Marcos Case Digest

Submitted by: Mateo, Mark Anthony T

Submitted to: Atty. Crisostomo Uribe

Facts: Civil Case No. 0141 is a forfeiture case entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
(represented by his Estate/Heirs) and Imelda R. Marcos. It emanated from the 1991 Petition sought the
recovery of the assets and properties pertaining to the Marcoses, who acquired them directly or
indirectly through, or as a result of, the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the
government. The properties, subject of other pending forfeiture cases before the Sandiganbayan, were
excluded; and the properties, subject of the 1991 Petition, were specifically listed and accordingly
clustered into 18.

Some of the properties listed in the 1991 Petition were already adjudged as ill-gotten wealth and
consequently forfeited in favor of the government. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (the Swiss deposits
case), the Court en banc in 2003 decreed that the deposits in various Swiss banks, referred to in the
1991 Petition under paragraph 9 (18), were ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State.
Likewise, in Marcos v. Republic (the Arelma case), the Court's Second Division in 2012 declared that the
funds, properties, and interests of Arelma were also ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State.

The present consolidated petitions emanated from the same Civil Case No. 0141, when the Republic
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 24 June 2009 with respect to another property listed
in the 1991 Petition. By way of that motion, the Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to render judgment
declaring the pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacañang Collection and specifically mentioned under
paragraph 9 (6) of the 1991 Petition, as ill-gotten; and to subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to
be declared forfeited in favor of the Republic. The latter categorized the pieces of jewelry recovered
from the Marcoses into three collections and singled out the Malacañang Collection as the object of the
motion.

Issue: whether the Malacañang Collection can be the subject of the forfeiture case; (3) whether
forfeiture is justified under R.A. 1379; OUR RULING

Held: Yes. We find no reversible error in the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the forfeiture was justified and that the Malacañang
Collection was subject to forfeiture. The legitimate income of the Marcoses had been pegged at USD
304,372.43. We reiterate what we have already stated initially in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, and
subsequently in Marcos v. Republic: "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired." Petitioners failed to
satisfactorily show that the properties were lawfully acquired; hence, the prima facie presumption that
they were unlawfully acquired prevails.

The Sandiganbayan also properly ruled that there was no inconsistency or incongruity between
Republic's Request for Admission and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Indeed, we have held that
a request for admission can be the basis for the grant of summary judgment. The request can be the
basis therefor when its subject is deemed to have been admitted by the party and is requested as a
result of that party's failure to respond to the court's directive to state what specifically happened in the
case. The resort to such a request as a mode of discovery rendered all the matters contained therein as
matters that have been deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

On the basis of respondent Imelda Marcos' s letter dated 25 May 2009; respondents' Answer to the
1991 Petition, which was considered to be a "negative pregnant" in Republic v. Sandiganbayan; and
respondents' failure to timely respond to petitioner's Request for Admission, the Sandiganbayan thus
correctly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Republic.

A careful scrutiny of the three bases used by the Sandiganbayan in justifying the absence of a genuine
issue and eventually granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment leads us to no other course of
action but to affirm the ruling of the Sandiganbayan. The prima facie presumption on unlawfully
acquired property indeed finds application on the first basis. Section 2 of R.A. 13 79 provides that
"[w]henever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed primafacie to have been unlawfully acquired." And in this regard, the Sandiganbayan had
taken judicial notice of the legitimate income of the Marcoses during their incumbency as public officers
for the period 1966-1986 which was pegged at USD 304,372.43.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174673
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B.
GIMENEZ, Respondents.
LEONEN, J.:

Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and facilitate a trial
court's function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and
probative value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in order to arrive at a
conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been able to establish the facts, the trial court will then
be able to apply the law and determine whether a complainant is deserving of the reliefs prayed for in
the pleading.

Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear demonstration of
the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively
participated in by both parties should not be encouraged.

Facts: The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez
Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired
by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda Marcos[.]" During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the
positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The
Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department
of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of
PCGG. Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez
Spouses.

On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel’s testimony. The
Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further evidence." Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence."

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006,
within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence." This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution of the same date.

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to
file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated
May 8, 2006. Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines waived
the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to
evidence.

Held: Yes.

To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to Evidence,
we review the nature of demurrer.

Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.

In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence
due to petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to evidence was
defined as:

. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue."
We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought."113 (Citations omitted)

This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every
proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably
inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his
case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained
where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.114

Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion to
dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff
is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on
demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to
sue. . . .115 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense
and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Facts: This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office
and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who
within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: Yes. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct
right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat
the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country,
and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right
to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence"
[Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights
may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health
or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It
would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in
the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under
our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct
and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of
effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially
material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American
jurisprudence.

Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be
limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An
appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its
resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether
or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the
Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar
their return.

Executive Power

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139
(1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines"
[Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of
powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative,
executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the
Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power
means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial
power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the
legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two
hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be
said of the executive power which is vested in one official the President.

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power"
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws,
the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power
to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is
within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at
the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124772 August 14, 2007
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT and MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, in his
capacity as CHAIRMAN thereof, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICECO HOLDINGS, N.V., respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Facts: On 7 April 1986, in connection with criminal proceedings initiated in the Philippines to locate,
sequester and seek restitution of alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses and other accused
from the Philippine Government, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote the Federal Office for
Police Matters in Berne, Switzerland, requesting assistance for the latter office to: (a) ascertain and
provide the OSG with information as to where and in which cantons the ill-gotten fortune of the
Marcoses and other accused are located, the names of the depositors and the banks and the amounts
involved; and (b) take necessary precautionary measures, such as sequestration, to freeze the assets in
order to preserve their existing value and prevent any further transfer thereof (herein referred to as the
IMAC request).

On 29 May 1986, the Office of the District Attorney in Zurich, pursuant to the OSG’s request, issued an
Order directing the Swiss Banks in Zurich to freeze the accounts of the accused in PCGG I.S. No. 1 and in
the "List of Companies and Foundations." In compliance with said Order, Bankers Trust A.G. (BTAG) of
Zurich froze the accounts of Officeco Holdings, N.V. (Officeco).

Officeco appealed the Order of the District Attorney to the Attorney General of the Canton of Zurich.
The Attorney General affirmed the Order of the District Attorney. Officeco further appealed to the Swiss
Federal Court which likewise dismissed the appeal on 31 May 1989.

Thereafter, in late 1992, Officeco made representations with the OSG and the PCGG for them to
officially advise the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters to unfreeze Officeco’s assets. The PCGG
required Officeco to present countervailing evidence to support its request.

Instead of complying with the PCGG requirement for it to submit countervailing evidence, on 12
September 1994, Officeco filed the which was docketed as Civil Case No. 0164 of the Sandiganbayan.
The complaint prayed for the PCGG and the OSG to officially advise the Swiss government to exclude
from the freeze or sequestration order the account of Officeco with BTAG and to unconditionally release
the said account to Officeco.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in not dismissing Civil Case No. 0164 on the ground of res
judicata.

Held: No.

Res judicata

Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled
by judgment.20 The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.

For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, the following requisites must obtain: (1) The
former judgment or order must be final; (2) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was
rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case; (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the
same parties.

While the first three elements above are present in this case, we rule that the fourth element is absent.
Hence, res judicata does not apply to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Civil Case No.
0164.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189434 April 25, 2012
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government,Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 189505
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SERENO, J.:

Facts: On 17 December 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), filed a Petition for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the forfeiture law, Republic
Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379) in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14.4 The petition was docketed as
Civil Case No. 0141.

Respondent Republic, through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought the
declaration of Swiss bank accounts totaling USD 356 million (now USD 658 million), and two treasury
notes worth USD 25 million and USD 5 million, as ill-gotten wealth. The Swiss accounts, previously held
by five groups of foreign foundations, deposited in escrow with the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
while the treasury notes were frozen by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

Respondent also sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy corporations and entities established by
nominees of Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal
properties manifestly out of proportion to the spouses’ lawful income. This claim was based on evidence
collated by the PCGG with the assistance of the United States Justice Department and the Swiss Federal
Police Department.7 The Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name
"Arelma, Inc.," which maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was
purportedly organized for the same purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth.

Issue: Whether petitioner Republic complied with Section 3, subparagraphs c, d, and e of R.A. 1375;

Held: Yes.

II. Republic complied with Section 3 (c), (d), and (e) of R.A. 1375

R.A. 1379 provides that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and to his other
lawful income, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The
elements that must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are the following: (1) the offender
is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property
during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.

Thus, in determining whether the presumption of ill-gotten wealth should be applied, the relevant
period is incumbency, or the period in which the public officer served in that position. The amount of
the public officer’s salary and lawful income is compared against any property or amount acquired for
that same period. In the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court ruled that petitioner Republic was able to
establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses "were
manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials."

The amount reported by the Marcos couple as their combined salaries more or less coincided with the
Official Report submitted by the Minister of Budget. Yet what appeared anomalous was the Php
11,109,836 representing "Legal Practice," which accounted for 67% or more than three-fourths of their
reported income. Out of this anomalous amount, Php 10,649,836, or 96% thereof, represented
"receivables from prior years" during the period 1967 to 1984. The Court cited the Solicitor General’s
findings:

In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became
a President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and
that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his
Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceding his ascendancy to the presidency he did
not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the ₱ 10.65-M that he decided to later recognize
as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing
on record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously stated,
his net worth was a mere ₱ 120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and
Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.

In addition, the former President also reported a total of Php 2,521,325 which he referred to as
"Miscellaneous Items" and "Various Corporations" under "Other Income" for 1972-1976. Spouses
Marcos did not declare any income from any deposits that may be subject to a 5% withholding tax, nor
did they file any capital gains tax returns from 1960 to 1965. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested
that there are no records pertaining to the tax transactions of the spouses in Baguio City, Manila,
Quezon City, and Tacloban.

The Balance Sheet attached to the couple’s ITR for 1965 indicates an ending net worth of Php 120,000,
which covered the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency. As previously
mentioned, the combined salaries of the spouses for the period 1966 to 1986, or in the two decades
that they stayed in power, totaled only USD 304,372.43. In stark contrast, as shown by Schedule D,
computations establish the total net worth of the spouses for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total
amount of USD 957,487.75, assuming that the income from legal practice is real and valid. The
combined salaries make up only 31.79% of the spouses’ total net worth from 1965 to 1984. This means
petitioners are unable to account for or explain more than two-thirds of the total net worth of the
Marcos spouses from 1965 to 1984.

Thus, for the final time, we soundly reiterate that the Republic was able to establish the prima facie
presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently
disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. The Republic presented further evidence
that they had bigger deposits beyond their lawful incomes, foremost of which were the Swiss accounts
deposited in the names of five foundations spirited away by the couple to different countries.