Standards and approvals organisations.................................................. 235
7
FOREWORD
EI Fire precautions at petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations (EI 19) provides
guidance on selecting, implementing and monitoring the continuing performance of
installation-specific justified risk reduction measures – from prevention through detection,
protection systems to mitigation measures – to reduce the risk from design event fires at
installations that process and store crude oil, petroleum, intermediates and refined products.
In line with recent legislation in the UK, Europe and elsewhere in the world,
EI 19 does not set out prescriptive practices for adoption. Instead, it provides good practice
guidance on options that may be appropriate to implement in order to satisfy pertinent
risk drivers such as legislation, safety, environmental protection, asset protection, reputation
and business continuity. The publication is based upon a framework of risk-based fire and
explosion hazard management (FEHM) to achieve this, although it recognises that other
approaches can be used. NB: Although the term ‘explosion’ is used within this definition it
should also be realised that not every substance or hazardous circumstance will give rise to
potential explosion conditions or create an explosion but for the purposes of this publication
the term will be used throughout for consistency.
The guidance in this publication should assist process safety engineers, safety
advisors, designers, emergency planners or others with responsibility for fire and explosion
hazard management to meet the pertinent requirements of the European Seveso II Directive,
whether installations are classified lower or upper tier.
This publication is based primarily on the UK and European legislative framework,
publications and good practice. However, its guidance is internationally applicable provided it
is read, interpreted and applied in conjunction with relevant national and local requirements.
It can be used as a basis for establishing a consistent fire and explosion hazard management
policy for companies with multi-installation operations within a country or across several
countries.
The third edition of EI 19 was commissioned by the Energy Institute’s Process Safety
Committee, contracted to Resource Protection International and directed by a Steering
Group. It supersedes the second edition, published in 2007. Whilst amendments have been
made throughout, major changes have been made to:
−− Define key principles.

−− Enhance guidance on consideration of environmental impacts of fire-fighting and the
need for environmental risk assessment; in particular, containment system capacity
and firewater management.
−− Provide guidance on fire response for ethanol and related polar substance handling/
storage; in particular, pertinent foam types.
−− Enhance guidance on fire and explosion scenarios, consequences and modelling.
−− Provide guidance on control measures for vent fires.
−− Include guidance on potential scenarios, the role of congestion, incident consequences
and examples of substances with a propensity to form large flammable vapour clouds.
−− Clarify basis for determining whether scenarios are credible by referencing their
likelihood to risk tolerability criteria.
−− Enhance guidance on storage tank layout, secondary and tertiary containment
systems requirements.
−− Enhance guidance on detection systems.
−− Define need for a policy on passive fire protection (PFP).
−− Provide guidance on PFP maintenance.
−− Update guidance on halon substitute gaseous extinguishing media.
8
−− Provide guidance on fire water systems.

−− Enhance guidance on foam systems for storage tanks.
−− Enhance guidance on option of controlled burn (CB).
−− Provide guidance on rapid intervention vehicles (RIVs) and mobile incident response
units (MIRUs), and typical fire equipment on board.
−− Provide guidance on vulnerability and siting of critical equipment and resources.
−− Enhance guidance on control of incidents by defining command structure.
−− Enhance guidance on scenario-specific ERPs.
−− Enhance guidance on dynamic risk assessment (DRA).
−− Enhance guidance on typical FEHM (detection and protection) measures at various
other installation areas.
−− Provide guidance on typical FEHM (detection and protection) measures for road and
rail tanker loading racks/gantries.
−− Enhance guidance on water supply requirements.
−− Revise minimum foam solution application rates and consider foam application to
prevent boilover.
−− Define requirements for emergency responder (ER) competence.
The 2nd edition of this publication was being finalised at the time of the Buncefield bulk storage
installation major accident in December 2005 and since then there have been changes in the
regulatory approach to fire precautions at such installations, encompassing fire prevention
measures, incident detection techniques, fire protection, fire-fighting and response and
emergency planning requirements. Some of these relate to process considerations, which
are not specifically covered in detail in this 3rd edition of this publication but may be relevant
for overall FEHM – wherever possible these are addressed. In addition to changes in the
regulatory approach there have been new developments in hardware, understanding of
potential to cause vapour cloud explosions (VCEs), changes in thinking in issues such as
human and organisational factors, and new approaches to fire response. It is not within
the scope of this publication to describe all of these and as such, users may wish to consult
the relevant Buncefield investigation reports for more detail. However, where appropriate,
and where they enhance the overall guidance in this publication, such measures are given
credit. It should also be noted that whilst a great deal of focus has been placed on this
particular incident in recent years, the circumstances that led up to it, and the recommended
prevention and mitigation measures, this publication is also relevant to other types of fire
incident types and scenarios. Consequently, some of the guidance contained herein may not
always be relevant to the particular type of incident mentioned.
The information contained in this publication is provided for general information
purposes only. Whilst the Energy Institute and the contributors have applied reasonable care
in developing this publication, no representations or warranties, express or implied, are made
by the Energy Institute or any of the contributors concerning the applicability, suitability,
accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein and the Energy Institute and
the contributors accept no responsibility whatsoever for the use of this information. Neither
the Energy Institute nor any of the contributors shall be liable in any way for any liability, loss,
cost or damage incurred as a result of the receipt or use of the information contained herein.
This publication may be further reviewed from time to time. It would be of considerable
assistance in any future revision if users would send comments or suggestions for improvement
to:
The Technical Department, Energy Institute
61 New Cavendish Street
LONDON, W1G 7AR
9
KEY TECHNICAL CHANGES
This section sets out in a generalised form, the key technical changes between the 2nd and
3rd editions of EI 19 (EI Fire precautions at petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations).
The key technical changes are to:
−− Define key principles.

−− Enhance guidance on consideration of environmental impacts of fire-fighting and
the need for environmental risk assessment. Section 1.7.3.
−− Provide guidance on the required capacity (e.g. via secondary and tertiary containment)
to hold safely the anticipated or foreseeable volume of hazardous liquids, including
firewater. Section 1.7.3.
−− Enhance guidance on firewater management, including the option of recirculation.
Sections 1.7.3, 2.5.5, 4.8.3, 4.8.6, 6.5.2, 7.2.6, 8.7, and Annexes D.6 and D.11.
−− Provide guidance on fire response for ethanol and related polar substance handling/
storage; in particular, pertinent foam types. Sections 2.2 and 6.4.3.
−− Refer to special hazards in storage and handling of petroleum additives, such as
diesel cetane improvers. Section 2.2.
−− Enhance guidance on fire and explosion scenarios, consequences and modelling
with reference to incident experience (e.g. from large atmospheric storage tank fires
(LASTFIRE) project); e.g. VCEs, bund fires, boilover. Sections 2.5.4, 2.5.5 and 2.5.8.
−− Provide guidance on control measures for vent fires. Section 2.5.5.1.
−− Include guidance on potential scenarios, their likelihood in areas with a lack of
congestion, incident consequences and examples of substances with a propensity to
form large flammable vapour clouds. Section 2.5.8 and annex B.5.
−− Clarify conditions under which flash fires might occur. Section 2.5.9.
−− Revise guidance on overpressure consequences. Section 2.6.3.
−− Enhance guidance on fire and explosion modelling. Section 2.7.1.
−− Clarify basis for determining whether scenarios are credible by referencing their
likelihood to risk tolerability criteria. Section 3.2.3.
−− Consider merits of using cost benefit analysis (CBA) in design/credible scenario
selection. Section 3.2.3.
−− Clarify general principles in controlling flammable substances. Section 4.2.1.
−− Provide guidance on isolation of sources of ignition. Section 4.4.1.
−− Clarify circumstances when it might be appropriate to use a smaller than usual
separation distance between tanks and other items of plant when designing a facility.
Section 4.8.1.
−− Enhance guidance on storage tank layout/secondary containment. Section 4.8.3.
−− Clarify intent of bund volume compared to storage tank operating capacity.
Section 4.8.3.
−− Provide guidance on benefits/disbenefits of using double or full containment-type
tanks in reducing the consequences of a loss of containment. Section 4.8.3.
−− Provide guidance on tertiary containment systems, and their capacity rating.
Section 4.8.6.
−− Refer to need to consider facility topography and the potential path of vapour and
liquid releases when locating fire protection and other safety critical equipment.
Section 4.8.7.
−− Provide guidance on location of flanges/pipework, and the vulnerability of long bolt
flanges. Section 4.8.8.
10
−− Enhance guidance on detection systems (e.g. flammable gas, toxic gas, liquid and fire
detection, gas imaging and their application) to assist implementation by capturing
the experience gained and equipment developments. Section 5.
−− Refer to safety integrity of detection control systems. Section 5.3.
−− Define need for a policy on PFP. Section 6.2.2.
−− Provide guidance on maintenance of PFP. Section 6.2.3.
−− Provide guidance on water quality and type for use as firewater. Section 6.4.2.
−− Update guidance on gaseous extinguishing media that have reduced impacts to air
compared to halons. Section 6.4.5.
−− Provide guidance on fire water systems and winterisation. Section 6.5.2.
−− Enhance guidance on foam systems for storage tanks. Section 6.5.7.
−− Provide guidance on the need for assurance of ongoing integrity of enclosures where
gaseous extinguishing systems are used. Section 6.5.9.
−− Provide guidance on the appropriateness of using foam to blanket vapours from LNG
etc. Section 7.2.1.4.
−− Clarify guidance on when to evacuate areas during emergency response to potential
BLEVE situations. Section 7.2.5.
−− Provide guidance on availability of operations/maintenance personnel to serve as
auxiliary ERs when installation-wide events occur. Section 7.3.3.2.
−− Enhance guidance on option of CB, including its development as a design philosophy
and operational strategy. Section 7.2.6.
−− Provide guidance on RIVs and MIRUs, and typical fire equipment on board.
Section 7.6.1.
−− Provide guidance on vulnerability and siting of critical equipment and resources.
Section 7.6.4.
−− Enhance guidance on control of incidents by defining command structure.
Section 8.5.
−− Enhance guidance on scenario-specific ERPs. Section 8.7.
−− Enhance guidance on DRA. Section 8.9.2.
−− Provide listing of environmental protection regulations. Annex A.3 (viii).
−− Enhance guidance on typical FEHM (detection and protection) measures for storage
tanks, process areas, LNG installations, marine beths and jetties, etc. Annex C.
−− Provide guidance on typical FEHM (detection and protection) measures for road and
rail tanker loading racks/gantries. Annex C.8 and annex C.9.
−− Clarify applicability of insulation in providing fire protection. Annex D.2(ii).
−− Provide guidance on cooling atmospheric tanks impinged by flame. Annex D.5(iii).
−− Enhance guidance on water supply requirements. Annex D.6.
−− Clarify context of scenario for foam/cooling water example. Annex D.6, Box D.1
−− Revise minimum foam solution application rates and consider foam application to
prevent boilover. Annexes D.8 and D.9.
−− Define requirements for ER competence. Annex E.1.
−− Update listing of references and bibliography (e.g. codes of practice, design standards,
specifications, guidance, etc.). Annex I.
11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The 3rd edition of EI Fire precautions at petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations
(EI 19) was commissioned by the Energy Institute’s Process Safety Committee. The project
was contracted to Resource Protection International, whose contributors were Paul Watkins,
Dr Niall Ramsden and Mark Plastow. The project was directed by a Steering Group that
comprised:
David Athersmith Consultant (member, Distribution and Marketing Safety Committee)

James Coull Total UK Limited (member, Process Safety Committee)
Ian Herbert ABB Global Consultancy
Gerry Johnson Fulcrum Consultants (member, Joint Oil and Industry Fire Forum)
Evert Jonker Shell Global Solutions International Downstream
Marc McBride (Chairperson) Centrica (Chair, Process Safety Committee)
Dr Mike Nicholas Environment Agency
Ken Palmer Consultant (member, Distribution and Marketing Safety Committee)
Mark Samuels Essex Fire & Rescue (pp Chief Fire Officers Association)
Dr Mark Scanlon (Secretary) Energy Institute (Secretary, Process Safety Committee)
Stuart Warburton Essar Oil UK Ltd. Stanlow Refinery
Kevin Westwood BP (Secretary, Joint Oil and Industry Fire Forum)
The Institute wishes to record its appreciation of the work carried out by them in providing
technical direction to the project.
Significant comments on the draft of this publication were received during its technical
reviews from:
David Athersmith Consultant

James Coull Total UK Limited
Martin Hassett WorleyParsons
John Henderson and others British Chemical Engineering Contractors Association (BCECA)
Ian Herbert ABB Global Consultancy
David Hughes Valero
Gerry Johnson Fulcrum Consultants
Evert Jonker Shell Global Solutions International Downstream
Marc McBride Centrica
Bruce McGlashan Environment Agency
Dr Mike Nicholas Environment Agency
Ken Palmer Consultant
Roger Roue The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)
Stuart Warburton Essar Oil UK Ltd. Stanlow Refinery
Kevin Westwood BP
Such comments have been considered and, where appropriate, incorporated. The Institute
wishes to record its appreciation of the work carried out by them and others who participated
during the technical review.
Project co-ordination and technical editing was carried out by Dr Mark Scanlon (Energy
Institute).
12
KEY PRINCIPLES
The 3rd edition of EI 19 outlines some key principles, which, historically, have been addressed
but by virtue of increased knowledge, incident experience and technological developments,
they are considered paramount to ensure that appropriate, justified and relevant fire
precautions and other aspects of fire hazard and explosion management (FEHM) are
promoted. They should be considered as guiding principles that should form part of an
installation’s FEHM policy.
1. FEHM – EI 19 sets out a methodology by which installation operators can assess

fire and explosion scenarios, compare various risk reduction measures, and define
an installation-specific FEHM policy, and offers guidance on implementation.
2. Fire prevention – Emphasis is placed on prevention of fires in the first instance,

as well as the circumstances in which events can lead to fires or explosions, such
as prevention of loss of containment and sources of ignition.
3. Incident detection – Ensuring that if a loss of containment or fire event occurs,

that they are rapidly detected to enable effective incident response (including
process measures such as isolation) to occur.
4 Fire protection – Guidance is given on PFP and active fire protection (AFP)
measures that may be implemented as mitigation measures in the event of a fire
event. Emphasis is placed on ensuring that relevant and effective fire protection
is selected and that a system of fire systems integrity assurance (FSIA) is adopted.
5 Maintaining FEHM policy – EI 19 covers many aspects of incident response,

recognising at all times that the focus should be on incident prevention. However,
where response measures need to be addressed, guidance is given on options,
strategies and preplanning measures with particular emphasis on:
— emergency response planning;
— training and competencies;
— life safety and environmental protection;
— management of fire-water runoff, and
— FSIA.
13
OVERVIEW
Section 1 clarifies the scope and exclusions, and describes how the publication should be
applied internationally. It introduces the concept of risk-based FEHM, which is the framework
upon which the publication is based. It also notes the legislative trend towards a risk-based
approach and sets out a portfolio of other risk drivers.
Section 2 outlines the fire-related hazards of petroleum and its products (including
their IP classification) and common fire and explosion scenarios that should be considered as
part of a risk-based FEHM approach. It addresses such scenarios as pool fires, jet fires, boiling
liquid expanding vapour explosions (BLEVEs), and VCEs.
Section 3 expands on the key steps in the FEHM process: fire scenario analysis –
typical scenarios are outlined for various facilities/areas; review risk reduction options – a
listing of options is provided; define FEHM policy between the limiting cases of burndown
and total protection; and implement FEHM policy, by referring to a range of measures from
FSIA through to staff personnel competency development and emergency response planning.
Section 4 describes several means of hazard avoidance that aim to prevent unplanned
releases and avoid their ignition. Fire prevention measures described include: control of
flammable substances; control of sources of ignition; maintenance; installation layout; and
operations.
Section 5 describes the use of fire and flammable gas detection to give early warning
of a fire event in critical installations or where there is a high emphasis on life safety. Their use
should enable immediate investigation and/or fire response. The section describes the various
types, their application to various installations/areas and design issues.
Section 6 describes PFP and AFP measures, which are intended to reduce the
consequences of fire. Options, applications and design issues are reviewed for PFP materials
in limiting temperature rise and preventing excessive heat absorption. The capabilities of AFP
media are reviewed for controlling a fire, extinguishing a fire, or preventing ignition during an
emergency in typical installations/areas. In addition, media application is reviewed, whether
using fixed or semi-fixed systems and portable/mobile fire response equipment.
Section 7 provides incident response strategies for various fire and explosion scenarios
to maintain FEHM policy; it includes options for mobile and portable fire response, including
the specification, use and maintenance of fire-fighting equipment ranging from fire monitors
to ER personal protective equipment (PPE). The guidance on incident response strategies
reflects experience and good practice in fire response; it can be used as a basis for developing
installation-specific fire response strategies accompanied by ERPs.
Section 8 sets out the requirements for maintaining an effective FEHM policy, in
particular through emergency planning from high-level incident preplans through to scenario-
specific ERPs. In addition, it covers personnel competency development, emergency response
plan testing and FSIA for fire and flammable gas detection and fire protection systems.
Annex A reviews the requirements of pertinent UK and European legislation, such
as the UK Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations and Seveso II Directive,
respectively.
Annex B provides the IP classification and physical properties of petroleum and its
products, which should be used when assessing their fire-related hazards.
Annex C provides typical applications of the most common fire and flammable gas
detection and fire protection risk reduction measures for various installations/areas.
Annex D provides guidance on typical fire-fighting media application rates for various
equipment types and fire scenarios, focusing mainly on applying water and foam to large
petroleum fires for extinguishment and/or cooling. In addition, some guidance is provided on
incident experience and recent good practice.
14
Annex E provides an example ER competency profile based on four units: operations;

maintenance; procedures; and skills.
Annex F details the European basis of classifying fires and reviews other classification
systems.
Annex G provides an example installation-specific ERP and an example scenario
worksheet. In addition, some benchmark radiant heat levels and their effects are provided.
Annex H provides a glossary of terms and abbreviations.
Annex I provides details of publications referenced and a bibliography of additional
ones (e.g. codes of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.). It also provides
a listing of contact details for pertinent organisations.
15
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This section clarifies the scope and exclusions, and describes how the publication should
be applied internationally. It introduces the concept of risk-based fire and explosion hazard
management (FEHM), which is the framework upon which the publication is based. It also
notes the legislative trend towards a risk-based approach and sets out a portfolio of other
risk drivers.
Generally, the petroleum industry is successful in minimising fire incidents and
containing their effects. This should not lead to complacency, however, and this publication
aims to help maintain and, indeed, improve FEHM.
1.2 SCOPE
EI 19 provides guidance on selecting, implementing and monitoring the continuing

performance of installation-specific justified risk reduction measures – from prevention
through detection, protection systems to mitigation measures – to reduce the risk from design
event fires at installations that process and store petroleum (e.g. crude oil), intermediates
(e.g. naphtha) and its products (e.g. gas oil). The publication provides a framework of good
practice which should assist attainment of legal compliance, in particular with the pertinent
requirements of European Seveso II Directive, and satisfying other risk drivers.
Its scope includes petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations (e.g. terminals,
depots and larger customer storage installations). In addition, it can be applied to bitumen
refineries and bulk storage installations, blending and storage at lubricants installations, and
similar petroleum industry installations. Installations excluded from scope are:
−− filling stations;
−− smaller customer storage installations;
−− natural gas storage installations (at ambient conditions), and
−− processing and storage on offshore installations.
Whilst the publication is built upon the principles of FEHM, the focus is on fire aspects,
whereas, explosion hazards, prevention and protection are specialised topics and are outwith
the scope.
1.3 APPLICATION
In line with recent legislation in the UK, Europe and internationally, this publication does
not set out prescriptive practices for adoption. Instead, it provides good practice guidance
on options that may be appropriate for users to implement in order to satisfy pertinent
risk drivers; in particular, legislation, safety (e.g. to personnel and society), environmental
protection, asset protection, reputation and business interruption.
Reducing the likelihood or consequences of fires may assist in risk reduction for any
risk driver; yet, when a measure is considered for risk reduction, it should be justified using
cost benefit analysis (CBA) and for safety and environmental risk drivers in the UK using as
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) principles. The reasons why any particular fire risk
reduction measure is provided should therefore be understood, appropriate performance
16
criteria for it should be developed, and it should be ensured that it meets those criteria on a
continuing basis. Thus, installation-specific risk reduction strategies should be adopted and
this publication provides guidance on their selection, implementation and monitoring.
This publication is based on a framework of risk-based FEHM; as its guidance is
therefore provided in support of that approach; however, the publication can also be used
independently by applying guidance of relevant sections, as summarised in Table 3.1.
EI 19 is based primarily on the UK and European legislative framework, publications
(codes of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) and good practice.
However, its guidance is universally applicable provided it is read, interpreted and applied in
conjunction with relevant national and local statutory legislation and publications. Where the
requirements differ, the more stringent should be adopted.
This publication can be used as a basis for establishing a consistent FEHM policy for
companies with multi-installation operations within a country or across several countries. The
FEHM approach can accommodate variations in risk drivers in determining the levels of risk
reduction measures; for example, in justifying higher levels of risk reduction measures where
an installation is critical to a country’s economy or of major strategic importance.
This publication is based on the premise that the general design and construction
of petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations are in accordance with all relevant
legislation and publications (codes of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance,
etc.).
The guidance in this publication should assist process safety engineers, safety advisors,
designers, emergency planners or others with responsibility for FEHM to meet the pertinent
requirements of the European Seveso II Directive, whether installations are classified lower
or upper tier.
Whilst the publication provides guidance relating to fire prevention and protection
measures to assist implementation, where appropriate, users should consult relevant
publications (codes of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) for
further information. The legislation, publications, etc. referenced are correct at the time of
writing; however, users should keep abreast of developments by contacting the pertinent
organisations.
1.4 RISK-BASED FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD MANAGEMENT (FEHM)
For the purposes of this publication risk is defined as the product of incident likelihood
and consequences. Thus, it is possible to reduce risk by implementing likelihood reduction
(prevention) measure(s) or consequence reduction (mitigation) measure(s). In practice, both
are applied.
The term risk-based FEHM is used to describe an auditable, integrated approach
to risk reduction by the provision of prevention and consequence reduction measures
appropriate to the levels of risk. It should be viewed as one method of addressing fire safety
issues at an installation and may form an integral part of an installation’s overall safety, health
and environment management system (SHEMS). The key stages in the approach are:
−− Fire scenario analysis.

−− Review risk reduction options.
−− Define FEHM policy.
−− Implement FEHM policy.
This sequence is shown in Figure 1.1, which also includes details of typical input tools at each
stage.
17
The decision on which risk reduction measures are to be put in place should be
based on the actual risk determined by risk assessment, which should include an evaluation
of typical fire scenarios. Once it has been decided that a particular measure is to be provided
then, and only then, are publications (codes of practice, design standards, specifications,
guidance, etc.) on fire protection system design used to give guidance on its implementation.
In addition, it should be noted that implementation does not just mean the installation of fire
systems; it should include system maintenance, preplanning, competency development and
assessment of system operation and fire response, exercises and training. Operating company
management should thus be involved on a continuous basis to ensure implementation is
continually effective.
The final decision on the most appropriate fire risk reduction options should depend
on installation-specific conditions. In theory the options can range from no provisions to a
totally integrated package of automatic process shut down, depressurisation, fixed automatic
fire detection systems and fixed automatic protection systems, backed up by a full-time
occupational fire brigade with mobile equipment. In practice, most installations typically
adopt a combination of fixed systems for critical items and mobile response for other areas.
Evaluate alternative Equipment maintenance

prevention, protection Preplanning
Sources of ignition and mitigation measures
Exercises
Hazardous materials Formalisation
Fire training
Incident descriptions Legislation
Update
Fire Review risk Define Implement

scenario reduction FEHM FEHM
analysis options policy policy
CONSEQUENCES
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset value
Other issues
POSSIBLE INPUT TOOLS POSSIBLE INPUT TOOLS POSSIBLE INPUT TOOLS

Hazard and Operability Fire engineering Publications
(HAZOP) Study Fire modelling (codes of practice,
Quantified Risk design standards,
Cost benefit analysis
Assessment (QRA) specifications,
Incident experience guidance, etc.)
Figure 1.1: FEHM process
By demonstrating the link between potential scenarios and the risk reduction measures
implemented, the FEHM process, if carried out properly by competent personnel, should result
in a strategy that is consistent with both legislation and business risk reduction requirements.
1.5 LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN FEHM ASSESSMENT AND PROVISION OF FIRE RISK

REDUCTION MEASURES
Following experience from major incidents, UK and European legislation and that in many
other parts of the world has moved away from prescriptive requirements. Instead, a risk-
18
based approach has been taken, putting the onus on operating companies to demonstrate
to the competent authority (CA) that they are taking all necessary measures to reduce risk to
life safety and the environment to acceptable levels. This may be achieved by a number of
options including both prevention and mitigation measures.
The key European legislation is the European Communities Council Directive
96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the Control of Major-Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous
Substances (‘Seveso II Directive’, named after a major accident at Seveso, Italy), as amended.
Each European Community country implements this Directive through national legislation.
For example, in the UK it is implemented as the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)
Regulations, except for land-use planning. See annex A.2 for more information regarding the
requirements of the COMAH Regulations.
For enforcement in the UK, the CA comprises the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE) and, for England and Wales the Environment Agency (EA), for Scotland the Scottish
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), and for Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland
Environment Agency (NIEA).
In the UK, all petroleum refineries and most bulk storage installations are subject to
the COMAH Regulations, although only lower tier duties apply for bulk storage installations
with lower inventories of dangerous substances. In the UK, installations subject to COMAH
and even smaller installations would, in any case, be subject to the Dangerous Substances
and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations (DSEAR), which implement European Communities
‘explosive atmospheres’ Directive 99/92/EC and the safety aspects of European Communities
‘chemical agents’ Directive 98/24/EC. See annex A.3 for more information regarding the
requirements of DSEAR.
An operating company may, of course, decide to provide additional levels of fire risk
reduction to reduce business and reputation losses. For example, a minor fire incident in a
critical part of an installation may have minimal life safety or environmental effects but could
cause considerable downtime; hence, additional fire detection or extinguishing systems may
be included, not as a matter of safety, but to reduce business interruption.
Thus, there is no conflict between the approach required by regulators to demonstrate
the reduction of risk to acceptable levels and that of operating companies to reduce business
risk. However, the types of risk that are important to regulators and those additional ones
important to operating companies should be defined.
1.6 INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION
Due to the nature of the petroleum industry, many users of this publication will have operations
in several countries. This publication can be used to give the basis for fire risk reduction
measures under different operating conditions, thus ensuring consistency in approach from
location to location. It can therefore be used as a basis for establishing company FEHM policy.
On an international level, the FEHM approach is particularly appropriate where an
installation is critical to a country’s economy or of major strategic importance. In some areas,
oil-related revenues represent the vast majority of national income. This should result in the
justification of higher levels of risk reduction measures. Indeed, in some countries these are
prescriptively applied. This does not conflict with the guidance in this publication but reflects
the levels of risk for such installations.
In some cases, users should seek specialist expertise regarding requirements for,
and design of, fire precautions and protection systems; for example, where operations are
situated in adverse environments.
19
1.7 RISK DRIVERS
The FEHM process and the consequent provision of cost-effective, justified, risk reduction
measures requires a comprehensive review of actual risk, including downstream issues as well
as immediate consequences.
Legislators/regulators are concerned about risk to personnel on the installation, to
society living around it and to the environment. Whilst operating companies should also
see these as their priorities, they should also consider other risk drivers, such as business
interruption and reputation (especially for large multi-national companies).
A formal quantitative CBA may ultimately be required to determine whether or not a
risk reduction measure is justified, particularly where the major risk is to business interruption
and reputation. In other cases, a more straightforward experience-based decision may be
used.
The main risk drivers that should be considered are set out in the following sections.
1.7.1 Legislation
Local relevant legislation should be considered as the ultimate risk reduction requirement; if
it is not met, then the operating company may face enforcement action.
As noted in 1.7, regulators should not request operating companies to put measures
in place where there is no significant impact on life safety, property and environmental
protection. Operating companies that have a robust risk assessment and consequent FEHM
policy should be in an advantageous position in such circumstances. Another legislation-
related risk to be considered is that of downstream cost repercussions in terms of investigations
and the imposition of additional legislative requirements.
1.7.2 Life safety
Life safety is clearly the primary risk driver. This should not only consider the risk to individuals
due to the incident itself but also to ERs, and to those in the surrounding local community. In
addition, life safety risk due to escalation should be taken into account. For example, in a full
tank surface crude oil fire, escalation to a boilover (see section 2.5.5.7) could lead to multiple
injuries and/or fatalities if the response strategy did not include evacuation of personnel from
the potentially affected area.
Life safety is often the subject of high levels of risk quantification.
Typically, results are expressed as risks either to personnel (individual risk) or to
population groups as a whole (societal risk).
When evaluating the need for risk reduction measures to life safety, risk criteria
should be set and agreed with local regulators; they may comprise criteria for personnel,
societal and establishment risks. Criteria may be based on company standards or regulators’
criteria such as those in HSE Application of QRA in operational safety issues or HSE Reducing
risks, protecting people (‘R2P2’).
1.7.3 Environmental impacts
Fires at petroleum installations have the potential to result in serious environmental impacts
due to loss of product and firewater or cooling water containment. Harm might also arise
from production of smoke and other toxic combustion products. An appropriate fire-fighting
and environmental protection strategy can prevent or mitigate these impacts. However,
inefficient or incorrect fire-fighting actions can exacerbate them.
20
For example, over-use of fire-fighting water and foam can carry petroleum and its products
beyond secondary and tertiary containment systems leading to pollution of watercourses
and/or groundwater and/or deleterious impact upon wastewater treatment plants. The harm
caused might include serious damage to environmental receptors, knock-on impacts to
persons and may also include financial loss (e.g. due to closure of drinking water abstractions
or contamination of land). Subsequent clean up costs can be considerable particularly if
groundwater is contaminated and there may also be legal consequences for the operating
company.
To prevent, reduce or mitigate these impacts an environmental risk assessment should
be carried out. Such an assessment should consider the potential source (e.g. contaminated
firewater, toxic smoke plume), pathway, (such as surface drains, air or permeable ground)
and receptor (a river, local population or groundwater source – for example). Where a risk
assessment shows a medium to high risk of pollution from fire-fighting, operating companies
should consult with the local government Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) and environmental
agencies to consider how best to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Some measures that
could be taken include:
−− Prevention (this should be the highest priority): Preventing the fire in the first place
with effective fire prevention measures and control of sources of ignition.
−− Detection: Ensuring that if a fire starts it is tackled as quickly as possible.
−− Process control: Adopting pre-planned process control measures such as isolation
and inventory minimisation to ensure fire duration is minimised as far as possible.
−− Containment: By using or installing facilities for containing firewater and foam run-
off (secondary and tertiary containment measures).
−− Mitigation: Planning with the FRS appropriate response strategies such as reducing
firewater usage, recycling firewater where possible, or focusing cooling efforts (which
should be the focus of effective pre-fire planning) and/or use of a CB.
One particular issue that should be considered is the potential environmental effects of using
fire-fighting foam. All fire-fighting foams are polluting to a greater or less degree due to
their high biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and in many cases their toxicity (for example
foam concentrates that contain zinc or fluorosurfactants). Thus release of both product and
foams to the environment should be prevented and unpermitted releases might constitute
an offence under environmental legislation.
Foams that contain fluorosurfactants – which give foams resistance to contamination
by petroleum and its products – have been of particular concern. Of these a group of chemicals
called perfluorooctane sulfonates (PFOS), used commonly as a surfactant in the past, is of
greatest concern; PFOS has been found to be persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic. The
EC has banned the marketing and use of PFOS in most applications. Fire-fighting foam
containing PFOS that was placed on the market before 27 December 2006 was permitted
to be used until 27 June 2011; however, any PFOS contaminated run-off was required to be
contained and advice should be sought [in the UK] from the pertinent environment agency
concerning suitable disposal. Currently, the preferred disposal option for liquid effluent
containing PFOS is high temperature incineration at 1 100 oC; however, the feasibility (e.g.
technical constraints of the process, costs and environmental impact of transport) of this
option should be assessed before considering other options. Other disposal options may
be considered on their merits. NB: UK application of restrictions has meant that, where
the environment agency confirms the presence of PFOS via their environmental monitoring,
those abstracting water intended for human consumption as well as other regulatory bodies
such as the Drinking Water Inspectorate and Food Standards Agency should be informed of
the presence of PFOS.
21
Also in the UK, the COMAH CA Policy on containment of bulk hazardous liquids at
COMAH establishments (‘Containment policy’) requires sufficient capacity (e.g. via secondary
and tertiary containment) to hold safely the anticipated or foreseeable volume of hazardous
liquids, including firewater, compatible with the intended operational characteristics.
A framework and further guidance to achieve this has been published, with further
good practice cited in HSE Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites. For
guidance on prevention and mitigation of environmental effects see sections 7 and 8 and
PPG 18, PPG 21 and PPG 28. Guidance on assessing and managing environmental effects is
provided in CIRIA R164.
1.7.4 Asset loss
Every fire results in some damage to an installation and hence direct asset loss and subsequent
repair or reinstatement costs. In practice, the direct asset loss is usually much lower than the
consequential loss. In addition, asset loss is often covered by insurance but consequential
loss may not be.
1.7.5 Business interruption
Fires usually lead to short or long term business interruption. This may only be limited to
stoppage during the incident itself but, if the damaged installation is critical, then the down
time may be prolonged. An example of this is a fire incident at a petroleum refinery jetty
which could prevent import of crude and/or export of refined products, thus effectively
closing down the refinery.
1.7.6 Reputation
The reputation (i.e. public image) of a company and its perceived capability of being in full
control of its installation can be severely affected by a fire incident. This is particularly true
for companies operating internationally and for long-duration incidents (such as the CB of a
full surface tank fire).
Media reports of incidents can be quickly transmitted around the world, often with
ill-informed commentary, and to the detriment of reputation; this may impact a company’s
share price.
1.7.7 Insurance
An incident may have a significant effect on the ability of an operating company to obtain
insurance cover at competitive rates. However, insurance cover may also be used to limit the
overall financial consequences of an event, particularly if environmental damage and business
losses are covered. (In other words, insurance can be viewed as a risk reduction measure by
limiting the financial consequences of an incident. (It should of course be recognised that
an insurance settlement may be limited should the insurance company conclude that the
insured were not complying with their legal duties.)
22
2 HAZARDS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Storing, handling and processing petroleum and its products invariably carries a risk of fire, or
in certain cases explosion, with threats to life, the environment, assets, business interruption,
etc. (see section 1.7).
Combustion and its potential consequences should be fully understood when
developing appropriate, justified fire risk reduction measures and fire response strategies.
Petroleum and its products are stored, handled and processed in different ways and
this can have a bearing on the type(s) of fire and explosion scenarios and their consequences.
Their fire-related properties should also be understood because they influence the likelihood
of combustion as well as fire (or explosion) characteristics.
For example, crude oil and certain petroleum products with a wide range of boiling
points may undergo boilover (see 2.5.5.7) during an incident giving a potential escalation
route as well as posing a major hazard to ERs. Other petroleum products might not pose
a significant life safety hazard if allowed to burn in a controlled manner, but might require
special mitigation measures if extinguishment is to be attempted (e.g. using alcohol-resistant
(AR) multi-purpose (MP) foams for polar solvents (see section 6.4.3.4)).
This section outlines the fire-related hazards of petroleum and its products (including
their IP classification) and presents key principles relating to their combustion, as well as
common fire and explosion scenarios that should be considered as part of any risk-based
FEHM approach.
2.2 FIRE-RELATED PROPERTIES OF PETROLEUM AND ITS PRODUCTS
Crude oil and its products are hazardous substances. The degree of the hazard can be
characterised by volatility (as indicated by boiling point/range), flash point, flammable limits,
ignition temperature and IP classification.
The flash point of a flammable liquid is the lowest temperature, corrected to
a barometric pressure of 101,3 kPa, at which the application of a source of ignition in a
prescribed manner causes the vapour of a test portion to ignite and the flame propagates
across the surface of the test sample under the specified test conditions.
Flash points are dependent on various factors, including the test method used; the
latter should be specified when a value is quoted. For the purposes of this publication, when
reference is made to flash point it will be to a closed cup non-equilibrium test method. For
liquids having flash points below 40 oC the test method to determine the flash point should
be IP 170; whereas, for liquids having flash points above 40 oC the test method used to
determine the flash point should be IP 34.
The ignition temperature of a substance is the minimum temperature required
to initiate or to cause self-sustained combustion independent of a spark or flame.
Most vapours of petroleum and its products have ignition temperatures in the range
220 - 500 oC. Combustible cellulosic materials (i.e. non-hydrocarbon materials such as paper
and rags) have lower ignition temperatures. Oil that has soaked into insulation may ignite at
a reduced ignition temperature. See Table B.1 for typical ignition temperatures.
The ignition temperature data in Table B.1 should be regarded as approximate only,
since they depend on the characteristics of the test method used. Some of the variables
known to affect the results are: percentage composition of the vapour-air or gas-air mixture;
shape and size of the space where ignition occurs; rate and duration of heating; and catalytic
or other effect of the material of the container.
23
The system of IP classification of petroleum and its products is based upon their
flash points (see Table B.2). When handled above their flash point, there is a greater risk of
ignition; accordingly, their IP classification will change.
Flammable substances are also characterised by upper and lower flammable limits,
between which gases or vapours mixed with air are capable of sustaining combustion. These
limits are referred to as the lower flammable limit (LFL) and the upper flammable limit (UFL),
and are usually expressed as percentages of the substance mixed with air by volume. For
flammable liquids and combustible solids, however, they may be expressed as a mass or
volume (e.g. in g/m3 for dusts). Flammable limits for petroleum and its products are provided
in Table B.3.
A distinction should be made between hydrocarbon products (such as petrol
(gasoline), diesel, crude oil etc.) and polar solvent substances such as methanol, ethanol,
methyl-tertiary-butyl-ether (MTBE) and other alcohols or solvents having water miscible
characteristics. In recent years, fuel grade ethanol and biofuels/blended petrol products have
been stored increasingly at bulk storage installations and refineries and some facilities carry
out blending operations. The physical properties and burning characteristics of a polar solvent
should always be established prior to any fire scenario analysis, but as an example, when
compared to petrol, ethanol exhibits a lower vapour pressure but a wider flammable range;
when combusting, ethanol flames are difficult to see in daylight. There are also special fire
protection and fire-fighting considerations for these types of substance. (These are addressed
briefly in sections 6 and 7.)
In some cases there may be storage and handling of petroleum additives such as diesel
cetane improvers; these may have special hazards such as potential for runaway reaction.
For specific guidance relating to fuel grade ethanol, which includes FEHM aspects
see EI Guidance for the storage and handling of fuel grade ethanol at petroleum distribution
installations. For petroleum additives, see ATC Document 86.
2.3 COMBUSTION OF PETROLEUM AND ITS PRODUCTS
2.3.1 General
The three essential conditions that must co-exist before a fire can become established are
a sufficient supply of flammable vapour, a source of ignition, and a supply of oxygen (e.g.
from air).
The mechanisms of burning in fires and in explosions are different. In a fire the
plume of vapour evolved by the fuel has been ignited and continues to burn at the interface
with the surrounding air. The rate of burning, which affects the flame length, is controlled
by the rate of diffusion of oxygen from the air to the burning vapour; the flames involved are
termed diffusion flames. With petroleum and its products the flames are typically yellow or
orange in colour, and are usually accompanied by the emission of black smoke. Damage to
neighbouring structures is due almost entirely to heat transfer by convection and radiation.
Damage by pressure effects is negligible.
In an explosion the fuel vapour becomes mixed with air before it is ignited. Flame
then propagates through the mixture, burning the fuel, with the rate of burning governed by
the chemistry of the oxidation. The flame is termed a pre-mixed flame. The rate of burning is
relatively fast (accelerating with increased congestion), and the rapid releases of energy can
generate sufficient pressure (overpressure) to damage neighbouring structures. Associated
heating effects are transient. For petroleum and its products, explosion flames are blue or
pale yellow, depending on the stoichiometry of fuel and air. Smoke emission is much less
than in fires.
The characteristics of fires and explosions are best considered separately.
24
2.3.2 Fires
Once a vapour has been ignited it will usually burn as a diffusion flame, which will stabilise
in the vicinity of the fuel. The flame travels to all exposed surfaces of liquid above its flash
point, providing there is sufficient air supply.
Nearly all the heat produced is distributed by convection and thermal radiation; the
majority is convected away. The significance of the convection component is that it forms an
upward moving fire plume that rises under the influence of buoyancy.
It has been estimated that up to one third of the heat from a fire is lost as thermal
radiation from the flames and accompanying smoke and soot. Radiation from the flames can
greatly hinder the approach to the fire by ERs and cause the heating of neighbouring tanks
and other installations, requiring cooling water to be applied to keep temperature low. See
section 6 for fire protection measures.
Anticipated wind velocities should be considered when designing risk reduction
options. Wind velocity has contributed to transporting petroleum vapour from a neighbouring
tank heated by radiation, to a burning tank, leading to flashback of flame to the neighbouring
tank and to its ignition.
A consequence of the upward velocity within the fire plume is the effect on fire
extinguishing agents applied to the surface of the petroleum fuel. When the agent is fire-
fighting foam, it may be swept upwards by the plume instead of falling onto the petroleum
liquid surface and so provides neither the desired covering nor cooling effects.
2.3.3 Explosions/boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions
2.3.3.1 General
Firstly, a air/vapour mixture must be within the flammable limits, e.g. in the case of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) vapours, not less than about 5,0 % or more than about 15,0 % of vapour
by volume in air. Data on flammable limits are widely available. Table B.3 gives typical
flammable limits under ambient conditions of petroleum and its products. Flammable limits
are considerably wider if the vapour is oxygen-enriched or if substances are processed at
elevated temperatures and pressures. The special case of hydrogen should be noted as it is
flammable between the wide limits of 4,0 % and 75,0 % by volume in air.
Secondly, a source of ignition must be present. Ignition can take place anywhere in
the cloud where the fuel/air ratio is within the limits of flammability; the flame then travels
through the vapour cloud, pushing unburnt gas ahead of it and generates a 'shock' wave.
Also, a vapour cloud may ignite if any flammable portion encounters a hot surface and is
locally heated to the ignition temperature. Alternatively, the whole flammable vapour may be
brought up to its ignition temperature. Examples of typical ignition temperatures are given
in Table B.1.
If an explosion takes place in a confined space, the heat release may result in a
pressure rise greater than the walls of the space can withstand. Examples of locations in
storage installations where confined explosions have occurred include drainage systems and
storage tanks. In addition, explosions have occurred at petroleum refineries in process areas,
furnace combustion chambers and flare systems.
It is also possible for explosions to take place in the open air when a large volume of
flammable vapour is ignited. Such volumes may accumulate, e.g. from a spill of highly volatile
product, or release of high-energy product such as LPG. Where such volumes are confined
or there is a degree of congestion (e.g. in a process unit or peripheral area) the flammable
vapour/air cloud can become very turbulent and explosion severity increases.
Confined and congested explosions are characterised by high flame speeds and
overpressures; local personnel cannot escape. These contrast with spills leading to flash fires
where flame speeds are generally much lower and escape may be possible.
25
Explosions may be classified into physical and chemical explosions:
(a) Examples of physical explosions, in which there is no chemical reaction, are

over-pressurising a vessel (e.g. stored energy from compressed gases) and the
explosive vaporisation of water due to very rapid heating (rapid phase transition).
Although a flame may not be involved in the explosion, the result can give rise to
a flammable atmosphere.
(b) Chemical explosions may be divided into uniform (or homogeneous) and
propagating explosions:
— In a uniform or homogeneous explosion the chemical reaction occurs

throughout the mixture simultaneously, e.g. uncontrolled exothermic
reaction.
— In a propagating explosion, the chemical reaction occurs in a flame front,
which involves only a thin layer of flammable mixture. The flame then
propagates through the remainder of the mixture. If the velocity of the flame
is subsonic, the propagation is termed deflagration. With a deflagration
in a closed volume the pressure rise is effectively uniform throughout
the volume. If the flame velocity is sonic or supersonic, propagation is
termed detonation. The flame is accompanied by a shock wave that causes
localised high pressure, and the pressure rise is not uniform throughout the
volume. Detonations and deflagrations are very hazardous, and preventing
their development is a main purpose of explosion protection.
2.3.3.2 Pressure effects

For the deflagration of petroleum vapour in air, in a closed vessel initially at 1 bar absolute
pressure, the explosion pressure can typically rise to a maximum of 8 bar absolute pressure,
unless containment is lost.
If the enclosure is vented, the maximum pressure is reduced. As pressure is equal to
force per unit area, a modest pressure exerted over an extended area such as a door or wall
can generate a high total force. The strength of the attachment of the door or wall to the
remainder of the structure should be adequate.
If a deflagration can accelerate over a long distance, it may undergo transition to
detonation. In a detonation in air the maximum pressure at the shock front may be as high as
20 bar; the pressure is exerted over a smaller area and for a shorter time than in a deflagration.
Detonations have a much greater shattering effect than deflagrations. Although the total
amount of energy released is similar, it is concentrated at the shock front and venting does
not give protection.
See 2.6.3 and Table 2.2 for overpressure effects associated with explosions.
2.3.3.3 Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion

A BLEVE is usually a consequence of prolonged heating of a pressurised (often liquefied gas)
vessel by an external fire. The vessel may heat up rapidly and fail, spreading burning fuel
as it ruptures. The initiating fire may be a pool or jet fire, which heats the vessel, increasing
its internal pressure. During the fire, a relief valve may operate and result in an additional
jet fire. Regardless of heating mechanism, as the liquid level in the vessel drops due to
combustion, the vessel above the liquid level is weakened and can eventually fail due to a
combination of continued flame impingement, high heat flux and overpressure. The sudden
relaxation of pressure on the liquid inside causes massive instantaneous boiling and release of
vapour, which is ignited by the fire. The resultant fireball can take the appearance of a large
26
'mushroom cloud' (sometimes called a 'ball on a stick'), which may give rise to high levels of
thermal radiation for short periods and fragments of the vessel may be projected over several
kilometres.
2.4 SMOKE AND GASES FROM FIRE
2.4.1 General
Smoke consists of particulate matter suspended in the gaseous products of combustion, i.e.
fire gases. Smoke is formed by the products of partial combustion of the fuel, as well as the
products of thermal decomposition.
The composition and quantity of smoke generated by a fuel in a fire are not solely
characteristic of that fuel but depend upon fire conditions. Amongst other factors, smoke
emission depends upon the air supply, the temperature of the fire and the presence of other
materials.
Moisture affects smoke emission in a complex manner. Dampness in solids slows down
the rate of combustion and reduces its completeness, and can cause increased generation of
smoke. The addition of steam to a flare burning gaseous fuels can reduce the burning rate in
the flame, but may also reduce the smoke generation and change its appearance. Addition
of water to a liquid petroleum fire can either reduce smoke emission if the fire is subdued, or
can increase emission if splashing enhances the fire.
Smoke and fire gases present the following serious health hazards to life:
−− Reduced visibility results from obscuration by the smoke and from irritation of the
eyes; consequently escape from the fire and efficient fire-fighting are difficult.
−− High temperatures of smoke and gases cause damage to the lungs and to exposed
skin. They may inhibit attempts to escape from the fire.
−− The inhalation of toxic or oxygen-deficient gases can cause death, collapse, or chronic
damage, and smoke inhalation can severely damage the trachea and lungs.
Smoke also has the potential to damage the environment, especially if the fire is sizeable and
volume production is large.
It is also worth noting that large smoke plumes can also damage company reputation
if seen from afar (see section 1.7.6).
2.5 FIRE AND EXPLOSION SCENARIOS
2.5.1 General
The first step in the FEHM process involves fire scenario analysis. Credible fire and explosion
scenarios should be identified at each installation on an installation-specific basis.
As introduced in section 1, one way to define and implement appropriate and justified
fire and explosion hazard management policies is to adopt a risk-based FEHM approach. This
process is increasingly being recognised worldwide as an alternative to prescriptive means
of providing fire and explosion prevention and protection measures. NB: The term FEHM
includes 'explosions' but it should be noted that explosion hazards, prevention and protection
are specialised topics and are outside the scope of this publication.
As part of this, fire and explosion scenarios should be evaluated for likelihood and
consequences (i.e. risk) so that appropriate, justifiable risk reduction options can be selected.
27
Scenarios selected as posing appreciable risk, and meriting risk reduction measures
may be included in a COMAH safety report used to demonstrate FEHM policy and its
implementation. In most cases, documentation should be provided to show that credible
scenarios have been identified, and risk reduction measures are in place and maintained as
part of the installation’s FEHM policy.
Fire scenario analysis can be achieved through a combination of various qualitative
scenario analysis tools including hazard analysis (HAZAN)/hazard identification (HAZID)/
hazard and operability (HAZOP) and quantitative methods such as event or fault tree analysis.
Quantified risk assessment (QRA) can also be used. Industry databases giving incident
probabilities can be employed to assist quantitative methodologies. These can be combined
with fire and explosion consequence modelling tools to gain an overall assessment of risk.
Incident experience may also provide a useful tool for assessing incident probabilities
and consequences. For example, it might be shown that certain types of incident have
occurred or are more likely because of certain failure modes, initiating events or even human
factors and inadequate practices and procedures (e.g. inappropriate maintenance). Similarly,
consequences in terms of life safety, asset loss, environmental impact etc. can be estimated
from documented incidents.
2.5.2 Scenarios
A range of fire and explosion scenarios should be considered. In most cases it will be
impractical to consider every possible scenario and a balance should be struck between
addressing larger, less frequent scenarios that would cause more damaging consequences to
personnel, business and the environment, and smaller, potentially more frequent events that
could lead to escalation or significant localised damage.
Scenarios should include:
−− unignited product releases;
−− pool fires;
−− atmospheric storage tank fires:
- vent fires;
- full surface fires;
- rim seal fires;
- spill-on-roof fires;
- bund fires;
- boilover;
−− jet fires:
- gas jet fires;
- liquid jet and spray fires;
−− BLEVEs;
−− vapour cloud explosions (VCEs);
−− flash fires;
−− building fires;
−− electrical fires, and
−− vehicle fires.
As well as the above, potentially toxic product releases should be considered, and it is worth
noting that these may have the potential to result in fires and/or explosions if ignited.
The likelihood and magnitude (i.e. consequences) of these events depend on a
number of product factors:
−− Release characteristics (e.g. whether the product is released as a gas, liquid or

mixture; whether it is of short duration or prolonged).
28
−− Whether the substance released is toxic, flammable or both.

−− If flammable, whether ignition occurs, and if so where and when.
−− For ignited gas releases, whether overpressures are generated on combustion (this
depends on the degree of confinement or congestion, as well as fuel reactivity and
strength of any source of ignition).
In addition, incident likelihood may be increased during activities such as maintenance and
start-up operations compared to normal operations.
For guidance on selection of credible scenarios see section 3.2.
2.5.3 Unignited product releases
Paradoxically, source of ignition control measures routinely adopted at installations mean

that releases of flammable liquids and vapours (whether pressurised or at atmospheric
pressure) have the potential to accumulate and remain unignited. Consequently, the amount
of flammable product may be large with potential to create damaging fires and explosion
if ignited. For flammable liquid releases, the extent of any fire depends on containment
measures, as well as any mitigation such as spill response carried out at the time of the release.
For gaseous releases, atmospheric dispersion is of importance. As part of any fire scenario
assessment, potential release rates should be determined with the help of a ‘source term’
model. The results of these can be fed into pool fire, jet fire and VCE consequence models to
determine fire extent and characteristics. Also, there are a number of gas dispersion models
available that can be used to evaluate the magnitude of any vapour cloud.
Recent incidents have illustrated the importance of topography both in terms of
vapour and firewater control, and also that losses to groundwater can occur through near
but off-site drains when petroleum and its products/firewater are not contained.
Unignited product releases generally require careful mitigation and response actions
to remove the hazard. These can include containing, neutralising and disposing of the
product, or achieving gas dilution or assisted dispersion with the use of water sprays and/or
curtains. Such measures are discussed in section 7.
It is also worth noting that in addition to fire and explosion, unignited releases can
pose environmental, toxic and asphyxia hazards and these should be included in any scenario
analysis.
2.5.4 Pool fires
Pool fires can be contained (e.g. atmospheric storage tank or bund fires) or uncontained (e.g.
unbunded or because of bund overtopping). The ignited fuel usually has very little or no
momentum (i.e. it lies in a static pool) and combusts as heat is fed back to the product and
it evaporates from the liquid surface. A pool fire can occur in areas such as in bunding below
a vessel. If unconfined, the spread can depend on the surface characteristics (e.g. whether
hard concrete or permeable), local topography, drainage systems and the presence of water
surfaces. Pool fire flames are often ‘tilted’ due to wind effects and can ‘drag’ downwind
for some considerable distance. In addition, they can be accompanied by large quantities of
smoke.
A ‘rule of thumb’ is that catastrophic failure of an atmospheric storage tank would
lead to some 50 % of its inventory overtopping a bund. See Thyer et al (2002).
Pool fires present a thermal hazard dangerous to personnel and installations. The
potential heat flux in the flame of a pool fire may be in the order of 250 kW/m2.
Fire escalation under pool fire conditions would normally involve direct flame
impingement on adjacent tanks, vessels or pipework and valves or prolonged exposure to
heat fluxes in excess of 8 - 12 kW/m2 near to the fire if there is no protection. Escalation may
29
be much more rapid if exposures are subjected to fluxes in excess of 32 - 37,5 kW/m2 nearer
the flame.
Pool fires may be preceded by a jet/spray fire as installations or process plant
depressurises, and this should be taken into account during fire scenario analysis.
Note, in many cases, the level of thermal flux from a pool fire determines personnel
safety, levels of fire protection that should be provided and emergency response requirements.
See 2.6.2, 2.7.2.1, and sections 7 and 8.
2.5.5 Atmospheric storage tank fires
Atmospheric storage tank fires are, essentially, contained pool fires and can vary from
being relatively small rim seal fires (in the case of a floating roof tank) to spill-on-roof fires
and full surface fires. The LASTFIRE project (see annex I.3) – a joint petroleum industry
initiative reviewing the risks associated with large diameter storage tank fires – provides
a comprehensive review of tank fire scenarios, as well as typical incident probabilities and
consequences based on incident experience and a comprehensive industry database.
The type of fire scenarios to be considered depends largely on the tank construction
and to a lesser extent on the product:
−− For fixed roof and internal floating roof tanks, vent fires and full surface fires (see
2.5.5.1 - 2.5.5.2).
−− For open top floating roof tanks, rim seal fires, spill-on-roof fires and full surface fires
(see 2.5.5.3 - 2.5.5.5).
−− For all tank types, bund fires (see 2.5.5.6).
−− For tanks containing crude oil and wide boiling point products, boilover (see 2.5.5.7).
−− For all tanks containing certain ‘in scope’ fuels as defined in HSE Safety and
environmental standards for fuel storage sites (see Table B.4) the possibility of forming
a large vapour cloud with subsequent VCE (see 2.5.8). This scenario is primarily due
to a major loss of containment from storage tanks but can be associated with other
plant areas.
2.5.5.1 Vent fires

A vent fire is a fire in which flammable vapour from one or more tank vents has ignited.
Flammable vapours are nearly always present in the vicinity of vents, due to routine
operational tank breathing. Most vent fires are attributed to ignition by lightning (see section
4.4.3), although instances have occurred when sources of ignition outside the tank have
started vent fires.
When addressed properly, vent fires can usually be extinguished with minimal
damage and low risk to personnel. Losses of containment associated with vent fires typically
occur as a result of overfilling due to human failure, failure of level instrumentation or in
normal tank operation.
The risk of a vent fire may be reduced by using a pressure/vacuum (P/V) control valve
on the vent nozzle in conjunction with providing an inert atmosphere inside the tank such
as nitrogen (nitrogen ‘blanket’) where available. Another option appropriate to tanks and
vessels working under pressure is to connect the vent to a flare system or common vent stack
serving a group of plant items.
2.5.5.2 Fixed roof tank full surface fires

A full surface fire in a fixed roof tank can be brought about by vent fire escalation. A vapour
space explosion can occur if the vapour space is within the flammable range at the time
of flame flashback, especially if vents and/or flame arrestors are defective. If the tank is
constructed to a recognised publication such as API Std. 650 then the roof should separate
30
from the tank shell along a weak seam (e.g. frangible tank roof to tank wall seal weld.
Depending on the force of the vapour space explosion, the roof may either be partially
removed or fully removed.
2.5.5.3 Rim seal fires

A rim seal fire is one where the seal between the tank shell and roof has lost integrity and
there is ignited vapour in the seal area. The amount of seal involved in the fire can vary from
a small localised area up to the full circumference of the tank. The flammable vapour can
occur in various parts of the seal depending on its design.
The most common source of ignition for a rim seal fire, as determined by the LASTFIRE
project (see annex I.3) is lightning (see section 4.4.3). Clearly, the likelihood of ignition
is increased in areas of the world where ‘lightning days’ are more common but ignition
likelihood may be further increased if tank maintenance is poor. Other notable sources of
ignition for documented rim seal fires include hot work on a ‘live’ tank where permit-to-work
(PTW) procedures (see section 4.5) have failed to identify fire risk.
2.5.5.4 Spill-on-roof fires

A spill-on-roof fire is one where a hydrocarbon spill on the tank roof is ignited but the roof
maintains its buoyancy. In addition, flammable vapours escaping through a tank vent or roof
fitting may be ignited.
2.5.5.5 Floating roof tank full surface fires

A full surface fire is one where the tank roof has lost its buoyancy and some or the entire
surface of liquid in the tank is exposed and involved in the fire. If a roof is well maintained
and the tank is correctly operated, the risk of a rim seal fire escalating to a full surface fire is
very low.
2.5.5.6 Bund fires

A bund fire is any type of fire that occurs within the secondary containment area outside the
tank shell due to pipe fracture, corrosion, etc. These types of fire can range from a small spill
incident up to a fire covering the whole bund area. In some cases (such as a fire on a mixer)
the resulting fire could incorporate some jet or spray fire characteristics due to the hydrostatic
head.
2.5.5.7 Boilover
Boilover is a phenomenon that can occur when a fire on an open top floating roof tank
containing crude or certain types of heavy fuel oils (which contain a range of fractions), has
been burning for some time. It can result in large quantities of oil being violently ejected,
even beyond the limits of any secondary containment - although integrity of bunding can
be an important factor in minimising fire spread. Boilover is a potential escalation route to
multiple tank/bund incidents and a major hazard to ERs.
A boilover can occur in crude oil tank fires when the hot zone of dense, hot crude
oil created by the burning of lighter ends descends through the bulk and reaches any water
base, which may have been augmented by fire-fighting or cooling actions. The water turns
to steam, expanding in the order of 1 500:1. This steam pushes up through the bulk, taking
crude oil with it and creates a fireball above the tank. Boilovers have spread burning crude
oil several tank diameters from the source, thus escalating the incident and endangering
ERs. The extent of the spread of oil can be dependent on the amount of oil and water in the
tank at the time the boilover occurs. However, currently there is still no proven relationship
between the depth of oil when a boilover occurs and the distance the oil wave travels. It is
also unknown how high the walls of the bund should be to stop the wave of oil overtopping
them. For practical purposes it should be assumed that fire spread to adjacent tanks within
the same bund is inevitable.
31
Regarding installation layout, it would not be practicable in most cases to have tank
spacing sufficient to prevent escalation to adjacent tanks by boilover spread as the tank
spacing would have to exceed a minimum of five tank diameters.
The phenomenon of boilover plays a key role in decision making on the most
appropriate and cost effective strategy for crude oil tank fires. Although such events are very
rare due to normal operating and design controls, when they occur they can cause major
asset, business interruption and reputation damage. Current research indicates that boilover
probability should be assumed to be 1 in the case of crude oil tanks with full surface fires
without any mitigation measures being taken, (i.e. if crude oil tank fires continue to burn
without intervention then it should be assumed that violent boilover will occur). Boilovers
have been known to cause multiple fatalities as well as fire escalation to adjacent installations.
Thermal radiation generated by boilovers increases significantly from that experienced
during ‘steady’ burning. These levels, although short lived, can far exceed maximum radiant
heat levels considered tenable for ERs (typically 6,3 kW/m2 for short periods – see 2.6.2).
Thus radiant heat levels during a boilover may not be survivable unless ERs are situated at an
appropriate safety distance. Also, ERPs should highlight the possibility that boilover can occur
more than once on the same tank and that burning inside or outside the tank may continue
for some time.
Fire spread potential should be assumed to be very high in the case of most boilovers
– fire spread to up to 10 tank diameters downwind is possible. Fire spread crosswind can
be at least five tank diameters in any direction, dependent on bund integrity and size. For
emergency planning purposes fire spread for up to 10 largest tank diameters should be
considered.
2.5.6 Jet fires
A jet fire is a stable jet of flame produced when a high velocity discharge catches fire.
The flame gives varying amounts of smoke depending on the product and degree of air
entrainment during discharge. For example, gas/oil jet fires can produce more smoke than
both gas or gas/condensate fires and may also feed pool fires.
Jet fires can result because of ignition of a high-pressure gaseous release, or otherwise
because of the combustion of a liquid spray (e.g. a high-pressure crude oil release).
The proportion of the release burning as a jet or spray tends to increase with the
pressure and the volatility of the liquid.
By their nature, jet fires are very hot and erosive and have the potential to rapidly
weaken exposed plant and equipment (even if PFP is provided) as well as pose a serious
thermal risk to personnel. The potential heat flux in the flame of a jet fire can be in the
order of up to 350 kW/m2. Escalation from jet fires would normally involve direct flame
impingement or prolonged exposure to high heat fluxes in the region of the flame.
2.5.7 Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions
See 2.3.3.3 for an explanation of BLEVE.

Pool and jet fire scenarios should be assessed for their capacity to create potential
BLEVE situations; these are more likely where fires can burn directly under or close to
pressurised vessels containing Class 0 products.
2.5.8 Vapour cloud explosions
A VCE involves the explosive combustion of flammable vapours released to the atmosphere.
The consequences of a VCE depend on factors such as the reactivity of the vapour, degree
32
of congestion and confinement and ignition characteristics. Also, characteristics such as

vapour density can affect the travel, ease of dispersion and therefore extent of the cloud.
This is particularly the case where atmospheric tank overfills are concerned; recently a great
deal of work has been carried out on characterising the substances, release conditions and
material properties that can give rise to potentially extensive clouds. See Table B.4 for typical
substances that have the potential to give rise to VCEs, as defined by the HSE Safety and
environmental standards for fuel storage sites.
Potential release areas in petroleum refineries are typically very congested with
pipework, process units, vessels and other equipment. Ignited releases there have the
potential to be major, generating damaging overpressures because the vapour/air mixture
becomes very turbulent and the combustion rate increases very rapidly. However, there have
been cases where high pressure VCEs have occurred where process congestion was not
present to any significant degree or even not present at all. Possible explanations for this
include flame acceleration by vegetation, peripheral structures or deflagration to detonation
transition from other areas.
The risk of VCEs should be reduced by minimising the potential for release and
by implementing appropriate source of ignition controls – although off-site ignition is still
a possibility even if correct specification of ignition protected electrical and mechanical
equipment to explosive atmospheres (ATEX) requirements and procedures are being
followed. (See section 4.4 for guidance on control of sources of ignition). In any case, if
a VCE does occur installations and structures within the blast zone may be demolished or
severely damaged, depending on the extent of overpressure generated. Such installations
can include safety critical systems or equipment, infrastructure and key emergency response
measures such as firewater pumps. Consideration should be given to the consequences of
loss of these and whether alternative arrangements can be made, or if damage would result
in unacceptable consequences to ongoing safety and operations: see section 7.6.4.
Personnel may also be at risk from the overpressure, as well as projectiles and blast/
heat effects. Assessment of potential blast consequences should be carried out to determine
safety of personnel in the areas outside the immediate impact zone so that measures can
be identified to safeguard them. See CIA Guidance for the location and design of occupied
buildings on chemical manufacturing sites for guidance on the location and the design
requirements of occupied buildings on installations with hazardous materials capable of
presenting risks of fire and explosion (or toxic gas escape).
It should be ensured that there are robust measures in place to minimise loss of
primary containment and – where appropriate – liquid leak or hydrocarbon gas detection to
detect loss of substances that can form vapour clouds (emphasis should – of course – be on
the former).
For assessment purposes, the likelihood of vapour release should be determined along
with the likely extent of dispersion. As well as this, the potential for damaging overpressures
should be ascertained. A number of explosion modelling techniques are available to carry
this out, and some of these are configured to provide 'lethality' data to assist in assessing
personnel or societal risk. However, it should also be borne in mind that a great deal of
uncertainty exists over the exact mechanisms for VCEs in some cases and current explosion
models may sometimes underestimate VCE consequences. The matter of estimating the
extent and severity of large scale storage location VCEs (e.g. Buncefield) will be the subject
of ongoing uncertainty until the science behind the higher than anticipated overpressures
generated is understood. Until such time, a precautionary approach should be adopted using
hazard ranges translated from the Buncefield event, as suggested in guidelines by the UK
HSE (see HSE Land use planning advice around large scale petrol storage sites SPC/Technical/
General/43). Operating companies should also keep up-to-date with the latest developments
in this field.
33
2.5.9 Flash fires
Flash fires occur when a vapour cloud with a concentration of fuel between LFL and UFL
encounters a source of ignition. A flash fire generally results in a flame passing through
the mixture at less than sonic velocity. Damaging overpressures are usually negligible, but
severe injuries can result to personnel if caught up in the flame. It is a convention in risk
assessment that should persons be enveloped in a flame, that they are assumed to suffer
fatality. This is due to external burns, lung damage by inhaling hot gases, toxic effects and
oxygen depletion. Also, a flash fire may travel back to the source of any release and cause a
jet or spray fire if the release is pressurised.
2.6 CONSEQUENCES
2.6.1 General
The consequences of the fire and explosion scenarios include:
−− Thermal fluxes hazardous to plant, buildings and people.

−− Potentially damaging overpressures affecting plant, buildings and people.
−− Flammable and/or toxic vapour/air 'clouds' hazardous to people and the environment.
−− Blast effects and missiles (e.g. because of BLEVE) hazardous to plant, buildings and
people.
Depending on release size, and extent of fire or explosion, consequences may be restricted to
the installation or the effects may impact offsite, endangering the public and the environment.
Fire and explosion consequence modelling can assist in the assessment of hazard distances.
Most models give hazard contours representing the levels of heat flux, overpressure, vapour/
air concentration, etc. as a function of distance from the fire or explosion centre. Such models
are described in 2.7.
As well as the above physical consequences, other impacts are possible, such as asset
loss, business interruption, reputation etc. These can be very difficult to quantify and are
best assessed on an installation-specific basis. However, as a guide, some insurance industry
estimates place typical consequential incident costs in the order of at least ten times the initial
incident cost.
In terms of life safety, fire and explosion consequences have the potential to cause
injury or even death; in most cases, additional risk reduction options to eliminate or reduce
them should be taken.
2.6.2 Thermal flux – consequence assessment
Both pool and jet fires have the potential to create hazardous heat fluxes in the region of the
flame and outside it, and damage or injury to plant and personnel can be a consequence.
For consequence assessment purposes, and to determine fire response resource
requirements, times to failure of unprotected plant and potential fire escalation may be in
the order of:
−− 5 - 20 min. for reactors and vessels at 250 - 350 kW/m2.

−− 5 - 10 min. for pipework at 250 - 350 kW/m2.
These data should be used for guidance only; times to failure and/or escalation may
vary depending on the extent and duration of exposure, as well as the characteristics of
34
plant and equipment. For practical fire response purposes, equipment/plant exposed to
>8 kW/m2 for a prolonged period should generally need cooling at some stage, possibly
provided by mobile means. Fixed cooling equipment should be considered for equipment/
plant likely to be exposed to >32 kW/m2 or more. ERs wearing appropriate PPE should be
able to carry out very brief (<1 min.) tasks if subjected to no more than 6,3 kW/m2 and longer
duration operations if subjected to between 3 - 6 kW/m2.
Table 2.1 categorises the potential consequences of damaging radiant heat flux and
direct flame impingement. See also EI Guidelines for the design and protection of pressure
systems to withstand severe fires.
Table 2.1: Heat flux consequences
Thermal flux Consequences

(kW/m ) 2
1 - 1,5 Sunburn
5-6 Personnel injured (burns) if they are wearing normal
clothing and do not escape quickly
8 - 12 Fire escalation if prolonged exposure and no protection
32 - 37,5 Fire escalation if no protection (consider flame
impingement)
Up to 350 In flame. Steel structures can fail within several
minutes if unprotected or not cooled
2.6.3 Overpressures
VCEs can result in damaging overpressures, especially when flammable vapour/air mixtures
are ignited in a congested area. Personnel may be killed or injured by blast effects, and
buildings, plant and equipment could be damaged or demolished potentially leading to
further loss of containment and subsequent fires.
Assessing consequences for VCE scenarios involves considering the release size,
and potential fireball and overpressure effects generated by the explosion. As a guide, the
overpressures given in Table 2.2 are often used as a basis for damage assessment.
35
Table 2.2: Overpressure consequences
Damage details Incident equivalent

peak overpressure
(mbar)
Effects on people
Threshold for ear drum rupture 138
50 % probability of eardrum rupture 345 - 480
90 % probability of eardrum rupture 690 - 1 034
Minimum pressure for penetration injury by glass fragments 55,2
Threshold of skin laceration by missiles 69 - 138
Persons knocked to the ground 103 - 200
Threshold of internal injury from the blast 490
50% fatality from serious missile wounds 276 - 345
Nearly 100 % fatality from serious missile wounds 483 - 689
Threshold of lung haemorrhage 837 - 1 034
Immediate blast fatalities 4 826 - 13 790
Building damage details
Nearly 100 % of exposed glass panes broken 46 - 110
Partial demolition of houses - made uninhabitable 69
Nearly complete destruction of houses 345 - 483
Probable total destruction of houses 689
Effects on plant
Most pipes fail 300
Steel cladding of buildings ruptured 400
Brisk panels in steel or concrete frame rupture 500
Reinforced structures distort and unpressurised tanks fail 210 - 340
Wagons and plant items overturned 340 - 480
Extensive damage to chemical plant >480
Failure of a pressurised sphere >700
Notes
1 Typical damage vs. incident equivalent peak overpressure data are provided for information only and
should not be used to judge the acceptability of any building design, building component of plant
item to a blast overpressure event. There should be a detailed analysis of the building or component
to determine its acceptability
2.6.4 Flammable/toxic vapour clouds
Accidental releases of flammable and/or toxic substances can have wide ranging consequences
including:
−− incapacitation and/or death of onsite personnel and offsite populations, and

−− VCEs if ignited.
For example, a release of highly toxic substance such as acrylonitrile or hydrogen fluoride
might require immediate evacuation of affected areas or sheltering in a temporary refuge
36
to safeguard personnel. If the release has potential to travel offsite, further emergency
procedures should be considered. Also, there may be localised depletion of oxygen after an
ignition and this should be taken into account if personnel are trapped in wreckage.
Vapour dispersion modelling can help to assess potential consequences (i.e. hazard
distances and vapour/air concentrations) associated with such releases.
BP Process safety series: The hazards of nitrogen and catalyst handling reviews
potential harm to persons subjected to oxygen depleted atmospheres.
2.6.5 Blast effects/missiles
In some cases, events such as BLEVE or pressure vessel burst will result in fragments of
plant and equipment being projected with potential danger to people and structures: these
consequences are more difficult to assess. However, documented BLEVE events and incident
experience have shown that fragments can be projected over several kilometres, and some
consequence models now include ways of assessing this potential.
2.7 FIRE AND EXPLOSION MODELLING
2.7.1 General
In an area where flammable liquids and gases are processed, handled or stored it is often
possible to predict the physical effects of fires and explosions to assess the threat to personnel
and to consider whether incident escalation is possible.
Recent advances in fire, explosion and gas dispersion modelling techniques enable
fire protection engineers to determine with some confidence the potential effects of
accidental releases of flammable fluid through the use of sophisticated computer programs
or simulations. However, fire and explosion modelling alone cannot act as a substitute for an
overall FEHM approach, in which incident experience, fire engineering and process awareness
all play a significant part.
Fire and explosion modelling can be used to:
−− Quantify the physical effects associated with fire and explosion such as heat
radiation, explosion overpressure and flame shape or length. These calculations can
be used to assess whether personnel and ERs will be placed at risk in the immediate
or surrounding environment.
−− Determine the response of plant and equipment to heat radiation and blast loadings
and estimate the likelihood of incident escalation due to factors such as the erosion
or failure of vessels and piping/equipment by flame or heat radiation.
−− Determine the response of buildings to heat radiation and blast loadings, and
estimate what the consequences may be for the occupants, if they either remain in
the building or attempt to escape.
−− Highlight the need for fire protection or mitigation measures such as PFP or water
spray for cooling purposes. Additionally, analyses can be used to underline the
requirement for additional fire-fighting resources.
Results of modelling can be included in scenario-specific ERPs to provide guidance for

technicians and ERs in the early stages of an incident. Information such as heat radiation
or overpressure contours can be superimposed on installation plot plans to assist incident
response, but the information should be considered as guidance only; although currently
available models can provide some indication of the potential consequences of fires and
37
explosions, dynamic risk assessment (DRA) (see section 8.9.2) should be used at the time of
an incident to ascertain safe working envelopes in fire response.
Similarly, modelling results should be used with caution when used for installation
design purposes since they may not accurately reflect the potential consequences under
certain situations unless specifically considered. Appropriate safety factors should be taken
into account if necessary and expert interpretation of the model inputs and outputs may be
required to optimise design.
Fire and explosion models should always be validated and the risk assessment
findings based on their outputs should be subject to sensitivity analysis – particularly when
incident consequences may be high and decisions about the implementation of appropriate
risk reduction measures rest on the application of certain modelling assumptions.
2.7.2 Types of model
2.7.2.1 Pool fire

For the purposes of assessing risk to personnel, plant and equipment it is most often the heat
radiation component that is modelled although the amount and toxicity of smoke can also
be addressed. Most models express levels of heat radiation in terms of kW/m2, representing
these as contours in the final output. Also, the degree of flame tilt and drag due to wind
effects can be shown, since this can bring the fire closer to downwind objects and engulf
them. A typical pool fire model output might appear as shown in Figure 2.1, with the results
of an analysis being used in an ERP, shown opposite. In this example, the contours produced
by a pool fire model have been superimposed on a storage tank in order to represent the
levels of heat radiation and their distances from a full surface fire. (It is worth noting that this
type of analysis or 'firemap' could equally be used to show heat radiation emanating from
pool fires beneath vessels and other process equipment.)
2.7.2.2 Jet fire

From a modelling perspective factors such as flame length and fire duration should be
addressed, since they determine the degree of flame impingement, subsequent heat transfer
and therefore escalation potential. Jet flames tend to be extremely erosive due to their
significant momentum, and so modelling jet fire behaviour can assess the likelihood of PFP
damage. A typical jet fire model gives similar contours to the pool fire model, enabling risk
to personnel and equipment to be considered. Recently, more sophisticated computational
fluid dynamics (CFD) models have been developed allowing more in-depth calculations of
flame temperature in specific regions, and detailed breakdowns of convective and radiative
heat transfer.
A typical jet fire analysis also requires modelling of fuel release rates. These should be
found by using a separate 'source' model, which may be part of the fire-modelling package.
Release rates invariably have a bearing on fire duration and flame length, and should be
estimated from credible scenarios, e.g. as a result of small-bore pipe work releases, pump seal
ruptures and larger equipment failures. Also, it is possible to model jet fires (and subsequent
pool fires if liquid 'rains' out of the plume) whilst taking into account a plant’s blowdown
strategy.
38
Pool fire: horizontal plane at 15 m

Sk North
id
100 FH
Water
tank Pu Of
St fs
m ag ho
p This fire map is provided
ho e r e
us for guidance only and
80 e
should not be regarded as
FH
Material: FH a definitive map of any fire
60 petrol/kerosine that may occur. Radiation

contours as at top of tank.
FH
40
Sl
Heat flux u
Pit dge 6 kW/m 2
20 A Contour
5 kW/m 2 FH 21 FH
12 kW/m 2
10 kW/m 2 Contour
0
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 20 kW/m 2 Flame drag
contour
20 Flame drag
Tank full
Flame FH
surface fire
FH
area
40
60 Rev Date Description By
Down wind
80 22 23
5 m/s Title
Pits Tank Full surface fire
100 FH
Unconfirmed spillage on land Distance (m) DRG BT/T21 F.S.F Do not scale
Figure 2.1: Typical pool fire analysis and fire-map aspect of scenario-specific ERP
2.7.2.3 Gas dispersion

It is also possible to estimate the likely size, composition and flammability characteristics
of accidental gas releases by modelling release rates. This should be carried out if the gas
release may threaten large areas of process plant and personnel due to the risk of a VCE.
Gas dispersion models are especially useful when specifying and planning the location of
flammable or toxic gas detection, since it is possible to determine potential gas concentrations
at specific locations, and hence select and position detectors able to respond at a point well
before the LFL or toxic threshold. Also, this type of model can be used to determine the
extents of the flammable range, whether or not gas will accumulate at low points if heavier
than air, or indeed whether pockets of potentially explosive gas/air mixtures might exist at a
particular point. Modelling can therefore help to define a significant gas hazard in terms of
risk to personnel and assets. However, it should be recognised that models are not perfect
and they should not be treated as such. Some regulators require operating companies to
model flammable releases to ½ LFL. This takes into account uncertainties within the models
and the fact that gas pockets >LFL could exist beyond the predicted LFL boundary.
From a fire response perspective, the results can be used to track gas movement
and provide guidance relating to the deployment of water curtains and other barriers to gas
dispersion. More sophisticated models may even be able to portray the degree of mixing
within congested areas and allow these results to be fed into further explosion severity
analyses.
2.7.2.4 Explosion models

Regardless of model type, the approach is usually to calculate or specify maximum potential
explosion overpressures upon the ignition of gas/air (in some cases fine droplet/air) mixtures.
The results can be fed into the design of blast-resistant buildings, or used to study the effect
of plant design modifications in reducing explosion overpressures (See CIA Guidance for the
location and design of occupied buildings on chemical manufacturing sites). The technique
can also be used with very good effect for emergency response purposes and can aid the
production of ERPs by indicating evacuation requirements.
Historically, explosion models such as the TNO Multi-energy model have been used to
determine potential hazard consequences. However, this method is not always appropriate
for all VCEs and new approaches such as congestion assessment, exceedance and other CFD-
based models are typically used.
39
3 FEHM PROCESS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of risk-based FEHM was introduced in section 1. It recognises the input to fire
risk reduction from a wide range of issues and enables selection of cost-effective installation-
specific strategies that are directly relevant to real needs.
The FEHM technique involves a scenario-based evaluation of credible incidents, an
assessment of their potential consequences and quantification and implementation of the
resources required to respond to them. (It should be realised, however, that not all possible
scenarios may be foreseen, nor may excessive analysis be desirable.)
As noted in section 1.7, meeting legislation alone is insufficient because this is primarily
aimed at life safety and protecting the environment: in addition, incident consequences to
other risk drivers should be assessed.
This section expands on the key steps in the FEHM procedure and outlines typical
risk reduction options. Finally, guidance is given on selecting appropriate FEHM policies and
implementing them.
3.2 FIRE SCENARIO ANALYSIS
This forms the first step of any risk-based FEHM approach. Its purpose should be to identify
fire scenarios, and assess them in terms of incident likelihood and consequences to build
a picture of the overall risks at an installation. Depending on these risks, appropriate and
justified FEHM strategies aimed at reducing risk can be selected and implemented as part of
an overall FEHM policy.
The aim should be to recognise and select credible fire scenarios on an installation-
specific basis. The scenarios that should be considered are outlined in section 2, and include
pool fires, jet fires, BLEVEs, VCEs, and flash fires.
The first step should be to identify hazardous substances and processes along with
potential sources of ignition. Scenarios should then be described and potential consequences
outlined.
As part of this, various scenario analysis tools may be used to evaluate incident
likelihood and consequences. These can include:
−− HAZAN/HAZID/HAZOP;
−− QRA;
−− event trees;
−− fault trees;
−− estimated maximum loss;
−− risk matrices;
−− industry databases;
−− incident experience, and
−− fire and explosion modelling.
Use of these techniques should help to focus on the likelihood of potential loss of containment
events and sources of ignition, as well as indicating the likely consequences of an incident in
terms of asset loss, personnel safety, business interruption etc. Persons with good installation
knowledge and experience as well as fire hazard expertise should be involved in hazard
identification.
Risk matrices and QRA techniques are particularly useful tools in assigning 'numerical'
values of risk that can be compared against risk criteria.
40
The types of generic fire scenarios that can occur at various installations are well
understood and are described in 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Identification of major fire scenarios, hazards and hazard characteristics
Typical fire and explosion scenarios are discussed in section 2.5.

In addition to fire scenarios associated with plant/storage areas, other fire hazards
and events such as cellulosic fires and electrical fires should be identified for likelihood
and consequences. External fire sources that are not immediately obvious should also be
considered. These may include those initiated by events such as tanker fires, collisions,
vegetation fires, etc.
Each identified hazardous event might result in a range of possible scenarios. Usually,
scenarios should be selected that represent the most significant consequences to personnel,
production and the environment. The most appropriate way is to carry out a risk analysis
aimed at identifying these, which also takes incident likelihood and consequences into
account. Following this, it should be easier to select credible design events meriting risk
reduction options and further, define the role of fire prevention and protection systems in
reducing risk.
In most cases, it is impractical to consider every possible scenario and a balance
should be struck between addressing larger, less frequent scenarios that could cause more
damaging consequences and smaller, potentially more frequent events that could lead to
escalation or significant localised damage.
An example of a smaller, more frequent event might be fire resulting from an ignited
pump seal release or a localised fire in an electrical cabinet – both of which may have
significant consequences in terms of production continuity.
An example of a larger, less frequent event may be a full surface tank fire or large
bund fire causing extensive damage with high consequences.
Consequently, risk-based legislation should be satisfied if a range of credible scenarios
is addressed as well as a smaller selection of larger, less credible but nevertheless potentially
high consequence events.
In selecting and evaluating scenarios, consideration should be given to the following factors:
−− installation design features;
−− human factors (e.g. human failure potential);
−− failure modes;
−− likelihood of failure/release;
−− locations of releases/potential release points;
−− fuel characteristics (density, flash point, composition, ignition temperature, heat
output etc.);
−− release characteristics (e.g. pressure, temperature etc.);
−− degree of isolation/quantity of isolated inventory;
−− release size;
−− probability of ignition;
−− ignition location;
−− mitigation measures, and
−− potential consequences (life safety, environment, production).
A useful way of selecting scenarios is to draw up a list of installations or plant areas
and examine possible generic fire or explosion events (e.g. pool fires) for likelihood and
consequences. In other words, the question should be asked, "how likely is this scenario,
and what consequences will it have?" A range of scenario analysis tools is available for this
purpose (see 3.2), but to assist, a list of typical scenarios for various installations and areas is
given in 3.2.2.
41
As well as the initial effects of fire or explosion, consideration should be given to

whether and how escalation can occur and if this can affect personnel, adjacent plant and
the environment. Escalation might also render fixed fire-fighting installations ineffective, and
this should be addressed as part of the scenario analysis.
Escalation analysis can be carried out by using event and/or fault tree methods,
HAZOP, etc. Such scenario analysis tools are useful in identifying potential escalation routes
and failures, which might result in a particular level of risk. Using such techniques should
identify additional risk reduction options to reduce either likelihood or consequences.
Industry databases and incident experience should also be used to estimate the
likelihood of failures leading to incidents (initiating events) or escalation from given fire or
explosion scenarios. Where failure rate data or any other data are used within an installation’s
risk analysis it should be authoritative, documented and periodically reviewed for validity.
3.2.2 Typical scenarios for various installations/areas
Scenario analysis tools (see 3.2) should be used to define potential fire and/or explosion
events.
It should be remembered that any fire incident is possible; however, whether it is
credible or not is a decision that should be made based on incident likelihood and through
examination of potential consequences.
Incident probabilities and consequences vary depending on the nature of the event
or installation, and each scenario should be assessed on an individual basis.
For major petroleum fires to occur there would need to be a loss of containment
(i.e. a release or spill) and a source of ignition. Process parameters such as temperature
and pressure as well as the size and nature of any release will determine the type of fire or
explosion event anticipated.
The following sub-sections set out installations/ areas that should be assessed.
3.2.2.1 Process areas

In many process areas, flammable fluids are typically at elevated temperatures and pressures.
Releases may be in the form of liquid sprays, or vapour jets depending on these and other
factors such as hole size, substance composition, release location and point of ignition. Also,
releases from atmospheric plant could result in product accumulation under vessels and other
plant. Scenario analysis should identify what type of event could be expected.
Some examples of typical generic fire/explosion events for process areas include:
−− flammable or toxic product releases (liquid or gaseous phase);

−− VCE, e.g. as a result of delayed ignition of flammable vapour;
−− pool fires, e.g. because of an ignited flammable liquid spill;
−− spray fires, e.g. from a pressurised flammable liquid release, and
−− jet fires, e.g. ignition of a pressurised vapour release.
Remote product pumps and manifolds are also potential sites for the above, and should be
included in any analysis. Consequence modelling should be used to estimate the size and
composition of releases as well as their consequences (e.g. flame lengths, pool size and
flammable regions).
3.2.2.2 Atmospheric storage tanks

The types of scenario for atmospheric storage tanks are well understood. The type of event
depends to a large degree on tank construction, safety features, product volatility and
potential for loss of containment. Typical fire scenarios that should be considered include, for
particular tank types:
42
−− vent fires (fixed roof tanks or internal floating roof tanks);

−− vapour space explosion (fixed roof tanks);
−− contained and uncontained spill fires;
−− rim seal fires (open-top floating roof tanks);
−− pontoon explosion (open-top floating roof tanks);
−− spill-on-roof fires (open-top floating roof tanks);
−− full surface fires (fixed, internal and open-top floating roof tanks), and
−− multi-tank and/or multi-bund fire (as might occur following VCE or due to escalation).
These events are also discussed in section 2.5.

Incident probabilities and escalation routes for these events are well-documented in
industry databases such as LASTFIRE. (In most cases, large events such as full surface fires
result from an initiating fire such as a spill-on-roof fire or vapour space explosion.)
As well as bulk storage areas (tank farms) there may be external areas for
petroleum storage in intermediate bulk containers (IBCs). For guidance on safe storage, see
HSE HSG 51.
3.2.2.3 Pressurised storage tanks

The types of scenarios associated with spheres or bullets containing pressurised LPG that
should be considered include:
−− combined jet/pool fire;
−− vent fire, e.g. from ignition of LPG released from a pressure relief valve (PRV);
−− jet fire, e.g. resulting from ignition of a release from valves or pipework, and
−− BLEVE.
In some cases, a pool fire results from an initial jet fire if the tank is depressurised (due
to product burn-off or emergency shutdown (ESD)). The most likely locations for jet fires
are from associated pipework or valves. BLEVE is a potentially high consequence event that
should be considered (see section 2.3.3.3).
3.2.2.4 Road tanker vehicle and rail tank wagon loading areas
Road tanker vehicle and rail tank wagon loading areas often handle a wide variety of
flammable substances ranging from LPGs and hydrogen to bitumens, as well as process
intermediates and other refined products. Product transfers through loading and unloading
arms or hoses are potentially hazardous operations. Most fire events occur through ignition
of accidental product loss of containment due to breakout of hoses and couplings, etc.
In such cases, a pool fire could occur if the spill is ignited. Also, liquefied gases or
other very volatile products may ignite close to the source of release and cause a flash fire
or jet fire.
BLEVE should also be considered as a possibility if a prolonged pool or jet fire is likely
close to, or under road tanker vehicles and rail wagon tanks containing liquefied gases and
other high-energy products.
3.2.2.5 Jetties
As well as spill fires resulting from accidental releases of product from loading or unloading
arms, ship fire incidents should also be considered, since they may threaten jetties. A VCE
is also a potential scenario in areas of confinement or semi-confinement, particularly where
large releases of liquefied gases are possible.
In addition, flash fires and/or spill fires can result at jetty 'roots' around product
pipelines, especially if there is potential for loss of containment around motorised
valves. Fires at jetties and marine berths often have the potential to cause significant
business interruption, and so risk reduction measures should be considered carefully.
See ICS/OCIMF/IAPH International safety guide for oil tankers and terminals (ISGOTT).
43
3.2.2.6 Electrical/switchgear facilities and substations

Petroleum installations invariably include critical switchgear, electrical installations, substations/
transformers and associated cabling. Some of these may utilise oil-filled equipment and the
risk of pool fires should be considered. For electrical installations, fires can originate from
faulty equipment. Initially, fires may smoulder and go unnoticed if appropriate fire detection
is not installed.
Fires can also occur within computing facilities, motor control centres (MCCs) and
other critical enclosures. They can originate from the equipment itself, mechanical media,
or auxiliary equipment such as air conditioning units or cooling systems. Such fires may only
cause localised damage but could have an effect on production continuity, data integrity, and
may also cause major operational disruption and process upsets, which may in turn lead to
secondary events such as fires.
3.2.2.7 Turbine enclosures

Turbine enclosures may utilise flammable substances such as oil, hydraulic fluids and fuel gas.
They generally consist of the following areas and potential fire scenarios:
−− control compartment – electrical fires;

−− auxiliary compartment – liquid jet, gas jet and electrical fires;
−− turbine compartment – liquid jet, gas jet and electrical fires, short duration gas
explosion, and
−− generator – deep-seated electrical fires.
Each of these potential fire incidents should be reviewed as part of a risk analysis.
3.2.2.8 Buildings
Support buildings and offices are also potential fire locations and credible fire scenarios
should be addressed. Fires including cellulosic (i.e. ordinarily combustible materials) as well as
flammable liquids and gases should be examined. Some examples of potential fire locations
can include:
−− control rooms;
−− laboratories;
−− warehouses/ storage areas;
−− workshops;
−− pump houses;
−− generator enclosures;
−− administration buildings, and
−− accommodation.
Where appropriate, factors such as the fire load, presence of flammable gases and liquids
and hazardous processes such as hot work, should be taken into account to determine fire
scenarios.
Fires in storage areas containing bulk storage of flammable liquids in IBCs should also
be considered. Tests have demonstrated that when ignited (e.g. by oil-soaked rags or paper
under IBC valves) containers can melt dramatically in a matter of seconds and running pool
fires can spread over a large area. Similarly, idle pallet storage in these areas represents a fire
hazard.
44
3.2.3 Design/credible scenario selection
Credible scenarios that are selected from risk assessments as meriting further risk reduction
options because of their likelihood or consequences can be termed 'design events'. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.1 where design events can consist of one or more prevention, control
and mitigation measures for identified fire hazards and scenarios.
As part of this process the role of prevention, control and mitigation measures,
including those of fire prevention and protection systems should be identified. For further
guidance, see section 8.9.3. For example, the role of a gaseous fire protection system might
be to control or extinguish a deep-seated electrical fire within an enclosure.
The selection of appropriate design events varies between installations but the
following factors should be considered:
−− Whether to include risk reduction for less frequent, catastrophic events.

−− What risk tolerability criteria to use (e.g. using HSE Reducing risk, protecting people).
−− Whether risk reduction is appropriate.
−− What ESD time should be used.
−− Whether the fire/explosion characteristics merit risk reduction.
−− What other emergency response measures should be implemented.
−−
Fire hazard Identify prevention, Define system

Define systemrole and
role
Fire hazard Identify prevention,
identification control
controland
andmitigation
mitigation develop
and performance
develop performance
identification measures specification
measures
Fire
Firetype
type Consequences
Consequences
Design events
Fire size Duration
Duration
Probabilities
Probabilities Fire
Fire products
Fire Products
products
Figure 3.1: Design/credible scenario selection
45
CONSEQUENCES INCREASING PROBABILITY

Has Has Happens Happens
occurred in occurred several several
Environment
petroleum in-house times per times per
Reputation
Life safety
industry year in- year at
Business
house location
Asset
Slight Slight Slight Slight Slight
injury effect effect damage impact
INCREASING CONSEQUENCES
9 1
Minor Minor Minor Minor Limited

injury effect local damage impact 2
effect
7
Major Localised Major Localised Consid-
impact effect local damage erable 4
effect impact
6
Single Major Massive Major National
fatality effect effect damage impact 2 3
4 6
Multiple Massive Total ex- Extensive Interna-
fatality effect tended damage tional 5
effect impact 8
7
Appropriate strategies for incidents

Strategy 1 - Minor incident intervention only
Strategy 2 - Dedicated fixed fire protection systems } Either strategy dependent on facility location
Strategy 3 - Systems/equipment plus back-up
Strategy 4 - Systems/equipment plus fire service } Either strategy dependent on facility location
Incident listing
1 Small incidents 6 Cone roof tank
2 Pump seal 7 Floating roof tank
3 Transportation incident 8 Compressor incident
4 Turbine enclosure 9 Buildings incident
5 Vessel incident
Figure 3.2: Scenario risk matrix
In some cases, CBA should be applied to determine whether to design and implement risk
reduction options. For example, it might be shown that the annual statistical costs associated
with an incident far exceed the amortised costs of implementing a particular risk reduction
option. This is explained further in 3.3.
Regulators and authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) expect the implementation of
good practice risk reduction measures at the time of implementation as a minimum standard
(or demonstration that the design approach is of an equivalent protective standard). An
example might be the implementation of linear heat detection (LHD) and a foam system
46
offering rim seal protection on an open top floating roof storage tank storing flammable
liquids. In addition, operating companies may wish to carry out CBA to decide whether an
even higher level of measures is justifiable beyond good practice at the time of implementation
or in the future. Using the example quoted this could be the implementation of a foam
system offering full surface protection and not just rim seal coverage, justified on the basis
of tank criticality, effectiveness of response etc. As time goes by, standards and knowledge
also improve. Operating companies may be expected to benchmark their existing measures
against what would be expected at that time for new build facilities and implement upgrades
that are reasonably practicable (using CBA as an aid if necessary). Should there be consensus
that a higher standard be applied according to good practice at the time, further upgrade
may be necessary.
In general, CBA should not be used to justify measures that are considered to be less
than good practice (or its equivalent standard) at a given time.
A particularly effective way of selecting appropriate design events is to use a risk
matrix approach in which potential scenarios are superimposed on a grid. Both incident
likelihood and consequences can be assigned numerical values to obtain an overall risk 'score'.
Risk reduction measures can then be considered for incidents above a certain threshold and
incident strategies can be developed.
An example risk matrix based on one used in the exploration and production sector
is shown in Figure 3.2. Such a matrix can be easily adapted for use at petroleum refineries
and bulk storage installations.
In Figure 3.2, credible scenarios are identified and appropriate strategies are matched
to incident risk. Thus, high-risk events might merit fire-fighting systems and possibly ER
intervention. Events that are considered lower risk (top left of the matrix) might benefit from
minor intervention only (e.g. using portable fire-fighting equipment).
A more quantitative way of determining whether scenarios are credible is to reference
their likelihood to risk tolerability criteria (Figure 3.3). For example in the UK, scenarios with
a frequency reducing from the intolerable criteria set out in Figure 3.3 to individual risk per
annum (IRPA) of fatality of one in a million years should be subject to risk reduction measures
that are reasonably practicable in line with a methodology acceptable to the COMAH CA. For
scenarios giving rise to fatality IRPA of between one in a million years and one in ten million
years, further risk reduction measures should be considered where they are considered
reasonable or cost effective. In addition, in the COMAH CA also expects scenarios that are
credible to be referenced against societal risk and environmental risk tolerability criteria.
47
Workforce Public
Intolerable:
Risk is so high that it is unacceptable
Intolerable
unless extraordinary circumstances
apply. Risk reduction must be -3
-4
IRPA=10 IRPA=10
undertaken.
Tolerable if ALARP: Tolerable if

Risk reduction measures should be ALARP
implemented where reasonably
-6 -6
practicable. IRPA=10 IRPA=10
Broadly tolerable:
Risk should be managed to ensure Broadly
that it remains within this region, and, tolerable
if practicable, continually reduced.
Figure 3.3: Individual risk triangle showing the UK HSE criteria
Decisions on which risk reduction measures are to be implemented should therefore be

based on assessed risk. Having made the decisions, publications (codes of practice, design
standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) on fire protection system design should be used to
give guidance on implementation.
Also, once appropriate risk reduction measures have been identified (see 3.3) good
fire engineering judgement and practices should be applied for design and implementation.
As part of this, a framework of FSIA should be adopted (see 3.5.2).
3.2.4 Fire and explosion modelling
Typical approaches to fire and explosion modelling are described in section 2.7.
It should be noted that modelling can only give an approximate indication of the
likely consequences of a particular fire or explosion scenario. It should not be used to
'predict' the effects of an incident with certainty. Although modelling techniques are now
very advanced, interpretation requires great skill and care. Consequently, the results should
be used as 'guidance' to assist in developing appropriate response strategies (i.e. as a tool to
help decide policies, rather than to decide them alone).
3.3 RISK REDUCTION OPTIONS
Fire and explosion risk reduction can be achieved in many ways:
−− elimination or substitution of fire and explosion hazards;

−− fire and explosion prevention measures;
−− fire, liquid and gas detection;
−− emergency shutdown;
−− PFP;
−− AFP, and
−− salvage.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
48
Hazard elimination Hazard substitution
Training Source of ignition Alarm systems

PFP
control
Process design/ Emergency shutdown
control Fire, liquid and
gas detection Access control
Plant layout
Inventory control First-aid fire equipment

Area classification Fire protection
FEHM systems
Escape routes Fire and Rescue Service
Salvage
Mobile equipment
Plant maintenance Process sparing Contigency planning
Operating Spillage Insurance
practice control Process reinstatement Mutual aid
Figure 3.4: FEHM risk reduction options
The approach should be to consider risk reduction options in the following order of
importance:
−− fire prevention;
−− fire, liquid and gas detection;
−− AFP and PFP measures;
−− fire response requirements.
Regardless of the method(s) of risk reduction employed, each should be assessed in

terms of its contribution to overall FEHM.
Guidance is given on the most common risk reduction options in this publication.
To locate the appropriate section, see Table 3.1. However, for clarity the following general
measures should be addressed:
−− inventory control;
−− installation layout to minimise fire consequences;
−− flammable and combustible product control and containment;
−− safe working practices and procedures including source of ignition control;
−− fire, liquid and flammable gas detection measures;
−− alarm systems and communications;
−− escape and evacuation arrangements;
−− fire control and extinguishment (fixed, semi-fixed or mobile systems);
−− emergency procedures and plans;
−− pre-fire planning, and
−− fire response training.
Alternative prevention, protection and mitigation measures should be evaluated. The most
appropriate way of achieving this is to adopt a scenario worksheet approach in which
scenarios are identified, current risk reduction measures are outlined and potential risk
reduction measures are evaluated for appropriateness and effectiveness. As part of this,
necessary resources (i.e. prevention, protection and fire response measures) should be listed.
49
Table 3.1: Risk reduction options guidance
Risk reduction option Section

Fire prevention measures
- Control of flammable substances 4.2
- Atmospheric monitoring 4.3
- Control of sources of ignition 4.4
- Permit-to-work systems 4.5
- Maintainance practices 4.6
- Housekeeping 4.7
- Installation layout 4.8
- Buildings fire precautions 4.9
Flammable gas detection 5.2.1
Toxic gas detection 5.2.2
Liquid leak detection 5.2.3
Fire detection 5.2.4
Passive fire protection (PFP) - Options, applications and design issues 6.2
Active fire protection (AFP) 6.3
Extinguishing media 6.4
- Water 6.4.2
- Foam 6.4.3
- Dry powder (dry chemical) 6.4.4
- Gaseous agents 6.4.5
- Fixed systems - Options, applications and design issues 6.5
- Fire water systems 6.5.2
- Water spray systems 6.5.3
- Fixed monitors 6.5.4
- Sprinkler systems 6.5.5
- Water mist systems 6.5.6
- Foam systems 6.5.7
- Dry powder (dry chemical) systems 6.5.8
- Gaseous systems 6.5.9
Fire equipment 7.6
- Portable and mobile fire-fighting equipment 7.6.1
Any identified FEHM shortfalls should also be identified, and risk reduction measures should
be considered to correct these.
Risk reduction measures should aim to reduce either likelihood or consequences, or both:
Risk = likelihood x consequences

Reduced likelihood or consequences = reduced risk
CBA is one way of justifying a particular risk reduction option (or options) in line with
ALARP-type principles. See HSE Reducing risks, protecting people (‘R2P2’).
A risk reduction measure is cost beneficial if the cost of the following quantitative
relationship applies:
{(Cwithout x Y without) - (Cwith x Ywith)} x Prcontrol > cost of implementation
where:
Cwithout is expected cost of incident without option in place;
Cwith is expected cost of incident with option in place;
Ywithout is expected statistical frequency of the initiating event if option is not
implemented;
50
Ywith is expected statistical frequency of the initiating event if option is

implemented, and
Prcontrol is probability that option will perform as required.
3.4 FEHM POLICY
As every installation operates in its own particular environment, the optimum, cost-effective
incident consequence reduction strategy/policy should be developed taking into account
local conditions, the installation’s criticality and an incident’s potential effect on life safety, the
environment, assets, business continuity, reputation and the requirements of local regulators.
Previously, fire protection practices used in major hazards industries have been very
prescriptive in approach and were not based on the real needs of a particular installation.
However, due to major incident experience, legislators/regulators and standards bodies, such
as HSE (UK) and NFPA (USA) advocate goal-setting performance-based standards within a
safety report. Consequently, requirements for cost effective fire protection resources should
be assessed and justified based on credible major incident scenarios.
Essentially, if both parties adopt risk-based approaches to FEHM then there should
be no conflict. Policies based on meeting legislation alone are not necessarily appropriate or
sufficient.
As noted in section 1.7, a number of drivers should be taken into account when
developing appropriate FEHM policies.
Most companies adopt a policy somewhere in between providing a 'total protection'
policy and adopting a 'burndown' policy; see Figure 3.5.
Thus, the overall aim should be to establish, in an auditable way, a formal, installation-
specific justified and cost effective fire and explosion damage mitigation policy appropriate to
the criticality and overall needs of the installation.
The most appropriate way to achieve this is to use fire and explosion scenario
analysis. Following this, appropriate and justified risk reduction measures should be adopted
and implemented.
Burndown
policy
FEHM policy Total
protection
policy
In practice, most facilities

will adopt a policy Full automatic shutdown.
No damage mitigation somewhere between the Comprehensive passive protection.
measures
two extremes Sophisticated automatic fire and gas
detection/protection systems.
Full portable/mobile equipment
back-up.
Figure 3.5: FEHM policy options
Many publications (codes of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) are
available and these should be used where appropriate to assist in implementing risk reduction
options appropriate to the FEHM policy.
In many cases, protection over and above the requirements of these publications
may be required. If this is the case, all assumptions and design philosophies should be stated.
Once a policy has been decided and appropriate risk reduction measures (see 3.3)
have been implemented, the policy should be maintained through relevant practices and
51
procedures, system testing and maintenance, preplanning etc. For more guidance, see section 8.
Regulators are typically less concerned about the loss of business assets (business risks)
than the health and safety of people. Any FEHM policy should ensure that risks to persons are
tolerable if ALARP. In the UK, allowed boundaries for fatality are given in publications such as
in HSE Reducing risks, protecting people (‘R2P2’).
3.5 IMPLEMENTATION
To effectively implement FEHM policy as part of a SHEMS, the following issues should be addressed:
−− practices and procedures;

−− SIA:
- inspection and testing of fire systems;
−− emergency response preplanning:
- fire response training;
- fire response exercises;
−− competency development, and
−− monitoring.
3.5.1 Practices and procedures
This refers to various aspects of FEHM such as:
−− continuing hazard identification, assessment and control;

−− incident and near-miss reporting;
−− safe operating procedures and working practices;
−− safety induction;
−− control of sources of ignition;
−− PTW systems;
−− protective clothing, and
−− pre-planned maintenance (PPM).
Guidance on some of these issues is given in Section 4.
3.5.2 Fire systems integrity assurance
FSIA is a structured approach aimed at ensuring the implementation of test, inspection and
maintenance procedures for fire systems. For guidance, see section 8.9.3.
3.5.3 Inspection and testing of fire systems
Test procedures should be based on ensuring that critical performance criteria defined at the
design stage are met, and maintenance schedules on ensuring that any system problems
should be quickly identified. When defining schedules and procedures, the reliability of
system components and the levels of risk reduction that the system is designed to provide
should be considered. For example, a system that is critical to life safety may require a more
rigorous testing regime than a similar system designed purely for asset protection.
Any system testing should be relevant to the role of the system and either a
direct measure of functional performance criteria or a measurement of a parameter that
demonstrates that the functional performance can be achieved.
If appropriate schedules and procedures are unable to be drawn up, then guidance
should be sought from manufacturers’ recommendations and recognised publications (codes
of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc. – see annex I.3.), recognising
52
that inspection and test frequencies may need to be increased if operating in a particularly
harsh environment where heat, humidity and dirty conditions are the norm. For guidance on
inspection and maintenance of fire equipment, see section 7.6.3.
3.5.4 Fire response pre-planning
The only way that fire incidents can be handled safely and effectively is to ensure there is in
place a formalised and justified strategy that everybody involved understands, pre-plans are
available to remind personnel of their role and exercises are carried out to test the pre-plans
and ensure that they are workable and relevant. Even if the FEHM policy is burndown, an
appropriate ERP should be developed to formalise it.
Strategic incident pre-plans should be developed addressing non-fire response issues
such as production continuity, media reporting, human resources and other aspects of
incident management. For further guidance, see section 8.3.
The implementation of risk-based legislation (e.g. under the Seveso II Directive)
specifically requires operating companies to demonstrate emergency preparedness and to
develop, maintain and exercise pre-fire plans for major incidents. These should serve as
training aids for ERs, enabling desktop and practical exercise response performance to be
measured. For further guidance, see section 8.7.
Pre-fire plans should be supported by scenario-specific ERPs (see section 8.8) that
provide instant written instructions, guidance and helpful information for operatives and ERs
to assist them at the critical early stage of a major incident ‘on the ground’. In addition, they
should provide sufficient potential hazard information to enable informed decisions to be
taken regarding the safety of personnel responding to the incident. As part of this, regular
exercises and ER competencies should be implemented. For further guidance, see section 8.9.1.
Pre-planning is only of value if the equipment that is going to be used in the fire
response is well-maintained and the ERPs are exercised regularly to check that they are
workable and that those involved are competent and aware of their role in a real incident.
3.5.5 Competency development
As well as ER competencies, personnel involved with the upkeep of fire and other safety
systems as well as plant maintenance should undergo regular review and assessment. This
should be aimed at ensuring that personnel have the necessary skills to work safely and
contribute to continuing fire safety. Operating companies also have an important role to
play in emergency response through isolation, process control and potentially, ‘first aid’
fire response and so they too should receive regular review and assessment with a view to
developing emergency response competency. For further guidance, see section 8.6.
3.5.6 Monitoring
Monitoring processes should be implemented as part of a management of change approach

to ensure that:
−− Incidents and near misses are recorded and reviewed.

−− Fire systems maintenance practices and testing procedures are reviewed for effectiveness.
−− Personnel training and competencies are kept up-to-date.
−− Fire risk assessments are periodically recorded and reviewed.
−− Risk reduction measures are reviewed for continuing effectiveness.
−− Practices and procedures are updated or revised where necessary.
−− Fire response training is regularly reviewed.
−− Safety education and training are effectively implemented and updated.
−− Safe working practices are followed.
53
4 FIRE PREVENTION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This section describes several means of hazard avoidance that aim to prevent unplanned
releases and avoid their ignition.
Fire prevention can be considered as the first step in effective FEHM; it includes many
aspects of installation design, operation, inspection and maintenance aimed at avoiding fire
and explosion by preventing accidental releases and avoiding ignition.
Operating companies should in the first instance minimise the likelihood of fire or
explosion before considering other risk reduction options such as fire, liquid and flammable
gas detection and PFP or AFP systems.
This can be achieved with the following preventative measures:
−− control of flammable substances (and other combustible materials);

−− atmospheric monitoring (e.g. flammable gas detection);
−− control of sources of ignition (e.g. through hazardous area classification);
−− controlling hazardous work (e.g. PTW systems);
−− using well-designed maintenance schedules and procedures;
−− good housekeeping to minimise fire hazards;
−− effective installation layout to minimise fire risks and escalation potential,
−− buildings fire risk assessment and fire prevention.
4.2 CONTROL OF FLAMMABLE SUBSTANCES
4.2.1 General principles
The petroleum industry handles a wide range of products derived from crude oil that are
processed in downstream units; they range from LPGs and hydrogen to bitumens, as well
as process intermediates and other refined products. If released at storage or processing
conditions these streams behave differently, forming gases, sprays or pools of liquid. They
may freeze or spontaneously ignite and the vapours may rise or form dense, low-lying clouds.
Additionally, releases may be acutely toxic if they contain hydrogen sulfide (H2S).
Operating companies should know the properties of the substances they handle, as
well as their location at an installation. In addition, they should know immediately of losses
of containment so that they can activate the appropriate ERP.
Some substances may react or represent an increased fire hazard if in contact
with others, e.g. substances that are flammable and those classified as oxidising agents.
Hazard identification and risk assessment should be undertaken to determine the need for
segregation, recognising that mixing of incompatible substances could occur within drainage
systems or anywhere that leaks/spills may accumulate.
Incident prevention should focus primarily on prevention of loss of containment.
There should be appropriate procedures and systems in place for the control and monitoring
of substances transferred to, from, and around an installation. Particular emphasis should be
on well-designed and maintained instrumentation with back-up procedures. For example,
arrangements to ensure receiving installations have ultimate control of tank filling should
be implemented where appropriate; tank gauging systems and independent high-integrity
automatic operating overfill protection systems meeting the requirements of publications (e.g.
codes of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) for safety instrumented
systems should also be provided.
54
In the UK, DSEAR require operating companies to put control measures in place to
eliminate risks from dangerous substances, or reduce them as far as is reasonably practicable.
Where it is not possible to eliminate the risk completely employers must take measures to
control risks and reduce the severity (mitigate) the effects of any fire or explosion.
The best solution is to eliminate the risk completely by replacing the dangerous
substance with another substance, or using a different work process: this is called substitution.
In practice this may be difficult to achieve – but it may be possible to reduce the risk by
using a less dangerous substance. For example, replacing a low flashpoint liquid with a high
flashpoint one. In other situations it may not be possible to replace the dangerous substance:
for example, it would not be practical to replace petrol with another substance at a filling station.
Where the risk cannot be eliminated, DSEAR require control measures to be applied
in the following priority order:
−− reduce the quantity of dangerous substances to a minimum;

−− avoid or minimise releases of dangerous substances;
−− control releases of dangerous substances at source;
−− prevent the formation of a flammable atmosphere (for example, through ventilation);
−− collect, contain and remove any releases to a safe place;
−− avoid sources of ignition;
−− avoid adverse conditions that could lead to danger (for example, exceeding the limits
of temperature or control settings),
−− keep incompatible substances apart.
4.2.2 Liquid releases
Many potential releases (e.g. from leaking valves or pipe joints) can be eliminated by good
operational and maintenance practices; however, small liquid leaks and discharges can
sometimes occur during normal plant operation (e.g. from manual and continuous analyser
sampling). Wherever possible, releases should be contained within secondary containment
and either returned to the plant or to a closed system. Liquid leaks should be collected and
removed safely. Tertiary containment can be used to prevent petroleum liquid carry-over to
other areas, or to direct larger spills to a safe area, and prevent fire spread in the event of
ignition.
4.2.3 Flammable atmospheres
Flammable atmospheres are often present at petroleum refineries or bulk storage installations.
Small quantities of vapour may exist during routine operations, in the vicinity of loading and
unloading operations, or released from vents (e.g. as a result of the normal, daily 'breathing
cycle' of a tank).
Prevention measures should be implemented where applicable to minimise vapour
releases to atmosphere. These may include:
−− inerting;
−− vapour recovery;
−− closed system design and/or avoiding open system design;
−− prompt maintenance, and
−− venting (e.g. P/V vents).
In many cases, environmental requirements should minimise emissions; for example, by using
primary and secondary seals in the rim seal areas of floating roof tanks.
Flammable atmospheres can also arise as a result of accidental spills, loss of
containment resulting from failure of vessels or pipework, human failure (e.g. error), or
simply because flammable concentrations of vapour are expected to occur in certain areas
from time to time.
55
Flammable atmospheres can also be formed within a nominally empty tank due to
residual product adhering to the tank walls and the roof underside. Vapours emitted present
a fire and/or explosion risk, particularly during filling or tank cleaning operations.
4.2.4 Isolation/depressurisation
The amount of fuel involved in a release can be minimised by plant isolation and
depressurisation. This should reduce the likelihood of a large fire and should also reduce fire
duration and consequences in the event of ignition.
Storage tanks, vessels and equipment containing large inventories of flammable
substances should be equipped with isolation valves that can be safely operated in
an emergency situation or are safely accessible in emergency conditions; remotely or
automatically operated isolation valves should be considered. (Emergency isolation should
not put ERs, whether operations personnel or fire responders, into unsafe situations such
as walking through a pool of flammable liquid, entering a potentially flammable gas cloud,
or being exposed to high levels of radiant heat.) Valves to relief systems should normally be
locked open. However, due to radiation from fires, it may not always be possible to operate
valves manually and automatic 'fire safe' isolation valves should be provided, or otherwise
the valve(s) should be situated outside any potential fire area. Location should be the subject
of fire scenario analysis and potential impingement/exposure to radiant heat.
Remotely operated valves used for isolation of flammable substances and associated
power supply lines should be fitted with PFP if they are in the potential fire zone near to
the protected equipment and the valve does not fail in the safe position. The valves should
be routinely tested, on-line if practicable, or as part of shut down and start-up procedures,
and their use should be included or simulated in emergency exercises (see HSE Emergency
isolation of process plant in the chemical industry).
Draining and depressurising valves should be provided for clearing material from
a system when normal process lines cannot be used. They should be routed to a recovery
system or flare rather than to atmosphere or grade.
4.2.5 Flammable gas/vapour dispersion
The aim of gas dispersion is to reduce the concentration of any flammable gas to below the
LFL as quickly as possible and within the shortest distance from the leak. DRA (see section
8.9.2) should be undertaken to determine if dispersion measures can be taken safely.
Dispersion can be achieved by using fixed water sprays, monitors or fan spray nozzles
positioned to aid the dispersion of gas into the atmosphere and divert it away from fixed
sources of ignition in plant areas, recognising that water sprays may also entrain air to a
gas ‘cloud’, inadvertently optimising conditions for combustion. Constant monitoring of gas
concentration should therefore be undertaken.
If provided for gas dispersion, fixed sprays and monitors should be located where
experience has shown there is the greatest likelihood of serious releases. For deployment
techniques, see section 7.2.1.3 and section 7.6.1.9, respectively.
Adequate collection, drainage and oil/water separator facilities should be provided
for water used for gas dispersion purposes. Also, gas releases may be accompanied by
flammable liquid and this too should be managed.
4.3 ATMOSPHERIC MONITORING
Installations processing flammable gases or liquids where there is a possibility of a loss of

containment producing a flammable atmosphere, may require flammable gas detectors to
give advance warning of a developing hazard. This is especially applicable to installations that
56
have a small operational staff and where large sections are virtually unstaffed or staffed only
during daytime working hours.
A scenario-based review of potential gas or vapour release incidents should be carried
out, preferably with the use of dispersion modelling. Appropriate flammable gas detectors
may be selected to detect foreseeable releases. The purpose of flammable gas detection
should be to give enough warning of potentially hazardous gas concentrations in plant and
building areas. Detection should be set to alarm at a point well before the LFL is reached
– typically < 20 % LFL. Flammable gas detectors can be used to perform executive actions
such as plant shutdown, isolation or damper activation to prevent ingress of flammable
atmospheres into buildings.
When selecting flammable gas detectors, units should be chosen that are stable and
reliable in the particular environment of the plant. Most flammable gas detectors include
'reference sensors' that are able to recognise potentially spurious alarm sources such as fog,
dust, humidity, etc.
For guidance see IEC 60079-29-2.
4.4 CONTROL OF SOURCES OF IGNITION
4.4.1 General
Control of sources of ignition refers to the practices and procedures that aim to prevent
accidental ignition of petroleum and its products. Potential sources of ignition include, but
are not limited to:
−− naked flames;
−− welding and cutting equipment;
−− smoking;
−− friction and sparks generated by equipment and/or vehicles;
−− sparks generated by the failure or collapse of equipment or structures;
−− thermite sparks;
−− electrical lighting;
−− electrical equipment not suitably certified for use in a hazardous area;
−− lightning strikes.
−− hot surfaces;
−− radio equipment/ mobile telephones;
−− static electricity;
−− incandescent particles;
−− pyrophoric scale/deposits (e.g. in crude oil/ bitumen tanks);
−− flares, and
−− external sources.
See BS EN 1127-1 for a more comprehensive list of potential sources of ignition.

One or more of the above sources can ignite combustible solids, flammable liquids
and flammable atmospheres. A systematic study of potential sources of ignition should be
carried out utilising risk assessment processes such as those outlined in the UK by DSEAR and
other relevant guidance addressing ignition potential.
To control ignition risks, the following precautions should be adopted:

−− Controlling hot work and grinding through PTW procedures (see 4.5).
−− Declaring hazardous areas (see EI Area classification code for installations handling
flammable fluids).
−− Prohibiting smoking, except in designated 'safe' areas.
57
−− Vehicular restrictions, where practicable.

−− Prohibiting unsuitably certified electrical, electronic and mechanical equipment.
−− Wearing of anti-static PPE (e.g. clothing and footwear).
−− Following anti-static procedures when loading/unloading.
The above controls are usually only necessary within source of ignition control areas.
However, when applied across an installation they can help to reinforce good FEHM as part
of a SHEMS or overall safety culture. Control of sources of ignition should be reinforced
regularly with the help of signage, and for visitors and contractors incorporated within an
installation induction process.
Arrangements should be made so that if there is an accidental release of flammable
material, any electrical or mechanical equipment that may be a source of ignition is isolated.
This can either be by an automatic system or by emergency procedure.
4.4.2 Static electricity
Static electricity is generated when relative movement results in charge separation and
accumulation on different parts of plant, people or liquid surfaces. If the plant is not earthed
or if the liquid has a low electrical conductivity, the charges may accumulate more quickly
than they can dissipate and cause an electrical discharge to adjacent equipment in the form
of a spark. With sufficient energy this could ignite a flammable atmosphere, depending on
the ignition energy of the gas or vapour concerned.
Static electricity is undoubtedly a major source of ignition, particularly during tanker
loading/unloading, product transfer and gauging operations. For static electricity to cause
fire or explosion, four conditions need to be met:
−− A means of static generation.

−− A means of accumulating charge and maintaining a potential difference.
−− A spark with sufficient energy.
−− A spark in a flammable atmosphere.
Operations and process conditions susceptible to static electricity generation in the petroleum
industry include:
−− High velocity and turbulent mixing e.g. in pipelines, at the discharge of jets from
nozzles, tank mixing, etc.
−− Filtration, particularly through micropore elements, with a large surface area exposed
to fluid flow.
−− Liquid droplets or foam falling through a vapour, e.g. spray or mist formation in
vapour spaces.
−− Splash filling of tanks or tankers.
−− Application of fire-fighting foam to an exposed fuel.
−− Settling of water droplets through petroleum liquids, e.g. in tankage.
−− Bubbling of gas or air through petroleum liquids.
−− Water jetting in tank cleaning.
−− Movements of belts and sheets of material over pulleys and rollers.
−− Movement of vehicles, fans, persons etc.
−− Movement or transport of powders.
−− Release of steam to the atmosphere.
Anti-static precautions can include:
−− Earthing and bonding.
58
−− Using anti-static additives.

−− Reducing flow velocities.
−− Avoiding splash filling.
−− Restricting tank sampling.
−− Wearing anti-static PPE, e.g. clothing and footwear, which should be regularly tested.
Personnel involved in process, maintenance or fire-fighting operations should have a basic

understanding of static electricity as it affects their own work. For further guidance, see EI
Guidelines for the control of hazards arising from static electricity.
4.4.3 Lightning
In recent years, a number of proprietary lightning protection systems have become available.
For information on lightning interaction with, and guidance on, the applicability of systems
to atmospheric storage tanks, see API RP 545.
4.5 PERMIT-TO-WORK SYSTEMS
Legislation and good practice require operating companies to carry out safe working practices
during maintenance, repair and hazardous operations.
The likelihood of fire incidents can be increased when personnel (including staff,
contractors and delivery drivers) have little knowledge of the hazards associated with
petroleum and its products, and if correct safety procedures are not carried out. For this
reason, personnel should be competent in the correct use of PTW systems through regular
training and refresher training.
PTWs should ensure that:
−− Hazards are identified. (Personnel should be trained to recognise the physical

properties and fire-related hazards of flammable substances, and to ensure that the
activity to be carried out does not introduce any new hazards to the area without
appropriate precautions being taken.)
−− Correct precautions and safety equipment, including appropriate PPE, are used.
−− Clear and adequate instructions are given to all personnel relating to the work/
equipment concerned.
−− Conflicts between interacting operations are avoided and there is clear authorisation
and communication regarding potentially hazardous tasks.
Permits should typically cover:
−− Personnel entry into special areas.

−− Testing, maintenance or repair work on plant and equipment including equipment
disjointing, electrical isolation, etc.
−− Personnel entry into confined spaces (e.g. tanks, vessels, sewers, excavations, etc.).
−− Vehicle entry into plant or storage areas.
−− Introduction into plant or storage areas of naked flames or other sources of ignition
(e.g. use of burning, welding, brazing, grinding, grit blasting, pneumatic drilling and
unsuitably certified electrical and battery powered tools and equipment).
−− Excavation work.
−− Use of particularly hazardous substances (e.g. radiation sources).
−− Precautions associated with inert gas for fire protection.
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Some practices may require specific work control and practices. For example, installation
of temporary equipment or by-passing equipment should generally be controlled under a
management of change system using a temporary change management procedure or a
safety critical defeat/bypass system, since a PTW system may not provide a sufficient level of
control.
Further detailed guidance on critical PTW issues can be found in HSE L137 and
HSE HSG 250.
4.6 MAINTENANCE PRACTICES
4.6.1 General
Many maintenance practices can be potentially hazardous and require fire prevention to be
considered by management and operators prior to, during and following the work. Such
maintenance activities should be subject to a PTW system (see 4.5).
For example, breaking containment can lead to releases of flammable gases or
liquids, whilst sparks are often generated during hot work practices such as grinding or
welding, increasing the chance of ignition. Operating companies should define what isolation
procedures are required, and in what circumstances (for example, some procedures may
require isolation, even though it might not be considered a maintenance task). In general,
the highest level of isolation that is reasonably practicable should be carried out – preferably,
physical disconnection or positive isolation. Isolation should also be proven prior to the
breaking of containment. For further guidance see HSE HSG 253.
Other maintenance practices, particularly on safety and fire protection equipment,
require systems to be temporarily disabled. This could increase the likelihood of fire occurring
or potential consequences should a fire develop. Such maintenance activities should also be
subject to a PTW system (see 4.5).
There should be thorough planning before carrying out maintenance work. Process
knowledge, approvals from operations personnel and hazard awareness should be in place.
Safety and fire officers should be consulted during the planning phase of a major turnaround.
At the design stage, plant areas should be laid out to enable safe access and working.
Special areas or buildings for maintenance work should be provided. These areas should be a
suitable distance away from possible sources of hazard arising from the plant.
Materials and supplies should be safely stacked and stored. Personnel issuing and
checking them should ensure they are kept in their proper location. Where mixed goods are
stored, combustible materials should be alternated with non-combustible items (other than
oxidising agents) where practicable, in order to prevent extensive fire spread. Also, tools,
accessories and equipment should be safely stored in cabinets, racks or suitable containers.
Work areas and work benches should be kept clear and clean.
Handling of waste should be given special consideration. Waste and rubbish
containers should be provided in appropriate locations, and emptied regularly. Clean rags
and waste should be stored in metal containers. Oily rags should be placed in self-closing or
covered metal containers and emptied at the end of every shift. Combustible material should
be properly disposed of and stored in appropriate containers. Plant areas and out of the way
places should be kept clean, well lit and free from waste material.
Flammable liquids in small quantities should be kept in dedicated containers (e.g.
made of materials that are impact resistant and compatible with the fluid), and kept in
a suitable fire-resisting cabinet. Larger quantities should be stored in purpose-built stores,
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labelled as hazardous, in a safe area away from buildings.
4.6.2 Hot work
Hot work is any activity which may involve, or have the potential to generate, sufficient heat,
sparks or flame to cause a fire. Hot work includes welding, flame cutting, soldering, brazing,
grinding and using disc cutters and other similar equipment.
There are common situations where people may be vulnerable to injury or fatality
when carrying out hot work. These include situations where welding torches are used that
vaporise residues on an inner tank wall, which eventually explode. Personnel have also been
injured when working with welding equipment in close proximity to flammable substances
such as paint thinners. Such situations should be avoided and personnel should be trained
to recognise when hot work is inappropriate. It should be ensured that hazardous areas are
free of vapours before and during any hot work and also that any plant that has contained a
flammable substance has been cleaned and gas freed before hot work starts. See HSE L137.
Before hot work commences, suitable fire extinguishers should be available (see
sections 7.6.1.1 - 7.6.1.5). Operators should be competent to use them, and in hazardous
areas, standby fire-fighting personnel should be considered. Adequate precautions should
be taken to prevent flame, sparks or hot metal from starting fires in adjacent materials, at
lower levels or the surrounding area in open plant. For example, the area could be wetted
and drains covered, or vents protected where vapours could escape to the atmosphere. The
atmosphere should be regularly monitored to check the safety of the operation. Where a
plant is declared gas - or vapour - free and hot work stops, the plant should be declared gas
- or vapour - free before work restarts. Where necessary, the requirement for such checks
should be written into the PTW.
4.6.3 Electrical equipment used for maintenance
Portable equipment such as power tools, lighting and test equipment, associated cables,
plugs, sockets etc, and temporary installations for maintenance purposes, should conform to
the requirements of EI The selection, installation, inspection, and maintenance of electrical and
non electrical apparatus in hazardous areas. Their use should be subject to PTW procedures
and examination by a competent person. Equipment not meeting these requirements should
be used only under hot work PTW procedures.
Particular care should be paid to the condition of equipment, cables, connections etc.
to minimise the risk to personnel and the possibility of fire. All equipment should be bonded
together and connected to an approved earth connection. Control measures such as those
given in 4.4.1 - 4.4.2 should be adopted as appropriate.
Portable pneumatic or hydraulic powered tools, though generally considered safe
from the viewpoint of power supply, may produce sparks due to their application. They
should therefore be subject to hot work PTW procedures when used in hazardous areas.
In the UK, refer to The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations (PUWER).
4.6.4 Hand tools
'Non-sparking' tools should not be used at petroleum installations; such tools are misnamed
because they can sometimes produce sparks on impact. As they are made of relatively soft
metal, particles of harder spark-producing materials can become embedded. They also have
a low mechanical strength.
When tools or equipment are used in a hazardous area, then hot work PTW
procedures should be followed. Consideration should also be given to covering the grade or
61
surface below the work to prevent sparks due to possible impact. The equipment and the
area should be wetted to prevent and quench sparks.
4.6.5 Chemical cleaning
Chemical cleaning is used when mechanical means are either unsatisfactory or impracticable.
The substances used may be inhibited acids, alkalis or proprietary products formulated for
a particular cleaning operation. Many solvents may be flammable liquids. A temperature
approaching the boiling point of water may be necessary in some cases.
Chemical cleaning can lead to the evolution of flammable and/or toxic gases or
vapours, for example when removing scale-containing sulfides. Appropriate precautions
should be taken for the safe disposal of such gases, not only from the equipment being
cleaned but also from any temporary surge tank and pipework. Operators should also wear
appropriate PPE. Drains are required on each piece of equipment and at all high and low
points on associated pipework in the loop.
4.6.6 High pressure water
High pressure water jetting is commonly used for cleaning purposes. In addition to the
hazards of water impact there is a risk of electrostatic charges being developed which are
potentially dangerous in the presence of flammable mists that can be generated by water
jetting. See 4.4.2.
4.7 HOUSEKEEPING
Good housekeeping should include the following precautions:

−− Maintaining indoor and outdoor plant areas in an orderly condition free from fire and
other hazards.
−− Minimising combustible materials and wastes.
−− Storing flammable liquids and flammable/ combustible waste in closed, non
combustible containers.
−− Safely disposing of flammable and combustible wastes at frequent intervals.
−− Segregating empty and full or part full flammable liquid or gas containers.
−− Storing flammable liquids and gases outdoors in dedicated areas.
Plant areas should be kept in a clean and tidy condition. Releases of petroleum, its products
and other process fluids should be prevented where practicable. ERPs including spill control
measures should be in place to activate assistance in the event of a significant release posing a
fire (or consequential environmental risk). Particular attention should be paid where leakages
saturate insulation on hot or traced line systems or tanks, since spontaneous ignition can
occur. Minor, low hazard leaks of substances such as waxes, oils, bitumens, etc. should be
collected in drip trays and the cause should be remedied as soon as possible.
Access-ways and roads should be kept free from obstruction and maintenance
materials should be removed promptly after completion of work. Items forming a temporary
obstruction should be clearly marked as a hazard and brought to the attention of process
supervisors and operators. Close attention should be paid to the condition of cladding and
PFP materials on process vessels, columns and tanks. In some cases, loose cladding may allow
ingress of water, causing hidden corrosion and weakening of the structure. Where necessary,
it should be repaired promptly to avoid the risk of it becoming detached and creating a hazard.
Regular and systematic inspections should be made to ensure that safe, clean and
orderly conditions are maintained. PTW systems should therefore address tidying-up and safe
disposal, etc.
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Vegetation likely to constitute a fire risk should be cut short within 6 m of any storage
building containing flammable or combustible materials. Cuttings should be removed to a
safe place.
Sawdust or other combustible materials should not be used for soaking up spills of
flammable liquids. Dry sand or absorbent inert mineral material should be used or otherwise
proprietary spill kits suitable for the purpose.
4.8 INSTALLATION LAYOUT
4.8.1 General
The layout and general design of a petroleum refinery or bulk storage installation should be
optimised with respect to safety, operational efficiency and environmental protection.
National regulations (e.g. COMAH in the UK) and local regulations including
petroleum-licensing conditions, building regulations and local bylaws, may have specific
layout requirements and should be consulted at the design phase of an installation. For
example, the preparation and submission of a pre-construction safety report can be a
requirement under Seveso II-type legislation. Discussions should be held at an early stage
with all authorities responsible for these and any other requirements. Formal approval should
be obtained before construction work commences.
Some petroleum companies have in-house standards for installation layout and
minimum separation distances may be specified. These may be based on experience and
can in many cases be used as a starting point for layout purposes. However, for optimisation
purposes, there should be additional considerations.
Under a goal setting (i.e. risk-based) legislative framework, detailed layout studies
and fire protection analyses should be carried out. Their purpose may be to optimise
installation layout, whilst considering necessary FEHM measures. For example, fire protection
such as water spray systems might be considered (depending on potential fire exposure and
emergency response, etc.) if land use needs to be optimised and storage tanks or plant are
to be situated close to each other. For a typical study, the following should be considered:
−− Credible fire scenarios at the installation (e.g. pool fire, pressurised gas jet or liquid
spray fire, etc.).
−− Fire likelihood and consequences (e.g. potential for asset damage).
−− Potential fire exposures, including personnel and buildings and implications for
life safety (e.g. is the flame from the fire likely to impinge on adjacent equipment,
vessels etc, or will nearby items and personnel be exposed to high radiant heat
levels?).
−− Potential risk reduction options or mitigation measures (e.g. fixed water spray systems
or foam systems), including the extent of spacing/separation required between items
or areas of plant.
Generally, smaller spacing between tanks and other items of plant may be considered
acceptable if a higher degree of fire protection is provided. For example, if PFP (i.e. a fire
wall) is provided between two critical product pumps, then greater separation may not be
required.
In some cases, appropriate fire detection backed up by a rapid fire response (whether
by fixed fire-fighting systems or by pre-planned and exercised manual means) can allow
relaxation.
In all cases, criticality of plant and equipment and implications of loss for asset damage,
business interruption and reputation should be considered, as well as those for life safety.
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For areas where personnel are normally present (e.g. loading and unloading areas)
there may be considerations for access and emergency egress. Also, appropriate areas should
be set aside to allow safe vehicle movement, and features such as crash barriers should be
installed to prevent collision with plant and structures.
In heavily built-up areas, a risk assessment should be carried out to determine both
personnel and societal risks (see section 1.7.2) arising from potential fire or gas release events.
The use of fire and explosion modelling and other scenario analysis tools such as event tree
analysis can assist in this purpose.
For buildings and other occupied structures, potential for external fire spread should
be assessed. Fire could start and spread because of exposure to fires within plant areas or it
could propagate due to fire spread from adjacent or adjoining buildings. Generally, a 'clear'
area should be provided around buildings where possible to minimise fire spread.
4.8.2 Boundaries
Installations should be surrounded by a suitable industrial grade security fence or wall of

minimum height of 2 m. Where petroleum installations are situated within a fenced or
controlled area, such as dock or harbour premises, the requirements for fencing may be
relaxed by agreement with the local controlling authority.
4.8.3 Storage tank layout/secondary containment
Installations intended for the handling of only Class II(1) or Class III(1) products present a
lower level of risk than those handling Class I, Class II(2) or Class III(2) petroleum and its
products. However, safe separation distances of storage and handling installations from
boundaries should still be observed for these products having regard to the installation's
location and the nature of its surroundings.
Good tank design and operations good practice should be the priority in preventing
large product releases. Tank inspection practices aimed at identifying potential corrosion
points well before a leak could develop should be implemented as part of a pre-planned
inspection and maintenance programme. However, adequate secondary containment (and
tertiary containment – see 4.8.6) should be provided for environmental protection and safety
of people. In the UK the COMAH CA Containment policy provides a framework outlining
requirements for containment systems (See Box 4.1). Detailed guidance on these aspects can
be found in supporting guidance to the COMAH CA Containment policy and the HSE Safety
and environmental standards for fuel storage sites. Environmental regulations and water
protection standards should be observed in the design of compounds, drainage systems and
impounding systems.
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Box 4.1 Secondary containment design requirements (replicated from COMAH CA Containment
policy)
6. Bunding of above-ground storage tanks (ASTs)

ASTs shall be bunded to provide secondary containment. (A bund being an enclosure designed to
contain fluids should they escape from the tank or vessel inside the bund.)
The bunds shall:

— be impermeable;
— have adequate corrosion resistance;
— have adequate strength and durability;
— have the minimum number of tanks within each bund, in line with good practice;
— have incompatible materials stored in separate bunds;
— have sufficient capacity to allow for tank failure and firewater management. This will normally be a
minimum capacity of either 110 per cent of the capacity of the largest tank, or 25 per cent of the
total capacity of all the tanks within the bund, whichever is the greater;
— have no rainwater drain, otherwise a drain into a contained and enclosed system requiring positive
action for operation;
— have no pipework that penetrates through the bund floor;
— have no pipework that penetrates through the bund walls as far as reasonably practicable, otherwise
it shall be with adequate sealing and support;
— be subject to periodic inspection and certification by a competent person regarding their condition
and performance.
7. Bunding and fire controls

ASTs containing substances that are flammable, highly flammable or extremely flammable shall
have additional secondary containment measures to those stated in section 6, these are:
— fire resistant structural integrity, joints and pipework penetrations;
— a means of removing firewater from below the surface of the liquid in the bund (for hazardous
substances which are not miscible with water and have a lower density than water).
In addition there should be adequate capacity and design to allow fire fighting measures, for
example the application of water and/or foam, to be taken in a combination of secondary and
tertiary containment.
Intermediate walls of up to half the height of the main walls, but normally not more than
height 0,5 m may be provided within a bund area to control losses of containment and avoid
the spread of substance to the vicinity of other tanks sharing the same bund. Such walls
should divide the tankage into groups of a convenient size.
‘Double tank’ or ‘Double shell’ bunds may be present where the containment
mechanism is effectively another tank with a larger diameter around the original tank. In this
case, there is typically a distance of 2 - 3 metres between the two tank walls and the outer
tank shell is of similar size to the inner tank shell. This type of bund has become increasingly
popular in areas where space is limited or where more and more stringent requirements on
bund flooring are being introduced to prevent loss of containment of petroleum products
into the ground. It saves space requirements but creates a deep confined space between the
main tank and the outer tank: this means that confined space entry PTWs are required when
inspecting or maintaining tank equipment or fittings. In addition, access for manual fire-
fighting of spills in the inter-tank space can be problematic. In the event of ignition of a large
leakage into the secondary containment, this still, essentially, is a tank fire with the same
potential for boilover in certain products. This type of structure, however, should ensure that
no leaked product flows around adjacent storage tanks; hence a mechanism of escalation is
prevented.
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As an alternative to these designs, lower walls may be employed in conjunction with

systems to direct the lost product to an impounding basin at a convenient, safe location
(such systems may be deemed by regulatory bodies to be remote secondary containment and
thus need to perform as if it were secondary containment, with potential need for tertiary
containment beyond it).
The maximum total capacities of tanks within a single compound should be:
(1) Single tanks, all classes, including crude oil No restriction

(2) Two or more floating roof tanks 120 000 m3
(3) Two or more fixed roof tanks 60 000 m3
(4) Crude oil tanks Not more than two
tanks of greater
individual capacity than
60 000 m3
The data for (2), (3) and (4) may be exceeded provided that a risk assessment indicates no
significantly increased risk of environmental impact or to people. Such a risk assessment
may take account of developments in floating roof seal technology and practice and should
consider the design of appropriate fire protection and extinguishment measures.
HSE HSG 176 suggests the total capacity of tanks in a bund should not exceed
60 000 m3 or 120 000 m3 for floating-roof tanks.
For guidance on storage tank separation distances in relation to fire risk reduction
options (including bunding), see annex C.2 and Table C.1.
4.8.4 Process plant layout
Process areas should include access-ways for fire-fighting, as well as routine inspection and
maintenance. Some guidance on process plant layout includes:
−− Access-ways should be arranged in a rectangular grid pattern, so that fire-fighting

can take place from two opposite sides.
−− To limit fire spread, low walls or kerbs should be provided and each should be
connected to a drainage system (but not any storm water system). These can assist
foam blanketing and limit fire spread caused by low flash point products floating
and burning on the surface of the water (carry-over). However, during fire-fighting,
it should be recognised that the drainage capacity of kerbed areas may be exceeded
and flooding may occur under full fire-fighting water application rates.
−− Fixed water spray or foam systems should be considered for high-risk equipment
where fire-fighting access is poor or if items are vulnerable to fire exposure. PFP
should also be considered.
4.8.5 Fire-fighting access
Pre-fire plans (see section 8.7) should identify emergency vehicle access points, including
means of gaining entry where unattended or remotely-operated secure entry systems exist.
Roads and crossings, as well as overhead pipe rack clearances, should allow emergency
vehicles easy access to all areas of the installation. Main roads should also be suitably surfaced
and drained. Speed bumps, which could limit response times, should not be provided on
emergency routes.
Roads or access over firm grade should be provided to allow fire appliances to
approach within reasonable operating distance of the hazard. Access should be kept free
of obstruction. In certain circumstances, railway lines may impede access for fire appliances.
Each case should be considered separately, but for initial guidance, access should be provided
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within 20 m to 45 m of the hazard. Water supplies should be available at these places.

A subsidiary road should be provided in large installations for general access and fire-
fighting purposes around the perimeter. This road may be sited within the safety distance
specified for the spacing of tanks from the boundary and should have access to the public
road system at two points at least. Secondary access to the installation should normally
remain clear of obstructions, secure or locked and with well-defined arrangements for
opening in emergencies. Connecting roads should normally be arranged to permit approach
from two directions to all major fire hazards on the installation.
Roadways should be provided with passing spaces for fire vehicle access if they do
not permit two lanes of traffic. Recommended widths for two-directional traffic and for
single directional traffic should not normally be less than 6 m and 4 m respectively. Cul-de-
sacs should be avoided, but, if necessary, should be provided with adequate turning areas.
Road junctions and curves should be constructed with sufficiently large turning circles to
ensure easy vehicle manoeuvring. It may be necessary to provide one or more vehicle turning
points and to cater for emergency vehicles, such as by providing hard standings at strategic
locations.
Each large storage area of flammable substances or major process plant unit should
be accessible from at least two sides. If access is only possible from two sides, these should,
wherever possible, be the longest opposite sides.
The design of the road layout should be influenced by plant complexity and the
type(s) of fire appliances likely to be employed in fire-fighting. Road widths, gate widths,
clearance heights, turning circles and axle loadings for the various types of vehicles likely to
be called to the hazard should be considered. These could include vehicles other than fire-
fighting appliances such as heavy bulk foam and/or carbon dioxide (CO2) carriers.
One or more hard standings should be provided beside each open water source to
enable fire-fighting appliances to be positioned at strategic points, where this is necessary to
prevent blocking roadways. A waiting area should be allocated near each main entrance to
the site as a rendezvous point for emergency vehicles where this is warranted by the size or
nature of the installation.
These aspects should be considered in consultation with the FRS. In particular, ERPs
(including fire and gas consequence assessments) should be reviewed to ensure that primary
and alternative upwind access can be made under differing incident conditions.
4.8.6 Drainage systems and tertiary containment
Due to their flammability and classification as dangerous to the aquatic environment, sewerage
companies and environmental agencies do not allow uncontrolled entry of petroleum and its
products into drainage systems and natural watercourses under their respective control. In
addition, fire-fighting water is likely to be toxic, posing a threat to watercourses, groundwater
and sewage treatment facilities. Therefore, the capacity of installation drainage and tertiary
containment systems should be carefully evaluated and the management of fire-fighting
water should be included in ERPs (see 8.8).
The COMAH CA Containment policy sets out requirements for tertiary containment
(See Box 4.2). Detailed guidance on these aspects can be found in supporting guidance to
the CA Containment policy and the HSE Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage
sites.
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Box 4.2 Tertiary containment plans and design requirements (replicated from COMAH CA
Containment policy)
10. Tertiary containment

Tertiary containment plans shall be prepared for establishments storing or using hazardous liquids,
including those establishments which may have firewater containing hazardous substances. The
plans will incorporate the grade and location characteristics of the site and are intended to:
— minimise the consequences of a loss of primary containment from equipment that is not provided
with secondary containment;
— minimise the consequences of a major incident that causes the failure of, or exceeds the storage
capacity of, secondary containment;
— enable additional measures to be deployed in time if an incident escalates.
11. Facility design

The installation shall have sufficient capacity to hold safely the anticipated or foreseeable volume
of hazardous liquids, including firewater, compatible with the intended operational characteristics.
Adequate drainage for storm water should be available and special provisions such as pumps,
run-off areas, etc, may be necessary for the disposal of water used in fire-fighting operations.
Increasingly, there are controls on the release of fire-fighting foam due to concerns over the
toxicity of fluorochemicals. Environment agencies will therefore require containment and
specialist disposal of any foam run-off (including training foams). Sacrificial areas (e.g. unused
bunds or storage tanks) may need to be designated as holding locations for contaminated
run-off.
To avoid flooding during fire-fighting, the secondary and tertiary containment
systems should be designed to cope with the available fire-fighting water, including cooling
and extinguishment water. See annex D.6 for guidance on calculations of water supply. As a
starting point, this should comprise at least 90 % of the flow, assuming some 10 % is lost. A
more robust approach should estimate the magnitude of losses from sources such as:
−− Evaporation in the fire (although it should be borne in mind that foam application may
continue once a fire is extinguished for additional post-fire security and evaporative
loss would cease to be a factor).
−− Wind effects.
−− Drainage systems such as continuous oil-contaminated drain systems, accidentally
contaminated drain systems and storm water systems.
−− Ability to transfer liquids off-site under pre-planned and licensed arrangements
(e.g. directly to appropriate disposal or to a 3rd party storage facility such as an adjacent
establishment).
Other factors to consider are:

−− The ability to recirculate any uncontaminated cooling water (if kept segregated from
petroleum and its products) to reduce total contaminated firewater volume.
−− Additional liquid volumes due to rainfall.
For the purpose of such calculations total predicted delivery rates (including delivery from
fixed systems and fire vehicles) should be used since they might greatly exceed the theoretical
rates required for cooling or extinguishment. Consideration should be given both to the
volumes that might occur during the incident as well as following it (e.g. due to re-application
of foam), and also to any rainwater that might increase quantities of polluted liquids required
to be contained.
Area drainage or alternative disposal systems for the large volumes of water that may
be used should be adequate to avoid flooding, which can introduce other hazards.
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Consideration should be given to installing recycling facilities for oil-free water.

The system should be designed to prevent carry-over of petroleum, its products and
other pollutants into the surface or groundwater or other environmentally sensitive areas.
Contingency plans should be discussed with the relevant environment agency.
Consideration should also be given to the possible danger from the mixing of
incompatible effluents. Flammable vapours can arise if hot fluids, e.g. steam condensate, mix
with petroleum and its products in drainage systems. Also, flammable substances may be
carried offsite by drains and precautions should be taken to prevent this possibility.
Where fire water and foam run-off have potential to conceal drainage systems,
creating trip and fall hazards for ERs, consideration should be given to clearly marking these
areas or providing physical barriers to prevent falls.
4.8.7 Fire protection and other safety critical equipment
Fire protection and other safety critical equipment should be located in safe and non-
hazardous areas, taking into account facility topography and the potential path of vapour
and liquid releases. Consequence modelling should be carried out to determine placement
of such items as they may constitute sources of ignition. Consideration should also be given
to locating such equipment so as to enable access at all times during incidents. In addition,
such equipment should be capable of withstanding the effects of fire and explosion if its use
is required during emergency conditions. For example, fire pumps should be located at a safe
distance away from any possible fire consequences.
4.8.8 Pipework/ flanges
Because of the vulnerability of flanges when subjected to fire, good tank bund design should
also attempt to minimise their location in these areas.
Long bolt flangeless valves, sandwich or wafer valves (typically >75 mm exposed bolt
length) and certain types of insulating flange are particularly susceptible and may fail in areas
where spill fire potential exists and they are not protected by PFP. When subject to direct fire
impingement, unprotected bolts expand rapidly and allow gaskets to leak product, typically
in less than 20 minutes after fire exposure.
4.9 BUILDINGS FIRE PRECAUTIONS
National and local regulations may require fire risk assessments to be performed for occupied,
as well as some unoccupied buildings at petroleum installations. In addition, some building
regulations (e.g. in England and Wales – DCLG Building Regulations approved document
B – Fire safety) specify minimum requirements for fire prevention and protection in newly
constructed buildings. Where applicable, these building regulations should be met. For
existing buildings, fire risk assessments should be performed to identify the extent of fire risk
and used to implement additional fire precautions and protection where appropriate.
See CIA Guidance for the location and design of occupied buildings on chemical
manufacturing sites for buildings fire safety considerations at petroleum installations.
API 752 and API 753 also offer information on the management of hazards associated with
location of process plant buildings.
Fire risk in buildings can be assessed and appropriate FEHM measures implemented
by performing a fire risk assessment. A typical assessment should consider for a building:
−− Its nature and use.
−− The type of construction, including its internal features.
−− Its size and layout.
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−− Its contents, including equipment, furniture and furnishings.

−− The presence of combustible materials or flammable substances.
−− Identification of all internal and external fire hazards.
−− Potential sources of ignition, both internal and external.
−− Its occupants, including whether they are typically staff, contractors or visitors and
their ability to respond in the event of a fire emergency.
−− Means of escape.
−− Existing fire prevention and protection measures.
For each building, the following steps should be taken:
−− Identify all fire hazards, including combustible materials and flammable substances,
potential sources of ignition and structural features contributing to fire risk.
−− Identify personnel at risk.
−− Eliminate, control or avoid fire hazards.
−− Assess existing FEHM measures and improve if needed.
−− Record the assessment.
−− Prepare an ERP.
−− Review the assessment periodically.
See annex C.7 for typical fire detection/protection measures for various building types at
petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations.
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5 FIRE, LIQUID AND FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Depending on the criticality of the installation and emphasis on life safety, automatic fire and
flammable gas detection systems can be used to give early warning of a fire event and allow
immediate investigation and/or fire response. This section sets out the various types, recent
developments, application to various facilities/ areas and design issues.
The capability to detect fire early is especially applicable to installations that have a
small operational staff and early warning is paramount for a rapid fire response. Appropriate
fire detection systems can be employed within operational areas, support facilities and
buildings. Detection systems can also be linked to AFP systems, thus providing executive actions.
Releases of flammable gases from process units pose an immediate threat to
operations personnel and plant, and accidental discharges should be detected as early as
possible to avoid the possibility of confined or partially confined VCEs. Evolution of large
vapour clouds from large losses of primary containment also represent potentially significant
risks to onsite and offsite populations; under certain circumstances flammable gas detection
can be used to enhance overall detection but in all cases, emphasis should be on prevention
of the loss of primary containment in the first instance.
5.2 PRINCIPLES OF FIRE AND FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION – OPTIONS, APPLICATIONS

AND DESIGN ISSUES
5.2.1 Flammable gas detection
For areas where the risk arises solely from a leak of flammable gas or vapour, appropriate
flammable gas detection should be employed.
5.2.1.1 Point detection

Point detectors measure gas concentration in a flammable gas/air atmosphere at a specific
location. To detect flammable gas they should be situated in an area close to potential sources
of release for maximum response (see 5.2.1.7).
5.2.1.2 Open-path detection

Open-path infrared (IR) detectors are useful for monitoring large open areas for gas releases.
In effect, they act as a series of point detectors placed end-to-end. Experience has shown
that they are most effective over distances of about 60 - 100 m but may be used over greater
distances in some cases.
Open-path detectors may be considered for use as perimeter monitoring devices
around installations; see Figure 5.1. The purpose of perimeter monitoring might be to track
the movement of a flammable gas/air cloud either around or offsite. Ideally, open-path
detectors should be supplemented with the use of point detection situated close to potential
sources of releases. In this way, sources can be pinpointed and the cloud movement assessed
to assist mitigation or deployment of gas cloud control actions.
5.2.1.3 Catalytic gas detection

Point catalytic detectors typically comprise an electrically heated platinum wire coil coated
in a catalyst, sometimes called a pellistor bead. This sensor responds to a flammable gas/air
mixture by heating and altering the resistance of the platinum coil. The amount of heating
(and therefore change in resistance) is proportional to the amount of combustible gas present
and a reading can be displayed on a meter.
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Figure 5.1: Open-path flammable gas detection used as perimeter monitoring
Figure 5.2: Catalytic flammable gas detection in process area
Figure 5.3: Catalytic flammable gas detection in LPG storage area
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Point catalytic detectors should be located near to potential points of gas release; see
Figures 5.2 - 5.3. Response can be delayed if the released gas has to travel to the sensor to
operate the detector.
Catalytic devices have been used very effectively for a number of years, but there
are recognised problems with such detectors, mainly due to the pellistor sensor becoming
poisoned and losing sensitivity over a period of time. Poisoning can be caused by a wide
variety of substances normally present in petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations –
one such substance is silicone grease. When specifying detectors, those with poison-resistant
sensors should be selected. It is also worth noting that they require oxygen (air) to operate
and thus will not respond in oxygen-deficient atmospheres, typically <12 % oxygen.
It is also possible that excessively high background gas concentrations outside the
UFL can cause poisoning. Other problems with catalytic detectors may include the sintered
disc through which gas/air passes being blocked with particulates, such as oils, fine dust, salt,
grit, corrosion or even water. Approved splash guards should be installed to prevent clogging
in areas where hoses are used frequently.
Catalytic detectors typically require more frequent attention than the newer IR
absorption types of flammable gas detection. As a minimum, detectors should be inspected,
maintained and calibrated twice a year; however, at some LPG/LNG installations, frequency
of inspection should be increased depending on criticality.
Catalytic sensors require a latching alarm system. The sensors require air to operate
and if an alarm does not latch, the sensor will move into a range where insufficient air exists
for it to operate and cease to indicate danger.
5.2.1.4 Infrared gas detection

IR detectors work on the principle that gases absorb infrared energy at certain wavelengths.
Advances in IR technology have meant that both point and open-path type detectors are
available.
Point IR devices typically consist of a sealed detection tube containing an IR transmitter
and receiver. The amount of flammable gas present in the atmosphere is proportional to the
amount of IR absorbed by the 'cloud' inside the unit. Again, the detector should be placed
close to potential sources of release for maximum response, necessitating a scenario-based
assessment of potential gas release incidents.
Point IR detectors generally require less frequent calibration, are immune to poisoning
and although relatively expensive, can be very cost effective in the long term due to reduced
maintenance. Experience has shown that they are sensitive, reliable detectors with good
resistance against spurious alarms if designed, installed and maintained correctly.
On the other hand, an open-path detector measures the attenuation of IR by a gas
cloud in the midst of a beam between a transmitter and receiver over a large area.
Double pass detectors require a retro reflector allowing relay of the IR beam back
to the receiver component of the transmitter/receiver unit. Single pass units can also be
used, consisting of separate transmitter/receiver units, and are usually preferred because of
alignment and reflectivity issues with the retroreflector. Both types of device can scan a large
distance, or path length. Typical coverage distances may be in the order of up to 300 m, although
in practice these may be limited to <100 m to ensure accuracy and reduce spurious alarms.
In effect, the beam measures the total amount of gas present along the beam, as if a
row of point detectors were placed end-to-end. In this way, the significance of a gas release
hazard can be estimated. This feature enables open-path detectors to be used effectively
as perimeter monitoring devices to track the size and direction of releases, although it is
common to provide point detection in order to back up such systems and identify specific
release points. IR detectors usually make a second reading at a reference wavelength, not
absorbed by petroleum and its products, so that differences in signal-to-noise ratio can be
interpreted as environmental effects.
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Whatever device is used, components should be mounted to a rigid structure, free

from vibration to minimise disruption to the beam and to allow accurate alignment. The
potential for ambient environmental influences on flammable gas detection including dust,
humidity and solar radiation should also be assessed and appropriate units immune to these
should be selected.
5.2.1.5 Acoustic detection

Recently, acoustic units have become available that are able to detect the characteristic sound
of high-pressure gas releases and/or jet fires. Typically, they operate by detecting frequencies
outside the normal range of human hearing, i.e. ultrasound.
These units should be considered for the detection of gas releases only and should be
carefully specified to provide the quickest response and immunity to unwanted alarms (e.g.
as a result of steam emission). They do not provide a measurement of gas concentration,
i.e. % LFL, only whether there is a high pressure gas leak. An acoustic survey of the area
should be performed to ensure there are no interferences and optimum configuration of the
detector is achieved.
Whilst other proven types of flammable gas detection may be more appropriate as
outlined below, acoustic detection is another option that should be considered.
5.2.1.6 Gas imaging detection

Another new development in flammable gas detection is in the use of imaging detection.
These are typically optical units (‘cameras’) working on infrared principles. Leaks are displayed
as plumes on the IR image, which can be relayed and recorded to a manned location. These
units have the advantage that they are able to cover a broad area in a rapid scan; such units
have been used widely to detect volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions and are now
being employed for flammable gas detection purposes. In general, imaging is very tolerant to
potential false alarm sources and given that absorption bands for most hydrocarbon gases
are known, this type of detection is generally unaffected by the absorption of water, CO2,
and other potential non-hazardous atmospheric gases that may be present on a plant. Hand-
held instruments are also available for mobile leak detection/site surveying.
5.2.1.7 Applicability
Suitable flammable gas detection should be provided where scenario-based analysis has
identified potential gas releases in installations and the need for early detection of accidental
loss of containment. Guidance on fire detection applications – including appropriate types –
for typical installations/areas is given in Annex C.
The optimum configuration of detectors will depend to some extent on the

manufacturer. However, the following should be considered:
−− Point detection should be placed close to potential sources of release and take into
account vapour density. For example, near LPG tanks (or other tanks containing
heavier than air gases) the detectors should be placed close to grade with suitable
clearance according to the manufacturer’s guidance.
−− Due to the possibility of poisoning, catalytic detectors should be regularly maintained
and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidance as a minimum.
−− Detectors should allow sufficient warning of a release. Typically, detectors should be
set to alarm at a maximum of 20 % LFL, although in certain critical circumstances,
sensitivity may be increased.
−− Point catalytic detectors may not respond, or may become poisoned, if subjected to
high velocity instantaneous releases of liquefied gas. For this reason, detectors should
not be located too close to potential sources of release. Alternatively, IR detection
may be used, as it offers greater resistance to high gas concentrations.
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−− A narrow plume of gas may drift away from a point gas detector if placed too close
to the source of release, or it may miss the detector completely if dispersion occurs
in another direction due to changes in wind direction. For this reason, there should
be careful thought as to the potential size of a release, and likely plume direction for
siting purposes.
−− Consideration should be given, e.g. around a liquefied gas storage area, to
supplementing point detection with perimeter monitoring in the form of open-path
detection. Consideration should be given to providing both types of detector so that
potential sources of release can be pinpointed or tracked by point detection, and the
open-path component can give a reading of average concentration over a specific
area. This type of configuration can allow estimation of the potential for a significant
gas hazard arising at an installation or otherwise drifting offsite.
5.2.1.8 General design guidance

Most standards relating to flammable gas detection only give an overview of operating
principles and key design criteria. The most appropriate way of evaluating whether flammable
gas detection is required and specifying/designing a system is to perform a scenario-based
review of potentially significant gas release hazards and develop performance based design
criteria. Installations should be designed taking into account the characteristics of potential
gas/vapour releases. Most vapours at petroleum refineries or bulk storage installations are
heavier than air, even when hot; yet, some gases containing a high proportion of methane
or hydrogen may be lighter than air and will rise if released. LNG, however, is so cold that it
is denser than ambient air and on escape may persist at grade. It will initially be visible due
to condensation of atmospheric water. Also, heavier vapours will tend to accumulate in low-
lying areas (e.g. sumps). Gas dispersion modelling can assist in identifying and optimising
detector location.
Whilst specific design guidance relating to individual components and capabilities
can be found in relevant standards, any flammable gas detection design philosophy and
subsequent implementation should be developed based on installation-specific reviews.
The UK Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) has investigated the possibility of using
gas detection to give early warning of flammable vapour clouds in bund areas as a result
of an atmospheric storage tank overfill event. See HSL A review of leak detection for fuel
storage sites. Apart from confirming the general reliability of IR gas detectors, the work has
concluded that detector location in bund areas (i.e. in the near field), would probably allow
the greatest chance of detection of such releases since fuel vapours would collect here.
However, due to uncertainties in vapour dispersion beyond the bund in the far field it is not
known how effective remote detectors would be. It is generally accepted that prevention of
loss of containment in the first place should be the focus, but flammable vapour detection
would be an additional line of defence if a release occurs. Liquid leak detection is also another
possibility and may be considered. See 5.2.3.
Considerable developments have been made in the assessment of optimal gas
detector locations. Gas detection mapping is a technique whereby existing gas detection
system coverage can be assessed against target gas cloud sizes based on consideration of
process parameters, degrees of congestion and confinement and elevation etc. and required
performance criteria such as response time. Optimal detector locations can be determined
and if necessary additional detector locations can be specified to ensure that a wide range of
gas volumes and concentrations can be detected. Similarly, for acoustic gas detection units,
mapping techniques can optimise location by taking into account background (process) noise
and potential leak rates. Such tools should be used as an integral part of flammable gas
detection system design.
For guidance on flammable gas detection design and application see standards
such as IEC 60079-29-1 (which supersedes the IEC 61779 series), IEC 60079-29-2 (which
75
supersedes IEC 50073) and IEC 60079-29-4 (which supersedes the IEC 50241 series).
Testing of the detection system should include operation of the entire system
including detector, analyser, alarm circuit, etc. Testing individual components of a gas/vapour
detection system alone can lead to unrevealed faults.
5.2.2 Toxic gas detection
Whilst the focus of this publication is on fore precautions, safety systems design for petroleum
refineries and bulk storage installations often includes provision for hardware capable of
detecting toxic substances which may be a threat to human life. Often, process streams
contain high levels of toxic substances such as H2S and there are many other potential
substances that should be considered. Provision of such detection should take into account
potential release scenarios and their consequences – toxic scenarios should also be addressed
alongside fire potential events – and appropriate detection (both fixed and portable) should
be considered and provided on a scale in accordance with the risks. For guidance see
IEC 60079-29-2.
5.2.3 Liquid leak detection
Liquid leak detection offers another barrier. Recently these types of detector have been used
in specific circumstances where a need has been established to detect potential hydrocarbon
releases; however, not all detector types offer an immediate response. The need for this type
of detection should be considered in cases where significant loss of primary containment
could result in undetected releases of petroleum and its products with the potential for risk
to life safety and the environment. (Prevention of loss of primary containment should be the
primary measure but liquid leak detection may be used as a secondary barrier.) Regardless of
the type of liquid leak detection installed, there should be written procedures and training
in the correct installation-specific response to alarms or fault signals. Typically these should
include initial incident assessment, either visually or by other instrumentation, followed by
shutdown of operations as necessary and deployment of emergency response.
There are systems available for detection of liquid spills, such as on or around
atmospheric storage tanks or process equipment. Liquid detection can also be provided in
sumps or at low points in secondary (bund) containment. There are a range of basic detection
principles but the most common systems operate on refractive index (fibre optic type),
conductivity, flow detection, or the reaction of polymers with the released hydrocarbon. In
some cases, floats are used in sumps as simple detection devices.
5.2.3.1 Refractive index

The attenuation of light travelling down a fibre optic is dependent, amongst other parameters,
on the refractive index of any liquid in which the fibre optic is immersed. Control equipment
can analyse the light signal received from a light source directed through the fibre optic and
can hence detect the presence of liquid and its type (i.e. hydrocarbon or water).
5.2.3.2 Conductivity
A conductivity meter can be used to sense the presence of either water or hydrocarbons.
These types of system have been used successfully to monitor roof drain lines on atmospheric
storage tanks and to automatically open a normally closed drain valve. When hydrocarbon
or other product is detected, as would be the case with a leaking drain or product on the
roof draining from the roof, the valve is closed. Response times of such detectors are in the
order of seconds. This type of technology could also be used in water bottom draw off lines
or between double tank bottoms, as well as around other defined potential liquid release
points and in bund areas.
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5.2.3.3 Polymer solution

Hydrocarbon sensing valves are available in which a component produced from a specific
grade of polystyrene holds the valve, often on drain lines, open. During normal operation
this allows normal drainage of non-hazardous liquids such as water. In the presence of
hydrocarbons, the polystyrene element dissolves and allows the valve to close. Closure
provides a local visual indication as well as a remote alarm. The response time (i.e. the
time taken for the polystyrene element to dissolve) depends on the type of hydrocarbon
and the flow rate. It can vary from seconds to more than 20 minutes. For example,
typically for crude oil at 5 l/hr., response time may be in the order of 20 minutes, whilst at
500 litres/minute it may be around 8 - 10 minutes. For refined products such as petrol the
response time may reduce to seconds even at relatively low flow rates. It is generally accepted
within the industry that response times with crude oil are too long. The polystyrene element
requires replacement on a regular basis even if it is not actuated.
5.2.3.4 Flow detection

Simple flow switches have been installed in water drain lines downstream of the drain line
valve to confirm that the drain line valve is open during periods of rain. A signal from the
unit in dry periods would indicate loss or hydrocarbon or some other fluid.
5.2.3.5 Instrumentation
In some cases leak detection systems rely on comparing data from flow or level instruments,
for example, on pipeline integrity systems or reconciliation systems. It should be borne in
mind that these can be effective if the leak is large, but if the leak is very small over an
extended period of time it is possible that the release might not be detected for some time.
5.2.4 Fire detection
5.2.4.1 General
In recent years, developments in fire detection systems utilising more reliable and appropriate
technologies have been made such that there is now a greater choice. Selecting a detector
for a given application should be based on a robust knowledge of the principles and pertinent
standards.
In typical petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations, a range of detectors may
be used. The most appropriate way to establish detector suitability is to conduct a scenario-
based survey of the area concerned. The key consideration for a fire detection system should
be to match the type of detector and its response time to the type of fire and combustion
products that are likely to develop during an incident.
Fire detectors should be chosen to detect one or more of the following combustion
phenomena:
−− heat;
−− smoke;
−− ultraviolet (UV) or IR radiation (flame detection) or visible (CCTV) with IR, and
−− incipient combustion gases e.g. carbon monoxide (CO).
To select a successful detector it should be known what kind of fire is likely to develop, taking
into account the properties and characteristics of hazardous substances in the detection area.
Generally, flammable gases, vapours, mists and low flash point liquids burn fiercely
with immediate generation of heat. The most appropriate types of detector for fires involving
them are heat, flame or optical units, although acoustic detectors may also be used in some
cases. Ultimately, the choice of detector should take into account the particular combustion
characteristics of the fuel.
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Many solids smoulder for a period before developing into flaming combustion.
During this period, smoke is formed without very much heat; however, some solid materials
can exhibit rapid flaming combustion. Again, the choice of detector should depend on the
combustion characteristics and fire phenomena generated by the burning material.
For detailed descriptions of detector operating principles and applicability see fire
detection standards such as NFPA 72, EN 54 and BS 5839. Guidance on fire detection
applications – including appropriate types – for typical installations/areas such as buildings,
is given in Annex C.
The following sections provide guidance on some of the most common detection
options.
5.2.4.2 Heat detection

Heat detectors respond to temperature increases associated with developing fires. Detectors
can be classified as either 'fixed temperature', 'rate-of-rise' or 'rate-compensated' type. They
are usually point detectors placed in a specific location (e.g. above a generator) and respond
to a fire in close proximity. A further type of detection – LHD – is also useful for specific
applications such as detection of rim seal fires in open top floating roof tanks. See 5.2.4.3
for guidance on LHD.
Heat detectors should be used where a scenario-based survey of installation/building
locations has identified areas where fires are likely to develop heat in their early stages rather
than large quantities of smoke. Potential applications are close to equipment skids where
flammable liquids may be released.
Heat detectors are not generally suitable for protection of life as their response is
much slower than smoke detection. Their use should be restricted to defined areas where
smoke detection is problematic or alternative detection cannot be used.
Heat detectors should not be used in buildings, in escape routes or areas (e.g. electrical
cabinets) where the use of smoke detection would give a much more rapid response to
smouldering fires or those likely to produce reasonable amounts of smoke. Also, they should
not normally be used in outdoor areas where heat from the fire is likely to dissipate rapidly.
Conventional sprinkler heads or fusible plugs should be considered as heat detectors
and may be installed in locations where automatic fire protection should be provided. They
function by maintaining pipework under pressure, usually using air, and when one or more of
the heads bursts, a fall in pressure actuates an alarm and operates any executive actions such
as an extinguishment release system. However, sprinkler heads are relatively insensitive as
point heat detectors and this should be taken into account when planning their positioning
and arrangement.
The following two kinds of installation may be considered:
−− Close arrangement around specific high-risk equipment: heads are located close to
and just above points where releases and fires may be expected, e.g, above pumps,
valve systems, vents. See Figure 5.4
−− General surveillance: heads are arranged in an array covering the required area.
To ensure that fire will be detected before significant fire damage is suffered by
structures and plant, heads should not be spaced too far apart; a spacing of not more
than 2,5 m is normally appropriate.
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LHD in
rimseal
area
End-of-line
device
CONTROL
PANEL
Figure 5.4: Heat detection in enclosure
5.2.4.3 Linear heat detection

LHD is now an accepted way of achieving a cost-effective detection strategy for a wide
range of applications, such as the protection of open-top floating roof storage tanks, pumps,
pipe racks, cableways and service tunnels. There are a number of different types of detector
available:
−− Electrical – a shorting wire contact operating at fixed temperatures ('digital'), or

an 'analogue' type measuring a change in resistance upon the application of heat,
which is also self-resetting, but may have a length limitation. This type of cable is
especially suitable for the protection of petroleum storage tanks, where alarm zoning
is not normally required. See Figure 5.5. A range of cable types may be available,
offering standard, chemical, or increased mechanical resistance.
−− Pneumatic – a fusible plastic tube containing an inert gas such as nitrogen is
depressurised when broken by fire. This type of LHD requires a pressure/electrical
control interface and may have a length limitation or be susceptible to physical
damage or UV deterioration. Nevertheless, this type of detection may be suitable
for protecting indoor cableways or pump sets, and is relatively inexpensive.
See Figure 5.6.
−− Optical – relies on internal changes in the properties of light transmitted down its
length when subjected to fire. Key applications for optical detection are service
tunnels where an indication of the position of the fire may be required; the cable
may be split into zones and sophisticated control and indicating equipment can be
incorporated. Generally, this type of detection is not widely employed at petroleum
refineries and bulk storage installations and is relatively unproven but may be of use
in specific circumstances.
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Figure 5.5: LHD for open top floating roof tank
Figure 5.6: Pneumatic LHD in LPG storage area
LHD should be placed near to, or just above equipment, where experience indicates that fires
can start. For specific applications, see Annex C. Generally, the basic digital electrical type has
been found to be the most reliable and straightforward type providing the system is designed
and maintained properly.
5.2.4.4 Smoke detection

Smoke detectors are widely used to detect smouldering or flaming fires capable of generating
appreciable amounts of smoke and are classified as point or volumetric types. Point detectors
can be ionisation or optical (photo-electric) types. Volumetric smoke detectors include ‘beam’
type detectors or 'incipient' units.
Point smoke detectors are often referred to as 'conventional' detectors and should
typically be used in indoor plant areas or buildings because smoke is rapidly dispersed in the
open air. Typical applications should include detection in control rooms, offices, equipment
cabinets and enclosed plant areas.
Generally, ionisation detectors are more suitable for detecting fires in fuels that are
likely to flame more rapidly on combustion whilst still producing appreciable smoke. They
tend to detect 'invisible' smoke having smaller particles more rapidly, as opposed to lighter
'visible' smoke produced when a fuel smoulders. However, for practical purposes, although
80
optical smoke detectors are more responsive to smouldering fires, response times for the two
types of detector are similar. In some cases, a mixture of ionisation and optical detectors may
be appropriate for the earliest possible alarm.
For guidance on detailed location and applicability issues, see NFPA 72, EN 54,
BS 5839 or equivalent standards.
5.2.4.5 Incipient fire gas detection

Typically, these devices are variations on conventional smoke detectors that are able to detect
concentrations of combustion gases produced by a fire in its incipient (early) stages. The most
common detectable gases are CO and CO2, although other toxic combustion products such
as hydrogen chloride (HCl) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) may be detected.
This type of detector should not be employed in isolation. It may be considered for
specific instances to back-up 'conventional' smoke and heat detection. Particular care should
be taken if specifying such devices, because not every fire will generate the aforementioned
fire gases resulting from combustion.
5.2.4.6 Combination detectors ('multi-sensors')

To reduce incidences of unwanted alarms, a number of manufacturers now offer 'combined'
or 'intelligent' conventional smoke and heat detectors. Typical devices are optimised to sense
whether fire phenomena such as smoke, heat and incipient fire gases such as CO are present
in sufficient quantities or the right proportions. The detectors thus make an 'intelligent'
decision over whether they are 'seeing' a fire, rather than some other false alarm source (e.g.
dust). Many devices can be optimised to take into account the expected nature of potential
fires (i.e. whether a slow, smouldering fire will result, or if the fire will exhibit rapid growth
with flaming) and respond accordingly. In tests, and in use, these devices drastically reduce
the incidence of 'nuisance' alarms due to smoking and vehicle fumes.
These detectors are usually termed 'multi-sensors' and can be considered for use in
areas where problems with 'conventional' smoke or heat detection are encountered, such as
frequent unwanted alarms.
When considering and selecting multi-sensors, fire sensitivities and response times
should be assessed in line with a relevant standard such as EN 54.
5.2.4.7 Incipient fire smoke detection

Incipient smoke detection or 'aspirating' detection is now seen as an effective way of
providing protection in support facilities such as computer suites or other areas containing
sensitive electronic equipment. This type of detection operates by sampling air through an
array of detection pipework, which is then drawn back to a central or local detection unit for
analysis. Typical units can detect very low smoke concentrations and contain algorithms able
to distinguish between smoke particles and other possible causes of false alarm such as dust
or fine particles in the air ('particle rejection').
This type of system can 'buy time' and allow an initial investigation at a set pre-alarm
level. Fire response can be taken manually, or by means of some other executive action. As
part of an extinguishant release strategy, the system may be able to delay release of inert
gas until an initial investigation is made when the fire is still very small and at a stage when
hand-held extinguishers can be used. Such systems can also be considered as part of a halon
phase-out strategy, often removing the need for a fixed fire protection system.
Incipient detection can overcome installation-related problems of smoke stratification
and difficult access for maintenance. In the case of computer suites, pipework can also be
routed so that detection is provided for individual cabinets, allowing internal fires to be
detected when still at the pre-smouldering stage. Ducting and floor/ceiling voids can be
protected as well as the room void, as part of a multi-zone system.
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There are a number of key considerations to take into account at the design stage and
throughout the system’s lifetime to ensure continued effectiveness. These include ensuring
that sampling points are positioned away from strong airflows (e.g. air conditioning ducts),
and that key system performance criteria such as transport time, sensitivity and hole balance
are all met for the intended application. Key performance criteria such as response time,
sensitivity and alarm functions should be specified in detail at the design stage and measured
by testing the system regularly.
Standards such as BS 6266 specify ways of testing incipient detection; typically, they
include methods of generating 'hot' smoke using standard 'hot wire tests'. When performed
correctly, they can allow easy, effective testing of these types of system.
In most cases, this type of detection should be used alongside 'conventional'
smoke detection (typically a mixture of ionisation and optical devices) for specific risks such
as electronic data processing suites. Guidance on application and design can be found in
standards such as BS 5839 and FIA Code of practice: Design, installation, commissioning &
maintenance of aspirating smoke detectors.
5.2.4.8 Flame detection

The use of flame detectors to detect flammable liquid fires is increasingly common. Flame
detectors are essentially optical devices and operate by a variety of means, each having its
own limitations.
(i) Single wavelength flame detectors
Single wavelength flame detectors usually operate on either IR or UV principles, and

are widely applied for the detection of a range of petroleum and its products. They
can be considered for use in indoor or outdoor plant areas where the main risks are
flammable liquid or liquid spray fires.
Where the possibility of high-pressure gas fires exists, the use of flame
detectors may not be appropriate, because these types of fire exhibit little or no
low frequency flickering, which is sometimes required by the sensor components.
Typically, IR flame detectors are configured to only detect burning fuels emitting
appreciable amounts of CO2. Consequently, fuels that do not contain carbon - such
as hydrogen, sulfur or burning metals - will not be detected. To detect fires involving
these fuels, detectors using UV principles should be considered.
Most UV detectors operate by measuring small bursts of current caused
by the absorption of UV radiation given off by the fire, and compare these against
set values. Since virtually every fuel emits UV radiation when under fire conditions,
difficult to detect fires involving the above fuels can be detected.
Materials such as smoke and vapours present in the detection area should
also be capable of absorbing UV radiation. Some vapours (usually hazardous) exhibit
significant absorption characteristics, and might restrict UV detection if present
in large concentrations. Others, including the lighter alkanes such as methane,
propane and butane, do not. Consequently, an initial survey to determine detector
suitability should be carried out. It is also possible that some spurious sources such
as sunlight, hot surfaces, welding and rotating machinery will cause false alarms,
but most models incorporate means of distinguishing between these and real fire
sources, such as 'flame flicker discrimination'.
Flame detectors are essentially optical devices, and airborne contaminants
such as smoke, dirt, grease and oils can potentially 'blind' them; units should be
chosen that have means of continuously monitoring optical integrity, and routine
cleaning of optical surfaces should be carried out.
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(ii) Combined UV/IR flame detectors
Combined UV/IR detectors can represent an effective solution for detection in

areas where a mixture of fuels is present. Current UV/IR technology produces very
sensitive, yet stable detectors.
Limitations of such devices are usually a combination of their respective
technologies but the process of ageing, or contaminants on the detector window
may still affect them; hence there should be effective maintenance. Vapours should
not usually present an absorption problem in the case of the IR component, except
for a small range of substances containing triple molecular bonds such as acetylene
(ethyne) or nitriles.
Combined UV/IR devices are able to respond to a wide range of potential
fire scenarios involving many different materials.
(iii) Multiple wavelength IR
More sophisticated IR flame detectors are now available to combat incidences of

false alarm and response failure. A new generation of 'triple wavelength' ('IR3')
devices able to detect three separate wavelengths present in the IR spectrum of a
burning fuel should be considered. Such devices may enable previously 'unseen' fuel
types to be detected and may represent a cost-effective alternative to the provision
of separate IR and UV devices or other combined units.
Ultimately, the key to choosing the most applicable flame detector is a good
understanding of detector architecture and special features, an understanding of
the fuels involved and potential fire sizes, and the effects of spurious environmental
sources on operation. Where false alarms are seen to be a continued problem, there
are other forms of optical detection that may be appropriate.
5.2.4.9 Optical (video linked) detection systems

Until recently, causes of unwanted alarms from optical flame detectors have been poorly
understood. The remoteness of some installations can make communication of problems
with detection difficult. In some cases it has been reported that false alarms have been
caused by sunlight, or even by personnel wearing brightly coloured coveralls! A more
common cause of false alarms can be flare stacks, since some detectors can respond to
reflections in water or on metal surfaces. This problem has recently been overcome with
optical detectors incorporating 'flame imaging technology'. Such systems typically include
three basic components – the camera/detector, control panel and visual display. The camera/
detection unit contains the camera and computing facilities to determine whether or not the
unit is 'seeing' a fire, and is programmed with a range of algorithms to determine whether
the phenomena within its field of view are fires or not. If a fire is detected, the view of the
camera is automatically displayed at the control point.
Units are available that can sense characteristic smoke patterns, and are thus very
sensitive smoke detectors whilst some units work by detecting flames over relatively large
distances.
Some false alarm problems have been reported with such devices, but in most
instances these have been overcome through operational experience, and it is often a matter
of re-programming the unit with updated algorithms to ignore previously unseen spurious
sources. Experience of using this type of device is that the main benefit is being able to see
a 'live' image of the area of alarm, providing unambiguous information about the detection
of fires.
This type of system can be considered for use in covering relatively large plant areas
with scope for inclusion in existing closed circuit television (CCTV)/security systems, since
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many now feature image recognition and processing software able to detect flames and/
or smoke. However, they should not preclude other forms of detection strategically placed
around plant areas and buildings.
5.2.5 General design guidance
The fire or flammable gas detection system should be designed taking into account all
relevant factors relating to the FEHM strategy for an installation and following a scenario-
based review of potential fire incidents.
For detailed fire detection design guidance see EN 54, BS 5839, NFPA 72 or equivalent
national standards.
For protection of specific areas such as electronic data processing (EDP) installations
and computer suites, additional guidance is available in BS 6266, NFPA 75 or equivalent
national standards.
Fire detection systems should be designed, installed and maintained in accordance
with the framework for FSIA (see section 8.9.3).
5.3 CONTROL SYSTEM EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
Automatic fire detection can be configured to initiate executive actions such as extinguishant
release, damper closure, shutdown or isolation. Where fire/gas systems have an executive
action these may be seen as having a safety instrumented function (SIF) and may also be
required to be compliant against IEC 61508 having had their safety integrity level (SIL)
determined in accordance with IEC 61511. (This usually relates to ensuring the reliability of
the instrument loop from detectors through fire/gas system to valves/ dampers/ deluge etc).
Where there is no immediate fire-fighting response, extinguishing systems linked
to fire detection systems may be considered for particularly hazardous, remote or unstaffed
installations such as offsite pumping stations.
Cross-linked zones employing similar or different detector types (i.e. monitoring
different fire phenomena) should be considered. The separate zones of the two detection
systems may be superimposed with the detectors of each zone alternated. Separate alarms
may be given locally from each system, but usually, automatic protection equipment
operation or remote alarm sounding will require the operation of detectors in each system.
An alternative scheme is to store the alarm from the first detector and either to re-examine
the circuit after a given time interval to see if the alarm is sustained, or to wait for a second
detector to operate, before transmitting the main alarm. In the case of flame detectors, those
in each zone may cover a potential fire area from opposite sides. This has the advantage
that both zones are not likely to detect flames produced outside the area to be supervised.
Where smoke may obscure the flames, detectors should be located so that not all the linked
detectors are downwind of the fire.
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5.4 FIRE/GAS ALARM AND WARNING SYSTEMS
Fire and flammable gas detection systems should be considered for each indoor or outdoor
plant location following a scenario-based review of potential fire or gas incidents. Fire
and flammable gas detection systems may be critical at particularly hazardous remote or
unstaffed installations such as offsite pumping stations where there is no immediate fire-
fighting response.
The need for, and exact types of, system employed should depend on a number of
factors including installation criticality, potential for asset loss, life safety and other human
factors such as staffing arrangements. Guidance on system suitability/applicability should be
obtained from publications (e.g. codes of practice, relevant fire detection standards, etc.) or
from the AHJ (e.g. FRS).
Alarm and fault signals should be transmitted to a staffed location where personnel
have the competence and authority to act on alarm information. Both audible and visual
forms of annunciation should be distinguishable from other installation alarms (e.g. process,
level alarms, etc.). Where an occupational fire brigade is provided, signals should be repeated
to the fire station control room.
Detailed guidance on system architecture, monitoring and annunciation can be
found in relevant fire detection standards such as NFPA 72, EN 54 or BS 5839. Products and
components certified by an approved test/certification body should be used.
Systems should be tested regularly in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions
and within a framework of FSIA (see section 8.9.3).
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6 FIRE PROTECTION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This section describes PFP and AFP measures, which are intended to reduce the consequences
of fire. Options, applications and design issues are reviewed for PFP in limiting temperature
rise and preventing excessive heat absorption. The capabilities of AFP media are reviewed
for controlling a fire, extinguishing a fire, or preventing ignition during an emergency. In
addition, AFP media application is reviewed, whether using fixed or semi-fixed systems and
portable/mobile fire response equipment.
The objective of fire protection is to protect equipment and structures from damaging
fire consequences such as radiant heat as well as convective and conducted heat through
prolonged fire exposure and direct flame impingement. Some potential consequences of fire
exposure include:
−− Increase in the temperature of steel to the point where its strength is impaired;
structural steel engulfed in flames may weaken and collapse.
−− Increase in the temperature of petroleum and its products or other process
intermediates in tanks, lines and vessels to levels at which vapour emissions increase,
ignite and potentially cause fire escalation.
−− In the case of LPG, onset of BLEVE conditions where potentially large quantities of
boiling flammable product are released following vessel failure and ignited. Whilst
LPG storage is the major source of BLEVE scenarios, it can also occur to a pressure
vessel containing a large quantity of volatile petroleum and its products, or a process
vessel such as a separator. The time for failure to occur depends on the severity of the
fire, the extent and type of fire protection, and the pressure response of the vessel
or pipework as well as the effect of any emergency depressurisation system. See EI
Guidelines for the design and protection of pressure systems to withstand severe
fires.
−− Increase in the pressure in confined or semi-confined spaces to a level where the
pressure exceeds the strength of the steel (possibly reduced by a temperature
increase) or of seal systems, resulting in failure with a consequent rapid release of
flammable product.
6.1.1 Passive and active fire protection
Protection measures can be provided by both passive and active means. For the purposes
of this publication, fire and flammable gas detection is considered as a separate type of fire
protection measure. See section 5.
PFP refers to the application of materials which are designed to limit temperature and
prevent excessive heat absorption, to items of process plant, structures or vessels (or within
buildings). In some in-house petroleum company standards the term is also used for other
FEHM measures, such as increased plant separation; however, this is not generally accepted.
AFP involves the application of fire extinguishing or other protective media to surfaces
either on fire, or exposed to heat or potential ignition during an emergency. Common media
can include foam, powders, gases, and coolants (which are normally water mists, sprays or
deluge).
The protection may be applied to extinguish the fire or to protect equipment in the
vicinity from the damaging effects of the fire and to reduce the risk of escalation of the
incident. For example, a fixed water-spray system might be provided to protect a tank from
potential radiant heat exposure from an adjacent tank fire.
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6.2 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION – OPTIONS, APPLICATIONS AND DESIGN ISSUES
6.2.1 General
PFP should be considered as an overall system, the aim of which is to provide a degree of fire
resistance to fire exposed structures, vessels, pipework and equipment.
Historically, PFP has been used to protect process plant; typically, this was referred
to as fireproofing, although the term PFP is now preferred. PFP comprises a variety of heat-
resisting materials, coatings, structures, blocks, tubes, sleeves, blankets and covers used to
provide fire resistance in buildings and within process/storage areas.
PFP is often applied to critical items that might create additional risk (e.g. BLEVE) if
exposed to high levels of thermal radiation flux.
Within buildings PFP should be used to prevent spread of smoke, flame or heat by
the provision of such measures as fire doors, fire-rated wall construction and floor/ceiling void
compartmentation. National building regulations and approved fire engineering publications
(e.g. codes of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) should be used to
determine the requirements.
For plant areas, consideration should be given to the fire resistance of structures
supporting vessels, the vessels themselves and associated equipment and pipework. If the
vessel or its supporting structure might be exposed to external fires, adequate fire protection
should be provided. Critical valves or process control equipment including cabling may also
require PFP.
PFP should be used to perform one or more of the following functions:
−− Contain a fire within a compartment or space in a building.
−− Delay fire effects impacting on means of escape.
−− Delay heat transfer to stored or processed flammable liquids and gases.
−− Delay the collapse of load-bearing structures or members.
−− Delay the failure of steel used for holding flammable liquids or gases.
−− Assure the closure of critical isolation valves or ESD valves under fire conditions.
−− Delay ignition of cables or control wiring.
PFP can be provided to protect against direct flame impingement/engulfment or exposure to
radiant heat, smoke and heat stopping, and also blast/overpressure protection.
The types of PFP materials available include:
−− Cementicious materials – these are usually sprayed or trowel applied but may also
be cast to preformed shapes or sections. PFP performance relies on a combination of
two effects – insulation and dehydration causing cooling.
−− Lightweight concrete (vermiculite) – such materials are effective and do not spall
in fires involving petroleum and its products. However, some have a high porosity
and will absorb liquids if unprotected, leading to lower impact resistance, reduced
adhesion to steel and potential corrosion. A mesh retaining system should be used
for petroleum fire protection systems to provide good protection against pool fires or
flame engulfment and jet fires.
−− Concrete masonry – this is not commonly used because of high installation costs
and extensive maintenance requirements. Assemblies are prone to cracking and
admitting moisture with serious corrosion and spalling problems.
−− Magnesium oxychloride plaster – this is not typically used for PFP in petroleum areas.
−− Fibrous materials – these are flexible, allowing them to be used for relatively complex
shaped items. Compared to spray coatings they can be more easily removed for
inspection of the protected equipment.
−− Composite materials – these tend to be lightweight and easily adapted for protection
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of complex structure and shapes. The flexible types available are relatively easy to
install and remove for inspection.
−− Preformed blocks, panels, sleeves etc. – these are normally for internal use only to
provide sealing and/or protection of penetrations and critical equipment.
−− Preformed firewalls – these consist of specialist combinations that can resist the
effects of fires and overpressures arising from petroleum and its products. Fire and
blast protected enclosures, or box units, are also available for protection of critical
ESD valves and/or their actuators.
−− Intumescent coatings – these are most often used as spray coatings but also available
as paints and varnishes, prefabricated panels, mastics for sealing penetrations, and in
strip form for sealing gaps such as those between doors and door frames.
6.2.2 Applications and design issues
The need for PFP should be determined using a scenario-based risk assessment of potential
fire events. Thus, a potential pool fire incident might identify the need for passively protecting
an exposed vessel and associated equipment. Common applications for PFP in outdoor plant
areas include the protection of liquefied gas vessels, supporting structures, critical items
of equipment and other process vessels. Some petroleum companies may have in-house
standards for the design and application of PFP, and these should be taken into account.
However, caution should be exercised in adopting a ‘blanket approach’ to the application of
PFP. Whilst typical standards such as API 2218 define fire exposed envelopes for extent of PFP
application these are sometimes too generalised or do not allow focus on specific areas that
may require passive measures. As a consequence, there may be areas that are protected that
do not require it, or potentially critical items may be neglected.
PFP should be selected by carefully reviewing design event fire and explosion events.
Careful specification of fire resistance ratings and, if necessary, overpressure requirements are
necessary to ensure fit-for-purpose PFP systems. Whilst a formal fire assessment may identify
no flame impingement on a structure or vessel, there may still be a requirement to apply PFP
due to high levels of radiant heat. Techniques such as fire and explosion modelling can assist
in assessing this.
Unless otherwise indicated by a fire risk assessment, a typical design philosophy for
PFP at petroleum refineries should be to provide protection against hydrocarbon pool and
jet fires for a minimum of one hour. and against hydrocarbon pool fires in areas such as
LPG storage for two hours. However, the required protection period should depend on the
potential duration of any fire, which should be determined at the scenario analysis stage.
Once scenarios have been reviewed, plant walk rounds may be required to determine
the potential impingement areas or items of equipment that might be directly or indirectly
exposed. PFP provision should then be prioritised for the key items, which, if failed, would
cause escalation resulting in unacceptable business interruption or asset loss. Credit may also
be given to methods of reducing fire consequences such as depressurisation (blowdown)
in the assessment and it may be shown that PFP is not required providing exposure time is
limited and there are other mitigation measures in place such as a rapid cooling capability via
fixed monitors or systems. In the absence of this type of analysis, then the requirements of
publications such as API 2218 should be followed for determining extent.
Structural steelwork on process plant should be given special consideration for
passive protection if its collapse in a fire would escalate the fire’s severity. Where the design
of vessel supports makes it difficult to ensure adequate protection against fire by water spray
(e.g. for the legs of Horton spheres) PFP should be provided.
PFP should also be considered for protection of critical actuators, electrical or
instrument cable systems, since damage to these items can lead to ESD or control problems
during an emergency.
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The type of fire expected should be considered carefully. In the case of a pool fire,
any flame impinging on vessels and/or equipment would not normally cause erosion of the
PFP, other than deterioration due to prolonged exposure and heat input. However, in a jet
fire a high-velocity flame will normally be sustained for as long as burning fuel is emitted at
high pressure. By their nature, jet fires tend to be very erosive, and it follows that the PFP
could deteriorate if jet fire resistance is not adequately specified. For this reason, PFP should
be certified as having jet fire resistance if the design objective is to protect equipment and
vessels against this type of fire.
Various jet fire resistance test methods are available; see HSE Jet fire resistance test
of passive fire protection materials. If jet fire protection is to be provided, the size of the jet
fire used during the fire test conditions (and thereby as the basis for an approval certificate)
should represent the expected or credible jet fire size impacting on the structure or vessel to
be protected.
Effectiveness of PFP systems is very installation dependent. Approvals testing should
be carried out to a recognised standard that uses a standard hydrocarbon time-temperature
curve and the method of installation should not differ from that subjected to the test. The
PFP should be regarded as a 'system', in which the quality of installation is as important a
factor as the physical properties and fire resistance of the material.
For buildings PFP, hydrocarbon resistance may not be required and testing/approvals
in line with a recognised cellulosic fire test should be specified (e.g. BS 476).
Regardless of the type of PFP used, the following practical availability and reliability
factors should be considered:
−− It should provide its functional role by limiting the temperature of the protected
structure or vessel to that specified over the potential time for the design fire event.
−− It should not fail rapidly or catastrophically during the design fire event.
−− It should remain in place under the design fire event conditions.
−− It should be designed to withstand fire-fighting measures e.g. water cooling applied
by fire hoses/ monitors/ deluge/ etc. where practicable. Where the PFP material is
susceptible to damage during fire response, ERPs should allow for extra provision of
cooling water.
−− It should not present additional hazards to ERs or personnel such as toxic by-products
or spalling etc.
−− It should not lose any integrity over the design lifespan whilst in situ. It should remain
intact, in place, for the expected duration of the fire and should not be compromised
by unauthorised actions during maintenance activities.
−− It should not hinder periodic examination/testing and maintenance of the structural
integrity of the protected structure or vessel.
−− Its application method should be subject to a recognised approvals test and it should
be applied by an approved contractor. Any alterations or repair to the PFP should
meet the standard of the original approvals testing for the 'system'.
For more guidance, see HSE Passive fire protection and HSE Availability and properties of
passive and active fire protection systems.
Guidance on PFP for specific installations/areas is given in Annex C.
6.2.3 Maintenance of PFP
A number of problems can occur with PFP materials as well as the protected substrate if
the materials are improperly specified, installed or maintained. These can range from water
ingress causing degradation in performance of cementicious materials, or possibly under PFP
corrosion leading to loss of containment – to cracking, spalling or disbondment. PFP systems
should be properly inspected, tested (where appropriate) and maintained. For guidance on
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risk-based inspection and acceptance criteria see HSE Offshore Information Sheet 12/2007,
which may also be applied to onshore PFP situations.
6.3 ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION
6.3.1 General
AFP systems are designed to achieve one or more of the following objectives:
−− Cooling fire engulfed plant and equipment.

−− Cooling plant and equipment exposed to thermal radiation.
−− Fire control and/or extinguishment.
−− Prevention of fire escalation.
−− Prevention of ignition (e.g. through application of foam to an unignited spill).
−− Containment, dilution or dispersion of vapours
Common media include water, foam, dry powder (dry chemical) and gaseous agents. They
may be applied to extinguish the fire or to protect the equipment in the vicinity from the
damaging effects of thermal radiation, conduction and convection and to reduce the risk of
incident escalation.
Under certain circumstances, foam may be used to reduce the likelihood of ignition
(e.g. in the case of a sunken roof in an open top floating roof tank where petroleum and
its products are exposed). However, this application requires special consideration and
techniques. See annex D.9 (vi).
6.4 EXTINGUISHING MEDIA
6.4.1 General
The most common fire-fighting agents applied at large petroleum fire incidents are water and
foam. Powders and gases are also used at petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations,
although their use tends to be restricted for small scale or local application to confined fires
and those in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces.
6.4.2 Water
Water is the most widely available and effective medium for extinguishing and controlling
Class A fires (see section 7.6.1.2). It also acts as a cooling medium to protect equipment from
the damaging effects of flame impingement or high levels of thermal radiation and convection.
Also, it can be used selectively as an extinguishing agent on some higher flash point fuels.
However, water is not generally effective as an extinguishing medium for flammable liquid
fires, for which foam is preferred. Water also cannot be used on live electrical equipment. For
such applications, electrically non-conductive media including CO2 and powders should be
used, although for smaller incidents extinguishers using foam spray approved for use (with
limitations) around electrical equipment are available providing the extinguisher has passed
the requirements of a dielectric test such as that specified in EN 3-7.
Water’s advantages include its high thermal capacity and latent heat of vaporisation,
non-toxicity and low cost. Its main disadvantage is freezing in cold weather. Its high
effectiveness in cooling makes it valuable for the protection of buildings, plant and storage
vessels exposed to heat radiation from a fire. Water may be applied either manually via
portable and mobile equipment, or by means of a fixed installation.
Water-based systems are detailed in 6.5.2 - 6.5.6, and corresponding application
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rates for specific situations are given in annex D.2 - D.5.

It should be recognised that water quality and type can vary and this may have an
effect on the efficacy of fire protection systems. For example, salt or brackish water may
accelerate corrosion of some firewater and water spray systems and some foam concentrates
may not be suitable for use with salt water. (See 6.4.3 for guidance on foam).
An adequate and reliable supply of water for all purposes should be available. This
supply should be sufficient to ensure that normal process requirements are met and that
sufficient additional water is available for fire-fighting and fire protection purposes. Wastage
of resources and creating excessive fire-fighting water (which may be dangerous to the
environment) should be avoided.
In practice, fixed fire systems and application equipment should usually determine
how much water should be provided and the necessary supply pressure. However, the most
appropriate way of determining water requirements for fire-fighting should be through
consideration of credible design events.
Water availability should match the requirements for the largest design event
envisaged at the installation, taking into account that needed for portable, as well as fixed
application equipment.
Further guidance, including an example calculation of water requirements, is provided
in annex D.6.
6.4.3 Foam
Foam is one of the most important extinguishing media for flammable or combustible liquid
(i.e. Class B) fires (see 7.6.1.2); however, it is not effective on pressurised liquid (spray) fires or
running liquid fires. Unfortunately, poor understanding, specification and testing often lead
to ineffective system performance.
To assist in foam selection, specification and system design, guidance is provided
in the following sections for the most common foam types and systems used at petroleum
installations. Guidance on foam application rates is provided in annexes D.7 - D.9. Further
guidance is available in the standard most commonly applied internationally, NFPA 11.
6.4.3.1 Foam production

The principal reason for foam’s effectiveness on burning petroleum substances is that it
provides a tough fire - and heat - resistant, vapour-suppressing blanket that floats on the fuel
surface, cutting off the fuel from the flame; this prevents evolution of flammable vapours.
In addition, foam provides a cooling action on the fuel, which reduces its tendency to emit
flammable vapour and cools any objects in the fire area.
Stage 1 Stage 2
Proportioning Aeration
(induction) (foam
generation)
W
at
pr er u Nozzle
es nd
su er Air
re
Foam solution
Foam
am ate Air
Fo ntr
nce
co
Figure 6.1: Stages in foam production
91
There are two stages to foam production; see Figure 6.1. In the first stage, foam concentrate is
introduced – at the correct percentage – into a water supply to produce foam solution (water
plus foam concentrate). The water can be provided by fire trucks, via dedicated water storage
and pump equipment or from a hydrant system; the volumes and pressures required depend
upon the type and size of the hazard, but for large atmospheric storage tank fires can be very
large. This first step is termed 'proportioning' and ultimately, it is the rate of foam solution
application that determines the efficiency of extinguishment. If a sufficiently high rate of
foam solution application is not achieved, then the fire will not be extinguished. Application
rates are described in units of l/min./m2. The critical application rate is the minimum rate at
which foam solution extinguishes a given fire. Typically, for a liquid fire involving petroleum
and its products, this is in the order of 1 - 2 l/min/m2.
Published application rates in internationally recognised standards attempt to strike a
balance between ensuring fast, secure extinguishment and minimising wastage of resources.
Annexes D.7 - D.9 provides typical application rates based on current standards and incident
experience. Where appropriate, key considerations are also given in Annex C for typical
petroleum installations/areas.
In the second stage of foam production, expanded foam is produced by mixing air
with the foam solution. Air is usually introduced into the foam solution by means of a venturi
effect in a foam nozzle; although some types of foam can be used through non-aspirating
equipment such as water spray nozzles where air is not deliberately introduced into the
solution. In practice, most non-aspirating discharge devices do give some levels of foam
expansion due to the nozzle design or travel through the air.
There is a conflict of requirements to some extent in that unaspirated foam is
generally recognised as not having such good vapour suppression qualities as fully aspirated
foams; yet it can be projected further and tends to flow more readily across a fuel surface.
Therefore, a balance has to be achieved.
Different nozzles give different foam characteristics hence the foam concentrate/
nozzle combination should be tested in practice to ascertain actual performance.
6.4.3.2 Foam properties

Ideally, foam should combine several different properties, each of which is described as
follows. However, even though many developments have taken place, there is still no single
foam that truly represents the best and most cost-effective solution to every possible situation.
The foam user should consider the particular application, decide the key foam properties and
then select the best foam for the task.
It should be remembered that producing good quality foam depends on the
proportioning system accuracy and the foam generating equipment as well as the foam
concentrate. However, if the wrong concentrate is chosen, poor quality foam will be achieved
whatever equipment is used in the system.
In order to achieve effective extinguishment there are eight qualities that foam
should exhibit:
−− Cohesion – foam bubbles should cling together and form a tough cohesive blanket
that does not split and allow pockets of uncovered fuel.
−− Vapour suppression – the foam should be capable of suppressing flammable vapours
and prevent them percolating through the bubbles to burn on the foam surface.
−− Stability/water retention – the foam should have the ability to retain water in order
to continue to perform its cooling function as long as possible. The method of
assessing this is to measure the 25 % drainage time (or quarter life/quarter drainage
time) of the foam (see 6.4.3.3 (ii)).
−− Flowability/flame knockdown – in order to knock down the flame front and control
a fire as quickly as possible, the foam should flow rapidly across the fuel surface and
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around any obstructions in the hazard.

−− Heat resistance – the foam should be able to resist the destructive effects of heat
radiated from any remaining fire or from hot objects. To some extent, this property
is related to water retaining ability, but this, in itself, is insufficient. Special additives
give good quality foams additional heat resisting capability.
−− Sealing capability – the foam should have the ability to seal against any obstruction in
the fire; otherwise, vapours will rise in the gap created and continue to burn.
−− Burn-back resistance – the foam should have the ability to resist burning back after
the majority of the fire has been extinguished. Testing for this property should be
part of a critical fire test for foam. When the fire has been extinguished in such a test
it is normal practice to re-ignite a small area and then see how long the foam layer
remains to assess its burn-back resistance.
−− Fuel tolerance – it is good practice to apply foam as gently as possible and minimise
fuel pick-up within the foam. However, this is not always possible. Any foam, if
totally saturated with fuel, will burn, but some foam types have the ability to resist
fuel pick-up better than others. Such foams are said to be oleophobic and the
bubbles actually try to ‘push out’ any fuel within their structure.
6.4.3.3 Foam quality

To achieve the properties described in 6.4.3.2, foam should be of good quality. This term
usually refers to two distinct foam characteristics: expansion and drainage time. Standards
such as NFPA 11 give guidance on the values of these parameters that should be achieved
on certain risks.
Expansion and drainage time can easily be measured and compared against
manufacturers’ typical values. However, interpretation of the results may require experience.
Because of the number of types of foam available, the physical characteristics of the foams
produced are subject to considerable variations. It should also be recognised that values given
for expansion and drainage time usually relate to a particular foam/equipment combination.
(i) Expansion
Foam expansion is the ratio of volume of foam produced to the volume of foam
solution used to produce it. It is, therefore, a measure of the foam solution’s ability
to produce a quantity of expanded foam. Its value depends on the foam-making
device and the method of measurement. It can also be affected by operating
pressures, temperature and quality of water.
This property can be measured by collecting a fixed volume of foam in a
standard container such as that specified in NFPA 11. The weight of foam collected
is then translated into a volume of foam solution. (Normally it is assumed that 1
ml of foam solution has a mass of 1 g.). The volume of foam is then divided by the
volume of foam solution used to make the foam:
Expansion = Volume of foam / Volume of foam solution
Low expansion foam (expansions up to 20 : 1) is the most widely used type for
fighting flammable liquid fires. Medium expansion foam (20 - 200 : 1) is most
commonly used for bund fire protection and extinguishment but may be used in
some cases for pool fires; there are several types of portable equipment and fixed
systems designed to apply this type of foam. High expansion foam (200 - 1 000 : 1)
is most effective in indoor spaces where it can be used to submerge a combustible
solid or flammable liquid fire and exclude the air needed for combustion. Because
it has relatively low water content per unit volume, it does not have a great cooling
effect on solid surfaces and so the extinguishment process depends mostly on
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smothering the fire. High expansion foam is most valuable in total flooding of
spaces where it is inadvisable for personnel to go during fire-fighting operations.
In some cases, it can be used to provide local application to risks where it is not
feasible to flood the entire volume.
(ii) Drainage time
Drainage time is a measure of the rate at which water drains from foam. A high
drainage time demonstrates a foam’s ability to maintain its heat-resisting and
stability properties.
Drainage time is usually expressed as 25 % drainage time (or quarter life/
quarter drainage time). This is the time taken for 25 % of the original water
content to drain from the foam. It is a property that can be influenced by the
same factors as expansion.
6.4.3.4 Foam types

Users should ensure that their foam concentrates meet the latest environmental standards. As
all fire-fighting foams are polluting to greater or less extent any foam must not be discharged
into surface or groundwater. This includes foam used during training as well in fire-fighting.
Instead, foam should either be contained onsite for subsequent disposal at a permitted
waste treatment facility or, with the permission of the local sewage provider, discharged
into the foul sewers for treatment or containment at a wastewater treatment works. Used
foam should be classified as waste, which in the UK is subject to the requirements of The
Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) Regulations, or The Special Waste Regulations, as
amended, in Scotland.
(i) Fluoroprotein foam
Fluoroprotein (FP) foams are produced from a protein base to which special
fluorochemicals are added. The good stability and heat resistance associated with a
protein base are still achieved, but also some other very useful properties are provided:
−− Fuel tolerance so that FP foams can be used with less gentle application methods. In
particular, FP foams can be used for sub-surface injection systems.
−− Greater compatibility with dry chemicals.
−− Lower shear stress in the finished foam allowing it to flow more quickly across the
fuel surface and hence give faster knockdown and extinguishment.
FP foams can achieve expansion ratios of up to approximately 40 : 1 but are normally used
for fire-fighting up to 10 : 1.
(ii) Aqueous film forming foam

Aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) was developed originally for crash fire situations
where fast fire knockdown is vital to maximise chances of personnel rescue.
AFFFs comprise fluorocarbon surfactants and synthetic foaming agents that
give the foam solution surface tension characteristics such that a thin vapour sealing
film is produced on a petroleum liquid surface. This film spreads rapidly over the
surface resulting in fast flame knockdown. The effectiveness and durability of the
aqueous film is directly influenced by the surface tension of the product. AFFFs are
more effective on fuels with higher surface tension coefficients such as kerosine,
diesel oils and jet fuels than they are on fuels with low surface tension coefficients
such as hexane.
AFFFs are formulated to drain foam solution quickly from the foam bubble
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to produce optimum film formation for rapid fire knockdown. To achieve this, long-
term sealability and burn-back resistance are sacrificed to some degree.
Because of the extremely low surface tension of AFFF solution, these foams
may be of some use as a wetting agent in Class A (solid fuel) materials (see 7.6.1.2)
where deeper penetration of water is needed.
Some AFFF products contain perfluorooctane sulfonates (PFOS); there are
legislative and regulatory measures in place to ban their use due to their inherent
environmental hazards. See section 1.7.3.
(iii) Film forming fluoroprotein foam
In order to combine the good stability and heat resistance of protein base foam and
the fast knockdown of a film forming one, some manufacturers have developed a
film forming fluoroprotein foam (FFFP) type. The result is usually foam that exhibits
good all round properties but may not achieve quite the same knockdown as an
AFFF or quite the same burn-back resistance as a FP. This is understandable because
for fast knockdown, rapidly draining fluid foam is better; whereas, for burn-back
resistance, slow draining stable foam is better. Thus, requiring these two features
tends to require opposite properties.
(iv) Multi-purpose/ alcohol resistant foam
Polar solvents and water miscible fuels such as alcohols and ketones are destructive
to standard foams used for petroleum and its products because they extract the
water contained in them and rapidly destroy the foam blanket. These fuels require
a special type of multi-purpose (MP) concentrate often known as alcohol resistant
(AR). MP foams are available in both protein and synthetic generic types and some
fluorine free foams have also been shown to be suitable for water soluble fuels
using relatively gentle application techniques.
One such polar solvent is ethanol, for which specific guidance is available
on foam application and other fire-fighting measures in EI Guidance for the storage
and handling of fuel grade ethanol at petroleum distribution installations.
The early types of AR foams were based on standard protein foam and
suffered from severe limitations such as the amount of time that they could be
stored in premix and the fact that they required very gentle application onto the
fuel surface. They were not very efficient on liquid fires involving petroleum and
its products.
MP foams have replaced AR foams. Some have a synthetic AFFF base
and others have a FFFP base. Both types can be used, with the right application
techniques, on petroleum and its products, and polar solvent fires. Generally, but
not exclusively, they contain special polymeric additives that remain in the foam until
it comes into contact with the water-soluble fuel. As the fuel extracts the water in
the foam bubbles a tough polymeric membrane preventing further destruction of
the foam blanket on top of it is formed on the fuel surface. This effect does not
occur on petroleum liquids but instead the foam behaves as a conventional AFFF
or FFFP with additional stability and burn-back resistance caused by the polymer
additives. Hence, modern MP foams can provide an effective agent for both types
of flammable liquid.
The MP foams currently available are suitable for use in sub-surface
injection systems for petroleum and its products but not for water-soluble liquids.
Earlier types of MP foams were designed for 3 % use on petroleum and
its products and 6 % on polar solvents (i.e. they differed from most conventional
foams in that they were used at different concentrations according to the fuel
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type). There are now grades available for use at 3 % on both substance types.
Application rate of foam solution for MP concentrates depends on the
identity of the fuel being extinguished.
When purchasing foam concentrate for water miscible fuels, the
manufacturer should be consulted regarding the correct application rate to be
used for the pertinent fuels prior to determining quantity requirements.
(v) Synthetic detergent foam

Synthetic detergent foam (SD or Syndet) concentrates are based on a mixture of
synthetic foaming agents with additional stabilisers. They are very versatile in
that they can be used to produce low, medium or high expansion foams. For this
reason they are often referred to as high expansion foam concentrates. In addition,
they can provide a certain amount of wetting action for Class A solid combustible
material fires (see 7.6.1.2).
The foams produced from them have good fluidity, will flow around
obstructions and achieve rapid knockdown. However, they have low stability and
relatively rapid drainage times and so provide little radiant heat resistance and
tend to dissipate fairly quickly. Therefore, SD foams exhibit very little burn-back
resistance and their fuel surface sealing capabilities are limited.
For these reasons SD foams have found very little application in the
petroleum industry. However, for general purpose FRS use they can be of value
because of their versatility.
6.4.3.5 Foam selection

At most installations there will be a range of hazards and potential fire scenarios. In some
cases, users should seek independent specialist advice regarding the foam type to be used,
especially where mutual aid schemes are in place and foam and supporting equipment
compatibility is necessary. (There are undoubtedly benefits in standardising foam concentrate
type as well as equipment in such instances.)
Ideally, only one type of foam concentrate should be kept onsite to avoid the
possibility of cross-contamination and to simplify foam application.
Whilst many different foam types are available, users should choose the appropriate
concentrate by reviewing the foam properties most relevant to their applications, installation-
specific considerations such as fuel types, potential scenarios, ambient conditions and
environmental hazards, as well as, of course, price.
For example, a tank fire application requires foam with excellent heat resistance
and burn-back resistance, whilst in other situations fast knockdown capability might be
preferable. Table 6.1 illustrates the properties attainable from good quality foam from each
generic type of foam concentrate for fighting flammable liquid fires. However, other factors
such as cost effectiveness, standardisation onsite, storage conditions and corrosion should be
considered prior to selecting the agent.
6.4.3.6 Foam specification and storage issues

For many installations handling petroleum and its products, storage tank application will
be one of the most critical hazards. In order to minimise risk to ERs and reduce fire losses,
the foam concentrate should be specified, maintained and used correctly. Its application –
particularly to large storage tank fires – demands effective, efficient performance in both
extinguishing a fire and preventing re-ignition. Often such fires burn for several hours before
the resources to extinguish them are deployed. This means that the foam concentrate has
to be capable of withstanding the effects of heat build-up in the fuel and the tank walls and
be able to form an effective seal against the hot tank wall, thus preventing further vapour
emission and possible reignition.
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Unfortunately, too often a fire performance test is not included as part of a

procurement specification or one that is not relevant to the situation is selected. This issue is
highlighted in OGP Fire systems integrity assurance.
Correct specification, stock management and storage are critical to ensuring
continuing foam performance but they are often not given sufficient consideration onsite.
When procuring foam stocks, a recognised fire test should be specified that is
relevant to the application. For example, when evaluating foam for storage tank application,
RPI LASTFIRE: Foam fire test specification for storage tank fires should be used. For other
applications a test such as UL 162 can be specified. Aviation-type test requirements designed
to evaluate foam for rapid rescue situations are not used as the exclusive specification for
foam procurement. Fire testing should be carried out at batch acceptance and at regular
intervals thereafter to ensure that the foam will perform as intended.
A detailed procurement specification should also demand measurement of various
physical properties on the batch. These, whilst not having a direct relevance to fire
performance, can be used to assess any changes in the concentrate due to degradation,
contamination or dilution. Samples should be retained by the user and the manufacturer to
act as reference points to facilitate identification of the cause of any degradation.
Table 6.1: Comparison of foam properties
Property Foam type

P FP AFFF SD FFFP MP/AR
Cohesion **** *** ** ** *** ***
Vapour **** **** ** ** *** ****
suppression
Stability/water **** *** ** ** *** ***
retention
Flowability/ * ** **** *** *** ***
flame
knockdown
Heat **** **** ** * *** ***
resistance
Sealing *** **** ** * *** ****
capability
Burn-back **** **** ** * *** ****
resistance
Fuel tolerance * *** *** * *** ***
- petroleum
and its
products
Fuel tolerance 0 0 0 0 0 ***
- polar
solvents
Key:
Performance:
**** Excellent *** Good ** Reasonable * Poor 0 Insufficient
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Foam types:
P – protein foam (obsolete) FP – fluoroprotein
AFFF – aqueous film forming SD – synthetic detergent
FFFP – film forming fluoroprotein MP – multi-purpose
AR – alcohol resistant
Note: Apart from protein foam (now obsolete) and SD foams (which exhibit very little burn-back
resistance, and have found very little application in the petroleum industry), all other types
indicated above are widely used for petroleum installation fire-fighting.
There should be good storage and regular inspection of concentrate to ensure performance
is maintained. Some basic principles are:
−− Where possible and deployment logistics allow, concentrate should be kept in

original containers.
−− Concentrate should not be transferred to recycled drums that have been used for
other liquids.
−− Concentrate should be stored within manufacturer’s temperature limits.
−− Storage should avoid direct sunlight impinging onto containers or storage vessels.
−− The air/liquid interface should be minimised by filling to expansion dome or using
sealer oil.
−− Storage tank materials should be compatible with concentrate.
−− Tank linings or coatings should be avoided. (High-density UV stabilised polyethylene
is a proven material for storage tanks.)
−− Clear labelling of tanks should be provided to minimise the possibility of contamination
from other materials.
−− Foam concentrate stock should be segregated from other materials.
−− Prior to adding new batches to existing bulk storage, the condition of existing bulk
storage should be assessed.
−− Foam concentrate properties should be tested regularly (at least annually) for
degradation.
−− Any bulk storage tank should be thoroughly cleaned if concentrate is all used prior
to refilling.
−− Bulk concentrate should not be kept in a single tank. Having two tanks allows the
use of a main tank until fully utilised, followed by a reserve tank. This means that
concentrate is used in sequence and tanks can be thoroughly cleaned and inspected.
−− Concentrates of different generic types should not be mixed.
−− Concentrates from different manufacturers for long-term bulk storage should not
be mixed.
−− Concentrates having different proportioning rates should not be mixed.
6.4.4 Dry powder (dry chemical)
Various chemicals in powder form are used in a wide range of portable fire extinguishers and
fixed suppression systems.
Powders generally are extremely effective in flame knockdown, as they act whilst in
the form of an airborne suspension. However, when the agent has settled out of suspension,
its flame knockdown capability is reduced. Powders are particularly useful against running
flammable liquid fires, which can result from ignition of a release or pipe fracture. (Foam cannot
readily extinguish these types of fire.) Powder can, in some cases, be used in conjunction with
other media such as water sprays, certain foams and gaseous agents, although compatibility
should be confirmed before doing so. Dry powder application requires special application
techniques and users should be experienced, since factors such as poor visibility can hinder
use.
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6.4.4.1 Powder types
(i) BC powder
Sodium and potassium bicarbonates and similar salts are particularly effective for
the extinction of flammable liquid fires.
(ii) ABC powder
Ammonium phosphate and some other salts are capable of extinguishing liquid and
solid fires, and can extinguish glowing embers.
(iii) Foam compatible powders
Some powders are incompatible with foam, as the chemicals used tend to break
down the bubble structure. Consequently, other powders have been developed that
are compatible with foam. Their advantage applies particularly to cases where the
larger types of dry chemical equipment are located and where it is probable that
additional fire-fighting will be undertaken by means of large quantities of foam.
6.4.4.2 Application
Powders are of particular value in dealing with fires involving flammable liquids, carbonaceous
substances, electrical equipment, gases and metals. However, some types of powder are
more effective than others for different applications.
Powder gives very rapid control of fire, although on initial application there may
be a momentary increase in radiation from the fire. Wind effects may also be an issue, as
the powder may be carried away from the fire when used outdoors. Powder may also be
affected by humid conditions. In some cases, if stored for a long time, powder may settle
and become compacted. It should be recognised that powder does not provide as effective
vapour suppression and post-fire security as foam; re-ignition is therefore a possible hazard.
Supplementary application of foam should therefore be considered.
There are also specialist application devices available: either hand-held branches
or monitor nozzles that combine powder within a water or foam stream to provide more
effective reach capability for three-dimensional fires. Use of such equipment should be
carefully considered for the hazards for which they are designed to protect.
A side effect of their use is deposition of powder residues: for this reason, they
should not be used on sensitive electronic equipment.
6.4.5 Gaseous agents
6.4.5.1 Types of gaseous agent

A number of gaseous agents are available for fire-fighting use. With the recognition of the
contribution of halons to the breakdown of the Earth’s ozone layer and regulatory restrictions
on its use, several alternative gaseous agents have been developed. The wide choice of
agents means that comprehensive performance criteria should be developed both for agents
and systems using them.
Gaseous agents are divided into three distinct types – CO2, 'chemical' halon
replacements and other proprietary inert gases.
Regardless of agent used, it should be of the correct quality. Guidance on quality
requirements for different gases is given in FIA Guidance on the use of high and regular
hazard concentrations for enclosures protected by gaseous fire fighting systems and
NFPA 2001.
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(i) CO2
CO2 effectively dilutes the atmosphere to a point where the oxygen content will
no longer support combustion. In doing so, it may create an oxygen-deficient
atmosphere hazardous to personnel; this may especially be the case when a large
volume discharge drifts and settles in an adjacent low-lying area, pit or trench.
CO2 produces little cooling effect. Glowing combustion may continue and
the fire may re-ignite once the extinguishing gas has dispersed.
Given the potentially harmful effects of CO2 (the gas is toxic at low
concentrations as well as being an asphyxiant at and below typical design
concentrations) it should not be used in normally staffed locations.
(ii) 'Chemical' halon replacements
Chemical agents typically function by terminating the chemical reactions that

maintain combustion. These are chemical agents that contain chlorine, fluorine,
or iodine, either individually or in some combination. Classes of agents include
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs), fluoroiodocarbons (FICs) and fluoroketones (FKs). These agents are all
electrically non-conductive, clean (vaporise readily and leave no residue), and are
liquefied gases or compressible liquids.
The use of chemical agents as halon replacements has gained popularity
recently and many systems are installed.
Some of the agents have measurable environmental impacts viz., ozone
depletion (HCFCs) or global warming potential and long atmospheric lifetime (HFCs
and PFCs), that in some countries have led to legislative restrictions, which may also
be adopted elsewhere in the future. All generate higher hydrogen fluoride (HF)
values than halon 1301 when released under fire conditions, and for this reason
personnel in a protected area should evacuate promptly at the sound of a pre-
discharge alarm. Also, because of the higher HF generation, some agents may have
a corrosive effect against electronic circuitry similar to or worse than halon.
The use and system design of the halocarbons discussed is specified in ISO
14520 and NFPA 2001.
(iii) Other gaseous agents
These are mainly mixtures of inert gases and typically include trade names such as
Argonite (50 % argon, 50 % nitrogen) and Inergen (40 % argon, 52 % nitrogen, 8
% CO2). Some agents are promoted by manufacturers as being non-toxic and non-
asphyxiant to personnel.
One of the main appeals of inert gases is their negligible environmental
impact, since their balance in the atmosphere is unlikely to be upset by the quantities
used in fire protection. Their main disadvantage is the large volume of agent required,
and that, being mainly ideal gases, they can only be stored in the compressed
gaseous phase, requiring high-pressure hardware for storage and delivery. Also, as
with CO2 systems, the risk of enclosure overpressure should be addressed during
system design. Inert gas systems are particularly useful for suppressing fires in
hazards where an electrically nonconductive medium is desirable; where clean-up
of other agents presents a problem; or where the enclosure is normally occupied
and requires a non-toxic agent, e.g. electrical rooms, turbine enclosures, etc. Owing
to the long discharge time and agent volume, they are not suitable for rapidly
escalating hydrocarbon fires or for explosion inertion in normally occupied areas.
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6.5 FIXED SYSTEMS – OPTIONS, APPLICATIONS AND DESIGN ISSUES
6.5.1 General
This section outlines the main fixed fire protection options, potential applications and
common design issues. Typical requirements and applicable standards for fixed fire systems
in specific installations/areas – storage tanks, process areas, liquefied gas facilities, marine
facilities, buildings, and road and rail loading racks/gantries – are given in Annex C. Portable
and mobile fire-fighting equipment are addressed in section 7.6.1.
The need for fixed fire protection systems will depend on identified scenarios, potential
consequences and other factors such as fire response availability. In all cases, a scenario-
based approach should be used, backed up where necessary by a CBA. This approach can
allow the potential benefits in risk reduction gained from different system types, options and
configurations to be compared against the cost of implementation.
Fire-fighting equipment is only called into action when a problem has occurred.
Therefore, it should be designed, manufactured, inspected and maintained to the best
possible standards so that when it is needed it can be brought rapidly into effective operation.
The best method of doing this is to design in accordance with recognised publications (codes
of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) and use materials that have been
approved by a reputable testing authority. Personnel who will be expected to use, inspect or
maintain the system should be fully trained and competent in these aspects.
6.5.2 Fire water systems
A fire water system (or fire water network) is designed to distribute water to parts of an
installation for use through fixed application devices (e.g. water spray systems) or outlets
(e.g. hydrants). It typically consists of a water storage volume, a number of fire pumps and
fire main piping, which distributes the water to the various hydrants and devices. It may
comprise discrete legs radiating out from the pumping location, or it may be gridded by
means of interconnecting legs. Isolation valves are usually provided to allow direction of
water to places where it is needed in the event of disablement of part of the system.
Water storage volumes required will differ, depending on the requirements for
credible scenarios at an installation. Calculations should be carried out to establish the
required volume based on consideration of the application rates and run times required to
fulfil the likely fire response strategies for the various scenarios. This may require a calculation
sheet-type approach when analysing scenarios (see annex D.6). In some cases, water supplies
are unlimited and calculation of required volumes is not so critical; however, alternative
supplies may need to be identified in the event of disablement of the primary means of
pumping water from such unlimited sources. However water is sourced, the volume should
be sufficient to allow for a defined period – this should be determined as part of the scenario
assessment through consideration of potential fire exposures and foam application / cooling
requirements but should generally be at least two hours.
Fire pump capacity should be provided on the n+1 principle, where n is the number
of pumps required to satisfy the maximum firewater demand. This is to ensure sufficient
redundancy in the event of failure of a pump, so that 100 % fire-fighting capacity should
remain. Consideration should also be given to providing alternative facilities to cover the
situation where one pump is out of service and the standby pump fails to start. This may
involve use of a second standby pump, mutual aid schemes, provision of temporary or
transportable pumps during periods of maintenance on a permanent unit, use of cooling
water supplies, and use of tug or ship firewater pumps on jetties or wharves.
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Consideration should also be given to the survivability of fire water systems,

particularly where there exists a possibility of VCE and contingencies should be identified
where necessary. Availability should also be addressed with winterisation precautions to
prevent freezing of ‘wet’ systems required at some locations (e.g. by locating fire main piping
underground). Reliability should be considered and a preventative maintenance should be
adopted that aims to prevent problems with fire main integrity or deterioration of pumps and
equipment, including discharge devices.
6.5.3 Water spray systems
The principal objectives of water deluge/spray systems are:
−− Cooling fire-engulfed plant and equipment.

−− Cooling plant and equipment exposed to thermal radiation.
Whichever of these objectives the system is intended to meet should be clearly defined
before a design is attempted or the system is installed, as application rates differ depending
on the objective.
The first priority should be to decide whether a water deluge/spray system should
be provided. Typically, this should consider the local legislative requirements as well as fully
appraising the risk. The most appropriate method is to carry out a scenario-based evaluation
of credible fire incidents. For example, a single small tank, where options exist for rapid
deployment of portable fire-fighting equipment may not necessitate use of such a fixed
system. However, a large tank within a bund with minimal separation and significant fire
exposure potential might benefit from fixed water-cooling.
One method of determining whether fixed water-cooling might be required is to
make use of validated fire consequence modelling software packages to determine the
extent of radiant heat flux on a given tank or part of an installation. Generally, fixed water-
cooling should be considered if the exposed tank, vessel or plant is likely to be exposed to a
radiant heat flux in excess of 32 kW/m2 (see section 2.6.2).
Where exposures are likely to be subjected to less than this amount – typically
8 kW/m2 and above – fixed water-cooling may be considered, but may not always be
necessary. Generally, cooling should be provided at some stage but this may be provided by
mobile means (e.g. by portable water monitors – see section 7.6.1).
Cooling water requirements should be based on the amount needed for the total
vessel or structure surface areas (see annex D.5 for typical water application rates).
Note that, in sizing relief valves, no credit for reduced heat input should be taken for
water spray cooling even though this will probably limit the heat input to the vessel.
For tanks, only that section of the tank surface exposed to the potential risk should
be protected by cooling. This is particularly applicable to large storage tanks where some
heat absorption can be tolerated. Note that for spheres and horizontal cylinders the lower
half of the surface of the vessel should be sprayed. Reduced nozzle spacing may be required
for this portion of the vessel.
When designing water spray systems special attention should be paid to drainage.
Drains should be suitably sized to handle the maximum design rate of water spray and be
equipped with flame traps and oil/water separators.
Consideration should be given to system drain points, testing facilities and flushing
facilities, particularly when brackish or salt water is used. For general design criteria see
NFPA 15.
The requirement for water deluge/spray should also be considered in relation to the
protection given by PFP measures.
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6.5.4 Fixed monitors
Fixed monitors may be used as an alternative to fixed water spray systems for providing
cooling water to exposed tanks, vessels and equipment.
Fixed monitors should be provided with adjustable, constant-flow, fog-to-straight-
stream nozzles so that process equipment is suitably covered but will not be damaged by
a solid stream at shorter ranges. Care should be taken not to direct water jets onto hot
operating process equipment since thermal shock could lead to relaxation of joints or fracture
of the equipment: fine sprays should be used.
A heavy fog may be projected into the process area if needed for exposure protection
of equipment or personnel.
Fixed monitors should be located within range of the equipment to be protected.
In the case of storage tank farms, they should be located outside bund areas. If, due to
obstructions, monitors are required closer to the equipment, cooling for the monitor should
be considered. Manually operated monitors should be located in an area that is not likely to
receive more than 6,3 kW/m2 (see section 2.6.2) which is considered as the limit for ERs to
perform brief fire equipment alignment tasks, if wearing appropriate PPE. This also applies
to actuation points and remote control units, which should be located outside of the fire
hazard area.
Various types of monitors are available for use with foam or water, and remote
controlled, electric or water-powered oscillating units are commercially available. Monitors or
‘foam stations’ with integral foam supplies – either drum or ‘tote’ tanks can be used where
there is a requirement for rapid response with minimal intervention. Whichever type is used,
range should be assessed in the most demanding flow and wind conditions.
6.5.5 Sprinkler systems
Sprinkler systems should be considered for storage areas and warehouses holding ordinarily
combustible (cellulosic) materials. For manufacturing or filling areas involving flammable
liquids or flammable liquid storage, use of automatic sprinkler systems requires careful
consideration of the system design, type of materials involved, and drainage provisions.
Where flammable liquids are stored, foam sprinkler systems are preferred, since water-only
sprinklers are largely ineffective against these risks and may actually spread the fire to other
areas.
The design of sprinkler systems should vary with the hazards and size of the
installation. The type, size and number of sprinklers required to operate in a fire, the water
discharge rate and duration of discharge are linked to the hazard classification. Thus, the size
of the water supply source and supply mains should vary accordingly.
For sprinkler systems protecting indoor storage of barrels, pallets and non-pressurised
containers, pipework should be designed to avoid impact damage during movement and
stacking operations.
Sprinkler systems should be designed, installed and maintained in accordance with
NFPA 13, EN 12845 or other recognised standard.
6.5.6 Water mist systems
Water mist systems have evolved from existing sprinkler and water washing systems
technology. They produce very fine water droplets – most fewer than 400 µm in diameter
and only small amounts of water are used. They are a viable alternative to gaseous systems
for protecting certain areas, although in most cases application is limited to some turbine
enclosures and other smaller, enclosed compartments.
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Single fluid (i.e. water only) and dual-fluid (water plus inert gas) high and low pressure
systems are available for local and volume application.
The advantages of water mist are that only small amounts of water are required, and
the water does not dissipate through enclosures like a gaseous agent. Cooling, wetting of
combustibles and a degree of oxygen exclusion are all given on activation.
Systems should be highly engineered to provide a high level of protection – there are
many variables in the design that have an effect on the effectiveness of the system; these
include nozzle spacing, positioning, ventilation, hazard geometry and fire size. In addition,
some dual fluid systems actually rely on additional inerting of the atmosphere by the inert
gas carrier. Care should be taken when specifying and designing these components. In most
cases, where water mist systems are to be used a full trial design should be established and
tested to ensure the system will work in practice.
For guidance on the design, installation and maintenance of water mist systems, see
NFPA 750.
6.5.7 Foam systems
Critical performance criteria relevant to foam systems include:
−− system response time (i.e. time taken to produce effective foam);

−− application method (e.g. via foam sprinkler/spray nozzles or fixed foam pourer, and
whether ‘gentle’ or 'forceful' application);
−− foam quality (expansion, drainage time and proportioning rate concentration);
−− application rate;
−− foam coverage;
−− duration of discharge, and
−− foam type.
6.5.7.1 Foam sprinkler/spray systems

Correctly designed foam sprinkler/spray systems provide effective protection for both indoor
and outdoor risks where flammable liquids may be released in relatively large quantities.
Typical risks that may be protected are road tanker vehicle and rail wagon tank loading
gantries, horizontal storage tanks, pump rooms, flammable liquid warehouses and process units.
They can provide an even distribution of foam giving fast flame knockdown and
fire control coupled with secure and safe extinguishment. In addition, they can provide a
valuable cooling effect to structures within the fire area or exposure protection from heat
radiation from adjacent fire areas.
Foam sprinkler or spray systems should therefore be considered for loading/unloading
bays, pump slabs and warehouses of strategic importance in which Class I and II products
are handled.
Systems can be initiated either automatically (e.g. by flame detection) or manually
depending on the layout of plant and access for fire-fighting services. Most foam systems
apply foam through foam-water sprinkler/spray heads positioned above the potential fire
hazard. For outdoor risks the effect of wind should be taken into account. It is common
practice in circumstances where this can be a problem to cover an additional area each
side of the actual risk. For example, if loading gantry dimensions were 10 m x 10 m, the
area covered may be increased to 13 m x 13 m. The actual allowance in any situation will
depend upon the particular circumstances such as prevailing wind directions and the degree
of exposure to strong winds. Obstructions to foam distribution should also be accounted for.
It may be necessary to provide additional nozzles to compensate for this. A wide range of
nozzles having directional capability and different angles of discharge is available for such
circumstances.
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Discharge nozzles should be tested with the foam concentrate being used. This is
particularly true for polar solvent risks where minimum application rates vary according to the
foam concentrate used and the product being protected. (In such cases, test data, preferably
from an independent source, should be used to decide final application rates.)
A good quality foam concentrate/nozzle combination will produce foam that, after
10 minutes foam solution discharge (or once foam concentrate supplies have run out), will
withstand 20 minute water discharge from the same nozzles and still provide an acceptable
degree of burn-back resistance and vapour suppression.
Essentially, there are two types of system:
(i) Open head foam/water deluge spray
In this type of system, every nozzle discharges simultaneously. This system is most
suitable for loading gantries, pump rooms, etc.
The nozzles used can be non-aspirating or aspirating. Aspirating types will
generally produce better foam quality. When non-aspirating heads are used, a film
forming foam type should be used.
Various nozzles with different discharge patterns for mounting at elevated
levels or grade are available.
(ii) Closed head foam sprinkler
This is a conventional sprinkler system using closed, non-aspirating heads. Heat

from a fire will cause individual heads to discharge. Proportioning accuracy over
the very wide range of possible flows can cause a problem and it is normal practice
to choose a proportioner type that will tend to give a rich concentration of foam
solution as opposed to a weak one at low flow levels where only a few heads
discharge.
The introduction of a film forming foam into a sprinkler system provides
a wetting action by reducing the surface tension of the water and enabling it to
penetrate further and more quickly into Class A materials (see section 7.6.1.2).
Tests have shown that fires can be extinguished more rapidly using a film forming
foam in such circumstances, thereby ensuring that water damage is kept to a
minimum. When a warehouse is protected by a sprinkler system, the introduction
of foam concentrate into the system is often used when the risk in the warehouse
involves flammable liquids.
Design should be in accordance with NFPA 11, NFPA 16 and/or BS 5306-6.
Generally, a fixed foam system should be designed to provide foam solution over
the full surface area to be protected at the typical application rates given in annex
D.7 and Table D.2.
6.5.7.2 Foam systems for storage tanks

Many tanks in service around the world containing flammable liquids do not have any form
of fixed foam protection systems. In these cases, it has been assumed that a fire-fighting
attack can be mounted from portable or mobile equipment such as foam/water monitors.
Major incidents have shown that this cannot always be relied upon. However, large diameter
tank fires have been extinguished successfully with large throughput monitors and several
manufacturers market this type of equipment.
The type of protection system specified should depend on the construction of the
tank and the properties of the product stored. In the event that a system is considered
justified, the standard typically applied is NFPA 11. See also the LASTFIRE project deliverables,
which features a comprehensive review of tank related foam system applications.
Systems may be fixed or semi-fixed, i.e. the discharge equipment mounted on a
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storage tank may be permanently fixed to the supply of foam solution or the connection
may only be made at the time of an incident in which case the term semi-fixed applies.
(Usually in such cases, the foam solution should be supplied from a specialist fire-fighting
vehicle.) Any inlets on a semi-fixed system for foam solution or foam, for example, should be
located outside any potential fire consequence area. As a general rule they should be situated
outside any 6.3 kW/m2 radiant heat envelope (see section 2.6.2) but local requirements for
consequences and other factors such as smoke should also be considered. If necessary,
alternative inlet points should be considered.
Fixed systems should have supplementary foam back-up: see section 7.
(i) Fixed foam pourers for bunds
Fixed foam pourers are sometimes used to protect bunded areas. The discharge
devices are fixed to the bund wall at equally spaced intervals so that the foam
discharges into the bund itself. Such systems offer significant advantages in dealing
with large bund fires because foam application can be rapid – providing a system is
engineered and maintained correctly – and required application rates are generally
lower than those required for mobile attack using monitors or foam branches.
Foam is also delivered relatively gently to the fuel surface. Personnel safety should
be increased with this type of equipment, since deployment does not depend on
moving equipment close to bunded areas: this is not the case if the system is semi-
fixed in which case ERs need to pump foam into the pourers. These types of system
are not as flexible as a fully mobile response – when designing it should be borne in
mind that there may be a limited foam supply and that supplementary application
may be needed – perhaps by also using mobile equipment.
Typically, application rates for systems covering hydrocarbon risks should be
at least 4 l/min./m2.
For foam destructive products (e.g. polar solvents), the foam concentrate
manufacturer’s recommendations on application rate should be followed.
(ii) Fixed foam pourer systems for fixed roof tanks
Fixed foam pourers are often used as the primary protection method for fixed roof
tanks. See Figure 6.2. In this case, they are located immediately below the weak
seam joining the roof to the tank shell. A vapour seal to prevent fuel vapours from
the tank escaping into the foam solution lines is incorporated into the units. This
normally takes the form of a frangible glass diaphragm or plastic seal that breaks
under pressure from foam entering the device.
Essentially, there are three components to a foam pourer assembly used for
storage tank protection:
- foam generator – this may be mounted very close to the discharge device or
remotely from it;
- vapour seal box;
- discharge device – inside the tank. Normally this is of a type that forces foam
back against the tank wall so that it flows down relatively gently onto the fuel
surface.
The major disadvantages of foam pourers for tank protection are: the relative
difficulty of maintaining them because they are located at the top of the tank; and
the fairly strong possibility that they will be damaged by an explosion or fire prior
to foam discharge being started. However, in some circumstances they may be the
only practicable solution particularly where water pressure is low as they tend to
106
require less pressure to operate than the alternative protection methods for fixed
roof tanks.
Where an internal floating roof is present within a fixed roof tank, fixed
foam pourers are the preferred protection method. In such cases, foam solution
application rates are the same as for standard fixed roof tanks and are based on the
entire surface area of the tank, unless the internal roof construction is one of the
types normally associated with open top floating roof tanks.
Weak seam
Vapour
seal box
Deflector
Pourer
assembly
Foam
generator
Foam
Air
Fuel
Foam
solution
Figure 6.2: Fixed foam pourer system for fixed roof tanks
(iii) Subsurface protection of fixed roof tanks
With subsurface application or base injection the foam is forced directly into the fuel
either via a product line or at a point near the bottom of the tank (but above any
water base that may be present). The foam then travels through the fuel to form
a vapour-suppressing blanket over the entire surface. See Figure 6.3. Circulation
of the fuel caused by the travel of foam through it helps to cool the fuel surface.
The advantage over top pourers is that there is less chance of damage to it during
an incident. Therefore, subsurface injection systems have become more popular
as the primary protection method for tanks storing petroleum and its products.
However, there is currently no commercially available foam suitable for use in such
systems with water-soluble substances and foam applied in this way through them
will deteriorate and fail to build a satisfactory foam blanket on top of the fuel. The
alternative would be to use a semi-subsurface system (see 6.5.7.2(iv)) or otherwise
apply foam as gently as possible from top pourers.
Special consideration should be given to high viscosity fuels, as subsurface
injection may not be suitable.
With some products where there has been a long preburn prior to the
application of foam, a hot zone may exist near the burning surface at temperatures
in excess of 100 oC. In order to avoid frothing and slop-over, continuous application
of foam should be avoided in the initial stages. Intermittent application of foam can
induce circulation of the product in the tank, thereby bringing the cooler layers of
fuel to the surface. The foam injected intermittently will disperse without sufficient
steam formation to produce frothing.
Special foam generators should be provided that are designed to produce
suitable quality foam against the backpressure caused by the product head in the
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tank and any friction losses between the foam generator and foam discharge
point inside the tank. Such high back-pressure generators typically can produce
foam against 25 - 40 % backpressure. Normally a minimum inlet pressure at the
generator of 7 bar is required.
In order to minimise product pick-up and foam breakdown the foam
discharge velocity into the tank should be limited in subsurface. This factor, along
with the need to calculate and minimise backpressure, mean that pipework sizing
and routing can be more critical than with other pourer systems.
In order to provide a positive seal against the product leaking back down
the foam system pipework, a bursting disc should be positioned in the line as well
as a non-return valve.
Testing of subsurface systems can be relatively easy, provided test discharge
outlets and the corresponding valving have been incorporated into the system
layout. Such test outlets should be of a size sufficient to simulate actual flow
conditions and foam generation.
(iv) Semi-subsurface protection of fixed roof tanks
In an attempt to overcome the disadvantages of subsurface systems for fixed roof

storage tanks not having an internal floating roof, some companies have developed
a semi-subsurface system in which the discharge equipment moving parts are at
grade but the foam is applied gently to the product surface. See Figure 6.4. This, in
theory, allows use on water-soluble products.
To some extent this equipment was made obsolete by the use of foams
that can be used in a true subsurface system. However, true subsurface systems
cannot be used on water-soluble products, so semi-subsurface techniques might
be a solution in such cases. (This point should be borne in mind now that more
and more foam destructive additives are being added to petroleum products such
as unleaded petrol.)
The equipment used for semi-subsurface technique consists of a container,
either mounted in the product itself or just outside the tank shell near its base, with
a hose of length equal to the tank height. The non-porous foam discharge hose
is made from a synthetic elastomer-coated nylon fabric and is lightweight, flexible
and oil resistant. It is packed into the container in such a way that it can easily be
pushed out by foam entering it from a foam generator. The container is provided
with a cap or bursting disc to exclude products from the hose container and foam
supply piping.
When foam is generated, a pressure wave in the container causes the
bursting disc to burst allowing the unattached end of the hose to float to the
surface. Foam flowing through the hose gives the hose added buoyancy and is
delivered gently to the fuel surface.
The major disadvantage of the system is that it is complicated compared to
other types. It is also relatively difficult to maintain and check and the unattached
end of the hose can disrupt the foam blanket as it moves around due to the
reaction force of the discharging foam. Consequently, it is not a preferred option.
(v) Foam top pourer protection of open top floating roof tanks
The main fire risk for open top floating roof tanks is the seal area between the tank
shell and the floating roof.
In fact, this type of tank has a relatively good safety record. The preferred
option is to have a fully fixed or semi-fixed rim seal foam system. However, some
petroleum companies choose not to install any fixed protection system at all but
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rely on an ER, at the time of an incident, to fight the fire from the tank top.
However the response to such fires is provided, it is vital that they are managed to
a well pre-planned strategy.
In some cases a foam solution riser is installed at the top of the tank so
that a hose line can be connected here and by walking around the walkway, an
ER can direct foam into the seal area, under water curtain protection. If there is no
foam solution riser at walkway level a response is still possible - by making foam
at the tank top; however, this is the least preferred option due to manoeuvrability
and manual handling problems with foam concentrate drums.
Even if fixed or semi-fixed fire protection systems are provided, it is essential
that back-up portable attack capability is provided. The objective of the portable
equipment response is to be able to complete extinguishment safely if this has not
been achieved by the system itself. In cases where no fixed or semi-fixed system is
available, the portable equipment response becomes the primary response.
Figure 6.3: Subsurface foam system for fixed roof tanks
Foam
blanket
Foam outlet
hose
Hose
container
Block
valve Check
valve
Foam solution
Figure 6.4: Semi-subsurface foam system for fixed roof tanks
109
As stated above, the optimum solution is to provide a fixed foam pourer system;
see Figure 6.5. It comprises a number of pourers positioned strategically around
the top of the tank discharging foam into the seal area. A foam dam is fixed on
the tank roof to contain the foam in the seal area.
Pourer systems have the following advantages:
- Relatively simple installation.

- No moving parts on tank roof.
- Maintenance of pourers is straightforward and safe to carry out provided the
tank has a walkway.
- Only fairly low solution pressures are necessary at the foam generators.
The main disadvantage is that, particularly when the tank is nearly empty and the
roof is some way below the top of the tank shell, a large proportion of the foam
may miss the seal area due to disruption of the foam stream by turbulent wind
effects.
With foam pourers it is only possible to apply foam over any secondary
seal or water shield. With other types of system described in 6.5.7.2 vi and vii
it is possible to inject the foam directly into the space under these. In theory,
this is more effective but in practice gives rise to additional maintenance issues.
Therefore, foam pourers are normally considered as the preferred choice.
Foam
generator Foam
pourer
Foam
Foam
solution
Foam
dam
Figure 6.5: Foam pourer for open top floating roof tanks
(vi) Catenary system protection of open top floating roof tanks
In order to overcome the potential disadvantages of the top foam pourer system
for open top floating roof tanks, some manufacturers have developed a system
known as the catenary system. In this, a foam solution riser goes to the top of
the tank. This is connected to a flexible hose that is attached to the rolling ladder
and feeds the foam solution to a ring of pipework on the floating roof. At equal
intervals around this ring there are foam makers discharging foam into the seal
area. Depending on the type of seal there may or may not be a foam dam and
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discharge may be above or below a secondary seal. See Figure 6.6.

Catenary systems therefore overcome the problem of losing foam as it
travels down the tank walls, but unfortunately experience has shown that they
suffer from other disadvantages:
- Routine maintenance has to be carried out on the floating roof.

- Air inlets to the foam maker are on the roof and so may draw in fumes or
combustion products.
- The flexible hose is very prone to damage from the environment or the rolling
ladder or other fixtures trapping it.
For these reasons, catenary systems have not found wide acceptance.
Rolling ladder
Foam generator Foam solution
Foam dam supply line
Fixed solution Flexible

pipework ring hose
Figure 6.6: Catenary system for open top floating roof tanks
Foam dam
Foam
distribution
manifold
Foam Bund wall

discharge
pipes
Foam
Foam solution
generator
Figure 6.7: Coflexip® system for open top floating roof tanks
(vii) Coflexip® system protection of open top floating roof tanks
In the Coflexip® proprietary system, a special flexible pipe of the type used for roof
drains on a floating roof tank is installed inside the tank.
Depending upon the total flow rates required and hydraulic calculations,
either foam solution or finished foam is pumped from outside the bund wall up
through this pipe to the tank roof. From there it is distributed through a 'spider'
network of metal pipe to the seal area (via foam makers if foam solution only has
been pumped into the system). See Figure 6.7.
111
This system therefore overcomes the potential disadvantages of top pourer

and catenary systems; however, a critical part of the system is actually inside the tank
and therefore cannot easily be inspected, maintained and repaired.
Acceptance of this type of system therefore depends on the reliability of the
flexible pipe and the joints connecting it to the distribution pipework.
6.5.8 Dry powder (dry chemical) systems
A range of fixed dry powder (dry chemical) systems are available including:
−− fixed total flooding systems;

−− fixed local application systems;
−− monitors, and
−− hosereels.
The main issues are selection of an appropriate powder (some are more effective than others
at extinguishing flammable liquids) and the possibility of re-ignition should also be taken into
account since there is no significant cooling effect unlike foam or water. Application method
and, for fixed systems, pipework design should also be considered. Discharge devices such
as nozzles, monitors etc. should be compatible with the powder used, positioned correctly
and provide the correct flow rate to control and extinguish the fire. Weight and composition
of the powder and propellant type are also key factors in system design; there may also be
discharge hazards to personnel. Specialist guidance and component/agent approvals should
be sought when considering dry powder systems.
In the case of total flooding systems, pipework should be designed so that the design
concentration is achieved within 30 seconds. The possibility of particulates and residues
affecting flow should also be borne in mind and pipework should be designed accordingly.
For guidance on dry powder system design see NFPA 17.
6.5.9 Gaseous systems
Fixed gaseous extinguishing systems use extinguishing media such as CO2, various 'chemical'
halon replacements and other inert gases.
'Total flooding' systems are commonly used in enclosed areas, mainly to contain
electrical fires such as those in computer suites, control rooms and switch rooms but they
are also used in turbine enclosures. See Figure 6.8. 'Local application' systems are used for
specific hazards. See Figure 6.9.
Local application systems have also been used to provide protection to the rim seal
area of floating roof tanks. However, experience has shown that these types of system provide
only limited discharge time and do not significantly cool the fire. (A more suitable system is a
fixed rim seal foam pourer system.)
Careful consideration should be given and, where necessary, specialist advice sought
on the design and installation of such systems for enclosed areas, particularly with respect
to personnel safety. Detailed guidance regarding personnel safety can be found from the
standards referenced in this section as well as BP Hazards of nitrogen and catalyst handling,
which contains guidance on hazards associated with oxygen-depleted atmospheres.
It should be recognised that whilst some other gaseous agents are marketed as
'personnel safe', exposure should be limited (particularly for 'chemical' halon replacements)
and international standards usually offer guidance on these aspects. For example, CO2 is
toxic and an asphyxiant and therefore hazardous to personnel – adverse health effects can
be felt at concentrations as low as 4 % in air.
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Entry into confined spaces protected by gaseous systems should be strictly controlled
by a PTW system. Provision should also be made to positively isolate the protection system
whilst maintenance work is carried out in the area covered by the system and to reinstate the
system once work is completed.
Some design considerations include:
−− design concentration;
−− application rates and retention time;
−− requirement for extended discharge;
−− nozzle placement;
−− detection, actuation and control;
−− ventilation;
−− life safety issues – interlocks and positive isolation, and
−− post-discharge response procedures.
Design concentration, application rate and retention time are key design criteria. The
concentration required depends on the product and fire type. It may be necessary to
develop specific performance criteria for some applications. Normally, a safety factor over
the minimum design concentration should be applied. The ongoing integrity of enclosures
should be assured so as to ensure the correct operation of these types of system: without this
assurance, extinguishing gas may escape and the system design concentration and retention
time for extinguishment may not be achieved. There should be periodic enclosure integrity
testing and (ideally) discharge testing of systems.
Comprehensive guidance can be found in BS 5306-4 or NFPA 12 for gaseous systems
using CO2, and ISO 14520 or NFPA 2001 for agents other than CO2.
System actuator Turbine

(electrical) Cylinder
valve
and Detector
actuator Delay
nozzle
Generator
Initial
nozzle
Exciter
Pressure
switch
Delayed discharge
feed pipe
Initial Extended
cylinders discharge Initial discharge
cylinders feed pipe
Figure 6.8: Total flooding gaseous system schematic
113
Damper
Manual
Pressure switch release
System controller
Pressure
trip
CO2 cylinders
Discharge horn
Heat detector
Figure 6.9: Example schematic of a CO2 local application gaseous system
114
7 RESPONSE STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This section provides incident response strategies for various fire and explosion scenarios
identified in section 2.5; it includes options for mobile and portable fire response, including
the specification, use and maintenance of fire-fighting equipment ranging from fire monitors
to ER PPE.
Fire incident response is only one aspect of FEHM; this section is based on the premise
that other FEHM measures – such as fire prevention, fire and flammable gas detection and
fire protection – are in place.
The guidance in this section reflects incident experience and good practice in fire
response. It can be used as a basis for developing installation-specific fire response strategies
accompanied by ERPs.
7.2 INCIDENT RESPONSE STRATEGIES
7.2.1 Unignited gas release
7.2.1.1 LPG or LNG liquid release

For LPG releases, the use of medium or high expansion foam application is not fully proven
as an effective control or extinguishing agent although there is anecdotal evidence of a small
number of limited successes. When foam is applied, this may initially result in a higher rate
of evaporation of the LPG before any control is achieved. However, in at least one instance,
the weather conditions were sub-zero, resulting in the foam forming an ice sheet over the
liquid LPG.
Good practice for LPG and LNG is to use fixed and/or portable water monitors or
water curtain/fan spray nozzles to contain or direct the liberated gas and prevent it from
reaching a source of ignition. Where downwind or downhill gas migration is toward an area
that has no source of ignition, the opportunity should be taken to set up water screens or
curtains upwind if sources of ignition are present in this direction, in case of wind direction
changes. It should not be assumed that wind direction and speed will be constant during any
incident. It should be assumed that a gas cloud will ignite and therefore any intervention,
after proper initial and continuing risk assessment, should consider setting up water curtains
to contain or disperse the gas to below its LFL. In most cases, such deployment should be
supported by hose line teams using water curtains to protect the deployment teams. Such
work needs careful preplanning and exercising.
The response strategy should depend on the size and nature of the release, and
direction of gas migration through wind direction, but it should consider the following tactics:
−− Halting all work and summoning emergency services.
−− Halting, switching-off and abandoning vehicles and machinery in the affected area
or onsite.
−− Evacuating all non-essential personnel.
−− Isolating the source of liquid release, if possible, safe and practical to do so.
−− Assessing as early as possible the gas cloud extent and areas that may be affected
either downwind or on all 'sides' of the cloud.
−− Identifying as early as possible potential sources of ignition the gas may reach and
carrying out necessary actions including:
115
- Switching off heaters and furnaces, extinguishing naked lights, and isolating
electrical systems only if this is possible in a safe time frame before any gas
migrates to the equipment. (It should be noted that heaters and furnaces,
once shut off, can still retain high temperatures that can ignite the gas.)
- Halting traffic on rail lines or nearby public roads.
- Preventing access by pedestrians/passers-by.
−− Alerting any neighbouring (e.g. 'domino') installations or public areas to gas hazard
and actuating any offsite ERPs to evacuate people and halt traffic, etc.
−− Closing roads, as required.
−− Implementing emergency response from upwind direction.
−− Activating arrangements for meeting oncoming external response groups at a safe
distance from the affected area to advise gas location.
−− Being aware of plant drainage systems, storm water drainage and other low level
drainage or piping, conduit, ducting or cable sleeve routes through which gas may
migrate to remote locations.
−− Being aware of buildings and enclosures where gas may accumulate and then ignite,
causing an explosion.
−− Using water in the form of water screens/curtains/spray that may check, contain or
minimise gas migration.
−− Avoiding direction of water streams/jets into the liquid release as this will increase the
rate of gas evolution. (Also, jets may cause electrostatic discharge which may ignite
gas/vapours.)
−− Using portable flammable gas detection equipment to monitor gas cloud extent.
−− Using water streams to agitate/aid gas dispersion at or near to the source of release.
(This would only be practical if the release was not of significant size or scale and the
spray streams were placed close together at the source to create turbulence.)
−− Using high expansion foam for vapour suppression and control if LNG is involved.
−− Avoiding use of foam if LPG liquid release is involved (as this is unproven).
−− Avoiding entering the liquid/gas hazard area under any circumstances.
−− Expecting gas ignition at any time, even if there does not appear to be any obvious
source of ignition.
−− Being aware that if a large gas cloud does ignite in a congested area, a VCE may
occur with resultant overpressures and blast debris consequences.
−− Evacuating all other personnel to a place of safety once all mitigation has been put
in place.
7.2.1.2 Gas or vapour release

The response strategy is similar to LPG or LNG liquid release (see 7.2.1.1), but the gas release
will typically be under pressure and should depend on the release size and direction of gas
migration through wind direction.
The response strategy should consider the following tactics:

−− Halting, switching-off and abandoning vehicles and machinery in the affected area
or onsite.
−− Isolating the source of liquid release, if possible, safe and practical to do so.
−− Assessing as early as possible the gas cloud extent and areas that may be affected
either downwind or on all 'sides' of the cloud.
−− Identifying as early as possible potential sources of ignition the gas may reach and
carrying out necessary actions including:
- Switching off heaters and furnaces, extinguishing naked lights, and isolating
116
electrical systems only if this is possible in a safe time frame before any gas
migrates to the equipment. (It should be noted that heaters and furnaces,
once shut off, can still retain high temperatures that can ignite the gas.)
- Halting traffic on rail lines or nearby public roads.
- Preventing access by pedestrians/passers-by.
−− Alerting any neighbouring (e.g. 'domino') installations or public areas to gas hazard
and actuating any offsite ERPs to evacuate people and halt traffic, etc.
−− Closing roads, as required.
−− Implementing emergency response from upwind direction.
−− Activating arrangements for meeting oncoming external response groups at a safe
distance from the affected area to advise gas location.
−− Being aware of plant drainage systems, storm water drainage and other low level
drainage or piping, conduit, ducting or cable sleeve routes through which gas may
migrate to remote locations.
−− Being aware of buildings and enclosures where gas may accumulate and then ignite,
causing an explosion.
−− Using water in the form of water screens/curtains/spray that may check, contain or
minimise gas migration.
−− Using water streams to agitate/aid gas dispersion at or near to the source of release.
(This would only be practical if the release was not of significant size or scale.)
−− Being cautious when using water streams/jets for gas dispersal as static electricity
may cause ignition.
−− Avoiding entering the gas hazard area under any circumstances.
−− Expecting gas ignition at any time, even if there does not appear to be any source
of ignition.
−− Being aware that if a large gas cloud does ignite in a congested area, a VCE may
occur with resultant overpressures and blast debris consequences.
in place.
7.2.1.3 Gas or vapour dispersion with water spray

Response strategies that may include gas dispersion using water spray should consider the
following tactics:
−− Approaching the source of release from upwind direction.

−− ERs wearing full fire-resistant PPE including self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA).
−− Using wheeled or portable water monitors (without permanent staffing).
−− Facilitating manual handling of water monitors.
−− Using hand-held hose lines with water curtain streams to protect ERs approaching to
set up water monitors.
−− Being cautious when using water streams/jets for gas dispersal as static electricity
may cause ignition.
−− Safely re-accessing the water monitors if there is a change of conditions (e.g. wind,
release volume increase etc.).
−− Providing relief crews for ERs as they may only be able to work for a limited time.
Total confidence should not be placed on water spray dispersion of a gas release. Monitoring
of the area in the vicinity of the release outside the water spray area should be continuous to
check if the tactic is effective. If the water supply has to be provided by fire vehicles, these
117
should be located upwind and preferably at a distance of >100 m from the identified source
of release. Wind direction and speed should be monitored critically during such operations.
Water application for dispersal should involve setting monitor nozzles to a wide
angle spray and gradually building up water pressure, whilst trimming the water spray to
a semi-fog or semi-solid stream pattern that should create turbulence to assist in the rapid
dispersal of the gas to below its LFL.
7.2.1.4 Foam blanketing for vapour suppression

A foam blanketing response strategy may be used where vapours from flammable liquids are
released and where the liquid release is either constant, or vapour migration may be a major
hazard. The objective should be to apply foam onto the liquid to reduce vapour and thus
reduce the distance to LFL.
Response strategies that may include foam blanketing should consider the following
tactics:
−− Selecting low, medium expansion or high expansion foam concentrate and application
equipment according to the liquid.
−− Approaching the source of release from upwind direction.
−− Using hand-held hose lines with branches to cover those approaching to set up foam
pourers or monitors.
set-up foam bund pourers or foam monitors.
−− ERs wearing full fire-resistant PPE.
−− Facilitating manual handling of foam bund pourers or foam monitors.
−− Directing foam application devices to apply foam ahead of any liquid in a rolling
application to minimise static electricity generation and consequent ignition.
−− Avoiding foam stream application directly into the liquid.
−− Safely re-accessing the foam bund pourers or foam monitors if there is a need to
re-position.
−− Using portable vapour or flammable gas detection equipment to monitor migration.
The applied foam blanket will need regular 'topping-up' to maintain vapour suppression.
Once portable equipment is in position and functioning correctly, ERs should retire to a safe
distance from the general hazard area to observe foam application.
The environmental impact of foam application should be considered and therefore
this strategy should be reviewed in advance to ensure that such an impact is either eliminated
or reduced. There is an increasing environmental requirement to contain fire-fighting water
and foam applied for incident control (see section 1.7.3).
The use of foam for vapour blanketing should be an installation-specific decision
based on need, environmental conditions (e.g. presence of potential sources of ignition such
as lightning) and ER capabilities.
For specific hazards such as LNG it may not be appropriate to apply certain types
of foam such as low or medium expansion. Even if high expansion foam is applied then it
will not be completely effective at blanketing vapours due to the high volatility and level
of vapour generation. However, some level of control may be achieved. (It is more usual to
use high expansion foam to control burning associated with a contained LNG fire.) For LNG
specifically, see annex C.5.
7.2.2 Flammable liquid pool fire
Where a major liquid release has occurred with subsequent ignition, and where there may
be a need to urgently limit the fire hazard this creates in terms of flame impingement or
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radiant heat, the response strategies for dealing with such a liquid pool fire should consider
the following tactics:

−− Assessing flame impingement or radiant heat impact on affected plant, columns,
equipment, spheres, tanks, vessels, drums, etc.
−− Alerting any neighbouring (e.g. 'domino') installations or public areas to potential
escalation hazard and actuating any offsite ERPs to evacuate people and halt traffic, etc.
−− Actuating any fixed water spray or deluge system for affected and adjacent plant,
columns, equipment, spheres, tanks, vessels, drums, etc.
−− Using water jets, sprays, screens or curtains to protect radiant heat exposed plant,
−− Using foam to reduce the flame and fire size and radiant heat and possibly to
extinguish the fire, resulting in an unignited liquid pool.
−− Being aware of flame impingement hazards and fire escalation mechanisms (e.g.
BLEVE).
−− Considering water stream application onto flame impinged areas of plant, columns,
equipment, spheres, tanks, vessels, drums, etc. if risk assessment concludes this can
be achieved in a safe time and will not expose ERs to escalation dangers.
in place.
The extent to which extremely large pool fires such as bund fires are managed depends on
a number of factors including, but not limited to, bund size, design, and integrity and also
considerations such as the contents of storage tanks within them. An installation-specific
assessment of how they should be dealt with should be carried out as part of a fire scenario
analysis but the extent of bund fires can vary from being a relatively small, contained fire to
one that covers the entire surface of the bund. Both eventualities should be considered for
representative large bund areas and ERPs (see section 8.8) – should be developed for such
scenarios. Whilst ERPs should be prepared this does not necessarily mean that the resources
should be provided to deal with them – especially ‘full’ bund fires – but at the very least,
identification of the required resources in terms of foam and firewater quantities should be
made so that justified and appropriate decisions can be made on how to manage them if
required. (For example, a decision may be made not to provide the foam stocks required
onsite for a full bund fire, but preplanning could identify foam concentrate sources and
equipment required as well as other critical emergency response resources. This should be
done in advance and in consultation with the FRS and other stakeholders; any decision on
required resources should also take into account life safety and environmental issues as well
as installation criticality).
For bund fire-fighting strategies, see Annex D.
7.2.2.1 Use of water for exposure protection during a flammable liquid pool fire
Water may be used for exposure protection where a flammable liquid pool fire is impinging
on petroleum-containing plant, columns, equipment, spheres, tanks, vessels, drums, etc.
to reduce heat input to such equipment and therefore to maintain equipment integrity.
The objective is to apply water onto affected surfaces until either burn-out of the liquid
fuel or foam application extinguishes it. Pool fire response strategies that include water
application for exposure protection should consider several safety factors:
−− Applying water from portable or fixed monitors in accordance with annex D.2 and
annex D.5 onto affected steelwork of flame impinged petroleum-containing plant,
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set up water monitors.
−− Being aware of potential delays in setting-up or applying water, fire escalation
potential and the possible need to fully evacuate ERs.
−− Being aware that prolonged water application may result in localised drainage
problems or flooding that may undermine hardstanding.
−− Being aware that prolonged water application may also result in flotation of the
flammable liquid pool fire to other areas of installation (product carry-over).
If there is any doubt over the extent of flame impingement on petroleum-containing plant,
columns, equipment, spheres, tanks, vessels, drums, etc., consideration must be given to
full evacuation of the area unless water can be directed to the affected plant in a timely
manner. There are no clear time warnings where flame impingement has occurred on plant,
columns, equipment, spheres, tanks, vessels, drums, etc. If ERs confirm flame impingement,
an immediate concern should be to apply cooling water onto the impinged or heat-affected
area. If this cannot be done within the first minutes of the fire starting, evacuation must be
given priority, especially where no local fire-fighting water for cooling can be applied, for
whatever reason, until the arrival of the FRS.
One method of assessing the need for cooling is to play a stream of water onto
suspected heat affected plant, columns, equipment, spheres, tanks, vessels, drums, etc. and
observe the response. If the water vaporises (steams), then further cooling is clearly required;
however, if no steam is produced, cooling is not required at that time, but further checks may
be necessary.
7.2.3 Gas/liquid release, flash fire and jet fire
Where a gas or liquid release has occurred and the gas or vapour migrates some distance and
is ignited, there will be a flash fire that burns back rapidly, though sometimes not instantly, to
the source of release. Due to the nature of a flash fire, plant, columns, equipment, spheres,
tanks, vessels, drums, etc. in its path will be exposed to high heat levels and flame impingement
for only a few seconds, although sensitive electrical equipment and instrumentation may be
damaged in the event. Escalation from a flash fire is therefore unlikely.
This flash fire condition is one reason why ERs and others must not enter a gas cloud.
There have been cases where ERs have done so in the belief that the 'middle' of the cloud
was too rich to burn, only to discover that when the cloud edge ignited, they did not have
time to escape from the resultant flash fire.
Where the gas release occurs from a pressure source, the flash fire may burn back,
leaving a gas or liquid jet fire that may or may not impinge on adjacent equipment.
Of all the fire events that are encountered by ERs, jet fires have the potential to
cause rapid escalation through total failure of a vessel or drum, with subsequent BLEVE
consequences, depending on the pressures and liquids involved.
This response strategy may be used where a jet fire exists and is impinging on a
vessel or drum etc. to reduce the heat input to such equipment and therefore to maintain
equipment integrity. The objective should be to apply water onto flame - or heat-affected
exposures until either isolation or burn out of the jet fire.
Response strategies should consider several safety factors:
−− Applying water stream onto the area of jet flame impingement of affected equipment.
−− Isolating the source of release – extinguishing jet fires without isolation will result in
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continued gas/vapour flow and a flammable atmosphere can quickly develop.

−− Being aware of potential delays in setting-up or applying water, fire escalation
potential and the possible need to fully evacuate ERs.
−− Not attempting to extinguish the jet fire by using dry powder or water application.
−− Being aware that prolonged water application may result in localised drainage
problems or flooding that may undermine hardstanding.
Under certain conditions, it may be possible to 'bend' a minor to moderate gas jet fire or
to deflect it away from a sphere or vessel. This tactic has had some success but only on
relatively low-pressure jet fires. It employs several water streams that are set to a pattern
between semi-fog and straight jet. The aim is to hit a large area of the flame near the
impingement area and direct it away. It is stressed that this tactic involves ERs approaching
close to the fire area using mobile equipment. Therefore, if this is considered as a strategy,
the water application must be deployed early on in the incident. Under no circumstances
should any such attempt be made where flame impingement has been continuing for more
than 15 - 20 minutes.
The following should be established as early as possible:
−− The identity of the inventory;

−− The fill level of the vessel or drum;
−− Time of fire starting, and
−− If possible, the status of the inventory.
This will aid DRA (see section 8.9.2) and lead to incident decisions being made on robust
information.
If ERs confirm flame impingement, an immediate concern should be to apply cooling
water onto the affected area. If this cannot be done within the first minutes of the fire
starting, evacuation must be given priority, especially where no cooling water can be applied,
for whatever reason, until the arrival of the FRS.
7.2.4 Unconfined/semi-confined vapour cloud explosions
The hazard of VCEs, both in unconfined or semi-confined mode, should be recognised and
assessed in pre-incident scenario analysis and ERPs.
Semi-confined VCEs may be possible where flammable gas or vapour releases in
the order of 5 tonne and above form either instantly or in a few seconds within and around
process plant and equipment that may be in a congested area. The gas/vapour-in-air mix will
be such that on ignition, the cloud may burn slowly but as the flame front meets obstructions,
it increases speed and continues to increase as it encounters more obstacles in congested
areas. The rapidly moving flame causes a pressure wave to build up in milliseconds, which
creates an overpressure capable of severe damage depending on the congestion and the
installations involved. This 'explosion' in a congested area can lead to secondary gas/liquid
releases and/or fire event. The overpressure decays over distance but ERs, when responding
to any large flammable gas or vapour cloud building up in a plant congested area must
consider, as a matter of urgency, immediate evacuation to a safe distance in case of a VCE.
Apart from the congestion factor, the relative proportions of the air/fuel mixture
(stoichiometry) will govern the efficiency of the explosion. If the mix is perfect or close to it,
very high overpressures can result when combined with large areas of plant congestion.
It is not possible to combat a VCE once a large cloud builds up in a plant. The safest
course of action is to evacuate.
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7.2.5 Fireball/boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
Normally, if flame impingement is below the liquid level, the liquid boiling off helps to keep
the steel cool. If the flame impinges above the liquid level, the temperature of the steel rises
to failure point and tears open, releasing the contents in a mass of combined burning vapour
and boiling liquid that expands to produce more vapours to feed the resultant fireball.
Thermal radiation levels from the resulting rising fireball are sufficiently high to result
in fatalities or serious burn injuries to people nearby. Damage to plant and equipment can
occur due to overpressures from the explosion aspect.
Emergency response to potential BLEVE situations should include details on when
to evacuate areas. For example if the vessel has no PFP or adequate water cooling, the area
should be cleared immediately. It should also detail that in the case of jet flame impingement
water spray systems alone may not be considered wholly effective at preventing a BLEVE
situation, given that these systems are generally only designed to mitigate against the effects
of pool fires.
Although most of the recorded cases of BLEVE involve LPGs, it can be created
from other flammable liquids under pressure in containers, process vessels or road tankers
involved in fires. However, it should be noted that LNG or refrigerated LPG storage tanks or
atmospheric flammable liquid storage tanks will not normally develop a BLEVE condition due
to their construction and lack of pressure. However, failure of an LNG tank or a refrigerated
LPG tank shell may result in a very large and rapid burning liquid pool fire cascading from the
failed shell area to cover the full bund and possibly overflow it.
In the case of BLEVE prone process vessels, options for mitigation should be
considered if the fire scenario analysis determines that the vessel is particularly vulnerable.
These could include:
−− Provision of cooling via water spray systems;

−− Application of PFP;
−− Modifications to pressure vessel/piping design (material, wall thickness, etc.), and
−− Change from manual to automatic depressurisation.
7.2.6 Controlled burn (CB)
CB is an operational strategy where the application of fire-fighting media such as water or

foam is restricted or avoided, to minimise damage to public health and the environment. In
addition, it may be proposed as a design philosophy where the consequences associated with
a fire incident have been evaluated and it is deemed appropriate not to extinguish any fire
because of low consequence to life safety, the environment, assets, business interruption etc.
in applying this strategy.
The strategy would normally be used to prevent water pollution by contaminated
firewater. It can also reduce air pollution due to the better combustion and dispersion of
pollutants. But it may also have adverse impacts such as allowing or increasing the formation
of hazardous gaseous by-products.
Should a situation arise where there is no, or inadequate, secondary and tertiary
containment then the only options to protect people and the environment may be to:
−− Extinguish the fire and deploy emergency containment measures to control run-off.
−− Use CB to reduce run-off and/or air pollution.
The preferred response strategy should be pre-planned. However, the decision on which of
these options to use should generally be taken by the FRS Incident Commander, based on
DRA (see section 8.9.2) at the time of any incident. The first step should be to assess the
impacts of fire-fighting on air quality and the ability/capacity to contain any firewater. Where
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fire-fighting is likely to exacerbate air pollution and/or it is not possible to contain firewater,
then CB may be considered.
It should be noted that some incidents might not afford use of a CB. These might
include incidents where significant fire escalation is possible and where early intervention is
critical to prevent this.
When deciding whether a CB is appropriate, preventing fatalities, injuries and adverse
health effects to people should generally override environmental and other considerations
such as the protection of property. CB should only be considered if the risk of escalation has
been minimised, there are no risks to people, and it is not possible to contain firewater or
if this is the best option to minimise air pollution; the short and long term effects of either
strategy (i.e. offensive or CB) on air, land and water quality should be considered.
A document should be prepared that outlines an installation’s policy on CB. It
should contain the risk assessment for evaluation of a CB response strategy and state the
circumstances under which it will be deemed appropriate and when it will not. Effective pre-
plans should be developed and should be exercised regularly for credible scenarios.
For guidance, see environment agencies PPG 28 and EA Environmental impact of
controlled burns.
7.3 OCCUPATIONAL FIRE BRIGADES
7.3.1 Overview
Historically, at least from the 1950s, the need for petroleum companies to have an onsite full-
time or part-time (auxiliary) petroleum fire brigade or ERT was driven by insurance companies.
Post-World War II memories of fire damage also drove many companies to establish their
own occupational fire brigade with a view to a rapid response by competent ERs.
Insurance companies recognised that financial and production losses could be
minimised if a competent, rapid response was available. The need for a full-time occupational
fire brigade was greater if the local government FRS stations were distant from the installation,
with subsequent response delays. Gradually, this resulted in a full-time petroleum fire brigade
at major installations. This practice continued until the 1980s and 1990s, until their benefits
were reviewed against their costs with rationalisation of business operations.
Around the same time, although occupational fire brigades were previously viewed
as a necessity by insurance companies, it became apparent that the largest financial losses
were actually resulting from catastrophic incidents that occupational fire brigades could do
little to prevent or reduce their consequences. Such instantaneous disasters (VCE, BLEVE, etc.)
occurred from either total failure of vessels or columns, or an explosion without warning.
These factors have meant that insurance companies do not normally insist on a full-time
occupational fire brigade at petroleum installations.
In the 1990s, due to CBA reviews and staffing rationalisation studies, many
petroleum companies reduced their onsite fire service capability, in some cases completely,
with reliance placed on only the FRS, or in other cases by use of auxiliary fire team members.
These auxiliaries were either shift working plant operators or shift maintenance personnel
who had a secondary job function as an ER.
7.3.2 Options for installation fire response
7.3.2.1 Full-time occupational fire brigade
(i) General
A full-time occupational fire brigade may be considered where the FRS is remote
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from the installation in terms of response time (e.g. > 10 minutes) or if the
installation is large and complex and there is a need for an immediate response
by personnel fully familiar with fire and other emergency hazards that may be
encountered. It may also be considered in situations where the FRS do not have the
necessary equipment or competencies to deal with credible fire scenarios and this is
recognised by both the FRS and the operating company. In such cases, the FRS may
still have a valuable role to play in terms of providing manpower, logistical support
and supporting fire fire-fighting).
Whilst there are many successful full-time occupational fire brigades, it
is not typically good practice to provide one for a petroleum installation from an
economic viewpoint unless there is:
- Lengthy FRS response times to the installation or areas of the installation (e.g.
for large installations).
- Justification from the requirements for credible scenarios (e.g. for complex
installations with numerous fire and other emergency hazards requiring rapid
response by competent personnel).
- Low operations staffing that limits or prevents an operations-based ERT.
- Adequate workload for their personnel on a rotating shift basis.
- Justification in terms of risk to assets and business interruption since more
and more FRSs will not put their personnel at risk to save property or business
interests.
This is a pragmatic view since most companies cannot have a large body of personnel
onsite waiting for an incident that may not happen for some time, if at all.
However, petroleum companies recognise that depending on the installation,
its assets and continued production criticality, some form of rapid fire response
may be desirable. This, in combination with good plant design practices, effective
process safety controls, fire and flammable gas detection, competent operators,
and safe working practices should mean that incidents are minimised in terms of
likelihood and consequences.
Petroleum companies do not normally have an explicit legislative
requirement to provide an occupational fire brigade. However, they are usually
legally required through emergency planning to protect their workforce, the public
and the environment from harm. See section 8.2.
It should be stressed that in the petroleum industry, it is usually fire
prevention, detection and mitigation measures that are considered as the first ‘lines
of defence’; fire response exists as a further mitigation measure when the other
measures have failed or need supplementing. The primary operating company
safety objective should be to avoid having an accidental release of petroleum or its
products (or toxic substance). If, however, a release occurs a secondary objective
will be ignition prevention. If it does ignite, fire detection would operate and various
mitigation measures including fire response may be the last line of defence to limit
escalation and damage.
It is also worthwhile recognising that for fires in process areas, ERs do not
always extinguish the fire event alone. Often, operations personnel will assist in
isolating inventories, depressurising vessels, drums or equipment and making safe
the remaining plant, thus making it easier for the fire responders to control or
extinguish any residual, depressurised fire.
Taking those factors into account, and given the normally low frequency of
incidents in the petroleum industry, the principal justification for an installation full-
time occupational fire brigade is not to respond to emergency incidents – although
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that is clearly a function of their role. Major incidents should be very infrequent on
a well-designed and operated petroleum installation.
One method of developing a full-time occupational fire brigade is to
identify and establish their functions to ensure that there are clear needs that justify
its existence. Typical functions of a full-time occupational fire brigade are described
in 7.3.2.1(ii); the list contains examples only, and should not be considered
exhaustive. Installations should develop a pertinent listing according to installation-
specific requirements.
(ii) Functions of a full-time occupational fire service

- To assure the availability, reliability and performance of all portable fire
equipment located throughout the installation.
This work is a key requirement if personnel are to utilise first-aid
fire-fighting equipment on discovering a fire. Such fires are far more frequent
than major fires and with the availability and guaranteed operability of onsite
fire equipment, small fires should be successfully controlled or extinguished
before the arrival of the occupational fire brigade thus preventing small
incidents from escalating to major incidents.
- To assure the safe working operation, availability, reliability and performance
of SCBA sets, airline sets and any other breathing apparatus (BA) sets and
cylinders located throughout the installation.
The life safety/protection factor of BA is critical in hazardous
operating areas. Personnel, in some emergencies, require ready-to-wear BA
that must be guaranteed safe and operating correctly.
- To assure the instant readiness, availability, reliability and performance of all
fire vehicles and trailers/mobile vehicles on a 24-hour basis.
Fire vehicles are designed to provide a fully mobile and flexible
response to those fire incidents that go beyond the incipient stage. They
should be available to respond, from a cold standing condition, at any moment
on a 24-hour basis. Inspections and vehicle tests should be regularly performed.
- To assure the availability, reliability and performance of fire equipment, fire
systems and rescue equipment onboard fire vehicles on a 24-hour basis.
Like fire vehicles, the on-board systems and equipment should
be available to work when required. Inspections and vehicle tests should be
regularly performed.
- To assure the availability, reliability and performance of all fixed fire systems
including foam systems and water systems.
Whilst more than one department may have responsibility for
the electronics and mechanics of fire detection and fire-fighting systems,
the occupational fire brigade should be responsible for coordination and
witnessing of fixed fire systems’ availability and readiness.
- To assure the maintenance of the required levels of fixed and portable fire
related equipment spares, extinguishing agent quantities, BA spares and
rescue equipment spares.
- To assure the availability, reliability and performance of the installation fire-
fighting water pumps and fire mains distribution on a 24-hour basis.
The occupational fire brigade should have control of the fire-
fighting water system to ensure that an adequate quantity of fire-fighting
water is available instantly and is assured in terms of pressure and flow at each
fire hazard area onsite.
- To perform fire prevention/protection inspections throughout the installation
and train operating units, line departments and personnel on correct fire
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safety procedures and initial fire actions.

Installation operating personnel cannot be expected to understand
the requirements of fire prevention and protection. Even with fire safety
training, they require periodic fire protection advice.
- To conduct onsite fire safety education classes for employees not connected
with production/storage operations.
Although the operating units are the critical assets, the support
infrastructure personnel require knowledge of basic fire safety procedures in
order to enhance life safety.
- To liaise, discuss and advise on installation-wide fire protection requirements
for new projects, revamps and/or upgrades in company installations.
This is over and above any technical fire protection engineering
input from any external organisation or projects department.
- To participate in daily/weekly fire training sessions using fire vehicles and
equipment and daily fire theory sessions.
Unlike operations personnel, ERs may have to face situations
and circumstances which cannot be easily predicted and which require a
combination of fire-fighting and/or rescue tactics with, in some situations,
improvisation. Since each fire or emergency situation is usually different from
the previous, ERs should maintain and where possible extend their level of
knowledge in order to meet fire-grade conditions and perform effectively.
This should be done by daily training sessions.
- To participate in a daily physical exercise programme in order to maintain the
required job fitness level.
This exercise requirement is unique in any operating company
environment. ERs, by the nature of their job assignment, require a minimum
fitness standard to allow them to perform manual tasks in sometimes harsh
conditions. Daily exercise sessions are fundamental to maintaining this fitness
level.
- To provide a trained auxiliary fire brigade (or operations support fire brigade)
capable of supporting the emergency actions of the occupational fire brigade.
This requires organising, administration and training of auxiliary
ERs on a regular basis to provide a trained ERT to act as back-up to the full-
time occupational fire brigade.
- To establish, update and maintain pre-fire plans, ERPs and procedures for each
operating and support installation.
This work enables ERs to become familiar with the hazards and
risks associated with installations and provide a pre-plan of actions that should
be used to combat emergencies there, thus improving fire control capability.
- To perform, on a routine and regular basis, simulated fire exercises for all
credible fire scenarios including major incidents to determine the adequacy of
ERPs and pre-fire plans in cooperation with FRS and operations departments
and to evaluate responses to those exercises.
This is an important aspect of incident control and should assist in
maintaining a state of readiness and capability at the installation.
- To develop, create and maintain the company Major Incident Control Centre
and any back-up facility.
This facility could act as the installation major incident support
room for future major incidents. The back-up facility may be offsite.
- To liaise with national regulatory organisations and FRS on all FEHM issues and
ensure company compliance with all relevant national fire safety legislation.
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- To check, test and maintain communication links to and from the fire stations
and to and from mobile fire vehicles.
- To maintain administration and inspection/testing records associated with
aforementioned functions.
- To maintain a status report on the facilities, roads, and operations of the
installation which may affect fire response times or fire protection.
- To assist in fire safety stand-by duties during hazardous working conditions in
operating installations.
- To respond to and perform rescue, fire-fighting duties and special services
within the installation and, if requested, to offsite facilities in public areas.
- To respond to and perform special services including environmental controls
such as spillage clean-up.
- To participate in live or desktop emergency response exercises with FRSs and
other emergency agencies.
Once the functions are defined and agreed, the responsibilities for the occupational fire
brigade can be developed. From these responsibilities, job descriptions can be created and
then, finally, the competencies for the positions can be defined and developed with the final
addition of the ERPs and scenarios adding to the detail of the competencies. This ensures an
auditable trail and justification.
7.3.2.2 Auxiliary fire brigade

The use of auxiliary ERs can offer an effective full-time fire response option for petroleum
companies but there are normally restrictions on personnel numbers that can respond from
operations so that others, e.g. maintenance, should be considered. Even at installations where
a full-time occupational fire brigade is in place, auxiliary fire brigade members may be used to
support the full-time response. This offers an economic means of meeting human resource
requirements for the foreseeable major incidents at an installation. Where the auxiliary ERs
are plant operators, consideration should be given to their availability when installation-wide
events occur, e.g. during utility failures, which could result in them being unable to attend an
incident. In these circumstances the risk of a fire during process upsets is increased.
However, if the auxiliary members are selected from operations/maintenance
personnel (e.g. from process plants) there will be readily available knowledge of the plants
and processes involved, something of which full-time occupational fire brigade ERs may not
have full awareness. This can lead to more rapid incident control.
Wherever auxiliary ERs are selected from, they should be:
−− Shift workers;
−− Instantly available for response (no permissions required);
−− Available for regular fire and emergency training, and
−− Physically and medically fit.
For large installations, it is not always practical to have a 100 % auxiliary fire brigade due
to the workload involved in maintaining the response capability and the overall installation
fire-fighting equipment and systems in readiness at all times. The numbers of extinguishers,
SCBA sets, fire hydrants, fire hose, etc, requiring inspection, testing and availability assurance
can place excessive demands on auxiliary members with limited time each shift.
7.3.2.3 Combination full-time/auxiliary fire brigade

A combination full-time and auxiliary occupational fire brigade can be the most effective
method of providing large numbers of trained ERs for worst-case incidents, provided the
auxiliary ERs are readily available and competent. The strategy for such a response should
focus on an initial deployment by the full time ERs (for cooling or for SCBA rescue work, etc.)
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whilst the auxiliary ERs arrive to support them in a reasonable time frame (typically, within
five - 10 min. from the call).
For auxiliaries, consideration should be given to:
−− Holding their turnout gear (see 7.6.2.1) near their working area, and
−− Travel distance and transport to potential incidents locations.
The option of requiring auxiliaries to move to the fire station to collect their turnout gear and
then travel to the incident may not always be the most time efficient means of supporting
the full-time occupational fire brigade members and should therefore only be used if there
are insurmountable difficulties.
7.4 ORGANISATION OF OCCUPATIONAL FIRE BRIGADES
There are no clear rules or standards for the organisation of an occupational fire brigade.
Typically, the structure and ranks within it will broadly follow that of the FRSs and, indeed,
many of its staff tend to be ex-FRS personnel, whether full- or part-time.
7.5 COMPETENCY STANDARDS FOR INSTALLATION EMERGENCY RESPONDERS
Guidance for the organisation and certification of ERs is provided in standards such
as NFPA 600 and IPDS National occupational standards or the relevant competence standards
(e.g. those managed by JOIFF). The minimum competencies should be risk assessed and
defined bearing in mind factors such as the installation’s size, nature and hazards of
operations, response systems and equipment.
There are various company competence standards used for a variety of disciplines.
An example of one set of competencies for a part-time ERT is provided in annex E.2.
7.6 FIRE RESPONSE EQUIPMENT
7.6.1 Fire-fighting equipment
7.6.1.1 Fire extinguishers

An installation-specific review should be performed to establish the types, locations, numbers
and sizes of fire extinguishers. Standards such as EN 3 can assist in this purpose, but often
too few (or too many) extinguishers can be located in a hazard area. Extinguishers should
generally be located at appropriate fire points on escape routes and at certain points of
emphasis – manual call points should be provided to ensure the fire alarm is raised before
attempts are made to tackle the fire.
Portable fire extinguishers are available for a variety of fire types and conditions.
National and international standards typically rate them for a range of limited fire sizes that
will be either in the form of burning cellulosic solids (three-dimensional) or burning flammable
liquids (two-dimensional).
Portable extinguishers are intended to provide a first-aid fire-fighting capability for
dealing with small (incipient) fire events. For larger fires, where more extinguishing medium
is required, wheeled extinguishers should be used. The extinguishers provided for specific
areas in a petroleum installation should be of a type suitable for use in fighting a fire of
the kind most likely to occur in the location. It should be noted that the use of hand-held
extinguishers is unlikely to be successful for pool fires of diameter >3 - 4 m.
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Similar types of extinguishers in a petroleum installation should operate in a standard

manner. All personnel should be made familiar with their siting, use, operation and colour
coding/markings. Formal training should include extinguisher use.
Extinguishers should be constructed and comply with a current standard for colour
coding/markings such as given in EN 3 or other recognised standard.
7.6.1.2 Fire classes

Fire classes defined by the European classification system (derived from EN 2) are:
Class A - Carbonaceous solid materials (wood, plastics, paper, etc.)

Class B - Flammable (or combustible) liquids
Class C - Flammable gases or vapours
Class D - Metals (magnesium, sodium, etc.)
Class E - Electrical equipment
Class F - Cooking oils
More guidance is given in Annex F on these, including other classification systems.
7.6.1.3 Extinguisher types

It should be noted that in providing portable fire extinguishers, the more types available, the
more potential there will be for using the wrong type on particular fires. Although it may be
necessary to have different types for use on various fire hazards in petroleum installations,
there are advantages in keeping the number of types to a minimum.
(i) Dry powder (dry chemical)

There are different types of dry powder available. B types are for use mainly on
flammable liquid fires and have a simple bicarbonate base, whereas BC types using
a sodium bicarbonate base can be used for liquids and gases. ABC and ABCD types
are also available as MP powders, typically using mono-ammonium phosphates as
a base although other additives are necessary for the metal fire-fighting aspect.
Such extinguishers may be used for hazards such as diesel fire hazard areas or liquid
product pumps and equipment.
Dry powder can also be used to deal with fires involving live electrical
equipment, but it should be remembered that powder will leave a residue that may
damage electrical components.
The advantage of using dry powder extinguishers for flammable liquid
fires is its large extinguishing power over a given area compared to a foam or CO2
extinguisher. Also, units can be installed outdoors due to relative resistance to
freezing temperatures.
Unfortunately, dry powder provides relatively little cooling effect when
applied to flammable liquids or to hot surfaces. During application, flames may
be obscured. If application is halted, flame ‘flashback’ can occur. Dry powders are
also not generally compatible with foam, which may affect their stability if applied
simultaneously.
Typical sizes of fillings for the extinguishers are 6 kg, 9 kg and 12 kg, each
with different ratings for fire sizes. When selecting size, consideration should be
given to weight and movement in restricted areas.
(ii) Carbon dioxide

CO2 stored as a liquid under CO2 vapour pressure in extinguishers is most effective
on fires involving live electrical equipment. It should be effective against small
flammable liquid fires in enclosed spaces, rooms or enclosures but will not be
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effective in open-air conditions where there is any appreciable wind speed.

The advantage of using CO2 for fires involving electrical equipment is that it
is a non-conductor and does not leave any residue that damages sensitive electrical
equipment. The disadvantages are that it is affected by winds, is an asphyxiant in
confined or enclosed spaces and can cause ice burns on prolonged discharge due
to the low CO2 temperatures involved.
Typical sizes of fillings are 2 kg and 5 kg.
(iii) Foam
Foam extinguisher types are available for different flammable liquid hazards and are
mainly a Class B extinguisher. The most common types are:
- foam jet pre-mix;

- foam spray pre-mix.
Foam jet pre-mix foam extinguishers typically use a low expansion FP base foam
concentrate mixed with water, the nozzle aerating the foam/water solution near
the exit.
The foam spray pre-mix extinguisher typically uses an AFFF foam
concentrate and water mix but the nozzle will be designed to allow a fine spray
of foam that can be used for Classes A and B and can also be used in areas where
there may be a risk of spraying foam onto electrical equipment found in offices.
This does not mean that it is completely safe to use on electrical equipment,
especially high voltage equipment, for which CO2 should be used. (Certain foam
spray extinguishers are ‘approved’ for use in the environs of electrical equipment
if they meet the requirements of the dielectric test of EN 3-7. When used in close
proximity to electrical risks, they tend to reduce the danger of conduction along
the discharge stream. However, it should be realised that they will not reduce the
risk of conduction (and therefore electric shock) via wetted surfaces such as floors.)
The advantage of using foam for flammable liquid fires is that it smothers/
blankets the flammable liquid surface and also cools any hot metal, whereas dry
powder offers no post-ignition protection. The disadvantage of foam is that it does
not have the same rapid fire knockdown capability as dry powder and that it can
freeze at temperatures < 0 oC.
Typical capacities are 6 l and 9 l.
(iv) Water
Water extinguishers should be used only on Class A fires, i.e. with 'cellulosic' type
combustibles. Under no circumstances should they be placed in an area where the
predominant hazard is flammable liquids or electrical equipment.
The advantage of using water is that it cools, reducing carbonaceous
materials to below their ignition temperature. The disadvantage is that water
cannot be used on fires involving electrical equipment and that it can freeze in
sub-zero climates.
Typical capacity is 9 l.
7.6.1.4 Extinguisher operation

Regardless of which particular extinguishing medium is selected for the identified fire hazards,
extinguishers should be as simple to operate as possible. The fewer actions to actuate the
extinguisher, and the more obvious the actuation means, the better for users.
There are basically two types of operation: CO2 or nitrogen cartridge type and stored
pressure type. In the first type, a pin will have to be removed and then the cartridge actuated
before use. With the second type, actuation is usually by pin removal and squeezing.
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7.6.1.5 Wheeled fire extinguishers

Larger sized wheeled extinguishers are mainly for use with dry powder, CO2 and foam. Where
larger quantities of water are required, a hose reel is more effective (see 7.6.1.7).
An assessment of the available personnel to use such extinguishers should be made
to ensure they can, in fact, be deployed under emergency conditions.
Typical filling sizes are:
−− dry powder - 50-100 kg;
−− foam - 40-150 l, and
−− CO2 - 20-50 kg.
7.6.1.6 Steam lances

Steam application by lance may be used in certain cases for smothering certain fire types,
such as flange fires or other relatively small sized fire events. Steam can also be used within
vessels as a snuffing agent but not where there is likely to be a dangerous reaction with the
substances involved in the fire. In addition, it should not be injected into unvented vessels.
Steam lances should be used with care and under controlled conditions. ERs should
be thoroughly practised in their use and protected against scalding and burning. Dry steam
should be used by the provision of effective trapping coupled with a good supply system.
Steam applied at a pressure of about 7 barg is effective in the control of fire involving
leakages of petroleum and its products and hydrogen from flanges or joints, or sulfur in
sulfur plants. It may also be used to disperse small clouds of flammable vapour that have not
ignited.
Steam lances should be earthed to minimise the possibility of electrostatic discharge;
condensed steam should be discharged away from the point of application and steam should
be flowing before application to hot surfaces.
7.6.1.7 Hose reels

Hose reels should typically be used where there may be an identified requirement for relatively
large quantities of water. They offer continuous, uninterrupted, water supply for fire-fighting
small to medium Class A fires, typically in office buildings, workshops, ship cabins and
compartments, etc.
Different operations are available for hose reels in that they can be either actuated by
a manual valve or by an automatic valve that activates when the reel is unwound. Personnel
should be trained in the use of such equipment.
Hose reel hose sizes vary from 20 - 40 mm diameter with hose nozzles typically
ranging between 50 - 400 l/min.
Hose reels can be used in place of normal fire hose because they offer a quick
deployment option and one-person operation.
7.6.1.8 Fire hose and branches/nozzles
(i) Fire hose

Fire hose sizes range from 45 mm and 65/70 mm diameter and length 15 - 22 m.
Various natural and synthetic mixed materials make up fire hose but regardless
of the type selected, the hose should be flexible and strong. For restricted area
fire-fighting, such as that found on tank walkways or process structures, 45 mm
diameter hose provides easier manoeuvrability than larger sizes. For other areas, it
may be necessary to use 70 mm sizes to apply maximum water or foam to a fire
area. Regardless of the sizes being considered, the immediate personnel availability
should be considered to ensure the hose can be deployed if an emergency occurs.
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(ii) Branches/nozzles
Hand-held water or foam projecting stream discharge devices are known as

branches (UK) or nozzles (Europe/USA). Regardless of their provision and location,
if such devices are to be used effectively they should have stream controls, both in
shut-off and stream pattern (from jet to wide angle fog/spray). Water discharge can
have the advantage of reducing radiation from the fire and also drag cool air past
the operator.
For water branches, typical flowrates are from 250 - 600 l/min. although
some nozzles can be up to 1 000 l/min. Foam branches will typically be from
200 - 1 000 l/min. but due to the lesser jet reaction, can be easier to handle than
water branches of high throughput.
For marine terminals and berths, an international ship-shore connection
should normally be provided, through which water could be supplied to a
tanker’s fire main if required for shipboard fire-fighting. For more guidance, see
ICS/OCIMF/IAPH ISGOTT.
7.6.1.9 Monitors
(i) Water monitors

Water monitors may be fixed or portable/mobile. For petroleum installations there
are advantages in having both fixed and portable units, with the fixed ones for
immediate actuation whereas the portable units are used for flexible response,
e.g. cooling difficult access areas etc. Portable or mobile monitors should have a
base that provides stability on ground surfaces. The monitor should preferably be
capable of deployment and actuation by one person. It is advantageous to have
fire hose either pre-connected or flaked ready for rapid connection and use with a
mobile monitor, to save time in deployment.
Portable and mobile water monitors have various throughputs; some have
a fixed flowrate whereas others have a variable flowrate. For either type, typical
ranges are 1 800 - 4 500 l/min. Variable flow types can be adjusted at the nozzle
and offer the capability to reduce flow for limited or reduced fire-fighting water
supply or due to fire-fighting water flooding concerns where drainage capacities
are limited.
Monitors should be able to project water streams to distant tank or jetty
cooling targets. It should be ensured that the listed ranges of monitor streams can
be achieved in reality and at the pressures of the petroleum installation’s fire-fighting
water system (see section 6.5.1).
Monitors should have a means of rotating the nozzle and elevating/
depressing it. It should be possible to retain the selected position to allow the
monitor to be used unstaffed.
When considering size and numbers of water monitors, it should be ensured
that installation fire-fighting water supply can provide the flow rate and pressure
demands during credible scenarios, e.g. to project water streams to distant tank or
jetty targets. In addition, it should be ensured that adequate personnel numbers
will be available to deploy the equipment.
(ii) Foam monitors

Foam monitors may be fixed or portable. For portable units, bases are similar to
water monitors and like them, there are different flowrates available.
The type of foam monitor also depends on the type of foam to be used and
whether it is capable of aspiration or not. Non-aspirating foam monitors can provide
a greater range than aspirating; this factor should be considered when evaluating
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tank fire risks. They can also be used in variable flow mode. Aspirating foam monitors
are fixed flow rate types.
A wide variety of foam monitor flowrates is available, from
2 500 - 80 000 l/min., the latter being intended for use only for large diameter tank
fires.
Provision of foam monitors also requires a stock of foam concentrate that
should be calculated for a given duration and by the number of monitors that may
be used. This reinforces the use of scenario worksheet analysis to ensure adequate
foam supplies are provided. See annex D.7 - D.9.
7.6.1.10 Rapid intervention vehicles

RIVs or ‘quick attack trucks’ provide a speedy response to spill fires or developing fire
situations. These types of vehicle incorporate single or dual agent application equipment
(e.g. foam / dry powder) which in some cases may be relatively high output of agent,
designed to offer rapid knockdown of fires. Such equipment often has a low requirement
for personnel, can be deployed easily and may offer significant benefits over traditional fire-
fighting methods that require manual connection to fixed firewater systems, and utilising
potentially heavy and cumbersome foam equipment or portable units.
7.6.1.11 Mobile incident response units

One recent approach to the problem of inadequate water supply, which has been taken
by some petroleum companies at business critical terminals and petroleum refineries, is to
develop MIRU ‘packages’ incorporating mobile or containerised fire pumps, large diameter
hose and large throughput monitors as well as associated adaptors, proportioners, foam
supplies and logistics. Such a package may either supplement existing firewater systems and
foam/water delivery devices or be considered as a standalone response system. Typically,
equipment might include:
−− mobile or containerised pump sets;

−− large diameter hose;
−− hose delivery/retrieval vehicles or trailers;
−− foam concentrate;
−− large throughput foam monitors;
−− proportioners/jet pumps, etc, and
−− adaptors, fittings etc.
Where sufficient firewater to operate large throughput foam or water application equipment
can be provided through existing firewater systems, a network of ‘super hydrants’ or ‘ultra
hydrants’ may be provided which offer larger connection sizes (typically 100 - 125 mm)
so that the equipment can be deployed where needed and be provided with the required
amounts of firewater for a given scenario or scenarios.
The firewater pumps to supply large throughput foam monitors and the large
diameter hose deployment and foam concentrate delivery and re-supply methods should be
carefully examined and specified as part of this type of approach.
7.6.2 Emergency responder (ER) personal protective equipment
7.6.2.1 Selection of personal protective equipment

ER PPE should meet an ISO, EN, NFPA or equivalent standard. See annex I.3.
PPE should be viewed as a 'system' in terms of wearer protection to suit individual
needs following risk assessment. The level of ER intervention and exposure should determine
the level of PPE required. For instance, for lower exposure potential, e.g. if the ER actions
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are simply to actuate a fire system switch and check evacuation status, then the PPE may
only comprise normal installation coveralls (which should ideally be inherently fire-resistant).
However, where ER actions require manual deployment of monitors, use of BA, etc, 'turnout
gear' should be provided, which should typically comprise:
−− fire helmet with visor;
−− fire coat;
−− fire trousers;
−− fire boots;
−− fire gloves, and
−− SCBA.
The use of fire-resistant materials for such PPE is critical for ER protection (see 7.6.2.2). In
addition, ER normal workwear should comprise fire-resistant coveralls to ensure maximum
protection is provided under fire-exposed conditions. This becomes particularly important
when ERs are working nearby to a gas release (knowingly or otherwise), where there is
potential for a flash fire event.
7.6.2.2 Fire retardant treatments versus inherently fire-resistant

Materials that are inherently fire-resistant, (e.g. based on aramid or PBI, such as proprietary
products like Nomex, Kermel, Kevlar, etc.), offer continuous fire resistance for ERs. This
resistance can be provided in coveralls, two piece protection suits or turnout gear.
Materials such as cotton that have been treated with fire retardant chemicals offer
some fire protection capability but when subjected to heat or flame, often result in the mass
release of these chemicals, thus making the garment unfit for further service. In addition,
the regular cleaning of fire-retardant treated clothing will result in leaching of the protective
chemicals. Therefore, the preference should be for inherently fire-resistant clothing rather
than fire-retardant treated clothing.
Special clothing and equipment may be necessary for dealing with specific installation
hazards in an emergency (e.g. acids and hydrogen fluoride). These will typically be what are
commonly referred to as 'gas suits' or 'acid suits', which are worn over turnout gear including
SCBA. These types of PPE are highly specialised such that employers should risk assess them
in consultation with the personnel who would wear them. Issues such as airline connections
for principal air supply and SCBA, as well as offtake air connections should be determined.
Vision, comfort, safety and size of such PPE are factors that should be carefully reviewed.
7.6.2.3 Breathing apparatus

SCBA should be available for fire-fighting and rescue. Arrangements should be made for
a supply of cylinders sufficient for the scale and duration of credible incidents. BA at an
incident should be strictly controlled and the advice of the FRS should be obtained on aspects
such as correct use, etc. There should be thorough training of personnel and maintenance
of equipment. A medical examination (by a qualified doctor) should be a prerequisite for
using SCBA. The servicing of SCBA should also be to the requirements of EN 137 or national
equivalent. Records of servicing should be kept for a minimum of five years.
There are three main types of BA: canister type that uses a filter to scrub the inhaled
air; oxygen sets that can regenerate or reuse exhaled oxygen; and compressed air SCBA sets
that rely on a single or double compressed air cylinder.
SCBA should be used in preference to the canister type, due to the latter not being
able to protect against oxygen deficiency caused by enclosed fires.
Oxygen regeneration sets, which offer prolonged (>one hour.) breathing duration
may be considered for deep entry or difficult rescue conditions but are not normally applicable
to petroleum installations.
Although there are standards for the use of BA, there is seldom any guidance on
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the number, type and duration of such sets for emergency response. There is, however, a
requirement that if BA is to be used, there always be a minimum of two persons in a team
and two persons in a back-up team.
Recent developments in the materials and engineering of such equipment has led to
compressed air cylinder capacities of 9 l, instead of the standard 6 l. SCBA sets and cylinders
can now provide one hour duration and this is an important feature for installations where a
prolonged toxic release may occur.
7.6.3 Inspection and maintenance
Fire protection equipment should work instantly and faultlessly when needed. This
requirement can be achieved only if there is a comprehensive and reliable system of inspection,
maintenance and appropriate testing.
It is almost always a condition of insurance that fire-fighting equipment is installed
and inspected at regular intervals. Insurance fire surveyors may inspect premises at regular
intervals. Notwithstanding insurance and legislative requirements, equipment should be
regularly inspected and maintained by a competent person.
Details of fire protection maintenance are outside the scope of this publication.
Maintenance will vary with the type of equipment used and with the environment in which it
is kept. Maintenance schedules should be drawn up covering all items of equipment.
Reference should be made to specific standards for system design and maintenance.
For further guidance on FSIA, see section 8.9.3.
A register of all fire protection equipment should be kept as one aspect of an
equipment management system; the dates and the nature of all inspections and maintenance
operations should be recorded in it.
7.6.4 Critical equipment and resources, vulnerability and siting
In reviewing critical equipment and resources all necessary measures to manage the incident
should be considered. This might include (but not be limited to):
−− assessment of drainage;
−− firewater management;
−− power supplies;
−− availability of control centres, and
−− communications etc.
Requirements to deal with smaller, more likely scenarios, should be determined – not just
those for high impact-low likelihood events.
Where there are gaps in resources against current good practice, operating companies
may consider other contingency arrangements as an alternative to upgrading onsite facilities:
e.g. mobile fire-fighting equipment and resources may be relocated. Where further measures
are necessary to provide an alternative to fixed equipment, or to cater for high impact events,
it may be more appropriate to identify what external assistance may be available to provide
sufficient contingency. External assistance might include local FRS, or mutual aid schemes.
Critical emergency response equipment and resources vulnerable to the worst case
scenarios should be identified. A list may be used to identify items such as emergency control
centres, fire-fighting pumps, lagoons, foam stocks, fire protection systems, or manual switches
and actuation points. Detailed installation plans with significant hazard ranges marked on
them may be used as an aid to determine if the resources are likely to be vulnerable in the
event of fire or explosion. This type of assessment should be carried out periodically, or
whenever process conditions change, following incidents or if there is a significant change
in fire response capability. Contingency arrangements should be put in place on- or off-site
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in the event of failure of the resources at any time of the year and emergency plans should
be revised to take into account any possible loss of these critical equipment and resources.
Where possible, fire protection and other critical emergency equipment and resources
should be located in non-hazardous areas. Operating companies should also consider the
potential consequences of major incidents to determine where to locate such items as they
may constitute a source of ignition. Equipment and resources should be located to enable
access at all times during incidents. They should be capable of functioning despite the effects
of fire and explosion. For example, fire pumps should be located at a safe distance away from
any potential fire/explosion consequences such as high radiant heat levels, blast overpressure
etc.
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8 MAINTAINING FEHM POLICY
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This section sets out the requirements for maintaining an effective FEHM policy, in particular
through emergency planning from high-level incident preplans through to scenario-specific
ERPs. In addition, it covers personnel competency development, emergency plan testing
and details the concept of FSIA with regard to fire and flammable gas detection and fire
protection systems.
8.2 ORGANISATION OF EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
For UK installations subject to the COMAH Regulations, both onsite and offsite emergency
plans should be prepared. They should cover emergency incidents and also include aspects
such as pollution control, since fire-fighting activities may otherwise result in uncontrolled
discharge of pollutants, whether petroleum and its products or fire-fighting media, into
surface and groundwater and sewage treatment systems.
In the UK, The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (including 7(2)(d)) and the Civil
Contingencies Act 2004 also establish requirements for the planning necessary to protect
persons, property and the environment.
Typically, operating companies should prepare emergency plans to deal with a
range of credible scenarios. The plans should be reviewed in conjunction with the police,
FRS, medical, health protection agencies and other emergency services, as well as local
governments who may make supplementary plans and arrangements for incidents affecting
offsite areas. They might address fire, explosion, loss of containment (e.g. gas release), spills
or other major emergencies and their consequences. The plans should include procedures for
the mobilisation of all resources that may be required.
Plans should be made for incidents where:
(a) The effect is confined within the installation boundary and the occurrence
can be controlled without external assistance.
(b) The effect is confined within the installation boundary but external
assistance will be required.
(c) The effect may extend beyond the installation boundary.
(d) The occurrence is outside the installation boundary.
External authorities should be brought into the early stages of planning as they will have a
major role to play in (b), (c) and (d). The FRS should have necessary information regarding
the installation’s facilities, e.g. mains water pressure, stocks and types of foam available, fire
equipment, etc. In addition, mutual aid arrangements with other installations may also be
commissioned, as required. Cooperative exercises should be held with the FRS whether there
is an occupational fire brigade or not.
Plans should be reviewed periodically, at least annually and when any significant
additions or changes to plant and/or personnel are made. Experience gained in site exercises
should be incorporated in the plans.
8.3 INCIDENT PREPLANNING
A comprehensive incident preplan should be developed for all locations storing or handling
petroleum and its products; it should take account of the guidance on fire protection and
precautions described in this publication. The incident preplan should be supported by a
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series of pre-fire plans (see 8.7). These in turn should be supported by scenario-specific ERPs
(see 8.8).
Factors that should be considered when formulating the incident preplan include:
−− The nature and quantity of substances processed and stored.

−− The proximity of other process plant, storage vessels, neighbouring major hazards
installations with 'domino' potential, works and public buildings and vegetation.
−− Accessibility to the installation for fire-fighting appliances.
−− Escape routes for personnel and the public.
−− Installation security.
−− Emergency power supplies.
−− Timing considerations.
−− Liaison with local government, FRS, medical services, environmental agencies, local
industry and communications media.
−− Meteorological and topographical conditions such as wind, precipitation, relief etc.
−− Likely offsite impacts on people and the environment.
The incident preplan should include liaison with the FRSs to establish the pre-determined
attendance (PDA) in normal response and in worst-case response. For severe toxic releases,
the PDA should be greatly reduced to lower the potential impact on the FRS approaching the
installation.
The approach to fire-fighting may be different in each major fire area depending on
the type of operation. Different areas containing process units, bulk storage, and buildings
may employ different techniques of fire-fighting given the different hazards and risks.
However, resources for control, containment, and fire-fighting on the installation should be
provided for the largest demand on each individual resource or fire-fighting agent in any
major fire area.
8.4 RECOGNITION OF HAZARDS
The preparation of an incident preplan should commence by identifying the risks, making
a reasonable assessment of the possible consequences and their effect, and bringing these
to the attention of the external authorities in a way which will enable them to understand
the size and scope of the problems they may be faced with. In making this assessment,
the consequences of major damage to essential services, e.g. electrical power supply,
communication systems, water supplies, etc. should be considered along with what needs to
be done to overcome these consequences including the possible need to provide alternative
supplies.
A large-scale incident may not only disrupt the normal means of access to the
installation but, in addition, may impose restrictions on the normal way of life in the area
surrounding the installation, at least for the duration of the incident.
It should be recognised that terrorism is a possible incident initiator; incident preplans
should address potential hazards, security issues and contingencies for dealing with such
incidents.
8.5 CONTROL OF INCIDENTS
A clearly defined command structure (e.g. incident command system) should be defined and
implemented between the operating company and FRS as well as other agencies. Whatever
system is used, it should be aligned with FRS’s own structure for incident command and
needs as required – this should be addressed in advance as part of the preplanning process
between the parties.
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Various separate control functions should be defined and co-ordinated, e.g. police,
fire, medical services and operating company management. Within the management
structure of larger installations, various responsibilities and duties also should be clearly
defined. In the event of an incident, an experienced, senior person from the installation
should be designated as the person responsible for liaison with external services. The police
and operating company management should have the administrative control and, where
there is a fatality, the police may have additional responsibilities. The FRS and medical services
are primarily concerned with physical activity onsite. If the incident is a fire, the senior fire
officer will have control. The designated installation liaison manager should closely liaise with
them.
A forward control point, located according to the circumstances, will be required by
the operational units. A suitably equipped vehicle or mobile trailer unit commonly serves this
purpose.
Additionally, if the incident is large enough to warrant it, a rear (or main) control
point will also be required, located in a safe place, where senior installation management,
local government representatives and others may be present. Their function should be to
control the wider effects of the incident on the remainder of the premises and beyond, give
technical advice to the operational units and to deal with media enquiries, casualty status
enquiries, next of kin, etc. Individual responsibilities should be defined in the incident preplan.
Plant drawings, an installation plot plan, a large scale Ordnance Survey-type detailed map
of the area, technical information and personnel lists (addresses and telephone numbers)
should be available.
On a large site comprising several major hazard installations, an alternative location
for the co-ordination centre should be available if there is any possibility of the building
becoming sufficiently damaged or rendered unavailable for some other reason in a major
incident.
A high standard of communications is necessary between the two control points and
with external authorities.
In addition, it is common for large petroleum installations to be divided between
several operating companies. Clearly, any arrangements for emergency planning should be
well-known and understood through good inter-company coordination.
8.6 TRAINING OF PERSONNEL
The key personnel involved in an incident preplan should be trained and practise it in
conjunction with appropriate local government personnel. Up to a certain level of emergency
this should be by practical exercise onsite but training for a major emergency should be
carried out at least annually and should be in the form of a table-top exercise using realistic
data related to the installation.
All personnel should be given clear instructions as to their responsibilities during an
emergency. These should include first aid, fire-fighting, pollution prevention/mitigation and
organisation of evacuation and marshalling at defined locations.
Under regulations such as COMAH, there is a requirement for installations to carry
out one major exercise every three years, which covers the on- and offsite ERPs. For smaller
petroleum installations not subject to such regulations, proportionate fire response exercises
should be performed at regular intervals to ensure onsite personnel and the FRS maintain a
robust fire incident response capability.
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8.7 PRE-FIRE PLANS
Regulations such as COMAH require planning for credible major incidents and also for these
pre-fire plans to be exercised. As part of the planning process, the decision-making process
for the choice of fire response strategy (including whether a CB or offensive approach is
to be taken) should be documented once agreed between the operating company and
stakeholders such as the local FRS and environmental agencies.
Pre-fire plans should address the following:
−− Actuating installation alarm systems.

−− Using fire-fighting agents.
−− Using fire-fighting equipment.
−− Emergency procedures for shutting-down process plant.
−− Emergency evacuation procedures and assembly points in safe locations and
procedures for the establishing and staffing of a fire control centre.
−− Training of personnel.
−− Firewater management/pollution control/environmental clean-up.
Whilst there are many styles or formats of such plans, it is advantageous to have regulator
involvement in their format and content.
The most appropriate way to provide pre-fire plans at a petroleum installation is to
develop scenario-specific ERPs (sometimes referred to as ‘fire-fighting plans'). These should
be in addition to the ERPs required for offsite consequences and emergency response such as
those detailing notification of offsite populations, evacuation etc. (commonly called ‘offsite
plans’).
When planning for emergency response, recent incidents have illustrated the need
to consider factors such as:
−− Vulnerability of emergency response equipment/resources.

−− Critical emergency response resources.
−− Contingency arrangements.
−− Appropriate incident response strategies.
−− Provision of offsite response information.
−− ER safety (considering hazards associated with fire or explosion as well as trip and
fall hazards especially where fire water runoff and foam may conceal open drains or
pits).
−− Pre-plans for large VCEs and multi-tank fires, if appropriate.
−− Environmental concerns:
- Firewater management (including installation containment facilities and how
to use them).
- Deployment of pollution control equipment on- and off-site (what, who,
when?).
- Use of accredited third party spill responders.
- Provision for monitoring and sampling of environmental receptors.
- Post-incident clean-up and restoration.
See environment agencies PPG 18, PPG 21 and PPG 28 and HSE Safety and environmental
standards for fuel storage sites.
In addition to producing pre-fire plans, it is good practice to review and where
necessary revise on-site emergency arrangements to ensure that relevant staff (or third party
ERs) are competent to execute the plan, e.g. they are trained and there are enough staff
available at all times to perform all the actions required. The range of emergency arrangements
should be sufficient to provide for all reasonably foreseeable emergency scenarios arising out
of credible major incident hazards.
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If reliance is placed on FRS intervention then the pre-plan should clearly demonstrate
that there are adequate arrangements in place between the operating company and the
FRS. This should be achieved by regular review of pre-plans between them to ensure correct
response strategies have been adopted, and that the pre-plans reflect the likely responses to
incidents.
Pre-plans should also consider and/or be prepared for potential escalation scenarios
arising out of initiating credible scenarios. Such plans could cover events such as VCE,
boilover, BLEVE etc. They should include information for ERs and installation personnel on
the ongoing potential hazards associated with the incident. Plans may address pre-and post-
escalation concerns.
8.8 SCENARIO-SPECIFIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS (ERPS)
Although a petroleum installation should have an installation-wide incident preplan and pre-
fire plans for higher-level control of credible scenarios, a series of generic and specific incident
ERPs should be prepared for use by ERs. They should cover, as a minimum, all the credible
scenarios identified in any safety report. In addition, further ERPs should be prepared for
some lesser fire events. The ERPs should be:
−− Based on potential credible scenarios;

−− Installation-specific and therefore relevant to the installation’s systems and equipment;
−− Fit-for-purpose;
−− Easy to use, and
−− Helpful to the end users.
ERPs should consist of only one or two pages and preferably a single front page of text
intended as guidance and instruction for ERs; an example is provided in Annex G. On the
reverse of the text page, an effects map can be provided. This should indicate the potential
jet or pool fire flame impingement area, radiant heat hazard areas or other affected area
where adjacent or nearby plant, tanks, vessels and associated equipment could be affected
by the incident. Unignited gas releases contours should also be indicated on the effects maps
to indicate the potential worst case incident severity.
ERPs should provide instant written instructions, guidance and helpful information
for personnel to assist them at the critical early stage of a major incident, and, to provide
sufficient potential hazard information to enable informed decisions on the safety of
personnel responding to the incident.
ERPs are intended to provide guidance on the actions and resources required to
deal with the incident during its first 20 - 30 minutes. Once this early stage has passed, a
stable response should have been established and if the incident duration may be prolonged,
a continuing strategy for dealing with this should be developed by those managing the
incident. The ERPs should combine operations personnel and fire responder actions so that a
coordinated ER approach is adopted for incident management.
The plans may consist of a three-tiered response with:
1. Installation operators as the first response.

2. Installation fire responders as the second response.
3. FRS or fire tugs (in the case of jetty incidents) etc. as the third response.
The ERP effects should be produced from fire, gas dispersion and explosion consequence
modelling programs. See section 2.7.
Effects maps are only ever indicative of the potential gas, fire or explosion area that
may be, or may become, involved during a major incident. Nevertheless, they create an
appreciation of potential incidents for ERs.
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The ERPs should be developed from detailed analysis of credible major incidents. This
is usually done in the form of scenario worksheets that set out the incident consequences,
prevention measures, mitigation measures and response measures. The scenario worksheets
themselves should not be viewed as ERPs, but as a basis for ERPs and as an auditable trail for
ERP development. An example of a scenario worksheet is given in annex G.2.
The worksheets should also allow an agreed fire or incident control strategy and a set
of tactics to be established, most of which is then transferred to the ERP. In this way, a fully
auditable trail is created for future reference.
An example ERP, as used at several petroleum installations, is provided in annex G.2.
Copies of ERPs should typically be distributed to:
−− operations ERs;
−− fire responder ERs and onsite security personnel (if applicable);
−− onsite incident management personnel (e.g. as part of the incident preplan), and
−− local FRSs.
The exact format and distribution should vary from installation to installation, but it has been
found advantageous to provide operations personnel with bound copies of ERPs for reference
purposes and onsite ERs with larger format, weatherproof versions that are normally used
as the active ERPs during an incident. (Ultimately, all personnel who are expected to use the
ERP should be provided with copies; however, only one copy may be marked-up and passed
between ERs during an incident).
8.9 MAINTAINING INCIDENT RESPONSE
8.9.1 Training and emergency response plans (ERPs)
In addition to their use during an incident, ERPs can also provide an effective means of
measuring the emergency response performance, in terms of the logical and sequenced
actions needed, time to carry out these actions, status of systems or equipment used for
control actions, etc. The provision of effects maps enhances ER collective vision of the fire or
gas cloud area, which better focuses the exercise when compared to imaginary areas.
The ERPs should consider staffing and capability of the local FRS. They should
highlight as much information as possible on the incident hazards and other concerns should
be highlighted for units who may attend an onsite incident. The FRS should be involved in
exercising the plans. Whilst it is not practical to expect them to attend every exercise given
other demands on their time, the aim should be to hold at least one major exercise per
year with their units to ensure familiarisation. An annual desktop exercise should also be
considered with FRS officers attending if possible.
Simulated incidents can be carried out to test the ERPs. Observers should use the
ERPs to check the actions performed by operators at a plant control room as well as in the
installation general area (and any ships alongside, in the case of jetty incidents). The actions
of ERs at the simulated incident scene should be checked against the ERP instructions and
guidance. In this way, the ERPs should offer an objective and beneficial means of ensuring
that operations ERs and fire responder ERs act in accordance with a structured and logical
response plan and that they train together for incidents on the particular installation.
Software packages are available that simulate developing scenarios with animation
and these should not be overlooked as an aid to incident response planning.
For installations with occupied buildings, other than local control rooms, etc, fire
wardens should be assigned to be responsible for evacuation and muster head counts,
reporting on building fire equipment, fire exit or other fire safety shortfalls within their floor
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or section of a building. The number of fire wardens will depend on the size, number of
floors and complexity of a building.
8.9.2 Dynamic risk assessment
DRA is the continuous process of identifying hazards, assessing risks, taking action to eliminate
or reduce risk, and monitoring and reviewing these in the rapidly changing circumstances of
an incident. This process should be adopted by senior ERs who will participate in an incident.
There are five key principles:
−− Evaluate the incident, ER tasks and persons/items at risk.

−− Select response procedures and ensure competency.
−− Assess response procedures and evaluate whether the risks are proportional to the
benefits.
−− Introduce additional risk reduction measures e.g. SCBA, PPE, Safety Officers, etc.
−− Re-assess response procedures and additional risk reduction measures.
The pertinent FRS may require designated operating company personnel at an installation
(such as an Incident Commander or On-scene Commander) to understand DRA and
demonstrate preparedness to participate in the emergency response and DRA. This is because
active participation in decisions to be taken as a result of DRA may be sought. Operating
company personnel should assist in documenting actions carried out under the DRA process;
this may be later in the event where there are immediate life safety concerns, or before the
event if consequences are not considered life critical.
For more detailed guidance see national health and safety or fire services publications
such as HMFSI Dynamic management of risk at operational incidents.
8.9.3 Fire systems integrity assurance
Operating experience has often shown that fire detection and protection systems are not
always designed or specified in sufficient detail to ensure that they meet the performance
criteria necessary to reliably achieve their intended role. In some areas this role is not even
clearly defined.
Generally, risk reduction measures including fire systems do not provide a direct
contribution to production and revenue. Consequently, they are sometimes not given the
inspection or maintenance priorities that they deserve and problems may go undetected
for some time. Systems should be tested to demonstrate that they meet their performance
requirements when initially installed, and routinely tested thereafter to check that they
meet it on a continuing basis, especially when the system is intended as a risk management
measure for personnel safety.
It is impracticable to give fire systems a full performance test onsite that truly
reproduces the design fire event: this situation often results in fire systems not providing the
performance required, when called upon to do so. To overcome this problem, there should
be a structured risk-based approach for fire systems, from design through to implementation,
to ensure that they have a clearly defined role with respect to fire hazards, and consequent
levels of risk reduction.
A structured risk-based approach to FSIA should be implemented by:
−− Reviewing potential fire incidents as part of risk assessment.

−− Setting performance standards to clearly define what measurable criteria the risk
reduction measure or fire system should meet.
−− Developing component specifications suitable to meet the performance criteria.
−− Developing relevant test, inspection and maintenance procedures through which
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continuing performance can be assured.

−− Implementing and keeping records of the test, inspection and maintenance
programme.
In practice this requires a good understanding of fire scenarios, as well as the various fire
detection and protection systems so that they can be designed effectively, and can be tested
and maintained regularly. This should ensure system integrity fulfilment of intended role in
risk reduction. Specific system guidance, specifications, and test, inspection and maintenance
are not covered in this publication, but good FSIA practice should include:
−− Correct design to incorporate test facilities and take into account installation-specific
conditions.
−− Witnessing factory acceptance testing of system components during system
procurement.
−− Testing fire and gas detection systems using hot smoke or simulated gas clouds.
−− Carrying out regular discharge tests of AFP systems (gaseous, foam, water spray etc.).
−− Measurement of performance criteria (e.g. response time of detection, flow rate of
systems, application rate, extinguishing concentration etc.).
When testing systems, intervals should be clearly defined: this should be an installation-
specific decision. However, fire systems providing a high level of protection for business critical
installations should be tested more regularly. In these cases, for example, annual checks
might need to be made more frequently (e.g. every six months). For further guidance on test
intervals see relevant EN, NFPA, etc. standards. However, some typical requirements are:
−− Weekly – Carry out visual checks to ensure that there are no leaks or obvious damage
to systems, operating controls and components are properly set and undamaged,
water/agent supplies are available and are at the right capacity/pressure.
−− Monthly – Check that personnel who may have to operate the fire system are
properly trained and authorised to do so, and in particular that new personnel have
been trained in system use.
−− Quarterly – Test, inspect and maintain related electrical, detection and alarm systems.
(More detailed test requirements are provided in electrical and fire detection
standards.)
−− Six-monthly – Carry out more detailed visual inspections ensuring that valves, controls
etc. are properly set and potential problems are identified.
−− Annually – Conduct full direct test of systems where possible (ideally a full discharge
test). Perform quality control checks on fire-fighting agents (e.g. foam concentrate
sampling and physical property measurement).
Inspection procedures should include regular system integrity checks to determine how likely
it is that a system may fail to perform correctly – an example of this may be monitoring of
corrosion or line thickness on an active system, or perhaps deterioration of PFP over time.
Leading process safety performance indicators should be developed in accordance with
guidance such as that given in HSE HSG254.
For further guidance on FSIA, see OGP Fire systems integrity assurance.
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ANNEX A
RELEVANT UK AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATION
A.1 NATURE OF LEGISLATION
Recent fire safety legislation in the UK, Europe and many other parts of the world has generally
moved away from prescriptive requirements that specify precise fire safety measures. A
more risk-based approach has been adopted which recognises foreseeable incident scenario
likelihoods as a means to identify options for risk reduction measures.
This risk-based legislation, as opposed to prescription, is supported by publications
such as Approved Codes of Practice (ACoPs) and guidance, for example, HSE L135 and
HSE HSG 176, respectively.
The choice of safety system measures to be put in place should therefore be the
decision of the operating company provided they can demonstrate to the regulator that
the measures are adequate and appropriate in terms of reducing risk to safety and the
environment and that they are implemented and maintained correctly.
This annex sets out for petroleum refineries and bulk storage installations, the
requirements of pertinent UK legislation, and where appropriate, the European legislation
that it implements. The scope of this legislation covers safety and environmental protection.
A.2 SEVESO II DIRECTIVE AND COMAH REGULATIONS
The Seveso II Directive, as amended, places a duty on operating companies to ensure major
hazards have been addressed and all practicable steps have been taken to limit the likelihood
and consequences of major accident hazards.
Implementation of major accident hazard legislation throughout Europe in response
to the Seveso II Directive follows a broadly similar approach throughout Member States.
For example, it is implemented in the UK as the COMAH Regulations, except for land-use
planning. Their main aim is to prevent and mitigate the effects of those major accidents
involving dangerous substances such as those commonly found at petroleum refineries and
bulk storage installations. It should be noted that the COMAH Regulations treat risks to the
environment as seriously as those to people.
The COMAH Regulations require demonstration of the means to achieve safe
operation, through hazard identification, risk assessment and the organisational and
engineering measures taken at an installation to reduce risks of major accidents, including
those involving fires. For larger installations (COMAH top tier), this should be documented
in a safety report.
In the first instance, operating companies should determine if the regulations apply by
assessing quantities of dangerous substances present, or likely to be present, and comparing
against thresholds set out in Regulation 3 and Schedule 1. If enough dangerous substances
are present over the lower threshold then 'lower-tier' duties apply and if there are enough to
exceed the higher threshold then 'top-tier' duties apply. The scope of COMAH requires not
only fire, but explosion, toxicity and environmental impacts to be taken into account.
The key duties for lower-tier installation operating companies are:
−− Notify basic details to the CA.

−− Take all measures necessary to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences
to people and the environment.
−− Prepare a major accident prevention policy (MAPP).
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Accident prevention should be based on the principle of reducing risk to ALARP for human
risks and using the best available technology (BAT) for environmental risks. The ideal should
always be, wherever possible, to avoid a hazard altogether.
The MAPP should usually be a short and simple document setting down what is to be
achieved but it should also include a summary and further references to the SHEMS that will
be used to put the policy into action. The detail should be contained in other documentation
relating to the installation e.g. plant operating procedures, training records, job descriptions,
audit reports, to which the MAPP should refer.
The MAPP should also address issues relating to the SHEMS, such as:
−− organisation and personnel;

−− identification and evaluation of major hazards;
−− operational control;
−− planning for emergencies, and
−− monitoring, audit and review.
Whilst top-tier operating companies may not have to prepare a separate MAPP, their safety
reports have to include the information that would in any case be provided in a MAPP.
A safety report should provide information to demonstrate to the CA that all
measures necessary for the prevention and mitigation of major accidents have been taken.
It should include:
−− A policy on how to prevent and mitigate major accidents.

−− As SHEMS for implementing that policy.
−− An effective method for identifying any major accidents that might occur.
−− Measures (such as safe plant operating procedures) to prevent and mitigate major
accidents.
−− Information on the safety precautions built into the plant and equipment when it
was designed and constructed.
−− Details of measures (such as fire-fighting) to limit the consequences of any major
accident that might occur.
−− Information about the ERP for the installation, which is also used by the local
government in drawing up an offsite ERP.
In addition, top tier operating companies should:
−− Keep the safety report up-to-date.

−− Prepare and test onsite ERPs.
−− Supply information to local government for offsite emergency planning purposes.
−− Provide the public with relevant details of the dangerous substances, the possible
major accidents and their consequences, and what to do in the event of a major
accident.
The COMAH Regulations are supported by complementary regulations (see A.3) and
publications including ACoPs and guidance (see Annex I.3).
A new Seveso III Directive was adopted in July 2012 (Directive 2012/18/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident
hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council
Directive 96/82/EC): this requires transposition into national law by 31st May 2015. A key
aim of the directive is to address the consequences of changes to EC legislation on the
classification, labelling and packaging of chemical substances and mixtures, which affects the
process for determining whether an establishment is subject to the directive and the flash
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point criteria, which differ from those currently used in the IP classification of petroleum (see
Table B.2).
A.3 COMPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS
In addition to major accident hazard legislation there is complementary legislation that

addresses relevant supporting issues, albeit where the potential impact is less. The following
apply in the UK, but are representative of similar provisions throughout Europe:
(i) ATEX Directives, Chemical Agents Directive and DSEAR
The ATEX Directives introduce specific legal requirements aimed at specifying the
necessary properties of electrical and non-electrical equipment for use in flammable
atmospheres, and protecting personnel from the potential dangers of flammable
atmospheres, respectively.
ATEX 100a (‘ATEX Equipment Directive’) (94/9/EC) (Approximation of the
Laws of Member States concerning Equipment and Protective Systems Intended
for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres) is implemented in the UK by The
Equipment and Protective Systems for use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres
Regulations. Such equipment should be assessed against the essential health and
safety requirements (EHSR) of the Directive and CE marked if it conforms. This
may require assessment by a notified body for certain categories of equipment.
The marking also comprises other information as may be required by the European
Communities directives applying to a particular product.
ATEX 137 (‘ATEX Workplace Directive’) (Directive 99/92/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on Minimum Requirements
for Improving the Safety and Health of Workers Potentially at Risk from Explosive
Atmospheres), and the safety aspects of Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998
on the Protection of the Health and Safety of Workers from the Risks related to
Chemical Agents at Work (‘Chemical Agents Directive’) are implemented in the
UK by DSEAR. This outlines minimum requirements for improving the safety of
personnel at risk from flammable atmospheres. Any changes to workplaces and
any new installations should comply with the requirements, including training,
PTW systems, classification of flammable atmospheres, mitigation of flammable
atmospheres, explosion protection and safety aspects of SHEMSs.
For detailed information regarding the implementation of the ATEX
Equipment Directive see EC ATEX guidelines.
DSEAR set out minimum requirements for the protection of workers from fire
and explosion risks arising from dangerous substances (as defined in the regulations),
and potentially explosive atmospheres arising from work with them. DSEAR apply at
all petroleum installations, including those not subject to the COMAH Regulations.
The main requirements of DSEAR are to:
- Risk assess work activities involving dangerous substances.

- Provide technical and organisational measures to eliminate or reduce as far as
is reasonably practicable the identified risks.
- Provide equipment and procedures to deal with accidents and emergencies.
- Provide information and training to employees.
- Classify places where flammable atmospheres may occur into zones, and mark
the zones where necessary.
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DSEAR have removed the need for licensing under the Petroleum (Consolidation)
Act at most bulk storage installations.
For up-to-date information on implementation, the relevant CA should
be consulted. In the UK, information is available from HSE Electricity in potentially
explosive locations FAQs website.
HSE L134, L135, L136, L137 and L138 are ACoPs that also provide guidance.
(ii) The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment
Regulations
Carriage of dangerous goods by road or rail is regulated internationally by the

European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by
Road (‘ADR’) and Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Rail (‘RID’). In the UK, they are implemented by The Carriage of Dangerous
Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations.
Their purpose is to protect consignees or carriers as well as those who
might become involved in an incident (such as members of the emergency services
and public). They place duties upon everyone involved in the carriage of dangerous
goods, to ensure that they know what they have to do to minimise the risk of
incidents and guarantee an effective response.
(iii) The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order/Fire (Scotland) Act
The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (RRO) and Fire (Scotland) Act (FSA) provide
the legislative framework for fire safety in workplaces in England and Wales, and
Scotland respectively. They revoke The Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations and
The Fire Precautions (Special Premises) Regulations, and repeal other legislation.
RRO and FSA introduce: a general duty to ensure, so far as is reasonably
practicable, the safety of employees; a general duty in relation to relevant non-
employees to take such fire precautions as may reasonably be required in the
circumstances to ensure that premises are safe; and a duty to carry out a suitable
and sufficient risk assessment. Fire certificates are no longer required.
RRO and FSA distinguish between the general fire safety requirements in
the workplace and specific process-related fire safety requirements. The former are
enforced by the local FRS; however, process fire safety is enforced by HSE (see A.4).
RRO and FSA implement some aspects of the Chemical Agents Directive
and the ATEX Workplace Directive with respect to dangerous substances. In doing
so, they set out requirements that should be considered in risk assessments where
dangerous substances are present, and their mitigation by inventory reduction,
prevention of loss of containment, managing sources of ignition, etc.
In general, they emphasise the need to prevent fires and reduce risk.
A responsible person should carry out a risk assessment to: identify fire
hazards; identify people at risk; evaluate risks and remove and reduce risks; record,
plan and train; and review risks.
Where necessary to ensure the safety of their employees in the case of fire,
operating companies should:
- Take measures for fire-fighting in the workplace.

- Nominate employees to implement these measures.
- Arrange any necessary contacts with the FRS.
- Take measures for fire-fighting in the workplace adapted to the nature of the
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activities carried on in the workplace and, the size of their undertaking of the
workplace concerned.
- Take into account persons other than their employees who may be present.
- Ensure that the number of such employees, their training and equipment
available to them are adequate, taking into account the size of, and the
specific hazards in, the workplace concerned.
The general fire safety requirements for the workplace are termed general fire
precautions under the RRO and fire safety measures under the FSA. They comprise
the following measures:
- To reduce the risk of fire and the spread of fire.

- Means of escape.
- For ensuring that the means of escape can be safely and effectively used.
- For fighting fires.
- For detecting and giving warning of fire in case of fire.
- For actions to be taken in the event of fire on the premises, including instruction
and training of employees.
- For mitigating the effects of fire.
The specific process-related fire safety requirements are not defined in such an exact
manner in the legislation, but the term process fire precautions is used to mean those
special, technical or organisational measures required to be taken or observed in any
workplace in connection with the carrying on of any work process; in particular,
where those precautions are designed to prevent or reduce the likelihood of fire
arising from such a work process or reduce its intensity.
Work process means all aspects of work involving, or in connection with:
- The use of plant or machinery.

- The use or storage of any dangerous substance (as defined under DSEAR).
Plant may be provided with fixed and/or in-built fire-fighting equipment primarily
to limit loss rather than necessarily contribute to life safety. This may be regarded
as part of the process fire precautions. Examples include automatic gaseous fire
protection systems (e.g. CO2), which may introduce a risk of suffocation in the
event of discharge. It would therefore normally be for HSE to check that this risk is
addressed in such installations. Where changes are considered necessary to guard
against such risk with equipment required under the FSO or FSA, these should be
sought in consultation with the FRS. Any manual operation of such systems should
be addressed in staff training and staff routines. In addition, those who may have
to fight fires on the premises should be competent to use the equipment provided.
Both the FRS and HSE have duties regarding safe separation of stored
materials:
- If separation or containment of stored materials is required to safeguard the

means of escape in case of fire, enforcement will largely be a matter for the
FRS.
- If separation or containment of stored materials is not directly related to
means of escape (e.g. for fire prevention and process control or prevention of
the spread of fire), enforcement will be a matter for the HSE.
There are obligations under DSEAR for operating companies to liaise with the
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emergency services on emergency arrangements, including providing relevant

information (see HSE L138). In this case enforcement of this is a matter for the HSE.
HSE inspectors will not normally inspect general fire precautions during
workplace inspections.
(iv) The Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations
The Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances (NIHHS)

(Amendment) Regulations apply to premises with specified quantities of particular
substances, and require such installations to be notified to the HSE. It is proposed
that these regulations are revoked in due course.
(v) The Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations
The Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations control the carriage,

handling and storage of dangerous substances in harbours and harbour areas.
(vi) Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations expand upon the
general duties within the HASAWA and require employers to manage health and
safety. They require risk assessments to be carried out for all work activities for the
purpose of deciding what measures are necessary for safety.
(vii) Confined Spaces Regulations
If a risk assessment identifies risks of serious injury/adverse health from work in

confined spaces, such as a lack of oxygen, or the presence of toxic gases, fumes
or vapours, and ingress of liquids or solids, The Confined Spaces Regulations may
apply. They require:
- Avoiding entry to confined spaces (e.g. by doing the work from outside).
- If entry to a confined space is unavoidable, following safe systems of work.
- Putting in place adequate emergency arrangements before the work starts.
Operating companies should put in place adequate emergency arrangements prior

to work commencing: they should not rely solely on the local FRS to comply with
these regulations.
(viii) Environmental protection
Whilst the scope of the UK COMAH Regulations covers impact of major accidents
on the environment, there is additional legislation that addresses more general
environmental protection; in particular, impacts on water receptors. Most UK
environmental legislation is based on European directives, and much of it is
implemented nationally rather than identically across the UK. Pertinent legislation
includes:
- The Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales)

Regulations 2003, which in England and Wales implement Directive
2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy
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(‘Water Framework Directive’). These regulations aim to prevent deterioration

and enhance the status of aquatic ecosystems, including groundwater, and
reduce pollution. More specifically to the petroleum industry, the Control of
Pollution (Oil Storage) (England) Regulations 2001 are applicable in England
to protect groundwater from above-ground oil tanks at storage installations,
except those installations for onward oil distribution. This exclusion differs
elsewhere in the UK.
- The Environmental Damage (Pollution and Remediation) Regulations

(‘Environmental Damage Regulations’), which in England implement
Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and
remedying of environmental damage (‘Environmental Damage Directive’).
These regulations require action to be taken in cases of imminent threat of
environment damage, and to remedy environmental damage.
- The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations (EPR) 2010,

which implement aspects of several directives including Directive 2008/1/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council concerning integrated pollution
prevention and control (‘Integrated Pollution Prevention Control (IPPC)
Directive’) and Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water
policy (‘the Water Framework Directive’). The regulations usurp the Pollution
Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000, as amended.
Their scope includes regulation of water discharge and groundwater activities,
as well as the direct or indirect emissions to air and land. From 2013, Directive
2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control)
(‘Industrial Emissions Directive (IED)’) will replace seven existing Directives
(including the IPPC Directive) that are currently implemented through the EPR.
IED will be implemented through revised EPR.
UK legislation is supplemented by a series of Pollution Prevention Guidance notes

(PPGs) which are published by the environment agencies (EA/SEPA/NIEA). These
PPGs provide practical information on issues such as storage, bund design, firewater
management and emergency response, etc.
A.4 LICENSING AND ENFORCEMENT
Regulations are normally enforced by a CA. Safety and health regulations are enforced at
UK petroleum refinery and bulk storage installations by HSE. Environmental regulations are
enforced by the environment agencies (i.e. EA, SEPA or NIEA) and local government. Under
the COMAH Regulations, the CA comprises HSE and the relevant environment agency.
In the UK, licensing for petroleum legislation may also fall to the local FRS or local
government. In many cases, responsibilities fall to the local harbour authority in a harbour
area and to the CA at installations subject to hazardous installations regulations.
Enforcement of fire safety under the RRO and Fire (Scotland) Act is the responsibility
of the local FRS; however, process fire safety is enforced by HSE at installations subject to the
COMAH Regulations.
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ANNEX B
FIRE-RELATED HAZARDS OF PETROLEUM AND ITS PRODUCTS
B.1 INTRODUCTION
This annex provides physical properties and the IP classification of petroleum and its products;
these should be used when assessing their fire-related hazards.
B.2 BOILING POINTS (OR RANGES), FLASH POINTS AND IGNITION TEMPERATURES OF
PETROLEUM AND ITS PRODUCTS
Table B.1 provides boiling points (or ranges), flash points and ignition temperatures of
petroleum products.
Table B.1 Boiling points (or ranges), flash points and ignition temperatures of
petroleum products.
Substance Boiling Flash point Ignition

point (or (closed cup) temperature
range) (oC) (oC) (Note 1) (oC) (Note 2)
Methane -161,5 N/A 537
Ethane -88,6 N/A 510
Propane -42,1 N/A 466
Butane -0,5 N/A 430
2-methylpropane (isobutane) -11,8 N/A Note 4
Pentane 361 < -40 309
Hexane 687 -22 247
Ethylene -103,7 N/A 542
Propylene -47,7 N/A Note 4
1-butene -6,3 N/A Note 4
2-butene 4 N/A Note 4
Benzene 801 -11 580
Toluene 110,6 4 552
Hydrogen -252 N/A 580
Kerosine (Note 3) 150 - 300 38 - 50 254
Naphtha (Note 3) 100 - 177 -2 - + 10 Note 4
Petrol (Note 3) 37 - 200 < -40 257
Gas oil (Note 3) 260 - 370 >56 338
Atmospheric residue (fuel oil) (Note 3) >350 >66 Note 4
Notes
1. See section 2.2 regarding limitations of using flash points. For substances whose flash point is identified
'N/A', flash point is not applicable as substance exists in gaseous state under ambient conditions.
2. The data for ignition temperature should be regarded as approximate only, since they depend on the
characteristics of the test method used. See section 2.2.
3. As they are mixtures, these petroleum products boil over a wide boiling range. In addition, the range data
152
Notes continued
are typical; actual values vary with manufacturer and specification.
4. Data not available.
B.3 IP CLASSIFICATION OF PETROLEUM AND ITS PRODUCTS
Table B.2 provides the IP classification of petroleum and its products by flash point.
Table B.2 IP classification of petroleum and its products by flash point.
Class Description Substance

0 Liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) LPGs, ethylene, propylenes
1 Liquids that have flash points Petrol
below 21 oC (Note 2) Stabilised crude oil
Avtage wide cut jet fuel (JP4; Jet
B)
Benzene
Toluene
Naphtha
Methanol
II(1) (Note 3) Liquids that have flash points from Avtur/Jet A/Turbofuel
21 oC up to and including 55 oC, Kerosine (a) premium grade, (b)
handled below flash point (Note 2) regular
II(2) (Note 3) Liquids that have flash points from Cutback bitumens (Note 4)
21 oC up to and including 55 oC,
handled at or above flash point
(Note 2)
III(1) (Note 3) Liquids that have flash points Gas oil/distillate heating oil
above 55 oC up to and including Automotive diesel
100 oC, handled below flash point
(Note 2)
III(2) (Note 3) Liquids that have flash points Cutback bitumens (Note 4)
above 55 oC up to and including
100 oC, handled at or above flash
point (Note 2)
Unclassified (Note 5) Liquids that have flash points Atmosphere residues
above 100 oC (Note 2) Heavy fuel oils
Bitumens other than cutback
grades
Notes
1. See section 2.2 regarding guidance on limitations of using flash points. Data based on closed cup flash
points, except for LPG.
2. A new Seveso III Directive was adopted in July 2012 (see annex A.2): this requires transposition into
national law by 31st May 2015. An implication are changes to flash point criteria which differ from those
currently used in the IP classification of petroleum and its products.
3. Class II and Class III petroleum and its products are subdivided in accordance with the circumstances in
which they are handled.
4. Depends on diluent. Bitumens using kerosine as diluent are typically Class III(2), whereas those using
naphtha as diluent are typically Class II(2) or possibly Class I.
5. Unclassified petroleum products should be considered as Class III(2) when handled at or above their flash points.
153
B.4 FLAMMABLE LIMITS OF PETROLEUM AND ITS PRODUCTS
Table B.3 gives flammable limits in air of petroleum and its products under ambient conditions.
Table B.3 Flammable limits in air of petroleum and its products under ambient
conditions.
Substance Physical state Flammable limits (% vol./vol.)

at ambient Lower Upper
temperature
Methane gas 5,0 15,0
Ethane gas 3,0 12,5
Propane gas 2,1 9,5
Butane gas 1,6 8,5
Pentane liquid 1,5 7,8
Hexane liquid 1,1 7,5
Heptane liquid 1,05 6,7
Hydrogen (Note 4) gas 4,0 75,0
Petrol liquid 1,4 7,6
Naphtha liquid 1,1 5,9
Kerosine liquid 0,7 5,0
Notes
1. Flammable limits can widen significantly when substances are at elevated temperature or pressure.
2. See section 2.2 regarding the definition of flammable limits.
3. Main data source: NFPA Fire protection guide to hazardous materials.
4. Hydrogen is a special case owing to its wide flammability range.
B.5 TYPICAL SUBSTANCES WITH POTENTIAL TO FORM A LARGE VAPOUR CLOUD IN

EVENT OF AN ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANK OVERFILL
HSE Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites, defines criteria for determining
whether storage tanks storing petrol have the potential to form a large vapour cloud. All of
the following criteria apply:
−− Storing petrol (as defined in European Parliament and Council Directive 94/63/EC of
20 December 1994 on the Control of Volatile Organic Compound Emissions Resulting
from the Storage of Petrol and its Distribution from Terminals to Service Stations).
−− Vertical, cylindrical, non-refrigerated, above-ground storage tanks typically designed
to BS 2654, EN 14015, API Std. 620, API Std. 650 (or equivalent publications at the
time of construction).
−− Above-ground storage tanks with side walls of height greater than 5 m.
−− Filled at rates greater than 100 m3/hr. (approximately 75 t/hr.).
HSE Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites defines the substances listed in
Table B.4 as having the potential to give rise to a large vapour cloud in the event of a storage
154
tank overfill. This list should not be considered as exhaustive: HSE Safety and environmental
standards for fuel storage sites provides more thorough guidance on determining such
substances.
Table B.4: TYPICAL SUBSTANCES WITH POTENTIAL TO FORM A LARGE VAPOUR

CLOUD IN EVENT OF AN ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANK OVERFILL
Substance Notes
Acetone
Benzene
Natural gas liquids (condensates)
Isopentane
Methyl ehtyl ketone
Methyl tert-butyl ether
Naphthas
Raw petrol
Reformate (light)
Special boiling point 2
Toluene 1. Research shows the vapour cloud
concentration at the base of a storage
tank for toluene to be just above its LFL;
however, there is a degree of uncertainty
over whether its subsequent movement
and dilution would lead to the formation
of a large flammable vapour cloud. A
precautionary approach should be taken.
Other single component liquids with
Reid vapour pressure (RVP) ≥ 2,5
Other multi-component substances: 2. The tank filling rate and tank size
— RVP ≥ 2,5 should be considered.
and 3. A default density of 750 kg/m3 could

be used.
— tank filling rate (m3/hr.) x
liquid density (kg/m3)/tank perimeter 4. Crude oils have the potential to form
(m) >3 600 a large vapour cloud in the event of a
storage tank overfill.
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ANNEX C
TYPICAL INSTALLATIONS/AREAS – FIRE AND EXPLOSION
HAZARD MANAGEMENT (DETECTION AND PROTECTION)
C.1 INTRODUCTION
This annex provides guidance on the most common fire and flammable gas detection and fire
protection risk reduction measures for various installations/areas. Similar guidance could be
developed for other installations/areas such as road tanker vehicle parking areas. The lists are
not intended to be prescriptive; rather, they indicate the risk reduction measures that should
be considered for implementation depending on the results of a risk assessment.
For design guidance on the listed risk reduction measures see publications (e.g. codes
of practice, design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) listed in annex I.3.
C.2 STORAGE TANKS
The most comprehensive guidance for storage tank FEHM includes LASTFIRE and design
standards such as API RP 2021. Risk reduction measures should be considered by tank type,
as set out in the following sections:
(i) All tanks

- Bund walls.
- Drains for bunded areas.
- Earthing/bonding for tanks.
- Bund wall penetration sealing or transit piece seals.
- Fire-fighting water mains and fire hydrants.
- Drainage and kerbing or dedicated tertiary containment to limit spillages
beyond bund areas.
- Automatic or semi-automatic emergency shutdown system, ROSOVs etc.
- Leak detection systems.
- Independent high-high level alarms.
- Drainage system incorporating flame or gas traps to prevent the transmission
of flame/gas through the system.
(ii) Fixed roof tanks

- Tanks identified as critical may require heat detection at vents for early
response.
- Fixed water spray systems for tank roof and tank shell if risk assessment
warrants protection against tank-to-tank escalation or bund fire protection.
- Fixed or semi-fixed foam systems for low flash point product tanks if risk
assessment warrants protection.
- Fixed monitors for cooling tanks, in place of water spray systems, may be
considered where tanks are of small diameter and can be protected by such
monitors.
- Wheeled large capacity dry powder and/or foam extinguishers where tanks
are of relatively small height and diameter and where the range of dry powder
stream or foam stream will reach all bunded areas.
- Portable, hand-held dry powder and/or foam extinguishers for minor spillage
fires in bunds.
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(iii) Internal floating roof tanks

- Fixed or semi-fixed foam system if risk assessment warrants protection.
- Fixed or portable monitors for cooling tanks may be considered where tanks
are of small diameter and can be protected by such monitors.
- Portable, hand-held dry powder and/or foam extinguishers for minor spill fires
in bunds.
(iv) Open top floating roof tanks

- Secondary rim seals.
- Fire retardant rim seal materials.
- Submerged shunts and bonding cables to minimise lightning ignition potential.
- Foam dam and semi-fixed or fixed foam system with top pourers.
- Auxiliary foam hose line outlets at the tank top walkway.
- LHD in the rim seal area.
- Fixed water spray system for tank shell if risk assessment warrants protection
against tank-to-tank escalation or bund fire protection.
- Fixed monitors for cooling tanks, in place of water spray systems, may be
considered where tanks are of small diameter and can be protected by such
monitors.
- Portable, hand-held dry powder and/or foam extinguishers for minor spill fires
in bunds.
(v) Refrigerated/insulated tanks

- Double walled or full containment storage tanks.
- Bund to contain any leakage in the event of a failure.
- Flammable gas detection inbetween tanks or in bund.
- PRV (or PRVs) that are designed to protect the storage tank against failure due
to overpressure.
- Deluge system to apply a film of cooling water to the storage tank at a rate of
(typically) 9,8 l/min./m2 of vessel surface area
(vi) Typical spacing for storage tanks

The minimum tank spacings given in Table C.1 are applicable to the storage of
petroleum and its products in Classes I, II(2) and III(2) in above-ground tanks.
They should be used in conjunction with an appropriate level of fire protection.
In exceptional circumstances, tank spacings may be reduced when justified by a
suitable and sufficient risk assessment and/or additional measures have been applied
to reduce risk to an equivalent level.
Petroleum and its products in Class II and Class III stored at bulk storage
installations such as depots may be regarded as Class II(1) and Class III(1)
respectively in temperate climates since they will be below their flash points at
ambient temperatures. The spacing of tanks should be governed by constructional,
maintenance and operational convenience only. However, where Class I products
are also present, tanks for Class II products should be spaced from tanks storing
Class I product at the distances for fixed roof tanks shown in Table C.1.
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At petroleum refineries, products or product component stocks may at

times be held at temperatures higher than their flash points. In this case, Class
II substances should be classified as Class II(2) and tank spacings should be in
accordance with Table C.1.
Table C.1: Location and spacing for above-ground tanks for storage of petroleum
and its products in Classes I, II(2) and III(2) (Note 1)
Factor Minimum spacing

Fixed roof, above-ground, including those with internal floating roofs;
horizontal cylindrical tanks (Notes 2 - 3)
1. Within group of small tanks (i.e. tanks Determined solely by construction/ maintenance/
≤10 m diameter, height ≤14 m); aggregate operational convenience.
capacity ≤8 000 m3.
2. Between groups of small tanks (i.e. ≥15 m, or as determined by fire consequence
tanks ≤10 m diameter, height ≤14 m or less); modelling.
aggregate capacity ≤8 000 m3 or less.
3. Between a group of small tanks and any ≥10 m, or as determined by fire consequence
tank outside the group. modelling.
4. Between tanks not part of a group of ≥0,5 times the diameter of the larger tank or
small tanks. ≥ the diameter of the smaller tank, whichever
is less, or as determined by fire consequence
modelling.
5. Between a tank and any filling point, ≥15 m, or as determined by fire consequence
filling shed or building not containing a fixed modelling but ≥6 m.
source of ignition.
6. Between a tank and outer boundary or ≥15 m, or as determined by fire consequence
installation, any designated non-hazardous area, modelling.
or any fixed source of ignition at grade.
Floating roof (Notes 2, 4)
1. Within a group of small tanks. Determined solely by construction/maintenance/
operational convenience.
2. Between two floating roof tanks. ≥10 m for tanks ≤45 m diameter. ≥15 m for
tanks >45 m diameter, or as determined by fire
consequence modelling. The size of the larger
tank should govern the spacing. For crude oil,
≥10 m but a minimum spacing of 0,3 times the
diameter should be considered, with no upper
limit.
3. Between a floating roof tank and a fixed ≥0,5 times the diameter of the larger tank or
roof tank. ≥ the diameter of the smaller tank, whichever
is less, or as determined by fire consequence
modelling but not ≥10 m.
4. Between a floating roof tank and ≥15 m, or as determined by fire consequence
any filling point, filling shed or a building not modelling but not less than ≥ 6 m.
containing a possible source of ignition.
5. Between a floating roof tank and outer ≥15 m, or as determined by fire consequence
boundary of installation, any designated non- modelling.
hazardous area or any fixed source of ignition at
grade.
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Table C.1 Notes

1. The minimum tank spacings given in Table C.1 are applicable to the storage of petroleum and its products
in Classes I, II(2) and III(2) in above-ground tanks. They should be used in conjunction with an appropriate
level of fire protection. In exceptional circumstances, tank spacings may be reduced when justified by a
suitable and sufficient risk assessment and/or additional measures have been applied to reduce risk to an
equivalent level.
2. For tank height ≥18 m it should be considered whether the spacings should be increased to take account
of the tank height.
3. Fixed roof tanks fitted with internal floating roofs should be considered as fixed roof tanks for the purpose
of tank location and spacing.
4. Floating roof tanks fitted with external geodesic domes extending over the entire roof area may be
considered as fixed roof tanks for the purpose of tank location and spacing.
C.3 PROCESS AREAS
Some of the most common risk reduction options and considerations for process areas
include:
−− Point flammable gas detectors at pumps and compressors.

−− Acoustic gas detection for very high-pressure gas/vapour detection at potential
release points.
−− Open-path gas detection on one or more sides of a process plant if risk assessment
requires early alert to a gas cloud moving off plant or to an identified source of
ignition (perimeter monitoring).
−− Point gas detection and point smoke detection at heating, ventilation and air
conditioning (HVAC) air inlets for local control rooms on or adjacent to process areas.
−− Toxic gas detection for identified hazards (H2S, CO, etc.).
−− Flame detection or LHD at pumps transferring low flash point or above ignition
temperature products, if justified.
−− PFP on steel structures supporting vessels, drums and petroleum-containing
equipment – typically PFP up to 8 m high.
−− PFP on petroleum-containing vessels or drums etc. if risk assessment identifies high
or rapid escalation risk.
−− Low height walls as spillage retention for vessel inventory, which may initially
overwhelm the installation drainage.
−− Grade level island design to ensure spillages run from under/around vessel to
installation drainage and eventual containment.
−− Fire-fighting water mains and fire hydrants.
−− Fixed monitors for cooling where staffing is low or the response and deployment of
portable monitors or hose lines may be greater than identified vessel, equipment or
structure failure times.
−− Portable or wheeled water monitors if operations ERs or fire responders staffing is
adequate to deploy in short time.
−− Wheeled large capacity dry powder and/or foam extinguishers where risk assessments
identify potential flammable liquid spills beyond the capability of conventional hand-
held extinguishers.
−− Portable, hand-held dry powder and/or foam extinguishers for minor spillage fires.
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C.4 LPG STORAGE INSTALLATIONS
Some of the most common risk reduction options and considerations for pressurised LPG
spheres and vessel installations include:
−− Sloping ground away from sphere or vessel to a drainage system or catchment pit.
−− Provision of blowdown valves with remote control to reduce pressure in advance of
relief valves lifting.
−− Drain system water seals to minimise gas or flame migration.
−− Low height bund walls as spillage retention.
−− Point flammable gas detectors at pumps, compressors.
−− Open-path gas detection on one or more sides of an LPG vessel storage area if risk
assessment requires early alert to a gas cloud moving off plant or to an identified
source of ignition.
−− Point flammable gas detection at HVAC air inlets for local control rooms on or
adjacent to LPG storage areas.
−− Manual call point fire alarm system.
−− Flame detection for LPG pumps and for coverage of potential leak/fire points under
vessels and spheres in case of early or instantaneous ignition of a gas release.
−− PFP of sphere legs and vessel saddles.
−− PFP on sphere or vessel shell depending on risk assessment, criticality and offsite
escalation impact.
−− Fixed water sprays for spheres and vessels (designed to wet the whole surface without
relying on run down).
−− Fixed monitors for additional cooling to support the water spray system.
C.5 LNG INSTALLATIONS
Some of the most common risk reduction options and considerations for LNG installations
include:
−− Use of double containment or full containment insulated storage tanks.

−− Sloping ground/paving away from storage, process, and shipment transfer areas to
channels or ducts leading to impounding basins for limited size spill containment
−− Protection against cryogenic damage for load-bearing structures.
−− Point flammable gas detectors at pumps using gas detection appropriate to LNG, i.e.
calibration for methane, located according to gas density characteristics.
−− Open-path gas detection on one or more sides of an LNG process/transfer area if risk
assessment requires early alert to a gas cloud moving off plant or to an identified
source of ignition.
−− Point gas detection at HVAC air inlets for local control rooms on or adjacent to LNG
storage areas.
−− Flame detection for LNG pumps in case of early or instantaneous ignition of a gas
release.
−− PFP on vessel supports and/or shells depending on risk assessment, criticality and
offsite escalation impact.
−− Fixed water spray system for storage tanks, road tanker vehicle and rail wagon tank
loading gantries and any other identified potential fire exposure hazards.
160
−− Fixed dry powder system for road tanker vehicle and rail wagon tank loading gantries.
−− Fixed monitors for additional cooling to support water spray systems.
−− Fixed water monitors for ship/jetty manifold area at jetties.
−− High-expansion foam systems for tank bunds. (NB: May not be appropriate for larger
storage tanks due to large bund area – a double or full containment storage tank
type should be used instead.)
−− High-expansion foam system for spill retention catchment pits.
−− Wheeled large capacity dry powder extinguishers.
−− Portable, hand-held dry powder extinguishers for minor spillage fires.
Additional requirements for LNG installations are addressed in EN 1473 and NFPA 59A.
C.6 MARINE FACILITIES
Some of the most common risk reduction options and considerations for marine installations
include:
−− Loading or unloading arms with emergency release couplings that automatically

isolate the flow of product if the arm is accidentally disconnected or pulled out of
position.
−− Emergency shutdown pushbuttons and valves on the loading / unloading systems.
−− Point flammable gas detectors at LPG or low flash point flammable liquid pumps to
detect accidental flammable releases.
−− Point gas detection at HVAC air inlets for local control rooms if gas export/import
operations.
−− Flame detection may be considered for critical pump houses with procedures or
executive action to shut down the pumps.
−− Water curtains between the ship and the loading equipment.
−− International ship/shore connection.
−− Port authority fire tug or other fire tug availability, if possible.
−− Remotely controlled fixed water monitors for ship/jetty manifold area at jetties if gas
export/import; remotely controlled fixed water/foam monitors if flammable liquids
export/import or if combination of flammable liquids/gases export/ import.
−− Portable or wheeled water monitors at strategic locations.
−− Wheeled large capacity dry powder and foam extinguishers.
−− Portable, hand-held dry powder extinguishers for minor spillage fires.
For guidance on fire detection and alarm, protection and emergency response at marine berths
and jetties see ICS/OCIMF/IAPH ISGOTT and ISO 28460. A variety of fire protection measures
should be considered – including fixed foam/water monitors, portable fire extinguishers and
wheeled extinguishers. At berths where early detection of fire incidents is required, measures
such as flame detection or LHD should be considered in addition to manual call points. For
liquefied gas jetties, flammable gas detection and water spray systems may be considered
to provide rapid detection of releases and vapour containment/knockdown capability. An
international ship/shore fire connection may also be provided through which water could be
supplied to a tanker’s fire main if required for shipboard fire-fighting.
161
Requirements for jetties and marine berths vary but are generally provided in
proportion to risks and jetty criticality. In general, the provision of fixed foam / water monitors
should be considered for tanker berths handling vessels in excess of 20 000 tonnes dead
weight. The scale of provision should be related to the size, location and frequency of use
of each individual berth. Water monitors may be situated at pier or wharf deck level or may
be mounted on fixed towers, remotely controlled from either the tower base or from a
distance. They should be located so as to be capable of cooling the berth structure as well
as the adjacent hull of a tanker. In some cases it may be necessary to provide elevated water
monitors in place of, or additional to, deck mounted monitors to ensure water discharge
above maximum freeboard height.
The number and capacity of foam monitors to be provided on a berth should depend
upon circumstances including the capacity of the firewater system at an installation. Where
a single elevated foam monitor is provided for berth and shipboard fire-fighting duty, the
discharge capacity of the monitor in foam / water solution should be at least 115 m3/hr. but
could be as high as 350 m3/hr. ICS/OCIMF/IAPH ISGOTT lists minimum requirements based
on various ship sizes and frequency of movement. However, for new jetties, or to meet foam
application requirements for some scenarios, it may be necessary to base foam monitor
needs by defining potential fire sizes and application rates for the scenario. In general, the
application rates given in standards such as EN 13565 2 and NFPA 11, and annex D.8 for spill
fires may be used. Where foam monitors are supplied from fixed foam equipment located on
or close to the berth, the equipment should be situated outside any potential fire area and
foam concentrate tanks should be shielded from extremes of temperature.
For rapid knockdown of small fires, dry powder extinguishers in the order of 9 kg
capacity can be provided and larger 50 kg wheeled units (generally at least two per berth)
will offer capability to deal with larger spill fires providing operators are trained to use them;
wheeled foam extinguishers containing approximately 100 l foam solution or ‘premix’ are
also suitable for use at berths. However, CO2 extinguishers should not generally be used
because they have little value in the open, often being of limited capacity with the gas able
to dissipate readily. Portable and hand-held fire extinguishers should be located so that in any
area or hazard, a fire extinguisher can be reached without travelling more than 15 m.
Other risk reduction measures such as powered emergency release couplings (PERCs)
should reduce incident likelihood in the first place – requirements for such devices are given
in ICS/OCIMF/IAPH ISGOTT. For guidance on LNG and LPG hard arms for cargo transfer see
BS EN 1474-1 and 28460. LNG and LPG carriers and terminal ESD systems should also be
linked and tested before cargo transfers occur.
For LNG, risk reduction measures are described in ISO 28460 and EN 1474.
C.7 BUILDINGS
(i) Local/central control rooms in process areas
Some of the most common risk reduction options and considerations for local/
central control rooms in process areas include:
- Appropriate location of control room outside potential hazard ranges or

consideration of appropriate building design measures to withstand effects of
fire or explosion.
- Blast and external fire protection if risk assessment warrants such protection.
- Fire protection/fire-resistant construction and internal linings in accordance
with fire regulations.
162
- Point gas and smoke detection at HVAC air inlets with executive actions for
damper closures, etc.
- Manual call point fire alarm system.
- Internal point smoke detection (depending on size of control room).
- Means of escape, emergency exits, emergency lighting in accordance with fire
regulations.
- Portable, hand-held dry powder, water, and CO2 extinguishers.
- Water sprinkler system or gaseous system (depending on criticality assessment).
(ii) Electrical switchgear rooms/sub-stations
Some of the most common risk reduction options and considerations for electrical
switchgear rooms/sub-stations include:
- Blast and external fire protection if criticality warrants such protection.

- Point gas detection at HVAC air inlets with executive actions for damper
closures etc.
- Incipient or point smoke detection.
regulations.
- Portable, hand-held dry powder or CO2 extinguishers.
- Gaseous system (depending on criticality assessment).
(iii) EDP installations and computer suites
Some of the most common risk reduction options and considerations for EDP
installations and computer suites include:

- Incipient smoke detection.
regulations.
- Portable CO2 extinguishers.
- A gaseous system or water mist system (depending on criticality assessment).
As the basis for determining risk reduction measures for (ii) and (iii), functions of
the equipment should be considered, as well as whether the room or building
is considered ‘occupied’. Protected equipment that is required to operate in an
emergency or a building that is frequently unattended should be provided with
more extensive risk reduction measures.
(iv) Warehouses
Depending on warehouse construction, and identity and criticality of stored

substances, a water sprinkler system should be considered. For warehouses storing
packaged flammable liquids for transport or export, a foam sprinkler system may
be required depending on quantities and warehouse design. Water or foam may
or may not be effective depending upon a variety of factors e.g. wettability of
contents, storage arrangements, type of containers, etc. Regardless of system type,
163
it should be carefully designed taking into account the relevant hazard classification,
which in itself is dependent on the nature of the stored substances.
If sprinkler systems are used, consideration should also be given to managing
the effects of fire-fighting water run-off.
Some of the other most common risk reduction options and considerations
for warehouses include:
- Smoke detection if warehouse is of relatively low height – high roof structures

may mean some time before smoke detection alarms.
- Internal office fire protection/fire-resistant construction and internal linings in
accordance with fire regulations.
regulations.
- Fire-fighting water mains and fire hydrants.
- Internal hose reels.
- Portable, hand-held dry powder, water or CO2 extinguishers.
(v) Laboratories/workshops
Some of the most common risk reduction options and considerations for laboratories/
workshops include:

- Suitably ignition protected electrical and mechanical equipment rated for use
in hazardous areas, where appropriate.
- Limited quantities (typically less than 50 l) of flammable liquids held in
laboratories.
- Flammable liquids to be stored in fire-resisting cabinet.
- Segregation of reactive substances.
- Gas and liquid line supplies from outside to have emergency isolation valves
operable from outside.
- Internal point smoke detection (away from any fume hoods etc.).
- Means of escape, emergency exits, emergency lighting (suitably ignition
protected for use in hazardous areas, where appropriate) in accordance with
fire regulations.
- Portable, hand-held dry powder, foam spray or CO2 extinguishers.
- Water sprinkler system or gaseous system (depending on criticality assessment).
(vi) Administration buildings
Administration buildings should generally be provided with fire precautions and fire
protection in accordance with local fire regulations. Where possible new buildings
should be located outside potential hazard ranges, or appropriate building design
measures should be considered to provide protection against the effects of fire or
explosion.
164
C.8 ROAD TANKER LOADING RACKS/GANTRIES
Water/foam monitors capable of applying foam and cooling the loading rack/gantry structure
as well as affected vehicles should be provided for those handling Class I products or products
that may be heated above their flash point. The number and capacity of foam monitors to be
provided in a loading area will depend upon circumstances, including the foam application
needs – based on estimation of flammable liquid pool fire sizes – and capacity of the firewater
system.
Alternatively, foam sprinkler/spray systems can be provided: these should be designed
in accordance with EN 13565 2, NFPA 16 or equivalent. These would generally be designed
to provide zoned or complete area discharge of foam solution onto pool fires. The systems
generally provide at least 10 minutes of foam application followed by water cooling, during
which the foam blanket should remain intact.
Portable and mobile equipment may also be provided to cater for small spill fires.
Typical provision of fire extinguishers includes:
−− 9 kg dry powder unit(s) at grade;

−− 9 kg dry powder unit(s) on platform (if applicable), and
−− 50 kg dry powder wheeled unit(s) at grade.
Fire incident detection may also be provided; in some cases confirmed or ‘double knock’
detection can operate foam systems or equipment. Detectors used should typically be flame
detectors for fast response to pool fires.
For liquefied gas loading racks, flammable gas detection should be considered; in
addition, water spray systems should be considered to cool tankers in the event of liquefied
gas pool fires.
C.9 RAIL TANKER LOADING RACKS/GANTRIES
Similar measures should be adopted to road tanker loading racks/gantries, as described

in C.8. Foam application equipment may also be provided for direct application of foam
under rail tankers so that pool fires can be dealt with efficiently. Fixed or self-contained foam
monitors are sometimes seen as an alternative to fixed foam application systems alongside
or above loading racks/gantries or unloading/loading points. Incident detection in the form
of flame detection or flammable gas detection may be provided depending on the product
handled at the loading racks/gantries.
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ANNEX D
TYPICAL APPLICATION RATES
D.1 INTRODUCTION
This annex provides guidance on typical fire-fighting media application rates for various
equipment types and fire scenarios; however, they may require adjustment if equipment
spacing is minimal, or according to the results of scenario-based risk assessment. Most of this
annex focuses on water and foam as they are the fire-fighting media commonly applied to
large petroleum fires for extinguishment and/or cooling. Some guidance is provided for use
of powders and gases as extinguishing agents for smaller scale fires and those in enclosed or
semi-enclosed spaces.
Water is used in fire-fighting at petroleum installations to control fire and act as a
cooling medium to protect equipment from the damaging effects of flame impingement or
high levels of thermal radiation and convection. It can be used selectively as an extinguishing
agent, normally applied as a fine spray. However, water may not be effective as an
extinguishing medium for fires involving flammable liquids.
Foam may be used as an extinguishing agent, and also for fire protection by
suppressing vapours. Applied as a blanket, it can also protect surfaces such as the roofs of
floating roof tanks from radiation, reduce the risk of ignition of pools of petroleum and its
products, and extinguish fires by excluding air.
D.2 COOLING USING WATER
The application rates given in this section are minimal but should provide a satisfactory level
of protection in most circumstances. Some operating companies may choose to increase the
application rates for process plant, tanks or equipment that have a high asset value or where
loss would have a significant effect in terms of business interruption.
Requirements for cooling heat-affected plant, tanks and equipment should be
determined by techniques such as fire and explosion modelling (see section 2.7).
(i) Cooling process areas

Table D.1 provides typical design fire-fighting water application rates for cooling
petroleum refinery process areas.
(ii) Cooling non-PFP uninsulated equipment enveloped in flame

Water spray application rates for cooling specific items of equipment at petroleum
installations are given in Table D.1. The application rates given relate to the area
of equipment exposed to radiation from the fire. The rates apply to pool fires. It is
generally not realistic to increase application rates sufficiently to mitigate the effects
of direct jet flame impingement.
(iii) Cooling equipment exposed to radiant heat

The radiated heat received by an object in the vicinity of a fire varies inversely with
the square of the separation distance: equipment close to a fire should be provided
with much more water for cooling. The actual water requirements depend on the
level of radiated heat, the absorbance of the irradiated surface, and the effect of
any wind on the flame pattern as well as the separation distance of equipment from
the fire.
166
Generally, applying water to equipment not immediately involved in the

fire may divert resources from other more critical tasks. This should be continually
subjected to DRA during the emergency and tactics should be changed where
necessary to optimise available resources. The rates shown in Table D.1 are for
guidance only. If the applied water does not evaporate from the surface it is supposed
to be protecting, the surface may not be hot enough to warrant protection. If
resources are limited and under strain at the time, concentration on other, more
critical areas should then be considered.
Cooling may be required if the equipment is likely to be exposed to heat
fluxes in excess of 8 kW/m2 for a prolonged period. The most appropriate way of
determining the need for cooling should be to carry out fire and explosion modelling
calculations as part of the fire scenario analysis to identify exposures (see section
3.2). Once a need for cooling has been identified, the minimum application rates
given in Table D.1 should be used.
D.3 CONTROL OF BURNING USING WATER
In some cases, water only may be used to control a fire until extinguishment is possible.
Although not usually fully effective at extinguishing flammable liquid fires, the water may
slow fire development and spread as well as providing valuable cooling to exposed equipment.
Although it is not possible to specify application rates for all fire types (since these will depend
on the specific petroleum and its products, fire size and presence of obstacles as well as
application equipment), the minimum application rates given in Table D.1 should be used.
Table D.1: Minimum application rates for water based systems
Application
rate (l/min./m2)
[Note 1]
Process areas (Application rates based on ground area)
Process unit blocks 4
High density - stacked equipment 6-8
Cooling non-PFP or uninsulated vessels and equipment enveloped in flame [Notes 2 and 3]
Process vessels, equipment, structural steel, pipe racks, fin-fan coolers etc. 10
Pumps handling flammable liquids in isolated areas [Note 4] 10
Pumps handling flammable liquids adjacent to cable runs, fin-fans, pressure 20
equipment, pipe racks etc. [Note 5]
Compressors handling flammable gases 10
Electrical and instrument cable trays, transformers, switchgear etc. 10
Cooling equipment exposed to radiant heat
Miscellaneous process equipment 2
Fixed [Note 6] and floating roof [Note 7] tanks containing Classes I, II and III liquids 2
Pressurised tanks (general) 10
LPG tanks 10
Buildings such as warehouses, offices and laboratories 2
Control of burning (application rate depends on product type)
Water spray for control of fire 10 - 20
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Table D.1 Notes

1. Rates are based on typical values given in international publications e.g. NFPA, EN. Efficacy of lower
application rates should be determined by test and/or incident experience.
2. Vessels and equipment that have insulation that is not specifically designed as PFP may also require
cooling depending on the properties of the insulation. The minimum application rates for non-PFP or
uninsulated items enveloped in flame should be applied for preplanning purposes.
3. Vessels and equipment that are provided with incorrectly specified, applied or maintained PFP may
require supplementary water cooling to compensate for such shortfalls. The minimum application
rates for non-PFP or uninsulated vessels and equipment enveloped in flame should be applied for
preplanning purposes.
4. Per square metre of horizontal area extending 0,6 m from the pump and driver's periphery.
5. Total water application rate based on application equipment and run time.
6. Consider roof and shell of fixed roof tanks
7. See D.5 for considerations on cooling tanks. Water spray should not be applied to the roof.
Direct application of water to fires in which the underlying fuel is cold, such as LPG and LNG,
should be avoided. This is because the relatively warm water will supply heat to the liquid and
cause additional evaporation of fuel.
D.4 EXTINGUISHMENT USING WATER
The application rate of spray water for extinguishment depends on the circumstances of
the fire and no precise guidance can be given. If necessary, trials with actual application
equipment should be conducted to establish required application rates. Actual application
rates depend on factors such as nozzle type, spacing and location, water pressure and
flowrate etc. As noted in D.3, water is not generally an effective extinguishing material for
fires involving Class I petroleum and its products.
D.5 STORAGE TANKS
(i) Considerations regarding the use of cooling water for tanks on fire
The need for cooling a fire-affected tank shell above the product level has been
much debated. There is no known incidence of tank shell failure leading to product
release under full surface fire conditions where cooling water was not applied to
the shell. However, there have been some cases where it is thought that uneven
application of water to the tank shell has caused distortion in some areas and
consequent loss of product.
Tank shells are intended to fold inward under full surface fire conditions
instead of folding outward with potential loss of burning product. Another factor
is that cooling the involved tank shell with uneven or erratic water streams will lead
to hot and cool zones on the shell surface area which may lead to distortion and
possible product spill or overflow. Therefore, cooling water should not be applied
to the tank on fire.
However, it should be remembered that if extinguishment is to be
attempted, tank shell folds may trap pockets of burning product that the foam
blanket cannot flow over. This may cause some difficulty in achieving complete
extinguishment. In addition, cooling may be required to gain full extinguishment by
giving the foam a better chance to seal against the tank wall. (The hotter the wall,
the more difficult it is to seal against it.) Therefore, cooling water, applied evenly
around the complete tank shell may be required towards the end of an incident and
calculations to determine maximum water requirements should make allowance for
it. In practice, it may only be required at the latter stages of the fire in which case
cooling water on adjacent installations may no longer be required, thus reducing
total water flow demand.
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(ii) Cooling adjacent tanks

Cooling of heat-exposed tanks can be achieved through the use of fixed or semi-
fixed water spray systems, or by mobile means. Table D.1 provides a summary of
minimum application rates.
For adjacent tank cooling, the required water flow depends on the distance
from the fire, wind direction, area exposed to radiation, type of tank (e.g. fixed
or floating roof) and the intensity of the fire. The need for fixed water-cooling
can, if necessary, be assessed by using appropriate fire and explosion modelling
techniques, or otherwise at the time of an incident if no fixed protection is provided.
Various publications provide guidance on water cooling requirements for
exposed tanks but a practical fire ground method of checking whether an adjacent
tank or other plant/equipment is affected by radiant heat is to sweep a water
stream across the exposed structure or tank shell above the liquid level; if it steams
off, it needs cooling. If not, heat input is minimal or non-existent and therefore
is not a hazard at that time. Regular checks should clearly be made if in doubt
about prolonged exposure to radiant heat. To avoid unnecessary wastage of water
and the potential problems of bund flooding or oil/water separator overflow, if the
water applied does not steam off, its application should be stopped and tried again
at regular intervals.
Overall, the final decision as to whether or not to apply cooling water
should be the responsibility of the person in charge of fire attack, and should be
based on the prevailing conditions.
Lessons learned from incidents include many cases where water has been
over-applied for cooling adjacent tanks, leading to bund flooding, carry-over of
product to other areas and excessive discharge of contaminated water offsite, as
well as a shortage of water for more critical use.
For tank fire design events, radiant heat should be calculated. Any
exposures to more than 32 kW/m2 should be provided with fixed cooling water
systems. Exposures receiving 8 - 32 kW/m2 should be cooled, but this can be
provided by mobile/portable means providing it can be deployed in a reasonable
time.
A water application rate of 2 l/min./m2 is normally sufficient; this removes
43 kW/m2 thermal radiation at 50 % efficiency, 30 kW/m2 at 35 %, or 69 kW/m2
at 80 % respectively. At many installations this may be the maximum practical rate
determined by supply and drainage considerations. Rates higher than 2 l/min./m2
do not provide a proportionate increase in protection.
(iii) Cooling atmospheric tanks impinged by flame

Fixed water spray systems are normally designed to cool tanks exposed to radiant
heat from a full surface fire on a nearby tank. The designed water application rates
from these systems (generally 2 l/min./m2) may not be sufficient to cope with the
heat fluxes from impinging flames from a large fire within the tank or in the bund.
For such situations, where cooling is required, application rates should be based
on a figure of 10 l/min./m2 from mobile equipment; however, the application of
such large volumes of firewater over a proportion of the impinged shell may affect
the quality of any foam blanket provided to deal with a bund fire. Consequently,
it may be more prudent to focus efforts on extinguishing any bund fire in the first
instance whilst providing cooling above the liquid level in the tank as and when
required. (Checks of whether the steelwork steams on application of water is a
good indicator).
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Box D.1: Example calculations sheet
The number of shell and roof segments that require cooling should depend on
several factors, including the tank farm layout, the height of a flame in an adjacent
tank and the orientation of the segments on the tank shell and roof.
The example calculation in Box D.1 shows two roof segments and two wall
segments being cooled as an illustration only.
The areas requiring cooling should be evaluated for each situation.
Note: Data are nominal only and should not be used for design purposes
1. Spillage fire foam quantity:
Spillage area = 50 m2
Foam application rate (e.g. 3 % FP foam) = 6,5 l/min./m2
Total application rate = 325 l/min.
Run time = 15 min.
Foam concentrate quantity = 325 x 0,03 x 15 = 146,25 l
Water requirement for foam solution = 325 x 0,97 x 15 = 4 728,75 l
(~5 m3)
2. Foam systems:
Tank area = 346 m2
Foam application rate (NFPA 11, e.g. 3 % FP foam) = 4,1 l/min./m2
Total application rate = 346 x 4,1 = 1 420 l/min.
System run time (NFPA 11) = 55 min.
Foam concentrate quantity = 1 420 x 0,03 x 55 = 2 343 l
Water requirement for foam solution = 1 420 x 0,97 x 55 = 75,8 m3
(~76 m3)
3. Water for cooling four adjacent tanks, based on typical tank dimensions of
20 m diameter x 10 m height and a minimum application rate of 2 l/min./m2
over 50 % of the height:
Each segment shell area = π x 20 x 10 = 157 m2
4
Each segment roof area = π x 202 = 78,5m2
4x4
Cooling on shell/segment (2 l/min./m2) = 0,5 x 157 x 2 = 157 l/min.
Cooling on roof segment = 78,5 x 2 = 157 l/min.
Total cooling/segment = 314 l/min.
Total for four segments = 1 256 l/min.
Run time = 2 hr.
Total quantity = 1 256 x 120 = 150 720 l
(~ 151 m3)
Total quantities:
Maximum water flow for foam solution = 1 420 l/min.
(Bund spill extinguished first)
Water requirement for foam solution = 76 m3
Foam concentrate = 2 343 l
Maximum water flow for cooling = 1 256 l/min.
Water for cooling = 150,72 m3 (~ 151 m3)
Therefore, calculation of resources results in the following quantities required
onsite:
Foam systems:
Foam concentrate = 2 350 l
Foam solution flow = 1 420 l/min.
Foam solution quantity = 78,1 m3
(includes ~76 m3 water)
Water cooling:
Water cooling flow = 1 256 l/min.
Water cooling quantity = 151 m3
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D.6 WATER SUPPLY
Fire-fighting water and foam solution requirements for credible fire scenarios should be
determined. Calculation of the required resources to manage fires to a given strategy should
use 'calculation sheets' detailing overall water demands for those scenarios. An example is
given in Box D.1; this should not be used for design purposes but indicates the calculation
process only. The calculation should reflect anticipated firewater delivery rather than
theoretical application rates when calculating resources by considering additional factors,
such as:
−− The potential over-application of water due to use of mobile fire-fighting equipment.
−− Changes in planned delivery, e.g. when fixed delivery systems fail and mobile systems
are implemented that deliver significantly greater volumes (e.g. due to wind blow or
over-rating of mobile equipment (e.g. that provided by FRSs)).
−− High volume pumping.
−− Requirements for continuing foam application to maintain post-fire security.
During an incident water supply requirements may vary greatly as cooling water is turned
on or off as required, or as foam is applied to the fire. (Cooling water should be minimised
to reduce the possibility of bund filling, etc). Generally, the water flow requirement should
be based on the maximum that might be required at any moment taking into account
the application rates needed to deal with design event fire scenarios. (See section 3.2 for
guidance on scenario selection.)
In many cases, the actual application equipment, system run time etc. govern the
required water flowrates, as well as incident experience.
Having assessed the overall water flow requirements it should be ensured that this
water is available. It is not sufficient to simply specify a total water flow capability of the main
fire pumps. Assessments of water requirements should be made on an area-by-area basis
from fire scenario evaluations. Hydraulic analysis of the fire water system (see section 6.5.2)
should then be used to assess whether or not these requirements can be met. In critical
situations, hydraulic calculation results should be checked by onsite tests.
Scenario evaluation should be used to calculate total water quantity, but a minimum
of two hours’ supply should be considered as a baseline given the potential use of water or
foam in a design event fire. However, in practice this figure may vary depending on incident
strategy, system run times, etc, as well as the likely duration of any fire and exposure to
radiant heat and flame impingement. A realistic estimate of the amount of water required to
control the facility’s design event should be determined and there should also be contingency
for further supply.
Consideration should be given to contingency arrangements in the event of the
installation supply being exhausted before the fire is under control. Water containment and
its recycling are options which should also be considered.
Water supply calculations should also be used to inform calculations of firewater
volumes and required secondary containment and drainage system capacities; see
section 4.8.6.
D.7 FOAM APPLICATION RATES
Foam is the most widely used extinguishing medium for large petroleum fires. It can be
applied over horizontal or near-horizontal surfaces subjected to thermal radiation during a
fire, to the rim seal area of a floating roof tank, by sub-surface injection in suitably equipped
fixed roof tanks, or over a pool of petroleum. A foam blanket protects surfaces from thermal
radiation, reduces the risk of ignition and will extinguish a fire if properly applied.
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The critical application rate is the minimum rate at which foam solution extinguishes
a given fire: below this, foam application is not effective. Typically, for a petroleum liquid fire,
this is in the order of 1 - 2 l/min./m2. However, some foam destructive products (e.g. MTBE,
methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) and acetone) require much higher application rates. Figure D.1
illustrates these principles.
Typical values for hydrocarbons
Critical Optimum Overkill

area design
Time to extinguish fire
Critical application rate
area
2 4 8
Solution application rate (l/min./m 2)
Figure D.1: Efficacy of foam application
Actual application rates should be much higher than this to provide a safety margin and
faster extinguishment. However, if the application rate is further increased, a point is reached
when no noticeable improvement is made in extinguishing time such that the additional
application rate is effectively wasted. Published application rates in international standards
therefore attempt to strike a balance between ensuring fast, secure extinguishment and
minimising wastage of resources.
As far as application method is concerned, it is generally desirable to apply foam as
gently as possible to the product surface and so minimise product pick-up or disruption of
any foam blanket; however, this is not always possible from a practical viewpoint. A range
of application devices is available from those that only cause foam to flow from them gently
without any residual kinetic energy to those that produce a foam jet that is projected a
considerable distance.
D.8 POOL FIRE FOAM APPLICATION
For pool fires in process areas the minimum application rates given in Table D.2 should be
used. For foam destructive products (e.g. polar solvents), guidance on minimum application
rates should be sought from foam manufacturers.
When applying foam for the purposes of ignition prevention, the information in
D.9 (vi) should be considered.
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Table D.2: Minimum foam solution application rates (Note 1)
Application rate
(I/min./m2)
Pool fires
Petroleum and its products - liquids 4 - 10 (Note 2)
Foam destructive products 4 - 6 (Notes 2, 3)
Tank bund fires
Petroleum and its products – liquids 4 - 10 (Note 2)
Fixed roof tanks and internal floating roof tanks (Note 4)
Open top floating roof tank rim seal fires
Foam pourer protection 12
Catenary system (Note 5) 20,4
Coflexip® system (Note 5) 20,4
Coflexip® system (Note 6) 12,2
Full surface fires – monitor application (Note 7)
Foam destructive products (Note 9) N/A
Notes
1. Minimum foam solution application rates listed assume a foam concentrate with an extinguishing
performance class of 1A to BS EN 1568 and should be increased for foams with lower performance
classes. Further guidance on application rates, see EN 13565-2.
2. Rate depends on fire size and foam type/application method: see EN 13565-2.
3. Guidance on minimum foam solution application rates for foam destructive products should be
sought from foam manufacturers.
4. Using fixed foam pourers or subsurface systems.
5. Application under rim seal.
6. Topside application.
7. This should achieve a minimum application rate of 6,5 l/min./m2 foam solution onto the fire surface.
8. Rate depends on tank size: see EN 13565-2.
9. Monitors should not be used for protection of tanks containing foam destructive products. If monitors
are used then specialist advice should be sought on the pertinent application rate.
D.9 TANK FIRE FOAM APPLICATION
This section describes typical strategies and minimum application rates that should be used
to tackle rim seal fires, roof spill fires, bund fires and full surface fires in petroleum storage
tanks. For further guidance, see EN 13565-2 and NFPA 11.
(i) Bund fires

For bund fires, the strategy should be to prevent the tank, if not already ignited,
becoming involved in the fire. This assumes greater importance where there is more
than one tank in a common bund. Pipework, valves and flanges (although the latter
173
should be minimised by design within the bund area) may be especially vulnerable
and cooling may be required for these, at all times ensuring that any foam blanket
is not diluted.
If the bund fire is not threatening a tank and a foam attack can be quickly
organised, then foam application by fixed system, monitors or hose lines without
cooling may be appropriate.
If a foam attack will take some time to organise, cooling water streams
should normally be directed onto exposed piping, valves or any tank shell above the
tank product liquid level.
For large bund fires, or where a tank has lost containment of all its contents
into the bund and fire occurs, the strategy should be to split the fire into manageable
areas or segments: this is known as a ‘quadrant foaming strategy’. This principle can
apply to both fixed systems and portable equipment. It is often necessary because
a large fire area can make it impracticable to tackle the complete bund at one time.
Also, there may be limitations to foam flow over a large surface area. Portable foam
monitors or portable foam bund pourers may be used for fire-fighting under these
conditions and moved as control is gained in one area. This has the advantage
of being able to use smaller throughput (flowrate) foam equipment rather than
the large throughput equipment required to tackle the fire in one attempt. During
this technique, allowance may need to be made for ‘overlapping’ foam application
to minimise foam burnback: calculations for preplanning purposes should take
this into account. Smaller volume foam application equipment should be used to
maintain foam blanket before moving on to the next quadrant.
Fixed foam protection may also be considered for common bunded areas
surrounding multiple tanks with poor access for fire-fighting. Minimum application
rates are given in Table D.2.
For foam destructive products (e.g. polar solvents), guidance on minimum
application rates should be sought from foam manufacturers.
When designing a bund foam system, or considering mobile/portable foam
application, the physical characteristics of the bund such as slopes, irregular areas
or obstructions should be taken into account.
(ii) Open top floating roof tank rim seal fires

The main fire risk for open top floating roof tanks is the seal area between the tank
shell and the floating roof. The most appropriate risk reduction option is to use
fixed or semi-fixed foam systems. There are three basic methods of applying foam
to the rim seal area, as identified in section 6.5.7.2. Minimum foam application
rates for these systems are given in Table D.2.
(iii) Foam application to rim seals and roofs affected by radiant heat
Where radiant heat is affecting adjacent tanks, there may be a need for foaming the
rim seals to provide vapour suppression, cooling of the rim seal area and to prevent
potential vapour ignition. This is a precautionary measure, which should always be
considered part of any strategy for fighting full surface fires. Once foamed, the rim
seal foam blanket should be monitored regularly and topped up if necessary.
There may also be circumstances where the roof of an adjacent tank is
adversely affected by radiant heat and cooling should be considered. The obvious
hazard in using water streams to achieve this cooling is that the roof may tilt or sink.
Therefore, a foam blanket, carefully applied, will provide both cooling and some
insulation from the radiant heat. The roof drain should be opened during either rim
seal or roof foaming. The roof foaming requirement will be more pronounced for a
174
single skin roof rather than for a double deck roof.
(iv) Fixed roof tanks and internal floating roof tanks

Fixed foam pourers are often used as the primary protection method for cone roof
tanks. Subsurface or semi-subsurface systems may also be used.
Internal floating roof tanks may also use fixed foam pourer systems, or in
some cases subsurface systems.
Minimum foam application rates for these systems are given in Table D.2.
For foam destructive products (e.g. polar solvents), foam manufacturers’
recommendations should also be sought on minimum application rates.
(v) Foam application rates for full surface fires – Monitor application
Table D.2 provides minimum application rates for full surface fires when using
monitor application. Rates specified in this table are drawn from EN 13565-2.
Historically, using NFPA 11 as a basis, a minimum application rate of 6,5 l/min./m2
of foam solution application onto the fire surface has been specified for full surface
tank fires when using portable foam monitors. As far as NFPA 11 is concerned this
figure does not account for foam stream drift loss, foam stream drop-out/fall out
due to stream turbulence, tank fire thermal updraft currents or rapid evaporation
losses as the stream enters the heat zone of the fire. However, EN 13565-2 already
includes a safety factor in the specified application rates to account for such losses.
ERs and system designers should therefore be careful that an appropriate rate is
selected and that the standard used in calculations is clearly specified.
Foam stream losses can be large and should be compensated by a higher
application rate if using NFPA 11 as the design basis. The rate currently in use by
several major oil company fire departments is 10,4 l/min./m2 for fires involving
petroleum and its products. (This figure is usually higher for water-soluble products.)
This equates to approximately 60 % more than the minimum rate to ensure that the
minimum application rate of 6,5 l/min./m2 actually settles on the product surface.
The 60 % figure is not based on any actual validated test programme but is estimated
from viewing foam trajectories in incidents and in exercises. It is suggested that
under high wind conditions more than the 60 % figure may be required. However,
a higher application rate means that a greater quantity of foam concentrate and
number of foam monitors are required.
As well as EN 13565-2 already factoring in foam stream losses into its
published application rates, the rates are dependent on tank diameter and therefore
surface area.
Once the surface area of the tank is known and the total foam solution
application rate is calculated, foam monitors should be selected that meet the total
minimum application rate, as shown in Table D.3.
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Table D.3 Example calculation of foam and monitor requirements when applying
both NFPA 11 and EN 13565 2
NFPA 11 EN 13565-2
Area for 80 m diameter tank 5 028 m 2
5 028 m2
Application rate (6,5 l/min./m2 x 1.6) 12 l/min./m2
= 10,4 l/min./m2
Total foam application rate = Area x 52 291 l/min. (foam 60 336 l/min.
Application rate solution) (foam solution)
Monitor capability 22 700 l/min. each 22 700 l/min.
(example capacity each (example
only) capacity only)
Number of monitors required 3 3
Note:
This table illustrates the same foam and monitor requirements calculation for an 80 m diameter tank
using both NFPA 11 and EN 13565-2. In the case of the former, the minimum application rate of
6,5 l/min./m2 is increased to account for losses giving a figure of 10,4 l/min./m2. However, the latter
standard includes this safety factor and specifies a rate between 10-12 l/min./m2 depending on the size
of the tank. For the largest tanks >60 m diameter this rate is 12 l/min./m2. Therefore, when calculating
foam resources for monitor application to storage tanks, either method may be used but the +60%
safety factor is only added in the case of the NFPA calculation.
In practice, it will be the type(s) and capacities of application equipment such as foam
monitors that will determine the required total application rate of foam solution, and
consequently foam concentrate and water supplies. Thus, in the above example, the
calculated flowrate was 52 291 l/min. but actual flow rate would be higher (perhaps
68 100 l/min.) corresponding to actual monitors available at the incident.
Application rates of 10,4 – 12 l/min./m2 coincide with the applied rates at
actual large diameter tank incidents that have been successfully extinguished, and
should be used as a minimum until fire tests or incident experience prove otherwise.
Providing such a large foam solution flow rate (as well as any supplementary
cooling that might be required at an incident) can present logistical concerns insofar
as needing large throughput monitors, foam concentrate supplies, etc. However,
incident experience shows that if this method of extinguishment is attempted, the
application rates mentioned above are necessary in practice so that a minimum of
6,5 l/min./m2 is actually delivered to the fuel surface.
It should be noted that there is little known about the most appropriate
application rates required to minimise potential for boilover, particularly where a full
surface fire in a crude oil tank has been burning for some time. For this type of fire,
the most recent research suggests that any foam attack should be within a period
of 2 - 4 hours from ignition using the application rates given in EN 13565-2 or NFPA
11. It should be recognised that prevention of boilover may not be possible even
with the ‘correct’ application rates if the foam application has taken some time to
administer.
(vi) Foam application to prevent ignition or re-ignition

Foam can also be used under some circumstances to prevent ignition of flammable
liquids by blanketing spills and suppressing flammable vapours. However, foam
generation and its subsequent discharge from a nozzle can produce an electrostatic
charge that can potentially ignite the fuel. Also, when applied to a product surface
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the foam will tend to break down into foam solution

In order to minimise the risk of ignition in this way, the most appropriate
strategy for an incident such as a sunken roof in a tank containing non-conductive
product is not to apply a foam blanket unless there is an immediate risk to safety due
to vapour spread or there is a definite potential source of ignition (e.g. a lightning
storm or generation of such a large vapour cloud that it could reach a source of
ignition such as vehicles on public roads, heaters, flares, etc.). In such circumstances,
resources required to foam the surface should be deployed and put on standby so
that application can be carried out immediately if required.
If foam application is required to an unignited surface, it should not be
applied directly into the product but should be run down the tank wall onto the
product surface.
There is very little proven guidance available regarding the amount of foam
required to supplement a foam blanket and prevent re-ignition following an incident.
This will clearly depend on the installation-specific conditions and time taken to
pump out or reclaim unburnt product. However, it is considered that the minimum
quantity of at least 50 % of that required to extinguish the fire should be available
for this purpose. Replenishment of all foam concentrate to minimum required stock
levels should be available within 24 hr. of usage.
(vii) Foam application for prevention of boilover
The likelihood of boilover may be reduced if a crude oil tank full surface fire is
rapidly extinguished. However, there are no guarantees that this will work and such
a strategy, if adopted, should be subjected to careful consideration and meticulous
pre-fire planning.
It is impossible to give an exact time by which the fire must be extinguished.
However, it is believed that the window of opportunity for a concerted foam attack
is a matter of a few hours. Industry test work so far has suggested that ideally, a tank
fire containing a boilover potential fuel such as crude oil should be tackled within
2 hours at typical NFPA/EN application rates (i.e. in the region of 10 – 12 l/min./m2
if using monitors, and 4 - 8 l/min./m2 if using systems). This should be a target time
for foam application but it should be recognised that there can be no guarantees
on the effectiveness of any foam attack. Practically speaking, this means that any
fire should be extinguished as soon as possible following ignition. If foam attack
resource deployment is seriously delayed there can be no guarantee that any foam
attack will be successful (not enough is known about the effectiveness of foam on
crude oil tank fires that have had extended pre-burn periods).
D.10 GASEOUS SYSTEMS
For gaseous systems, the minimum application rate is actually based on the quantity of
gaseous agent needed and the maximum allowable time to achieve design concentration.
Usually the requirements differ for 'total flooding' or 'local application' systems.
For example, NFPA 12 specifies that the design concentration should be achieved
within 1 min. from start of discharge for surface fires and 7 min. for deep-seated fires for
total flooding installations.
To a large extent, the application rate will depend on individual nozzle characteristics
such as the design discharge rate, but also the nozzle location and projection distance. Other
factors influencing application rate will be the product, area to be protected, the presence of
obstacles within an enclosure and enclosure integrity.
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Systems should be engineered on an individual basis and performance criteria such

as design concentration, the time taken to achieve the design concentration and retention
time should be specified.
For detailed design and performance criteria, see NFPA 12 and NFPA 2001.
D.11 INCIDENT EXPERIENCE
Only competent people should interpret guidance on application rates; in addition, they
should be fully aware of their application, and have knowledge of actual fire incidents and
resource deployment options.
(i) Tank fires
For major tank fires involving petroleum and its products, there are three main
options:
— CB.
— System application of foam.
— Monitor application of foam.
All three strategies have been used successfully at different locations around the
world. The final decision on the most appropriate strategy will depend on installation-
specific issues including the assessed risk, availability of water supplies and availability
of competent ERs. Clearly the installation strategy should be reviewed and accepted
by the CA and appropriate incident preplans should be developed.
One major problem at tank fires in the past has been the unnecessary over-
application of water to heat exposed tanks and to tanks on fire. The experience-
based consensus is that provided the tank on fire is designed to API Std. 650 or
equivalent (e.g. EN 14015), it should not be cooled except, perhaps, to help foam
seal against the hot tank shell in the final stages of a fire. The tank shell above the
contents will gradually curve inwards in a fire and not jeopardise the tank shell
integrity. Some cooling may be required eventually to assist any foam seal against
the tank wall.
The maximum recommended thermal radiation exposure level for
unprotected tanks (i.e. having no AFP or PFP) should be 8 k W/m2 or 32 kW/m2 for
protected tanks (see section 2.6.2). This, with the availability of validated radiant
flux calculation programs, allows a more rigorous analysis of fire-fighting water
requirements.
Incident experience has demonstrated that monitor application of foam
can be a successful way of extinguishing large tank fires providing the response is
well planned, the required resources are available and foam logistics (see section
D.11(iv)) are carefully considered. In practice, actual application rates for the largest
successfully extinguished tank fires have been in excess of the minimum application
rates specified in publications. Consequently the minimum application rate should
be 10,4 l/min./m2 (see section D.9(v)); however, this may need to be increased to
achieve extinguishment.
Regarding incident duration, petroleum and its products on fire in a tank,
will typically burn down at a rate of approximately 2 - 4 mm/min. Incident duration
has been reduced in some cases by pumping out the fuel from the base of the tank
into spare tanks a safe distance away. Note however, the proviso regarding boilover
in section D.11(ii)).
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(ii) Boilover
The phenomenon of boilover in crude oil storage tanks remains of major interest
and opinions are divided over the effects of fire-fighting strategies on its likelihood
and consequences.
The boilover mechanism is described more fully in section 2.5.5.7. Essentially,
the height of the boilover and the lateral spread depends on the characteristics of
the crude oil, the amounts of water in the tank as well as ambient conditions.
Some boilover events will be more severe than others. However, from a fire-fighting
perspective it should be assumed that once a crude oil tank full surface fire develops,
a boilover will always occur unless the fire is extinguished.
What is less clear is the effect of application of large amounts of water and/
or foam to the tank and whether this can actually speed up the boilover mechanism
or result in more severe consequences. The effect of fire-fighting media application
on boilover likelihood and consequences is not fully understood, although work is
being carried out internationally to establish this.
In addition, work is being carried out internationally to establish the exact
mechanisms present for boilover to occur, and whether indeed boilover is inevitable.
Also, opinions are divided as to whether boilover can occur in certain other denser
products such as fuel oil.
Regarding fire-fighting strategies, it should be noted that pumping out of
product is one option that could reduce the consequences of a boilover (since less
product would be present to boil over) but it is generally accepted that doing so
would probably reduce the time taken for boilover to actually occur. It has also
been suggested that hot zone formation (if this is indeed the dominant boilover
mechanism) could be tracked using available equipment such as thermographic
cameras, thermocouples etc. to predict time to boilover. However, work is still
continuing to establish practical fire ground techniques useful in predicting boilover
time and consequences.
(iii) Bund fires and process area fires

Bund and process area fires have been successfully extinguished using both fixed
systems and mobile means. With regard to foam application, standards such as
NFPA 11 recognise that portable monitors, foam hose streams or both have been
adequate in fighting spillage fires. There is also a suggestion that in order to obtain
maximum flexibility due to the uncertainty of location and the extent of a possible
spillage in process areas and tank farms, portable or trailer mounted monitors are
more practical than fixed foam systems in covering the area involved. However,
there are logistical issues to address and in some cases a fixed or semi-fixed system
may be appropriate depending on staffing, training and availability, etc.
It should also be recognised that large throughput monitors require careful
use when fighting process area fires. In particular, large volumes of water or foam
delivered at high pressure might make an incident worse by rupturing pipework,
damaging equipment or causing product 'carry over'. Application techniques should
minimise this possibility. The ability to provide large volume foam application to a
serious spill fire on a process unit may allow for structural steel and vessel cooling,
fire extinguishment, as well as vapour suppression.
In many cases, mobile foam trolleys or wheeled extinguishers may be the
most suitable equipment for fighting relatively small spillage fires.
As always, incidents should be reviewed by risk assessment, as part of an
FEHM approach, and equipment should be matched to the scenario for suitability,
application rate and system run-time.
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(iv) Foam logistics

Bulk movement and supply of foam concentrate represents a major logistical
problem which, if not carefully considered, planned and rehearsed, may delay
foaming operations and, in some instances, will prevent effective and continuous
foam application. It should be remembered that once foam application commences
onto a fire, it must be maintained uninterrupted for the duration required.
The use of 25 l foam concentrate drums is not a viable option for supply of
foam concentrate during a large storage tank fire. The capacities of foam monitors
for large tank fires would typically begin at 4 500 l/min., which at 3% proportioning
rate would require 135 l/min. or more than five drums each minute.
Equally, 200 l drums will generally last for less than 1,5 minutes assuming
a 4 500 l/min. monitor is in use. With monitor flowrates above 4 500 l/min., 200
l drums will be consumed rapidly. These drums are therefore of no benefit if large
throughput foam monitors of 30 000-60 000 l/min. are to be used.
One option may be to use large capacity IBCs of 1 000 litres or more, which
can be transported using flatbed trucks or fork-lift vehicles to each fire vehicle (or
monitor) and delivered to the spot within foam suction hose reach. Having two or
more within suction hose reach will clearly increase the duration before changeover
and therefore give more time for transport crews to keep re-supply moving. If the
containers have a side-top mounted funnel point the containers can be stacked at
the vehicles or monitors.
Using foam tankers in the range of 10 000-15 000 l capacity is the other
method of supply, but this needs large assets/procurement in the form of foam
tankers dedicated only to a full surface large tank fire and these would have to be
onsite within a very short period of the incident start.
During the UK Buncefield incident a combination of foam stocks and
supply methods were encountered and many different grades and generic types
of foam were eventually utilised due to the large quantities involved; whilst foam
stocks can be sourced in such a manner it is prudent to calculate the amounts
of concentrate that potentially might be required as part of the pre-fire planning
process and consider how and in what form these stocks should be supplied for
logistical advantage as well as ease/effectiveness of use.
One option to simplify logistics would be to provide a foam system capable of
providing full surface foam application, perhaps with centralised foam concentrate
storage and foam solution distribution. The design of such systems is covered within
NFPA 11 and EN 13565-2.
(v) Environmental issues
The environmental protection consequences of a CB policy for tank fires are,

essentially, smoke production. Some limited data on the toxic effects of smoke from
petroleum and its products are available. It is recognised that the environmental
effects of CB may be preferable to the potential effects of over-application of water
and/or foam and the potential for run-off to offsite areas caused by this in some
circumstances. However, see section 7.2.6 for more guidance on considerations
relating to CB and its appropriateness.
For process area fires, the consequences of CB may be more severe,
depending on escalation potential. There will, in many cases, be a requirement to
fight the fire, and fire-fighting water runoff and limiting its consequences will be a
major consideration.
An installation-specific assessment of the potential firewater and foam
180
volumes that could be applied should be made. This should be balanced against the
available tertiary containment volumes and/or hold-up capacity, taking into account
post fire application. In this way, firewater and foam for tank fire application
(and for other incident types requiring such application) can be managed more
effectively and the potential for run-off affecting sensitive environmental pathways
and receptors can be minimised. A comprehensive fire water management plan
should be developed and this should also contain information on the disposal
arrangements and considerations for identified credible scenario fire water and
foam usage.
(vi) Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) response issues

FRSs have water vehicles as the main response units to incidents. There may be
special foam carrying or other vehicles where the need has been identified. These
may include emergency vehicles for rescue or large scale BA incidents, foam vehicles
(which are not recognised as petroleum industry foam vehicles but will carry limited
quantities of foam concentrate, hydraulic platforms or aerial ladders, command and
control vehicles, etc.).
Water vehicles will typically feature a water tank of 2 250 l and a fire-
fighting water pump in the order of 2 250 l/min. There may be some units that can
pump 4 500 l/min., depending on the brigade, its area of response and the facilities
within.
The type and number of foam monitors carried by FRSs is often very limited.
Water vehicles will typically carry one or two foam branches of 225 l/min. or 450
l/min. capacity, together with an inductor. Some brigades may have one or two
larger capacity foam monitors but will not usually hold the numbers and capacity
of foam monitors necessary for larger incidents such as tank fires.
Taking these factors into account, it is considered that the unofficial role of
FRSs during major fire incidents is to respond and provide trained and disciplined
personnel for hose deployment, water and foam monitor deployment and foam
supply. Recent major incidents have shown that the functions of FRSs that are
considered invaluable include command and control duties, provision of dedicated
manpower and major logistical aspects such as high volume water transfer.
There is therefore a clear need to ensure that a competent industry response
team will mobilise the major resources required and provide the guidance and
expertise to FRSs to deal with the incident, if necessary.
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ANNEX E
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM COMPETENCE
E.1 INTRODUCTION
E.1.1 Introduction:
Each member of an organisation’s ERT should receive training that will enable them to
perform their duties safely, efficiently and in a competent manner on an ongoing basis.
Training for ERs should be competency based and assessed and verified on an ongoing basis.
The content of training courses/ programmes should focus on building on the core ERT
skills for installation-specific competencies at the level of universally acceptable minimum
standards of training for Industrial ERTs.
Competency-based training for ERs should be in five distinct phases:
−− Initial training – acquisition: to gain the attitude, knowledge, skills and understanding
identified for a particular role, before being permitted to engage in workplace
emergency response.
−− Continuous training – application: to consolidate, practise and apply the knowledge,
skills and understanding developed during initial training, to the workplace emergency
response.
−− Refresher training – maintenance: revision of fundamental knowledge and skills.
−− Conversion training – acquisition: designed to familiarise whenever changes in
procedures and/or technology are introduced, and/or new hazards are identified in
the work environment.
−− Revalidation training – confirmation: to update and develop new techniques and/or
to enhance the skills learned in earlier training.
E.1.2 Competence
Competence refers to a consistently demonstrated application of the knowledge, skills,

behaviours and aptitude required to perform safety and production critical roles to a specified
proficiency standard.
Competence assurance is a comprehensive, systematic and sustainable process for
verifying that individuals are competent in performing safety and production critical roles
within their current job description. It is a documented system used to clearly:
−− Identify installation - and job - specific standards for competency in those roles.
−− Evaluate competence before assigning to a person a safety and production critical
role, and at defined intervals thereafter.
−− Provide training to maintain or improve competence.
In practice, any person undertaking a role where action or lack of action by them can
significantly affect health and safety or production may be considered to hold a safety and
production critical role. Safety and production critical roles can include, but may not be
limited to:
−− All those in which the person’s acts or omissions could result directly in loss of physical
integrity or uncontrolled energy or chemical releases within refineries, storage and
distribution facilities, equipment or plant – thereby initiating a potentially serious
incident.
−− Defined emergency response roles, including those where performance can
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significantly control or mitigate the consequences of a loss of integrity and

uncontrolled releases.
−− Engineering and technical roles that include making decisions or providing advice
on matters which can directly impact safety and/or production, including advice on
compliance with applicable legal requirements.
A person is generally deemed to be competent where, having regard to the task that they
are required to perform and taking account of the size and/or hazards of the installation
in which they undertake work, they possess sufficient training, experience and knowledge
appropriate to the nature of that work.
All members of ERTs should be trained to a level of competency commensurate with
the response duties and functions that they are expected to perform, in accordance with
NFPA 600.
Competent ERs will not prevent accidents/incidents, but should ensure that their
impact on an organisation, people, the environment and business continuity is reduced.
E.1.3 Installation-specific competence
The definition of a competence in E.1.2 encompasses both quantitative and qualitative

requirements:
−− Quantitative – having regard to the task that they are required to perform and taking
account of the size and/or hazards of the installation in which they undertake work.
−− Qualitative – they possess sufficient training, experience and knowledge appropriate
to the nature of their work.
Installations should define their emergency response capability based on their credible
scenarios. This should involve evaluating the installation-specific conditions and hazards to
determine installation-specific response duties to be assigned to the ERT in accordance with
NFPA 600.
To accurately identify required emergency response competences relevant to
installation, ERPs or pre-fire plans should be developed. These should take into account
possible supporting response from external agencies, such as the FRS.
In building the pre-plan it should be noted that ‘best case scenario’ external response
may not be available, i.e. expected external resources might be depleted for various reasons,
such as dealing with another incident at the time or may not have the equipment and
competent personnel available to deal with the installation hazards.
Decisions on the competences and resources required to deal with emergencies onsite
should be realistically based to take into account how long and effectively the installation ERT
can deal with an emergency without the support of external resources.
Changes in the pre-fire plans and new legislation may affect training of personnel,
communication procedures and staffing requirements, which in turn should lead to the
amendment of existing instruction and schedules.
E.1.4 Training
The purpose of training ERs should be to allow demonstration of ongoing competence in

dealing with potential accidents/incidents at the installation where the ER may be required
to respond.
Both the employer and the employee have responsibilities to demonstrate that
competencies are being maintained.
All members of the ERT should be trained to a level of competency commensurate
with the response duties and functions that they are expected to perform, including the
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operation of all of the fire-fighting and rescue equipment and systems they are expected to
use, in accordance with NFPA 600.
Installation training programmes should be compiled after a training needs analysis
which should reflect the key performance indicators (KPIs) that are required to maintain
competence to site requirements.
Three separate aspects should make up effective provision of training to ERTs:
−− Course content should be relevant to potential emergencies on the installation to
which the ER may be required to respond.
−− Instructors should have the technical and training ability, knowledge and experience
to effectively provide training on the courses to which they are assigned.
−− Facilities, procedures and training scenarios that ERs face should be safe and relevant
to the hazards on the installation to which the ER may be required to respond.
Training should be as frequent as necessary to ensure that members of ERTs can perform
their duties in a safe and competent manner that does not pose a hazard to themselves or to
other persons. After initial training has been satisfactorily completed, competence should be
maintained by a regular robust training programme which is a mixture of onsite and offsite
training, building on core content to address installation-specific issues.
For the ongoing safety and efficiency of ER personnel whose responsibility includes
fire-fighting, competence in both practical fire-fighting and in the correct use of SCBA should
be maintained.
All ERs should participate in a drill at least biannually and live fire training should be
conducted at least annually, in accordance with NFPA 600.
SCBA drills should take place at least biannually for each ER who is expected to wear
SCBA during an emergency. In addition, SCBA should be used in an annual fire-fighting
exercise.
Achievement and maintenance of competence by ERs should be facilitated by the
frequency, robustness and varied content of training drills, so the requirements of frequency
of drills and training set out in this section should be regarded as minimum requirements.
Whether full-time or part-time, ERs expected to carry out the same duties and to
have the potential to be exposed to the same risks should receive the same amount and type
of competency based training and should be issued with and trained in the use of the same
type of PPE.
E.1.5 Record keeping, assessment and verification
Records of the training received by each ER should be maintained and available for audit to
support the ability to demonstrate that each team member is competent in their particular
role.
Competency based training should be carried out under a continual procedure of
internal assessment and verification to ensure that the training being carried out is to the
standard specified and that this can be demonstrated. Installation assessment and verification
should be confirmed on a regular basis – at least biannually – through verification by suitably
qualified independent verifiers.
The competence of internal assessors and verifiers should be monitored on a regular
basis to ensure that the standards required are maintained.
E.1.6 Key performance indicators for ERTs
Installation management should be responsible for evaluating the installation-specific

conditions and hazards for assigning the installation-specific response duties of the ERT, in
accordance with NFPA 600.
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Every member of an ERT should be competent in key response skills, and this should
be based on industry key performance indicators (KPIs) dealing with high hazard materials
and processes.
24 categories of ER key response skill competencies have been identified from an
examination of international documentation for industrial training of ERs. There are other
KPIs for installations/operations such as aviation, shipping, exploration etc. where there are
other risks that require further key response skill competencies. To maintain all competences,
all ERs should participate in suitable drills least biannually and in live fire training at least
annually.
A list of typical key response skills is given in E.1.7: this list is indicative only and is by
no means exhaustive. Procedures and response skills should be included on an installation-
specific basis which takes account of approved prior learning, where applicable. Subject to
installation-specific risks further specialist skills may be required.
Competency profiles may be developed, outlining specific requirements for
knowledge, performance criteria and required equipment usage to supplement such lists.
An example of a competency map format is given in E.2, but note that this should not be
considered as being exhaustive.
Records for each ER should be maintained on their progress and success in achieving
and maintaining ongoing competence in each category identified for their installation.
E.1.7 Example key response skills for ERs
UNIT COMPETENCE
01. The ER will demonstrate knowledge of the topography of the installation.

02. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of operating safely in the workplace.
03. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of the basics of the science of fire.
04. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of elementary fire service hydraulics.
05. The ER will be familiar with the media used in fire-fighting on the installation and
their application.
06. The ER will be familiar with the operation of the first-aid/ portable/ incipient fire-
fighting equipment used throughout the installation.
07. The ER will be familiar with the appliances and equipment used in fire-fighting
operations on the installation.
08. The ER will be able to participate as a team member in hydrant/hose drills.
09. The ER will be able to participate as a team member in pump drills.
10. The ER will be able to participate as a team member in ladder drills.
11. The ER will be able to participate as a team member in combined pump and
ladder drills.
12. The ER will be able to participate as a team member in foam drills.
13. The ER will be familiar with the standard knots, ropes and lines and their terminology.
14. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of operating safely when using SCBA.
15. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of the principles of first aid relating to
the role of team members when encountering casualties at medical incidents in
their workplace.
16. The ER/control room operator will demonstrate an understanding of
communication procedures.
17. The ER will be familiar with procedures to be followed to save and preserve
endangered life.
18. The ER will be familiar with procedures to be followed to protect the environment
from the effects of hazardous substances
19. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of the elements of building construction.
185
20. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of the principles of fixed alarm,

detection and suppression systems.
21. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of practices that result in fire safety in
buildings and of the procedures to be followed by personnel in case of fire in a
building.
22. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of the procedures for ventilation,
salvage and overhaul operations during and after a fire.
23. The ER will demonstrate competence in driving, manoeuvring and re-deploying fire
service vehicles.
24. The ER will demonstrate an understanding of the operation of high volume pumps
and hoses and the safety procedures associated with their use.
E.2 EXAMPLE ER COMPETENCY MAPPING PROFILE
This annex provides an example ER competency profile based on four units: operations;
maintenance; procedures; and skills.
Unit 1 Operations
Elements
1.1 Inspect and test fire vehicles
1.2 Inspect and test fire station communications
1.3 Exercise emergency response
1.4 Fire prevention
For details, see Table E.1.
Unit 2 Maintenance
Elements
2.1 Inspect and test installation portable/mobile fire equipment
2.2 Inspect and test installation fixed fire systems
2.3 Inspect and test installation fire hydrants
Unit 3 Procedures
Elements
3.1 Execute assigned duties
3.2 Working safely
Unit 4 Skills
Elements
4.1 Respond to emergencies
4.2 Fixed systems/fire vehicle work in incident area
4.3 Carry out fire-fighting or incident control operations
4.4 Rescue personnel
4.5 Reinstate resources
4.6 Training and instruction
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Table E.1: Unit 1 Operations
Element Performance Range Equipment Knowledge

criteria usage
1.1 1. Vehicles ready for Vehicle fuel, oils, Vehicle chassis/
Inspect and test start-up. water, battery levels. drive unit layout,
fire vehicles fuel, water, oil
capacities.
2. Vehicles ready for Lights, indicators, Vehicle cabin
driving. wipers/washers, switches, tyre
horn, sirens, tyres pressures.
condition, defects.
3. Vehicles Acceleration, Fire vehicles. Speed limits,
roadworthy and safe. braking, steering, safe driving
gear changing, requirements.
engine condition,
defects.
4. Fire and emergency Equipment Vehicle equipment
equipment on-board quantities, and agents
vehicles. extinguishing quantity standard.
agents, equipment
fastenings.
5. Vehicles’ SCBA SCBA sets general SCBA cylinder SCBA set
ready for use. condition, air and valves. minimum contents
pressure readings, and pressure,
warning alarm, spare warning alarm
cylinder air and settings, harness/
pressure readings. backplate safe
condition.
1.2 1. Station Station Radios, Communication
Inspect and communications communications telephones, methods, styles,
test fire station hardware functioning hardware. fire and gas call signs and
communications clearly. alarms. procedures.
1.3 1. Participate in Training according to Portable/ Daily training

Exercise theory and practical training programme/ mobile programme,
emergency training sessions schedule. fire-fighting training session
response according to training equipment, aims and
programme. rescue objectives.
equipment,
fire vehicle
pumps and
systems.
2. Appropriate Response procedures. ERPs, fixed Actions required
actions taken and fire systems, from ERPs.
equipment selected portable/
and used for ERP mobile
drills and exercises. equipment,
vehicle
pumps and
systems.
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Table E.1 continued.

criteria usage
1.4 1. Monitor Emergency exits, Building Effects of heat,
Fire prevention buildings, means emergency structure smoke and poor
of escape and take lighting, means hardware, visibility, means of
appropriate action for of escape routes, fire doors, escape regulations
deficiencies. fire enclosures, fire door fire for buildings.
doors, door self- stops/seals,
closers. self-closures
and final exit
doors.
2. Test building fire Smoke detection, Fire alarm call Fire alarm testing
alarms according to manual alarm call points, fire procedures, use
schedule. points, building fire alarm panels, of manual fire
alarms. smoke alarm call points
generator. for tests, use of
smoke detection
for tests, use of
smoke generator.
3. Monitor building Evacuation routes, Evacuation
evacuation during fire warden checklists,
drills and take reporting, assembly assembly
appropriate actions points, head counts. checklists.
for deficiencies.
4. Monitor Clean and tidy Fire Safe working
installation facilities facilities, safe storage prevention procedures
for housekeeping of combustible checklists. and practices,
and take appropriate and flammable safe storage of
actions for substances, drip flammable and
deficiencies. trays, source of combustible
ignition controls. substances,
sources of ignition
and controls.
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Table E.2: Unit 2 Maintenance
Element Performance Range Equipment usage Knowledge

criteria
2.1 1. Check Portable and Extinguishers, Equipment locations,
Inspect equipment mobile fire portable water/foam manufacturers’
and test condition in and rescue monitors, branches, recommended inspection
installation accordance with equipment foam inductors, fire procedures and
portable/ manufacturers’ onsite. hose, ancillary fire methods, inspection
mobile fire instructions and equipment, rescue frequency, recording
equipment procedures. equipment. procedures.
2. Top-up, Portable and Extinguisher gas Required capacities,
recharge, refill mobile fire cartridges, dry loads and levels of fire
equipment in equipment. chemical, water, and rescue equipment,
accordance with SCBA cylinders, foam recording procedures.
manufacturers’ drums, foam tanks,
instructions and water tanks.
procedures.
3. Service and Portable and Extinguishers, Manufacturers'
clean equipment mobile fire portable water/foam recommended servicing
in accordance with equipment. monitors, branches, procedures and
manufacturers’ foam inductors, fire methods, recording
instructions and hose, ancillary fire procedures.
procedures and equipment, rescue
take appropriate equipment.
actions for
deficiencies.
4. Test, operate, Fire vehicles, Vehicle foam and Manufacturers'
run equipment in vehicle fire water pumps, recommended
accordance with and foam monitors, branches, testing and operating
procedures and pumps, foam inductors, fire procedures and
take appropriate fire-fighting hose, SCBA sets, methods, recording
actions for and rescue ropes, harnesses, procedures.
deficiencies. equipment. rescue equipment,
stretchers, ancillary
equipment.
189

criteria
2.2 1. Check Fixed fire Fixed fire and water Manufacturers'
Inspect equipment systems monitors, foam/water recommended inspection
and test condition in onsite. hose reels, water procedures/methods,
installation accordance with deluge systems and frequency, recording
fixed fire manufacturers’ rim seal foam system. procedures.
systems instructions and Fire water supply to
procedures. site, onsite storage
and pumps (if any),
fire water control
system, instruments,
and valves.
2. Top-up, Foam systems. Rim seal foam system, Required capacities/
recharge, refill foam drums at fixed levels, recording
equipment in monitors, foam tanks procedures.
accordance with at foam hose reels.
manufacturers’
instructions and
procedures.
3. Service and Fixed fire/ Fixed fire and water Manufacturers'
clean equipment water monitors, foam/water recommended servicing
in accordance with monitors. hose reels, water procedures and
manufacturers’ deluge systems, rim methods, recording
instructions and seal foam system, procedures.
procedures and foam drums at fixed
take appropriate monitors, foam tanks
actions for at foam hose reels.
deficiencies.
4. Test, operate, Fixed Foam/water monitors, Manufacturers'
run equipment in equipment fixed deluge systems, recommended
accordance with and systems. foam/water hose reels testing and operating
procedures and Foam/water and rim seal foam procedures and
take appropriate monitors, systems. methods, recording
actions for fixed deluge procedures.
deficiencies. systems,
foam/water
hose reels and
rim seal foam
systems.
190

criteria
2.3 1. Check condition Fire hydrants Fire hydrant discharge Manufacturers' or
Inspect in accordance and isolation outlets and their operating company’s
and test with installation valves onsite. valves. recommended inspection
installation or manufacturers’ procedures/methods,
fire procedures. frequency, recording
hydrants procedures.
2. Service and Fire hydrants Fire hydrant discharge Manufacturers' or
clean equipment and isolation outlets and their operating company’s
in accordance with valves onsite. valves. recommended servicing
manufacturers’ procedures and
or operating methods, recording
company’s procedures.
procedures and
take appropriate
actions for
deficiencies.
3. Operate/ Fire hydrants Fire hydrant discharge Manufacturers' or
flush hydrants and isolation outlets and their operating company’s
in accordance valves onsite. valves. recommended
with operating testing and operating
company’s procedures and
procedures and methods, recording
take appropriate procedures.
actions for
deficiencies.
Table E.3: Unit 3 Procedures

criteria usage
3.1 1. Discharge daily ERT role, Required vehicles ERT organisation,
Execute assigned routine duties. responsibilities, and equipment role within
duties functions and according to test operations, routine
duties. schedule. duties, schedules,
programmes.
3.2 2. How to work Safety, health and Required Installation safety
Working safely safely. environmental equipment and procedures, use of
working methods, tools according PTWs, use of PPE
operations and to work carried for routine and
practices. out. emergency work.
191
Table E.4: Unit 4 Skills

criteria usage
4.1 1. Alarms responded Installation alarms, Alarm response Alarm response
to in accordance with communications, routines, role of routines, role of ER,
Respond to
installation procedures. evacuation routes, ER, installation installation emergency
emergencies
access roads. emergency incident plan and
incident plan and evacuation plan.
evacuation plan.
2. Identification of Crude oil, Installation ERPs. Installation ERPs, fire
hazards and hazardous condensate and chemistry, fire behaviour
areas. associated gas. characteristics of crude
LPG, refined oil, condensate and
products. associated gas, wind
direction and approach
roads.
3. Identification of Fire, explosion. Installation ERPs. Installation ERPs, BLEVE
potential or actual causes and effects,
means of escalation. boilover causes and
effects.
4. Turnout gear worn Fire clothing, boots, Use and Use and limitations of
in accordance with helmet, gloves. limitations of turnout gear.
procedures. turnout gear.
5. SCBA worn if BA. Fitting, adjusting, Fitting, adjusting,
required. wearing and wearing and
controlling BA. controlling BA.
6. SCBA entry control SCBA entry control Pre-entry checks, Pre-entry checks, tally
procedures completed board, pre-entry tally system and system and entry
in accordance with checks. entry control control procedures.
procedures. procedures.
4.2 1. Fixed water/ Fixed fire systems, Operating fixed Monitor water/foam
foam monitors or monitors, hose water/foam throughput, water
Fixed systems
fixed deluge used to reels. monitors, making deluge controls and
and fire
optimum effect to foam via monitors, locations. Selection
vehicle work
fight fire. operating deluge of appropriate stream
in incident
systems. patterns.
area
2. Fire hydrants used Fire-fighting water Connecting to Installation fire pumps’
for fire vehicle water system capacity, fire hydrants, fire capacities, mains
supply. water pressure, vehicle pumps’ sizes, friction loss,
source. suction. head/pressure, mains
isolation valves.
3. Fire vehicles used Fire vehicles’ on- Fire vehicle water Power take off
to supply foam or board systems, and foam pumps’ (PTO) engagement,
water or both for fire- extinguishing pressure and flow centrifugal and gear
fighting. agent capacities. control, foam pump operating
proportioning principles, pressure
system, dry relief equipment and
chemical system. methods.
4. Effectiveness of Water and foam Operating fixed Determining water
fixed fire systems streams, water water/foam cooling efficiency
monitored and deluge coverage. monitors, making and/or foam blanket
corrective actions foam via monitors, efficiency. Limitations
taken to optimise fire operating deluge of fire-fighting foams.
control. systems.
192

criteria usage
4.3 1. Appropriate Hoses, water and Running out Use and limitations of
portable and mobile foam branches, hoses, adding portable equipment,
Carry out
fire-fighting equipment stream patterns, hose lengths, types of foam
fire-fighting
used according to dry chemical, removing concentrate, foam
or incident
incident type and water and CO2 hose lengths, proportioning
control
location. extinguisher replacing hose methods, water and
operations
ranges. lengths, branch foam application
connections, techniques and
foam/water equipment usage.
branch streams/ Use and limitations of
patterns control, water, dry chemical
producing foam and CO2 extinguishers.
via foam inductors
and foam
branch, operating
extinguishers.
2. Effectiveness Water and foam Foam/water Determining water
of portable and streams, foam branch stream and cooling efficiency
mobile equipment application, foam pattern control. and/or foam blanket
water/ foam streams blanketing. efficiency. Limitations
monitored and of fire-fighting foams.
corrective actions
taken to optimise fire
or emergency incident
control.
3. Escape routes and ER personnel Choosing safe
exits maintained for safe emergency evacuation and
duration of incident. routes away from escape routes under
incident area. emergency conditions.
3. Trapped personnel Rescue equipment, Considerations to be
are extricated or stretchers. taken into account
released as a matter of when extricating
urgency. personnel. Choosing
appropriate equipment,
knots and ropes.
Selecting appropriate
first aid treatment for
casualties.
4. Casualties are Airway breathing Body harness,
prioritised and treated and circulation, quadpod and
in an appropriate resuscitation, winch system,
manner in accordance establish stretcher,
with procedures. breathing, cardiac karabiners, rescue
massage, stop ropes with loops
bleeding, correct and rescue ropes
positioning, for general-
reassurance and purpose work.
comfort.
5. Casualties removed Casualty Stretchers. Casualty condition
to safe location using movement, considerations when
appropriate equipment casualty handling. handling/moving.
and handling methods
and procedures.
193

criteria usage
4.5 1. Response Fixed systems Fixed systems, Cleaning materials
equipment serviced and equipment, monitors, hose and methods, foam
Reinstate
and cleaned. portable and reels, valves flushing procedures,
resources
mobile equipment. and actuation foam drums refilling/
devices, portable replacement methods
fire-fighting and procedures.
equipment, fire
vehicles.
2. Resources, stocks, Response Replacement foam Required stock and
agents replenished. equipment, concentrate, dry agents' levels, types
extinguishing powder, water, and capacities of
agents, fuel, CO2 agents, SCBA extinguishers, fire
breathing air. air cylinders, vehicle equipment
fire hose, rescue levels, and fuel and
equipment, fire lubricant levels.
vehicle fuels and
lubricants.
4.6 1. Fire training facility Absence of Checking fuels, Fuel control,
in safe condition and tripping hazards valves, PPE, safe storage of
Training and
ready for use. and product extinguishers, flammables, hardware
instruction
spills, hydrants in hose reels, requirements.
working order, monitors for
hose extinguishers training use.
and branches
ready.
2. Delivery of training Emergency Instruction on Use of instruction
on raising alarm and reporting, running out hoses, techniques, use of
use of first aid fire- chemistry of fire, adding hose audio and visual
fighting equipment for classification of lengths, removing equipment, training
staff. extinguishers, use hose lengths, session aims and
of extinguishers replacing hose objectives.
and hose reels on lengths, branch
live fires. connections,
foam/water
branch streams
and patterns
control, producing
foam via foam
inductors and
foam branch,
operating
extinguishers.
194
ANNEX F
CLASSIFICATION OF FIRES
F.1 INTRODUCTION
This annex details the European basis of classifying fires based on EN 2. F.8 reviews the NFPA
system.
F.2 CLASS A – FIRES INVOLVING SOLID MATERIALS
Class A fires involve solid materials, usually of an organic nature, in which combustion
normally takes place with the formation of glowing embers.
The most effective extinguishing medium for most of these fires is water, in the
form of a jet or a spray; this is effective in extinguishing glowing material. Powders or
foam may also be used in appropriate circumstances, for example where access is difficult,
but these media may be less effective in extinguishing glowing material in preventing re-
ignition. Halons are being phased out for environmental reasons. CO2 should not be
used for Class A fires.
F.3 CLASS B – FIRES INVOLVING LIQUIDS OR LIQUEFIABLE SOLIDS
Selection of an effective extinguishing medium for Class B fires involving liquids or liquefiable
solids depends on whether the burning substance is miscible with water or not. Suitable
extinguishing media include foam, powder, CO2 and water spray. Medium or high expansion
foams may be used on both types of liquids, but MP (i.e. AR) foam is necessary if foam is
to be used on a miscible or semi-miscible liquid. Water sprays can be used for extinguishing
fires of non-miscible liquids with a flash point above 66 oC, or fires of miscible liquids of any
flash point.
Fires involving liquids or molten solids are particularly prone to frothing if water is
present: this gives rise to froth-over or boilover which can be particularly hazardous to ERs.
F.4 CLASS C – FIRES INVOLVING GASES
The most effective method of extinguishing Class C fires involving gases is to cut off the
supply. If the flames are extinguished, but the gas continues to flow, there is a possibility of
the build-up of a large volume of gas-air mixture, which could explode if ignited.
Burning gas jets may be deflected and their effects mitigated by the appropriate use
of water jets.
F.5 CLASS D – FIRES INVOLVING METALS
Class D fires are those involving burning metals such as magnesium, titanium, sodium,
potassium, calcium and uranium. One example is a fire in a packed column at a petroleum
refinery. The usual extinguishing agents are ineffective and may be dangerous to use. Special
materials and techniques should be used, and there should be prior planning.
195
F.6 CLASS E – FIRES INVOLVING ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
Class E fires involve electrical equipment. The use of water and foam media can result in
electric shock from the electrical equipment. This is due to water or aqueous foam solution
being conductive and allowing current to either pass up the discharge stream to the operator,
or via wetted surfaces such as the floor as the operator passes over them. Suitable CO2,
'clean agent' (gaseous) or specialist powder extinguishers should be used instead, since the
risk of electric shock is reduced.
Recently, some water-based extinguishers have been 'approved' for use near electrical
equipment. Such extinguishers should meet the requirements of a dielectric test such as that
given in EN 3-7. However, they should not be used directly on electrical hazards.
The first action to be performed when confronted by a fire involving electrical
equipment is to isolate the electrical supply to the affected item, and any others that could
be affected.
F.7 CLASS F – FIRES INVOLVING COOKING OILS
The Class F designation is relatively new, and encompasses fires involving cooking fats or
oils: one application is in kitchen areas. Cooking oil fires, because of their low ignition
temperatures, are difficult to extinguish. Water-based extinguishers are not effective for
cooking oil fires, as they do not cool sufficiently or may even cause burning oil to be ejected
as water expands to steam at the base of the oil layer, putting the operator at risk. Dedicated
Class F extinguishers should be used for these fires.
Good housekeeping, including regular cleaning of cooking equipment and ducting
to remove deposits, can reduce the likelihood of such fires. Also, fire consequences can be
minimised by the provision and use of approved fire blankets.
F.8 OTHER CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES
Certain countries have adopted a different classification scheme. For example, the following
is based on the NFPA (USA) approach:
−− Class A: Fires in ordinary combustible materials, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber,
and many plastics.
−− Class B: Fires in flammable liquids, combustible liquids, petroleum greases, tars, oils,
oil-based paints, solvents, lacquers, alcohols, and flammable gases.
−− Class C: Fires that involve energised electrical equipment where the electrical
nonconductivity of the extinguishing media is of importance. (When electrical
equipment is de-energised, fire extinguishers for Class A or Class B fires can be used
safely.)
−− Class D: Fires in combustible metals, such as magnesium, titanium, zirconium,
sodium, lithium, and potassium.
−− Class K: Fires in cooking appliances that involve combustible cooking media (vegetable
or animal oils and fats).
196
ANNEX G
EXAMPLE INSTALLATION-SPECIFIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
(ERP)
G.1 INTRODUCTION
This annex provides an example installation-specific ERP. Forming two back-to-back pages,
it comprises a text aspect with several phases of response (see Table G.1) and an example
fire map, which includes effects contours (see Figure G.1). An example scenario worksheet is
provided (see Figure G.2), which includes equipment and resources in support of the ERP. In
addition, some benchmark radiant heat levels and their effects are provided.
G.2 EXPLANATORY NOTES TO TEXT ASPECT OF INSTALLATION-SPECIFIC ERP
The ERP is divided into key sections, or panels, as shown in Table G.1.
(i) 'Strategy' heading

The 'Strategy' heading should be a broad series of statements intended as guidance
on what actions should be taken during the first 15 - 20 min. to either minimise or
control the consequences of an incident.
The strategy is taken from the incident scenario worksheets, which are
also used to determine for the incident numbers of fire vehicles and other mobile
equipment, fire-fighting water flows, fire systems applications, water and foam
monitors, hose, foam concentrate, staffing, etc.
It should be recognised that it is not always possible or desirable to list every
action necessary for successful control or elimination of any incident. Therefore, fire
ERs should use DRA (see section 8.9.2) to determine at any time that a change in
strategy or tactics is required due to changing conditions or circumstances.
(ii) 'Immediately' heading

The 'Immediately' heading is intended for the immediate personnel to carry out
initial procedures identified in the emergency procedures such as personnel alerting,
evacuation and assessment related tasks, together with the equipment and resources
required unless these are obvious.
(iii) '2nd response' heading

The '2nd response' heading is intended primarily for an occupational fire brigade
(if any), although further operator actions may be listed. The text here should
usually set out the tactics/actions for minimising escalation potential or controlling
or extinguishing the incident, together with the minimum equipment and resources
necessary to do so.
(iv) '3rd response' heading

A '3rd response' heading may also be included; this is intended primarily for the
FRS or other third party response group. The text here should usually be the
tactics/actions for continuing the control or extinguishment, or in some cases, the
evacuation of personnel at an incident.
Recognising that escalation can occur or may occur very early into the
incident, the ERPs should refer to other plans that may be used when or if this
happens. ERs should be reminded in the ERP of the existence of such plans, thus
ensuring their rapid availability.
197
(v) 'Ongoing potential hazards' heading

The 'Ongoing potential hazards' heading may be used for any known hazards or
hazardous events that may occur as a result of the incident. Information under this
heading may include personnel exposure hazards, explosion potential, escalation
hazards, gas migration hazards, etc.
(vi) 'Other issues' heading

The 'Other issues' heading contains information on any other identified issues
such as offsite considerations, incident control cautions, resource issues or other
incident-specific concerns which have been noted during the course of the incident
scenario evaluation work. This assists ERs by prompting early consideration or an
early decision without having to wait for, or seek, information.
(vii) 'Equipment and resources' headings

A scenario analysis of credible major incidents should be carried out for the
petroleum installation. This analysis should include the likely resources required to
deal with the incident in terms of fire vehicles, fire hose, staffing, water and foam
monitors, foam concentrate quantities, etc. Resources stated on ERPs should be
the minimum required and should be agreed with ERs. This analysis may lead to
identification of equipment or resource shortfalls not previously noted.
A typical scenario worksheet is shown in Figure G.2 and indicates the levels
of analysis that may be used in developing the ERPs.
Table G.1: Example text aspect of installation-specific ERP
ERP for Description of the type of fire or emergency anticipated

Strategy The fire control (fire-fighting) strategy which states the
overall objectives to prevent escalation and bring the
incident under control
Immediately Actions Equipment Resources Comments
Usually control Logical step-by-step What equipment Any specific As required.
room or actions that are required to carry resources not
installation required according out the actions. previously mentioned
personnel who to the fire type and Valves or devices or personnel
will alert, detect, location. Typically, to isolate. that should react
shut down, alarm, evacuation, immediately.
evacuate, etc. isolation, shut down,
informing etc.
198
Table G.1 continued.

1st response Actions Equipment Resources Comments
May be Logical step-by-step Valves or devices Any foam concentrate As required.
installation actions necessary to to isolate. required. The
personnel who isolate the fuel, or Fixed fire systems anticipated water
will use portable carry out initial fire installed onsite. demand for the fire.
fire equipment or control actions. Fire hose/nozzles
fixed fire systems. Portable fire required. The number
If no personnel equipment for of hoses should be
available for this, initial control. Any based on the hydrant
the 1st response water or foam locations and fire
would be monitors required. vehicles used.
occupational fire The fire vehicles and
brigade personnel provided by
the FRS.
2nd response Actions Equipment Resources Comments
Usually the Logical step-by-step Fixed fire systems Any foam Foam
supporting actions necessary installed onsite. concentrate applied at
fire group or to control and Any water /foam required. The pertinent
FRS. Installation extinguish the fire. monitors required. anticipated water application
personnel may demand for the fire. rate etc.
be required to do The fire vehicles and
other tasks at this personnel provided
stage. by the FRS.
Ongoing potential hazards
Any known hazards that will be present because of the anticipated fire either from flame impingement or
radiated or conducted heat. Also consider any explosion possibility.
Other issues
Any other issues, e.g. personnel safety, gas releases, public exposure etc.
199
Sk North
id
Water
FH tank Pu Of
St fs
m ag ho
p This fire map is provided
ho e re
us for guidance only and
e
FH should not be regarded as
FH a definitive map of any fire
that may occur. Radiation
FH
contours as at top of tank.
Sl
u 6 kW/m 2
Pi dge
tA Contour
FH 21 FH
12 kW/m 2
Contour
Flame drag
contour
Tank full
FH
FH
surface fire
area
Rev Date Description By
22 23
Title
Pits Tank Full surface fire
FH
DRG BT/T21 F.S.F Do not scale
Figure G.1: Example fire map aspect of site-specific ERP
Scenario Worksheet 1 Scenario Worksheet 2
SCENARIO RESOURCES FOR STRATEGY

CONSEQUENCES Non-response group resources
Immediate Detection
Life safety Process
Environment Fire and gas
Business interruption Alarm system
Asset loss
Response group
Escalation time estimates
Passive protection
Post escalation
Active protection
Life safety
Environment Firewater flow (fixed systems)
Business interruption/deferment Drainage
Reputation Containment
EXISTING FEHM
Fire response group resources
Detection
Process control Procedures
Vehicles
Mitigation
Staffing
Containment Hose
Drainage Monitors
Passive protection Special equipment
Active protection Extinguishing agent
Firewater flow (portable equipment)
Fixed systems
Total firewater flow
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY Total water quantity
FIRE FIGHTING TACTICS
Figure G.2: Example scenario worksheets
200
G.3 EFFECTS MAPS
Various effects contours may be used in effects maps but the most widely used and
informative are:
−− Pool fire or jet fire extent, whereby the radiant heat would be in the initial order of
200 - 300 kW/m2.
−− Radiant heat contour emanating from the jet/pool area down to 12 kW/m2.
−− Radiant heat contour of 6,3 kW/m2 lessening from the edge of the 12 kW/m2 contour
down to 6,3 kW/m2.
−− BLEVE/fireball extent where the fireball area is in the order of 200 - 300 kW/m2.
−− Gas cloud extent to LFL/UFL.
It should be recognised that radiant heat levels and extent may be affected by wind as well
as obstructions. Also, flames may drag or be deflected towards grade downwind of the fire.
Clearly, any effects map should include this possibility, but the actual effects can only be
assessed at the time of an incident. For this reason, effects maps should be used as guidance
only.
G.4 RADIANT HEAT EXAMPLES
The following indicates radiant heat levels and their effects:
1 - 1,5 kW/m2 = Sunburn.

6,3 kW/m2 = Personnel injury (burns) if normal clothing worn and fast escape
not possible. ERs wearing appropriate PPE should be able to carry
out very brief (< one minute) tasks if subjected to no more than
6,3 kW/m2 and longer duration operations if subjected to
between 3 - 6 kW/m2.
8 - 12 kW/m2 = For example, escalation through ignition of other product
surfaces if long exposure times without protection.
200 - 300 kW/m2= Within the flame of a pool or jet fire. Steel structures can fail
within several minutes if there is no cooling or other protection.
It may be necessary to use fire consequences modelling software to assist with this aspect of
the ERPs.
201
ANNEX H
GLOSSARIES OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
H.1 INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of this publication, the interpretations for terms in H.2 and abbreviations in
H.3 apply, irrespective of the meaning they may have in other connections.
H.2 TERMS
active fire protection (AFP): fire protection systems designed to control or extinguish fires,
to provide cooling to heat affected plant (and prevent fire escalation), or to prevent ignition
by applying fire-fighting media such as water, foam, dry powder (dry chemical) or gaseous
agents. See passive fire protection (PFP) and fire-fighting media.
application rate [foam]: the rate at which foam solution is applied to a fire, expressed as
litres per minute, per square metre of exposed area (l/min./m2). See foam solution.
application rate [water]: the rate at which water is applied for the purposes of exposure
protection (cooling), expressed as litres per minute, per square metre of exposed area
(l/min./m2).
area classification: the notional division of an installation into hazardous areas and non-
hazardous areas, and the subdivision of hazardous areas into zones. See hazardous area and
non-hazardous area.
as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP): a level of risk which is tolerable compared

to cost, effort and time needed to further reduce it. CBA may be used in ALARP decision
making: See risk and cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
atmosphere explosiv: See explosive atmospheres directives.
atmospheric monitoring: the use of portable or fixed flammable gas detection equipment
to give advance warning of a developing flammable or toxic hazard. See gas detector.
autoignition temperature: see ignition temperature.
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) (synonymous with biological oxygen demand):

A measure of the degree of water pollution. The amount of oxygen required by aerobic
microorganisms to decompose the organic matter in a sample of water.
biological oxygen demand: See biochemical oxygen demand.
boilover: a major fire scenario that can occur within a prolonged fire in tanks containing
crude oil or certain fuel oils. The consequences include a major spreading of the fire with fall-
out of burning liquid over the surrounding area.
breathing apparatus (BA): PPE that ensures that the wearer has a continuously available
supply of uncontaminated air through a face mask, helmet or mouthpiece. BA comprises
canister, oxygen and SCBA types. See personal protective equipment (PPE) and self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA).
bund: secondary containment in the form of an enclosure around the primary containment,
202
which includes a bund wall, embankment, or barrier. See secondary containment, primary
containment and bund wall.
bund wall: a wall of appropriate height and size forming part of a bund, constructed
of suitable materials and designed to retain petroleum and its products that have lost
containment from primary containment or fire-fighting media. See bund and fire-fighting
media.
catalytic gas detector: flammable gas detection using a sensor that responds to a potentially
flammable atmosphere by heating up and altering the resistance of a platinum coil. See gas
detector and flammable atmosphere.
catenary foam system: a foam system for open-top floating roof petroleum storage tanks
in which foam is applied through a ring of pipework on the tank roof. At equal intervals
around the ring there are foam makers discharging foam into the rim seal area. See foam.
classification of fires: system of assigning fires to classes based on properties such as the
type of fuel (e.g. by its physical and chemical properties) or the type of item that warrants
protection (e.g. electrical equipment). The system can be used to select fire-fighting media.
See fire-fighting media.
classification of petroleum: system of IP classification of petroleum and its products into

Classes 0, I, II(1), II(2), III(1), III(2) and Unclassified based upon their flash points. See IP and
flash point.
Coflexip® foam system: a proprietary foam system for open-top floating roof petroleum
storage tanks in which foam is applied through a 'spider' network of pipes to the rim seal
area. The foam first travels through a special flexible pipe of the type used for roof drains,
situated inside the tank. See foam.
cold work: the carrying out of any task, or the use of any tool or equipment that will not
produce a source of ignition in a flammable atmosphere. It includes the use of tools for
erection, dismantling and cleaning, which are not liable to produce sparks, and operations
such as drilling, tapping and cutting carried out in such a way as to limit the heat produced
and keep the temperature of the tools and work below the level at which ignition of a
flammable atmosphere could occur (typically 100 oC). See source of ignition, flammable
atmosphere and hot work.
combustible: a substance not falling into the flammable classification as such, but capable
of self-sustained burning in air, once ignited. See flammable.
competence: a consistently demonstrated application of the knowledge, skills, behaviours

and aptitude required to perform safety and production critical roles to a specified proficiency
standard. See competence assurance and competency development.
competence assurance: a comprehensive, systematic and sustainable process for verifying

that individuals are competent in performing safety and production critical roles within their
current job description. See competence and competency development.
competency development: ensuring personnel have the necessary competence to work

safely and contribute to continuing safety. See competence and competence assurance.
competent authority (CA): body or bodies responsible for enforcing health, safety and
environmental legislation. See environment agencies and Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
203
concentration: the percentage of foam concentrate contained in a foam solution. For

example, a 3 % foam concentrate is mixed in the ratio of 3 parts foam concentrate and 97
parts water to make foam solution. See foam concentrate and foam solution.
control of sources of ignition: practices and procedures necessary in order to prevent

inadvertent ignition of petroleum and its products. See source of ignition.
controlled burn (CB): An operational fire response strategy where the application of fire-
fighting media such as water or foam is restricted or avoided, to minimise damage to public
health and the environment. The strategy would normally be used to prevent water pollution
by contaminated fire water. It can also reduce air pollution due to the better combustion and
dispersion of pollutants. But it may also have adverse impacts such as allowing or increasing
the formation of hazardous gaseous by-products.
cost-benefit analysis (CBA): process of determining the cost of a control against the risk
reduction benefits that it provides. CBA may be used in ALARP decision making. See as low
as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
credible scenario: scenarios that represent the most significant consequences to personnel,
business and the environment. See fire scenario analysis and design event.
critical application rate: the minimum application rate at which foam solution extinguishes
a given fire. See application rate [foam] and foam solution.
design event: credible scenarios that are selected from risk assessments as meriting further
risk reduction measures/options because of their likelihood or consequences. See credible
scenario and risk reduction measure/option.
drainage time: a measure of foam quality, which is the rate at which water drains from
foam. A high drainage time demonstrates foam’s ability to maintain its heat-resisting and
stability properties. See foam quality and foam.
dry powder (dry chemical): a fire-fighting medium which inhibits the combustion process.
See fire-fighting media.
dynamic (operational) risk assessment (DRA): the continuous process of identifying

hazards, assessing risks, taking action to eliminate or reduce risks, monitoring and reviewing,
in the rapidly changing circumstances of an operational incident. See hazard and risk.
earthing: the provision of a safe path of electrical current to ground, in order to protect
structures, plant and equipment from the effects of stray electrical currents and electrostatic
discharge. See static electricity.
emergency responder (ER): person with defined competencies to participate in an

emergency, e.g. to isolate inventories, depressurise plant, etc. or serve as fire responders.
They may be drawn from operations staff or from an occupational fire brigade, whether
full-time, auxiliary or an emergency response team (ERT). See competence, occupational fire
brigade, emergency response team (ERT) and petroleum fire brigade.
emergency response plan (ERP): a pre-fire plan designed to assist ERs, whether operations
or fire responders, in the early stages of a petroleum fire incident by listing actions, resources
required and continuing potential hazard information. See emergency responder (ER), pre-
fire plan and hazard.
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emergency response team (ERT): an occupational fire brigade comprising ERs employed
or contracted to implement fire safety ERPs and to take initial action to protect property
using fire-fighting equipment. Its service capability is less than a petroleum fire brigade. See
emergency responder (ER), occupational fire brigade, emergency response plan (ERP) and
petroleum fire brigade.
emergency shutdown (ESD) time: time taken to shut down/depressurise fire-affected

plant.
environment agencies: government sponsored bodies responsible for enforcing

environmental protection regulations in the UK at most installations subject to the
requirements of this publication. In the UK they comprise the Environment Agency (EA) in
England and Wales (www.environment-agency.gov.uk), the Scottish Environment Protection
Agency (SEPA) in Scotland (www.sepa.org.uk) and the Northern Ireland Environment Agency
(NIEA) in Northern Ireland (www.doeni.gov.uk/niea). See competent authority (CA).
expansion ratio: a measure of foam quality which is the ratio of final foam volume to
original foam solution volume. See foam quality, foam and foam solution.
explosive atmospheres directives: ATEX 100a (‘ATEX Equipment Directive’) Approximation

of the Laws of Member States concerning Equipment and Protective Systems Intended for Use
in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres 94/9/EC (as amended) and ATEX 137 (‘ATEX Workplace
Directive’) Directive 99/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December
1999 on Minimum Requirements for Improving the Safety and Health of Workers Potentially
at Risk from Explosive Atmospheres.
exposure protection: protection of plant, equipment and personnel against the damaging
effects of thermal flux. See thermal flux.
FEHM policy: an installation-specific, optimum, cost-effective incident consequence

reduction strategy which takes into account local conditions, the installation’s criticality and
an incident’s potential effect on life safety, the environment, asset value, business continuity
and reputation. See fire and explosion hazard management (FEHM).
fire alarm: visual and/or audible alarm of a fire or developing fire when sensed by fire
detection equipment, either locally, or at a remote staffed location. See fire detection.
fire and explosion hazard management (FEHM): an auditable, integrated approach to risk
reduction by the provision of prevention and consequence reduction measures appropriate
to the levels of risk. See FEHM policy.
Fire and Rescue Service (FRS): a fire response group funded by a statutory fire authority
under the auspices of local government. See occupational fire brigade.
fire detection: equipment used to warn of a fire by sensing fire phenomena such as heat,
smoke, flame radiation or incipient combustion gases. Fire detection can give a local, remote
or installation-wide fire alarm. See heat detection, incipient detection and smoke detection.
fire-fighting media: Agents such as water, foam, dry powder (dry chemical) and inert gases
used to prevent, control or extinguish fires. See foam, dry powder (dry chemical) and gaseous
agent.
fire resistant treated [PPE]: materials used in certain types of PPE that offer fire resistance
through modification of their normal physical properties, usually by the application of special
chemicals and/or treatments designed to resist fire. See personal protective equipment (PPE)
205
and inherently fire resistant [PPE].
fire safe valve: a valve for petroleum service that is designed to withstand a fire and provide
a degree of isolation that is acceptable under specified fire conditions. See isolation.
fire scenario analysis: the process of identifying credible fire scenarios (in terms of incident
likelihood and consequences) at an installation. See credible scenario and scenario analysis
tools.
fire systems integrity assurance (FSIA): a structured approach aimed at ensuring the
implementation of test, inspection and maintenance procedures for fire systems.
fire water network: see fire water system.
fire water system (synonymous with fire water network): system designed to distribute
water to parts of an installation for use through fixed application devices (e.g. water spray
systems) or outlets (e.g. hydrants). It typically consists of a water storage volume, a number
of fire pumps and fire main piping, which distributes the water to the various hydrants and
devices. It may comprise discrete legs radiating out from the pumping location, or it may
be gridded by means of interconnecting legs. Isolation valves are usually provided to allow
direction of water to places where it is needed in the event of disablement of part of the
system.
fixed system: a fire protection system designed to work with minimal or no personnel
intervention. See semi-fixed system.
flame detection: fire detection designed to sense fires by sensing infrared (IR), ultraviolet
(UV) or a combination of UV/IR radiation emitted by fires, and generate a fire alarm. See fire
detection and fire alarm.
flammable (synonymous with inflammable): a combustible substance (solid, liquid, gas or

vapour), which is easily ignited in air. The term non-flammable refers to substances that
are not easily ignited but does not necessarily indicate that they are non-combustible. See
combustible.
flammable atmosphere: a mixture of flammable gas or vapour with air in such proportion
that, without any further addition of gas or air, it will burn when ignited.
flammable gas detector: see gas detector.
flammable gas dispersion: reducing the concentration of any flammable gas to below
the LFL as quickly as possible and within the shortest distance from the release source. See
flammable, lower flammable limit (LFL) and release.
flammable limits: the limits of combustibility of flammable vapours when mixed with air.
See lower flammable limit (LFL) and upper flammable limit (UFL).
flash point: the lowest temperature, corrected to a barometric pressure of 101,3 kPa, at
which the application of a source of ignition in a prescribed manner causes the vapour of a
test portion to ignite and the flame propagates across the surface of the test sample under
the specified test conditions. See source of ignition.
foam: a fire-fighting medium made by mixing air and foam solution using suitably designed
equipment; it can be aspirated or non-aspirated. It flows freely over a burning flammable
liquid surface and forms a tough fire and heat resistant, vapour-suppressing blanket that
floats on the product surface thus cutting off the product from the flame. See fire-fighting
206
media and foam solution.
foam concentrate: concentrated liquid as received from the supplier used to make foam
solution. See foam solution.
foam pourer: a discharge device designed to apply foam gently onto a flammable liquid
(e.g. in the case of a fixed foam system for rim seal foam application on a petroleum storage
tank). See foam.
foam quality: foam parameters such as expansion ratio and drainage time which, when
measured, indicate foam’s properties such as flowability and heat resistance. See expansion
ratio and drainage time.
foam solution: a mixture of water and foam concentrate in the correct proportions (e.g. 3
parts foam concentrate to 97 parts water). See foam concentrate and foam.
foam sprinkler/spray system: a conventional sprinkler system supplemented with foam for
the protection of flammable liquid installations, such as road tanker and rail tanker loading
racks/gantries, horizontal product storage tanks, pump rooms, flammable liquid warehouses
and process units. See sprinkler system.
gas detector (synonymous with flammable gas detector): an instrument, fixed or portable,
designed to detect and measure the presence and concentration of flammable gas/vapour/
mist/spray in an area. Other types of gas detector exist (e.g. to measure the oxygen content
or the presence of specific toxic substances (e.g. H2S)). See flammable, catalytic gas detector,
infrared (IR) gas detector, open-path gas detector, perimeter monitoring and point gas
detector.
gaseous agent: CO2, chemical halon replacements and other proprietary inert gases
used for extinguishing fires (e.g. in areas such as turbine enclosures). They work either by
reducing oxygen concentration to a point below which combustion cannot be supported, by
terminating combustion reactions, or a by combination of both mechanisms.
gaseous system: a fixed fire protection system using a gaseous agent. See gaseous agent.
halogenated alkane: see halon.
halon (synonymous with halogenated alkane): a group of chemical compounds based on

alkanes where one or more hydrogen atoms have been replaced by halogen atoms. They
have been used as fire-fighting media but have detrimental effects on the environment, such
as ozone depletion. See fire-fighting media.
hazard: the potential for human injury or adverse health, damage to property, business
interruption or environmental impact. See risk.
hazardous area: a three-dimensional space in which a flammable atmosphere is or may

be expected to be present at such a frequency that special precautions are required with
potential sources of ignition within it, such as electrical and non-electrical apparatus or hot
work. Note, in this context the term does not refer to the possibility of that atmosphere also
being toxic, oxygen deficient or radioactive. A hazardous area may be part of a wider source
of ignition control area. See flammable atmosphere, source of ignition, hot work, hazardous
area, toxicity and source of ignition control area.
Health and Safety Executive (HSE): government sponsored body responsible for
implementing health and safety legislation in the UK at most installations subject to the
207
requirements of this publication. www.hse.gov.uk. See competent authority (CA).
heat detection: fire detection designed to respond to temperature increases associated with
developing fires and generate a fire alarm. See fire detection and linear heat detection (LHD).
hot work: the carrying out of any task, or the use of any tool or equipment that might
produce a source of ignition in a flammable atmosphere. This typically includes welding, the
use of any flame or electric arc, any equipment likely to cause heat, flame or spark, such as
drilling, caulking, chipping, riveting, grinding, and any other such heat-producing operation
unless it is carried out in such a way as to keep the temperature below the level at which
ignition of a flammable atmosphere could occur (typically 100 oC). See source of ignition,
flammable atmosphere and cold work.
ignition source: see source of ignition.
ignition source control area: see source of ignition control area.
ignition temperature (synonymous with spontaneous ignition temperature and autoignition

temperature): the temperature at which a petroleum substance will burn without application
of a source of ignition. See petroleum substance and source of ignition.
impounding basin: a form of secondary containment where product from a loss of

containment is temporarily collected at a convenient, safe location. See secondary
containment and loss of containment.
incandescence: self-heating. See pyrophoric scale.
incident preplan: a high-level plan setting out emergency preparedness arrangements for
major fire incidents. It is developed by pre-planning and supported by a series of pre-fire
plans. See pre-planning and pre-fire plan.
incipient detection: Fire detection designed to give the earliest possible warning of a fire
and generate a fire alarm, by sensing minute quantities of smoke or combustion gases such
as CO and CO2 in the early stages of a fire. See fire detection, fire alarm and smoke detection.
individual risk: risk to personnel. See risk and societal risk.
inflammable: see flammable.
infrared (IR) gas detector: Flammable gas detector designed to work on the principle that
gases absorb infrared energy at certain wavelengths. See gas detector.
inherently fire resistant [PPE]: materials used in certain types of PPE that offer fire
resistance without modification of their normal physical properties. See personal protective
equipment (PPE) and fire resistant treated [PPE].
installation layout: the optimum layout and general design of a petroleum refinery or
bulk storage installation with respect to fire safety, operational efficiency and environmental
protection.
interceptor: see oil/water separator.
208
intermediate bulk container (IBC): usually a high-density cross-linked polyethylene

container, with typical volume 1 000 l, used for storage of liquids, including flammable liquids
and fire-fighting foam. They usually have a valve or tap at the base.
IP: formerly The Institute of Petroleum; the successor body being the Energy Institute. The
term is used for numbered publications, e.g. IP 34, and for classifying petroleum and its
products. See classification of petroleum.
isolation: means to reduce the amount of fuel involved in a loss of containment, such as by
plant isolation or depressurisation. This will reduce the likelihood of a large fire but will also
reduce fire duration and consequences in the event of ignition. See loss of containment.
jet fire: a stable jet of flame produced on ignition of a high velocity loss of containment,
usually pressurised gas or flammable liquid spray. See loss of containment.
l/min./m2: units of litres per minute, per square metre are typically used for water and foam
application rates. See application rate [water] and application rate [foam].
large atmospheric storage tank fires (LASTFIRE) project: a joint petroleum industry
project examining the fire risks associated with large diameter atmospheric petroleum
storage tanks.
linear heat detection (LHD): electrical, pneumatic or optical heat detection cabling designed
to initiate a fire alarm when sensing heat from fires. See heat detection and fire alarm.
liquefied natural gas (LNG): liquid form of natural gas, consisting primarily of methane,
with low concentrations of other hydrocarbons and water, CO2, nitrogen, oxygen and sulfur.
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG): light hydrocarbons, which at normal atmospheric

temperature and pressure exist as gases, but which are readily liquefied by the application
of moderate pressure. They may be stored and handled as liquids under pressure at ambient
temperature or as refrigerated liquids at substantially atmospheric pressure. The term LPG
includes commercial butane, commercial propane and their mixtures.
loss of containment (synonymous with release): loss of product, usually in the form of a
gas, liquid, mist or spray, from a process vessel, pipework, storage, bund, etc. See bund.
lower explosive limit (LEL): see lower flammable limit (LFL).
lower flammable limit (LFL) (synonymous with lower explosive limit (LEL)): the lowest
concentration of flammable gas or vapour in air at atmospheric pressure capable of being
ignited, expressed as percentage by volume. The term LFL is preferred to LEL. See flammable,
flammable limits and upper flammable limit (UFL).
major accident prevention policy (MAPP): documentation, usually required by a CA

under the COMAH Regulations to demonstrate hazard identification, operational controls,
emergency planning and other organisational arrangements such as monitoring and
assessment are in place at certain smaller petroleum installations. At larger installations, a
safety report may be needed. See competent authority (CA) and safety report.
mobile fire-fighting equipment: fire-fighting equipment generally larger than portable

fire-fighting equipment but which is nevertheless designed for effective deployment by small
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numbers of ERs at a fire incident. It typically includes mobile foam units or medium sized
monitors. See portable fire-fighting equipment, emergency responder (ER) and monitor.
major incident response unit (MIRU): ‘packages’ incorporating mobile or containerised

fire pumps, large diameter hose and large throughput monitors as well as associated
adaptors, proportioners, foam supplies and logistics. Such a package may be considered
either to supplement existing fire water systems and foam/water delivery devices or as a
response system in its own right.
monitor: a portable, mobile or fixed cannon designed to project water, foam, or both, for fire
protection purposes. See portable fire-fighting equipment, mobile fire-fighting equipment,
fixed system and foam.
non-hazardous area: a three-dimensional space in which a flammable atmosphere is not

expected to be present so that special precautions are not required with potential sources
of ignition within it, such as electrical and non-electrical apparatus or hot work. Note, in
this context the term does not refer to the possibility of that atmosphere also being toxic,
oxygen deficient or radioactive. A non-hazardous area may be part of a wider source of
ignition control area. See flammable atmosphere, source of ignition, hot work, hazardous
area, toxicity and source of ignition control area.
occupational fire brigade: a fire response group, which unlike the FRS is not funded by a
statutory fire authority. It exists to save life and protect property from fire or other emergency
in locations owned, managed or occupied by the sponsor. It may be employed by the sponsor
or contracted from an external competent organisation. It may operate as a full- or part-time
(auxiliary) petroleum fire brigade or a more limited service ERT. See Fire and Rescue Service
(FRS), petroleum fire brigade and emergency response team (ERT).
oil/water separator (synonymous with interceptor): an installation to remove petroleum

and its products from oily water effluent.
open-path gas detector: gas detector designed to indicate a potentially flammable

atmosphere by monitoring large open areas for flammable gases. See gas detector, flammable
atmosphere and point gas detector.
passive fire protection (PFP): fire protection systems designed to reduce vulnerability to fire
and heat by treating process plant, structures or vessels (or within buildings) with materials
that limit temperature and prevent excessive heat absorption. See active fire protection (AFP).
perfluorooctane sulfonates (PFOS): substances used in some AFFFs whose usage may be
restricted by emerging legislative and regulatory moves.
perimeter monitoring: open-path gas detectors used, for example, around a liquefied gas
storage area, to supplement point gas detectors. See gas detector, open-path gas detector
and point gas detector.
permit-to-work (PTW): a document (whether paper or electronic) issued by an authorised

person or persons permitting specific work to be carried out in a defined area during a stated
period of time, provided that specified safety precautions are taken.
personal protective equipment (PPE): clothing, head protection, footwear, etc. designed
to offer protection against toxic substances, fire and other potential hazards, provided, where
required by a task risk assessment, to employees by employers to prevent or reduce exposure.
210
See toxicity, inherently fire resistant [PPE], fire resistant treated [PPE] and turnout gear.
petroleum class: see classification of petroleum.
petroleum fire brigade: an occupational fire brigade with specialist petroleum fire-fighting
capability. Its service capability is more than an ERT. See occupational fire brigade and
emergency response team (ERT).
petroleum substance: a substance extracted with, or derived from, crude oil, e.g. by
refining.
point gas detector: flammable gas detector designed to indicate a potentially flammable
atmosphere at a specific plant location. See gas detector, flammable atmosphere, open-path
gas detector and perimeter monitoring.
pool fire: a fire involving flammable liquid with very little or no initial momentum, usually a
result of an ignited loss of containment of petroleum, which is either contained or lies in a
static pool.
portable fire-fighting equipment: fire-fighting equipment designed for simple, effective

operation by one or two persons, such as a fire extinguisher, portable monitor, foam hose line
etc. See mobile fire-fighting equipment and monitor.
pre-fire plan: plans for fire response developed for credible scenarios in support of a high-
level incident preplan. They are supported by ERPs. See credible scenario, incident preplan
and emergency response plan (ERP).
pre-planning: the process of demonstrating emergency preparedness by developing,

maintaining and exercising incident preplans for major fire incidents. See incident preplan.
primary containment: equipment and facilities having direct contact with petroleum and
its products (e.g. storage vessels, pipework, valves, pumps and associated management and
control systems), and their operation and management to prevent loss of containment, such
as high-level alarms linked and associated shut down systems. See loss of containment and
secondary containment.
pyrophoric scale, deposits or material: usually finely divided ferrous sulfide formed inside
a tank, pipeline or equipment, in the presence of mercaptans or H2S, but oxygen-depleted. It
is capable of incandescence when its temperature or the surrounding oxygen concentration
is increased. See incandescence.
qualitative risk assessment: non-numerical methods of qualifying risk. See risk and fire
scenario analysis.
quantified risk assessment (QRA): numerical methods of quantifying risk. See risk and fire
scenario analysis.
quick attack truck: see rapid intervention vehicle (RIV).
rapid intervention vehicle (RIV) (synonymous with quick attack truck): fire response
vehicles used to provide a speedy response to spill fires or developing fire situations. They
incorporate single or dual agent application equipment (e.g. foam/dry powder), which in
some cases may be relatively high output of agent, designed to offer rapid knockdown of
fires. Such equipment often has a low requirement for personnel, can be deployed easily
211
and may offer significant benefits over traditional fire-fighting methods that require manual
connection to fixed fire water systems, and utilising potentially heavy and cumbersome foam
equipment or portable units.
release: see loss of containment.
risk: product of likelihood and consequences of human injury or adverse health, damage to
property, business interruption or environmental impact from a hazard. See hazard, individual
risk, societal risk and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
risk reduction measure/option: methods of reducing fire risk such as fire prevention
measures, fire and heat detection, PFP and AFP systems and incident response. Cost-effective
risk reduction options can be selected depending on the results of a fire scenario analysis
and a CBA. See risk, fire detection, heat detection, passive fire protection (PFP), active fire
protection (AFP), fire scenario analysis and cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
safety instrumented function (SIF): Safety function with a specified safety integrity level
which is necessary to achieve functional safety. See safety integrity level (SIL).
safety integrity level (SIL): Discrete level (one out of a possible four), corresponding to a
range of safety integrity values, where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety
integrity, whereas level 1 has the lowest safety integrity. See safety instrumented function
(SIF).
safety report: documentation, usually required by a CA to demonstrate compliance with,

and implementation of FEHM policy and other safety related requirements (e.g. under the
COMAH Regulations) at larger petroleum installations. At smaller installations, a MAPP
may suffice. See competent authority (CA), fire and explosion hazard management (FEHM),
COMAH and major accident prevention policy (MAPP).
scenario analysis tools: methods such as HAZID, HAZOP, fault tree analysis etc. that can
be used to assist in fire scenario analysis. See qualitative risk assessment, quantified risk
assessment (QRA) and fire scenario analysis.
scenario worksheet: documentation used as part of fire scenario analysis to qualify risk,
existing and potential fire risk reduction measures and incident response. They are usually
supplemented by calculation sheets for determination of FEHM resources and can form an
auditable trail for inclusion in a safety report. See fire scenario analysis, risk, risk reduction
measures, fire and explosion hazard management (FEHM) and safety report.
secondary containment: contingency measures that minimise the consequences of a loss

of containment from the primary containment system by preventing the uncontrolled spread
of the hazardous liquid. The measures should also contain fire-fighting media applied during
an emergency. The measures are equipment that are external to and independent of the
primary containment system and may be in the form of a bund and bund walls, lagoon,
diversionary walls or ditches to direct flow to a dispersion or impounding basin, or a drip tray.
See loss of containment, primary containment, bund, bund walls, impounding basin, fire-
fighting media and tertiary containment.
self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA): BA that relies on air supplied by a single or

double compressed air cylinder. It is the preferred type of BA for fire-fighting and rescue. See
breathing apparatus (BA).
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semi-fixed system: a fixed fire protection system that requires some personnel intervention
(e.g. the connection of foam lines to a foam inlet connection on a petroleum storage tank
foam system) in order to function correctly. See fixed system.
semi-subsurface foam system: a foam system for storage tanks in which foam is injected
into the tank from the base through a special hose. It is usually used for tanks containing
water soluble products. See foam.
Seveso II Directive: European Communities Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996

on the Control of Major-Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances, as amended.
See Seveson III Directive.
Seveso III Directive: Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances,
amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC. See Seveso II Directive.
smoke detection: fire detection designed to warn of smouldering or flaming fires capable
of generating smoke in their incipient or developing stages, and generate a fire alarm. See
fire detection, incipient detection and fire alarm.
societal risk: risk to population groups as a whole. See risk and individual risk.
source of ignition (synonymous with ignition source): accessible source of heat or energy,
electrical or non-electrical, capable of igniting a flammable atmosphere. See flammable
atmosphere and hot work.
source of ignition control area (synonymous with ignition source control area): see a
general area that may contain several hazardous areas and some non-hazardous areas in
which hot work is controlled by a PTW. See hazardous area, non-hazardous area, hot work
and permit-to-work (PTW).
spontaneous ignition temperature: See ignition temperature.
sprinkler system: fixed multiple nozzle spray systems to enable water to be applied, for
either cooling purposes or fire containment. They may be fitted with automatic activation
systems. See foam sprinkler/spray system.
static electricity: the build-up of an electrical difference of potential or charge, through

friction of dissimilar materials. See earthing.
subsurface foam system: a foam system for storage tanks in which foam is injected into
the tank from the base. The foam travels upwards through the product to form a vapour-
suppressing blanket over the entire surface. See foam.
tertiary containment: contingency measures that minimise the consequences of a loss

of containment from the primary and secondary containment systems by preventing the
uncontrolled spread of hazardous liquid. The measures should also contain fire-fighting
media applied during an emergency. The measures are achieved by means external to and
independent of the primary and secondary containment systems, such as installation drainage
and sumps, diversion tanks, impervious liners and/or flexible booms. Tertiary containment
should be utilised when there is an event such as bund joint failure or fire water overflowing
from a bund during a prolonged tank fire. See loss of containment, primary containment,
213
secondary containment, bund, bund walls, impounding basin, fire-fighting media and
secondary containment.
thermal flux: the level of heat (thermal) radiation emitted by a fire. This has the potential to
cause damage to plant and equipment or injury to personnel.
toxicity: the capacity of substances to induce adverse health on reaching a susceptible site or
sites on or within the human body or another receptor (including environmental receptors).
Acute toxicity refers to effects occurring within a short period of time following exposure,
whereas chronic toxicity refers to effects occurring after prolonged or repeated exposures.
turnout gear: ER PPE for fires comprising:

- fire helmet with visor;
- fire coat;
- fire trousers;
- fire boots;
- fire gloves;
- SCBA.
See personal protective equipment (PPE), self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), fire
resistant treated [PPE] and inherently fire resistant [PPE].
unignited gas release: a loss of containment of petroleum and its products in the gaseous
state which is close to, or has formed, a flammable atmosphere, but has not ignited and has
the potential to cause a VCE. See loss of containment, flammable atmosphere and vapour
cloud explosion (VCE).
upper explosive limit (UEL): see upper flammable limit (UFL).
upper flammable limit (UFL) (synonymous with upper explosive limit (UEL)): the highest
concentration of flammable gas or vapour in air at atmospheric pressure capable of being
ignited, expressed as percentage by volume. The term UFL is preferred to UEL. See flammable,
flammable limits and lower flammable limit (LFL).
vapour cloud explosion (VCE): an explosion resulting from the ignition of an unconfined
or partially confined vapour cloud within its flammable limits. See flammable limits.
water mist system: a fire protection system producing very fine water droplets – most fewer
than 400 µm diameter. It controls and extinguishes fires by wetting combustible materials,
cooling, and to a certain extent, excluding oxygen. Minimal amounts of water are used in this
type of system, but it should be highly engineered to be effective.
water spray system: a fire protection system consisting of fixed nozzles (designed to
discharge water over plant or equipment) for the purposes of cooling against thermal flux,
or, in some cases, for fire control. See thermal flux.
H.3 ABBREVIATIONS
ADR European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous

Goods by Road.
AFFF aqueous film forming foam.
AFP active fire protection.
AHJ authority having jurisdiction.
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable.
214
AR [foam] alcohol resistant [foam].

AST above-ground storage tank.
ATEX explosive atmospheres [directives] (atmosphere explosiv).
BA breathing apparatus.
BAT best available technology.
BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.
BOD biochemical oxygen demand.
CA competent authority.
CB controlled burn.
CBA cost benefit analysis.
CCTV closed circuit television.
CFD computational fluid dynamics.
CO carbon monoxide.
CO2 carbon dioxide.
COMAH
[Regulations] Control of Major Accident Hazards [Regulations].
DRA Dynamic Risk Assessment
DSEAR Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations.
EA Environment Agency.
EDP electronic data processing.
EHSR essential health and safety requirements.
EN European norm.
ER emergency responder.
EPR The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations (EPR) 2010
ERP emergency response plan.
ERT emergency response team.
ESD emergency shutdown.
FEHM fire and explosion hazard management.
FFFP [foam] film forming fluoroprotein [foam].
FIC fluoroiodocarbon.
FK fluoroketone.
FP [foam] fluoroprotein [foam].
FRS Fire and Rescue Service.
FSA Fire (Scotland) Act.
FSIA fire systems integrity assurance.
HASWA Health and Safety at Work etc. Act.
HAZAN hazard analysis [study].
HAZID hazard identification [study].
HAZOP hazard and operability [study].
HCFC hydrochlorofluorocarbon.
HF hydrogen fluoride.
HFC hydrofluorocarbon.
HSE Health and Safety Executive.
HVAC heating, ventilation and air conditioning.
H2S hydrogen sulfide.
ICS incident command system.
IBC intermediate bulk container.
IED Industrial Emissions Directive.
IR infrared.
ISGOTT International safety guide for oil tankers and terminals. (ICS/OCIMF/IAPH
publication)
JOIFF Joint Oil and Industry Fire Forum.
215
KPI key performance indicator.

l/min. litres per minute.
l/min./m2 litres per minute, per square metre.
LASTFIRE
[project] large atmospheric storage tank fires [project].
LFL lower flammable limit.
LHD linear heat detection.
LNG liquefied natural gas.
LPG liquefied petroleum gas.
MAPP major accident prevention policy.
MCC motor control centre.
MEK methyl ethyl ketone.
MP [foam or
powder] multi-purpose [foam or powder].
NIEA Northern Ireland Environment Agency.
NOS national occupational standards.
PDA pre-determined attendance.
PERC powered emergency release coupling.
PFOS perfluorooctane sulfonate.
PFC perfluorocarbon.
PFP passive fire protection.
PPE personal protective equipment.
PPM pre-planned maintenance.
PRV pressure relief valve.
P/V pressure vacuum [control valve].
PTO power take off.
PTW permit-to-work.
PUWER The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations.
QRA quantified risk assessment.
RID Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods
by Rail.
RIV rapid intervention vehicle.
RRO Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order.
R2P2 Reducing risks, protecting people - HSE’s decision-making process (HSE
publication)
RVP Reid vapour pressure.
SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus.
SD [foam] synthetic detergent [foam]. See Syndet.
SEPA Scottish Environment Protection Agency.
SHEMS safety, health and environment management system.
SIF safety instrumented function.
SIL safety integrity level.
Syndet
[foam] synthetic detergent [foam]. See SD.
TifALARP tolerable if as low as reasonably practicable.
TNO Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk
Onderzoek (Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research)
UFL upper flammable limit.
UV ultraviolet.
VCE vapour cloud explosion.
216
ANNEX I
REFERENCES, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER INFORMATION
I.1 INTRODUCTION
The information provided in this annex is divided into: references to publications that are
referred to herein; bibliographies that provide listings of further publications not specifically
referred to herein; and other information sources such as Internet sites. All were current at
the time of writing. Users should consult the pertinent organisations for details of the latest
versions of publications. To assist, Internet addresses are provided.
Generally, in terms of the provision of risk reduction measures, once it is decided
to implement a certain measure, a great deal of information is available; some is general in
nature, whereas others address specific FEHM issues. To assist users, key publishers of FEHM
publications are summarised in I.2.
Regulators may recognise some publications as providing a benchmark of good
practice, which if complied with should contribute to the demonstration of regulatory
compliance.
I.2 KEY PUBLISHERS OF FEHM PUBLICATIONS
The most relevant, internationally recognised FEHM publications (e.g. codes of practice,
design standards, specifications, guidance, etc.) pertinent to this publication are published
by the following European-based organisations:
−− Chemical Industries Association (CIA);
−− Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA);
−− Environment agencies (EA/SEPA/NIEA);
−− Fire Protection Association (FPA);
−− Health and Safety Executive (HSE);
−− Her Majesty’s Fire Service Inspectorate (HMFSI);
−− International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP);
−− IP and EI (published by Energy Institute (EI));
−− LASTFIRE. (Published by Resource Protection International on behalf of the LASTFIRE
Group)
The following non-European-based organisations are internationally recognised and offer a

wealth of publications on FEHM issues:
−− American Petroleum Institute (API);

−− ASME;
−− National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).
In addition, many standards organisations such as the British Standards Institution (BSI),
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the International Standards Organisation
(ISO) publish specific standards and specifications. The approach with such standards is
to refer to international standards (e.g. ISO or IEC), then regional standards (e.g. CEN or
CENELEC), then national standards (e.g. BSI). Users should refer to the pertinent national
version published for the appropriate country.
In the UK, the HSE publishes ACoPs and guidance to advise operating companies on
health and safety issues in support of legislation.
Lists of the most useful publications from these and other organisations are given in
section I.3.
217
I.3 CODES OF PRACTICE, DESIGN STANDARDS, SPECIFICATIONS, GUIDANCE, ETC.
I.3.1 European
Additives Technical Committee (ATC)

www.atc-europe.org
References
−− ATC Document 86: Fuel additive packages containing 2 ethylhexyl nitrate (2EHN):
Best practices manual
BP (published by IChemE)
www.icheme.org
References
−− Process safety series: The hazards of nitrogen and catalyst handling
British Standards Institution (BSI)

shop.bsigroup.com
Note: European and international standards adopted by BSI are not included in this listing: see CEN,
IEC and ISO listings
References
−− BS 476: Fire tests on building materials and structures (in several parts)
−− BS 2654: Specification for manufacture of vertical steel welded non-refrigerated
storage tanks with butt-welded shells for the petroleum industry
−− BS 5306: Fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises
- Part 4: Specification for carbon dioxide systems
- Part 6: Foam systems (in two parts)
−− BS 5839: Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings
- Part 1: Code of practice for system design, installation, commissioning and
maintenance
−− BS 6266: Code of practice for fire protection for electronic equipment installations
Bibliography
−− BS 2000: Methods of test for petroleum and its products (in several parts)
−− BS 2050: Specification for electrical resistance of conducting and antistatic products
made from flexible polymeric material (obsolescent - partially replaced by ISO 2878)
−− BS 2594: Specification for carbon steel welded horizontal cylindrical storage tanks
(superseded by EN 12285-1, EN 12285-2)
−− BS 3492: Specification for road and rail tanker hose assemblies for petroleum
products, including aviation products
−− BS 5041: Fire hydrant systems equipment
- Part 1: Specification for landing valves for wet risers
- Part 2: Specification for landing valves for dry risers
- Part 3: Specification for inlet breachings for dry riser inlets
- Part 4: Specification for boxes for landing valves for dry risers
- Part 5: Specification for boxes for foam inlets and dry riser inlets
−− BS 5306: Fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises
- Part 0: Guide for the selection of installed systems and other fire equipment
- Part 1: Code of practice for fire extinguishing installations and equipment on
premises. Hose reels and foam inlets
218
- Part 2: Specification for sprinkler systems

- Part 3: Commissioning and maintenance of portable fire extinguishers. Code
of practice
- Part 8: Selection and installation of portable fire extinguishers
−− BS 5499: Graphical symbols and signs. Safety signs, including fire safety signs.
Specification for geometric shapes, colours and layout (in several parts)
−− BS 5970: Code of practice for thermal insulation of pipework and equipment (in the
temperature range -100 oC to +870 oC)
−− BS 6150: Code of practice for painting of buildings
−− BS 7430: Code of practice for earthing
−− BS 7777: Flat-bottomed, vertical, cylindrical storage tanks for low temperature
service (in several parts)
−− BS 7944: Type 1 heavy duty fire blankets and type 2 heavy-duty heat protective
blankets
−− PD CLC/TR 50404: Electrostatics. Code of practice for the avoidance of hazards due
to static electricity
Chemical Industries Association (CIA)

www.cia.org.uk
References
−− Guidance for the location and design of occupied buildings on chemical manufacturing
sites
Bibliography
−− Risk – Its assessment, control and management
−− Warehouse fire safety – Guidance on chemical warehouse fire safety: Key questions
for managers concerned with the protection of warehouses against fire
COMAH CA
www.environment-agency.gov.uk
References
— COMAH Competent Authority policy on containment of bulk hazardous liquids at
COMAH establishments (‘Containment policy’)
Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN)

www.cen.eu
References
−− EN 2: Classification of fires
−− EN 3: Portable fire extinguishers (in several parts)
- Part 7: Characteristics, performance requirements and test methods
−− EN 54: Fire detection and fire alarm systems (in several parts)
−− EN 137: Respiratory protective devices: Self-contained open-circuit compressed air
breathing apparatus with full face mask. Requirements, testing, marking
−− EN 12845: Fixed firefighting systems. Automatic sprinkler systems. Design, installation
and maintenance
−− EN 13565-2: Fixed firefighting systems. Foam systems. Design, construction and
maintenance
−− EN 14015: Specification for the design and manufacture of site built, vertical,
cylindrical, flat-bottomed, above ground, welded, steel tanks for the storage of
liquids at ambient temperature and above
219
Bibliography
−− EN 340: Protective clothing. General requirements
−− EN 420: Protective gloves. General requirements and test methods
−− EN 469:. Protective clothing for firefighters. Performance requirements for protective
clothing for firefighting
−− EN 531: Protective clothing for workers exposed to heat
−− EN 659: Protective gloves for firefighters
−− EN 1127-1: Explosive atmospheres. Explosion prevention and protection. Basic
concepts and methodology
−− EN 1474-1: Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas. Design and testing
of marine transfer systems. Design and testing of transfer arms
−− EN 1532: Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas. Ship to shore interface.
(Usurped by ISO 28460)
−− EN 1869: Fire blankets
−− EN 12266: Industrial valves. Testing of metallic valves (in two parts)
−− EN 12285-1: Workshop fabricated steel tanks. Horizontal cylindrical single skin and
double skin tanks for the underground storage of flammable and non-flammable
water polluting liquids
−− EN 12285-2: Workshop fabricated steel tanks. Horizontal cylindrical single skin and
double skin tanks for the aboveground storage of flammable and non-flammable
water polluting liquids
−− EN 12416-2: Fixed fire fighting systems. Powder systems. Design, construction and
maintenance
−− EN 14605: Protective clothing against liquid chemicals. Performance requirements
for clothing with liquid-tight (Type 3) or spray-tight (Type 4) connections, including
items providing protection to parts of the body only (types PB [3] and PB [4])
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)/Environment agencies

(EA/SEPA/NIEA)
www.communities.gov.uk
Bibliography
−− Fire and rescue manual – Volume 2: Fire service operations – Environmental protection.
Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA)

www.ciria.org
References
−− Report 164: Design of containment systems for the prevention of water pollution
from industrial incidents
Construction Industry Research and Information Association/Environment Agency

(CIRIA/EA)
Bibliography
−− Concrete bunds for oil storage tanks
−− Masonry bunds for oil storage tanks
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)

www.communities.gov.uk
References
−− Building Regulations Approved Document B – Fire safety
220
Energy Institute (EI)

www.energypublishing.org
Model code of safe practice:
References
−− Part 1: The selection, installation, inspection, and maintenance of electrical and non
electrical apparatus in hazardous areas
−− Part 15: Area classification code for installations handling flammable fluids
−− Part 21: Guidelines for the control of hazards arising from static electricity
Bibliography
−− Part 2: Design, construction and operation of petroleum distribution installations
−− Part 9: Liquefied petroleum gas. Vol.1 Large bulk pressure storage and refrigerated
LPG
Other publications:
References
−− Guidance for the storage and handling of fuel grade ethanol at petroleum distribution
installations
−− Guidelines for the design and protection of pressure systems to withstand severe fires
Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA)

www.eemua.co.uk
Bibliography
−− 147: Recommendations for the design and construction of refrigerated liquefied gas
storage tanks
−− 155: Standard test method for comparative performance of flammable gas detectors
against poisoning
−− 159: Users’ guide to the inspection, maintenance and repair of above ground vertical
cylindrical steel storage tanks
−− 180: Guide for designers and users on frangible roof joints for fixed roof storage
tanks
−− 181: A guide to risk based assessments of in-situ large EX 'e' and EX 'N' machines
−− 186: A practitioner's handbook - Electrical installation and maintenance in potentially
explosive atmospheres
−− 190: Guide for the design, construction and use of mounded horizontal cylindrical
steel vessels for pressurised storage of LPG at ambient temperatures
−− 191: Alarm systems – A guide to design, management and procurement
−− 193: EEMUA Recommendations for the training, development and competency
assessment of inspection personnel
Environment agencies (EA/SEPA/NIEA)

Pollution prevention guidance notes:

http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/ppg
References
−− PPG 18: Managing fire water and major spillages
−− PPG 21: Incident response planning
−− PPG 28: Controlled burn
221
Bibliography
−− PPG 02: Above-ground oil storage tanks
−− PPG 03: Use and design of oil separators in surface water drainage systems
−− PPG 27: Installation, decommissioning and removal of underground storage tanks
Environment Agency (EA)

References
−− Environmental impact of controlled burns, EA Technical report P2-081
European Communities (EC)

europa.eu/index_en.htm
Directives:
References
−− Approximation of the Laws of Member States concerning Equipment and Protective
Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres 94/9/EC, OJ L 100,
19.4.1994 (‘ATEX Equipment Directive’)
−− Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the Introduction of Measures to
Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health of Workers at Work, OJ L 183,
29.6.1989, pp 1–8 (‘Framework Directive’)
−− Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the Protection of the Health and Safety
of Workers from the Risks related to Chemical Agents at Work, OJ L 131, 5.5.1998,
pp 11–23 (‘Chemical Agents Directive’)
−− Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October
2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ
L 327, PP. 1 – 73, 22/12/2000 (‘Water Framework Directive’)
−− Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 December 2003 amending Council Directive 96/82/EC on the Control of Major-
Accident Hazards involving Dangerous Substances, OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, pp 97–105
−− Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April
2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of
environmental damage, OJ L 143/56, 21 April 2004 (‘Environmental Damage
Directive’)
−− Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning
integrated pollution prevention and control (‘Integrated Pollution Prevention Control
(IPPC) Directive’), O.J. L 24, 29.1.2008, pp. 8 - 29
−− Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (‘Industrial
Emissions Directive (IED)’), O.J. L 334, 17.12.2010, pp 17 - 119
−− Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012
on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending
and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, O.J. L 197, 24.7.2012,
pp. 1 - 37 (‘Seveso III Directive’)
−− Directive 99/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December
1999 on Minimum Requirements for Improving the Safety and Health of Workers
Potentially at Risk from Explosive Atmospheres (15th individual Directive within the
meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L 23, 28.1.2001, pp 57-64
(‘ATEX Workplace Directive’)
−− European Communities Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the
222
Control of Major-Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances, OJ L 10,

14.1.1997, pp. 13–33 (‘Seveso II Directive’)
−− European Parliament and Council Directive 94/63/EC of 20 December 1994 on the
Control of Volatile Organic Compound Emissions Resulting from the Storage of
Petrol and its Distribution from Terminals to Service Stations). OJ L 365, 31.12.1994
pp. 24-33
Internet sites:
References
−− Guidelines on the application of Directive 94/9/EC of 23 March 1994 on the
Approximation of the Laws of the Member States concerning Equipment and
Protective Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres (‘ATEX
guidelines’) ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/mechanical/documents/guidance/atex/
application/index_en.htm
Fire Industry Association (FIA)
www.fia.uk.com
References
−− Code of practice: design, installation, commissioning & maintenance of aspirating
smoke detectors
−− Guidance on the use of high and regular hazard concentrations for enclosures
protected by gaseous fire fighting systems
Fire Protection Association (FPA)

www.thefpa.co.uk
Bibliography
The FPA offers a wide selection of publications, guidance and design standards relating to fire
protection in buildings and the process industries
Health and Safety Executive (published by HSE Books)

books.hse.gov.uk
Guidance:
References
−− HSG 51: Storage of flammable liquids in containers
−− HSG 176: Storage of flammable liquids in tanks
−− HSG 250: Guidance on permit-to-work systems: A guide for the petroleum, chemical
and allied industries
−− HSG 253: The safe isolation of plant and equipment
−− HSG 254: Developing process safety indicators - A step-by-step guide for chemical
and major hazard industries
Bibliography
−− HSG 65: Successful health and safety management
−− HSG 71: Chemical warehousing – The storage of packaged dangerous substances
−− HSG 140: Safe use and handling of flammable liquids
−− HSG 158: Flame arresters – Preventing the spread of fires and explosions in equipment
223
that contains flammable gases and vapours

−− HSG 178: The spraying of flammable liquids
−− HSG 186: The bulk transfer of dangerous liquids and gases between ship and shore
−− HSG 190: Preparing safety reports: Control of Major Accidents Hazards Regulations
1999
−− HSG 191: Emergency planning for major accidents: Control of Major Accidents
Hazards Regulations 1999
−− HSG 228: CHIP for everyone
Internet sites:
References
−− Electricity in potentially explosive locations FAQs (www.hse.gov.uk/electricity/atex)
Legal (Approved codes of practice):
References
−− L134: Design of plant, equipment and workplaces. Dangerous Substances and
Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002. Approved code of practice and guidance
−− L135: Storage of dangerous substances. Dangerous Substances and Explosive
Atmospheres Regulations 2002. Approved code of practice and guidance
−− L136: Control and mitigation measures. Dangerous Substances and Explosive
Atmospheres Regulations 2002. Approved code of practice and guidance
−− L137: Safe maintenance, repair and cleaning procedures. Dangerous Substances and
Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002. Approved code of practice and guidance
−− L138: Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres. Approved code of practice
and guidance. Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002
Bibliography
−− L5: Control of Substances Hazardous to Health: The Control of Substances Hazardous
to Health Regulations 2002 (as amended). Approved code of practice and guidance
−− L111: A Guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as
amended). Guidance on regulations
Miscellaneous:
References
−− CHIS 2: Emergency isolation of process plant in the chemical industry
−− Offshore Information Sheet 12/2007 Advice on acceptance criteria for damaged
passive fire protection (PFP) coatings
−− Reducing risks, protecting people - HSE’s decision-making process (‘R2P2’)
−− Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites - Process Safety Leadership
Group Final report
Bibliography
−− INDG 136: COSHH: A brief guide to the regulations
−− INDG 254: Chemical reaction hazards and the risk of thermal runaway
Regulations:
Bibliography
−− HS(R)27: A guide to Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987
224
−− HS(R)29: Notification and marking of sites. The Dangerous Substances (Notification

and Marking of Sites) Regulations 1990: Guidance on regulations
Research reports:
References
−− OTI 92 606: Passive fire protection: Performance requirements and test methods
−− OTI 92 607: Availability and properties of passive and active fire protection systems
−− OTI 95 634: Jet fire resistance test of passive fire protection materials
−− RR025: Application of QRA in operational safety issues
Bibliography
−− CRR 137/1997: Efficacy of water spray protection against jet fires impinging on LPG
storage tanks
Semi-Permanent Circulars (SPCs):
References
−− Land use planning advice around large scale petrol storage sites (SPC/Technical/
General/43 http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/hid/spc/spctg43.htm)
Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL)

www.hsl.gov.uk
References
−− A review of leak detection for fuel storage sites (ECM/2008/08)
Her Majesty’s Fire Service Inspectorate (HMFSI) (published by The Stationery Office)
www.tso.co.uk
References
−− Dynamic management of risk at operational incidents
Bibliography
−− Breathing apparatus: Command and control procedures. Technical Bulletin 1/1997
Home Office (HO) (published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office)

www.legislation.gov.uk
Bibliography
−− Fire Prevention Note 1/70
−− Manual of firemanship. A survey of the science of fire-fighting. Book 2 Fire service
equipment
Home Office (HO) (published by The Stationery Office)

www.tso.co.uk
Bibliography
−− Manual of firemanship. A survey of the science of fire-fighting. Book 6 Breathing
apparatus and resuscitation
−− Manual of firemanship. A survey of the science of fire-fighting. Book 7 Hydraulics,
pumps and pump operation
225
−− Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1928: model code of principles of construction and

licensing conditions. Part 2 For distributing depots and major installation
Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IMechE)

www.imeche.org
Bibliography
−− Fire and explosions – Recent advances in modelling and analysis
−− International conference on management of fire and explosions, (8 - 9 December 1997,
IMechE, London, UK, 28 - 29 April 1998, UMIST Conference Centre, Manchester, UK)
−− Materials and design against fire (Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers)
Integrated Personal Development System (IPDS)

www.skillsforjustice-ipds.com
References
−− National occupational standards
Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF)

www.otif.org
References
−− Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail
(‘RID’) 2011
IP (published by Energy Institute)

www.energypublishing.org
Standard test methods:
References
−− IP 34: Determination of flash point – Pensky-Martens closed cup method (Technically
identical to BS 2000/34, BS EN ISO 2719)
−− IP 170: Determination of flash point – Abel closed cup method. (Technically identical
to BS 2000/170, BS EN ISO 13736)
Joint Oil and Industry Fire Forum (JOIFF)

www.joiff.com
References
−− International standards for competence
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek (TNO)

(Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research)
www.tno.nl
References
−− Multi-energy model
226
Research papers
References
−− Thyer et al (2002): Thyer, A.M., Hirst, I.L., Jagger, S.F., 2002, Bund overtopping – The
consequence of catastrophic tank failure, Journal of loss prevention in the process
industries – 15(5), pp 357 – 363 (2002).
RPI LASTFIRE
www.lastfire.co.uk
References
The large atmospheric storage tank fires (LASTFIRE) project is a joint petroleum industry
initiative to review the risks associated with large atmospheric storage tank fires. Over 20
major international petroleum companies have been involved. The LASTFIRE project has,
from a comprehensive and independent review of the risks associated with large storage
tanks and associated risk reduction options, provided a methodology by which operating
companies can select appropriate and justified measures to reduce fire related risk to ALARP
for storage installations. The project co-ordinators, Resource Protection International (RPI)
can offer the following project deliverables:
1. Incident frequency survey report
2. Risk reduction options review
3. Fire-fighting foam review
4. Risk workbook
5. Lightning study
6. Foam fire test specification for storage tank fires
Items 1-4 above are included in the main LASTFIRE Report, and a number of other deliverables
are available
The National Archives (NA)

www.legislation.gov.uk
References
−− Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (2004 c.36)
−− Control of Pollution (Oil Storage) (England) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/2954)
−− Environmental Damage (Pollution and Remediation) Regulations (SI 2009/153)
(‘Environmental Damage Regulations’)
−− Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (2004 c.21)
−− Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 (2005 asp5)
−− Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (1974 c37) (HASWA)
−− Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1928
−− Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000
(SI 2000/1973)
−− The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment
Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/568)
−− The Confined Spaces Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/1713)
−− The Control of Major Accident Hazards (Amendment) Regulations 2005
(SI 2005/1088)
−− The Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/743)
−− The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002
(SI 2002/2776)
−− The Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/37)
227
−− The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/675)
−− The Equipment and Protective Systems for use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres
−− The Equipment and Protective Systems for use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres
(Amendment) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/3766)
−− The Fire Precautions (Workplace) (Amendment) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/1877)
−− The Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations (SI 1997/1840)
−− The Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/894)
−− The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/3242)
−− The Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances (Amendment)
−− The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations (1998/2306)
−− The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005/SI 2005/1541)
−− The Special Waste Amendment (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (SSI 2004/204)
−− The Special Waste Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/972)
−− Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations
2003 (SI 2003/3242)
The Stationery Office (TSO)

www.tso.co.uk
Bibliography
−− Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations – Environmental protection
Underwriters Laboratories International (UK) Ltd (UL)

www.ul.com
References
−− UL 162: Standard for safety foam equipment and liquid concentrates
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)

www.unece.org
References
−− European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by
Road 2011 (‘ADR’) (ECE/TRANS/215, Vol. I and II)
I.3.2 Non-European
API
www.api.org
Publications:
Bibliography
−− Publ 2021: Guides for fighting fires in and around petroleum storage tanks
−− Publ 2026: Safe access/egress involving floating roofs of storage tanks in petroleum
service
−− Publ 2214: Spark ignition properties of hand tools
−− Publ 2216: Ignition risk of hydrocarbon vapours by hot surfaces in the open air
228
−− Publ 2218: Fireproofing practices in petroleum and petrochemical processing plants

−− Publ 2510A: Fire protection considerations for the design and operation of liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) storage facilities
Recommended practices:
References
−− RP 545 Lightning protection of aboveground storage tanks for flammable or
combustible liquids
−− RP 752: Management of hazards associated with location of process plant permanent
buildings
−− RP 753: Management of hazards associated with location of process plant portable
buildings
−− RP 2021: Management of atmospheric storage tank fires
−− RP 2030: Application of fixed water spray systems for fire protection in the petroleum
and petrochemical industries
Bibliography
−− RP 520: Sizing, selection and installation of pressure relieving devices in refineries –
Part 1 Sizing and selection
−− RP 521: Guide for pressure relieving and depressurising systems
−− RP 2001: Fire protection in refineries
−− RP 2003: Protection against ignitions arising out of static, lightning and stray currents
−− RP 2009: Safe welding, cutting and hot work practices in the petroleum and
petrochemical industries
−− RP 2027: Ignition hazards involved in abrasive blasting of atmospheric storage tanks
in hydrocarbon service
−− RP 2028: Flame arrestors in piping systems
−− RP 2201: Safe hot tapping practices in the petroleum and petrochemical industries
−− RP 2210: Flame arrestors for vents of tanks storing petroleum products
Other
Bibliography
−− PSD 2201: Welding or hot tapping on equipment containing flammables
Standards:
References
−− Std. 620: Design and construction of large, welded, low-pressure storage tanks
−− Std. 650: Welded steel tanks for oil storage
ASME
www.asme.org
Bibliography
−− Fire induced stresses in tanks containing liquefied gas. ASME Pressure Vessels and
Piping conference, June 1974
229
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP)

www.ogp.org.uk
References
−− Fire systems integrity assurance (Publication 304)
International Chamber of Shipping/ Oil Companies International Marine Forum/

International Association of Ports and Harbours (ICS/OCIMF/IAPH) (published by
Witherbys)
www.witherbypublishinggroup.com
References
−− International safety guide for oil tankers and terminals (ISGOTT)
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

www.iec.ch
References
−− IEC 50073: Guide for selection, installation, use and maintenance of apparatus for
the detection and measurement of combustible gases or oxygen (superseded by
EN 60079-29-2)
−− IEC 60079-29-1: Explosive atmospheres. Gas detectors. Performance requirements
of detectors for flammable gases. (Usurps IEC 61779 series)
−− EN 60079-29-2: Explosive atmospheres. Gas detectors. Selection, installation, use
and maintenance of detectors for flammable gases and oxygen. (Usurps IEC 50073)
−− EN 60079-29-4: Explosive atmospheres. Gas detectors. Performance requirements of
open path detectors for flammable gases. (Usurps IEC 50241 series)
−− IEC 61508 series: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
safety related systems.
−− IEC 61511 series: Functional safety. Safety instrumented systems for the process
industry sector
Bibliography
−− IEC 60079: Explosive atmospheres
- Part 1: Equipment protection by flameproof enclosures ‘d’
- Part 5: Equipment protection by powder filling ‘q’
- Part 6: Equipment protection by oil immersion 'o'. (Usurps IEC 50015)
- Part 11: Equipment protection by intrinsic safety 'i' (Usurps IEC 50020)
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)

www.iso.org
References
−− ISO 28460: Petroleum and natural gas industries. Installation and equipment for
liquefied natural gas. Ship-to-shore interface and port operations. (Usurps EN 1532)
−− ISO 14520 series: Gaseous fire-extinguishing systems
Bibliography
−− ISO 4126: Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure
- Part 1: Safety valves
−− ISO 12944 (series): Paints and varnishes. Corrosion protection of steel structures by
protective paint systems
230
−− ISO 20344: Personal protective equipment. Test methods for footwear

−− ISO 20345: Personal protective equipment. Safety footwear
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

www.nfpa.org
References
−− Fire protection guide to hazardous materials
−− NFPA 11: Standard for low-, medium-, and high-expansion foam
−− NFPA 12: Standard for carbon dioxide extinguishing systems
−− NFPA 13: Standard for Installation of sprinkler systems
−− NFPA 15: Standard for Water spray fixed systems for fire protection
−− NFPA 16: Standard for Installation of foam-water sprinkler and foam-water spray
systems
−− NFPA 17: Standard for dry chemical extinguishing systems
−− NFPA 72: National fire alarm and signaling code®
−− NFPA 75: Standard for the protection of information technology processing equipment
−− NFPA 600: Standard on industrial fire brigades
−− NFPA 750: Standard on water mist fire protection systems
−− NFPA 2001: Standard on clean agent fire-extinguishing systems
Bibliography
−− NFPA 10: Standard for portable fire extinguishers
−− NFPA 14: Standard for installation of standpipes and hose systems
−− NFPA 20: Standard for installation of stationary pumps for fire protection
−− NFPA 24: Standard for installation of private fire service mains and their appurtenances
−− NFPA 30: Flammable and combustible liquids code
−− NFPA 45: Standard on fire protection for laboratories using chemicals
−− NFPA 58: Liquefied petroleum gas code
−− NFPA 497: Recommended practice for the classification of flammable liquids, gases
or vapours and of hazardous (classified) locations for electrical installation in chemical
process areas
−− NFPA 780: Standard for the installation of lightning protection systems
−− NFPA 1971: Standard on protective ensembles for structural fire fighting and
proximity fire fighting
Underwriters Laboratories (UL)

www.ul.com
Bibliography
−− UL 1709: Rapid Rise Fire Tests of Protection Materials for Structural Steel
I.4 INDUSTRY ORGANISATIONS
Association for Specialist Fire Protection (ASFP)

Kingsley House, Ganders Business Park, Kingsley, Bordon, Hampshire, GU35 9LU
t: +44 (0) 1420 471612
f: +44 (0) 1420 471611
w: www.asfp.org.uk
231
British Safety Industry Federation (BSIF)

93 Bowen Court, St Asaph Business Park, Glascoed Road, St Asaph, Denbighshire, Clwyd,
LL17 0JE, UK
t: +44 (0) 1745 585600
w: www.bsif.co.uk
Chemical Industries Association (CIA)

Kings Buildings, Smith Square, London, SW1P 3JJ, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7834 3399
f: +44 (0) 20 7834 4469
w: www.cia.org.uk
Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA)

63 Mark Lane, London, EC3R 7NQ.
t: +44 (0) 20 7488 0801
f: +44 (0) 20 7488 3499
w: www.eemua.org
Energy Institute (EI)

61 New Cavendish Street, London W1G 7AR, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7467 7100
f: +44 (0) 20 7255 1472
w: www.energypublishing.org
European Process Safety Centre (EPSC)

165-189 Railway Terrace, Rugby, Warwickshire, CV21 3HQ, UK
t: +44 (0) 1788 534409
f: +44 (0) 1788 560833
w: www.epsc.org
Fire Industry Association (FIA)

Tudor House, Kingsway Business Park, Oldfield Road, Hampton, Middlesex, TW12 2HD, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 3166 5002
f: +44 (0) 20 8941 0972
w www.fia.uk.com
Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE)

Davis Building, 165-189 Railway Terrace, Rugby, Warwickshire, CV21 3HQ, UK
t: +44 (0) 1788 578214
f: +44 (0) 1788 560833
w: www.icheme.org
Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET)

Savoy Place, London WC2R 0BL, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7240 1871
f: +44 (0) 20 7240 7735
w: www.theiet.org
232
Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE)

London Road, Moreton in Marsh, Gloucestershire, GL56 0RH, UK
t: +44 (0) 1608 812 580
f: +44 (0) 1608 812 581
w: www.ife.org.uk
Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IMechE)

1 Birdcage Walk, London SW1H 9JJ, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7222 7899
f: +44 (0) 20 7222 4557
w: www.imeche.org
LASTFIRE Group
Project Coordinators, Resource Protection International, Walker House, George Street,
Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, HP20 2HU, UK
t: +44 (0) 1296 399311
f: +44 (0) 1296 395669
w: www.resprotint.co.uk
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)

27 Queen Anne's Gate, London, SW1H 9BU, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7654 1200
f: +44 (0) 20 7654 1205
w: www.ocimf.com
Society of International Gas Tankers and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)

17 St. Helen’s Place, London, EC3A 6DG, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7628 1124
f: +44 (0) 20 7628 3163
w: sigtto.re-invent.net
UKLPG
Camden House, Warwick Road, Kenilworth, Warwickshire, CV8 1TH, UK
w: www.uklpg.org
UK Petroleum Industry Association Limited (UKPIA)

Quality House, Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1HP, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7269 7600
w: www.ukpia.com
233
I.5 OTHER SAFETY ORGANISATIONS
Chemical Hazards Communication Society (CHCS)

P.O. Box 222, Lymington, Hampshire, SO42 7GY, UK
t: +44 (0) 844 636 2427
f: +44 (0) 844 636 2428
w: www.chcs.org.uk
European Fire and Safety Group (EFSG)

Secretariat c/o VdS Schadenverhütung GmbH (Ms Gabriele Späth), Amsterdamer Strasse
174, D-50735 Köln, Germany
t: + 49 221 7766 375
f: + 49 221 7766 377
w: www.efsg.org
Fire Protection Association (FPA)

London Road, Moreton in Marsh, Gloucestershire, GL56 0RH, UK
t: +44 (0) 1608 812 500
f: +44 (0) 1608 812 501
w: www.thefpa.co.uk
Fire Safety Engineering Group (FSEG)

University of Greenwich, Greenwich Maritime Campus, Old Royal Naval College, Queen
Mary Building, Greenwich, London, SE10 9LS, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 8331 8730
f: +44 (0) 20 8331 8925
w: fseg.gre.ac.uk
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

Redgrave Court, Merton Road, Bootle, Merseyside, L20 7HS, UK
w: www.hse.gov.uk
International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

4 Albert Embankment, London, SE1 7SR, UK
t: + 44 (0) 20 7735 7611
f: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
w: www.imo.org
Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH)

The Grange, Highfield Drive, Wigston, Leicestershire, LE18 1NN, UK
t: +44 (0) 116 257 3100
f: +44 (0) 116 257 3101
w: www.iosh.co.uk
234
Institute of Risk Management (IRM)

6 Lloyd’s Avenue, London, EC3N 3AX, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7709 9808
f: +44 (0) 20 7709 0716
w: www.theirm.org
International Institute of Risk and Safety Management (IIRSM)

Suite 7a, 77 Fulham Palace Road, London W6 8JA, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 8600 5538/9
f: +44 (0) 20 8741 1349
w: www.iirsm.org
Joint Oil and Industry Fire Forum (JOIFF)

JOIFF Secretariat, Fulcrum Consultants, P.O. Box 10346, Dublin 14, Ireland
t: +353 (0) 1 4137300
f: +353 (0) 1 4137301
w: www.joiff.com
I.6 STANDARDS AND APPROVALS ORGANISATIONS
British Standards Institution (BSI)

389 Chiswick High Road, London, W4 4AL, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 8996 9001
f: +44 (0) 20 8996 7001
w: www.bsi-global.com
Building Research Establishment (BRE)

Bucknalls Lane, Garston, Watford, Hertfordshire, WD25 9XX, UK
t: +44 (0) 1923 664000
w: www.bre.co.uk
Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN)

European Committee for Standardisation, Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
t: +32 2 550 08 11
f: +32 2 550 08 19
w: www.cen.eu
w: www.cenelec.org
Det Norske Veritas (DNV)

Palace House, 3 Cathedral Street, London, SE1 9DE, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7716 6543
w: www.dnv.co.uk/services/certification/
235
FM Global
FM Insurance Company Limited, 34 Lime Street, London, EC3M 7AT, UK
t: +44 (0) 20 7480 4000
f: +44 (0) 20 7488 2555
w: www.fmglobal.com
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

3, rue de Varembé, P.O. Box 131, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland
t: +41 22 919 02 11
w: www.iec.ch
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)

1, ch. de la Voie-Creuse, Case postale 56, CH-1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland
t: +41 22 749 01 11
f: +41 22 733 34 30
e. [email protected]
w: www.iso.org
Loss Prevention Certification Board (LPCB)

BRE Certification Ltd., Garston, Watford, Hertfordshire, WD25 9XX, UK
t: +44 (0)1923 664100
w: www.bre.co.uk
UL International (UK) Ltd (UL)

Wonersh House Building C, Old Portsmouth Road, Guildford, Surrey, GU3 1LR, UK
t: +44 (0) 1483 302 130
f: +44 (0) 1483 302 230
w: www.ul.com/uk
Loss Prevention Certification Board (LPCB)

BRE Certification Ltd., Garston, Watford, Hertfordshire, WD25 9XX, UK
t: +44 (0)1923 664100
w: www.bre.co.uk
UL International (UK) Ltd (UL)

Wonersh House Building C, Old Portsmouth Road, Guildford, Surrey, GU3 1LR, UK
t: +44 (0) 1483 302 130
f: +44 (0) 1483 302 230
w: www.ul.com/uk
236
Energy Institute This publication has been produced as a result of

61 New Cavendish Street work carried out within the Technical Team of the
London W1G 7AR, UK Energy Institute (EI), funded by the EI’s Technical
Partners. The EI’s Technical Work Programme
t: +44 (0) 20 7467 7100 provides industry with cost effective, value adding
f: +44 (0) 20 7255 1472 knowledge on key current and future issues
e: [email protected] affecting those operating in the energy sector,
www.energyinst.org both in the UK and beyond.
ISBN 978 0 85293 634 4
Registered Charity Number 1097899

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Model code of safe practice

Fire precautions at petroleum refineries

EI MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE PART 19:

For further information, please visit http://www.energyinst.org

Copyright © 2012 by the Energy Institute, London.

ISBN 978 0 85293 634 4

Published by the Energy Institute

Electronic access to EI and IP publications is available via our website, www.energypublishing.org

Key technical changes............................................................................................................... 10

2.6.2 Thermal flux - consequence assessment.................................................... 34

4.8.5 Fire-fighting access.................................................................................... 66

5Fire, liquid and flammable gas detection...................................................................... 71

7Response strategies and options................................................................................. 115

7.2.6 Controlled burn (CB)............................................................................... 122

8Maintaining FEHM policy.............................................................................................. 137

Annex B Fire-related hazards of petroleum and its products....................................... 152

Annex C Typical installations/areas - Fire and explosion hazard management .

C.8 Road tanker loading racks/gantries......................................................... 165

Annex D Typical application rates................................................................................... 166

Annex E Emergency response team competence.......................................................... 182

Annex F Classification of fires......................................................................................... 195

Annex G Example installation-specific emergency response plan (ERP)...................... 197

Annex H Glossaries of terms and abbreviations............................................................ 202

Annex I References, Bibliography and further information......................................... 217

−− Define key principles.

−− Provide guidance on fire water systems.

KEY TECHNICAL CHANGES

The key technical changes are to:

−− Define key principles.

David Athersmith Consultant (member, Distribution and Marketing Safety Committee)

David Athersmith Consultant

1. FEHM – EI 19 sets out a methodology by which installation operators can assess

2. Fire prevention – Emphasis is placed on prevention of fires in the first instance,

3. Incident detection – Ensuring that if a loss of containment or fire event occurs,

5 Maintaining FEHM policy – EI 19 covers many aspects of incident response,

Annex E provides an example ER competency profile based on four units: operations;

EI 19 provides guidance on selecting, implementing and monitoring the continuing

1.4 RISK-BASED FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD MANAGEMENT (FEHM)

−− Fire scenario analysis.

Evaluate alternative Equipment maintenance

Fire Review risk Define Implement

POSSIBLE INPUT TOOLS POSSIBLE INPUT TOOLS POSSIBLE INPUT TOOLS

Figure 1.1: FEHM process

1.5 LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN FEHM ASSESSMENT AND PROVISION OF FIRE RISK

1.6 INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION

1.7 RISK DRIVERS

1.7.2 Life safety

1.7.3 Environmental impacts

1.7.4 Asset loss

1.7.5 Business interruption

2.2 FIRE-RELATED PROPERTIES OF PETROLEUM AND ITS PRODUCTS

2.3 COMBUSTION OF PETROLEUM AND ITS PRODUCTS