GUIDANCE ON

Critical
Facilities

DISASTER
RECOVERY
Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project TOOLKIT
Citation
2015, Disaster Recovery Toolkit, Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project
www.adpc.net/tgllp/drt

The Disaster Recovery Toolkit comprises of the following:

1) Handbook for Disaster Recovery Practitioners
2) Training Manual – Learning Workshop on Recovery and Reconstruction
3) Guidance on Critical Facilities
4) Guidance on Housing
5) Guidance on Land Use Planning
6) Guidance on Livelihood

ISBN 978-1-942960-00-3

Copyright © Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) for

the Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project - Steering Committee, 2015

Published by the Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project Steering Committee

(TGLLP-SC)
Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Chair, TGLLP-SC
Mr. Satya S. Tripathi, Secretary, TGLLP-SC

This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and any form for educational
or non-profit purposes without special permissions from the copyright holder, provided
acknowledgement of the source is made, ADPC on behalf of TGLLP-SC would appreciate
receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publication as a source.

No use of this publication may be made for resale or for any other commercial purpose
whatsoever without prior permission in writing from the Asian Disaster Preparedness
Centre, SM Tower, 24th Floor 979/69 Paholyothin Road, Bangkok 10400 Thailand.
 GUIDANCE ON

Critical
Facilities

DISASTER
RECOVERY
Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project TOOLKIT
 FOREWORD

Ten years have passed since the Indian Ocean Earthquake

and Tsunami of December 2004. The consequences of this disaster have
continued to unfold in the minds of individuals, the collective lives of
affected families and communities, and within the framework of nations
and the region as a whole. Indeed, the memory of this great tragedy is
imprinted on the global mind. The loved ones of the more than 228,
000 people who perished look back on this disaster every day. For the
rest of us, the 10th anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on
the memory of these departed souls, and to think of those who were left
behind in devastated families, communities and environments.

The recovery of the affected areas in the months and years since the
event itself is an affirmation of human resilience and creativity in
building solutions- and finding ways out- of the most challenging
situations. It is out of respect to those who perished or suffered that we
should take what lessons we can from such experiences, and use them to
design better strategies for disaster response and recovery in the future.
With climate change proceeding apace, the notion of environmental
vulnerability is becoming increasingly broad and hard to pinpoint:
everybody is vulnerable, and because of this, our incentive to learn from
what came before should be heightened.

The Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project (TGLLP) was created with
a view to gathering, learning from and sharing experiences relating to
the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, and other disasters in the region that
occurred between 1993 and 2013. The project sought to deliver three
principle outcomes: a global lessons learned study, a Discovery Channel
documentary tracking the recovery, and a disaster recovery toolkit for
recovery practitioners.

2 Guidance on Critical Facilities

The first of these outcomes was a report entitled The Tsunami Legacy:
Innovations, Breakthroughs and Challenges which was officially released
on 24 April 2009 at a ceremony at the United Nations Headquarters in
New York. A few months later, in December 2009, a documentary on
lessons learned, produced independently, was aired on the Discovery
Channel.

At the launch of The Tsunami Legacy in 2009, an announcement

was made regarding the development of a suite of handbook and
guidance notes targeted specifically at recovery programme leaders and
practitioners. The Disaster Recovery Toolkit forms the third deliverable,
and it is this that has been developed by the Tsunami Global Lessons
Learned Project Steering Committee (TGLLP-SC) in partnership
with the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC). The ‘Toolkit’
is targeted at practitioners responsible for implementing recovery
programmes, its objective to provide a ‘how to’ guide on development,
implementing and managing complex post-disaster recovery
programmes.

This document, Guidance on Critical Facilities, has been framed as a

reference document to provide strategic guidance on incorporating
DRR measures in critical infrastructures during the post-disaster phase.
It also aims to accompany and enrich the handbook and the learning
workshop module with key considerations on ‘why and how’ to bring
DRR in recovery and reconstruction of critical facilities.

Introducing this guidance, the TGLLP Steering Committee hopes it will

enhance the capacities of government agencies, especially central level
agencies engaged in policy and strategy formulation for critical facilities
in recovery and reconstruction and supporting local level agencies.
The Steering Committee also hopes that the guidance will serve as a
reference tool for development partners who work alongside the above
agencies in land use planning in recovery and reconstruction.

- Steering Committee of The Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project

3
4 Guidance on Critical Facilities
CONTENT
FOREWORD 2
ABBREVIATIONS 6

INTRODUCTION 9
1 Background 10
2 Purpose of this Guidance 11
3 Structure of this Guidance 11
4 Target audience 11

CRITICAL FACILITIES 13
1 Impact of Disasters on Critical Facilities 15
2 Vulnerability of Critical Facilities 18

RATIONALE TO INTEGRATE DRR INTO CRITICAL FACILITIES R&R 23

1 Minimising Damage and Protecting Occupants 26
2 Minimising Service Disruption and Mitigating Cascading Failure 27
3 Promoting DRR and Safeguard Investment 27

KEY CONSIDERATIONS 29
1 Importance of DRR in Critical Infrastructure R&R 32
2 Utilising Damage Assessments and Risk Information 34
3 Minimising Exposure to Hazards 34
4 Incorporating Resiliency in Design 35
5 Incorporating non-structural Mitigation Measures 42
6 Enhancing Access to Critical Facilities 42

REFERENCES / ENDNOTES 44
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 45

5
 ABBREVIATIONS
AADMER ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency
Response
ADRM Aceh Disaster Risk Map
ARTF Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BMTPC Building Materials Technology Promotion Council
BRR NAD-Nias Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi NAD-Nias (Indonesia)
(Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias)
CBA Community Based-Assessment / Communication-based Assess-
ment
CBO Community-based Organization
CCA Climate Change Adaptation
CFAN Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias
CSO Civil Society Organization
CZMA CZM Authority
DAD Development Assistance Database
DALA Damage and Loss Assessment
DRMS Disaster Risk Management Strategy
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
DRR-A “Making Aceh Safer Through Disaster Risk Reduction in Develop-
ment”
ECHO European Commission for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ERRA Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (Pakistan)
GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GIS Geographic Information System
GoTN Government of Tamil Nadu’
GPS Global Positioning System
GSDMA Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (India)
HRNA Human Recovery Needs Assessment
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
IRP International Recovery Platform
KPI Key Performance Indicator
LIFT Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund
MDF Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund

6 Guidance on Critical Facilities

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MHJ Ministry of Health
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MPTF Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NCRC NGO Coordination and Resource Centre (Nagapattinam, India)
NDRF National Disaster Response Force (India)
NDRF National Disaster Response Framework (USA)
NWFP North-Western Frontier Province
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA Official Development Assistance
OSD Officer of Special Duty
OSDMA Orissa State Disaster Mitigation Authority
PAK Pakistan-Administered Kashmir
PDNA Post Disaster Needs Assessments
PHC Primary Health Centre (India)
PONJA Post-Nargis Joint Assessment
PONREPP Post-Nargis Recovery and Emergency Preparedness Plan
PR Periodic Review
RADA Reconstruction and Development Agency (Sri Lanka)
RAN Recovery Aceh-Nias Database (Indonesia)
RIAS Recovery Information and Accountability System
R&R Recovery and Reconstruction
SAARC SAARC South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
SIFFS South Indian Federation of Fishermen Societies
SIM Social Impact Monitoring
SLF SL framework or SLA framework (according to IFAD)
SNEHA Social Need Education and Human Awareness
TCCC The Coca-Cola Company
TCG Tripartite Core Group
TGLL Tsunami Global Lessons Learned
TGLLP TGLL Project (UNDP publications never wrote TGLLP)
TGLLP-SC TGLL Project Steering Committee
TRIAMS Tsunami Recovery Impact Assessment and Monitoring System
UN ECHA United Nations Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs
UNF United Nations Foundation
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNORC United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and
Nias
USD United States Dollar
VTC Volunteer Technology Community

7
8 Guidance on Critical Facilities
INTRODUCTION
 1 BACKGROUND
The world has witnessed some of history’s worst disasters in the recent
past, including the 2011 East Japan earthquake and tsunami, the 2010
Haiti earthquake, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Cyclone Nargis of
2008, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake,
the 2003 Bam earthquake, the 2001 Gujarat earthquake and the 1999
Orissa Super Cyclone. Unplanned urban growth, increased exposure of
populations in vulnerable areas and climate change are reconfiguring
risks. Thus, over the past few decades, there has been an increase
in the rate of disaster events. These disasters claimed precious lives
and destroyed developments gained the previous years etc or even
centuries.

These developmental gains included critical facilities such as hospitals,

fire stations, blood banks, power stations and transport networks. The
disruption of critical facilities has multiple implications, especially as
these facilities are of utmost importance for affected countries and
populations in the aftermath of disaster. Relief and recovery responses
are highly dependent on these facilities. For example, during the 2001
Gujarat, India earthquake, the Bhuj and many other hospitals were
damaged, which not only led to more deaths but also impacted response
capacities.

Furthermore the absence and disruption of critical facilities can even

lead to secondary disasters; for example, the 2011 East Japan earthquake
and tsunami led to the secondary disaster of nuclear leakage.

In this context, the disaster resilience of critical facilities is of high

importance. Recovery and reconstruction programmes often involve
reconstruction of critical facilities, which provides an opportunity to
build back better and safer. This chapter looks at how to take advantage
of this opportunity.

10 Guidance on Critical Facilities

2 PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDANCE
This guidance is framed as a reference tool for incorporating DRR
measures into the recovery and reconstruction of critical facilities. It draws
upon some valuable lessons from previous recovery and reconstruction
efforts, in particular from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. It emphasises
the need for adopting a participatory and flexible approach to support
affected people, ensure a smooth recovery process and support long-term
development and resiliency.

3 STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDANCE

This guidance on DRR considerations in recovery and reconstruction of
critical facilities aims to:

Discuss critical facilities and their importance, identify factors

contributing to critical facilities vulnerability, discuss
current practices in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction
of critical facilities.
Give a rationale for integrating DRR in recovery and reconstruction
strategies of critical facilities.
Offer key considerations for integrating DRR in recovery and
reconstruction of critical facilities to support the overall objective of
‘Build Back Better’.

4 TARGET AUDIENCE
The guidance serves as a reference guide to a wide variety of stakeholders,
including government agencies and development partners. However, it is
primarily targeted at central level government agencies engaged in recovery
and reconstruction policy and strategy formulation, as well as supporting
local level agencies undertaking recovery and reconstruction of critical
facilities. In addition, it serves as a reference tool for development partners
who work alongside the above agencies in supporting the overall recovery
and reconstruction of critical facilities.

11
Guidance on Critical Facilities
CRITICAL FACILITIES
 The concept of critical facilities and infrastructure is
continuously evolving, with no common definition existing for either
term. The table on the following page lists critical infrastructure,
facilities and key assets according to the U.S. government. However,
the list of critical facilities may vary from country to country and
between communities according to availability and needs. For example,
educational facilities (schools) are not listed in the table on the next page,
although in many communities in Asia and other developing regions,
educational facilities are key assets that house hundreds of children for
schooling as well as act as evacuation shelters during emergencies.

Critical infrastructures can encompass a vast array of engineered systems,

assets and facilities which are essential for day-to-day functions, as well as
continued economic and societal function in the aftermath of a disaster
event.

This guidance focuses on critical facilities for water supply, food supply,
public health, telecommunications, emergency services, government
facilities, evacuation, energy, banking and finance, all of which are
essential for the functioning of a society.

14 Guidance on Critical Facilities

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS

Infrastructure Assets

Agriculture and Food National Monuments and Icons

Water Nuclear Power Plants

Public Health Dams

Emergency Services Government Facilities

Defense Industrial Base Commercial Key Assets

Telecommunications

Energy

Transportation

Banking and Finance

Chemicals and Hazardous

Materials

Postal and Shipping

SOURCE: White House, 2003

1 IMPACT OF DISASTERS ON CRITICAL FACILITIES

Critical facilities and their services play an important role in the
socio-economic development of communities. With increasing
dependence on modern-day provisions like electricity, water supply,
and telecommunication services, people become more vulnerable in
case these services are destroyed by natural hazards. The box on the
next page shows the impact of recent disasters on critical facilities and
infrastructure in Asia.

15
THE IMPACTS OF DISASTERS ON CRITICAL FACILITIES AND
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE ASIAN REGION

The 2001 Gujarat earthquake in India caused widespread damage to health and
education infrastructure, with two district hospitals and more than 1,200 health clinics
(mostly in rural areas), and 11,600 schools destroyed or damaged. There was similar
destruction of both rural and urban water supply schemes. Other infrastructure
services such as electricity and telecommunications were extensively damaged.i

In Aceh, Indonesia, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami destroyed 3,415 schools, 517
health facilities, 669 government buildings, 22 ports, and 8 airstrips/airports.

The 2005 Kashmir earthquake in Pakistan caused widespread damage. In the water
and sanitation sectors, more than 4,000 public and community-owned drinking water
supply systems and 25 kilometers of sewage systems, drains, solid waste management
systems and street pavements were partially or totally damaged. More than 10,000
school buildings collapsed.

During the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake in Indonesia, educational facilities,

considered some of the best in the country, were seriously affected with more than
3,000 buildings, partially or totally losing their function for extended periods (including
schools and university buildings). Healthcare facilities were also hit hard, resulting in the
closure of 17 hospitals in Yogyakarta city alone. The estimated damage to government
structures and public administration buildings was about USD15 million.

The direct economic loss of damaged infrastructure after the 2008 Sichuan
earthquake in China was estimated at CNY 1.94 million (USD 279.9 million). Damage
to transportation facilities (including railway lines) alone cost some CNY 712.3 million
(USD 102.6). Another CNY 499 million (USD 71.89 million) went toward water supply
and power generating facilities. The loss of education facilities was estimated at CNY
278.7 million (USD 40.15 million), with 7,000 classrooms destroyed.

The 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami caused extensive and severe structural
damage to roads and railways. One dam collapsed and homes were flooded or washed
away. Around 4.4 million households were left without electricity and 1.5 million were
without water. Several oil, gas and coal production plants had to halt operations because of
damage. Many electrical generators were taken down, and at least three nuclear reactors
suffered explosions when their cooling systems failed. Although internet services were
largely intact, cellular and landline phone services suffered major disruptions.

16 Guidance on Critical Facilities

 While critical facilities are generally designed and built as standalone
facilities for specific purposes, their ability to function depends on
other facilities. Impacts of natural hazards on critical facilities can
be far reaching, beyond mere direct and immediate damages, but
including damages to other dependent or interdependent facilities,
creating second- and third-order cascading effects in areas not directly
exposed to the hazard.ii For example, the interdependent relationship
of water supply or health facilities with power grids can have broad
impacts over a geographic region.iii
Similarly, the disruption of a transportation network can lead to an
increase in the price of commodities in disrupted geographic areas,
while prices may fall in production.

SCHEME SHOWING INTERCONNECTED INFRASTRUCTURES AND

THEIR QUALITATIVE DEPENDENCIES AND INTERDEPENDENCIESIV

Compenser Power Power Supply

OIL / Station Plant ELECTRIC
GAS Fuel POWER
Supply Substation

COMMUNICATIONS
END OFFICE TRANSPORTATION
Switching
Transport
Office

EMERGENCY
WATER Reservoir Emergency SERVICES
Substation Hospital Call Center
Ambulance

Bank Persons/ Legislative

Service
BANKING Checking ATM Payment
Offices GOVERNMENT
AND FINANCE Processing Military SERVICES
Federal treasury
Centre Reserve Department Installations

17
 2 VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL FACILITIES
Generally, there are certain key factors that can contribute to the
vulnerability of critical facilities (for both structural and nonstructural
elements) to natural hazards. The following section highlights these
key factors. As critical facilities are numerous, the following section
highlights common and general vulnerability issues.

LOCATION
Development is a sign of progress but unplanned or poorly planned
development can lead to the loss of valuable investments. Location
is one crucial factor that determines exposure and vulnerability to
hazards and can threaten the safety, serviceability, and longevity of
critical facilities. Conventionally, facilities are built to be as close as
possible to human settlements. Facilities need highly functional and
well-connected public transportation systems to carry supplies and
other resources. It is convenient and economical to have them in close
proximity, but at the same time it must be understood that proximity
also creates greater vulnerabilities to disaster, which could trigger a
cascading impact on the operations of all facilities.

Since the majority of critical facilities are owned and operated

by the government, although with increasing participation of the
private sector, the site selection process often focuses on available
government-owned land to reduce acquisition costs and minimise
resettlement. With no proper land use plan, risk assessments, and/
or environmental assessments prior to construction, facilities are
likely to be subject to various natural and man-made shocks and
can themselves constitute new forms of risk. For example, structures
constructed over landfills (reclaimed area) or along steep slopes
and roads constructed over flood plains, can reconfigure the hazard
itself. Risk creation is primarily due to a lack of understanding or
knowledge of the link between environmental and DRR issues and
long-term development. The priority of risk and environmental
assessments is often low (for more information, please refer to the
G Guidance on Land Use Planning).

18 Guidance on Critical Facilities

Many utility-based facilities such as electricity, water and gas supply
plants tend to be located in close proximity to one another due to their
operational inter-connectivity, which can compound risk.

Inappropriate or inadequate design also increases facilities’

susceptibility to natural hazards, as discussed in the following section.

STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY
While it is not possible to construct critical infrastructure that is
entirely resistant to hazards (especially considering socio-economic
planning requirements), susceptibility to hazards is shaped by the
planning, design, and construction practices and enforcement of
building codes, as well as the quality of materials, age of the structure
and maintenance of a facility. In general, the structural vulnerability
of infrastructure remains the critical factor as does the age of the
facility, particularly considering the possibility of designs using
obsolete parameters, improper materials used, and poor maintenance
of the structure. Lessons from past disaster events reveal that
inadequate planning and design, or poor construction quality are
the primary causes of damage to critical facilities. In theory, health
facilities, schools and government offices should be constructed with
higher safety standards and quality controls. However, due to weak
oversight and enforcement mechanisms, these are often ignored and
maintenance is often compromised, resulting in dilapidated conditions
which increase the vulnerability of the structure.

VULNERABILITY IN NON-STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS

Critical facilities house equipment that sustains day-to-day operations.
For example, health facilities have life-saving equipment and
electrical appliances, and water supply facilities have pumps and
treatment capabilities. In addition to structural vulnerability, critical
infrastructure is susceptible to damage to these non-structural
elements. Damages to non-structural elements can result in the
disruption of basic functions and at times can potentially create other
collateral hazards compromising the structural safety of the facility.

19
DAMAGE TO HEALTH FACILITIESV

26 January 2001 Gujarat (India) earthquake:

A magnitude 7.7 earthquake destroyed 227 health facilities.

8 October 2005 Pakistan earthquake:

About 574 health facilities were partially damaged or destroyed.

26 December 2004 earthquake and tsunami:

Aceh, Indonesia – 30 of 240 health clinics were destroyed.
77 others were seriously damaged and 40 suffered minor damages.
Sri Lanka – 92 health facilities were destroyed, including 35 hospitals.
Maldives – One regular hospital, 2 atoll hospitals and 20 health centres were destroyed.
India – 7 district hospitals, 13 primary health centres and 80 sub-centres were damaged
in the southern Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala,
the Union Territory of Pondicherry and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

2010 Pakistan floods:

515 health facilities (5.3 per cent of the total) were partially damaged or completely
destroyed.

20 Guidance on Critical Facilities

POOR MAINTENANCE
Unlike other general facilities, critical facilities need routine
maintenance as they provide day-to-day support for social
functions. The unceasing demands for such services as water, energy,
telecommunication and transportation all require continuous
functionality and durability. Poor maintenance due to a lack of
human, financial or technical resources can lead to day-to-day service
interruption and significant disruption during natural hazards; in turn
leading to cascading failures of other services. For example, a failure
to supply energy after an earthquake can lead to an insufficient water
supply to hospitals.

INADEQUATE AWARENESS OF DRR AND RESILIENCE

Critical facilities are important to societal needs during and after
disaster events, but many people often ignore the demands of critical
facilities from the post-emergency perspective, both in relation to for
individual facilities and cascading impacts. While critical facilities
need to be resilient, there is a limited understanding of the facilities’
vulnerabilities or of their inter-connectedness and role in society. As
a result, the importance for resilient structures is often overlooked in
policy, design and operations.

LACK OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND

BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANS
In addition to the structural and non-structural vulnerability of critical
facilities, there is also a lack of disaster preparedness and response
plans to protect and mitigate disaster impacts, as well as a lack of
business continuity plans to sustain operations during and after a
disaster recovery phase. With the increasing interdependency of
critical facilities, there is a greater need for knowledge and planning to
address cascading failure of systems.

21
22 Guidance on Critical Facilities
 RATIONALE TO
INTEGRATE DRR INTO
CRITICAL FACILITIES R&R
 It is clear from the last chapter that impacts on critical
facilities could be far reaching, not just restricted to direct immediate
damages to the facilities and occupants, but also to overall societal
recovery. As the concepts of critical facilities and infrastructure,
building back better and resilience are evolving, greater emphasis has
been placed on critical infrastructure. The table on the following page
covers key elements of resiliency for critical facilities in relation to the
technical, organisational, social and economic dimensions of critical
facilities.vi

Resilient physical and social systems must be robust, redundant,

resourceful, and capable of rapid response.

It is important to understand that mainstreaming DRR in critical

facilities (in design, reconstruction, retrofitting and maintenance)
entails not only addressing structural vulnerability but also enhancing
technical, organisational, societal and economic aspects. It is necessary
to address both structural and non-structural factors of critical
facilities during recovery and reconstruction in order to:

Minimise damage to structural and non-structural elements and

protect occupants.
Minimise service disruption and mitigate cascading failure to other
critical facilities and services.
Promote DRR and safeguard investment, which contribute to
sustainable development.

24 Guidance on Critical Facilities

MATRIX OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
Interdependencies, and Resilience Qualities with Examples Pertaining to Technical,
Organisational, Social, and Economic Dimensionsvii

DIMENSION/
Technical Organisational Social Economic
QUALITY

Robustness Building codes Emergency Reduced social Extent of

and construction operations planning vulnerability regional
procedures for and degree of economic
new and retrofitted community diversification
structures preparedness

Redundancy Capacity for Alternate sites for Availability of Ability to

technical managing disaster housing options substitute
substitutions and operations for disaster victims and conserve
‘work-arounds’ needed inputs

Resourcefulness Availability of Capacity to Capacity to Business

equipment and improvise, innovate address human and industry
materials for and expand needs capacity to
restoration and operations improvise
repair

Rapidity Downtime, Time between Time to restore Time to regain

restoration time impact and early lifeline services capacity, lost
recovery revenue

25
 1 MINIMISING DAMAGE AND PROTECTING OCCUPANTS
Structural and non-structural damage to critical facilities can lead to
service disruptions. Depending on the facility and type of occupancy,
damage can also lead to fatalities. Facilities such as hospitals, schools,
and government buildings can house large numbers of people as well
as vulnerable groups. The box below highlights the vulnerability of
educational facilities during recent earthquakes in the region.

CRITICAL FACILITIES: VULNERABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

During the 2001 Gujarat, India earthquake, 971 students and 31 teachers died.

In Aceh, Indonesia, after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2,237 teachers and
staff (13 per cent) were missing or dead, and 38,644 students were missing or dead
(11 per cent).

The 2005 Kashmir earthquake killed 18,000 children in schools.

In Sichuan, China, the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake killed about

7,000 students in schools.

Health facilities also represent a high level of vulnerability as they house

sick and weak people. They are also crucial as they store life-saving
equipment.

While it may not be possible to have a hazard-proof facility, it is

important to ensure that facilities protect occupants and continue to
function in the aftermath of any event. This requires adequate design
and planning to address vulnerability and exposure to natural hazards.
Protecting non-structural elements, such as equipment sustain the
function of operations.

26 Guidance on Critical Facilities

2 MINIMISING SERVICE DISRUPTION AND
MITIGATING CASCADING FAILURE

Considering the importance of critical facilities in development, as well

as emergency response and recovery efforts, it is important to ensure
that facilities and services are functional at all times to provide support
after disaster events. For example, damaged schools can disrupt classes
but also increase dropout rates and decrease the quality of education.
Facilities such as hospitals, emergency services, telecommunications,
and airports have a critical role in supporting rescue and life-saving
activities. As facilities are highly interdependent, they need to be
designed with higher performance standards and with backup
facilities to ensure redundancy and continued operation during any
event. Reducing the downtime of a facility by adequate planning and
provisions to expand services can improve critical response functions
and restore normalcy. Special attention is required regarding the
location, detailing and fixture of nonstructural elements in the critical
facility to limit primary and secondary failures. Planning scenarios
for disaster preparedness and business continuity should encompass
multiple-hazard scenarios as well.

3 PROMOTING DRR AND SAFEGUARD INVESTMENT

Critical facilities are often resource intensive and have a longer life
span compared with other infrastructure. Incorporating DRR elements
into design and planning will enhance the longevity of a facility by
making it resilient to recurrent hazard effects. Facilities such as schools
and hospitals are places where vulnerable groups congregate. By
ensuring resilience in these facilities, the vulnerability of those groups
can be reduced and the sense of safety and DRR-related awareness can
be increased. For example, ensuring schools are resilient can promote
DRR knowledge of children and the wider community. Schools can
also act as emergency shelters. Ensuring its resilience with additional
costs can also safeguard investment during reconstruction.

27
28 Guidance on Critical Facilities
KEY CONSIDERATIONS
 Critical facilities play an important role in the daily economic
and social functions of a society. These facilities will trigger both
positive and negative impacts during emergency response, recovery
and reconstruction processes. As critical facilities are interconnected,
they have far-reaching impacts when their services are disrupted.
Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction provides an opportunity
to improve the resilience of critical facilities and their network.
Transportation, water supply, health services, and power supply sectors
in particular are crucial to re-establishing normal operations within
a community in the aftermath of a disaster. Therefore, it is critical
to ensure that service interruption caused by disasters is kept to a
minimum in future disasters to aid the recovery of the economic sector
and the restoration of daily lives and livelihoods. This should be done
through institutionalisation of DRR considerations in both structural
and nonstructural elements of facilities. It also requires consistent,
cooperative partnerships between the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure and the stakeholders dependent on the facilities.

With the likelihood of future hazards expected to increase in both

severity and frequency due to climate change, making critical
infrastructure safer will have a profound impact upon the success and
sustainability of current and future development initiatives. Moreover,
less damage to these structures during disasters allows greater saving
in resources during repair and restoration, as well as more investment
towards long-term development goals.

30 Guidance on Critical Facilities

 INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION POLICY AND STRATEGY –
ACEH, INDONESIAVIII
Of the total losses of USD 4.7 billion, the infrastructure sector alone suffered 19 per cent
of the destruction. Some of the key elements of the infrastructure reconstruction policy
and strategy are highlighted below, in particular, the prioritising of reconstruction and
improvement with DRR elements.

Policy and Strategy:

Prioritising the provision of infrastructure and facilities to fulfil basic needs and the
uninterrupted operation of logistics.
Assisting and conducting rehabilitation and reconstruction of housing and its
supporting basic infrastructure and facilities for survivors.
Reconstructing adequate transportation and communication systems to support
uninterrupted communication within and between provinces and with foreign entities.
Rehabilitating energy and electricity distribution facilities in order to support the
resumption of social and economic activities.
Supporting efforts to maintain food availability.
Recovering security for the communities affected by the disasters by increasing the
resilience of facilities and infrastructure against disaster threats.
Applying principles of investment based on economic, technical,
environmental, social, cultural and religious feasibility consistently.

During the reconstruction of infrastructure damaged or destroyed during these

events, the Government of Indonesia made several efforts to ensure that the effect
earthquakes and tsunami would have was reduced in rehabilitated facilities and
systems.

The improvements made addressed the following:

Increased capacity of national ports and increased transportation access to and from
ports for commerce. This, in turn, allowed for uninterrupted and more efficient logistic
distribution and improved regional development.
Rehabilitation and upgrading of the existing telecommunication facilities and
construction of new communication facilities that placed a greater emphasis on
wireless technology, which together provided a vast improvement in local, regional,
and international telecommunication access.
Rehabilitation and improvement of electricity grids.
Increased diversification of the nation’s electrical energy sources, including
alternative (renewable) energy sources.

31
 1 IMPORTANCE OF DRR IN CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE R&R*

The foremost priority after an emergency is to assess the extent of

damage to critical facilities and to prioritise facilities that need to be
repaired or retrofitted in order to sustain relief and recovery operations.
Considering the need for resilient facilities, it is important to integrate
DRR and resiliency elements into the early recovery process as part of
the ‘build back better’ strategy. While the requirements and priorities
of each critical facility may differ in terms of design, scale, time and
resources needed, recovery and reconstruction policy should identify
the types of critical facilities needed to support the recovery process. It
should similarly emphasise the creation of new resilient facilities and the
retrofits of existing ones. The policy should encourage the participation
of communities in identifying suitable locations for the construction
of new facilities. The box on the previous page presents infrastructure
reconstruction policy and strategy in Aceh, and highlights some of the
key elements that were needed in the local context.

The policy should also address the vulnerability of dependent and

interdependent critical facilities, so facilities are designed and
addressed through a holistic approach, and so that provisions of
redundancy are made in terms of operations and the overall resiliency of
the facility and infrastructure. The key message here is that efforts should
be made to ensure that disaster risks are assessed before the planning and
design of recovery and reconstruction activities.

HB * see Handbook for Disaster Recovery Practitioners, Chapter 2 for details

32 Guidance on Critical Facilities

PERFORMANCE-BASED CRITERIA FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF BUILDINGS FOR
SEISMIC SAFETY, CALIFORNIA BUILDING CODE

Earthquake Event

Facility Type Upperbound Maximum

Likely (100yrs)
(1000yrs) Probable
(500 yrs)

Hospitals LS IO O

Police Stations LS IO O

Fire stations LS IO O

Emergency Communications Centres LS IO O

Schools CP LS IO

Public facilities CP LS -

Private commercial – emergency response LS IO O

Private commercial with hazardous LS IO O

materials

Private commercial – essential operations LS IO O

Private commercial - ordinary operations CP LS -

O – Operational: No significant damage has occurred to structural and nonstructural components. Building is
suitable for normal intended occupancy and use.

IO – Immediate Occupancy: No significant damage has occurred to structure, which retains nearly all of
its pre-earthquake strength and stiffness. Nonstructural components are secure and most would function if
utilities were available. Building may be used for intended purpose, albeit in an impaired mode.

LS – Life Safety: Significant damage to structural elements, with substantial reduction in stiffness. However,
margin remains against collapse. Nonstructural elements are secured but may not function. Occupancy may be
prevented until repairs can be conducted.

CP – Collapse Prevention: Substantial structural and nonstructural damage. Structural strength and stiffness
substantially degraded. Little margin against collapse. Some falling debris hazards may have occurred.
 2 UTILISING DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS AND
RISK INFORMATION

Damage assessments following an emergency phase should not be

limited to structural damages but should also include nonstructural
elements of the critical facility. In addition, assessments should focus
on the exposure and vulnerability of facilities to related hazard events
and to the cascading effects of other critical facilities.

Critical facilities and infrastructures need to be designed with higher

safety standards. Damage assessment needs to be comprehensively
analysed by relevant specialists to provide specific guidance on the
design of structural and non-structural elements, protection measures,
options for redundancy, and new and retrofitted facilities. While
conventional building codes prescribe minimum safety standards,
there is an increasing recognition for the need of higher performance
standards for critical facilities to withstand higher levels of impacts
while sustaining operations. Based on the type and functionality of
a critical facility, the operational and performance levels need to be
determined for both existing and new facilities. For example, the
table on the previous page illustrates the performance-based criteria
for different types of buildings for seismic safety per the California
Building Code.

3 MINIMISING EXPOSURE OF HAZARDS

While natural hazards are omnipresent in the environment, their

spatial and temporal intensity varies depending on the local geographic
and climatic conditions. It is important to limit the exposure of critical
facilities to recurrent hazards and to future climate change associated
risks. As critical facilities have a longer life span they will be more
exposed to risks associated with climate change in the future.

Existing critical facilities need to be evaluated to assess their exposure

to natural hazards, based on damage assessment findings as well as
available risk information. The findings should determine options
to limit the physical exposure of a facility through structural and
nonstructural mitigation measures or relocation. Relocation or

34 Guidance on Critical Facilities

construction of a new facility needs to be based on proper land use
planning, taking into consideration disaster risks and environmental
considerations (see Guidance on Land Use Planning). Relocation or G
construction of essential community facilities needs to be prioritised
based on local needs and in consultation with the local community.
Furthermore, access to these facilities needs to be adequately assessed
from a disaster risk point of view in order to ensure the safe movement
of communities and the capabilities of emergency support functions
(emergency services). One example is taking evacuation routes into
consideration.

While it may not be possible to select a place which is generally safe

from hazards (for example, cyclones and earthquakes are regional-
scale phenomena), appropriate site-specific considerations (design
controls) can be taken into account to minimise the exposure of
critical facilities to recurrent and future hazards.

Addressing the exposure component of a critical facility helps

ensuring structural safety and continued functionality during a time of
emergency.

4 INCORPORATING RESILIENCY IN DESIGN

As discussed above, there is a need to ensure a high level of operational
and performance standards in critical facilities, as well as to minimise
hazard exposure. It is increasingly recognised that appropriate
architectural and structural designs for buildings can minimise their
susceptibility to hazards such as floods, cyclones, earthquakes and
tsunamis. However, there is still a need to improve the operational and
performance levels of both existing and new facilities. Historically,
building codes were based on a prescriptive approach that was limited
by compliance, but performance-based design has also become an
important consideration.ix (see box on the next page)

35
PRESCRIPTIVE VS. PERFORMANCE-BASED DESIGN

Building codes typically seek to ensure the health, safety and wellbeing of people in
buildings, as they set minimum design and construction requirements to address
structural strength, adequate means of egress, sanitary equipment, light and ventilation,
and fire safety. Traditional building codes (prescriptive) are limited by compliance and are
easy to understand, follow and monitor. While compliance with a prescriptive building
code may satisfy the requirements to protect the facility’s occupants, it may nonetheless be
insufficient to ensure its continued operation.
The nature of services provided by critical facilities requires that designers and decision
makers define an objective of building performance levels above the minimum
requirements prescribed by the building code. Performance-based codes define acceptable
or tolerable levels of risk for a variety of health, safety, and public welfare issues. The
performance-based design process explicitly evaluates how building systems are likely
to perform under a variety of conditions associated with potential hazard events. The
process takes into consideration the uncertainties inherent in quantifying potential risks
and assessing the actual responses of building systems, as well as the potential effects of
the performance of these systems on the functionality of critical facilities. Identifying the
performance capability of a facility is an integral part of the design process and guides the
many design decisions that must be made. Currently available are the Performance Code
for Buildings and Facilities by the International Code Council (ICC, 2006), 101 Life Safety
Code (NFPA, 2006a), and the NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code (NFPA,
2006b) by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The table on the next page
illustrates the performance level of buildings for various design events.

36 Guidance on Critical Facilities

MAXIMUM LEVEL OF DAMAGE TO BE TOLERATED

Performance Performance Performance Performance

Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Very large Event
(very rare) Severe Severe High Moderate

Large Event
(rare) Severe High Moderate Mild

Medium Event
(less frequent) High Moderate Mild Mild

Small Event
(frequent) Moderate Mild Mild Mild

Performance

RELATIVE MAGNITUDE AND RETURN PERIOD FOR

SEISMIC, FLOOD, AND WIND EVENTSXI

Seismic Group Flood Wind

Very large Event Determined on site-

2,475 years 125 years
(very rare) specific basis

Large Event 475 years (not to exceed Determined on

100 years
(rare) two-thirds of the intensity) site-specific basis

Medium Event
72 years 500 years 75 years
(less frequent)

Small Event
25 years 100 years 50 years
(frequent)

37
 There is no single procedure mandated for the planning, site selection
and design of critical facilities, as no such procedure would be
universally applicable. The decision to build a critical facility depends
on many factors and requires a rigorous and comprehensive analysis
of all the conditions that may affect the operation of a facility.x This
guidance document is not meant to enumerate design specifications.
However, the box below provides a list of useful references for hazards.

RELEVANT TECHNICAL DESIGN GUIDELINES

Protection and Mitigation from Tsunami - A Strategy Paper, National Disaster Management Division,
Government of India, 2006. http://nidm.Tgov.in/PDF/safety/flood/link1.pdf

Guidelines for Design of Tsunami Escape Buildings - Sea Defence Consultants, 2009.

Guidelines for Design and Construction of Cyclone/Tsunami Shelters, Ministry of Home Affairs, India, 2006.
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7664_GUIDEFORCYCLONESHELTERS.pdf

Design Guide for Improving Critical Facility Safety from Flooding and High Winds: Providing Protection to
People and Buildings, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2441

International Journal of Critical Infrastructures,

http://www.inderscience.com/info/ingeneral/forthcoming.php?jcode=ijcis

When designing a structure, it is important to introduce resilient

elements into the architectural design, such as minimising plan
irregularities, soft story and overhangs. Likewise, facilities and
infrastructures need to be designed for additional (specific) load cases,
such as debris and scouring, in the event of a tsunami (see table on the
next page), and also take into account climate change. Furthermore,
architectural and structural design should consider appropriate
building materials to ensure the structures’ serviceability and longevity.

38 Guidance on Critical Facilities

GENERIC DESIGN SOLUTIONS TO TSUNAMI HAZARDS BASED ON THEIR EFFECTSXII

Phenomenon Effect Design Solution

Inundation • Flooded basements. • Choose sites at higher elevations.

• Flooding of lower floors. • Raise the building above the flood elevation.
• Fouling of mechanical, electrical and • Do not store or install vital material and equipment on floors
communication systems and equipment. or basements below tsunami/flood inundation levels.
• Damage to building materials, furnishings, • Protect hazardous material storage facilities that must remain
and contents (supplies, inventories, personal in hazard areas.
property). • Locate mechanical systems and equipment at higher
• Contamination of affected area with locations in the building. Use concrete and steel for the
waterborne pollutants. portions of the building subjected to inundation.
• Evaluate the bearing capacity of soil in a saturated condition.

• Hydrostatic forces (pressure on walls caused • Elevate buildings above flood level.
by variations in water depth on opposite sides). • Anchor buildings to foundations.
• Provide adequate openings to allow water to reach equal
heights inside and outside of buildings.
• Design for static water pressure on walls.

Buoyancy (flotation or uplift forces caused by • Elevate buildings

buoyancy). • Anchor buildings to foundations.

Saturation of soil causing slope instability and/ • Evaluate bearing capacity and shear strength of soils that
or loss of bearing capacity. support building foundations and embankment slopes under
conditions of saturation.
• Avoid slopes or provide setback from slopes that may be
destabilised when inundated.

Currents Hydrodynamic forces (pushing forces caused • Elevate buildings.

by the leading edge of the wave on the • Design for dynamic water forces on walls and building
building and the drag caused by flow around elements.
the building and overturning forces that result • Anchor building to foundations.
from it).

Debris impact • Elevate buildings.

• Design for impact loads.

Scour • Use deep piles or piers.

• Protect against scour around foundations.

Wave break Hydrodynamic forces • Design for breaking wave forces.

and bore
Debris Impact • Elevate buildings.
• Design for impact loads.

Scour • Design for scour and erosion of the soil around foundations
and piers.

Draw-down Embankment instability • Design waterfront walls and bulkheads to resist saturated
soils without water in front.
• Provide adequate drainage.

Scour • Design for scour and erosion of the soil around foundations
and piers.

Fire Waterborne flammable materials and ignition • Use fire-resistant materials.

sources in buildings. • Locate flammable material storage outside of high-hazard
areas.
40 Guidance on Critical Facilities
 5 INCORPORATING NON-STRUCTURAL
MITIGATION MEASURES
In addition to appropriate structural design, there is a need for comprehensive
non-structural mitigation measures to avoid collateral damage and to sustain
the operations of critical facilities. Non-structural mitigation measures need
to take up additional considerations of facility components and equipment to
avoid injury to occupants and loss of equipment. Depending on the nature of
the equipment, components, and serviceability requirements, non-structural
components must be designed for sustained operation as well as meeting
any surge requirements. An appropriate backup system also needs to be
established.

Furthermore, there is a need for contingency planning for different scenarios,

interdependent systems and improved coordination and partnership with
stakeholders. The planning should work within broader community-level
planning as well as with overall recovery and development planning.

6 ENHANCING ACCESS TO CRITICAL FACILITIES

Access during normal and emergency times will be critical for any facility’s
operation, particularly facilities associated with emergency response functions
such as hospitals and evacuation shelters. Access to critical facilities, including
both outside and inside access routes, needs to be carefully planned based
on the specific function of the facility. It is important to minimise the hazard
exposure of access routes so that emergency functions can be carried out with
zero or minimal interruption. Existing access routes need to be evaluated
based on their hazard exposure, considering potentially unstable locations (for
example, potential collateral damage zones with debris or mud flow), traffic
movement and flow.

Outside access routes to facilities need to be considered within the broader

contingency plan of the community, as well as within the recovery and
development strategy. Appropriate signage needs to be provided along the
access route for safe evacuation, particularly for access associated with schools,
hospitals and emergency shelters. The figures on the next page show emergency
evacuation planning to safe areas (shelters) in Aceh, including time estimated
from feeder roads from the community to the main access route to safe
shelters, with signage for evacuation along primary and secondary escape
routes.

42 Guidance on Critical Facilities

 REFERENCES
ASCE Critical Infrastructure Guidance Task Committee, Guiding Principles for the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, 2009.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of Disruption of Lifelines in Conterminous
United States, 1991.
Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009.
Hamburger R. O., A Framework for Performance-Based Earthquake Resistive Design, National Information Service for
Earthquake Engineering, 1997.
Lekkas et al., The Mw=9.0 Tohoku Japan Earthquake, March 2011.
Tsunami Impact on Structures and Infrastructure
Making the Case for Hospitals Safe from Disasters, www.safehospitals.info
Maitland H., Critical Information Infrastructures: Resilience and Protection, 2007.
Murray A. T. and Grubesic T. H., Critical Infrastructure Reliability and Vulnerability, 2007.
National Academy of Sciences, Sustainable Critical Infrastructure Systems: A Framework for Meeting 21st Century
Imperatives, 2009
NEHRP, Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and
Other Structures, FEMA, 1997.
Next-Generation Performance-Based Seismic Design Guidelines Programme Plan for New and Existing Buildings,
FEMA-445/ 2006
Pacific Disaster Center, Tsunami Mitigation Strategies, 2005.
Rourke T. D., Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience, The Bridge, 2007
The Infrastructure Security Partnership, Infrastructure Resilience, and Interdependencies, White Paper, 2010
The Guidance Notes on Recovery: Infrastructure, International Recovery Platform and UNDP-India.
WHO Hospitals Safe from Disasters Reduce Risk, Protect Health Facilities, Save Lives, 2008.

ENDNOTES
i http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INDIAEXTN/Resources/Reports-Publications/
gujarat-earthquake/full_report.pdf
ii The Infrastructure Security Partnership, Infrastructure Resilience, and Interdependencies,
iii Secondary disasters could easily be activated and the catastrophic effects can lead to cascading
failures of interconnected facilities.
iv Department of Homeland Security, 2009
v World Health Organization
vi Rourke, 2007
vii Rourke, 2007.
viii The Guidance Notes on Recovery: Infrastructure. The International Recovery Platform.
ix (FEMA 445, 2006.
x FEMA 445, 2006
xi FEMA 424, 2010
xii Tsunami Mitigation Strategies, Pacific Disaster Center. 2005.
xiii Source: TDMRC Rules for Supporting InaTEWS (PPT), Tsunami Workshop by Sentinel Asia, 2012

44 Guidance on Critical Facilities

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The development of this toolkit comprising of the Handbook,

the Training Manual and the Technical Guidelines was made possible
by the invaluable guidance, contribution and support of:

Budi A.A. Trevor Dhu

Shahid Abdullah Narayanan Edadan
Viraj Abeyruwan Nigel Ede
Emma Allen Lowil Espada
Hanef Are Yuzid Fadhli
Charlie Ayco Said Faisal
Amara Bains Colin Fernandes
H.K. Balachandra W.B.J. Fernando
A. Balasooriya Annie George
Brittany Benson Biju Jacob George
Francis Bon Mahesh Gunasekara
Slamet C. Tendy Gunawan
U.W.L Chandradasa Maggy H.
G.M. Chandramohan Suprayoga Hadi
Gothami Chandratne Jonath Har
H.M.U. Chularathna Maharani Hardjoko
M.D.N. Cooray Hasma
Rohan Cooray Mukhlis Hawid
Philipp Danao Vajira Hettige
John C. David Eunice Ho
Erik Davies Julia Hoeffmann
Rathika De Silva Eivind S. Homme
John Devaram MHJ Miao Hongjun
M. Dirhamsyah Moritz Horn

45
 Ikaputra Bill Nicol
Thamara Illeperuma Nina Nobel
Nishani Jayamaha Joe O’Donnel
Wathsala Jayamanna G. Padmanabhan
Hemantha Jayasundara Samantha Page
J.K. Jayawardena Al Panico
Sunil Jayaweera Jonathan Papoulidis
Luke Juran Togu Pardede
H. Muhammad Jusuf Kalla K.M. Parivelan
Adelina Kamal C. Parthasarathi
Nishantha Kamaladasa Parwoto
Geethi Karunarathne John Paterson
Angela Kearney C. J. Paul
Tessa Kelly Prema Paul
Nalini Keshavaraj Sugandika Perera
Shukuko Koyama Ashok Peter
Wolfgang Kubitski Poemvono
Sathish Kumar S. K. Prabhakar
Sudhir Kumar Heru Prasetyo
Nilantha Kumara Firliana Purwanti
Shriji Kurup Eddy Purwanto
Ahana Lakshmi Nanang Puspito
Parissara Liewkeat Usman Qazi
Lucky Ferdinand Lumingkewas Felicity Le Quesne
Dammika Mahendra Dyah R
Ashok Malhotra J. Radhakrishnan
Kuntoro Mangkusubroto Susana Raffalli
Ruby Mangunsong Irman Raghman
Mia Marina P. Joseph Victor Raj
Suresh Mariyaselvam Prema Rajagopal
A.P.B. Melder S. Ranasinghe
Bob McKerrow Eng. Sujeewa Ranawaka
C.M. Muralidharan Bhichit Rattakul
Jaiganesh Murugesan Loy Rego
Jimmy Nadapdap Jesu Rathinam
Hideto Namiki Nugroho Retro
Nuly Nazila Marqueza L. Reyes
Federico Negro Alfa Riza
Ann-Kathrin Neureuther Arghya Sinha Roy

46 Guidance on Critical Facilities

Rudiyanto Agus Susanto
William Sabandar Syihabuddin T
Nirarta Samadhi Jerry Talbot
Prof. Santhakumar Temmy Tanubrata
Trihadi Saptoadi Teampakasare
Umadevi Selvarajah R. Rajkumar Thambu
C.V. Shankar V. Thirrupugazh
P.S. Shankar Ahmad Tochson
Keerthi Sri Senanayake Beate Trankmann
Kristanto Sinandang Satya S. Tripathi
Kiran Singh Sugeng Triutomo
Arghya Sinha Roy Archida ul-Aflaha
Chitawat Siwabowon Wayne Ulrich
Pieter Smidt Coco Ushiyama
Soesmakyanto Peter van Rooij
R.M.B. Somarathna Lorna Victoria
Pannawadee Somboon V. Vivekanandan
Uditha M. De Soysa James Waile
Dave Stomy Buddhi Weerasinghe
Amin Subekti Hnin Nwe Win
Bambang Sudiatmo Weniza
Kishan Sugathapala Wisnubroto
Ravee Supanimitwisetkul Kirk Yates

47
Strategic Partners
 GUIDANCE ON

Critical
Facilities

DISASTER
RECOVERY
Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project TOOLKIT