E.

General Provisions

1. Manila Prince hotel vs GSIS

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GOVERNMENT SERVICEINSURANCE SYSTEM

Doctrine:
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executingrather than non-self-executing .
. . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions ofthe Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give thelegislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. Theseprovisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could makethem entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.(Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10)

FACTS:
Government Service Insurance System(GSIS), decided to sell through public bidding 30%to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince HotelCorporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and RenongBerhad, a Malaysianfirm, withP2.42more than the bid of
petitioner (P44.00 per share).

petitioner came to this Court onprohibition and mandamus. petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitutionand submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and haspractically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippineheritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believedin
the nobility andsacredness of independence and its powerand capacity to release thefull potential of
the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of thenational patrimony.
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHCcarries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondentGSIS, agovernment-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondentGSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy.Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered bythe term national economy, to whichSec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution,applies.

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the1987 Constitution
is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a selfexecutingprovision and
requiresimplementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, for the saidprovision to operate, there must be existing
laws "to laydown conditions under whichbusiness may be done."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

HELD:

Yes.

1
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governanceand administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable exceptby the authority from which it emanates. It has
been defined as the fundamental andparamount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system ofgovernment, assigns to the different departments their respective powers
and duties, andestablishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamentalconception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must
conformand in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authorityadministered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contractviolates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by thelegislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for privatepurposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution isthe fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it is deemed written in everystatute and contract.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such asthose found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provisionwhich is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary orenabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right itgrants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision isself-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed arefixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
andconstruction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred tothe
legislature for action.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not tomake it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutionalprovision so long as the contemplated statute squares with
the Constitution. Minor detailsmay be left to the legislature without the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-
executing inanother.

2. Santiago vs. COMELEC

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
***This has been reversed

DOCTRINE:
The right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

FACTS:

Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with publicrespondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a
"Petition to Amend theConstitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative". He
alleged that he and the members of the Movement and othervolunteers intend to exercise the power
to directly propose amendments to theConstitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.

Petitioners alleged that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 togovern "the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendumon national and local laws, is
ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments tothe Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC
has no power to provide rulesand regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution.Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.The

2
people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution,not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revisionand is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.

ISSUE:

W/N the provision in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is self- executory.

HELD:

This provision is not self-executory.

Joaquin Bernas, a member ofthe 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although

this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on
congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to theConstitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold nicheof the Constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise,while the Constitution has recognized or granted
that right, the people cannot exerciseit if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.

The Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 beamended by changing
"Congressshall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.Thisamendment was
approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section2.The conclusion then is
inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on theConstitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory.This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a
power toprovide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "thedetails on
how [the right] is to be carried out."

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to"provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

SEC. 2. Statement and Policy . — The power of the people under asystem of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, inwhole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by anylegislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is herebyaffirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. Thatword is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates toinitiative and referendum on national
laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions.That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier,initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people arenot accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in

3
whole or inpart, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respectto
"laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

3. Lambino vs. COMELEC

LAMBINO v. COMELEC

DOCTRINE:

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respectand obedience of
all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution bycavalierly amending or revising it
in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes ofamendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself.To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution
inunchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of theday. If this
Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside theconstitutionally prescribed modes,
tomorrow the new dominant political group thatcomes will demand its own set of changes in the same
cavalier and unconstitutionalfashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of
law in thiscountry.

FACTS:

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution bymodifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 ofArticle VII (Executive Department) 5 and by
adding Article XVIII entitled "TransitoryProvisions." These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

The COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to theLambino Group's petition for lack of
an enabling law governing initiative petitions toamend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this
Court's ruling in Santiago v.Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the
initiativeclause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUE:
W/N the proposed revision of Lambino is valid

HELD:

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in theconstitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system ofchecks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantialentirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisionsof the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change thatadds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revisiongenerally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generallyaffects only the specific provision being
amended.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as whenthe three great co-
equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reducedinto two. This alters the
separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from thepresent Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is arevision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radicalchange in the structure of government.

4
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Officeof the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt arevision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposedchanges, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework ofgovernment as set forth in the Constitution.

Where the intent of the framersand the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated,
courts do not deviatefrom such categorical intent and language. Any theory espousing a
constructioncontrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if
suchtheory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government establishedin the
Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and invitinginconsistencies in the
Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group'sposition. Any theory advocating that
a proposed change involving a radical structuralchange in government does not constitute a revision
justly deserves rejection.

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respectand obedience of
all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution bycavalierly amending or revising it
in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes ofamendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution inunchartered waters, to
be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of theday. If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside theconstitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
political group thatcomes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutionalfashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in
thiscountry.

II. General Considerations

A. National Territory and the Archipelagic Doctrine

1. Province of North Cotabato vs GRP

`````````GR No. 183591

Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga,
petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon,
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping &
Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral
Movement for Peace and Development and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,

Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is
scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August
05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

5
• GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare
unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public
consultation.
• GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD
and to exclude the city to the BJE.
• GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and
additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
• GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the
MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-
AD.
• GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any
other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government
and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on
August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when
then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued.
MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia
interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli
Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman
Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this
MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO
Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law
of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources,
and governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their
Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First
Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity
and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion
to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject to
plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years
from the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have
jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have
"territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within

6
these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters;
but no provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in
those countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in
the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government.
The BJE shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and
the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions
and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection
and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between
the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its
resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to
cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is
associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance
shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested
before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial
review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the
right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of
judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on
issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the
SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does
not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave
abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their
authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and
statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an

7
actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-
AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not
yet effective does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato,
Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention
Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it
is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin
Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would
be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory.
On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as
an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim
Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim
lawyers since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the
MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been
suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court
reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained
of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially
when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render
the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including
possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its
negotiating entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable
expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents'
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus
to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have
already complied thereat.

On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for
the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions

8
are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable safeguards
—the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the
contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be
consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As
such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he
complied with the Court’s order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of
the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as
enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that
would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing
ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the
ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised
by the respondent—since they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot
be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them:

On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested that
in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In international
law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the
one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its
international status as state; free association is a middle ground between integration and
independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international
definition of association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of
an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects
because the principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the
Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the
fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law

9
that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state
in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas
who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents
in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express
provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an
expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its
territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers vested to the
BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a
mere passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement.
The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the
Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the
treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the
President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nation. Should the
BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must be
amended consequently. Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the law that promotes
national unity and development. Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not
epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the BJE and
the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive
to national unity.

On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition
of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between the
Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which
includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain
is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of
reference of the MOA-AD.

On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the
land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that
people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development. There are the internal and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-
pursuit of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral
secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial

10
integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when
there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination.
International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the
right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated
within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under
international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have
the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their
own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide
for the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does
not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would
impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the
provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal
framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions
from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity
of the country—such was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart
from this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP
Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even constitutional
amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether the President
can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule
that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the
President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather
implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the
President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she
has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions
that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may
not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be
prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded,
act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only
by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the
course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that
require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.

11
The President’s power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not
changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is
not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when.
Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework –which
changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent
with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual
guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be
adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck
down as unconstitutional.

On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding
on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a
document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to
guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their
solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process
of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.

2. Magallona vs. Ermita

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students vs.
Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National
Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr.

Carpio, J:

Facts: (keep in mind: Territorial Sea is 12nautical miles(NM) from the baseline; contiguous zone is 24
nm from the baseline and EEZ is 200 nm from the baseline)

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of
the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign
right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left
undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960
(UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades,
save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors
and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny.
The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27
February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application

12
for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified
adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as
"regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. Petitioners contend that the law
has effectively reduced the maritime territory of the country. With this, Article I of the 1987
Constitution will be violated. The petitioners also worried that that because of the suggested changes
in the maritime baselines will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to traverse the Philippine territory
freely. In effect, it steps on the state’s sovereignty and national security.

Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in no way will the amendments affect any pertinent power of
the state. It also deferred to agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over
Sabah. Lastly, they have questioned the normative force of the notion that all the waters within the
rectangular boundaries in the Treaty of Paris. Now, because this treaty still has undetermined
controversies, the Congress believes that in the perspective of international law, it did not see any
binding obligation to honor it.

Issues:

1. Whether petitioners have standing? - Yes

2. Whether RA 9522 is constitutional? - Yes

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC recognizes petitioners' locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the
resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably
difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus
satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to
demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that
UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations.
UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the
state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role
played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000
square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base
points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the
Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country

13
will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not
exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the
country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand
and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from
the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the
Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation
under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines
of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic
of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of
internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to
archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages,
exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether
internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its
obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international
law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed
incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international
law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of
archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the
demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing
of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the
UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring
powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime
space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent
areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest.

B. State Immunity
1. University of the Philippines vs. Dion

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIZON

DOCTRINE:

14
An appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered theUP liable for moral
and actual damages (including attorney's fees) would be satisfiedconsidering that such monetary
liabilities were not covered by the "appropriationsearmarked for the said project." The Constitution
strictly mandated that "(n)o money shallbe paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."

FACTS:

On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into aGeneral
Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (SternBuilders)for
theconstruction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts andSciences
Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).

UP paid only two of thebillings. The third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its
disallowance by theCommission on Audit (COA).The RTC issued the writ of execution and served the
writ of execution and notice of demand upon the UP. The sheriff served notices ofgarnishment on the
UP's depository banks, namely: Land Bank of the Philippines and DBP.

That there was no longer any legal impediment to the release of the garnished funds.The UP argued
that government funds and properties could not be seized by virtue of writsof execution or
garnishment, as held in Department of Agriculture v. National LaborRelations Commission, and citing
Section 84 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 to theeffect that "[r]evenue funds shall not be paid out of
any public treasury or depositoryexcept in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific
statutory authority;" and thatthe order of garnishment clashed with the ruling in University of the
Philippines Board ofRegents v. Ligot-Telan to the effect that the funds belonging to the UP were
publicfunds.

ISSUE:
The court of appeals committed grave error in allowingGarnishment of a state university's funds in
violation of articleXIV, Section 5(5) of the constitution.

HELD:

UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State'sconstitutional mandate of promoting quality

and accessible education. As agovernment instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced
from the fees andincome enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No.
714,andfrom the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act1870, as
expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession ofthe UP, including any
interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any bankinginstitution, constitute a "special trust
fund," the disbursement of which should always bealigned with the UP's mission and purpose, and
should always be subject to auditing bythe COA.

The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include theincome
accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only forthe attainment of its
institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this actioncould not be validly made the subject of
the RTC's writ of execution or garnishment. Theadverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit
to which it had impliedly consentedwas not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP,
because suability of theState did not necessarily mean its liability.

15
UP correctly submits here that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgmentawards of actual
and moral damages (including attorney's fees) was not validly made ifthere was no special
appropriation by Congress to cover the liability.The CA and the RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored
thelegal restriction imposed on the trust funds of the Government and its agencies
andinstrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the trusts werecreated or
for which the funds were received except upon express authorization byCongress or by the head of a
government agency in control of the funds, and subject topertinent budgetary laws, rules and
regulations.

2. Arigo vs. Swift

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the
US. 7th Fleet

G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

FACTS:

The present petition seeks the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise
known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of
environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian
over the Tubbataha Reefs.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative
and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident.

Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment to the petition, petitioners also filed a
motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents.

ISSUE1:

WON petitioners have locus standi?

HELD:

Yes. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that
not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights,
they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

16
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations
yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental
cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.”

ISSUE2:

WON the US respondents, being impleaded in their official capacity is covered by the State immunity
from suit?

HELD:

Yes.

ISSUE3:

WON they may nonetheless be held liable under the UNCLOS?

HELD:

Yes.

ISSUE4:

WON the US, being not a signatory to the UNCLOS, may nevertheless be bound by it?

HELD:

Yes.

RATIO:

On State Immunity From Suit and the US respondents being sued in their official capacity

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability
of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority
of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition
and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the
state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by
Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which
the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen
of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]

17
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,.such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its
consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states
from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he
is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment
against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit
must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an
immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is,
rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which
distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and
proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends
only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs.

In Shauf v. Court of Appeals, we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGeZaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property

18
 rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he
does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
x xxx

They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official
acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that
a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity
as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and
its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on
the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of
funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
Swift, Rice and Robling.

On UNCLOS liability of a warship

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct
of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and
caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional
uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former
Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean
Cruise Lines, Ltd.

The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms
governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with
respect to the uses of the oceans." The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for
signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984
but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.

The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare
clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the
world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law.The UNCLOS
gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea
which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and
5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending
on where the vessel is located.

19
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to
the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it,
the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State
resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through
the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal
waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may
apply.

On US Liability under the UNCLOS being a non-signatory

An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite
this the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.

While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S.
delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed
mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to
induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding
decade to revise the objectionable provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration,
which signed the revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President
Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its
advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and
an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for
the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.

Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10,
1983 that the US will "recognize the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts, as
reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and

20
others under international law are recognized by such coastal states", and President Clinton's
reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to
traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31
relates to the "traditional uses of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of
the other states in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to
expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this
case."

As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the
UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining
(Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,"
pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation."

We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean
that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal
waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under
Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which
has been actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal
waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs,
unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect
and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:

Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable
for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-
commercial purposes under Article 31.

ISSUE5:

WON the waiver found in the VFA covers special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan?

HELD:

No. The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel
visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in
the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines
the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and

21
supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering
that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine
waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation
of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the
criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

ISSUE:

WON the constitutionality of the VFA may be questioned in the present petition?

HELD:

No. We cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and
to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.

As held in BAYAN (BagongAlyansangMakabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred
in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VFA being a
valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its
terms and provisions. The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions.

C. General Principles and State Policies

1. Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch vs CIR
2. Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, 618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010,
En Banc [Del Castillo])
Doctrine:
“The Court is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public
opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate”.

Facts: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Their applications to Comelec were
denied due to lack of basis and moral issues. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the assailed resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.

22
Issue:
1) WON the petitioner’s application will be granted?
2) WON the Philippines is not giving effect to reflect binding principles of international law?

Held 1: . Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,
and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its
views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech
for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a
political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception
that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex
conduct.[41] European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants
on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign
and international texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have
reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign
authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive
influence on the Courts analysis.

Held 2 : At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms
that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any
of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are
divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is
to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in
the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

3. James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8,
2014,
Doctrine : “life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the
uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of
life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb, is an abortifacient”
Facts: Challengers from various sectors assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law). Respondent Lagman argues that the the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.
ISSUE: WON RH LAW is unconstitutional as it prevents the implantation of the fertilization?

23
HELD: Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State
has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits
any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to
that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug
or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean
at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare
either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather,
it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two,
the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches
and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the
moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or
destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the
RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization,
not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained
but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined
by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized
ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.
4. Garcia vs. Drilon
5. Republic vs. Albios
6. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., et.al. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et.al. (G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301
and 209430) 8 December 2015
Doctrine: Precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.

FACTS:

In 1990, President Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order (EO) No. 430 creating the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) which was tasked to identify and evaluate
potential hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments and introducing new
species and genetically engineered organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks.
In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines which governs the regulation of
the importation or introduction, movement and field release of potentially hazardous biological
materials in the Philippines. The same was followed by the Guidelines on Planned Release of
Genetically Manipulated Organisms (GMOs) and Potentially Harmful Exotic Species (PHES).

On 29 December 1993, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) came into force. This is a
multilateral treaty recognizing the great potential of modern biotechnology for human well-
being if developed and used with adequate safety measures for the environment and human
health.

In January 2000, an agreement was reached on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

(Cartagena Protocol), a supplement to the CBD, which aims to ensure an adequate level of
safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern
biotechnology. The Philippines signed the same on May 24 of the same year.

24
In April 2002, the Department of Agriculture (DA) issued DA Administrative Order No. 08 which
provides rules and regulations for the importation and release into the environment of plants
and plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology.
On 17 March 2006, EO No. 514 (EO 514) entitled, “Establishing the National Biosafety
Framework (NBF), Prescribing Guidelines for its Implementation, and Strengthening the
NCBP” was issued. It expressly provides that DAO 2002-08, NCBP Guidelines on the
Contained Use of GMOs, except for provisions on potentially harmful exotic species which
were repealed, and all issuances of the Bureau of Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) on
products of modern biotechnology, shall continue to be in force and effect unless amended by
the issuing departments or agencies.

On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed between International

Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the
Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI),
in pursuance of a collaborative research and development project on eggplants that are
resistant to the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner agencies volved were UPLB through its
Institute of Plant Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell
University and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) of USAID.

The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was
described as a “bio-engineered eggplant.” The crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant genome to produce the protein
CrylAc which is toxic to target insect pests. The latter is said to be highly specific to
lepidopteran larvae such as fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of
eggplant.

NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which was conducted from
2007 to 3 March 2009 stating that during the conduct of experiment, all the biosafety measures
have been complied with and no untoward incident has occurred.

On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) issued biosafety
permits to UPLB.

Field testing commenced on various dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North
Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay,
Laguna.

On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace, et.al.)

filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field
trials violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that:
- The required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under PD 1151 was not
secured prior to the project implementation
- There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt talong for human
consumption and the environment
- There was a study conducted showing adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt corn,
local scientists likewise attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human and animal
health
- Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species
- There is a failure to comply with the required public consultation under Sections 26 and
27 of the Local Government Code

25
 - The case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, it being a classic
environmental case where scientific evidence as to the health, environmental and socio-
economic safety is insufficient or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation
indicates reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially dangerous effects on
human health and the environment
The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace, et.al., to wit:
- Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) from processing for field testing and registering as
herbicidal product Bt talong in the Philippines, stopping all pending field testing, and
ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and
- Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the ISAAAI, et.al.: (1) to submit
to an environmental impact statement system under the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-EMB); (2) to
submit an independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk assessment, field tests report,
and regulatory compliance reports; (3) to submit all issued certifications on public
information, public consultation, public participation and consent from the LGUs affected
by the field testing; (4) to submit an acceptable draft of an amendment of the NBF and
DAO 2002-08; and
(5) for BPI of DA to conduct balanced nationwide public information on the nature of Bt
talong and Bt talong field trial, and a survey of its social acceptability.

On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA and UPLB,
ordering them to file a verified return.

The contentions of the respondents are as follows:

- All environmental laws were complied with, including public consultations in the affected
communities
- The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement
Law
- There is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of Bt
talong for human consumption
- Allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong are irrelevant in the field trial stage as none
of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals
- There is a non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts
- Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing as they do not stand to suffer any direct
injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests
- The precautionary principle does not apply since the field testing is only a part of a
continuing study to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative impact on
the environment

SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the case to the Court of Appeals.

On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the following procedural issues before the CA:
(1) whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2)
whether the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the alleged termination of the
Bt talong field testing; and (3) whether the case presented a justiciable controversy

CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved that: (1) the Greenpeace, et.al. possess
legal standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it is capable of repetition yet evading review;
and (3) the alleged non-compliance with environmental and local government laws present
justiciable controversies for resolution by the court.

26
 On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of the Greenpeace, et.al. finding that the
precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (the Rules) finds relevance in the case.

CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and
UPLBFI rejecting the argument that CA violated UPLB’s right to academic freedom. The writ
stops the field trials of Bt talong as a procedure, it does not stop Bt talong research. Thus,
there is no assault on academic freedom.

CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing a genetically
modified plant into our ecosystem is an “ecologically imbalancing act.”

Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI to

reverse the CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of field trials for Genetically
Modified eggplants.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Precautionary Principle applies

RULING:

Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the normative
idea that governments are obliged to “foresee and forestall” harm to the environment. The Rules
incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:

SEC.1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a

causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply
the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be
given the benefit of the doubt.

SEC 2. Standards for application. – In applying the precautionary principle, the

following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or
health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the
environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those
affected.

When the features of uncertainty, possibility of irreversible harm, and possibility of serious
harm coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. The Supreme Court found all
three (3) conditions present.

While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable, independent
scientific studies revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops and
plants, adverse effects on the environment associated with the use of GE technology in
agriculture, and serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich
country like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination and
genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the crucial stages
of risk assessment and public consultation, including the determination of the applicability of the

27
 EIS requirements to the GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for the application of the
precautionary principle.

There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the GMOs into the environment
threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of
our people once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food.

Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the principles of the NBF
need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the concerned departments and
agencies before allowing the release into the environment of genetically modified eggplant.

Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from stakeholders, including marginalized
famers, not just the scientific community. This proceeds from the realization that acceptance of
uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical
dimension.

D. Separation of Powers and Check and Balances

1. Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa (2013)

Antecedents:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects”
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya
Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations)
which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in

28
fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the
results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

I. Procedural issue: Whether the Supreme Court can exercise its power of juridical
review on the ground that the requisites of judicial review is not present? – Yes. All
the requisites are present.
Held:

Justiciable Controversy
By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power operates only when there is
an actual case or controversy. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. The Court finds that
there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of
legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System. Also, the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such
as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869 for the Presidential
Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

Ripeness for Adjudication

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness, meaning
that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action The cases at present have
not become moot. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The Court observes that
respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy since said
reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct
subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he
had already abolished the PDAF render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through
the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality

Moreover, the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (c) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the four
exceptions are applicable in this case.

Whether the question is a Political Question? No.

The issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its
province to resolve. A political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. The intrinsic constitutionality

29
of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise
judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith under the expanded concept of
judicial power under Section1, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution.

Whether petitioners have Locus Standi? Yes.

Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing. Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question
the validity of the existing Pork Barrel System under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
Moreover, as citizens, petitiones have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues
they have raised may be classified as matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest

Whether Res Judicata Applies?

Held: No. (It does not apply)
Res judicata means “a matter adjudged”. The focal point of res judicata is the judgment.The res
judicata principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there
exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. The res judicata principle
cannot apply in this case. The required identity is not present since Philconsa and LAMP,
respectively, involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel System.
Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus,
hardly a judgment on the merits.

Whether the principle of Stare Decisis applies? No.

Stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis) means “follow past precedents and do
not disturb what has been settled”. The focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The stare
decisis principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if
the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the
first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike.

The Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the
contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of the entire Pork Barrel System. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore,
considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As for
LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and,
hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues
in these cases.

II. Substantive issues

30
Discussion of the Pork Barrel System (preface before the substantive issues)
The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern
the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government,
including its members.

The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

1. Congressional Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators,

either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control
certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or
practices.

2. Presidential Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner of its utilization.

Issue #1 for the Substantive Issues

Whether the Congressional Pork Barrel system is constitutional? – No on the following
grounds:
The Supreme Court declared that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and its
predecessor, the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) are unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional on the following grounds:

(a) Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators have been authorized to
participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in
violation of the separation of powers principle. From the moment the law becomes effective,
any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional.
(b) Non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate is lodged in Congress and must
be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Insofar as the 2013 PDAF Article has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine, it has violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power;
(c) Checks and balances. Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the
2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible
item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto. Insofar as it has created a
system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted
the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power
to veto items
(d) Public Accountability. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Allowing legislators
to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.

31
 (e) Political dynasty. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said
provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
(f) Local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets
the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which
would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. This concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs). Insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene
in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has
likewise subverted genuine local autonomy.

Issue #2: Whether the Presidential Pork Barrel is constitutional? – No because it is an undue
delegation of legislative power.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is
sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of
(a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.

The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under
the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects”, it has transgressed the
principle of non-delegability..

Other Notes: Please Read also kasi eto ung history ng Pork Barrel
Previous Rulings on PDAF/CDF
In Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the then known Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The petitioners in the said
case claimed that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects
and activites to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power.
They argued that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or
the repeal and amendment thereof which is the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be. The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of
ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and other credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries..." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. On
the other hand, the Executive was responsive for the implementation of the priority projects specified
in the law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the authority given to the members of Congress is

32
only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under the GAA of 1994, the
President must examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the
specific items of expenditures for which the CDF was set up, and if qualified, the President next
determines whether they are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the
proposed projects qualify for funding, it is the President who shall implement them. The proposals
and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.

In addition, the Supreme Court stated that the CDF is a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely o be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given to each
project.

In Sarmiento v. Treasurer, G.R. Nos. 125680 & 126313, September 4, 2001, the petitioners
questioned the constitutionality of the CDF under the GAA of 1996. Seeking the reversal of Philconsa
v. Enriquez, the petitioners alleged that the proposal and identification of projects by members of
Congress were not merely recommendatory considering that requests for releases of funds under the
CDF are automatically released. The Solicitor General argued that since the questioned provision is
basically the same provision found in the 1994 GAA held as constitutional by the Supreme Court in
Philconsa v. Enriquez, the instant case should be resolved in the same manner, following the
principle of stare decisis. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the CDF under the 1996
GAA.

In League Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management,
G.R. 164987, April 21, 2012, petitioners assailed the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in the GAA of
2004. According to the petitioners, the provision in the GAA as regards the PDAF is silent and
therefore prohibits an automatic allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for
funding of projects. It does not give the individual members of Congress the mandate to propose,
select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. The petitioners submitted that
such a situation violates the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and thereafter
spending funds for their chosen projects, the members of Congress in effect intruded into an
executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to
legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction and therefore
impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the PDAF. The Court stated that no convincing proof was presented showing
that, indeed there were direct releases of funds to members of Congresss, who actually spent them
according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM
in favor of the members of Congres was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe
into the truth of their claims. The Court further stated that the authority granted to members of
Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa v. Enriquez, and there is no
need to review or reverse the pronouncements made in said case so long as there is no showing of a
direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget.

Mandamus
Petitioners prayed that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management
be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed
reports related to the availments and utilization of the PDAF and Malampaya funds. Petitioners‘
prayer was grounded on Section 28, Article II (policy of full public disclosure) and Section 7, Article III
(right of the people to information on matters of public concern) of the 1987 Constitution. The court
denied the prayer of petitioner on procedural grounds. The proper remedy to invoke the right to
information is to file a petition for mandamus. Citing Legaspi vs CSC: “ the duty to disclose the

33
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the
part
of said agencies. Xxx The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case” Moreover, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte
Jr., it has been clarified that the right to information does not include the right to compel the
preparation of lists, abstracts, summaries and the like. In the same case, it was stressed that it is
essential that the applicant has a well defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and
that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information.

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions,
the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right"
to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use
Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or
administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the
documents requested. Nevertheless, petitioners are not denied access to official documents which
are already existing and of public record.

Inclusion of Funds in Budgetary Deliberations

The Court also denied petitioners' prayer to order the inclusion of the subject funds in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.

TRO Enjoining Release of Remaining PDAF

In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF
allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular 2013-8 which authorized the continued
implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: (a) covered by a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO); and (b) that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing
agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO. As to the issue of
lifting the TRO, the present decision has rendered it moot and academic. The unconstitutionality of
the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary
injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the
remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

As to the coverage and application of the TRO, the Court agreed with the petitioners’ position that
"the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is
only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). As such, PDAF disbursements,
even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.

A SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking,
the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of
the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which
will prevent the actual release of funds.Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should
not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of
2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs
issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to
the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.

Operative Fact Doctrine

The Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD

34
910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact
doctrine.

The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and
thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.

2. ROMARICO J. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs .PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 183891. October 19, 2011

Doctine: Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the offense.

FACTS:

Romarico J.Mendoza,the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC’s Decision dated August 3,
2010. The Decision affirmed the petitioner's conviction for his failure to remit the Social Security
Service (SSS) contributions of his employees. The petitioner anchors the present motion on his
supposed inclusion within the coverage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 or the Social Security
Condonation Law of 2009, whose passage the petitioner claims to be a supervening event in his
case. He filed for motion for reconsideration with the CA, arguing that:

1. During the pendency of the petitioner's case before the Court, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo signed RA No. 9903 into law. RA No. 9903 mandates the effective
withdrawal of all pending cases against employers who would remit their delinquent
contributions to the SSS within a specified period, viz., within six months after the law's
effectivity. The petitioner claims that in view of RA No. 9903 and its implementing rules, the
settlement of his delinquent contributions in 2007 entitles him to an acquittal. He invokes the
equal protection clause in support of his plea.
2. The petitioner alternatively prays that should the Court find his above argument wanting, he
should still be acquitted since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged.
3. The petitioner prays that a fine be imposed, not imprisonment, should he be found guilty.

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment and claims that the passage of RA No.
9903 constituted a supervening event in the petitioner's case that supports the petitioner's acquittal
"after a conscientious review of the case."

However the CA denied his motions.

ISSUE:

35
Whether or not the Supreme Court can recommend to the President the grant of executive clemency
to a convict, without violating the separation of powers
RULING:

Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, 12 the courts are bound to apply the law as it is and
impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision, however, gives the
Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its
power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive.

Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge
of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

E. Delegation of Powers

1. BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, respondents.
G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008

Doctrine: , Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The
power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

FACTS:

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic Act (“R.A.”) No.
6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM.
Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in
November 1989.

There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district of
Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for the reason noted
above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff
Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming
the first legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly
First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City,” prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion

36
from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.

RULING:

No, The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress
to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However, pursuant to the
Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated.
Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly
and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid.

The creation of local government units (LGUs) is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. There are three conditions that must be complied with in creating any of the four local
government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – to wit:

1. The creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code.
2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to
create LGUs, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of
the Constitution.

When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the
Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM Regional
Assembly) of the power to create such LGUs. The creation of provinces and cities is another matter.

The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
This is clear under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution (“Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution (“ “Any province that
may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x
x x.”) In other words, for Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must
also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.

However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law,
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to
reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the

37
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a
law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact.
The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.

The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national
legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a
law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative
districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior
legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its
occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous
for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its
legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is
maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-
evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it
can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To
allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to
operate outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers
“[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.”

2. NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA), et al. petitionersvs.

THE NATIONAL POWERCORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF
DIRECTORS (NPB) et. al, respondents
G.R. No. 156208. September 26, 2006

Doctrine: An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the

presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise
that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has
been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

FACTS:

On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took
effect on 26 June 2001.

Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, a new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors was formed. An
energy restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was also created to manage the
privatization and the restructuring of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the National
Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Corporation
(PSALC).

On November 18 , 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124, which provided for
“Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel.”
Under this Resolution the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31,
2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits provided therein. On the same day, the NPB

38
approved NPB Resolution 2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to manage and implement the
NPC’s Separation Program.

Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in their individual and
representative capacities, the present Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from
implementing NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is valid delegation of duties by the department secretaries, hence NPB
Resolutions No.2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly enacted

RULING:

No, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and
discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defned as "the act or the liberty to
decide according to the principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the
circumstances, without willfulness or favor. Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a
power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to
the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of
others. It is to be presumed that in naming the respective department heads as members of the
board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on
the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to occupy their
present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their
duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions,
because it is their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.

There is no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involves the exercise of
discretion and not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate, thus, the rule
enunciated in the case of Binamira v. Garrucho is relevant in the present controversy, to wit:
An officer to whom discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being
that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot
delegate his duties to another.

In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer,
the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was
deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute
another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

While it is true that the Court has determined in the case of American Tobacco Company v.
Director of Patents that a delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to assist
him in his functions, it must be stressed that the Court explicitly stated in the same case that said
practice is permissible only when the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of
the officer authorized by law. According to the Court, the rule that requires an administrative officer
to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of
practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates, so long as it is the legally authorized
official who makes the final decision through the use of his own personal judgment.

In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-
124 and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive
departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed

39
Resolution, as shown by the fact that it is the signatures of the respective representatives that are
affixed to the questioned Resolutions. This, to our mind, violates the duty imposed upon the
specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising the
corporate powers of the NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by these mere representatives in favor of the
adoption of the said Resolutions must not be considered in determining whether or not the necessary
number of votes was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may be validly enacted. Hence,
there being only three valid votes cast out of the nine board members, namely those of DOE
Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T.
Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President Rolando S. Quilala, NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No.
2002-125 are void and are of no legal effect.

40