JOEY P. MARQUEZ v.

SANDIGANBAYAN 5TH DIVISION

GR Nos. 187912-14

January 19, 2011

Facts:
Through this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, petitioner Joey P. Marquez
(Marquez) assails the 1] February 11, 2009 Resolution of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan
(SB-5th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905; and its 2] May 20, 2009
Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
In the assailed issuances, the SB-5th Division denied Marquez's Motion to Refer Prosecution's
Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
From the records, it appears that as a result of the Report on the Audit of Selected Transactions
and Walis Ting-ting for the City of Parañaque for the years 1996 to 1998, conducted by the
Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies were... discovered
involving Marquez, then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards committee of
Parañaque City; and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General Services Office of said
city.
It was found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding, Marquez and Caunan
secured the procurement of several thousand rounds of bullets of different calibers that were
grossly overpriced from VMY Trading, a company not registered as an arms and ammunitions
dealer with either the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Finding the transactions anomalous, the COA Special Audit Team issued Notices of
Disallowances for the overpriced ammunitions. Marquez and Caunan sought reconsideration of
the findings of the team, but their plea was denied.  Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the
COA but their appeal was denied.
At the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), in answer to the charges filed against them, Marquez
and Caunan filed their Joint Counter Affidavit with the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau of said office. In the said affidavit, the two insisted on the propriety of the transactions
and raised the pendency of their appeal with the COA.
Having found probable cause to indict them for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, the OMB, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed three (3)
informations[5] against Marquez and Caunan. The cases were raffled... to the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan (SB-4th Division).
Before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of the forged signatures,
Marquez sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization
requests to the NBI and the reinvestigation of the cases against him.[6]  These were denied by
the OSP.
On May 20, 2008, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez recused themselves from further
participating in the cases. The cases were then raffled to the SB-5th Division.
Thereafter, on July 4, 2008, Marquez filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution's Evidence for
Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. In
his motion, he again insisted that his purported signatures on the vouchers were forged.
By way of Comment/Opposition to the motion, the prosecution argued that its documentary
exhibits had already been formally offered in January 2006 and had been duly admitted by the
anti-graft court. The prosecution added that, when confronted with the questioned transactions...
during the COA audit investigation, Marquez never raised the defense of forgery. Instead, he
insisted on the propriety of the transactions. He did not claim forgery either when he filed his
Joint Counter-Affidavit with the OMB. Also, in his verified Motion for Reconsideration dated May
29, 2003 and Supplemental Motion dated July 1, 2003 filed with the COA, no allegation of forgery
was made.
The prosecution pointed to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court and posited that
since Marquez alleged in his pleadings that he had relied on the competence of his subordinates,
there could be no "palpable mistake," thus, he was estopped from alleging that his signatures on
the subject documents were forged. The prosecution accused Marquez of filing the motion
merely to delay the proceedings.
Issues:
Whether or not public respondent Sandiganbayan - 5th Division committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its resolutions respectively
dated February 11, 2009 and May 20, 2009 denying the petitioner's motion to refer prosecution's
evidence for examination by the questioned documents section of the National Bureau of
Investigation which denial is in violation of his right to present evidence and his twin constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection of law.
Ruling:
One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due
process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present one's
defense. Under Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that:
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the
court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)
that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it
means that the accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the
courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an
accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of
its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN                    

G.R. No. 148560.

November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.

On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. It suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. It dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions

3. It abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the revised penal
code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against

petitioner.

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,

reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied.

Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused.

Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than
one offense. Same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague.

HELD:

NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct  to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164266.

July 23, 2008

FACTS:

Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga had three daughters, namely: Marianne, Mary Ann and
the victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the petitioner herein. The Zuiga family, including
Mary Ann and the petitioner were living together at 550 Coloong I, Valenzuela City. Their
residence had three bedrooms one for the Zuiga spouses; the other for Marianne and Arlene;
and the last for Mary Ann and the petitioner. On September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses,
together with Marianne, went to Bulacan to attend the wake of Ernesto’s mother; while Mary Ann
with her new born child, and Arlene, stayed at their Valenzuela home. Petitioner, at that time,
asked permission to attend a birthday party. At about 9:00 in the evening, petitioner,
accompanied by Eduardo Palomares, returned home to get some karaoke tapes to be used at
the birthday party. They thereafter went back to the party and stayed there until 12
midnight before heading back home.

At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuiga spouses and Marianne arrived home. They
opened the main door which was then locked. After preparing for sleep, Marianne proceeded to
the room which she was sharing with Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who suffered stab wounds,
already dead. After seeing Arlene’s body, the Zuiga spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann
and the petitioner. While Mary Ann proceeded to Arlene’s room, petitioner stayed at the sala and
cried. He was later seen embracing Mary Ann and telling her that he was innocent.

At around 5:00 in the morning, police investigators arrived. The police found no forcible entry into
the house; no valuables were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house except
Arlene’s room. They likewise discovered, on top of the kitchen table, petitioner’s underwear
(briefs), gray t-shirt and short pants. They further found hair strands on Arlene’s bed. These
pieces of evidence were brought to the laboratory for examination. The NBI Forensic Biologist
also examined petitioner’s briefs, t-shirt and short pants, and found that the briefs and shirt were
positive of type O human blood, Arlene’s blood type.

Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide in an Information. The aforementioned facts were
established during the prosecution’s presentation of evidence. It was further testified to by the
witnesses that petitioner owned a knife otherwise known as balisong, which he usually brought
every time he went out. Ill motive was shown by petitioner’s previous act of peeping through the
bathroom and Arlene’s room on two occasions while she was taking a bath and while she was
inside the room with Marianne. For his part, all that the petitioner could offer was bare denial of
the accusations against him. The RTC rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty of
homicide.  The RTC considered the following circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish
petitioners. On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of homicide.

RULING:

As to petitioner’s shirt and briefs, as correctly held by the trial court (and as affirmed by the
appellate court), they were found to be stained with type O blood (the victim’s blood
type). Instead of questioning the absence of proof that he was not of the same blood type as the
victim, petitioner should have presented evidence that he indeed has type O blood. The fact
remains that petitioner offered no explanation why his shirt and briefs contained bloodstains. It is,
therefore, correct to conclude that they were stained with the victim’s blood.

 Moreover, the absence of scratches and bruises on petitioner’s body parts does not negate the
trial courts conclusion that the victim had the chance to struggle with the petitioner. This is so
because, at the time the petitioner attacked the victim between 1:00 and 4:00 in the morning, she
was most likely asleep and was only awakened by the petitioner; she was, therefore, not in a
position to offer strong resistance. This explains why such struggle produced no bruises and
scratches.

The presence of petitioner’s wife inside the house at that time does not likewise negate the
commission of the crime. Considering that his wife was a nursing mother who definitely had
sleepless nights, she could not be expected to be conscious of everything that happened outside
her room.

More importantly, intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they testified relative
to the peeping incident. Although there was no evidence or allegation of sexual advances, such
incident manifested petitioner’s evil motive. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of
mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or
from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. Motive and intent may be
considered one and the same, in some instances, as in the present case.

Lastly, the DNA analysis made by the NBI expert placed the petitioner at the scene of the
crime. Such evidence was considered, together with the other circumstances discussed
earlier. The individual pieces of evidence may not be sufficient to point to the accused as the
author of the crime. However, when taken together, they are more than enough to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of homicide. We would like to
emphasize at this point that the peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the
accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like
a puzzle which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing towards the conclusion
that the accused is the author of the crime.

The prosecution’s evidence, especially the testimonies of the witnesses who happen to be the
victim’s relatives, was not weakened by the fact of such relationship. The Court notes that
petitioner himself is a relative of the witnesses, albeit by affinity, being the husband of the victim’s
sister. It is unnatural for a relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody
else other than the real culprit. For her/him to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where there is
nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their
positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.

We also reiterate the well-settled rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of
respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the present
case. Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the power to
review whether the trial courts conclusions were in accord with the facts and the relevant
laws. The credibility given by the trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of
evidence which appellate courts can rely on, because of the trial courts unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and
cross-examination by counsels.
BAHILIDAD VS PEOPLE

GR-185195

MARCH 17, 2010

FACTS:

This is a complaint filed by a Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the
Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants
and donations using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in
Sarangani province. Release of financial assistance intended to NGOs/POs and LGUs were
fraudulently and illegally made thus local development projects do not exist, Financial Assistance
were also granted to Cooperatives whose officials and members were mostly government
personnel or relative of the officials of Sarangani Province. Included in the list of alleged fictitious
associations that benefited from the financial assistance given to certain Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), Peoples Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was
Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in the amount of P20,000.00, issued in the
name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof. Accused Felipe Katu Constantino,
a high-ranking public officer, being the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Maria D.
Camanay, Provincial Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial Board Member, Amelia Carmela
C. Zoleta, Executive Assistant III, all accountable public officials of the Provincial Government of
Sarangani, by reason of the duties of their office, conspiring and confederating with Violeta
Balihidad, private individual by falsifying or causing to be falsified the corresponding
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822 and its supporting documents, making it appear
that financial assistance had been sought by Women in Progress, Malungon, Sarangani,
represented by its President Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta (Zoleta, who was the daughter of Vice-
Governor Constantino, and simultaneously an Executive Assistant III in the latters office.)

SANDIGANBAYAN DCN: found petitioner Bahilidad (alleged treasurer) and Zoleta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents.

Petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission
of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The trial
court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bahilidad was correctly found guilty of conspiring with the said public
officials.

HELD: NO. Other than her being named as the payee, however, there were no overt acts
attributed to her adequate to hold her equally guilty of the offense proved. There was no showing
that petitioner had a hand in the preparation of the requirements submitted for the disbursement
of the check. There was no evidence presented that she was instrumental to the issuance of the
check in favor of WIP, nor was there any showing that she interceded for the approval of the
check. Why the check was issued in her name and not in the name of WIP is beyond cavil, but
this was not incumbent upon her to question.

On being informed by Melanie Remulta that WIPs request for financial assistance was granted,
petitioner went to the provincial capitol to claim the check, because the check was issued in her
name as the Treasurer of WIP. She later encashed the check and distributed the proceeds to the
different members of WIP. There were acknowledgment receipts and the Sandiganbayan faulted
petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting that she should have deposited the
check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioners
name and, as payee, she had the authority to encash it. The Disbursement Voucher (No. 101-
2002-01-822) clearly states that she is the WIP treasurer, and the purpose of the voucher is to
cash advance financial assistance from grants and donations for Winds Malugon, Sarangani as
per supporting papers hereto attached. Petitioners action cannot, in itself, be considered as
specious.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical
acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken
together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal
design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an
offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.  
Garcia v. CA

GR 157171

March 14 2006

FACTS:

On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino Pimintel,
Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully and
unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes.

Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was acquited
due to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined under
Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total
of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.

Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no
motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES: 

(1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se.

(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

HELD: 

(1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a
candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and
hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.

“Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the
acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are
mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because
the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been
violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy.”

(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of
the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would
result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial
candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of
canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of
six months is AFFIRMED.

YSIDORO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192330

November 14, 2012

On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Brgy. Tinugtogan, was 70% done,
the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their
families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction
stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she
sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the
municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And
since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to
the CSAP beneficiaries.

Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to se
ek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed th
e withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.

Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint
against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject
SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children. She also
pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government
Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation
when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.

The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolu
tion appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on the executi
ve budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive an
d Integrated Delivery of Social Services which covers the CSAP housing projects.

The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than that f
or which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation

Ruling: No.

The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies
public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use
for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance.Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the
offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave
the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.

Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If
Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing
beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for the
latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the
CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted
the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no
criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another
public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently
immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.  It is the commission of an act as defined
by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.

Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted,
constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that
his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.
Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72964

January 7, 1988

FACTS:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano (Urbano) was on his way to his
ricefield when he discovered that the place where he stored palay was flooded with water coming
from an irrigation canal. When he investigated the area, he saw Marcelino Javier (Javier) and
Emilio Efre (Efre). Javier admitted that he opened the irrigation canal. A quarrel ensued, and
Urbano started to hack Javier with a bolo. Javier was wounded at the right palm of his hand.

Upon intervention, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano agreed to
shoulder all the expenses for the medication of the wound of Javier, as well as to pay also
whatever loss of income Javier may have suffered. Javier, on the other hand, signed a statement
of his forgiveness towards Urbano and on that condition, he withdrew the complaint that he filed
against Urbano.

After several weeks of treatments and medication, the doctor pronounced that the wound
of Javier was already healed. However, on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
hospital when he had sudden lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be
caused by tetanus toxin which infected from the healing wound in his right palm of his hand. The
following day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died.

The heirs of Javier filed a case of homicide against Urbano. Urbano was charged with
homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Intermediate Appellate
Court.

Urbano then filed a motion for a new trial based on the affidavit sworn by the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on
November 5. The motion was denied by the respondent court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier may be considered as the proximate
cause of the latter’s death.

RULING:

No, the wound inflicted by Urbano cannot be considered as the proximate cause of Javier’s
death.

The Court defined proximate cause as “that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.” In this case, the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we
are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’ €™s death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court ruled that Urbano is not liable for the death of Javier. Urbano is only liable for
the physical injuries inflicted to Javier through the wound on the right palm of his hand. The Court
took into account the average incubation period of tetanus toxin, and medical evidence indicated
that patients affected with tetanus experience its symptoms within 14 days. If, indeed, Javier had
incurred tetanus poisoning out of the wound inflicted by Urbano, he would not have experienced
the symptoms on the 23rd day after the hacking incident.

The medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. However, the act
of Javier working in his farm where the soil is filthy, using his own hands, is an efficient
supervening cause which relieves Urbano of any liability for the death of Javier. There is a
likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death
with which the petitioner had nothing to do.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 171951

August 28, 2009

FACTS: 

Amado Garcia and Fidel Foz Jr., had a drinking spree in the morning of September 1999 that
lasted the until the evening of that day. Because of the blaring noise of the videoke machine that
the two were enjoying, Manuel Chy, told the group to quiet down. Two days after, the met again
on a wedding and again, Chy told the two to stop singing. On the next day, the two, now with a
friend, decided to have a drinking session and later moved to Punta.

On their way to Punta, they saw Chy. The petitioner suddenly assaulted Chy and struck him on
the lower part of his head with a bottle. When Chy found a way to escape, he rushed to his home
and phoned his wife and told her to call the police. When they arrived, they found Chy
unconscious and later pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital

The petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The petitioner contended
that he should only be charged with slight physical injuries as his assault on Chy was not the
cause of his death.

ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia is liable for Manuel Chy’s death.

RULING: 

YES. It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from
the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion
then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.

The essential requisites for the application of this Article 4 of the RPC are: (a) the intended act is
felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong
was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously
afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s liability for his death. a person committing
a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the
unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended.
PEOPLE vs. PAGE

77 SCRA 348

June 7, 1977

Facts: On February 13, 1972 Crisanto Camposano, went to the house of William Page. They
were friends since boyhood. Page was an eighteen-year old third year high school student at the
Arellano' University.

At past ten o'clock, Page and Camposano went to the rotonda or intersection of Taft Avenue and
F. B. Harrison Boulevard, where they boarded a Manila-bound jeepney. Page was armed with
a balisong knife. Camposano had a revolver. According to Page's confession, he seated himself
beside a male passenger who was near the driver on the front seat. Camposano took a seat at
the back of the jeepney where two female passengers were seated. 

With the jeepney was in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank on Harrison Boulevard, Page and
Camposano told the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue, going to M. Roxas Boulevard, and then
to turn left going to Parañaque . There, they held up the driver and the three passengers. They
got the money and pieces of jewelry of the passengers and the driver. From the rear view mirror
of the jeepney, Page saw Camposano dumping the two female passengers on Roxas Boulevard.
Then, the two directed the driver to proceed to the airport. Camposano gave Page a watch and a
woman's ring as his share of the loot. The woman, who jumped from the jeepney was brought to
the hospital, however, she was already dead when she reached the hospital. William Page
appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated July 21, 1973, convicting
him of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly ruled that Page, as a fellow conspirator of
Camposano, could be held liable for robbery with homicide or for robbery only.

Held:
YES. The SC find that the trial court's conclusion as to conspiracy is borne out by the evidence.
Page and Camposano were boyhood friends. About six hours before the crime was committed,
they were already together. They were in the Baclaran rotonda at around ten o'clock in the
evening or shortly before the holdup was committed. They boarded the jeepney in that place.
Inside the jeepney, they coordinated their actions. They directed the jeepney driver to go near
the airport or in the vicinity of Page's residence, a place which was well-known to the two
malefactors. They left the jeepney together and fled in the same direction.

There is not a scintilla of doubt that a conspiracy to commit robbery existed between Page and
Camposano. The fact that the two armed themselves with deadly weapons, a knife and a
revolver, signified that they were determined to kill their victims in order to consummate their
nefarious objective. The conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of Page and Camposano.
Those acts reveal that they had agreed to commit robbery inside a passenger jeepney (Art. 8,
Revised Penal Code). This Court may take judicial notice that that kind of robbery has been
frequently committed since the liberation when the jeepney came into existence as a public
conveyance.

Page and Camposano implemented their agreement when they waited for a passenger jeepney
at the Baclaran rotonda and boarded it at the same time. If they had no evil intention, they could
have sat together at the back. But, they did not do so. Obviously, as previously planned by them,
Page took the front seat so that he could control the driver and at the same time extort money
from him and the other passenger in the front seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the
jeepney so that he could rob the two female passengers.

Intod v. CA

G.R. No. 103119

 October 21, 1992

FACTS:
February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan.  Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that
he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany them.  Otherwise, he would also be killed. By February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All
of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there
was no one in the room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: Whether or not Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art.
4 (2)

RULING: YES. Petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the
law, and to pay the costs

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. The Revised Penal
Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability to punish
criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:

1.    the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2.    there is intention to perform the physical act
3.    there is a performance of the intended physical act
4.    the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
Jacinto v. People

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner, together with two other women, was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL
INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside
the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro
Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made
by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int’l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter
in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and her subsequent MR was
denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft. 

RULING:

NO. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment
was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.

The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she
thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held
in Valenzuela v. People that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of
personal property of another.

There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check
meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft,
had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner
receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer
necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft.

Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
BALERO V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 138033

FEBRUARY 22, 2006

FACTS: One evening, inside her room, Malou retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of
her bedroom door, her maid slept on a folding bed. Early morning of the following day, petitioner,
clad in t-shirt and shorts, entered the room of Malou through its window. Once inside, he
approached Malou and tightly pressed on her face a piece of cloth soaked with chemical and. at
the same time, pinned her down on the bed. She was awakened thereby and she struggled but
could not move.

She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals
were very tight. Still, Malou continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right
hand got free. With this, the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his
sex organ which she then squeezed. Petitioner let her go and escaped while Malou went straight
to the bedroom door and roused her maid.

ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape?

RULING: No, he is not. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse
or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is
whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top
of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.

Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense.

Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce
her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were,
petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to
rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no
attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner
wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s
guess.
LEONIDAS EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 

G.R. No. 157057

June 26, 2007 

FACTS: On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo) and his cousin, Allan Perez (Allan),
were walking to their respective homes after spending time at the house of Crisaldo's father.
Since the pavement going to Crisaldo's house followed a narrow pathway along the local shrubs
called banganga, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing thrust of a
bladed weapon on his back, which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround
and saw his attacker, petitioner, also known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo
again but only hit the latter's left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry, he rushed to Crisaldo's
side which caused petitioner to run away. Allan then brought Crisaldo to his father's house where
Crisaldo's wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was then brought to the Peñaplata
Hospital where he was given first aid and then transferred to the Davao Medical Center where he
stayed for three weeks to recuperate from his wounds. 

Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his arraignment, petitioner
pleaded "not guilty." Petitioner's defense consisted mainly of denial. On July 5, 1994, the RTC
rendered its Decision convicting the petitioner. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA,
which affirmed the decision in toto. 

ISSUE: Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated murder. 

RULING: No. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines
whether a felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the subjective
phase in the commission of the offense. 

In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the
crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill
the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the
offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the
nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by
the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim. 

In the present case, the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable
doubt through the unwavering testimony of Crisaldo on the manner of execution of the attack as
well as the number of wounds he sustained. Crisaldo was stabbed from behind by petitioner.
When Crisaldo turned around, petitioner continued his assault, hitting Crisaldo on the left arm as
the latter tried to defend himself. The treacherous manner in which petitioner perpetrated the
crime is shown not only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim but
also by the deliberate manner in which the assault was perpetrated. Nonetheless, petitioner
failed to perform all the acts of execution, because Allan came to the aid of Crisaldo and
petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not voluntarily desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but
he had to stop stabbing when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo and recognized petitioner. Thus, the
subjective phase of the crime had not been completed. 

Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds
sustained by Crisaldo. No evidence in this case was introduced to prove that Crisaldo would
have died from his wound without timely medical attendance. It is well-settled that where there is
nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the
character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused
and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.

PEOPLE vs. (EMBAS) JOSE TIU, SANTOS AROCHA, RODOLFO REAL - Deceased, Luis
(LICAROS) DENOLAN

G.R. Nos. 75032-33

December 1, 1992

FACTS:

On July 27, 1981, two informations for murder and frustrated murder were filed against Jose
(Embas) Tiu, Santos Arocha, Rodolfo Leal and Luis Licaros Denolan, for the killing of Warlito
Jumangpang and the wounding of his father, Otillo Jumangpang. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases nos. 2682 and 2675, respectively, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte, and by agreement of the parties jointly tried on the merits.

On April 30, 1981, at about 2:00 a.m., Otillo, who as sleeping with his wife Vivencia and their
seven children, was awakend by a noise outside their house in Sitio Pigan, Barangay Disakan of
the Municipality of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. With a flashlight, he saw that it was a
carabao that was causing the noise. He told Warlito to tie the animal. Warlito had difficulty in
doing so and asked his father to help him. Otillo went down. While he and Warlito were puling the
carabao, shots were fired from the direction of the road. Otillo was hit on the right ankle joint and
fell down. He crawled towards the back of the house near the kitchen. While lying flat on the
ground, he saw Embas Tiu, Santos Arocha, Rodolfo Leal, and Luis Licaros coming from the
road. 2

When the four men reached the front ladder of their house, they trained a flashlight on the body
of Warlito, who was sprawled motionless on the ground.

Santos Arocha and Rodolfo Leal proceeded to the back of the house and went upstairs. Otillo
heard them ask his wife where he was. Silently, he crawled toward the bushes about 20 meters
from their house. Santos and Rodolfo ordered Vivencia and the children to go down, past Embas
Tiu and Luis Licaros who were standing near the rear ladder, carrying long firearms. Embas fired
a warning shot and ordered them to lie flat on the ground. He asked them where Otillo was but
everyone kept silent. They remained lying on the ground until 6:00 a.m. when they sense that the
men had left.

Vivencia now called for Otillo who had lain hidden all the while. Seeing him wounded, she
immediately took neighbors. Warlito was already beyond help. The autopsy of his body revealed
the cause of his death as "severed spinal cord secondary to fractured vertebral column
secondary to gunshot wound."

The four accused were no strangers to the three eyewitnesses, who knew them as CHDF
members who used to pass by their house and ask for water. 

Lourdes and Vivencia Identified Arocha and Leal as the persons who came up their house, which
was lighted by lamp or "tingkarol" on top of the sewing machine that night of April 29, 1981. the
moon and the stars were also shining bright then.

Otillo recognized the four accused by the light from their flashlights and also of the moon and the
stars.
The denials of the accused-appellants, corroborated only by their friend Magawa, cannot
overthrow the positive and categorical testimony of the prosecution eyewitnesses, who have not
been shown to have any malicious motive in testifying against them. Mere denial cannot prevail
against the unequivocal declaration of credible witnesses testifying on affirmative matters as in
the case at bar.

Alibi is also a weak defense and cannot stand against the positive Identification of the accused-
appellants. Moreover, they have not shown that is was impossible for them to have been present
at Otillo's place when the shooting occurred, in view of the distance between that place and the
place where they claimed to be that morning.

The accused were known members of the notorious Civil Home Defense Force (which has since
been disbanded for its record of violence). This was the reason for the natural reluctance of
ordinary individuals to participate in litigation involving that organizations. The failure of the
prosecution witnesses to immediately report the malefactors to the police officers who
investigated the shooting is not difficult to understand. Otillo and his family feared for their lives
as the killers of Warlito were still at large and armed with the rifles they had used that morning.

There was conspiracy among the accused-appellants because they were moved by the same
desire when they went to Otillo's house and shot him and his son Warlito. It is plain that they
acted in concert when they executed the crimes they had agreed to commit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Tiu, Arocha, and Denolan

RULING:

NO. We find that the trial court did not err in the convicting Tiu, Arocha and Denolan.

The conviction of Rodolfo Leal, who died on July 9, 1984, before the promulgation of the decision
on December 18, 1985, must be set aside as null and void ab initio.

The criminal liability of Jose Tiu was extinguished by his death on May 16, 1988, while his appeal
was pending. However, his civil liability survived him and can be recovered against his estate.

Treachery qualified the killing of Warlito Jumangpang to murder, which was correctly punished
with reclusion perpetua and all the accessory penalties.
But the shooting of Otillo, also attended by treachery, was only attempted murder because,
although the intent to kill him was clearly established, he was shot only in the ankle. The doctrinal
rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death , the
accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the
crime is only attempted murder. 11

Under Article 248 and Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for attempted murder is
prision correccional in it maximum period to prison mayor in its medium period. The medium
period of this penalty should be the maximum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there
being no aggravatingor mitigrating circumstance. One degree lower of the penalty for attempted
murder is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium. Thus, for attempt murder, the
accused Santos Arocha and Luis Denolan are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
months and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 8 years of prison mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as above modified, with costs against the
accused-appellants. It is so ordered.
People v. Trinidad

GR No. 79123-25

9 January 1989

Facts: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa. While the
three were driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused Emeliano Trinidad asked for a
ride to Agusan del Norte. Trinidad, a member of the Integrated National Police, was in uniform
and had two firearms, a carbine and a .38 caliber revolver.

Tan was driving the car at that time, and he was instructed by Trinidad to slow down
because they were treading dangerous territory. Tan suddenly heard two gunshots -- Soriano
and Laroa slumped dead for both were hit on the head. Trinidad had used his carbine in killing
the two victims. Tan was able to get off the car and hail a jeepney passing by. However, he
noticed that Trinidad was also seated at the back of the said jeepney. Tan immediately got off the
jeepney, followed by Trinidad. When the jeepney started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its
side, but Trinidad fired two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from the
jeep and fortunately a Philippine Constabulary member chanced upon him and helped him board
a bus for Butuan.

Trinidad was charged with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the shooting of Tan, and
he was found guilty by the RTC. On appeal, Trinidad claims that the RTC erred in convicting him
of the crime of frustrated murder.

Issues: W/N Trinidad is correct in contending that he can only be convicted of attempted
murder? YES

Ruling: Trinidad should only be held criminally liable for attempted murder. Trinidad had
commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to perform all the
acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous
desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion, and there was a
spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body.

Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound
inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only ATTEMPTED murder,
the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the
death (citing, People v. Pilones)
People v Lopez

312 SCRA 684

August 19, 1999

Facts:

Federico Lopez was accused of killing Rogelio Saldera & Rodolfo Padapat & frustrated murder of
Mario Seldera. They work in a farmland in Nancalabaasan, Umingan, Pangasinan. On their way
home on Nov. 15, 1991 at around 9 pm they were met by Lopez & another guy. There were in
trail beside Banila river. Lopez had a shot gun & shot 3. Thinking they were dead, he left. Mario
survived and identified Lopez

Issue:Whether or not the conviction is correct?

RULING: Modified especially damages.

1. Mario is a credible witness & memory of massacre is deeply etched in his memory thus he
remembered even minute details. Natural reaction is to remember assailants & manner how
crime‘s committed (People v Gomez). Shot gun wounds were verified. PAGASA states that there
was 60% illumination of moon at that time. 62% illumination in People v. Pueblas was found to
be sufficient in sustaining identification of accused. Mario was also well-adjusted to lighting since
he‘s been walking for some time when they were attacked (People v. Vacal). He was identified
not by name but by knowledge of who accused was who frequented his place before.

2. Alibi is weak. His alleged location was near enough to crime scene thus not impossible to
reach it. Inconsistent witnesses. Overridden by positive identification of a witness who doesn‘t
posses ill motive to falsely testify against accused.

3. Defective information not assailed before accused waived right to do so. Each shot should be
considered as one act thus liable for three separate crimes, Complex crime (RPC-48) only when
one act results to different felonies. There was treachery thus Mario should have been for
murder, but attempted not frustrated cause wounds were not fatal as attested to by doctor.
PEOPLE v. RAVELO

202 SCRA 655

Oct. 15, 1991

Facts:

Accused-appellants allegedly kidnapped by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano on May

21, 1984. They then detained Reynaldo at the house of Pedro Ravelo, one of the
accused. Accused-appellants assaulted, attacked, and burned Reynaldo Gaurano and latter die
as consequence thereof. On May 22, 1984; the accused-appellants kidnapped by means of force
Joey Lugatiman and was brought to Ravelo's house where he was tortured. Lugatiman was able
to escape.

Lugatiman reported what happened to him and to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC
convicted the accused-appellants of murder of Gaurano and frustrated murder of Lugatiman.

In this appeal, counsel contends that there can be no frustrated murder absent any proof of
intent to kill, which is an essential element of the offense of frustrated murder.

Issue:

Whether the statement by the accused stating that “Lugatiman” would be killed is sufficient proof 

 of intent to convict a person of frustrated murder.

Held:

No. In a crime of murder or an attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or
the actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. A verbal expression is not
sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a
statement of the aggressor, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of means necessary
to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CEILITO ORITA

Facts:

In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina Abayan arrived at her boarding house from a
party. All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She recognized the
person who was Orita, a frequent visitor of the boarding house. He ordered her to go upstairs
with him from the back door leading to the first floor. He commanded her to look for a room, while
still pointing the knife to her neck. They entered Cristina’s room. Upon entering the room, he
pushed Cristina who hit her head and ordered her to take off her clothes. She took off her T-shirt
and Orita pulled off her bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down and mounted her. He
ordered her to insert his penis to her vagina while still poking the knife to her neck. However,
Orita could not fully penetrate her, only a small portion of his penis entered her. Orita then lay
down and ordered her to mount him but small portion of the penis again was inserted into her
vagina. Orita, both of his hands flat on the floor, she used this opportunity to escape. She dashed
out to the other room and locked herself in, Orita pursued her until she jumped out through a
window and darted to the municipal building where a police saw him outside naked and crying. A
complaint of the crime of rape was filed in the RTC, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar against
Orita. The trial court rendered its decision rendered its decision convicting Orita of the crime of
frustrated rape since there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
victim and the accused.
On appeal, the CA modified the trial’s court decision, a crime of rape is committed. Later on,
issued a resolution forwarding the case to the Supreme Court. In the appeal filed to the SC Orita
contends that the trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed.

Issue: Whether or not the accused conviction of frustrated rape is proper. (NO)

Held:

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge
of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the
felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v.
Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666;
People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform
rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to
warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
(People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9
Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. In this case, the victim, cristina, positively testified
that there was penetration, even if only partially. Hence, the RTC’s decision is modified and the
accused is guilty of the crime of rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADEO HANGDAAN and ROMEL BALLOGAN

Facts:
In the evening of November 12, 1986, Jocelyn Binoy, a 15-year old student attended a program
at the Convention Hall of her school. After the program, she went to her dormitory. Before
entering the dorm, she went to the toilet for necessity. Two boys entered the bathroom who were
identified as Romel and Amadeo. They grabbed Jocelyn and pushed her back to the wall poking
a knife at her side. Jocelyn shouted but her mouth was covered. Her panty was roughly removed
and Romel tried to insert his penis to her vagina. Despite several attempts, his penis was not
able to penetrate her as they were in standing position. Suddenly, the light went off inside the
toilet. The two boys dragged Jocelyn in a hut near the river, and there she was undressed.
Romel Ballogan succeeded three times to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn. Every after
Romel finished his sexual intercourse with Jocleyn, Amadeo also went on top of her but he could
not penetrate her because his penis was too big, instead, he mashed her nipples and breast. A
criminal case was filed against Amadeo in the RTC, Branch 14 of Lagawe, Ifugao. In Amadeo’s
defense, he stated that he only saw Romel and Jocelyn in the hut. At that time, Romel was on
top of Jocelyn who was crying and asked for his help. He left and told Romel that he will return
the flashlight he borrowed. The trial court convicted the accused for the crime of rape. He filed an
appeal to the SC, interposing the denial of his defense and only one person rape Jocelyn since
the sperm found in her vagina came from one person who was Romel.

Issue: Whether or not Amadeo is guilty of the crime of rape

RULING:
There is a positive identification of the accused as the author, or more accurately, co-author of
the crime. It must be pointed out that in the crime of rape, the important consideration is
penetration and not emission. In the case at bar, a conviction would still be proper, it appears
from the evidence that Amadeo was unable to introduce his private part into the victim’s vagina.
However, unrebutted evidence positively implicates that Amadeo as having made several efforts
to penetrate the victim’s vagina. It is settled rule for rape to be consummated, it is not essential
that there be perfect, complete, and full penetration of the vagina. Entry of the labia or lips of the
female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Hence, the judgment appealed is affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN

Facts:
Corazon P. Pamintuan went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo
chocolate drinks for her two children, there he saw Primo, a helper of his brother, filling small
plastic bags to be frozen in the freezer located at second floor.
While she was busy preparing, she heard one of her daughter’s cry “Ayoko! Ayoko!”
prompting her to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo inside her children’s room kneeling
before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were already removed, while his short pants were
down to his knees. The trial court found him guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to death.
The conviction of the accused was relied on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with
his short pants down on his knees and Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were remove
supposedly removed and the Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel’s vagina.
Primo assails the credibility of Corazon’s narration or testimony. He insists that it was almost
inconceivable that Corzaon would give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact
when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of his sexual
organ and the victim Crysthel.

Issue: Whether or not statutory rape has been consummated

RULING:
In People v. De la Peña, the SC clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if
the attacker's penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in
the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the
accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which
could not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on
the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his
penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his
organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her
vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal
contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated
rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain
some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia
majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape. In this case, the
prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that Primo's penis was able to
penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed
Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim
that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw
upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his
penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her
to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. However, the court gave
credence to Crysthel’s categorical statement denying penetration. Thus, the decision of the court
a quo finding accused Primo "Sonny" Campuhan y Bello guilty of statutory rape and sentencing
him to death and to pay damages is modified. He is instead found guilty of attempted rape.
VALENZUELA V. PEOPLE

Facts:

May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super
Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo
Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing an ID with the mark “Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)” who hauled a push cart with cases of detergent of “Tide” brand and
unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. He then returned inside
the supermarket and emerged 5 minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again
unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.  Thereafter, he left the
parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space
where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then
boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open
parking area and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot.  Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards. 
Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered
worth P12,090.

In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft , petitioner cites two decisions
rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People vs. Diño and People vs. Flores. Both
decisions elicit the interest of the Court, as they modified trial court convictions from
consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present
case.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s conviction be modified from consummated theft to

frustrated theft only.

HELD: NO.
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies. A felony is consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.” It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.” Finally, it is attempted
“when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”
Court has long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, namely: 1) that there be taking of personal property; 2) that said property
belongs to another; 3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; 4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and 5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases
of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain,
completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things,
and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the
extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.
Now, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to
inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft “produced .” Parsing through the statutory definition
of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law —
that theft is already “produced” upon the “taking of personal property of another without the
latter’s consent.”
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated
stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due
to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft ,
is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner
alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief
Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that “in theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate
the same , although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated.”
Under the RPC, there is no such thing as frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success
of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for
we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to
recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract
from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised
Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized.
People v Enriquez

28 SCRA 103

October 23 1997

FACTS:

Informant “Danny” told Sgt. Cerillo that a person called “Bulag” was looking for
prospective buyers of marijuana. This became the impetus for the buy-bust operation conducted
by Sgt. Cerillo and his team of Anti-Drug Abuse Movement officers. Maramot, one of the ADAM
officers who posed as a buyer, executed the deal with Enriquez and Rosales (petitioners).Right
before the deal was concluded, Maramot announced that she was a policewoman and they
subsequently arrested Rosales. Enriquez was also apprehended eventually. Trial court charged
Rosales and Enriquez with sale and delivery of marijuana and sentenced them to life
imprisonment with a fine of P30,000. Petitioners assailed the decision of the trial court hence this
appeal. Rosales asserted that his act of carrying the sack of marijuana (more than 750 grams) is
a mere attempt to deliver the prohibited drug. Since the sack was still within his control, he could
have refused to deliver the prohibited drug. He asserts that he was still in the subjective phase of
the crime.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner Rosales should be held accountable for merely attempted
delivery of marijuana.

RULING: NO. The rules regarding the Stages of Commission of a felony are inapplicable to
offenses governed by special laws. Unfortunately for petitioner Rosales, the crime with which he
is being charged is penalized by a special law. The incomplete delivery claimed by Rosales,
granting that it is true, is thus inconsequential. The act of conveying prohibited drugs to an
unknown destination has been held to be punishable, and it is immaterial whether or not the
place of destination of the prohibited drug is reached. The Court decided that the rule regarding
the stages of commission of a felony (attempted-frustrated-consummated) does not apply to
offenses governed by special law. The sale and delivery of a prohibited drug is governed by a
special law (RA No. 6425).
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L.
TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168852
September 30, 2008

Facts:
On April 18, 1999, petitioner and Steven L. Tan were married. Two female children were
born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. Barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and
her parents-in-law, respondents before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of
Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of RA 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." RTC issued an Order/Notice granting
petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
Petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that
respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at
promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.
RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case on the ground that, being the parents-in-
law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under
the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
Petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration contending that the doctrine of
necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due
process.
Respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration arguing that
petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the
relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the
application of R.A. No. 9262.
RTC issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The
RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a
strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

Issues:
Whether or not respondents, parents-in-law of petitioner, may be included in the petition for the
issuance of a protective order, in accordance with R.A. 9262. (Yes)

Ruling:
Respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former
marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship. However, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. Article 10 of the
RPC also provides that: Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Conspiracy is an evidentiary matter and cannot be determined in the present petition
since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is thus premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether
respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of
conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily
to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered
indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005
and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-
54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition
against respondents is concerned.

Notes:
expressio unius est exclusio alterius -  a principle in statutory construction: when one or more
things of a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''violence against women and their children'' as "any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has
a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 141066
February 17, 2005

Facts:
Spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga are regular customers in the pawnshop
business of complainant Alfredo Oculam. The spouses obtained three loans from Alfredo,
₱9,075.55, ₱12,730.00 and ₱8,496.55. In the City of Tagbilaran, petitioner, conspired,with her
spouse, even when knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, still drawn and issued a UCPB Check
in the amount of (₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo. Without informing Alfredo that they did not have
sufficient funds deposited, they still delivered the check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check for encashment, the same was
dishonored for because  the account of the accused had already been closed, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.

The RTC rendered found the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P.
Blg. 22.The CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issues:
1. Whether or not conspiracy is applicable in violations of B.P. BLG. 22 by invoking the last
sentence of Art. 10 of RPC. (Yes)
2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of conspiracy (No, lack of evidence)

Ruling:
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe (forbid) the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general
provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.
To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown
to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. In the present case,
the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. Complainant did not specify the nature of petitioner’s involvement in the
commission of the crime, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
The only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when
the first check was issued.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of
conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in  affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED
of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

 Notes:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are
made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the
second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are
contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling
with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule
of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.Lex specialis
derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity (excess, oversupply),
and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article.
The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be
supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO MANLULU AND DANTE
SAMSON, accused-appellants. 

Facts:

- Testifying for the prosecution, Wally Manlapaz narrated that at around ten o'clock in the evening
of 29 May 1986, he and accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu were having a drinking
spree in an alley along Quirino Avenue, Paco, Manila. - They were later joined by Agent Gerardo
Alfaro who had a .45 cal. pistol tucked to his waist. When Alfaro arrived he blurted out, "Dito may
kumakatalo sa aking tao." - At twelve o'clock midnight, the group transferred in front of the house
of Manlapaz and continued to drink. There Samson suddenly stabbed Alfaro in the chest with a
6-inch double-bladed knife while boasting, "Dapat sa iyo manahimik na." Alfaro at this time was
"somewhat bent because he was already drunk." Manlulu then followed suit and stabbed Alfaro
in the abdomen several times with an ice pick they used to chip ice. Samson grabbed the .45 cal.
service pistol of Alfaro and shot him in the neck. When Alfaro slumped on the pavement, both
accused fled, with Samson holding Alfaro's handgun. 

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE 

- Both accused invoked self- defense. - According to Samson, while they were drinking, and after
taking ekis pinoy, Alfaro, apparently resenting Samson's unwillingness to join them to rob, drew
his gun and pointed it to Samson who parried it saying: "Pare, wala tayong biruan ng ganyan.
Baka pumutok iyan." But Alfaro repeatedly pointed the gun to him. Every time he did, Samson
would push the gun aside. Fearful that it might go off, he held the gun and tried to ward it off,
resulting in a struggle for its possession. He got hold of the ice pick on top of the drum and
stabbed Alfaro instinctively. Manlapaz tried to separate them; as a consequence, Samson
dropped the ice pick. As Samson and Alfaro continued to wrestle for the possession of the gun,
they fell on the ground and the gun accidentally went off hitting Alfaro in the neck. - Rolando
Manlulu corroborated the testimony of his co-accused. He added that he picked up the ice pick
when it fell, and fearing that he might be the next victim should Alfaro succeed in shooting
Samson, he (Manlulu) stabbed Alfaro several times with the ice pick, then dropped it, and ran
away. 

- Patrolman Perez that when he arrested Manlulu and seized from him the handgun as well as
the wristwatch, he (Perez) was not with any warrant nor did he inform the accused of the latter's
right to counsel. 

- The trial court was found accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu "guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of Murder. 

- Upon review, the appellate court raised their penalties to reclusion perpetua and certified the
case to the Supreme Court 

- In the appeal to the SC, accused Manlulu and Samson would want the Court to believe, 
first, in their version of the incident, and next, that they acted in self-defense. 

Issue:  
Whether or not the accused acted in self defense (NO) 

Held: 

The three (3) requisites for self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. For self- defense to prosper, it
must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed
the life of the accused in danger which forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his
assailant, employing therefore reasonable means to resist said attack. 

In this instance, the two accused have already failed to show that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Alfaro. A gun aimed at the accused, without more, is insufficient to
prove unlawful aggression. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated in self-defense, there must
be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. 

The means employed to repel or prevent the supposed attack was not reasonable.
For, even if we disregard the gunshot wound which Samson claims to have resulted from an
accidental firing, the victim also suffered seven other stab wounds, three of which were fatal, one
of which was admittedly inflicted by Samson, while the other two, by accused Manlulu. Definitely,
it was not necessary to stab, more so repeatedly, the victim. At any rate, the number of wounds
suffered by Alfaro indicates a determined effort of both accused to kill the victim, which negates
self- defense. 

FOR THE WARRANTLESS

ARREST: 

A valid warrantless arrest under paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have "personal knowledge" of an
offense which "has in fact just been committed." In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have
"personal knowledge," nor was the offense "in fact just been committed." While Pat. Perez may
have personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough.
The law requires "personal knowledge." The killing took place at one o'clock in the morning. The
arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening, some
nineteen hours later. The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the
offense, not some nineteen hours later. 

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of
Manlapaz which the Court find to be credible. Hence, in spite of the nullification of the arrest of
accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, i.e., the .45 cal. service pistol of Agent
Alfaro and his Casio wristwatch, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in
violation of the provisions of the Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the illegality of the warrantless arrest
cannot deprive the state of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record
point to their culpability. 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELYBOY SO Y ORBES, accused-
appellant. 

Facts: 

On June 2, 1991, at around 9:00 p.m., Elyboy So after bringing Teresita to her house.
Elyboy passed by his cousins' house to honor their invitation. After an exchange of pleasantries,
Edgar offered Elyboy a bottle of beer which the latter declined because it was already past 10:00
p.m. and he was on his way home already. Edgar convinced him to drink just a little and to stay
awhile so he could also meet his future brother-in-law, Mario Tuquero, who will arrive later with
his sister Emy. Elyboy was prevailed upon to stay on as he was also interested in meeting Mario
Before Emy and Mario arrived, Edgar invited Elyboy and Ronnie to watch the dance in the
playground which was part of the fiesta celebration Ronnie and informed them that Emy and
Mario had arrived Upon arriving in the house, Emy introduced Elyboy to her boyfriend Mario 

The group, consisting of Esteban, Edgar, Elyboy, Ronnie, Mario and Emy resumed their
drinking spree. However, after the group consumed four (4) cases of beer and before 3:00 a.m.,
Emy felt sleepy and went inside. While Emy was sleeping inside the house, she was awakened
by the noise coming from the group outside their house. It turned out that Elyboy had a
misunderstanding and altercation with somebody and he was shouting loudly, disturbing the
neighbors in the process. After pacifying the protagonists, Mario advised Elyboy to go home
because his loud voice was disturbing the neighbors. After he was pacified and advised to go
home, Elyboy ran towards home. 

At around 4:00 a.m. of June 3, 1991 while Mario and Emy were waiting for a taxi at the
corner of Magsaysay Avenue and Pureza Street, Elyboy suddenly appeared from behind and
stabbed Mario at the back several times with an eleven inch fan knife with a white handle 

As a result of the stabbing incident, Mario suffered several stab wounds causing his
death. 

Appellant Elyboy vehemently opposed the version of the prosecution. When he tried to
go back to his cousin's house and talk to them, he met Mario Tuquero and Emy So at the corner
of Pureza and Magsaysay Streets. Suddenly Mario Tuquero attacked him with a knife but
because Tuquero's thrust was slow, he was able to evade it. He grabbed the knife and
proceeded to stab Tuquero repeatedly. 

The Regional Trial Court of Manila finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of "Murder" qualified by treachery. 

On appeal, appellant claimed self-defense and likewise seeks to exempt from criminal
liability by claiming that he was insane at the time he stabbed the victim . 

Issue: 

1. Whether or not the lower court erred when it overruled self-defense in the instant case. 
(NO)
 2. Whether or not Elyboy was insane at the time he stabbed the victim (NO) 

Held: 
1. The accused in invoking self-defense must prove the essential requisites, to wit: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The initial and
crucial point of inquiry is whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim for
absent this essential element, no claim of self-defense can be successfully interposed. If there is
no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second requisite of self-
defense would have no basis. In this case, appellant's claim that the Mario, attacked him with a
knife and he was able to wrest the knife from Mario because the latter's thrust was slow. At this
point, after appellant successfully wrested the knife from Mario, the unlawful aggression had
ceased. After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making the defense has no more
right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Hence, appellant Elyboy acts does not
constitute self-defense. In People v. Gomez: “There was no self- defense where the accused
was able to obtain possession of the weapon from the deceased and there was no necessity to
stab the latter for aggression had already ceased.” Hence, appellant Elyboy cannot invoke self-
defense. 

2. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. stabbed the victim. Well-settled
is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of appellant should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the act was committed. In the present case, the
testimony of Dr. Galvez refers to appellant's treatment six (6) years before the incident
happened. Furthermore, a perusal of appellant's testimony further negates his plea of insanity.
His recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as well as
the nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind. His memory
conveniently blanks out only as to the number of wounds he inflicted on the victim. The Court is
far from convinced. The defense has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overthrow the
presumption of sanity. 

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision of RTC is AFFIRMED in
toto. 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON GUTUAL Y REMOLLENA
and JOAQUIN NADERA Y APOSTOL, accused. 

Facts: 

- On 29 December 1990, at around 1:30 p.m., the victim Celestino Maglinte was walking along
the barangay road of Belmonte in San Vicente, Davao, carrying his four-year old child. The victim
had a bolo with him, which was placed in its scabbard. - Maglinte was then surprised by the
sound of an exploding firecracker; thus, he left his child by the road and ran towards the store of
Barangay Captain Wayne Gutual, calling to the latter, who did not, however, cone out of the
store. - Maglinte was running amuck or berserk, chasing Barangay Captain Wayne Gutual in
front of the latter's house. Drawn by shouts for help from onlookers, accused Gutual and Nadera
rushed to the scene, with Gutual firing warning shots into the air. - Maglinte stopped pursuing the
barangay captain, turned towards the accused, then started approaching them. Although Gutual
continued to fire warning shots, Maglinte kept walking towards him, while Gutual kept retreating
to put some distance between him and the victim. The two moved some ten meters, crossed the
road in front of the barangay captain's house, and ended up near the barangay hall. - Finally,
Gutual was, pinned against the staircase of the barangay hall. Maglinte was now about one to
three meters from Gutual and pressing on, unceasingly hacking away at Gutual, who, however,
managed to evade the blows. Nadera fired warning shots into the air, but Maglinte continued his
attack. - Gutual then fired at the victim's hand to disarm him, but unfortunately the bullet pierced
Maglinte's bolo-wielding arm, went through his chest, and came out his back. Immediately the
following morning, the victim was buried upon the Barangay Captain's order. - The defense
claims that the killing was committed in self-defense or defense of a relative 
or stranger. - The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum, Davao del Norte, Branch 1, charged
Wilson Gutual with the crime of murder is therefore hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and Joaquin Nadera with is aquitted. 

- On appeal, the accused Gutual alleges that the lower court committed the and error in not
acquitting him on grounds of either self-defense or defense of a relative, or in not considering
in favor of him incomplete justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of [a] stranger. 

Issue: 

Whether or not Wilson Gutual has sufficiently proved self-defense or defense of a relative
or of a stranger, or, at the very least, the incomplete justifying circumstance of self- defense or
defense of a stranger (NO) 

Held: 

Clearly then, what might have been unlawful aggression on the part of the victim against the
barangay captain had ceased, and there was nothing more to prevent or repel. The accused-
appellant shot the victim while the latter, after having stopped chasing the barangay captain, was
approaching the former. At that instance then, the barangay captain's life was no longer in
danger as the accused-appellant admitted. Hence, the second requisite of the defense of a
relative or a stranger under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz., reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression, cannot be present. 
Consequently, the accused-appellant has to rely solely on the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. 

The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. In this instance, It was sufficiently established that the unlawful
aggression came from the victim. Indeed, since he was running amuck, he did not care anymore
whom to attack or whether the person to be attacked was unarmed or armed with a high-
powered rifle. The accused-appellant became the target of the victim's violent nature when, after
the victim stopped chasing the barangay captain, he turned to and vented his ire against the
accused-appellant. The victim menacingly walked towards the latter who, in turn, kept walking
backwards until he was pinned against the staircase of the barangay hall. At that point, the victim
unceasingly hacked away at the accused-appellant and continued to move closer to him. When
the victim was then only one meter away, he raised the bolo, ready to strike the accused-
appellant. Plainly, the accused-appellant could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by
the victim who, as inexorably shown by his relentless advance towards the accused- appellant,
was poised to kill the latter. The danger to the accused-appellant's life was clearly imminent. It
would not then be proper nor reasonable to claim that he should have fled or selected a less
deadly weapon, because in the emergency in which, without any reason whatever, he was
placed, there was nothing more natural than to use the weapon he had to defend himself. In the
natural order of things, following the instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a
proper defense. 

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. That the challenged decision of Branch
1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao finding accused-appellant WILSON GUTUAL Y
REMOLLENA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the civil liabilities therein mentioned is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby entered ACQUITTING him of the charge. 
NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-51206
August 25, 1989

Facts:
Barangay Capt. Nicolas Potane and his father, Pedro Potane requested assistance from
the Police Sub-station Commander of San Isidro in apprehending Leopoldo Potane, son of Pedro
Potane and elder brother of Nicolas, who has begun to show signs of recurring insanity. Since
his arrival from mindoro, Leopoldo had been acting queerly and at times violent, chased the wife
of Nicolas with a bolo, and threatened other family members with death. 
Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, before proceeding to the
house where Leopoldo was, had a conference with Leopoldo’s family. A joint affidavit was
prepared and signed by the family members, authorizing the petitioners to apprehend Leopoldo
Potane and that if Leopoldo would resist as he is armed with a weapon, the policemen 'have the
right to shoot him but not to kill him ... but if such does not permit, if he resists arrest they have
the right to resort to any manner and if he would be killed by the police officers on account of his
resistance, the family members would not take any action.
The two policemen then proceeded to Leopoldo’s house. Masipequina then called
Leopoldo and urged him to come out but he refused and told Masipequina to go inside the house
instead.  Masipequina went up the house followed by Nicolas. Alampayan stayed in the yard
where he can see what was going on inside.
Masipequina entered the sala and was about to sit down when Leopoldo suddenly
emerged and rushed at him swinging a bolo. Masipequina pushed the rocking chair towards
Leopoldo. Leopoldo hit Masipequina on the bridge of the nose. As the latter retracted, he lost his
balance and was hit on the right side of his face. Masipequina drew his revolver and fired three
shots. One shot misfired but the other two hit Leopoldo on the chest. Leopoldo continued to
advance towards him. He pushed the rocking chair at Leopoldo and ran out of the house
shouting for help. Leopoldo ran after him. Masipequina jumped from the house and landed on
the ground. Leopoldo also jumped to the ground and continued to pursue Masipequina. As
Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequina, Pat. Alampayan fired his gun hitting Leopoldo once
at the thigh.
RTC and CA rejected the defense of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED. Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan are
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Masipequina had acted in lawful self-defense. (Yes)

Ruling:
U.S. v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922)
A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot, like a private
individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which
he may exert therefore differs somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self-
defense.
Thus, the means employed by Masipequina in repelling the attack were both reasonable
and necessary. He initially tried to defend himself by pushing the rocking chair toward Leopoldo
Potane but when that proved futile and he was caught in a very precarious position, i.e., his back
was on the floor and Leopoldo Potane kept flailing at him with the bolo, he had no other choice
but to use his revolver to defend himself against the attack. There was also no sufficient
provocation on the part of Masipequina as they were tasked to capture Leopoldo and was
suddenly attacked when he was about to take a seat, a non-provocative act. 
On whether or not Alampayan could be separately convicted of the lesser offense of less
serious or slight physical injuries for the gunshot wound he inflicted on Leopoldo
Potane's thigh:
The means employed by Alampayan in trying to prevent Leopoldo Potane from further
attacking Masipequina with a bolo were reasonable as Alampayan only shot at Leopoldo
Potane's thigh to prevent him from further pursuing Masipequina who was trying to escape
Leopoldo Potane's attack.
Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive becuase the two policemen were in the
performance of their official and lawful duties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED. Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan are
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SANTIAGO PAERA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181626
May 30, 2011

Facts:
As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera
allocated his constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting
distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the
neighboring barangay of Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong, father of
complainant Indalecio. Despite petitioner’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the
tank. The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water
supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly
disconnected. To stop the flow of water, he used a bolo to fashion a plug. Indalecio arrived then 
According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and
charged towards Indalecio, shouting “I will kill you!”. Indalecio ran for safety,  petitioner also
threatened and chased Diosetea who also ran away. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner
turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and,
recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, and also threatened and shouted
at him.
According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily
inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but
to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper. The MCTC
found petitioner guilty. The RTC affirmed the MCTC’s ruling.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats. (Yes)

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC’s decision.

On whether petitioner acted in self-defense:

Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties’ rights when
petitioner successively threatened them with bodily harm. With the element of unlawful
aggression absent, inquiry on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or
repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records support the conclusion that
petitioner acted with resentment due to the refusal of the Darongs to follow his water distribution
scheme.
 
On whether petitioner is liable for the three counts of grave threats:
To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the
case to the concept of "continued crime" (delito continuado) which envisages a single crime
committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.
There is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but
only of one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime. The
act of taking the roosters [and heads of cattle] in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are
not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.
Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three individuals petitioner
incurred three separate criminal liabilities. Petitioner can only be charged with one count of grave
threat if he threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR., Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 199892
December 10, 2012

Facts:
Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar
Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members of the
Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at San
Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. Around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the "All-in-
One" Canteen to have some drinks. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a
nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they continued their drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a
heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a flickering light bulb
inside "Aquarius." When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off, appellant
misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement and reacted thinking that SN1
Bacosa’s statement was directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant,
while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was
still visibly angry.
To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave "Aquarius" and return to the
NETC camp. Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and
F1EN Dimaala flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van. The sentries
approached the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant
angrily uttered words while pointing toward the direction of the navy personnel’s group. Appellant
then sped away without being given the go signal and hit the group. Arnulfo Andal and Antonio
Duclayna died.
RTC found ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR. is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with Attempted Murder attended by the
aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle. CA affirmed this with modification of increase
payment to indemnities.

Issues:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder (Yes)
Ruling:

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that prosecution witnesses F1EN Dimaala and SN1 De
Guzman "positively identified accused-appellant as the one who hit and ran over the victims."
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, taken together, showed the criminal intent of the
Appellant to inflict harm on the victims. They testified on the incident in a clear, concise,
corroborative, and straightforward manner. Thus, their testimonies must prevail over the
testimony given by the Appellant which, on the other hand, was neither substantiated nor
supported by any evidence.
Appellant’s version of the crime, upon which the justifying circumstance of avoidance of
greater evil or injury is invoked, is baseless. This is because his assertions anent ( concerning)
the existence of the evil which he sought to be avoided did not actually exist as they neither
conformed to the evidence at hand nor were they consistent with the testimony of his own
witness, Alicia Eusantos.
Appellant failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self
may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another.
If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there
is no such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or
injury to one’s self, then such course should be taken. Appellant did not make any attempt to
avoid hitting the approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so.

On Treachery: 
Accused-Appellant’s act of running over the victims with his van from behind while the victims
were walking inside the NETC camp was a clear act of treachery.

On Art. 48 Complex Crimes

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a
single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through
the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time,
constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo. The
crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies. 

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming
the conviction of appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. for the complex crime of double murder with
multiple attempted murder, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
him to pay the following is AFFIRMED.
 SPO2 RUPERTO CABANLIG, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 148431
July 28, 2005

Facts:
Version of the Prosecution
A robbery occurred in the Municipality of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Four days later the
investigating authorities apprehended three suspects: Jordan Magat, Randy Reyes, and Valino.
The police recovered most of the stolen items. However, a flower vase and a small radio were
still missing. Cabanlig asked the three suspects where these two items were. Reyes replied that
the items were at his house.
Cabanlig asked his colleagues, Padilla, Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban, to accompany
him in retrieving the flower vase and radio. Cabanlig then brought out Reyes and Magat from
their cell, intending to bring the two during the retrieval operation. Valino informed Cabanlig that
he had moved the vase and radio to another location without the knowledge of his two cohorts.
Cabanlig decided instead to bring along Valino, leaving behind Magat and Reyes.
Around 6:30 p.m., they escorted Valino to Barangay Sinasahan to recover the missing
items. The policemen and Valino were aboard a police vehicle. The rear end of the jeep had no
enclosure. A metal covering separated the driver’s compartment and main body of the jeep.
Valino, who was not handcuffed, was between Cabanlig and Mercado at the right bench. While
the jeep was slowly negotiating a bumpy and potholed road, Valino suddenly grabbed Mercado’s
M16 Armalite and jumped out of the jeep. Cabanlig, who was then facing the rear of the vehicle,
saw Valino’s act of taking away the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig acted immediately. Without issuing
any warning of any sort, Cabanlig fired one shot at Valino, and after two to three seconds,
Cabanlig fired four more successive shots. Valino did not fire any shot.
Cabanlig declared Valino dead. The following morning SPO4 Segismundo Lacanilao
went to Barangay Sinasahan, Nueva Ecija to investigate a case. Lacanilao met Mercado who
gave him instructions on how to settle the case that he was handling. During their conversation,
Mercado related that he and his fellow policemen "salvaged" (summarily executed) a person the
night before. Lacanilao asked who was "salvaged." Mercado answered that it was "Jimmy
Valino." Mercado then asked Lacanilao why he was interested in the identity of the person who
was "salvaged." Lacanilao then answered that "Jimmy Valino" was his cousin. Mercado
immediately turned around and left.

Version of the Defense

Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting as an act of
self-defense and performance of duty. Mercado denied that he told Lacanilao that he and his co-
accused "salvaged" Valino. Cabanlig, Mercado, Abesamis, Padilla, and Esteban denied that they
conspired to kill Valino.

Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban as the court found no
evidence that the policemen conspired to kill or summarily execute Valino. Since Cabanlig
admitted shooting Valino, the burden is on Cabanlig to establish the presence of any
circumstance that would relieve him of responsibility or mitigate the offense committed.
Sandiganbayan found Cabanlig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. 

Issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that the defense of fulfillment of duty put up by
Cabanlig was incomplete (Yes)

Ruling:
Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is based
on the principle of self-preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is premised on the
due performance of duty. 
The elements of self-defense are as follows: a) Unlawful Aggression; b) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
The requisites of fulfillment of duty are: 1. The accused acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; 2. The injury caused or the offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office.
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of
duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite. In People v. Delima, when the
policeman found the fugitive, the fugitive was armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape
of a lance. The policeman demanded the surrender of the fugitive. The fugitive lunged at the
policeman with his bamboo lance. The policeman dodged and fired his revolver at the fugitive.
The policeman missed. The fugitive ran away still holding the bamboo lance. The policeman
pursued the fugitive and again fired his revolver, hitting and killing the fugitive. The Court
acquitted the policeman on the ground that the killing was done in the fulfillment of duty.
If the policeman were a private person, not in the performance of duty, there would be no
self-defense because there would be no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. His
aggression is not unlawful, it being necessary to fulfill his duty.
The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was
absolutely necessary to prevent his escape. But Valino was not only an escaping detainee, he
had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. If he had no intention to engage the policemen
in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the jeep without grabbing the M16 Armalite.
Valino’s act of grabbing the M16 Armalite clearly showed a hostile intention and even constituted
unlawful aggression.
 In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law
enforcer is already imminent, and there is no other option but to use force to subdue the
offender, the law enforcer’s failure to issue a warning is excusable. The embattled policemen did
not have the luxury of time. 
At most, Cabanlig and the other police officers are guilty of gross negligence for failing to
handcuff and secure the convict.

WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court REVERSE the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting
accused RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG of the crime of homicide. The Supreme Court
ACQUIT RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG of the crime of homicide and ORDER his
immediate release from prison, unless there are other lawful grounds to hold him. We DIRECT
the Director of Prisons to report to this Court compliance within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision. No costs.
 SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 120744-46
June 25, 2012

FACTS:
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the June 30, 1995 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612 (murder), 16613
(multiple counts of attempted murder) and 16614 (frustrated murder) 
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay
Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup)
and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). 
Accused were petitioners from:
Integrated National Police (INP) at Sindalan substation
 Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and
Ernesto Puno (Puno) 
Barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen
 Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes,
Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF)
 Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David,
Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan)
and Carlos David (David), 

Portions of the charges against the petitioners in the Sandiganbayan are as follows:
Criminal Case No. 16612 (murder):
That the above mentioned petitioners had deliberate intent to take the life of
Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green
Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds
which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and
immediate death of the latter.

Criminal Case No. 16613 (multiple counts of attempted murder):

That the above mentioned petitioners had the intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores,
Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with automatic weapons by
firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R.
de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of
murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder by reason of some
cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.

Criminal Case No. 16614 (frustrated murder):

That the above mentioned petitioners had the intent of taking the life of Noel C.
Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota
Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which
are necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of
murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants’ will, namely, the
able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his
death.
The actual incident took place as follows:
Version of the prosecution:
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores,
Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio
fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. 
The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession
had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the
wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. 
With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his
Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed.
Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and
instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.
It was determined that the members of the INP where situated at a distance in front of the
vehicle of Villanueva, while the members of the CHDF and the barangay captains were situated
inside the house of a certain Lenlen Narun, which is directly perpendicular to the right of
Villanueva’s vehicle.
Version of the defense as narrated by Yapyuco:
The members of the INP together with Yu were investigating a physical injuries case with
when Yu was called upon by David (CHDF), who was instructed by Pamintuan, requesting police
assistance concerning a reported presence of members of the NPA in Quebiawan. 
Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at
the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence,
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, carrying with them their M-16 rifles.
Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms.
Pamintuan assembled a group of nearby CHDF members to intimidate the said rebels.
Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney
conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. 
As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle,
so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop.
He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This
allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno, to fire warning shots but
the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Naron’s house directly at
the subject jeepney.
Judgment of the Sandiganbayan
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Yapyuco, Cunanan, Jr., Puno, Mario Reyes, Andres
Reyes and Manguerra are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in
the offense of Homicide, crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven. 
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused charged in the
information are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder charged therein,
with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Yapyuco, Cunanan, Jr., Puno, Mario Reyes,
Andres Reyes and Manguerra are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, crediting them with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in its decision on the above mentioned
convictions of the accused (No)

HELD:
The Court finds that evidence, nonetheless exists, to  support the penultimate finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I. On determining the identity of the Criminal
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal. To
this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-affidavit of all the
accused. Details of the counter-affidavits can be found and summarized on the testimony of
Yapyuco above.
II. On the justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
The Court finds that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code do not obtain in this case.
The specific duty of police officers is to identify the occupants of the suspect vehicle and
search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a
bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were
committing or were bound to commit a crime.
No material evidence was presented at the trial to show that the accused were placed in
real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the
suspects were armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
III. On the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact 
The Court finds that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure.

A reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent
component of the crime.
He is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with
wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected
otherwise.
IV. On whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been
established beyond cavil of doubt.
The crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law
looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof. Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding
of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses, and
thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of
said offenses.
V. On the petition of Yapyunco  of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
frustrated homicide
The crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice. People v. Guillen and
People v. Nanquil declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo, the Court held that that there can
be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies
lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Additionally, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
VI. On the ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the
other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims. 
The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
because the evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds
of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and
evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable
proof that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.

NOTES:
III.
The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable
and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should
immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit
without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged
pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the
completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.
An agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case
when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his
duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender.
IV
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. Corpus delicti consists of two
things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. In
homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: 
(a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; 
(b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was
not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and 
(c) that the defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for
the act which resulted in the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with
malice), that is, with intent to kill.
Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors
before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if
there is no intent to kill.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,  vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
G.R. No. 135981 
January 15, 2004
 
Facts: 
Appellant (Marivic Genosa) and Ben Genosa were united in marriage in Ormoc City. 
Sometime in 1995, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang,
Isabel, Leyte. Appellant testified that going home after work, she got worried that her husband
who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. They found Ben drunk
upon their return at the Genosas' house. Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following
him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their
children who were doing their homework. Disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the
light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from
watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed
and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted
him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage,
dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her
'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was aware that
there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch
long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing
him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as
he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom. She
then pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it
to shoot him. 
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband
who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and
she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted
later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the
baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995. (2        
Marivic Genosa prayed for her acquittal on a novel theory -- the “battered woman
syndrome” (BWS) which allegedly constitutes self-defense. 
RTC found no self-defense, and killed her husband while sleeping sentencing Marivic
Genosa with an aggravating crime of treachery.

Issues: 
1. Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; (No, but with
two mitigating circumstances Art. 13, Par. 6 and Par. 9 & 10) and
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa. (No) 

Ruling:
The appeal is partly meritorious.
On whether defendant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus:
There was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. He
was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. The principle that
aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. 
On whether the defendant (Marivic Genosa) was suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome:
 The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence". She failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern.

Mitigating Circumstances Present

The cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
"cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,"
"psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous
to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however,
depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her
freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of
the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered
as a mitigating factor. 
The court also finds in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has
been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. (Art. 13, Par. 6)

On whether the defendant committed treachery:

There is no showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the
shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression
from the assailant. 
Being a novel concept in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the battered woman
syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in
the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took
great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the
case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to
understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused
person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and
appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby

AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. 
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed
upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody
upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other
lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
Notes: 

In Determining Parricide: 

In People v. Malabago, this Court held:

"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the
case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected
to."
To appreciate the circumstance of Art. 13, Par. 6, the following requisites must concur:
 1. There is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind;
and 
2. This act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,

sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person.
Taken from the dissenting opinion of Justice Ynares-Santiago:
The novel theory of "Battered Woman Syndrome" is recognized in foreign jurisprudence
as a form of self-defense. It operates upon the premise that a woman who has been cyclically
abused and controlled over a period of time develops a fearful state of mind. Living in constant
danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will
escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert
to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously threaten her survival.
Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her
helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her
batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have
no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of
eliminating her sufferings.
As exhaustively discussed in the ponencia, the "Battered Woman Syndrome" has three
phases, to wit: 
(1) the tension-building phase, where minor batterings in the form of verbal or slight
physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind,
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way;
(2) the acute battering incident phase which is characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and sometimes, death. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot
reason with him and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition; and
(3) the tranquil period, where the couple experience a compound relief and the batterer
may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner.

On Treachery:
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make. In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances
invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Because of the
gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
 RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, 
Vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835
April 20, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner-accused Rustan Ang and defendant Irish Sagud were college classmates at
Wesleyan University in Aurora Province who eventually became an “on-and-off” couple by the
end of 2004. Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife
Michelle), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Irish changed her phone number when Rustan became persistent in contacting her, even
suggesting the idea of eloping because he alleged that he did not love his wife.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service
(MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with her face superimposed on the
figure. The sender’s cellphone number was one of the numbers that Rustan used. Rustan sent
succeeding messages boasting he could create similar photos and threatened to spread the
picture through chat groups in their community.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police.
Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess
Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora. He came in a motorcycle and  after parking it, walked
towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being
questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Expert testimonies from Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, were gathered to attest the authenticity of the photo. He said that it was very much
possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of
another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to
make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the
acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim
during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of
human nature and experience”. Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2005, the RTC found
Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
Ruling of CA
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision dated
January 31, 2008, affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face
pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation
on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262 (Yes)

HELD:
I. On Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term
is defined in R.A. 9262
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of
a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. The parties
to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating
relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation
where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course
of the relationship
II. On Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in
this case, already constitutes a violation of Section
The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low
regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case.
Irish testified that Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it on the internet for all to
see. That must have given her a nightmare.
III. On Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in
violation of his constitutional rights
The prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that
the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such
items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-
trial conference.
The bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the
obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to
Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication.
IV. On Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes
an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
Rustan raised the objection for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late
since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was
offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection
Besides, he rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings

In conclusion
The Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
 KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,1 Respondents
G.R. No. 193960
January 7, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information which states:
On or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines,, the above-
named accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, used personal violence on the
complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and
consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter
posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at
the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with
private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of
the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon,
private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her, the physical injuries
alleged in the Information.

RTC Ruling
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the
parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the
parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted
an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

Petitioner’s defense:
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is
not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead,
he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

ISSUE:
I.  Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense; (Yes)
II.  Whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused; (No)
and 
III.  Whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be
quashed (Yes)
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
I. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 
1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife,
or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child;
and 
2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. 
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as
long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship
between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
The Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as:
a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence
committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is
covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of
the said law.

II. On Whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity
because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the
degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the
same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the
legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent
act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or
their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.

III. Whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be
quashed
Yes. SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on
an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made.

NOTES:
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the
doctrine that ‘a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or
inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.’"
Separate Opinion of CJ Corona in People v.Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008,
citing Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1359 (2004).
 NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193707
December 10, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition
was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their
son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00
more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu. Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering. To date,
all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 
Petitioner then filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Respondent submitted his counter-
affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. Thereafter, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the
crime charged against herein respondent.
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order
against respondent. Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed
his Opposition. Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. Subsequently, without
the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the grounds of: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and
(2) prescription of the crime charged. 
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information
do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 195of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes
him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are
obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law; (Yes) and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child. (Yes)
HELD:
The circumstances present warrant the court to exempt  the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts when the issue is a novel question of law,  the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national
has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be
held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

I. On Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. 
In Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners, such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, the Court agrees with the
RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law
In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards
the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws
Even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

II. On whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child. 
Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, the Court find strength
in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "Penal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and treaty stipulations." 
On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing
to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein
are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over
the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further
proceedings based on the merits of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO

Facts:

Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of the then 5-
year-old victim AAA. The crime was committed when appellant was only 17; Judgment was
rendered when appellant was already 25.

Issue:
Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344 regarding criminal liability
of an accused who was a minor during the commission of the crime and the suspension of
sentence of one who is no longer a minor during the pronouncement of verdict.

Held:

The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the straightforward testimony of the
victim and the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the defense witnesses.

I. A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age
even in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c)
by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating
in the insertion of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings
of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

II. The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant
was elsewhere when the crime was committed.

We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good
look at him during the commission of the crime. AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover,
appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus that it
would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the
way to the rice field.

III. In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the
crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who
were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason,
the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in
which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed.

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing
and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minor’s cunning and shrewdness.

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark
place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her
defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully
understand the consequences of his unlawful action.

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

The birth certificate of AAA shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she
was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing
the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old applies.

The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was only 17 during the
commission of the crime since, in view of the circumstances to which accused committed the
felony, it was proved that he acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was showing that
the accused understood the consequences of his action such as choosing the site of rape as
dark and grassy, and boxing the victim to weaken her defenses.

Applying the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with reclusion perpetua instead of the
death penalty.

As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to the decision of the Court,
ordering accused to pay the victim for damages.

However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension of his sentence provided
in Section38 of RA 9344, which made no distinction to an accused found guilty of a capital
offense. The Court stated that what was important was the intent of the Act to uphold the welfare
of a child in conflict with the law. What was to be considered was the fact that accused
committed the crime at a tender age.

DISPOSITION: CA decision is affirmed - Hermie M. Jacinto is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

qualified rape with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages
PEOPLE V. NEPOMUCENO, JR.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr. has appealed in regard to the decision finding
him guilty of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized under Article 246 of RPC for the
death of Grace Nepomuceno.

On May 2, 1994 in Manila, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of one GRACE NEPOMUCENO Y BENITEZ, his wife,
with whom he was married in lawful wedlock, by then and there shooting her with a gun of
unknown caliber hitting her on the left hip, thereby inflicting upon the victim a fatal gunshot
wound. The prosecution presented Monserrat de Leon, sister of the victim, who declared that
Grace would confide to her that accused-appellant was jobless and that Grace had problems
with the low income of the store she owned at Zurbaran Mart as compared to her expenses.
Accused-appellant would force sex on Grace especially when he was drunk. Defense claimed
that the accused was initially thinking about ending his life by shooting himself because of the
financial woes and his wife’s relentless pestering and nagging, but in the process of both
spouses’ struggle to take possession of the gun, it went off and hit Grace.

Issue:
1) WON the trial court erred in not finding the killing was accidental, and that the accused was
exempt from criminal liability.
2) Assuming the accused is criminally liable, WON the trial court erred in not finding the killing
was result of simple negligence.
3) WON the trial court erred in finding that the guilt of the accused was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

HELD:

1) No. First, accused-appellant cannot cite Paragraph 4, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code in
order to be exempted from criminal liability. Said provision pertinently states:
 
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
 
4) Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.

Accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here, however, the act of
accused-appellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not being in self-
defense, is unlawful -- it at least constitutes as light threats (Article 285, par. 1). There is thus no
room for the invocation of accident as a ground for exemption.
 
The gun was not even licensed or registered hence, he could have been charged with illegal
possession of a firearm. Secondly, appellant's claim that the shooting happened when he tried to
prevent his wife from killing herself and he and his wife grappled for the possession of the gun is
belied by the expert testimony of Dr. Arizala of the who conducted a second postmortem
examination. Moreover, the act of accused ordering Eden Ontog to call a taxi in which he brought
the wounded Grace to the hospital is "merely an indication or act of repentance or contrition on
the part of appellant. Accused-appellant's voluntary surrender is not sufficient ground to
exculpate him from criminal liability. The law merely considers such act as a mitigating
circumstance. Non- flight is not proof of innocence.
 
2) No. What qualifies an act of reckless or simple negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice
or criminal intent in the execution thereof. Moreover, if the version of grappling for the gun were
to be believed, there should have been nitrates on both hands of Grace, as examined by the NBI
doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim. Thus, these
physical evidences, the lack of powder burns or nitrates on the hands of Grace and the trajectory
of the bullet that entered her left thigh being slightly upwards and from left to right instead of
downwards, repudiate accused-appellant's claim of simple negligence.

3) Yes, but with mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The prosecution has sufficiently
established the elements of parricide by its evidence.

These elements are:

(1) the death of the deceased;
(2) that she was killed by the accused; and
(3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused (Article 246).

The first and third elements were stipulated during the pre-trial stage of the case, thus: the victim
and the accused are legally married, and that immediately after the shooting, the accused
voluntarily and bodily carried the victim into a taxicab and proceeded to the hospital where she
died.” Further, accused-appellant having admitted that he shot his wife, he has the burden of
proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility.

DISPOSITION: Crime of Parricide is AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SUSAN LATOSA

FACTS:

On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Susan Latosa, herein appellant, together
with his husband Major Felixberto Sr. and two children Sassymae and Michael, were in their
house in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig. While Major Felixberto Sr. was asleep, Sassymae saw her
mother take Felixberto Sr.’s gun and leave. She asked her mother where she was going and if
she could come along, appellant refused. Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae
to buy ice cream. After Sassymae left, appellant instructed Michael to join his sister, but he
refused. Appellant thereafter turned up the volume of the television and radio to full. Shorty after
that, appellant gave her son money to buy food.
After buying his food, Michael went back to their house and thereupon saw his friend
Mac-Mac who told him that he saw appellant running away from their house. Moments later, a
certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something had happened in their house. Michael replied
in the negative then entered their house. At that point, he saw his father lying on the bed with a
hole in the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.
Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about what happened. Sgt.
Ramos told him that appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office.
Then, Sassymae arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his
left hand.
Appellant claimed that the killing was an accident, that when Felixberto, Sr. woke up, he
asked her to get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the
pistol to him it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was still lying down.

RTC: Found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of parricide. The RTC, in
finding appellant guilty, considered the following circumstantial evidence established by the
prosecution:

(1) shortly before the shooting, appellant asked her two (2) children to do errands for her which
were not usually asked of them;
(2) at the time of the shooting, only the appellant and Felixberto, Sr. were in the house;
(3) appellant was seen running away from the house immediately after the shooting;
(4) when Michael went inside their house, he found his father with a hole in the head and a gun
in his left hand;
(5) the medico-legal report showed that the cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage due to
the gunshot wound on the head with the point of entry at the left temporal region;
(6) the Firearms Identification Report concluded that appellant fired two (2) shots;
(7) Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed and the gun was found near his left hand;
(8) Sassymae testified that she heard Sta. Inez tell appellant “bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak
mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok”;
(9) appellant’s children testified that they were informed by Felixberto, Sr. regarding the threat of
appellant’s paramour, Sta. Inez, to the whole family; and
(10) Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum showing that appellant was terminated from her
teaching job by reason of immorality.

CA: Upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA held that since appellant admitted having killed her
husband albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of proving the presence of the
exempting circumstance of accident to relieve herself of criminal responsibility.  She must rely on
the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be
weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the appellant has admitted the killing. .

Issue:

WON appellant has strongly established the exempting circumstance of accident to relieve him
from criminal liability.

Held:

No. SC held that it was incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear and convincing evidence,
the following essential requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident. To prove the
circumstance she must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of that
of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted the killing. The essential requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident, to wit:

1. She was performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;

3. She caused the injury to her husband by mere accident;

4. Without fault or intention of causing it

SC find no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove by

circumstantial evidence her motive in killing her husband.  Intent to kill and not motive is the
essential element of the offense on which her conviction rests.

However, by no stretch of imagination could the pointing of the gun towards her
husband’s head and pulling the trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care.
As correctly found by the CA, which we quote in full:

Appellant’s version that she "accidentally shot" her husband is not credible. Appellant’s manner
of carrying the caliber .45 pistol negates her claim of "due care" in the performance of an act.
The location of the wound sustained by the victim shows that the shooting was not merely
accidental. The victim was lying down and the fact that the gun was found near his left hand was
not directly disputed by her. We find it contrary to human nature that a newly awakened military
man would suddenly ask his wife for his firearm, and even patiently wait for her return to the
house, when the said firearm was just inside the cabinet which, according to appellant, was just
about two meters away from his bed.

There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove by circumstantial
evidence her motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of
the offense on which her conviction rests. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

The following circumstantial evidence considered by the RTC and affirmed by the CA
satisfactorily established appellant’s intent to kill her husband and sustained her conviction for
the crime.
THE UNITED STATES vs. ISIDRO VICENTILLO

FACTS:

The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and
arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a
fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of
the trial.

Three days were expended in detention, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time
of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to
reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to
take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch,
the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for
trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written
complaint, which was entrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or
stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both
occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge
were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from
the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more commodious
sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not failing to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause is punishable by law.

HELD:

NO.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to
see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial,
but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the
arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his
official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge
lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping
in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident
occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the
peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this
point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local
ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender
forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be
offenders that the forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local
municipal judicial officers.

SC: Under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the
defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the
complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the
evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was
committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all
the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine
laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
6. Insuperable or lawful cause.
Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause. (Art. 12, Par. 7)

This is a felony by omission. The failure of a policeman to deliver the prisoner lawfully arrested to
the judicial authorities within the prescribed period because it was not possible to do so with
practicable dispatch as the prisoner was arrested in a distant place would constitute a non-
performance of duty to an insuperable cause. (US v. Vicentillo, 19 Phil. 118).
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
Mandy, the accused and Mary Jay were having dinner at their home in Dasmariñas, Cavite when they
got into an argument. The accused did not want Mary Jay to attend a party, causing them to fight.
Incensed, the accused collected the clothes that Mary Joy had given him and told her he would burn
them all and started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary Jay tried to wrestle the can of kerosene
from him and, at the same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife’s plea, the accused
still poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his wife on fire. 
The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely accidental. He said it was
Mary Jay who was being difficult while they were arguing. She threatened to throw away the clothes
he had given her. To spite her, he also took the clothes that she had given him and told her he would
burn them all. He then got a match and a gallon of kerosene. Mary Jay caught up with him at the dirty
kitchen and took the match and kerosene from him. They both got wet from the spilled kerosene. 
Accused, trying to avoid further provoking his wife, left his wife and went upstairs to his son. He heard
Mary Jay shouting, "Mandy, Mandy, nasusunog ako. (Mandy, I’m burning.)" He ran down the steps
and saw the blaze had reached the ceiling of the kitchen. 
The accused likewise claimed that his late wife made a dying declaration in the presence of PO3
Celestino San Jose and Atty. Rosemarie Perey-Duque. 
The RTC rendered its decision that the accused JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYESis guilty beyond 
The CA upheld the ruling of the trial court. The dying declaration made by Mary Jay to her mother
Lourdes and laundrywoman Norma had all the essential requisites and could thus be used to convict
accused-appellant. 
Hence, we have this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that (1) he never or did not intend to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed or so grave an offense as the felony charged against
him; and (2) that he voluntarily, and of his own free will, surrendered or yielded to the police or
government authorities.
Issue:
Whether the guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
No intent to commit so grave a wrong
The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the mitigating circumstance that the offender
had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. We held, "This mitigating
circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the
offender executes or commits the criminal act." We also held, "This mitigating circumstance is
obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a
wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission
of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury
sustained by the victim."17
The court is convinced that the deceased did not take possession of the gallon container with
kerosene. The accused had full control and possession of the same. He is a bulky and very muscular
person while the deceased was of light built, shorter, smaller and weaker. It is extremely far-fetched
that accused-appellant could accidentally pour kerosene on his wife and likewise accidentally light her
up and cause third degree burns to 90% of her body. Theaccused-appellant knew the fatal injuries
that he could cause when he poured kerosene all over his wife and lit a match to ignite a fire. There
was no disparity between the means he used in injuring his wife and the resulting third degree
burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the
Code.
Voluntary surrender
An accused may enjoy the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender if the following requisites
are present: "1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or the latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. "The essence of
voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself
to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture."
In this instance, all the elements for a valid voluntary surrender were present. Accused-appellant at
the time of his surrender had not actually been arrested. He surrendered to the police authorities. His
surrender was voluntary, as borne by the certification issued by the police. There is, thus, merit to the
claim of accused-appellant that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary 
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02541 affirming the
RTC Decision that found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide is
AFFIRMED. 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROMEO AGAPINAY, ALEX AGAPINAY, FORTUNATO AGAPINAY, DANTE AGAPINAY, DELFIN

AGAPINAY and CIRILO AGAPINAY, accused-appellants.

Facts:

Agapinays brothers, except Romeo, who is Delfin's son, and that along with Virgilio Paino, Amor
Flores, and Eufemio Paino, they were hirelings of Julia Rapada, an operator of fishing boats. They
unloaded their catch and spread out their fishnet on the sand to dry. Thereafter, except for Romeo,
they mended the net, with thread and small knives, under portable shed. Meanwhile, Virgilio took the
shed and placed it where he and Alex and Cirilo were. Moments later, Romeo appeared and
confronted Virgilio, and berated him for taking the shed without permission. Virgilio said that they
were going to use it. The two exchanged words and tempers apparently flared. Romeo lunged at
Virgilio with a hunting knife, six inches long that hit his right arm. Virgilio ran away but Delfin and
Fortunato met him and held on to his arms. Romeo approached him and dealt him a second stab at
the right side of his back. Virgilio, however, managed to extricate himself again and ran away. While
he was running, Delfin, Alex, Fortunate, Dante, and Cirilo took turns in stoning him. All of a sudden
Amor Flores appeared and plunged a knife at the back of Virgilio. It was then that Virgilio collapsed.

Romeo Agapinay, who had been tagged as the knife-wielder, alleged that Virgilio suddenly appeared
at the shore "uttering bad words to his father Delfin." 1 Virgilio then allegedly struck Cirilo Agapinay and
his father with a paddle. He stated that he was forced to stab Virgilio three times. Virgilio allegedly
later went home alone. 

The trial judge rejected the accused's claim of defense of relative and convicted all six accused of the
crime of murder, attended by treachery. 

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.

Whether or not the accused acted in defense of relative

Whether or not the accused is entitled to mitigating circumstance

Held:

TREACHERY

There is further no doubt that murder has been committed, but not because of treachery, as ruled by
the trial court. Treachery depends on the suddenness of the attack, by which the victim is rendered
hors d'combat, as in an ambuscade, or any manner in which the victim is deprived of all defenses,
and in which the malefactor faces no risk to himself.  The manner of attack must be shown. There is
no such showing here.

The fact that Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay held Virgilio Paino while Romeo stabbed him, does not
demonstrate treachery. Rather, what it proves is abuse of superiority. It is indeed plain from the
records that the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had taken advantage of their strength to
overcome the victim who, at that time, was already injured.  Abuse of superiority qualifies the taking
of the life of another into murder

DEFENSE OF RELATIVE

As we noted, the trial court repudiated the accused's posturing of defense of relatives, so also do we.
"Defense of relatives" requires the concurrence of three elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending the
relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation have been given by the person
attacked. Of these three requisites, "unlawful aggression" is said to be the most essential and
primary, without which any "defense" is not possible or justified. Thus: "If there is no unlawful
aggression there would be nothing to prevent or repel."  In that event, not even incomplete self-
defense can be validly invoked. 

The Court is not persuaded that Virgilio Paino had acted with unlawful aggression that might have
provoked the Agapinays' deadly wrath. The records show that all that Virgilio did was to address
offensive language to Delfin Agapinay. In one case, this Court held that 'injurious words or
threats do not amount to unlawful aggression. Assuming that Virgilio did strike Delfin and Romeo
Agapinay with a paddle, the expedients reveals that thereafter and upon having been stabbed in the
right arm by Romeo, he, Virgilio, ran away. It has also been ruled that: "Self-defense does not
justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray." 

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

The Court finds, however, that the accused should be entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of provocation (or vindication of a grave offense or passion or obfuscation). Since clearly, the
deceased uttered offending words ("vulva of your mother, if you are talking as if you have no
debts, not like me, I have no debts") that made the Agapinays, especially Romeo, react
violently.

 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO,
accused-appellant.

Facts:

Renato R. Perez, the victim, testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and the
deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store. While they were walking, Pajares suddenly
appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at the back of his head. The latter ran a short
distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to help Viojan, he, too, was
attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat. He then grappled with the appellant for the possession of
the baseball bat but the latter's companions mauled him until he lost consciousness

Leandro Pajares denied the allegations of the prosecution. He asserts that at the time of the incident,
he was inside the store of Alex Blas with about eight (8) other People watching television. Hence, he
did not see who hit Diosdado Viojan and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the advise of Alex
Blas, he went home and slept. At about 3:30 in the morning of October 12, 1985, he was arrested. At
the police detachment, he was coerced to admit his participation in the crime since a gun.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused LEANDRO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and the crime of Slight Physical Injuries.

In an appeal, Pajares alleged that the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by herein appellant was a
vindication of the grave offense committed against his family, a mitigating circumstance under
paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: 

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be
appreciated in Pajare’s favor.

Held:

While it may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the
deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985 as shown in the entry in the Police Blotter and by
appellant's brother himself, it must be emphasized that there is a lapse of about ten (10) hours
between said incident and the killing of Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of time was more than
sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People v. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042,
December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of
a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.

The decision appealed from is affirmed.

 
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
 vs. JUNE IGNAS y SANGGINO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. Nos. 140514-15
September 30, 2003

FACTS: 

June Ignas Y Sanggino and Wilma Grace Ignas are husband and wife. However, Wilma was having
an affair with Nemesio Lopate. Later on, Wilma left for Taiwan. She sent 4 letters, 2 of which are
meant for Romenda Fogayao and the other 2 for Nemesio. In her letter for Romenda, Wilma
instructed the latter to reveal to June her affair with Nemesio. Romenda informed June that Wilma
was having an affair with Nemesio. She added that the two had spent a day and a night together in a
room at Dangwa Inn in Manila. June got furious. He uttered “There will be a day for that Nemesio. I
will kill that Nemesio.” The accused killed his wife's lover 2 weeks after he discovered his wife's
extramarital dalliance. Two gunshots were heard by the witnesses in the evening at the Trading Post/
bagsakan in La Trinidad, Benguet. The fallen victim was Nemesio Lopate. He was brought to the
hospital was declared dead upon arrival. The RTC found June guilty of murder aggravated by
treachery, nighttime, and specially aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm, with no mitigating
circumstance and sentenced to the penalty of death by lethal injection. 

Nature: Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 8, found appellant June Ignas y Sanggino guilty of murder aggravated especially by the use of
an unlicensed firearm. Appellant was initially sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
but on motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, the penalty was upgraded to death by lethal
injection. Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.
ISSUE:
1. Assuming arguendo that the accused-appellant is guilty, WON the trial court gravely erred when it
ruled that the killing of the deceased was attended by evident premeditation, treachery and nighttime.
[YES]
2. WON the trial court committed reversible error when it appreciated the alleged use of an
unlicensed .38 caliber firearm as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime of
murder without any factual and legal basis. [NO]
3. WON The trial court committed reversible error when it did not appreciate in favor of the accused-
appellant the mitigating circumstances of immediate vindication of a grave offense, passion and
obfuscation and voluntary surrender. [NO]

RULING: 

1. The amended information does not definitely and categorically state that the unlawful killing was
attended by the aggravating or qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and
nighttime. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure took effect only on December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio, as a
procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should be given retrospective application. Hence, absent
specific allegations of the attendant circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity
in the amended information, it was error for the trial court to consider the same in adjudging appellant
guilty of murder. As worded, we find that the amended information under which June was charged
and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall
under the scope and coverage of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 

2. Under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 8, 1997, where murder or homicide is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no
longer be imposed since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. This Court has held
in a number of cases that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm where another crime, as indicated by R.A. No. 8294, is committed. Although R.A. No. 8294
took effect over a year after the alleged offense was committed, it is advantageous to June insofar as
it spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms and thus should be given
retroactive application.

3. The court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation because for the
same to be well founded, the following requisites must concur:
1 there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and 
2 the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. The
period of two weeks between the discovery of his wife’s  extramarital dalliance and the killing of her
lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off. 

DISPOSITION: The Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 95-
CR-2522 is MODIFIED as follows:

Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is ORDERED TO PAY the heirs of the victim, Nemesio Lopate, the
following sums: a) P7,000 as actual damages; b) P1,020,000 for loss of earning capacity; c) P50,000
as civil indemnity; d) P25,000 as temperate damages; and e) P20,000 as attorneys fees. Costs de
oficio.
 GREGORIO PELONIA, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 168997
April 13, 2007
 
FACTS:
It was the eve of the fiesta of Barangay Tawan-Tawan when at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of
August 17, 1986, Gregorio Pelonia received a group of visitors in his house. They were Winnie
Bustamante, Boy Guhiling, Monico Betarmos and Ignacio Nacilla. Upon the introduction of Boy
Guhiling, Gregorio Pelonia invited them to come up. The group seated themselves in the balcony,
while Gregorio Pelonia went back to the kitchen to finish the chopping of the meat, afterwhich he put
aside the meat in a basin, placed the bolo he was using on top of the meat and placed the whole
thing on the native sink. He prepared the table, then he called the group to partake of the food.
Monico Betarmos, Boy Guhiling and Winnie Bustamante came inside the sala but Ignacio Nacilla who
also came forward spoke that his purpose in coming was not to eat but to kill because he has a long
standing grudge against Pelonia and that this is the time to avenge himself. Pelonia asked what he
had done against Nacilla but the latter took hold of Pelonia’s shoulder and pushed him to a chair.
Pelonia’s wife cried for help and Cipriano Losica came up but he was collared by Nacilla. Thus,
Pelonia was able to run towards his room and got his gun, then he went back to the sala and fired a
warning shot upwards, saying that Nacilla should better go down because he is abusive. Then,
Pelonia ran towards the kitchen and jumped to the ground. He told Boy Guhiling to get Nacilla and
Boy Guhiling, together with Flor Losica, went upstairs. Pelonia heard the shout and crying of his wife
and children so he went back upstairs through the fox hole (an underground passage in his room).
Emerging in his room, he proceeded to the sala where he saw Ignacio Nacilla holding the bolo which
he (Pelonia) used to chop meat. Again, he warned Nacilla to go down but the latter instead attacked
Pelonia who was able to evade the blows. When Pelonia saw that Nacilla was about to thrust the bolo
towards him, he shot Nacilla.
RTC: WHEREFORE, accused Gregorio Pelonia, having been found to be guilty of the crime of
Homicide as proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as
minimum to Fourteen (14) Years Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as
maximum and payment for damages and fees.
The RTC rejected petitioner’s theory of self-defense, holding that it was not established by clear and
convincing evidence. The RTC ruled that the prosecution had failed to prove the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. It held that treachery cannot be presumed
and, like evident premeditation, must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. According to the
trial court, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to show the circumstances which would
qualify the crime to murder.
CA: The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 02 April 1993 is hereby MODIFIED. The
accused is hereby entitled to the MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES of sufficient provocation, passion
and obfuscation, and voluntary surrender which, taken altogether, constitute a special mitigating
circumstance. The accused shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day
of Prision Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
HOWEVER, in light of the circumstances surrounding this case, this Court recommends the
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY be extended to the hereunder accused. Without pronouncements as to
cost.
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 30, 2004 Decision 1 and the
June 24, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17476 which affirmed
with modification the April 2, 1993 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch
13, in Criminal Case No. 14,182.

ISSUE:
1. WON the court of appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts and
is guilty of misapprehension (sic) of facts when it disregarded the defense of accused-petitioner of
self-defense when he shot the deceased. [NO]

2. WON the court of appeals violated the right of the accused-petitioner to due process when it
disregarded the findings of the ocular inspection of the scene of the crime conducted on April 16,
1988. [NO]

3. WON the court of appeals is guilty of misapprehension of facts when it did not acquit the accused-
petitioner.[NO]

RULING:

Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense and can easily be fabricated. When the accused
interposes self-defense, he hereby admits having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden of
proof then shifts on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential
requisites for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the prosecution’s, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after
the accused has admitted the killing. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden.
Second. The trial court found the collective testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be
credible, while those of petitioner incredible and barren of probative weight. The legal aphorism is that
factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment
of their probative weight is given high respect if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts and
circumstances of substance, which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case, were ignored,
misconstrued or misinterpreted. We have meticulously reviewed the records and found no reason to
deviate from the factual findings of the trial court.
Third. The issues raised by petitioner require the determination of factual matters which is beyond the
province of this Court. It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court’s findings of fact, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. It is true that there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are
based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8)
the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and, (11) such findings are contrary to
the admissions of both parties. Unfortunately, however, petitioner failed to show that any of the
exceptions is present in the instant case to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the lower courts.
We also agree with the disquisition of the CA in supporting its ruling affirming the ruling of the RTC
that it was improper for it to consider the ocular inspection of the source of the crime.
The Court agrees with the CA that mitigating circumstances should be considered in petitioner’s
favor. However, only two out of the three mitigating circumstances 17 considered by the CA can be
credited to petitioner. The CA properly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was,
likewise, properly appreciated. Petitioner was humiliated in front of his guests and kin in his own
house. It is settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be
considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances
arose from one and the same incident so that they should be considered as only one mitigating
circumstance.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 17476 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Gregorio Pelonia is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. The assailed Decision and
Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RUBEN CAETE (deceased), ALFREDO CAETE,
SERGIO CAETE (deceased), TRINIDAD CAETE and SOTERO CAETE (deceased), appellants.
G.R. No. 138366.
September 11, 2003

FACTS: On May 24, 1997, at about 10:20 a.m., in Sitio Canagahan, Barangay Tabla, Liloan, Cebu,
Leonaldo Tumayao, Joel Quimod and Lilio Tundag were on their way home after attending a wedding
party. Tumayao was walking ahead of Tundag and Quimod. As they passed by the houses of the
accused, Quimod and Tundag heard successive gunshots. The two immediately looked in the
direction where the bursts of gunfire were coming from and saw defendants shooting at Tumayao
who slumped to the ground. Apparently not satisfied, all the accused approached the fallen Tumayao
and continued shooting him. On order of his father Sotero, Alfredo shot Tumayao in the head.

Quimod ran went home and narrated the incident to Tumayao’s wife. On the other hand, Tundag,
who was behind Tumayao, saw Ruben fire his gun at the victim. Tundag attempted to come to the aid
of Tumayao but the latter shouted at him to flee. Thus, he ran back to the wedding party while hearing
more gunshots. At the wedding party, Tundag informed the people about the ambush. Thereafter, he
went back to the crime scene where he saw Tumayao’s lifeless body on the road.

Vilma Tumayao, daughter of the victim, went to the crime scene after she was informed of the
shooting. She saw all the accused near the dead body of her father. Vilma, however, could not
approach him because Alfredo aimed his gun at her. It was only after the arrival of the policemen that
Vilma was finally able to get near the body of her father.

The policemen ordered the accused to come out of their houses and surrender. After an hour, Sergio,
Sotero and Trinidad surrendered to the authorities while Ruben and Alfredo managed to escape and
later surrendered to the Talamban Police Station, Cebu City.

Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the PNP, conducted an autopsy on Tumayao. According
to him, the victim sustained five wounds from a shotgun and one grazing wound which could have
been caused either by a pellet or a cartridge of a shotgun, or by a bullet fired from a gun. The cause
of death of Tumayao was shock, secondary to shotgun (pellet wounds) body and extremity.

RTC: The trial court found the three accused, appellants herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder for the killing of Leonaldo Tumayao, said accused are hereby sentenced to each
undergo the penalty by imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify jointly and severally the legal heirs of the deceased Leonaldo Tumayao for damages.

Nature: This is an appeal from the decision dated December 15, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XXVIII, Mandaue City, in Criminal Case No. DU-5985, convicting the appellants of murder
and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: WON the trial court committed grave reversible error in convicting accused Sergio, Trinidad
and Alfredo Caete, principally, on the basis of the evidently biased and highly incredible testimony of
witnesses Joel Quimod, Lilio Tundag and Vilma Tumayao, much less, for murder. [NO]

RULING:

The perceived contradictions in the testimonies of Quimod and Tundag referred only to minor
matters. There was no inconsistency as far as the principal occurrence and the positive identification
of the assailants were concerned. Minor discrepancies do not damage the essential integrity of the
evidence in its material whole nor reflect adversely on the witnesses’ credibility. We have previously
held, in fact, that minor inconsistencies, far from detracting from the veracity of the testimony, even
enhance the credibility of witnesses for they remove any suspicion of a contrived or rehearsed
testimony. Despite the absence of any wound in the head allegedly caused by a final shot by Alfredo,
the shots fired at Tumayao by the appellants nevertheless resulted in his death.

So long as the witnesses testimonies agree on substantial matters, the inconsequential

inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the witnesses credibility nor the verity of their
testimonies. When the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is
insignificant and can not have any bearing on the essential fact testified to, that is, the killing of the
victim. The time-tested rule is that, between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the
mere denials of the accused, the former undisputedly deserve more credence and are entitled to
greater evidentiary value. Appellants likewise assail the trial courts finding that conspiracy, treachery
and evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of criminal design. Gleaned from the records is the following chain of
events which proved that there was a community of design among the appellants: (1) appellants
positioned themselves strategically before ambushing Tumayao; (2) Alfredo fired at Tumayao
although there was no certainty that he hit the victim; (3) Ruben shot and hit the victim with his
shotgun; (4) appellants fired their guns successively at Tumayao; (5) appellants, still holding their
firearms, surrounded Tumayao after he slumped to the ground; (6) Sotero was holding a pistol and he
ordered Alfredo to deliver the coup de grace to the victim; (7) Alfredo obeyed Soteros order by
shooting Tumayao one last time; (8) Alfredo and Ruben escaped from the scene of the crime; (9)
Sotero, Sergio and Trinidad hid inside the latters house away from the crime scene until they were
ordered by the police to come out and surrender.

Therefore, even presuming for the sake of argument that the wounds inflicted on Tumayao were the
result of a single shot from a shotgun, appellants presence and participation nonetheless made
possible the execution of the crime.

We likewise agree that treachery attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means or methods in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. In this
case, the events narrated by the eyewitnesses point to the fact that Tumayao could not have been
aware that he would be attacked by appellants. There was no opportunity for Tumayao to defend
himself as appellants, suddenly and without any provocation, fired their guns at him, one after the
other.

However, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation. There was no proof that the appellants deliberately planned to liquidate the
victim. On the contrary, the killing of the victim was the immediate impulsive reaction of appellants to
Tumayao’s act of punching Ruben. Moreover, the time that elapsed between the punching incident
and the commission of the crime was not sufficient for Ruben and the rest of the appellants to reflect
upon the consequences of their intended act. The elements of evident premeditation, namely: (1) the
time when the offender appeared determined to commit the crime; (2) the act evidently indicating that
the offender clung to his determination, and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to
commit the crime and the execution thereof during which the offender was able to reflect on the
consequences of his act, were wanting in this case.

We agree with the trial court that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in favor of Alfredo and the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense conceded in favor of all the appellants. Saving the authorities the trouble and expense for his
search and capture, and freely placing himself at their disposal, Alfredo should be given the favor of a
mitigated penalty for his voluntary surrender. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
being personal however, can only be appreciated in favor of appellant Alfredo.

It must be recalled that, immediately prior to the incident, Tumayao punched Ruben in the presence
of many people at the wedding party. Although the incident did not immediately precede the killing, its
impact, by reason of its seriousness and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, festered till
the commission of the crime. The mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense
must, therefore, be appreciated in favor of the appellants.

DISPOSITION: The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Mandaue City, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Trinidad Caete and Alfredo Caete are hereby found
guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

 
 RICARDO BACABAC, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 149372
September 11, 2007
FACTS:
In the evening of December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in Purok 4,
San Joaquin, Iloilo City in the company of Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor).
And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel).
Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his companions also left and on
their way home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel and, then and there figured in a
misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus) saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later
"tying" Jonathan "with his hands." Still later, he saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick." He thus told the
victim and his companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor “Jose” Talanquines, Jr. whereupon
Eduardo told him (Jesus) to go away for they might shoot him. Jesus left and proceeded to Edzel's
residence to report to his father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and Jonathan
managed to flee.
The victim and his companions headed home and met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner),
together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his nephews, and Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and
two sisters. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were
carrying a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively.
Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled
Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan
and Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out, however, "You are just bragging that you are brave.
You are only bullying small children." Petitioner, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his
armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at the victim and Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in
the thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on the move to strike [the victim] with a piece of wood." Eduardo fell.
And so did the victim who was in a kneeling position, and as he was raising his hands in surrender,
Jose shot him again. Meanwhile, Melchor escaped. The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought
to the hospital. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.
RTC: In Criminal Case No. 35783 and 35784, all the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel
Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and there being no aggravating circumstances
with one mitigating circumstance [immediate vindication for Jose and Jesus; voluntary surrender for
Pat. Ricardo Bacabac12], and applying the indeterminate sentence law, accused Jose Talanquines,
Jr., Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for
a period of 10 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day as maximum; while
accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac who are entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) years, 2 months,
and 1 day, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day as maximum. All the accused are ordered to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Hernani Quidato, the amount of P50,000.00 for his
wrongful death; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for attorneys fees; and the costs of the
suit.
CA: By Decision of June 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Entry of
final judgment was made by the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1999.
Nature: On February 24, 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, Order, and/or Denial of Appeal which was granted, hence, the Entry of Judgment issued
by the appellate court on July 22, 1999 was set aside. He thereafter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the appellate court's June 28, 1999 Decision which was denied by Resolution of
August 8, 2001; hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner may be deemed to be in conspiracy with the other accused.[YES]
WON there was treachery. [YES]
WON contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner, assuming in gratis argumenti the correctness of the
pronouncement of guilt, should have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense, in the same manner that the other Accused were so credited. [NO]
WON Petitioner is not civilly liable. [NO]
RULING:
1. Petitioner's firing of his armalite could not have amounted to none other than lending moral
assistance to his co-accused, thereby indicating the presence of conspiracy. Petitioner's failure to
assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court's appreciation of community of design
between him and his co-accused to harm the victims. That it was he who first officially reported the
shooting to the police station does not make him any less a conspirator. In petitioner's case, he
reported the shooting incident after it had already taken place. In legal contemplation, there was no
longer a conspiracy to be repudiated since it had already materialized.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the appellate court did not err in appreciating the presence of
conspiracy despite its finding that there was no evident premeditation. This Court's pronouncement
that conspiracy presupposes the existence of evident premeditation does not necessarily imply that
the converse ─ that evident premeditation presupposes the existence of a conspiracy ─ is true. In any
event, a link between conspiracy and evident premeditation is presumed only where the conspiracy is
directly established and not where conspiracy is only implied, as in the present case.
2. Neither did the appellate court err in finding the presence of treachery. Treachery, under Article 14,
paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, is present "when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make."
What is decisive in treachery is that "the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it
impossible for the victim to retaliate." In the case at bar, petitioner, a policeman, and his co-accused
were armed with two M-16 armalites and a revolver. The victim and his companions were not armed.
The attack was sudden and unexpected, and the victim was already kneeling in surrender when he
was shot the second time. Clearly, the victim and his companion Eduardo had no chance to defend
themselves or retaliate.
3.As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of a grave
offense," it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article
13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degree."
 The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo
pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head."
That act would certainly not be classified as "grave offense." And Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence,
not a relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appellate court's decision is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
 
 
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
AURELIO CABALHIN y DACLITAN

FACTS: 22 February 1987, in Taytay, Rizal, the appellant stabbed, with the use of a 13-inch
dagger, three (3) persons, namely, Marianita Atison (appellant's wife), Flaviana and Rolito, both
surnamed Saldivia (mother and son).

*3 separate information filed on the trial court against the accused:

(1st information) says that he committed frustrated murder. “accused, armed with a deadly
weapon (dagger), with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery… attack, assault and stab
one Flaviana Lacambra-Saldivia on the right lower portion of the breast” the victim did not die
because of medical assistance.

(2nd information) says that he committed murder. “armed with a dagger, with intent to kill, and
by means of treachery and evident premeditation…attack, assault and stab Rolito Saldivia y
Lacambra on the vital parts of his body,…mortal stab wound caused his death.

(3rd information) says that he committed parricide “accused, with evident premeditation to kill
his wife, entered the house, where she was then living separately, and said accused armed with a
bladed weapon suddenly and without warning and employing means which tended to ensure its
commission without danger to himself…stab his wife, Marianita Atison, repeatedly….the latter died
instantly.

*During the trial at RTC, 3 witnesses gave their respective testimonies.

Robin Saldivia (brother of victim Rolito Saldivia) testified that he was at their house that day (their
house has 2 bedrooms and the floor of which was about 4 1/2 feet from the ground). He was at one
bedroom with his brother while his mother Flaviana Lacambra-Saldivia and Marianita Atison were on
the other bedroom. He hid under their house and saw, through the spaces of wooden slabs of the
floor, the accused stabbing the 3 victims.

Igmidio Ducay testified that he was in front of the house of the Saldivias that day and when he notice
that the accused forcibly enters the house by kicking it, he then peeped through inside the house and
saw how the 3 victims were stabbed by the accused.

Romulo del Monte (a barangay tanod) testified that upon learning of the incident, he went to said
house and saw Nita Cabalhin and Lito Saldivia sprawled on the bed in one room of the house — Nita
Cabalhin was fully dressed while Lito Saldivia was wearing khaki pants but without T-shirt.

But the accused AURELIO CABALHIN y DACLITAN testified as a sole witness for the
defense saying that when he learned that his wife was in the house of Wenceslao Saldivia and had a
paramour, he immediately went there. In the house, he saw his wife lying on her back with her legs
apart while the man was on top of her with his buttocks between the parted legs of his wife.
The man and his wife were engaged in sexual act. He said that the latters were both naked. Because
of anger, he lost himself and stabbed the both of them by a knife which he saw near the pillow.

Accused Aurelio D. Cabalhin y Daclitan was found guilty by the RTC br. 73 (3 separate
offences) for the crimes namely: frustrated homicide, homicide, and parricide.

ISSUES: (1st issue) Whether or not he killed his wife Marianita and Rolito Saldivia under the
exceptional circumstances provided under Article 247 of the RPC. (NO)
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon
them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

            (2nd issue) Whether or not the crime of parricide and murder shall be mitigated. (YES)

RULING: The principal question is whether or not appellant killed his wife Marianita and Rolito as he
caught them in the act of committing the sexual act, or immediately thereafter.

It is noted that the trial court gave great weight to the testimony of the prosecution witness,
Romulo del Monte (the barangay tanod) whom the trial court believed to be an unbiased witness.

In accused testimony, he said that his wife lying on her back with her legs apart while Rolito
Saldivia was on top of her with his buttocks between her parted legs, but he also alleged that two
were covered with blanket from their shoulders down to their feet when he first saw them. Therefore,
it is impossible for the accused to see their exact position which he even described in detail and what
they were doing.

It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of trial courts are given great on appeal because
they are in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, and can therefore discern if they are telling the truth or not.

Under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, the killing of the wife by the husband (or vice-
versa) is justified if the husband kills her while engaged in sexual intercourse with another man or
immediately thereafter.

In the present case, appellant failed to prove that he killed Marianita and Rolito while in the
act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Therefore, appellant cannot invoke Article 247 to
be exempt from criminal liability.

The trial court ruled that the appellant was entitled to two (2) mitigating circumstances; the
first, for having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obsfuscation (as provided for in Article 13, paragraph no. 6, of the Revised Penal Code) and, the
second, for voluntary surrender (Article 13, paragraph no. 7 of the same Code).

The records show that on 22 February 1987 appellant went to the house of the Saldivia family
after being informed that he would find there his wife (Marianita) together with her alleged paramour,
Rolito Saldivia. The stabbing incident happened, according to the trial court, because appellant acted
upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obsfuscation. The evidence
further discloses that after appellant stabbed the three (3) victims, he voluntarily went to the Taytay
Police Station on that same night of 22 February 1987 and surrendered to Police Captain Davan.

We uphold the ruling of the trial court in appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances
above-cited.

DISPOSITION: the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Criminal Cases Nos. 3081, 3082,
and 3094 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

 
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs. MELCHOR REAL y BARTOLAY
 

FACTS: *At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant
and Edgardo Corpus, both vendors, engaged in a heated argument over the right to use the market
table to display their fish. The Mayor who happen to be at the market, tried to pacify them. They
momentarily kept peace but Corpuz raised his voice and said something to Melchor again.

*Melchor, in a soft voice, uttered "SOBRA NA INA NA IMO PAGDAOGDAOG" (You are being
too oppressive). Melchor sharpened his bolo but Edgardo Corpus kept on walking and fro near the
disputed fish table. Once Corpus turned around with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him
on the nape.

*The accused in this case is a recidivist having been convicted in the following cases:

*Crime Date of Conviction

1. Ill treatment by Deed — July 6, 1965

2. Grave Threats — November 25, 1968

*In his testimony in court, Melchor said that it was anger that lead him to hack Edgardo in the
neck.

*The Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, finds appellant guilty of murder.

*Appellant argues that the crime committed was only homicide and not murder and that he is
entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, passion and obfuscation and vindication of a grave
offense.

ISSUES:

 1st WON Appellant is guilty of the crime homicide rather than murder. (YES)

            2nd WON Appellant is entitled to a mitigating circumstance under art. 13 par.6 (passion or
obfuscation). (YES)

            3rd WON Appellant is entitled to a mitigating circumstance under art. 13 par. 5 (vindication of a
grave offence) (NO)

            4th WON Appellant’s crime shall be aggravated because he is a recidivist in accordance with
article 14 section 9. (YES)

RULING:

1st issue:

We agree with appellant that the offense committed was homicide. He is entitled to the
benefit of the doubt as to whether he acted with alevosia when he attacked the victim. As a rule, a
sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack
was cooly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to
either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply in this case, however, where the attack was not
preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of
the accused because of the provocative act of the victim (People v. Aguiluz, 207 SCRA 187 [1992]).
This is more so, where the assault upon the victim was preceded by a heated exchange of words
between him and the accused (People v. Rillorta, 180 SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case at bench, the
assault came in the course of an altercation/argument and after appellant had sharpened his bolo in
full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can be interpreted as an attempt to
frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to
continue walking to and fro near appellant in a taunting manner while the latter was sharpening his
bolo.

2nd and 3rd issues:

Appellant also claims that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, vindication
of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation. The peculiarity of these two mitigating circumstances
is that they cannot be applied at the same time if they arise from the same facts or motive.

            If appellant attacked his victim in the proximate vindication of a grave offense, he cannot
successfully claim in the same breath that he was also blinded by passion and obfuscation. At most,
only one of two circumstances could be considered in favor of appellant

2nd issue:

            The act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to produce passion and
obfuscation, considering that the incident happened in a market place within full view and within
hearing distance of many people.

4th issue

            The trial court held, and the Solicitor General agreed, that there is an aggravating
circumstance which is recidivism.

            In recidivism, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[9])

            In the case at bar, appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal
Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was
convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight).
Inasmuch as homicide and ill-treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating
circumstance to be appreciated against him is recidivism under Article 14[9]

            Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of

passion and obfuscation, which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.

            DISPOSITION: the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant is convicted of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TEN
(10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
reclusion temporal as maximum. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim is increased to
P50,000.00.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ELPIDIO GERMINA y MALDO

FACTS:  Elpidio Germina was charged of the murder.

             Based on the testimonies of the eye witness accounts of Marcelino Almazan, Gaudencio
Angeles and Ramil Regencia (victim's brother-in-law, father and neighbor, respectively) during trial,
the prosecution’s version of what happened is as follows:

Ø  That on November 9, 1994, appellant, armed with a revolver, arrived at the Angeles residence, looking
for Raymond who was not there at that time. A heated conversation took place between Raymund's
relatives (parents, brothers and sisters) and appellant concerning a quarrel that transpired earlier
between appellant's brother and Raymund (Raymund allegedly stabbed Elpidio’s brother)

Ø  Then Raymund arrived. Appellant, upon spotting him, drew his gun which prompted Raymund and his
relatives to scamper for safety. Hardly had Raymund gained momentum in his retreat when he
stumbled on a street hump and fell on the ground face down. Appellant easily caught up with and
then fired at his defenselessly positioned prey — the single bullet finding its mark on the back of
Raymund's neck.

 Autopsy report and testimony of NBI officer revealed that the victim must have been in a lying, face-
down position when fired upon by the assailant.

            Appellant did not deny that he shot Raymund. But his contentions, corroborated by his wife,
painted a picture of self-defence. Appellant Elpidio learned the news that his mentally retarded
brother was mauled and stabbed by Raymund. So he, together with his wife, went to Angeles’
residence to verify it. Suddenly Raymund, holding a double-bladed weapon on his right hand, arrived
then instantly cursed and threatened him saying "Putang ina mo, papatayin ko kayo!" (You son of a
bitch, I will kill you all!). Elpidio run away but was cornered against the wall and when Raymund was
about to strike him with the bladed weapon, he fired at Raymund.

            The trial court believed on the prosecution’s story and convicted him for the crime of murder.
The court said that treachery (an aggravating circumstance under art. 14) qualified Raymund's killing
to murder.

            But the trial court mitigated his penalty from Death to reclusion perpetua because he
voluntarily gave up himself to the police authorities immediately after the commission of the offense to
which the prosecution did not refute.

            Appellant appealed into Supreme Court praying, not for his acquittal, but that he be convicted
of homicide only and thus be made to suffer a reduced penalty corresponding thereto.

ISSUE: WON the Elpidio Germina shall be convicted for the crime of homicide instead of murder.
(YES) 

RULING: The Supreme Court cited two jurisprudence: in “Nemeria” and “Flores” case where the two
accused on different cases were only convicted of homicide and not murder although Nemeria and
Flores attacked their victims from behind, the court did not considered it as treachery.
            The present case cannot be treated differently from "Flores" and "Nemeria." Raymund was
well-aware of the danger to his life since he even managed to run away — without success, however
— before appellant shot him to death. Moreover, in the immediate vicinity of the crime scene, the
front gate of the house of the victim, were his relatives who certainly were in a position to give the
latter moral and physical support.

If murder was his bent, appellant would not have gone to the house of the victim. Moreover, if
appellant had in mid a way to attack the victim to insure his death without risk arising from the latter,
why would he engage his (victim) relatives in heated arguments? If his intention was ambuscade, he
could have just kept his silence and waited for the proper time. Engaging the relatives in a useless
debate would only put the victim on his guard.

SC said that Passion cannot co-exist with treachery because in passion, the offender loses
his control and reason while in treachery the means employed are consciously adopted. One who
loses his reason and self-control could not deliberately employ a particular means, method or form of
attack in the execution of the crime.

Passion also existed as it clearly arose from lawful sentiments or legitimate feelings. 20 The
trial court's observation on this point is worth reiterating:
. . . he [appellant] committed the serious crime due to the maltreatment/physical injuries
inflicted by the victim on his mentally retarded brother, that triggered his anger which diminish
(sic)/weaken (sic) the exercise of his power, . . .
 

The Supreme Court said that there is no aggravating circumstance in this case. And
considered 2 mitigating circumstance namely voluntary surrender (art. 13 par.7) and Pasion and
obfuscation (art. 13 par. 6)
 

DISPOSITION: Premises considered, accused-appellant ELPIDIO GERMINA y MALDO is

hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
 People vs Layson

FACTS: On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were
inmates of the Davao Penal Colony who were back then were serving sentences of conviction for the
following crimes:

"Nicolas Layson — kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and theft;

"Cezar Ragub — frustrated murder and homicide;

"Cezar Fugoso — robbery in an inhabited house and theft;

"Joventino Garces — robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited house."

The four accused, armed with bladed weapons, entered the cell of prisoner Regino Gasang.
Layson locked the door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly took turns
in stabbing Gasang.

The information was filed to the court saying that the 4 accused conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, and with intent to kill….. attack, assault and stab with their weapons Regino Gasang,… ;
with the aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and
Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them with two or more prior convictions."

(Note: Recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgement of another crime EMBRACED IN THE SAME TITLE OF THIS CODE.)

Upon arraignment, all the four accused pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the
court a quo proceeded to hear them because of the gravity of the offense.

RTC’s RULING:

 ·         Applied mitigating circumstance favouring all of them for plea of guilt.

 ·         accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub subject to aggravating circumstance for
recidivism and having been previously punished for two or more crimes (see art. 14 par 9 and
10)
 ·         accused Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces  subject to the aggravating circumstance
of having been punished with two or more offenses to which the law attaches a lighter penalty
(art 14 par 10)
 ·         All the accused subject with aggravating circumstance of treachery (par 16), evident
premeditation (par13) and superior strength (par.15)
 ·         RTC held that all of them shall be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.
 ·         sentences all of them to DEATH and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased Regino Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) CONSIDERING
THE ABOVE MENTIONED CIRCUMSTANCES. 

 Solicitor General suggest the application of mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in
favour of all the accused because three of the accused (Layson, Ragub and Fugoso) admitted that
they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups several times
while Gasang spat on the fourth accused (Garces) a week before the incident.

 ISSUE: WON the accused are entitled to mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. NO
HELD: Mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be invoked because the time when
the event of urinating on the coffee cups of the 3 accused and spitting on the other one had
happened long before the alleged murder.

             For this circumstance to exist, it is necessary that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation
be not removed from the commission of the offense by a considerable length of time, during which
period the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

In the present case, Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against
Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least
ten days before the actual slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of
the accused plotted to kill Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these
circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their
equanimity.  THEREFORE, MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PASSION AND OBFUSCATION
CANNOT BE INVOKED BECAUSE THE TIME FOR IT TO BE APPLICABLE HAD ELAPSED WHEN
THE 4 ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME ON JANUARY 17, 1964.

DISPOSITION: imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and
Joventino Garces, is affirmed. The indemnification to the heirs of the victim, Regino Gasang, is
hereby increased to P12,000, 7 to be paid jointly and severally by the four accused. Costs de officio.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENATO BAUTISTA, ARMAN
HERNANDEZ, ARNOLD MENDOZA & JESS SABARIN (At large), defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

Rodel Yarza – victim, spouse of Zenaida Yarza, from Tondo, Manila ; sells pants, t-shirt and bags in
Divisoria. Died from a mortal wound with 4-inch depth, on the left lower part of his armpit, penetrating
the lower lobe of his left lung that causes hemorrhage and shock and resulted to instantaneous
death. Brought initially to Mary Johnston Hospital where his wife saw him in the Emergency Room
lying down, profusely perspiring, pale and very weak. Due to no budget, the victim was then
transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was operated and expired 02:30 the next day.

On December 14, 1989, After dinner, he told his wife, Zenaida, that he would play a game of cards
(pusoy), At about 9:00 oclock that evening, his wife went out of their house to fetch her husband. She
saw him playing cards with accused Arman Hernandez, Jess Sabarin, Arnold Mendoza and appellant
Renato Bautista. When Rodel Yarza saw her, he told his wife to go home ahead and that he would
soon follow. 

About 10 to 15 minutes prior to Zenaida arrival at the hospital, Efren Bautista, the father of appellant,
and his wife, Teresita, were already there obviously waiting for Zenaida. Efren Bautista assured
Zenaida that they will help defray part of the hospital expenses. And, in the course of his conversation
with Zenaida, Efren Bautista said that, before the stabbing incident, he saw appellant enter their
house, get a knife and then leave immediately. His sons unusual behavior moved Efren to follow him.

‘She asked him who it was who stabbed him. Rodel replied, Nette, my playmates and the one who
stabbed me was Rene.4 Nette, he was the son of Efren Baculaw, the short-changer in Divisoria.’

RENATO BAUTISTA – accused and with only motive to kill ; the Deceased hit him with a bottle on the
left side of his head with no apparent reason. Then went home to his parents and as per his father’s
testimony, ‘he get a knife and leave immediately’ ; charged with a crime of murder.

ARMAN HERNANDEZ, ARNOLD MENDOZA & JESS SABARIN (At large)

Dr. Marcial G. Ceido, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the necropsy examination upon the
deceased, testified as to the degree and seriousness of the stab wound suffered by the victim.
Testified that a Pointed bladed weapon, Like a bolo caused the mortal wound of the Deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the deceased victim will be considered a Dying Declaration.

RULING:

RTC: Accused Renato Bautista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime murder, and hereby
sentences him to serve the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, accessory penalties provided by
law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and
to pay the costs.

Let warrant of arrest be issued against accused Arman Hernandez, Arnold Mendoza and Jess
Sabarin.

SC: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo dated June 1, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

This, we consider to be a dying declaration. The general rule is that [A] witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception xxx. Any other testimonial evidence outside the witness personal knowledge is hearsay
and downright inadmissible. In fact, hearsay evidence, even if not objected to during trial and thus
admitted, should carry no probative value whatsoever. 9 Nevertheless, the Rules and jurisprudence
provide certain well- recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule among which is a dying declaration
found under Section 37, Rule 130:

Dying declaration--- The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

There are two (2) obvious reasons for the admissibility of a dying declaration: (a) necessity and (b)
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants death renders impossible his taking the witness
stand. And trustworthiness, since the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point
of death and every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the
mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. A situation so solemn and
awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath
administered in court,10 There are four (4) requirements for the admissibility of a dying declaration, to
wit:

[1] That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;

[2] That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death;

[3] That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and

[4] That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry. 

Accused-appellant maintains that the testimony of Zenaida Yarza to the effect that the victim told her
that it was accused-appellant who stabbed him should not be admitted as a dying declaration simply
because it was not made under a consciousness of impending death, which is the most important and
decisive requisite for a statement to qualify as a dying declaration.

We do not agree. While it is true that the victim, Rodel Yarza, did not explicitly mention that he knows
or feels that he is about to die, this does not negative the fact that the victim, who was already pale,
weak from a fatal wound, and perspiring profusely, was conscious of his impending death at the time
he declared to his wife who attacked and stabbed him. He in fact died a few hours thereafter. The law
does not require that the declarant explicitly state his perception 12 that he has given up the hope of
life. It is enough if, from the circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have been
his state of mind. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, there can be no other conclusion
than that the victim must have realized the seriousness of his condition. Thus, it can safely be inferred
that he made the declaration under the consciousness of impending death
RTC, however, erroneously considered the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
against accused-appellant. For there to be evident premeditation, the prosecution must prove: 
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; 
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and 
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. 
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In this case, there is simply an entire absence of evidence to
prove that Renato Bautista had deliberately planned to commit the crime, and had persistently and
continuously followed such plan. The interval between the initial altercation between the victim and
accused-appellant up to the time that accused-appellant allegedly committed the crime, is definitely
not a sufficient lapse of time to give the defendant an opportunity to coolly and serenely deliberate on
the meaning and consequences of what he planned to do. The absence of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, however, will not alter the penalty imposed by the lower court
in light of the presence of abuse of superior strength alleged in the information, which qualifies the
killing to murder. 
The victim, who was alone and unarmed, clearly, was no match against his four (4) assailants, two (2)
of whom were armed, one, accused-appellant Renato Bautista, with a knife, and the other, Ricky
Sabarin, with a dust pan. It is evident, therefore, that the culprits took advantage of their collective
strength to overpower their lone and helpless victim.
 ROSARIO T. DE VERA, Petitioner, vs. GEREN A. DE VERA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petition for Certiorari seeking to Reverse the Decision of CA.
Rosario De Vera – accused her Spouse and Josephine Juliano Francisco for Bigamy, dissatisfied
with the ruling of CA, do not agree with the Voluntary Surrender. Opposed on the ground that not all
the elements of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender" were present. She added that
"voluntary surrender" was raised only as an afterthought, as Geren had earlier invoked a "voluntary
plea of guilty" without raising the former. Finally, she posited that since the case was ready for
promulgation, Geren’s motion should no longer be entertained.
Geren De Vera – accused for Bigamy, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
accused Josephine Juliano y Francisco, who likewise has previous knowledge that accused Geren A.
De Vera’s previous marriage with Rosario T. De Vera is still valid and subsisting, said second
marriage having all the essential requisites for its validity. Pleaded Guilty, However, in a Motion dated
April 8, 2005, he prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to prove the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. 
RTC granted Geren’s motion and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
the determination of the penalty to be imposed. 
Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court issued an
Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court
and filed a motion for reduction of bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more need for the
court to issue the warrant of arrest. 
Records show that after the promulgation of the judgment convicting Geren of bigamy, it was
petitioner (as private complainant) who moved for the reconsideration 14 of the RTC decision. This was
timely opposed by Geren, invoking his right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Geren De Vera’s plea for Voluntary Surrender met all the necessary elements
to mitigate the case.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. 
The Court of Appeals February 28, 2006 Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 
1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 
2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and 
3) the surrender was voluntary. 
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up
and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save
the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without
these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest
and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be
characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.
Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. Cagas and in People v. Taraya, the Court added a
fourth requisite before "voluntary surrender" may be appreciated in favor of the accused – that there
is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. Since the warrant of arrest had been issued,
petitioner insists that arrest was imminent and the "surrender" could not be considered "voluntary." 

In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, the accused ran to the upper portion of the cemetery where a
police officer caught up with him. Thereupon, he voluntarily gave himself up. The Court held that if the
accused did then and there surrender, it was because he was left with no choice. Thus, the
"surrender" was not spontaneous. 

In Taraya, when the accused learned that the police authorities were looking for him (because of a
warrant for his arrest), he immediately went to the police station where he confessed that he killed the
victim. Notwithstanding such surrender and confession to the police, the Court refused to appreciate
the mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Lastly, in People v. Barcino, Jr., the accused surrendered to the authorities after more than one year
from the incident in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court refused to
mitigate the accused’s liability because there was no acknowledgment of the commission of the crime
or the intention to save the government the trouble and expense in his search and capture; and there
was a pending warrant for his arrest.
Certainly, we cannot apply the same conclusion to the instant case. Cagas is not applicable because
the accused therein did not surrender but was caught by the police. In Taraya, the warrant of arrest
had, in fact, been issued and was forwarded to the proper authorities for implementation. In Barcino,
it was a year after the commission of the crime when the accused went to the police station, not for
purposes of acknowledging his culpability, nor to save the government the expense and trouble of
looking for and catching him, but actually to deny his culpability.
We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of
arrest will not automatically make the surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco, the Court
appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a warrant for his
arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the accused surrendered to the
police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may
still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts
surrounding the very act of giving himself up.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORIO MAGALLANES, Accused-
Appellant.

FACTS:
Gregorio Magallanes – Principal ; willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
use of a sharp-pointed, sharp-edges (sic) weapon (knife) one Virgilio Tapales y Melendres hitting and
injuring the vital parts of the body of the victim which resulted in the victims instantaneous death ;
appeal where he invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor, and contends, in the
alternative, that he should be convicted of the crime of homicide only and not murder.
-slashing on the left face and neck, stabbed the throat of the victim, upper portion of the heart just
above the left side of the face
-The appellant, however, seeks exception to this rule by pointing out the superficial nature of majority
of the wounds inflicted on Tapales, and the fact that of the seven (7) wounds, only one (1) was fatal
enough to cause his death.
 
-Surrendered to the Police Authorities
 
Danilo Salpucial – Accessory ; willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowing (sic) take part in said
crime after the commission by allowing accused Gregorio Magallanes to, and taking him on a 
backride on the motorcycle which accused Danilo Salpucial was driving and operating, in order to flee
from the scene of the crime; ACQUITTED
 
Virgilio Tapales -- was drinking in the store of Umping Amores which was located on the elevated
side of the road. Tapales hailed Cempron and invited him for a drink but the latter courteously refused
as he was going to the cockpit. Tapales approached Cempron and conversed with him briefly. For
some unknown reason, Tapales then directed his attention to the appellant who was walking a few
steps behind Cempron. Tapales held the appellant by his shirt, slapped him and strangled his neck.
But seeing a knife tucked in Tapales waist, the appellant pulled out the knife and slashed at Tapales
to loosen his grip. The appellant succeeded in wounding the face and neck of Tapales who let go of
the appellant and fled for his life. Insatiated, the appellant pursued Tapales and when the latter fell,
the appellant stabbed him several more times before uttering the following words: you are already
dead in that case.
 
-sustained seven (7) stab wounds in all caused by a sharp bladed weapon
  *incised wound 10 to 14 cms. 10 x 4 cms. located at the base of the skull extending from the
posterior portion of the right ear down to the nape.
  *incised wound about 20 cms. by 7 cms. extending from the occipietal (sic) area of the head
passing the left ear cutting it into halves – Ear
  *7 cm by 3 cm by 6 cm stabbed (sic) wound at the anterior area of the neck at the superior
border of the manobrium.
  *Stabbed (sic) wound 5 x 1 x 5 cm. penetrating the torasic (sic) area hitting the spinal column.
– Back
  *incised wound measuring 14 x 2 cms. about 1 to 2 cms. just above the left scapula. – Back
  *incised wound about 6 cms. in length at the left palmar area. – Left palm
  *2 cms. length incised wound at the right palm.
 
RTC: Gregorio Magallanes GUILTY of the crime of Murder punished under Article 243 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with
the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
 
P50,000.00 representing indemnity, P50,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages,
P31,300.00 -- burial and incidental expenses relative to the death of Virgilio Tapales and P3,000.00
representing attorneys fees,
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the Appellant acted against Self-Defense.
 
RULING: 
 
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by convicting the appellant
Gregorio Magallanes of the crime of homicide only with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty in his favor, and imposing upon him an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision
mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED.
 
**ADDITIONAL Readings**
 
the claim of self-defense, we reiterate herein the time honored doctrine that although it is a cardinal
principle in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused, the
rule is reversed where the accused admits committing the crime but only in defense of oneself. In the
latter case, the burden is shifted to the accused who must prove clearly and convincingly the following
elements of self-defense: 
 
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 
 
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and 
 
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
 
The appellant asseverates that he was justified in stabbing Tapales as he was merely defending
himself from the formers unlawful and unprovoked aggression. But the prosecution witnesses are one
in testifying that it was the appellant who mercilessly pursued the already wounded Tapales, and
when the latter fell to the ground, inflicted several more stab wounds on his person including a fatal
blow to his neck.
 
the appellant had assumed the role of aggressor, thus, his claim of self-defense cannot obviously
prosper. In People vs. Tampon we ruled that:
 
Even granting arguendo that the initial act of aggression came from Entellano (the victim) as claimed
by the appellant, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense. As testified by the appellant, he
grappled with Entellano for the knife and was able to take possession of the same. At this point, it
was no longer necessary for appellant to stab Entellano in order to protect himself. His subsequent
act of stabbing the now unarmed Entellano belies his claim that he acted in self-preservation and
indicates nothing more than a perverse desire to kill. Thus, this Court held in the case of People v.
So, that [a]fter appellant successfully wrested the knife from Tuquero, the unlawful aggression has
ceased, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
 
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 
 
Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must
establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: 
 
(a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and 
 
(b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him. The latter condition is immediately negated by the fact that the meeting between the appellant
and Tapales was by chance. We have held that:
 
x x x where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was done
impulsively, there is no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected and while the victim
was running away with his back towards the accused. As has been aptly observed the accused could
not have made preparations for the attack, x x x; and the means, method and form thereof could not
therefore have been thought of by the accused, because the attack was impulsively done.
 
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL PINCA y HUARDE, accused-
appellant.
FACTS:
 **WITNESS** Gerry Abenir
 
Gerry Abenir went to Madona's Bake Shop located at the public market of Balilihan, Bohol. He heard
Joel Pinca [ACCUSED] made a remark that somebody splashed [him with] liquor [and that] if it were
not for the presence of the shop owner, he would have inflicted injuries to the person responsible.
While riding on a habal-habal with the Accused, they saw Conrado Angcahan (DECEASED VICTIM)
walking on the road in an unsteady manner. The motorcycle stopped and both Gerry and the accused
disembarked. The accused told Gerry that he would wait for the victim for he was the person who
splashed [on] him liquor earlier in the afternoon. The ACCUSED got a piece of wood, waited for the
victim and once near, the accused suddenly and without warning, struck the victim hitting the latter on
the head rendering the victim unconscious and deprived of a chance to defend himself.
 
**DEFENSE** Joel Pinca
 
Gerry Abenir together with a friend entered Madona's Bake Shop and ordered beer and then offered
to drink with them. While drinking, Conrado Angcahan approached Gerry Abenir and asked for
cigarettes. Gerry Abenir refused to give the victim causing the latter to murmur and went away. At
about 7:00 in the evening, the accused and Gerry Abenir rode on a habal-habal, While on their way,
they passed by the victim and Gerry remarked that the said person Conrado Angcahan was the one
who asked him cigarette. The motorcycle stopped and both Gerry Abenir and the accused
disembarked. Gerry Abenir called the victim and once the victim got near to Gerry, the two boxed
each other. Gerry ran and got a piece of wood and used it in hitting the victim. The victim fell to the
ground despite defending himself using his forearm. While the victim was [on] the ground, Gerry
Abenir struck the latter hitting the head. He was told by Gerry not to talk. The following morning,
police officer Llano arrived at his residence together with Gerry Abenir. Because Gerry made signs
not to talk, the accused did not give information to the police. After the police investigation, he
proceeded to Tagbilaran City to fetch his wife. While in Tagbilaran City, he received an information
that the police of Balilihan, Bohol were looking for him. He presented himself to the police and he was
placed in jail.
 
-Firstly, there was motive on the part of the accused to inflict injuries to the victim considering that the
victim was responsible in splashing liquor [on] the accused a few hours before the incident.
 
-Secondly, Gerry Abenir's testimony that the victim was hit on the nape was ably supported by the
Autopsy Report (Exhibit "C") made by Dr. Jude Doblas.
 
-Thirdly, it contrary to human experience for Gerry Abenir to assault the victim, who did nothing wrong
nor provoked him.
 
Autopsy findings:
1) lacerated wound about 3 inches in length over the right occipito-parietal region of the head
2) contusion with hematoma over the anterior face
 
Cause of death:
Cardio-respiratory arrest, Intra-cerebral hemorrhage, Lacerated head wound
CA: Appellant Joel Pinca is guilty of murder. NO aggravating circumstance warranting the imposition
of death, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Since the factual circumstances do not merit the
death penalty as prescribed under RA 7659, the Court finds it unnecessary to tackle the constitutional
question raised by appellant. In addition, we grant actual damages to the heirs of the victim,
consistent with current jurisprudence.
 
ISSUE:
 
(1) the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence; 
 
(2) the presence of the modifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, voluntary
surrender and/or intoxication; and 
 
(3) the constitutionality of the death penalty for the crime of murder.
 
RULING:
 
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
Appellant Joel Pinca y Huarde shall serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, not death, and shall pay
the heirs of Conrado Angcahan P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P4,600 as actual damages. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 
**Additional Readings**
 
1ST: Credibility of the Witnesses and Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence  
 
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is generally entitled to
great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless 
 
(1) it is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded; 
 
(2) some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was
overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted; 
 
(3) the trial judge gravely abused his or her discretion; or 
 
(4) the judge who penned the appealed decision was not the same one who had presided over the
trial and heard the witnesses testify.
Despite the paraphrasing of the question several times, appellant could not give a clear and
categorical answer. In fact, at some point the trial court castigated him for being evasive and
admonished him to give truthful answers to the questions asked. At another time, the public
prosecutor, exasperated that he could not get a responsive answer from him, simply opted to proceed
to another topic.
 
First, he stated earlier that Abiner disembarked about ten meters from the place where they had seen
and passed by Angcahan. 
 
Second, appellant stated during his direct examination that in calling the attention of the victim, Abiner
said "shit-shit," or "sit-sit" in the vernacular. On cross-examination, however, appellant alleged that
Abiner had whistled. 
 
Third, the alleged fistfight between Abiner and Angcahan could not have occurred immediately after
the former disembarked because, if that were so, the habal-habal driver would have witnessed at
least part of the incident. However, the driver, who testified for the prosecution, stated that he did not
know what transpired after his two passengers disembarked.
 
Appellant's statements are not supported by the autopsy report of Municipal Health Officer Jude
Doblas, which stated:
 
2ND: Attendance of Modifying Circumstances
 
Treachery
 
For treachery to be considered a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must concur: (1) the
offender employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from
the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method or manner of execution
was deliberately adopted. The essence of treachery is the deliberateness and the unexpectedness of
the attack, which give the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape
 
The appellant's attack from behind, being sudden and deliberate, was treacherous indeed. The victim
was utterly unsuspecting, thus, unable to put up any resistance or defense. These elements make up
the very essence of treachery
 
Evident Premeditation
 
For evident premeditation to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, there must be clear and
convincing proof of the following: 
 
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, 
 
(2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and 
 
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and the execution that allowed the criminal
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
 
Voluntary Surrender
 
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must
concur: 
 
(1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 
 
(2) the offender surrendered to a person in authority, and 
 
(3) the surrender was voluntary. If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to ensure the safety
of the accused whose arrest is inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence not voluntary
 
According to appellant himself, when the police came to his house the morning after the incident, he
completely denied any knowledge of the murder incident. He learned that he was a suspect when he
was in Tagbilaran City later that morning to fetch his wife, who told him that the police had come
looking for him at her place of work. It was only when he got back to Balilihan, Bohol that he
proceeded to the police station "to clear his name." But being the prime suspect, he was instead
incarcerated.
 
Intoxication
 
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered
an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of
having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to
produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person must show proof of not being
a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to
commit the crime
 
Appellant cannot simply rely on those statements of the prosecution. He himself must present
convincing proof of the nature and the effect of his intoxication. What appears undisputed in the
records, however, is that he had a glass of beer prior to the murder incident. Under normal
circumstances, a glass of beer is not so intoxicating as to diminish a man's rational capacity. It was
not proven at all that such amount of alcohol blurred his reason. This element is essential for
intoxication to be considered mitigating.
 
3RD: Constitutionality of the Reimposition of the Death Penalty on the Crime of Murder
 
Proper Penalty
 
Appellant additionally avers that RA 7659, insofar as it classifies murder as a heinous crime and
metes the death penalty therefor, is unconstitutional.
 
"It is a well established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a
law [or part of it] to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties, and
that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until
a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable."
 
The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, prescribes the penalty range of "reclusion
perpetua to death" on the crime of murder. Where the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the applicable rules are as follows:
 
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
 
**no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense. Hence, pursuant
to Item 2 above, the lesser penalty — reclusion perpetua — should be imposed upon the appellant
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN,
Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 182551
July 27, 2011

Facts:
On the afternoon of Nov 6, 2002, accused-appellant, Rosendo Rebucan went to the house of
victim, Felipe Lagera, and hacked him with bolo. Lagera’s grandson Ranil, 1 year old, also became
victim of the alleged hacking incident. Testimonies presented by the prosecution, including 5-year-old
grandson of Felipe Lagera, testified that Rebucan did the killing.
Based on the testimonies of the defense, it shows that when Rebucan was in Manila, Felipe and
his son tried to rape Rebucan’s wife. When he arrived in Leyte, his wife confirmed that she was
sexually molested by Felipe and his son. On the day of the incident, he was drunk when he went to
the house of Felipe. Felipe was then carrying his grandson in his arms. There he confronted the old
man, but who tried to push him out of the house. He then hacked Felipe with bolo. Rebucan alleged
that Felipe appeared to be getting a gun to retaliate so pursued the old man inside the house. On the
second blow, Felipe used his grandson as shield, unintentionally inflicting a huge wound on the
forehead of the baby.
After the incident, Rebucan voluntarily surrendered to the authority. He was tried by the RTC and
was convicted guilty of Double murder with the penalty of DEATH.
The case was elevated to SC on automatic review. Case was adjudged by Court of Appeals
instead, where the decision was modified into 2 counts of murder and penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each count. Rebucan appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in appreciating aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication (YES)

Ruling:
According to Art 14 of the CIVIL CODE, the following are aggravating circumstance: (3). That the
act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not
given provocation; (13). That the act be committed with evidence premeditation; (15). That advantage
be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense. And ART 15: when the
intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
For evident premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of
the crime itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time, between determination and execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. In this case, the prosecution failed to show any evidence of Rebucan devising a plan to kill
Felipe and when it did happen. Therefore, CA erred in appreciating evident premeditation as
aggravating circumstance.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a generic aggravating circumstance will not be
appreciated by the Court unless it is alleged in the information.
Thus, dwelling, minority and intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in
the instant case considering that the same were not alleged and/or specified in the information that
was filed on January 23, 2003.
The decision is affirmed.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO TAC-AN y HIPOS, accused-
appellant
G.R. No. 76338-39
February 26, 1990

Facts:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen years old, and the deceased Francis Ernest Escano III,
fifteen years old, were classmates in the third year of high school. They were close friends, being not
only classmates but also member of the same gang, Bronx Gang. Francis’ mother did not approve of
him being a gang member, forcing him to withdraw from it.
Since then, their relationship turned sour. Their strained relationship aggravated when Francis
learned that Renato, with the gang, was looking for him to beat him up. There was also a time where
the gang and Renato was deprecated thru a graffiti on a wall describing them as “bayot”
(homosexual). Renato thought it was Francis who did this. Third time was when Francis was
unintentionally sitting on Renato’s scrapbook for their mathematics, this angered Renato.
Their class just started when Renato suddenly burst into the room, locked the door holding a
revolver and looked for Renato. He fired at Francis but he missed, while all the other students and
their teacher were evading from being shot. On the fourth time that he fired, Francis was shot in the
head and fell on the ground, bleeding profusely.
Renato went out of the room but he was greeted by another teacher, who was unaware of what
happened, and asked him to help Francis. Upon knowing that Francis was still alive, Renato went
back into the room and fired once more, aiming on his chest.
Philippine Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and surrounded the faculty
room. He was then arrested after his father pleaded for his surrender.
Accused-appellant claimed he acted in self-defense. He said he was challenged to a gun fight by
Francis, but it was proved that there is no unlawful aggression.
Renato also claimed there is no treachery involved and that there was no evident premeditation
and he should be penalized with reclusion perpetua and not death.

Issue:
Whether or not Renato Tac-an be punished with penalty of death (No)

Ruling:

There is treachery in the crime committed.

According to Art 14 of the CIVIL CODE, the following is an aggravating circumstance: (16).
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
generic aggravating circumstance will not be appreciated by the Court unless it is alleged in the
information.
In this case, treachery as aggravating circumstance was present as shown in Renato’s act of
locking the door, leaving Francis no way to evade him and not having a weapon to defend himself.
Even though it is present, it could not be used as qualifying circumstance since it is not included in
the information.

On the contention that there was no evident premeditation, Renato is correct.

According to Art 14 of the CIVIL CODE, the following is an aggravating circumstance: (13).
That the act be committed with evidence premeditation; For evident premeditation to aggravate a
crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: (1)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and execution, to
allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
While it was true that before the commission of the crime, anger and resentment had welled up
between the two, 15 minutes had elapsed from that time, his equanimity must have been restored.
Therefore, evident premeditation as aggravating circumstance must be discarded.
In view of the foregoing, decision of finding Renato Tac-an guilty of murder is affirmed, while his
penalty has been reduced to 2 reclusion perpetua.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ANGELITO BAGSIT, Appellant
G.R. No. 148877
August 19, 2003
Facts:
It was evening of Sept 1999, prosecution witness Richard Sison and his younger sister Heidi
were watching television inside their house, when he saw Angelito Bagsit pointing at gun at his father
Pepito Sison. Richard heard a gunshot and almost simultaneously saw his father falling to the cement
floor. Richard rushed his father to the hospital, he died shortly after.
Zenaida Bagsit Aguilar, daughter-in-law of the deceased, also testified that, in the evening of
the killing, she was inside her house which was about ten (10) meters away from that of the
deceased. As she was preparing coffee in the kitchen, appellant Angelito, who was toting a gun,
passed by. She heard Angelito cock his gun. Before she could even talk to her father, a shot rang out.
Although she did not see the actual shooting, she was certain that it was the appellant who fatally
shot her father-in-law because, under the circumstances, nobody else could have done it.
Appellant Angelito Bagsit denied having anything to do with the death of Pepito Sison,
claiming he was drunk and that he spent the night leaning on a fence by a house of a friend. When he
went home in the morning, his wife told him about the shooting, then a few minutes later he was
invited by the police.
He contended that he was unlawfully arrested, when, in fact, his voluntary submission of his
plea during arraignment waived his constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches.
He was found guilty of the crime of murder with penalty of death. Angelito appealed to SC.

Issue:
Whether or not supreme penalty of death shall be imposed on the crime committed by
Angelito Bagsit (YES!)

Ruling:

Yes, Angelito Bagsit must be penalized with death because treachery qualified the
killing to murder.
According to Art 14. of the CIVIL CODE, the following is an aggravating circumstance: (16).
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
In this case, the appellant, who closely positioned himself surreptitiously behind the window of
the house of his unsuspecting victim while the latter had his back turned, and fired his gun execution
style, eliminated any risk from any defense that the victim might put up.

Yes, Angelito Bagsit must be penalized with death because he attacked on the victim’s
dwelling.
According to Art 14 of the CIVIL CODE, the following is an aggravating circumstance:
(3).That the act be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given
provocation. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the
accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense - it is enough
that the victim was attacked inside his own abode, although the assailant might have devised means
to perpetrate the assault from the outside (People v. Perreras, G.R. No. 139622, 31 July 2001, 362
SCRA 202)
In this case, although outside the house, Angelito attacked his victim inside the Pepito’s own
house when he could have very well committed the crime without necessarily transgressing the
sanctity of the victim’s home.
Therefore, Angelo Bagsit is guilty of murder, and the decision imposing penalty of supreme
penalty of death is affirmed.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGEL RIOS, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 132632
June 19, 2000

Facts:
Ambrocio and Anacita Benedicto owned a sari-sari store in their house. It was evening of Feb
1996, the appellant Angel Rios, neighbor, hurled stones at their house. A few minutes later, appellant
went to their store to buy cigarettes. He was then confronted by Ambrocio for the stoning incident. An
altercation ensued between them. Barangay tanods chanced upon them, intervened and parted the
two.
After a few minutes, the appellant went back to the store and suddenly stabbed Ambrocio in
his stomach. Anacita was only a meter away from them when this happened. She was facing
husband’s back. Anacita started shouting, appellant fled.
Rios was arrested. He denied seeing the victim the whole night. He was charged guilty of the
crime of murder, sentenced to suffer death penalty.
The case was elevated to SC for automatic review.

Issue:
 Whether or not the crime committed by Angel Rios is murder (NO!)
 WON the CA correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling (YES)

Ruling:
No, there must be treachery for the crime to be considered murder.
According to Art 14. of the CIVIL CODE, the following is an aggravating circumstance: (16).
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
In this case, there is no treachery since the there was a heated argument that preceded the
attack. There is no way that the victim could not have foreseen Rios’ retaliation.

The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or

morada in this case
According to Art 14 of the CIVIL CODE, the following is an aggravating circumstance:
(3).That the act be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given
provocation. When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not
given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Provocation in the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and
(c) immediate to the commission of the crime
In this case, the crime was committed in the victim’s terrace. The word dwelling includes
every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof, including the terrace.

Therefore, the crime must now be homicide instead of murder with penalty of death.
The decision appealed from is MODIFIED and appellant is found guilty of the crime of
homicide and is meted to suffer an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years prision mayor
maximum to twenty (20) years reclusion temporal maximum
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLO UYCOQUE y YAP, accused
(acquitted). JOSE VILLANUEVA y ANDES, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 107495
July 31, 1995

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling attended the commission of the crime. (NO!)
Facts:
Accused-appellant Jose Villanueva was an investigator at Police Station No. 5 at the time of
the incident. Before the incident, bad blood existed between him and the victim. Accused-appellant
and his brother-in-law, Carlo Uycoque, reside inside the Department of Public Works and Highways
Compound in Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila.
The victim, Lucas Flores, was a former member of the Philippine Marines, Armed Forces of
the Philippines. At the time of his death, he was a barangay tanod.
On the evening of May 1991, Lucas and his wife, Francisca Flores, were resting in their
house when they heard someone knocking at the door. Lucas stood up and opened the door.
Suddenly, someone grabbed Lucas, poked a gun at him, and forced him out of the house.
Immediately thereafter, Francisca heard two (2) successive gunshots, followed by another volley of
gunshots.
Francisca found Lucas lying prostrate on the ground, shot and bloodied. She claimed she saw
Jose Villanueva and 2 other suspects armed with guns. When she shouted for help, the accused-
appellant and his cohorts fled. Lucas died.
After the incident, accused-appellant surrendered to the authorities at police. Francisca
positively identified him as the suspect and claimed that the other assailants were Ulysis Garcia and
Carlo Uycoque (Jose’s brother-in-law).
Accused-Appellant claimed sole responsibility for shooting the victim while claiming a different
version of what happened. He contended that he saw Lucas Flores shot at them first and threatened
to pull out the pin from his grenade. When he saw the attempt of the victim to pull out the pin, he shot
him. That’s when Francisca went to the scene and was in hysteria. His testimony was corroborated
by two other witnesses, but it was later found out to be riddled with inconsistencies.
Jose Villanueva was found guilty of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, with penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Meanwhile, Carlo Uycoque was acquitted for lack of evidence of intent showed by
the prosecution. Jose appealed to SC.

Ruling:

Treachery is present.
According to Art 14. of the CIVIL CODE, the following is an aggravating circumstance: (16).
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
In this case, the accused Jose Villanueva and his cohorts pretended to be visitors, knocked
on the door to the house of Lucas Flores and, when the latter went to open the door, the accused and
his cohorts then pulled Lucas Flores out of the door and shot him to death. The incident was so
sudden and unexpected. Lucas Flores was not thus able to defend himself and (sic) against the
unforeseen assault on him.

No, the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling in
this case
According to Art 14 of the CIVIL CODE, the following is an aggravating circumstance:
(3).That the act be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given
provocation. Dwelling is aggravating if the victim was taken from his house and killed just beside his
abode although the offense was not completed therein
Here, while the victim was resting in the comfort of his home, accused-appellant and his
cohorts forcibly led the victim out of his house shortly before he was shot to death. At that point, the
aggression had begun, although it ended outside the victim's house.
Therefore, the decision is AFFIRMED with modification that the award for actual damages is
reduced to fifteen thousand pesos