The Perception Gap in the

THAAD Dispute – Causes

and Solutions
Zhao Tong ††

In recent years, the deployment of the THAAD system has

become a thorn in China’s ties with the United States and South
Korea. This has undermined their capability and willingness to
cooperate in addressing the growing challenge from the nuclear
program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
There is ample evidence to suggest that the three countries are
fundamentally divided on the understandings, purpose, and
strategic motives of the THAAD system in South Korea. For
all of these countries, effectively narrowing their differences and
addressing their dispute relies on a thorough understanding of
how the others think. Without a persistent effort to develop an
empathetic understanding of the others’ real thinking, there would
be no real prospect of progress.
To this end, the paper aims to analyze and compare respective
perceptions toward the THAAD deployment in the strategic
security communities in the United States, South Korea, and
China, and to promote more nuanced and objective balanced
understandings of this complex issue among the policymakers and
experts in these countries.

† Zhao Tong is a Research Fellow at Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.

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 Zhao Tong

I. The Nature of the THAAD Dispute

China’s Foreign Ministry officials have reiterated that THAAD

is not simply a technical issue, but a strategic one. This is echoed by
most Chinese experts, who argue that THAAD is an issue of major
political and strategic importance to China.
American and South Korean officials and experts, however,
tend to look at the issue through the lens of the technical details of
the missile defense system, and have a difficult time to understand
why China does not want to discuss the technical capabilities but
insists on taking it as a strategic and political problem and exerts
pressure on South Korea accordingly. The author has followed the
THAAD-related discussions within the US strategic community
and had in-depth discussions with American scholars and officials,
including various Track II level dialogues. According to my
observation, the US misunderstanding of China’s stance has led to a
common belief in Washington: China is fully aware that THAAD
does not pose any serious threat to its security; it has no substantial
concern over the system; and its vehement opposition is actually
choreographed to serve other geopolitical objectives. Based on
this view, the US concludes that since any good-faith discussion
with China on THAAD is unlikely to get anywhere, it may as
well ignore China’s “unreasonable” and ill-intentioned demands
and stick to what it deems perfectly “reasonable” deployment of
THAAD. Judging from my discussions with South Korean scholars
and officials, this view is widely embraced in South Korea as well.
Most South Korean experts also believe that THAAD can provide
useful protection against DPRK’s missile threat, and it was not due
to American coercive pressure that the South Korean government
made the decision to install THAAD.
In comparison, China’s understanding about the motives
behind the THAAD deployment is fundamentally different. A
very popular view is that dealing with DPRK’s nuclear threat
is just an American excuse and the main—or the real—target
of THAAD is China; the objective is to implement a policy of
strategic containment against China, through undermining China’s
strategic security interests and disrupting the regional strategic
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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

balance. As for South Korea, China is convinced that the country

fully understands that THAAD cannot effectively protect it;
nonetheless, it is arm-twisted into approving the deployment by
the US pressure. In other words, China has little doubt that South
Korea made a decision to pick side in this China-US dispute to
enhance its military alliance with the latter, despite knowing very
well that THAAD would seriously undermine China’s key security
interests.
For the ease of writing in this paper, the US and South Korea,
who share similar perceptions, are grouped together as one side in
the THAAD dispute, while China is on the other side. For both
sides, there is a clear difference between how one understands its
own strategic intentions and how such intentions are understood
by the other side. The deep perceptual gap has led to serious mutual
misunderstandings that make their differences seem irreconcilable.
If one continues resorting to pressure tactics in the hope to force the
other side to change positions, there would be no way to settle the
dispute. Now is the time for experts from the two sides to explore
causes of such huge perceptual gap and develop a common strategy
to solve it.

II. Divergent Perceptions about THAAD’s Capability to Protect

South Korea

Even those who regard the THAAD deployment issue as more

of a political and strategic issue than a technical one would agree that
understanding the technical capabilities of THAAD is the key for
evaluating the level of threat the system poses to China. The reason
why China has expressed the greatest concern over THAAD rather
than any other US missile defense systems deployed in the region is
precisely that China believes THAAD possesses a special technical
capability to threaten China’s key interests. Without a systematic
effort to develop an in-depth understanding about THAAD’s
technical capabilities, fact-based and prudent strategic decision-
making is impossible. The problem is, however, many policy
analysts from the two sides often engage in geopolitical debates

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 Zhao Tong

independent from the technical context. Many experts are not even
aware that the issue involves sophisticated technical details and that
there are genuine disagreements between the technical experts of the
two sides about the underlying technical issues. This disconnection
between technology and policy has greatly contributed to the
misunderstandings about each other’s strategic intentions. In
such a light, this paper explores the sources of some key technical
disagreements to better understand where the perception gap comes
from.
The first question is to what extent THAAD can protect South
Korea. Chinese experts argue that THAAD can only provide
limited protection, because the system is primarily designed
to intercept medium- and intermediate-range missiles, but it is
DPRK’s short-range missiles1 that pose a threat to South Korea;
therefore the system is not in a position to defend Seoul from
missile attacks; and even if it were deployed closer to Seoul, it would
not be able to defend against DPRK’s conventional military threats
to the city, such as those from large-caliber conventional artillery
and rockets. For these reasons, most Chinese experts don’t think
THAAD can provide any real extra protection for South Korea and
this leads to the conclusion that the most important purpose behind
the deployment must be to contain China, rather than to deal with
DPRK’s threat.
However, American and South Korean experts disagree. They
hold that: THAAD can effectively address DPRK’s missile threats,
including those posed by short-range missiles; working together
with the lower-tier Patriot system, THAAD contributes to a
layered defensive shield that significantly improves the chances of
successful interceptions against short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. For American and South Korean experts, there is little
doubt that THAAD’s target is DPRK’s missiles.
Technically speaking, THAAD is capable of intercepting ballistic
missiles of medium (1,000 – 3,000 km) and intermediate (3,000 –
5,500 km) ranges but is also designed to be capable of intercepting
targets with shorter ranges. It can intercept targets at altitudes of 40-
150 km and is capable of engaging most short-range missiles (with
ranges longer than about 250 km). In fact, the system’s intercept
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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

tests during R&D stage primarily focused on short-range missiles. 2

This is also noted by Chinese technical experts, who point out that
the 13 intercept tests conducted since 2006 used nine short-range
and two medium-range targets3. Therefore, it is inappropriate to
conclude that THAAD is for intercepting medium-range targets
and cannot defend against short-range ones.
Then, there is the often heard argument by some Chinese experts
that THAAD deployment is totally unnecessary because the current
low-tier Patriot defense system alone can protect against DPRK’s
missiles. However, the fact is, with lower speed, lower intercept
altitudes (up to 20 km), and shorter range, Patriot interceptors have
limited interception capabilities, particularly against targets moving
at high speeds in their final phase. Unfortunately, such threats are
real, as DPRK has frequently test-fired missiles at highly lofted
trajectories to shorten flying distance and can use the same tactics to
defeat South Korea’s Patriot system.
One advantage of THAAD is its ability to fill the gap left by
the Patriot system. As some Chinese technical experts pointed
out, “THAAD is designed to protect large areas—for example,
American forces, allied forces, population centers, and critical
infrastructure—against short- and medium-range missiles.” As a
result, “the THAAD and PAC–3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3)
systems constitute a layered-defensive system: the former is
able to intercept missiles both inside and outside of the Earth’s
atmosphere at an altitude of 20 to 200 km, while the latter capable
of hitting short- and medium-range targets in the terminal phase”
4
. Some Chinese experts acknowledged that THAAD comes as a
complement to PAC–3. “Thanks to their light weight and small
size, both PAC–3 kinetic energy interceptor and THAAD have
great mobility and flexibility, but what makes THAAD different is
that it is a regional defensive system that can hit targets at an altitude
of 40 – 150 km to protect a large area, within a range of up to 200
km in diameter, while PAC–3 only offers point defense for key
assets. In addition, THAAD enables multiple interception attempts.
Given its intercept range and altitude, the system allows extra
time to launch an interceptor first, assess the result, and then fire a
second interceptor if the first one misses the target. Even when the
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 Zhao Tong

second attempt also fails, PAC–3 can then take over to have a third
shot. The value of THAAD is that it offers a more flexible option
to defend against large-scale missile threats. It complements, rather
than replaces, the existing missile-defense systems and sensors, such
as the land-based PAC-3, the sea-based Aegis, and Ground-based
Midcourse Defense systems, as part of the US effort to develop a
multi-layered ballistic missile defense capability. 5”
Therefore, from the technical perspective, it makes sense that
in response to DPRK’s improving missile capacities, the US and
South Korea choose THAAD to complement the Patriot system6.
Admittedly, Seoul is too close to the border to be fully protected by
THAAD, which is also acknowledged by both South Korea and the
US. However, it is hard to imagine that under such grave security
threats as possible nuclear attacks, a government would give up
efforts to defend most part of its territory altogether simply because
they cannot effectively protect the capital city. Besides, there are
always other ways to reinforce the protection of Seoul, for example,
through increasing the number of PAC–3 systems deployed around
the city. In fact, a 1999 US Department of Defense report made the
exact recommendation: to compensate the inadequate protection
of Seoul from the possible deployment of THAAD by deploying
more low-tier anti-missile systems.7
It is also true that anti-missile systems cannot counter
conventional artillery threats from the DPRK, but for years South
Korea and the US have been making efforts to develop and deploy
both active and passive defense capabilities against conventional
artilleries. Even if the threat from conventional artilleries cannot be
adequately addressed at the moment, that seems no reason for
South Korea to give up trying to defend against the nuclear threat.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that however technically
advanced they are, the American anti-missile systems have not
been fully tested under real battlefield conditions. There is still
considerable uncertainty about the effectiveness and reliability of
THAAD’s realistic battlefield performance. The US and South
Korea do not seem to completely count on these anti-missile
systems to successfully intercept all incoming missiles; without
being seriously provoked, DPRK is also unlikely to launch a
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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

missile attack on South Korea and/or

US military bases there. Therefore, the The THAAD
THAAD system is more of an insurance
against extreme scenarios. At the end of system is more of
the day, even one successful interception an insurance against
of a DPRK nuclear warhead would save
massive losses of life and property. extreme scenarios. At
the end of the day,
III. Divergent perceptions about even one successful
THAAD’s impact on China’s strategic interception of a
security interests
DPRK nuclear
Both sides agree that THAAD warhead would save
interceptors do not pose any significant
threat to China’s strategic security massive losses of life
interests. What divides them is whether and property.
the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar of the
THAAD system seriously undermines China’s strategic security
interests, particularly against the deterrent capability of China’s
nuclear weapons. Chinese experts argue that the radar can track
the trajectory of China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
during their ascent phase, and can distinguish real warheads
from decoys when they are released after the booster burns out.
Here is how many Chinese experts believe the radar undercuts
China’s nuclear deterrence: during peacetime, the radar monitors
China’s missile tests and collects data on the warheads and decoys
of Chinese ICBMs. During wartime, THAAD updates real-
time warhead and decoy monitoring information for American
homeland missile defense systems deployed in Alaska and
California; such information is then analyzed and compared
with previous data to ensure that interceptor directly hits the
real warheads without being confused by decoys, increasing the
success rate of interception. The odds are further improved by the
advantageous location of the radar. Based in South Korea, it is close
enough to enable early detection and warning, which contributes to
increased response time for more than one intercept attempts.
On the other side, however, the mainstream American and
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 Zhao Tong

South Korean view is that the THAAD radar cannot have the
capability of undermining China’s strategic nuclear deterrent. They
seriously doubt the alleged capability of the radar to distinguish
ICBM warheads from decoys. They also point out that the US has
already deployed a range of sensors and warning systems in the
Asia Pacific region and ask why China is so much more concerned
about the THAAD radar than any other. They often note that the
US government repeatedly offered to provide China with technical
briefings about this system, to which China did not respond.
Despite the lack of official technical information about the system,
in the public domain a number of American technical experts have
conducted independent assessments on some key technical issues.
Among them, Theodore Postol, a recently retired MIT professor
and expert in missile and missile defense technologies, suggested
that THAAD’s ability to identify real warheads and increase
warning time is only possible in theory, and can hardly make
much difference in reality; identifying real warheads is extremely
challenging, and the THAAD radar does not add much to the US
anti-missile capability against China8.
This understanding is supported by some Chinese experts, who
point out that according to available technical documents from the
US military, it would be very difficult to use sensors such as the
THAAD radar to distinguish real warheads from decoys9. The
design of ICBM post boost vehicles (PBV) varies from country to
country and special devices can be added to mask the deployment
movements. During the release of warheads and decoys, a PBV also
uses thrusters to conduct maneuvers and readjust flight conditions.
This means it is very difficult to tell the difference between real
and fake warheads simply by observing the kinetic energy changes
of the PBV during the release process. One possible solution, as
suggested in one of the US Army Science Board (ASB) reports, is
to look into differences of more subtle motion changes between
warheads and decoys. For example, a decoy may show a different
micro motion change from a real warhead when it is impinged by
the PBV’s thruster plume, and such motion--if discriminable--may
help the identification of a real warhead. However, this requires
much greater sensitivity and resolution of the remote sensor (radar),
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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

and is susceptible to countermeasures such as by deploying small

attitude rate reducers10. Thus, it would be ill-conceived—and
potentially misleading—to suggest that the THAAD radar is able to
discriminate Chinese missile warheads from decoys and therefore
poses a serious threat to China’s strategic nuclear deterrence simply
because such missiles may be within the radar’s detection range
when they release their warheads and decoys. 11
There is no simple conclusion as to whether THAAD radar has
the warhead discrimination capability. It depends on numerous
technical factors beyond the radar itself, and there are always
countermeasures China can take. The technological competition
between target discrimination and counter-discrimination
capabilities is usually endless, especially between such major
military powers as China and the US. As is pointed out by Dean
Wilkening, an American missile defense expert and researcher
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a wide array
of discrimination techniques and countermeasures have been
developed. However, “[t]here is no countermeasure against which
an effective defense cannot be designed, and [t]here is no defense
against which an effective countermeasure cannot be designed.” 12
The view is also shared by ASB in its above mentioned report: “It
must be recognized that discrimination [of real and fake warheads]
is not a problem that can be ‘solved’. Rather it will be a continuing
race between the offense and defense to institute, respectively,
more effective pen-aids [penetration aids] and more capable means
to counter those pen-aids to a degree that is adequate to maintain
the defense’s desired level of effectiveness…its effectiveness
will probably always be a matter of judgment rather than a
demonstrable fact.” 13
Dean Wilkening, whose technical know-how has influenced
the US missile defense policy14, made clear at a domestic seminar
in the United States that if the US chooses the right technologies,
it may have a chance “for staying ahead of the discrimination
problem against states like the DPRK and Iran”. 15 In other words,
when faced with more powerful countries like Russia or China, it
would be difficult for the US to gain the upper hand even with its
best technologies. His statements seem to indicate that America
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 Zhao Tong

is not necessarily seeking warhead discrimination capabilities

against China and Russia. Admittedly, even if this is the US
policy for now, the policy may change later; it does not mean that
the US will never try to develop such capabilities in the future.
However, from the technical perspective, no single technology
can secure perpetual advantages once and for all in this on-going
race between the offense and defense. Technical breakthroughs
and new military deployments can only bring about relative and
temporary advantages, not absolute and permanent ones. To obsess
oneself with the controversial debate over THAAD radar’s target
discrimination capability and dramatize its influence tends to lose
the longer-term picture. This would do no good to ensure rational
distribution of China’s resources for achieving advantages in the
long-term competition.
Another threat theory claims that the deployment of THAAD
radar in South Korea allows earlier detection of China’s ICBMs or
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), giving the US
missile defense systems an earlier warning and longer preparation
time. However, this argument also seems oversimplified. The
THAAD radar in South Korea affects the Chinese SLBM fired
from the Bohai Bay most, but it would still need at least 50 seconds
to detect the launch of an SLBM16, and would take longer to detect
an ICBM fired from China’s hinterland. By comparison, the US
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites can provide an
earlier warning with their see-to-ground (STG) infrared sensors.17
According to Chinese technical experts, these sensors are capable of
conducting cloud-penetrating and high-frequency scanning and
therefore can detect missiles immediately after launch. The warning
can be communicated to the control center within 10-20 seconds
after the launch. 18 Due to the existence of other sensors that can
provide earlier warnings against a Chinese missile launch, it seems
ill-founded to suggest that THAAD radar can significantly increase
early warning time for the U.S. missile defense systems against
Chinese strategic missiles.
Apart from the SBIRS, the Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS) satellites constellation is also considered to have
significant early warning capabilities against missiles. In his
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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

statement to Congress in 2011,

Patrick J. O’Reilly, then director The THAAD radar’s
of the US Missile Defense Agency,
pointed out that in two recent flight threat to China should be
tests by that time, STSS satellites assessed by taking into
demonstrated the ability to provide
tracking data more accurately and
consideration America’s
timely than the Aegis or THAAD overall early-warning
radars. 19 In addition to early warning capabilities.
satellites, America also has a strong
sea-based sensor network. It consists
of the Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX) and a number of missile
range instrumentation ships of various sorts. The Howard O.
Lorenzen, for example, is a tracking ship that carries the powerful
Cobra King radar system comprising of X-band and S-band phased
radars. These sea-based sensors are mobile and can be deployed
in waters near China when needed and can provide effective early
warning detection of missile launches.
As a result, it is questionable how much the THAAD radar
can meaningfully add to America’s existing early warning and
tracking capabilities against China’s strategic missiles. 20 The
THAAD radar’s threat to China should be assessed by taking
into consideration America’s overall early-warning capabilities.
Looking at the issue in isolation from the broader context can lead
to misunderstandings about America’s strategic intentions.

IV. Causes of perception difference

Strategic distrust
Profound and long-term distrust has long shadowed China-US
strategic security relations, particularly over nuclear issues. The
lack of internal consensus and the existence of future uncertainties
over key US nuclear policy issues contribute to China’s long-term
suspicion about American strategic intentions. Sometimes the
American nuclear policies vis-à-vis China were clearer than other
times. The Obama administration, in particular, clearly stated its
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 Zhao Tong

willingness to maintain strategic stability with China, indicating

that the US would not seek to undermine China’s strategic nuclear
deterrence. However, there are also always hardline voices from
some American experts who feel uneasy about the mutual assured
destruction relationship with China. Some American experts
even suggest that with the constant advancement of military
technologies, it is technically possible for the US to acquire
preemptive strike capability against China’s nuclear weapons. 21
Although these voices by no means represent the US mainstream
thinking or official policy, they inevitably ring alarm bells for
the Chinese strategic community. Given the importance of such
issues, it is only natural that China has taken it seriously and
prepared for the worst.
There are also ambiguities over US missile defense policies
which may have important implications for other countries’
nuclear policies. The US National Missile Defense Act of 1999
defined the scope of US missile defense as “limited.” This
principle has guided the missile defense policies during the Bush
and Obama administrations, as they sought primarily to protect
the US homeland against limited ballistic missile threats from
states such as the DPRK and Iran, not major nuclear powers like
Russia and China. 22 This policy has been constantly challenged
by suggestions on developing strategic missile defense capabilities
against countries with very advanced nuclear capabilities. 23 This
is extremely difficult to achieve from both financial and technical
perspectives. Nevertheless, such voices have raised serious
concerns over future US policies and strategic intentions in China
and Russia. In response to the rapid development of DPRK’s
missile capabilities, the US has stepped up its efforts for building
a multi-layered missile defense system; the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 removed the word
“limited” from its guidance on missile defense development; and
the Trump administration seems very committed to enhancing
homeland missile defense and how its new Ballistic Missile
Defense Review Report may change the relatively moderate
missile defense policy of the Obama administrations continues to
unease Chinese experts.
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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

Against the background of strategic distrust, China suspects

any US moves to deploy better missile defense capabilities in the
Asia-Pacific region would be part of a long-term grand strategy to
establish a comprehensive missile defense network to ultimately
neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence. Just as many American
analysts tend to interpret the Chinese efforts to enhance defense
postures as aiming at challenging the existing US dominance,
China could not help but assume the worst in US strategic
intentions when it comes to future US missile defense policy. The
Chinese perception over the THAAD deployment is inevitably
influenced by this general dynamic.
However, exaggeration of missile defense
threat is against China’s own security interests.
Admittedly, from the technical perspective, the Exaggeration of
possibility cannot be absolutely ruled out that missile defense
the THAAD radar in South Korea does serve threat is against
other purposes such as monitoring China’s
missile launches and collecting intelligence. China’s own
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that most security interests.
evidence suggests the system is primarily aimed
at countering DPRK’s missile threat and is not to undermine
China’s nuclear deterrent. This view is shared by some Chinese
technical experts, who point out that: the primary target of the
X-band radar is the DPRK24; and South Korea chooses to deploy
the THAAD system “out of concern of DPRK’s ballistic missile
attacks.” 25 Such issues are essential, as they determine how China
understands the nature of the matter and responds to it. Some
Chinese commentators have categorically asserted without the
backing of any specific technical analysis that the primary—and
even the “only”—target of THAAD is China. If this ill-founded
view becomes dominant in China, the risk is that the Chinese
government would develop serious misunderstandings about the
strategic intention of the US (and South Korea). The consequences
of China’s misinterpreting the THAAD deployment as part of
a long-term US strategy to neutralize China’s strategic nuclear
deterrence may include problematic Chinese countermeasures
such as making too much investment in building up its nuclear
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 Zhao Tong

forces rather than investing in other more pressing and important

areas, which can undermine China’s long-term development and
strategic interests. It may also trigger an unnecessary nuclear-arms
race, making the Sino-American Thucydides trap a self-fulfilling
prophecy.

Confusion about the type of the threat

It should be noted that while it is not the US official policy to
seek strategic missile defense capabilities against China or Russia,
the US is clearly interested in developing defense systems against
the perceived threat from theater missiles of China and Russia,
to protect US allies.26 The theater missiles mainly refer to China’s
short- and medium-range missiles that can directly threaten key
regional targets of the US and its East Asian allies. In this regard,
the THAAD inceptors and the radar deployed in South Korea
may indeed be helpful for defending South Korea-based US and
allied forces from China’s theater missiles. More broadly speaking,
most of the US missile defense systems deployed in East Asia
can be useful for protecting the interests of US’ allies (especially
Japan) against threats not only from DPRK’s missiles, but also
from China’s theater missiles. This objective is clearly stated in US
official documents and acknowledged by officials of the Ministry
of Defense the US and some US experts.27 Some Chinese experts
have also expressed concerns over such US intentions. 28
However, the distinction between the US regional missile
defense (for protecting regional assets from short-range and
medium-range missiles) and US strategic missile defense (for
protecting US homeland from ICBMs and SLBMs) should not
be overlooked. The latter may be seen as a strategic threat to
China’s strategic security interests, while the former is a threat
at the tactical level. In the case of THAAD, if China believes the
system poses threat to China’s theater missiles, there are a number
of tactical countermeasures that China can employ to effectively
address the threat. 29 However, whether such tactical-level military
competition should be elevated as a “strategic” or “political”
priority deserves careful consideration.
What is needed in the THAAD discussions in China is in-
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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

depth studies and sound assessment of the nature and level of

the threats that THAAD poses to China. Opinions diversify
as to what specific threats the system presents, ranging from
undermining China’s strategic nuclear deterrence, to undermining
China’s theater missiles, and to collecting intelligence of aircraft
activities in China’s airspace; some acknowledge that THAAD
itself does not pose any serious military threat but still conclude
that the system would bring about “profound” and “significant”
impact on the “strategic balance and geopolitics of East Asia”.
The lack of consensus on the specific threat that THAAD poses
makes it impossible for policymakers to accurately understand the
nature of the threat and to properly develop diplomatic, military,
and economic responses. Unfortunately, such discussions have
not been thoroughly conducted within the expert community.

Summary and Looking Ahead

The US, South Korea, and China have major differences in their
perceptions of the THAAD issue. So far, these countries focus too
much on the strategic and political aspects of the issue to realize
that the dispute to a large extent is a result of their divergent
understandings of key technical issues, such as to what extent
the THAAD system is aimed at countering DPRK’s or Chinese
missiles, and its real capability to undermine China’s strategic
nuclear deterrent. If these countries do not acknowledge and
seriously address their genuine divisions on these key technical
issues, the complete resolution of the THAAD dispute seems
unlikely.
As discussed above, the complexity and nuances of many key
technical issues regarding THAAD are not yet fully appreciated;
some existing mainstream judgments of key technical issues are
debatable and controversial. Inadequate understandings about
technical issues can mislead policy makers and exacerbate the
dispute.
The dispute continues even after China and South Korea
agreed to temporarily set aside their differences. On the one
hand, as the US and South Korea are committed to deploying
more advanced missile defense systems on the Korean Peninsula,
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 Zhao Tong

the possibility exists that upgraded and more capable THAAD

systems may be deployed in South Korea in larger numbers in
the future; and on the other hand, the mainstream Chinese view
about the threat of THAAD has not changed even after the
recent détente. This means in the foreseeable future, the THAAD
issue will continue to plague China-US and China-South Korea
relations and to hinder productive cooperation to check DPRK’s
nuclear ambitions. Even worse, misunderstandings of China’s
thinking have led to a popular view in the US that China has
been deliberately exaggerating the THAAD threat to achieve its
own geopolitical goals—such as to weaken the US-South Korea
alliance. This fuels the strategic mutual suspicion and a vicious
circle of negative interactions among these regional powers. For
China, there is also the danger of overreaction. The country is
faced with a growing domestic clamor for nuclear force expansion,
which is partially driven by the popular perception that the
THAAD system would severely undermine China’s existing
nuclear deterrence capability. The result is an increasing risk of an
unnecessary nuclear arms race, which is far from good news to
China’s long-term interests.
Looking ahead, it is imperative that all sides recognize and
work to manage the perception gap. Specifically, based on open
source information, technical experts from all sides can jointly
conduct and publish research on some of the key technical issues
regarding THAAD. In the near future, complete removal of the
current THAAD system seems impossible; as a result, options of
interim agreements to address the key concerns and to manage
the fallout for their strategic relations should be explored. One
historical precedent we can learn from is a 2007 proposal from the
Bush administration to address a similar US-Russian dispute. In
order to ease Russia’s concerns over the US plan to deploy missile
defense radar in the Czech Republic, then US Defense Secretary
Robert Gates suggested that Russia station its inspectors at the
radar base to prevent it from being operated in ways that might
jeopardize Russia’s security interests. In the case of THAAD,
China, the US, and South Korea can explore similar confidence-
building mechanisms that would allow China to exercise a
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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

reasonable level of supervision and verification to ensure that the

THAAD radar would only operate in a manner that does not
threaten China’s strategic interests. Chinese experts have also
proposed to replace the THAAD radar with some other radar
that is less threatening to China. It would require joint research
by technical experts from these countries to evaluate the technical
feasibility of such a plan, as well as the logistical and economic
price for doing so. The bottom line is that priority should be given
to avoiding useless political finger-pointing and to conducting fact-
based in-depth dialogues on underlying technical disagreements.
So long as all sides recognize the existence of genuine technical
disagreements and take a pragmatic approach to address them, it
may still be possible to find effective solutions that take care of
the primary concerns of all parties. This may be the only hope for
settling the THAAD dispute without undermining their strategic
relations.

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 The Perception Gap in the THAAD Dispute – Causes and Solutions

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