1. Loadmaster Custom Services, Inc. v. Glodel Brokerage Corporation, G.R No.

o. the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the
179446 amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.

[G.R. No. 179446. January 10, 2011.] R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both
Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that
GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover from the
INSURANCE CORPORATION,respondents. party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss." 2
On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision 3 holding Glodel
liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters'
counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees against R&B Insurance. The
DECISION dispositive portion of the decision reads: ECDHIc
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the plaintiff
having established by preponderance of evidence its claims
MENDOZA, J p: against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the latter:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised 1. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of
Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of P1,896,789.62 as actual and compensatory
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled "R&B Insurance Corporation v. damages, with interest from the date of
Glodel Brokerage Corporation and Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.," which complaint until fully paid;
held petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to
respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of 2. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the amount
P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity which R&B Insurance equivalent to 10% of the principal amount
Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the insured-consignee, Columbia Wire and recovered as and for attorney's fees plus
Cable Corporation (Columbia). P1,500.00 per appearance in Court;
THE FACTS: 3. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN- P22,427.18 as litigation expenses.
00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric WHEREAS, the defendant Loadmasters Customs
copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped Services, Inc.'s counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees
on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, against plaintiff are hereby dismissed.
Manila. They arrived on the same date.
With costs against defendant Glodel Brokerage
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal
Corporation.
of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants.
Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery SO ORDERED. 4
trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbia's warehouses/plants in Bulacan and
Valenzuela City. Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision which reads
Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed in part:
truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to
Considering that appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel,
Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang
whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance
Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly
delivered in Columbia's warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount
it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters.
Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck,
loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo. WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered PARTLY GRANTED in that the appellee Loadmasters is likewise
but without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B held liable to appellant Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62
Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After
 representing the insurance indemnity appellant Glodel has been rights of the insured against the wrong-doer or the person who has
held liable to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation. violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company
does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
Appellant Glodel's appeal to absolve it from any liability is entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss
herein DISMISSED. or injury.
SO ORDERED. 5 As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance
has the right to seek reimbursement from either Loadmasters or Glodel or both for
Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review
breach of contract and/or tort.
on certiorari before this Court presenting the following:
The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay
ISSUES
R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia.
1. Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and
Respondent Glodel in spite of the fact that the latter Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject
respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons,
(Loadmasters)? corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
2. Under the set of facts established and undisputed transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation,
in the case, can petitioner Loadmasters be legally considered offering their services to the public.
as an Agent of respondent Glodel? 6 Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier
because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its
To totally exculpate itself from responsibility for the lost goods,
trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private
Loadmasters argues that it cannot be considered an agent of Glodel because it
carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it
never represented the latter in its dealings with the consignee. At any rate, it further
does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. 10 The distinction is
contends that Glodel has no recourse against it for its (Glodel's) failure to file a
significant in the sense that "the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract
cross-claim pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on
Glodel, in its Comment, 7 counters that Loadmasters is liable to it under common carriers." 11
its cross-claim because the latter was grossly negligent in the transportation of the
In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the
subject cargo. With respect to Loadmasters' claim that it is already estopped from
contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was private in character. There is no
filing a cross-claim, Glodel insists that it can still do so even for the first time on
showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel.
appeal because there is no rule that provides otherwise. Finally, Glodel argues that
its relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the transporter In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier. 12
(Loadmasters) is only hired for the specific job of delivering the merchandise. Thus,
the diligence required in this case is merely ordinary diligence or that of a good In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the
father of the family, not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers. context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum, 13 it states that it "is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is
R&B Insurance, for its part, claims that Glodel is deemed to have engaged in the business of customs brokering." It cannot be considered otherwise
interposed a cross-claim against Loadmasters because it was not prevented from because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v.
presenting evidence to prove its position even without amending its Answer. As to Transport Venture, Inc., 14 a customs broker is also regarded as a common
the relationship between Loadmasters and Glodel, it contends that a contract of carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
agency existed between the two corporations. 8
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated
Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the
reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of
securities. 9 Doubtless, R&B Insurance is subrogated to the rights of the insured the Civil Code.When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme
to the extent of the amount it paid the consignee under the marine insurance, as measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
provided under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which reads: EScHDA circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or
rights. 15 This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of
ART. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured,
carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the
and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the
mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for
injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract
shipment. 16 Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed
complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 17 This presumption of fault or
negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
observed extraordinary diligence over the goods. demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil
Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the xxx xxx xxx
goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier
for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. 18 employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and business or industry.
Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject
cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, "the responsibility of two or more It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary." aEcSIH Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the
hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made
Loadmasters' claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by
answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope
Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid
of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable
for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another,
expressly provide: there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. 20 To avoid liability for a quasi-
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 21 In this
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
regard, Loadmasters failed.
Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary
Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York/McGee & diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the
Co., Inc. 19 where this Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. It
contractual relationship, to wit: should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in
filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters.
which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent
and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the CA.
Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: "By the contract of agency a person binds
have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf
who is not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao of another, with the consent or authority of the latter." The elements of a contract
Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the
cause of action in light of the Court's consistent ruling that the act relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third
that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a liability for person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent
tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which acts within the scope of his authority. 22
breaches the contract. In the present case, Phoenix and McGee
are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties.
of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent Loadmasters never represented Glodel. Neither was it ever authorized to make
manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes such representation. It is a settled rule that the basis for agency is representation,
belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope
contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally
Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the executed by the principal. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual
defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions,
from quasi-delict. [Emphases supplied] while on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment
and act on it. 23 Such mutual intent is not obtaining in this case. HSaCcE
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
 What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 24,
Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED to read as follows:
Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved
from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring petitioner
efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel
to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other R&B Insurance Corporation for the insurance indemnity it paid to
concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of consignee Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and ordering both
Appeals, 24 parties to pay, jointly and severally, R&B Insurance Corporation a]
the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance
. . . . Where several causes producing an injury are indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent thereof
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury for attorney's fees; and c] the amount of P22,427.18 for litigation
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any expenses.
of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the The cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel
case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that Brokerage Corporation against petitioner Loadmasters Customs
the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No Services, Inc. is DENIED.
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely
SO ORDERED. STADIH
because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as ||| (Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. v. Glodel Brokerage Corp., G.R. No. 179446,
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. [January 10, 2011], 654 PHIL 67-82)
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose
liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently,
are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury
to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible
for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted
in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors
and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194
of the Civil Code.[Emphasis supplied]
The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect from
Loadmasters, it having failed to file a cross-claim against the latter.
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters
for breach of contract of service as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the
subject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction
against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not properly
interpose a cross-claim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray that
Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor
of R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim,
not set up shall be barred. 25 Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for the first time
on appeal.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court
cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds. "Equity, which has been aptly
described as 'a justice outside legality,' is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure." 26 The Court cannot be a
lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.
 2. People v. Velasco GR No. 195668 Trial on the merits ensued as to the remaining cases (Criminal Case No. 04-
1562, for illegal recruitment; and Criminal Case No. 04-1564; Criminal Case No. 04-
[G.R. No. 195668. June 25, 2014.] 1566; Criminal Case No. 04-1567; Criminal Case No. 1569 and Criminal Case No. 04-
1574, for estafa). 7
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MA. The CA recounted the transactions between the complainants and the
HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, accused, including Inovero, in the following manner:
MARISSA DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO, accused,
Regarding Criminal Case No. 04-1562, the prosecution
presented the five (5) private complainants as witnesses to prove
the crime of Illegal Recruitment, namely: Novesa Baful ("Baful"),
MARICAR B. INOVERO, accused-appellant.
Danilo Brizuela ("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre ("Aguirre"),
Annaliza Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella ("Marbella"),
and Mildred Versoza ("Versoza") from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration ("POEA").
DECISION
Baful testified that on May 20, 2003 she, together with her
sister-in-law, went to Harvel International Talent Management and
Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit 509 Cityland Condominium,
BERSAMIN, J p: Makati City upon learning that recruitment for caregivers to Japan
was on-going there. On said date, she allegedly met Inovero;
The several accused in illegal recruitment committed in large scale against Velasco, and Diala, and saw Inovero conducting a briefing on the
whom the State establishes a conspiracy are each equally criminally and civilly liable. applicants. She also testified that Diala, the alleged talent
It follows, therefore, that as far as civil liability is concerned each is solidarily liable to manager, directed her to submit certain documents, and to pay
the victims of the illegal recruitment for the reimbursement of the sums collected from Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as training fee,
them, regardless of the extent of the participation of the accused in the illegal as well as Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as placement and
recruitment. processing fees. Diala also advised her to undergo physical
examination.
The Case
On June 6, 2003, after complying with the aforesaid
Accused-appellant Maricar B. Inovero seeks the review and reversal of the requirements and after paying Diala the amounts of Eighteen
decision promulgated on August 26, 2010, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) and Ten Thousand pesos
affirmed her conviction for illegal recruitment committed in large scale amounting to (P10,000.00), Baful was promised deployment within two (2) to
economic sabotage under the judgment rendered on January 14, 2008 by the Regional three (3) months. She likewise testified that Inovero briefed her
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 133, in Makati City. 2 and her co-applicants on what to wear on the day of their
Antecedents departure. However, she was never deployed. Finally, she testified
that she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to deploy
On March 17, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the workers for overseas employment.
RTC two informations 3 charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, Marissa
Diala and Berna Paulino with illegal recruitment as defined and penalized under Section Brizuela, another complainant, testified that he went to
6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Worker's Act of 1995), and 11 HARVEL's office in Makati on February 7, 2003 to inquire on the
informations 4 charging the same accused with estafa as defined and penalized under requirements and hiring procedure for a caregiver in Japan. There,
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only Inovero was arrested and Diala told him the amount required as processing fee and the
prosecuted, the other accused having remained at large. caEIDA documents to be submitted. And when he submitted on March 7,
2003 the required documents and payments, it was, this time,
Six cases charging estafa (Criminal Case No. 04-1565, Criminal Case No. Paulino who received them. He claimed that he underwent training
1568, Criminal Case No. 1570, Criminal Case No. 1571 and Criminal Case No. 1572 and medical examination; he likewise attended an orientation
and Criminal Case No. 1573) and one of the two charging illegal recruitment (Criminal conducted by Inovero at which time, he and his batchmates were
Case No. 04-1563) were provisionally dismissed because of the failure of the advised what clothes to wear on the day of their departure; he was
complainants to prosecute. 5 The seven cases were later permanently dismissed after assured of deployment on the first week of June 2003, however,
the complainants did not revive them within two years, as provided in Section 8, 6 Rule on the eve of his supposed "pre-departure orientation seminar,"
117 of the Rules of Court. Paulino texted him that the seminar was cancelled because
Inovero, who had the applicants' money, did not show up. He
testified that he was not deployed. Neither was his money Inovero likewise denied receiving any money from the
returned, as promised. complainants, nor issuing receipts therefor. 8
On cross-examination, Brizuela testified that Inovero Judgment of the RTC
was the one who conducted the orientation, and represented
On January 14, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five
to all the applicants that most of the time, she was in the
counts of estafa but convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-1562 of illegal recruitment
Japanese Embassy expediting the applicants' visa.
committed in large scale as defined and penalized by Section 6 and Section 7
Aguirre, the third complainant to testify, alleged that she of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995),
went to HARVEL on May 22, 2003, to apply as caregiver in Japan; disposing thusly:
there, Diala informed her that Inovero was one of the owners of
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the
HARVEL and Velasco was its President; she paid Thirty Five
aforestated cases as follows:
Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), and submitted her documents,
receipt of which was acknowledged by Diala; despite her In Criminal Case No. 04-1562, accused Maricar Inovero
undergoing medical examination and several training seminars, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
she was however not deployed to Japan. Worse, she found out Recruitment in large scale defined and penalized under Sections
that HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers. 6 and 7, II, of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as the
'Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995', and is
Amoyo, the fourth complainant, testified that she went to
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. She is
HARVEL's office on May 28, 2003 to apply as caregiver in Japan,
likewise ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
and Diala required her to submit certain documents, to undergo
(P500,000.00).
training and medical examination, and to pay Thirty Five Thousand
Pesos (P35,000.00) as placement and processing fees. However, Criminal Case No. 04-1563 also for illegal recruitment in
after complying with said requirements, she was never deployed large scale is hereby ordered dismissed to its finality for failure of
as promised. CSTDIE complainants Alvin De Leon, Roderick Acuna, Agosto Vale and
Marina Viernes to revive said case despite the lapse of two years
Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged
from its provisional dismissal.
that she applied for the position of janitress at HARVEL sometime
in December 2002; just like the rest of the complainants, she was Criminal Cases No. 04-1564, 1566, 1567, 1569, 1571
required to submit certain documents and to pay a total amount of and 1574 are hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the
Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as processing fee; after prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence to prove all the elements
paying said fee, Diala and Inovero promised her and the other of the said offense.
applicants that they will be deployed in three (3) months or in June
2003; however, the promised deployment never materialized; she Criminal Cases Nos. 1565, 1568, 1570, 1572 and 1573
later found out that HARVEL was not even licensed to recruit also for estafa [are] hereby ordered dismissed to its finality for
workers. failure of complainants Agosto Vale, Alvin De Leon, Roselyn
Saruyda, Roderick Acuna and Marina Viernes to revive said cases
[Mildred] Versoza, on the other hand, is a Labor and despite the lapse of two (2) years from its provisional
Employment Officer at the POEA Licensing Branch. She testified dismissal. ACaEcH
that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither HARVEL
nor Inovero was authorized to recruit workers for overseas Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, she
employment as per records at their office. shall be credited in the service of her sentence with the full time
during which she has undergone preventive imprisonment if she
In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations hurled agrees voluntarily to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
against her. As summarized in the assailed Decision, upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, with four-fifths thereof.
she claimed that she is the niece of accused Velasco, the owner
of HARVEL, but denied working there. Explaining her presence in Meanwhile, considering that the accused Ma. Harleta B.
HARVEL, she alleged that she worked for her uncle, Velasco's Velasco, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino are still at large, let alias
husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at least two or three warrants of arrest be issued against them. In the meantime, let the
times a week, she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her cases filed against them be archived, which shall be revived upon
uncle. She also testified that her alleged errands mainly consisted their apprehension.
of serving food and refreshments during orientations at HARVEL.
SO ORDERED. 9
 Decision of the CA Second, when Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private
complainant Amoyo as one of the owners of HARVEL, Inovero did
Inovero appealed, contending that:
not bother to correct said representation. Inovero's silence is
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING clearly an implied acquiescence to said representation.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
complainant Brizuela, represented herself as the one expediting
[HER] GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 10
the release of applicants' working visa for Japan.
On August 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction, viz.:
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The POEA's Versoza — Inovero had no license nor authority to
January 14, 2008 Decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED. recruit for overseas employment. EASIHa

SO ORDERED. 11 Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that

the RTC correctly found that Inovero committed illegal
Issue recruitment in large scaleby giving private complainants
In this appeal, Inovero insists that the CA erred in affirming her conviction by the impression that she can send them abroad for
the RTC because she had not been an employee of Harvel at any time; that she could employment purposes, despite the fact that she had no license
be faulted only for her association with the supposed illegal recruiters; that in all stages or authority to do so. 12
of the complainants' recruitment for overseas employment by Harvel, they had It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on
transacted only and directly with Diala; and that the certification from the POEA to the the findings of fact by the trial court which are conclusive and binding once affirmed by
effect she was not a licensed recruiter was not a positive proof that she engaged in the CA on intermediate review. The bindingness of the trial court's factual findings is by
illegal recruitment. virtue of its direct access to the evidence. The direct access affords the trial court the
Ruling of the Court unique advantage to observe the witnesses' demeanor while testifying, and the
personal opportunity to test the accuracy and reliability of their recollections of past
The appeal lacks merit. events, both of which are very decisive in a litigation like this criminal prosecution for
the serious crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale where the parties have
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of the RTC, disagreed on the material facts. The Court leaves its confined precinct of dealing only
stating: with legal issues in order to deal with factual ones only when the appellant persuasively
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed demonstrates a clear error in the appreciation of the evidence by both the trial and the
in large scale are: (1) that the accused engaged in acts of appellate courts. This demonstration was not done herein by the appellant. Hence, the
recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article Court upholds the CA's affirmance of the factual findings by the trial court.
13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article All that Inovero's appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal
34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused had not complied with recruitment of the complainants. But the complainants credibly described and affirmed
the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment her specific acts during the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Their positive
with respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority to assertions were far trustworthier than her mere denial.
recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that the accused committed the
unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative
recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority assertion of the fact. Thus, courts — both trial and appellate — have generally viewed
from the government, give the impression that they have the the defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with outright
power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the recognition that denial is inherently
weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for
In Our view, despite Inovero's protestations that she did the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial should be substantiated
not commit illegal recruitment, the following circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and
contrarily convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment. self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 13 It
testified that Inovero was the one who conducted is no different here.
orientations/briefings on them; informed them, among others, on We concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the
how much their salary would be as caregivers in Japan; and what illegal recruitment charged against her. Strong and positive evidence demonstrated
to wear when they finally will be deployed. beyond reasonable doubt her having conspired with her co-accused in the recruitment
of the complainants. The decision of the CA amply recounted her overt part in the
conspiracy. Under the law, there is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for
agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. 14 only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would
they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity
The complainants paid varying sums for placement, training and processing for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition
fees, respectively as follows: (a) Baful — P28,500.00; (b) Brizuela — of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe
P38,600.00; (c) Aguirre — P38,600.00; (d) Amoyo — P39,000.00; and (e) Marbella — the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law
P20,250.00. However, the RTC and the CA did not adjudicate Inovero's personal require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
liability for them in their judgments. Their omission needs to be corrected, penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
notwithstanding that the complainants did not appeal, for not doing so would be patently jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to
unjust and contrary to law. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil
only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the
is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal law that every person criminally liable is also complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
civilly liable. 15 Civil liability includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and Courtmandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil
indemnification for consequential damages. 16 To enforce the civil liability, the Rules liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived. 20
of Court has deemed to be instituted with the criminal action the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged unless the offended party What was the extent of Inovero's civil liability?
waives the civil action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 17 Considering that the crime of The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the
illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, crime requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire
is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return of the amounts obligation. 21 As a co-conspirator, then, Inovero's civil liability was similar to that of a
paid as placement, training and processing fees. 18 Hence, Inovero and her co- joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those who command,
accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid. instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the benefit. 22 They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or
CA was not disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People 19that it was whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. 23 Under
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting
and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," because: extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
As regards the extent of their respective liabilities, the Court expressed in Far Eastern
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals: 24
disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, . . . . Where several causes producing an injury are
state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or responsible persons although under the circumstances of the
accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same. No
wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely
by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement because it does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each
of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as
reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their
omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently,
of law and justice. HTCISE are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury
to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for
avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law the whole injury. . . .
or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not
be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the
 It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her
individual participation in the wrong was insignificant as compared to those of the
others. 25 Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned
among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the
purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the
whole amount. 26 Hence, Inovero's liability towards the victims of their illegal
recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether she actually received the amounts paid
or not, and notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped arrest until now, have
remained untried.
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, interest as part of the damages may be
adjudicated in criminal proceedings in the discretion of the court. The Court believes
and holds that such liability for interest attached to Inovero as a measure of fairness to
the complainants. Thus, Inovero should pay interest of 6% per annum on the sums paid
by the complainants to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full
payment. 27
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26,
2010, subject to the MODIFICATION that appellant Maricar B. Inovero is ordered to
pay by way of actual damages to each of the complainants the amounts paid by them
for placement, training and processing fees, respectively as follows:
(a) Noveza Baful — P28,500.00; EaHDcS
(b) Danilo Brizuela — P38,600.00;
(c) Rosanna Aguirre — P38,600.00;
(d) Annaliza Amoyo — P39,000.00; and
(e) Teresa Marbella — P20,250.00.
plus interest on such amounts at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Inovero shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Inovero, G.R. No. 195668, [June 25, 2014], 737 PHIL 116-133)
 3. Navida et al v. Dizon, Jr. GR No. 125078 EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM
ENGLIS, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA,
[G.R. No. 125078. May 30, 2011.] RUBENTITO D. ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO,
FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY, RODOLFO M.
ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A.
BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ESPAÑOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ,
ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A. ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO,
ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, FELIPE VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO M.
ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES,
ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, RICARDO C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F.
ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA, BERNARDO P.
ANCORDA, TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO,
RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGO ROLANDO V. GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO
ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES,
AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G.
ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, HALILI, NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO,
MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R. CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S. ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G.
ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, HERMIE L. JALICO,
NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C.
BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI, HERMOGENES T. JAVINAS, ALEJANDRO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR,
BARBECHO, ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO, NAPOLEON T. JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D.
VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO A. LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE
BAUTISTA, VICTOR BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J. LAS
BETITO, GERARDO A. BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, PEÑAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO
FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO,
TOMAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTE P. CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS BAÑEZ, CONCISO L.
BURGOS, MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, DIOSDADO LOVITOS, ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN,
CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, JR., JUANITO
JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. A. MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D.
CALISO, NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, CELESTINO MAGALLON, PEDRO P. MAGLASANG, MARIO G.
CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, VICTORIANO CANETE, MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. MAMARADLO, PANFILO A.
DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI,
VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE M. ALBERTO T. MANGGA, ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO
CASSION, JAIME S. CASTAÑARES, FLAVIANO C. T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P. MANSANES, ALCIO P.
CASTAÑARES, ELPIDIO CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B. MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT,
CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO DENDERIA MATABANG, ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI
G. CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V. C. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIO R. MESA,
CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR CORTES, NOEL Y. RENATO N. MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, ALBERTO M.
CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA,
CRUZ, ROGER CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA, RICARDO MONTAÑO, RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO MUNAR,
ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO RODOLFO E. MUÑEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C.
DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS, NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO
GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO G. NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T. NOVENA,
P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG, JR., MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO, BIBIANO
JULIETO S. DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY C. ODI, ALFREDO M. OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M.
R. DELA TORRE, RAUL DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P. ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO
DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL, M. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA, NELSON G. PADIOS, SR.,
ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, FRNACISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, RENE B. PALENCIA,
SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, MICHAEL P. PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO, NOLITO C.
FE DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO, PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. PASTERA,
DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG, FREDDIE VICENTE Q. PEDAZO, EDGAR M. PEÑARANDA, ILUMINIDO B.
DURAN, SR., MARIO C. ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M. PERACULLO, ANTONIO C. PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ,
 OSCAR C. PLEÑOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ,
PRIETO, ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ORLANDITO A. ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R.
ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA,
QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO,
MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A. REYES, OCTAVIO F. LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B.
REYES, EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA,
RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E.
ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO ROSARIO, ROMEO L. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGO ANTOPINA,
SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN G. MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO,
SALIGONAN, VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO J. MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M.
SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A. SAMELIN, ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G.
EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R.
SAMELIN, ROMEO A. SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT,
SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE, MAXIMO M.
SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. SERRANO, NESTOR G. BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI, HERMOGENES T.
SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S. SIMTIM, SERAFIN BARBECHO, ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO,
T. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO A.
SOLOMON, JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, BAUTISTA, VICTOR BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO
ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT, PEDRO A. BETITO, GERARDO A. BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN,
SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO,
MANUEL T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A. TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO TOMAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTE P.
L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO BURGOS, MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, DIOSDADO
TAHITIT, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE, CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA,
MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S. JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A.
TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, CALISO, NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, CELESTINO
ALBERT G. TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M. CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, VICTORIANO CANETE,
TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA,
EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD, JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE M.
URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E. CASSION, JAIME S. CASTAÑARES, FLAVIANO C.
VALENZUELA, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, CASTAÑARES, ELPIDIO CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B.
WALTER VILLAFAÑE, DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO
VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA, G. CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V.
JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG, CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR CORTES, NOEL Y.
RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, MANSUETO M. CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX
YBERA, EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, ROMEO CRUZ, ROGER CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA,
P. YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA and ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO
GRACIANO ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. HON. TEODORO A. DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS,
DIZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO
General Santos City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG, JR.,
OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD FRUIT CO., JULIETO S. DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY
STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC., R. DELA TORRE, RAUL DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P.
DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL,
N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO,
INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON,
INC., respondents. FE DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO,
DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG, FREDDIE
DURAN, SR., MARIO C. ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M.
[G.R. No. 125598. May 30, 2011.] EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM
ENGLIS, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA,
RUBENTITO D. ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO,
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and OCCIDENTAL FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY, RODOLFO M.
CHEMICAL CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BERNABE L. ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A.
ESPAÑOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ, REYES, EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO
EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO, RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC,
VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO M. ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO ROSARIO, ROMEO L.
FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES, SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN B.
RICARDO C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F. SALIGONAN, VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO M.
GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA, BERNARDO P. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A. SAMELIN,
GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE
ROLANDO V. GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO SAMELIN, ROMEO A. SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S.
GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO
AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G. SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. SERRANO, NESTOR G.
HALILI, NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO, SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S. SIMTIM, SERAFIN
CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S. ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. T. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M.
IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, HERMIE L. JALICO, SOLOMON, JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT,
ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C. ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT, PEDRO A.
JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY,
NAPOLEON T. JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D. MANUEL T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A. TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO
LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO
LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J. LAS TAHITIT, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE,
PEÑAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S.
G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO TINACO,
CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS BAÑEZ, CONCISO L. ALBERT G. TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M.
LOVITOS, ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. TORRIBIO,
PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, JR., JUANITO EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD, JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M.
A. MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E.
MAGALLON, PEDRO P. MAGLASANG, MARIO G. VALENZUELA, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL,
MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. MAMARADLO, PANFILO A. WALTER VILLAFAÑE, DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P.
MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA,
ALBERTO T. MANGGA, ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG,
T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P. MANSANES, ALCIO P. RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, MANSUETO M.
MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT, YBERA, EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, ROMEO
DENDERIA MATABANG, ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI P. YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA, and
C. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIO R. MESA, GRACIANO ZAMORA, respondents.
RENATO N. MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, ALBERTO M.
MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA,
RICARDO MONTAÑO, RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO MUNAR, [G.R. No. 126654. May 30, 2011.]
RODOLFO E. MUÑEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C.
NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO
G. NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T. NOVENA, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO
MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO, BIBIANO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO
C. ODI, ALFREDO M. OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M. ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA,
ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE
M. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA, NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO,
FRANCISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, RENE B. PALENCIA, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON
MICHAEL P. PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. ASUAL, SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J.
PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. PASTERA, BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO,
VICENTE Q. PEDAZO, EDGAR M. PEÑARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A.
PERACULLO, ANTONIO C. PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ, BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO,
OSCAR C. PLEÑOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G. LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO
PRIETO, ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO
ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U. BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M.
QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES,
MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A. REYES, OCTAVIO F. CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO
CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and
BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., respondents.
COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO
COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR.,
RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. [G.R. No. 127856. May 30, 2011.]
DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR.,
CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA,
ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A. and DEL MONTE
FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. TROPICAL FRUIT CO., petitioners, vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL
GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, COURT OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCHES 16 AND 13, CORNELIO
ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M. ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA,
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO,
IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO
OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY,
JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO
VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL,
FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA,
LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N.
ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL,
LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO
LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO,
MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS
AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA,
MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A.
CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS,
NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO
LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA, M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT,
CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS,
OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C.
CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO,
PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G.
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO
PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG, JAIME
QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA,
RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO
ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M.
TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO
SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD,
TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO
TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN E. JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO,
TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA,
HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B.
TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON,
VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO
VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, petitioners, vs. THE LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO
HON. ROMEO D. MARASIGAN, Presiding Judge of Regional LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO
Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP,
CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP., AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR
STANDARD FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES,
CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H.
MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR.,
LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA,
 CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M.
OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO
CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD,
PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO,
PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA,
QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B.
RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON,
ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO
TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO
SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO
TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP,
TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN E. AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR
TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES,
HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H.
TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR.,
VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA,
VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, respondents. CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO
OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR.,
CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C.
[G.R. No. 128398. May 30, 2011.] PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG,
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO
PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D.
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., and CHIQUITA BRANDS QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO
INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners, vs. HON. ANITA ALFELOR- RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN,
ALAGABAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE,
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 13, CORNELIO TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO
ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO
ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO
CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN E.
AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA,
MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T.
A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA,
SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO
REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N. VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, respondents.
BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL,
MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO
BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO,
MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS DECISION
BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA,
RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A.
CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS,
FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT,
BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review
ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which arose out of two civil cases
DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, that were filed in different courts but whose factual background and issues are
JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. closely intertwined.
DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO
ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG, JAIME The petitions in G.R. Nos. 125078 1 and 125598 2 both assail the
FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, Order 3 dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos
RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617. The said Order decreed the dismissal of
the case in view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject defense that has matured since the
matter of the complaint. The petition in G.R. No. 125598 also challenges the commencement of these actions in the courts of
Orders dated June 4, 1996 4 and July 9, 1996, 5 which held that the RTC of Texas;
General Santos City no longer had jurisdiction to proceed with Civil Case No.
5617. (4) stipulated within 40 days after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order that any discovery
On the other hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos. conducted during the pendency of these actions
126654, 6 127856, 7 and 128398 8 seek the reversal of the Order 9 dated may be used in any foreign proceeding to the
October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 24,251- same extent as if it had been conducted in
96, which also dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. proceedings initiated there; and
G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were (5) submitted within 40 days after the entry of this
consolidated in the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, 10 April 28, 1997 11 and Memorandum and Order an agreement binding
March 10, 1999. 12 them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in
The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows: favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.

Proceedings before the Texas Courts xxx xxx xxx

Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from this
Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. Memorandum and Order, in the event that the highest court of any
The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home
nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may
were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume
the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein that involved jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed
plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil for [forum non conveniens]. 13
Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon
Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.,"which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95- Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General Santos City and G.R.
1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the Nos. 125078 and 125598
actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. DEScaT In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District plaintiffs from General Santos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter
Court conditionally granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Pertinently, the court referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed a Joint Complaint 14 in the RTC of General
ordered that: Santos City on August 10, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5617.
Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co.
Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo will (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole
be dismissed 90 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter
Order provided that defendants and third- and fourth-party collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands
defendants have: International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte
Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac
States . . .; Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and referred to as defendant companies.)
waived any other jurisdictional defense within 40 NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the
days after the entry of this Memorandum and illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered
Order in any action commenced by a plaintiff in because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were
these actions in his home country or the country exposed to this chemical during the early 1970's up to the early 1980's when they
in which his injury occurred. Any plaintiff desiring used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they
to bring such an action will do so within 30 days resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et
after the entry of this Memorandum and Order; al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of
each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put
(3) waived within 40 days after the entry of this
into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et
Memorandum and Order any limitations-based
al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant
 companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former's the averments in the present complaint are examined in terms of
health and well-being. the particular categories of tort recognized in the Philippine Civil
Code, it becomes stark clear that such averments describe and
Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies identify the category of specific tort known as product liability tort.
respectively filed their Motions for Bill of Particulars. 15 During the pendency of the This is necessarily so, because it is the productmanufactured by
motions, on March 13, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint defendant foreign companies, which is asserted to be the
Complaint, 16 excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd., Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine proximate cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff workers,
Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac Chemical Corp. as party defendants. and the liability of the defendant foreign companies, is premised
Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions for on being the manufacturer of the pesticides.
Bill of Particulars. 17 On May 15, 1996, DOW filed an Answer with
It is clear, therefore, that the Regional Trial Court has
Counterclaim. 18
jurisdiction over the present case, if and only if the Civil Code of
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the the Philippines, or a suppletory special law prescribes a product
RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the liability tort, inclusive of and comprehending the specific tort
trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, to wit: described in the complaint of the plaintiff workers. 20
THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES Third, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were
FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, viz.:
COURT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION FILING OF CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES
xxx xxx xxx — COERCED AND ANOMALOUS
The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to
The substance of the cause of action as stated in the file the instant action, but rather were coerced to do so, merely to
complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity comply with the U.S. District Court's Order dated July 11, 1995,
on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return
and beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of to the U.S. District Court. 21
defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of
pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary
sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the appearance of the defendant companies therein, thus:
stream of commerce. THE DEFENDANTS' SUBMISSION TO
Accordingly, the subject matter stated in the complaint JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT
IS ILLUSORY
and which is uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of
activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to
accept service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant
outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the
to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily
jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present Regional
Trial Court. 19 submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court
acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their
Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged by voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance
NAVIDA, et al., in their complaint is a tort category that is not recognized in of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the
Philippine laws. Said the trial court: IcaEDC "Defendants' Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of
Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens" (Annex to the Complaint)
THE TORT ASSERTED IN THE filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that "(t)he
PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST authority of each designated representative to accept service of
DEFENDANT FOREIGN COMPANIES IS process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions
NOT WITHIN THE SUBJECT MATTER by the Court". The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL the case is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and
TRIAL COURT, BECAUSE IT IS NOT A defendants appealed therefrom (par. 3(h), 3(i), Amended
TORT CATEGORY WITHIN THE Complaint). Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the
PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final
adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the
The specific tort asserted against defendant foreign
defendants is also conditional. . . . .
companies in the present complaint is product liability tort. When
 The appointment of agents by the defendants, being appearance. But the same insistence would actually thwart the
subject to a suspensive condition, thus produces no legal effect very ends of justice which it seeks to achieve. DcCEHI
and is ineffective at the moment. 22
This evaluation and action is made not on account of but
Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et rather with due consideration to the fact that the dismissal of this
al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping case does not necessarily deprive the parties — especially the
and litis pendencia. The trial court expounded: plaintiffs — of their possible remedies. The court is cognizant that
the Federal Court may resume proceedings of that earlier case
THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON between the herein parties involving the same acts or omissions
AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING as in this case.
This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are
both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties this case is now considered DISMISSED. 24
to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same
cases in another forum, violates the rule on 'forum shopping' so On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued
abhorred in this jurisdiction. . . . . an Order, 25 dismissing DOW's Answer with Counterclaim.

xxx xxx xxx CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for
reconsideration 26 of the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, while DOW filed a
THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S. motion for reconsideration 27 of the RTC Order dated June 4, 1996. Subsequently,
DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN DOW and OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration 28 of the
JURISDICTION RTC Order dated May 20, 1996.
Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested
this court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. In an Order 29 dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City
District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. declared that it had already lost its jurisdiction over the case as it took into
The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of NAVIDA, et al., which stated that
which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the latter had already filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration 30 of the
this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial above order.
acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. . .
.. On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari in order to assail the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, which was
xxx xxx xxx docketed as G.R. No. 125078.
THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE The RTC of General Santos City then issued an Order 31 dated August
OF "LITIS PENDENCIA" 14, 1996, which merely noted the incidents still pending in Civil Case No. 5617 and
Furthermore, the case filed in the U.S. court involves the reiterated that it no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
same parties, same rights and interests, as in this case. There
On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for
exists litis pendencia since there are two cases involving the same
Review on Certiorari, 32 challenging the orders of the RTC of General Santos City
parties and interests. The court would like to emphasize that in
dated May 20, 1996, June 4, 1996 and July 9, 1996. Their petition was docketed
accordance with the rule on litis pendencia . . .; the subsequent
as G.R. No. 125598.
case must be dismissed. Applying the foregoing [precept] to the
case-at-bar, this court concludes that since the case between the In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General
parties in the U.S. is still pending, then this case is barred by the Santos City erred in ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
rule on "litis pendencia." 23 case as well as the persons of the defendant companies.
In fine, the trial court held that: In a Resolution 33 dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to
consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with G.R. No. 125078.
It behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case. For to
continue with these proceedings, would be violative of the CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 34 which sought the
constitutional provision on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing speedy reversal of the RTC Orders dated May 20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and August 14, 1996.
disposition of cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution). The The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 126018. In a Resolution 35 dated
court has no other choice. To insist on further proceedings with this November 13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid petition for failure of
case, as it is now presented, might accord this court a charming CHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. CHIQUITA
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 36 but the same was denied through a plaintiffs, after having elected to sue in the place of
Resolution 37 dated January 27, 1997. defendants' residence, are now compelled by a decision
of a Texas District Court to file cases under torts in this
Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the jurisdiction for causes of actions which occurred
RTC of Davao City and G.R. Nos. abroad (par. 19); a petition was filed by same plaintiffs
against same defendants in the Courts of Texas, USA,
126654, 127856, and 128398
plaintiffs seeking for payment of damages based on
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, negligence, strict liability, conspiracy and international
OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 tort theories (par. 27); upon defendants' Motion to
of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. This case was docketed Dismiss on Forum non [conveniens], said petition was
as Civil Case No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in G.R. No. 126654, provisionally dismissed on condition that these cases be
hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et al.) amended their Joint-Complaint on May filed in the Philippines or before 11 August 1995
21, 1996. 38 (Philippine date; Should the Philippine Courts refuse or
deny jurisdiction, the U. S. Courts will reassume
Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al., ABELLA, et al., alleged that, jurisdiction.)
as workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation,
they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the 11. In the Amended Joint Complaint, plaintiffs aver that: on 11 July
chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in "serious 1995, the Federal District Court issued a Memorandum
and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and and Order conditionally dismissing several of the
severe injuries to their reproductive capacities." 39ABELLA, et al., claimed that the consolidated actions including those filed by the Filipino
defendant companies manufactured, produced, sold, distributed, used, and/or complainants. One of the conditions imposed was for the
made available in commerce, DBCP without warning the users of its hazardous plaintiffs to file actions in their home countries or the
effects on health, and without providing instructions on its proper use and countries in which they were injured . . . .
application, which the defendant companies knew or ought to have known, had Notwithstanding, the Memorandum and [O]rder further
they exercised ordinary care and prudence. provided that should the highest court of any foreign
country affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdictions over
Except for DOW, the other defendant companies filed their respective
these actions filed by the plaintiffs in their home countries
motions for bill of particulars to which ABELLA, et al., filed their opposition. DOW
[or] the countries where they were injured, the said
and DEL MONTE filed their respective Answers dated May 17, 1996 and June 24, plaintiffs may return to that court and, upon proper
1996.
motion, the Court will resume jurisdiction as if the case
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Case No. 24,251-96 in had never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.
its Order dated October 1, 1996, which, in its entirety, reads:
The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at
Upon a thorough review of the Complaint and Amended bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the
Complaint for: Damages filed by the plaintiffs against the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer
defendants Shell Oil Company, DOW Chemicals Company, in its Special report "Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility," to wit:
Occidental Chemical Corporation, Standard Fruit Company,
Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE Food Company, DOLE 1. Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May
Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an
International, Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage
Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign corporations with Philippine suit against foreign companies since the causes
Representatives, the Court, as correctly pointed out by one of the of action alleged in the petition do not exist
defendants, is convinced that plaintiffs "would have this Honorable under Philippine laws. There has been no
Court dismiss the case to pave the way for their getting an decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence
affirmance by the Supreme Court" (#10 of Defendants' Del Monte awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP.
Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co., Reply to This means there is no available evidence which
Opposition dated July 22, 1996). Consider these: will prove and disprove the relation between
sterility and DBCP.
1) In the original Joint Complaint, plaintiffs state
that: defendants have no properties in the Philippines; 2. Retired Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento
they have no agents as well (par. 18); plaintiffs are suing opined that while a class suit is allowed in the
the defendants for tortuous acts committed by these Philippines the device has been employed
foreign corporations on their respective countries, as strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify as a class
 suit injury within the contemplation of Philippine shopping. CHIQUITA, however, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
statute. granted by this Court in the Resolution 44 dated October 8, 1997.
3. Retired High Court Justice Rodolfo Nocom stated that On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review
there is simply an absence of doctrine here that on certiorari before this Court assailing the above-mentioned orders of the RTC of
permits these causes to be heard. No product Davao City. Its petition was docketed as G.R. No. 127856.
liability ever filed or tried here.
DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over Civil
Case ordered dismissed. 40 Case No. 24,251-96, as defined under the law and that the said court already
obtained jurisdiction over its person by its voluntary appearance and the filing of a
Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition for review, filed on November motion for bill of particulars and, later, an answer to the complaint. According to
12, 1996 by ABELLA, et al., assails before this Court the above-quoted order of DEL MONTE, the RTC of Davao City, therefore, acted beyond its authority when
the RTC of Davao City. it dismissed the case motu proprio or without any motion to dismiss from any of
the parties to the case.
ABELLA, et al., claim that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil
Case No. 24,251-96 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March
10, 1999, this Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856,
According to ABELLA, et al., the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over and 128398.
the subject matter of the case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil Codeare
broad enough to cover the acts complained of and to support their claims for The Consolidated Motion to Drop
damages. CaEIST
DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL
ABELLA, et al., further aver that the dismissal of the case, based on the as Party-Respondents filed by
opinions of legal luminaries reported in a newspaper, by the RTC of Davao City is
bereft of basis. According to them, their cause of action is based on quasi- NAVIDA, et al. and ABELLA, et al.
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.They also maintain that the absence of On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed before
jurisprudence regarding the award of damages in favor of those adversely affected
this Court a Consolidated Motion (to Drop Party-Respondents). 45 The plaintiff
by the DBCP does not preclude them from presenting evidence to prove their
claimants alleged that they had amicably settled their cases with DOW,
allegations that their exposure to DBCP caused their sterility and/or infertility.
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL sometime in July 1997. This settlement agreement
SHELL, DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their respective motions for was evidenced by facsimiles of the "Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold
reconsideration of the Order dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. DEL Harmless Agreement," which were attached to the said motion. Pursuant to said
MONTE also filed its motion for reconsideration, which contained an additional agreement, the plaintiff claimants sought to withdraw their petitions as against
motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge. DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
The presiding judge of Branch 16 then issued an Order 41 dated DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, as
December 2, 1996, voluntarily inhibiting himself from trying the case. Thus, the well as the settlement entered into between the plaintiff claimants and DOW,
case was re-raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of Davao City. OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
In an Order 42 dated December 16, 1996, the RTC of Davao City The Memoranda of the Parties
affirmed the Order dated October 1, 1996, and denied the respective motions for Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the
reconsideration filed by defendant companies. parties, this Court, in a Resolution dated June 22, 1998, 46 required all the parties
Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997, to submit their respective memoranda.
questioning the Orders dated October 1, 1996 and December 16, 1996 of the RTC
CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998; 47 SHELL asked
of Davao City. This case was docketed as G.R. No. 128398.
to be excused from the filing of a memorandum alleging that it had already
In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in executed a compromise agreement with the plaintiff claimants. 48 DOLE filed its
dismissing the case motu proprio as it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter Memorandum on October 12, 1998 49 while DEL MONTE filed on October 13,
of the case as well as over the persons of the defendant companies which 1998. 50 NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed their Consolidated
voluntarily appeared before it. CHIQUITA also claims that the RTC of Davao City Memorandum on February 3, 1999; 51 and DOW and OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a
cannot dismiss the case simply on the basis of opinions of alleged legal experts Memorandum on December 23, 1999. 52
appearing in a newspaper article. The Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Initially, this Court in its Resolution 43 dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the Review in G.R. No. 125598
petition filed by CHIQUITA for submitting a defective certificate against forum
 On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw Philippine [c]ourts of jurisdiction over the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598, 53 explaining that the said petition "is same. cICHTD
already moot and academic and no longer presents a justiciable controversy" since
they have already entered into an amicable settlement with NAVIDA, et al. DOW d. The Compromise Agreement and the subsequent
and OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully complied with their obligations set Consolidated Motion to Drop Party
forth in the 1997 Compromise Agreements. Respondents Dow, Occidental and Shell does
not unjustifiably prejudice remaining
DOLE filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004, 54 interposing no respondents Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita. 58
objection to the withdrawal of the petition, and further stating that they maintain
their position that DOW and OCCIDENTAL, as well as other settling defendant DISCUSSION
companies, should be retained as defendants for purposes of prosecuting the On the issue of jurisdiction
cross-claims of DOLE, in the event that the complaint below is reinstated.
Essentially, the crux of the controversy in the petitions at bar is whether
NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment dated September 14, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing
2004, 55 stating that they agree with the view of DOW and OCCIDENTAL that the Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.
petition in G.R. No. 125598 has become moot and academic because Civil Case
No. 5617 had already been amicably settled by the parties in 1997. Remarkably, none of the parties to this case claims that the courts a
quo are bereft of jurisdiction to determine and resolve the above-stated cases. All
On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to parties contend that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
Withdraw Petition for Review Filed by Petitioners in G.R. No. 125598, 56 stating have jurisdiction over the action for damages, specifically for approximately P2.7
that it has no objections to the withdrawal of the petition filed by DOW and million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts
In a Resolution 57 dated October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory.
others, the motion to withdraw petition for review filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL. Specifically, the use of and exposure to DBCP that was manufactured, distributed
THE ISSUES or otherwise put into the stream of commerce by defendant companies happened
in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to
In their Consolidated Memorandum, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et assume jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., presented the following issues for our consideration: al., assert that the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code,
IN REFUTATION as well as Article 2176 thereof, are broad enough to cover their claim for damages.
Thus, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., pray that the respective rulings of the
I. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO LACK OF RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617
JURISDICTION. and 24,251-96 be reversed and that the said cases be remanded to the courts a
quo for further proceedings.
a) The court did not simply dismiss the case because it
was filed in bad faith with petitioners intending DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies
to have the same dismissed and returned to the constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.In
Texas court. addition, DOLE states that if there were no actionable wrongs committed under
Philippine law, the courts a quo should have dismissed the civil cases on the
b) The court dismissed the case because it was ground that the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
convinced that it did not have jurisdiction. al., stated no cause of action against the defendant companies. DOLE also argues
that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Codedictates that a judge
II. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE may not refuse to render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE. court may still resolve the case, applying the customs of the place and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of law. DOLE posits that the Philippines is
a. The acts complained of occurred within Philippine the situs of the tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant companies as
territory. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which
occurred in the Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other reproductive
b. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is broad system problems that they allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that the RTC of
enough to cover the acts complained of. Davao City gravely erred in relying upon newspaper reports in dismissing Civil
Case No. 24,251-96 given that newspaper articles are hearsay and without any
c. Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S. District Court evidentiary value. Likewise, the alleged legal opinions cited in the newspaper
over petitioner[s'] claims did not divest
reports were taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the parties. DOLE, Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
however, opines that the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
proper, given that plaintiff claimants merely prosecuted the cases with the sole consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
intent of securing a dismissal of the actions for the purpose of convincing the U.S. where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
Federal District Court to re-assume jurisdiction over the cases. of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the cases filed before them. The Amended Joint- Here, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., sought in their similarly-worded
Complaints sought approximately P2.7 million in damages for each plaintiff Amended Joint-Complaints filed before the courts a quo, the following prayer:
claimant, which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. CHIQUITA avers
that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the PRAYER
place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of
respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in
a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was
favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:
committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies
also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary a) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF moral damages in the
appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
proceedings. None of the defendant companies ever objected to the exercise of (P1,500,000.00);
jurisdiction by the courts a quo over their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the
remand of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City b) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF nominal damages in the
and the RTC of Davao City, respectively. amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) each;
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction c) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF exemplary damages in the
over Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00);
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is d) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF attorneys fees of Two
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. 59 Once vested by law, on a particular e) TO PAY THE COSTS of the suit. 61
court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot
be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main
law. cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately
P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both
civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the
7691, was: definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. EaIDAT
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that:
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
THE CAUSES OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
4. The Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, used,
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN COMMERCE nematocides
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation containing the chemical dibromochloropropane, commonly known
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy as DBCP. THE CHEMICAL WAS USED AGAINST the parasite
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such known as the nematode, which plagued banana plantations,
other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the INCLUDING THOSE in the Philippines. AS IT TURNED OUT,
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos DBCP not only destroyed nematodes. IT ALSO CAUSED ILL-
(P200,000.00). 60 EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO IT
AFFECTING the human reproductive system as well.
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94,
states: 5. The plaintiffs were exposed to DBCP in the 1970s
up to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they used this product in the
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" banana plantations WHERE they were employed, and/or (b)
in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and they resided within the agricultural area WHERE IT WAS
USED. As a result of such exposure, the plaintiffs suffered serious 8. The illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also due
and permanent injuries TO THEIR HEALTH, including, but not to the FAULT or negligence of defendants Standard Fruit
limited to, STERILITY and severe injuries to their reproductive Company, Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Dole Food Company, Inc.,
capacities. Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. in that
they failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent each plaintiff's
6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE AT FAULT OR WERE harmful exposure to DBCP-containing products which defendants
NEGLIGENT IN THAT THEY MANUFACTURED, produced, knew or should have known were hazardous to each plaintiff in
sold, and/or USED DBCP and/or otherwise, PUT THE SAME that they, AMONG OTHERS:
into the stream of commerce, WITHOUT INFORMING THE
USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND/OR a. Failed to adequately supervise and instruct Plaintiffs in
WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS PROPER USE AND the safe and proper application of DBCP-
APPLICATION. THEY allowed Plaintiffs to be exposed to, DBCP- containing products;
containing materials which THEY knew, or in the exercise of
ordinary care and prudence ought to have known, were highly b. Failed to implement proper methods and techniques of
harmful and injurious to the Plaintiffs' health and well-being. application of said products, or to cause such to
be implemented;
7. The Defendants WHO MANUFACTURED,
PRODUCED, SOLD, DISTRIBUTED, MADE AVAILABLE OR PUT c. Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards of exposure to
DBCP INTO THE STREAM OF COMMERCE were negligent OR said products or to cause them to be so warned;
AT FAULT in that they, AMONG OTHERS:
d. Failed to test said products for adverse health effects,
a. Failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs of the dangerous or to cause said products to be tested;
characteristics of DBCP, or to cause their e. Concealed from Plaintiffs information concerning the
subsidiaries or affiliates to so warn plaintiffs;
observed effects of said products on Plaintiffs;
b. Failed to provide plaintiffs with information as to what
f. Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs exposed to said
should be reasonably safe and sufficient
products;
clothing and proper protective equipment and
appliances, if any, to protect plaintiffs from the g. Failed to place adequate labels on containers of said
harmful effects of exposure to DBCP, or to products to warn them of the damages of said
cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so; products; and
c. Failed to place adequate warnings, in a language h. Failed to use substitute nematocides for said products
understandable to the worker, on containers of or to cause such substitutes to [be]
DBCP-containing materials to warn of the used. 62 (Emphasis supplied and words in
dangers to health of coming into contact with brackets ours.)
DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates
to do so; Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts
d. Failed to take reasonable precaution or to exercise and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing the
reasonable care to publish, adopt and enforce a chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure
safety plan and a safe method of handling and to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their
applying DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or reproductive system.
affiliates to do so;
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of
e. Failed to test DBCP prior to releasing these products plaintiff claimants — a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an
for sale, or to cause their subsidiaries or act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
affiliates to do so; and To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
f. Failed to reveal the results of tests conducted on DBCP Article 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to each plaintiff, governmental agencies and the to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
public, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliate damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
to do so. contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third,
al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as
companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise putting doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would
into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, "without be easier to gather in the Philippines. Considering the great number of plaintiff
informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions claimants involved in this case, it is not far-fetched to assume that voluminous
on its proper use and application." 63 records are involved in the presentation of evidence to support the claim of plaintiff
claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged
Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, 64 this Court has always cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the defendant
reminded that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction
plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient
The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up fora for trying these cases. 67
in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines The RTC of General Santos City
the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
and the RTC of Davao City validly
the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. acquired jurisdiction over the
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant persons of all the defendant
companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages companies
filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately
P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a
the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs. quo lack jurisdiction over the cases filed before them. All parties are one in
asserting that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies in the
ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they action below. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and
were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo.
were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The
factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General "[t]he defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to of summons." In this connection, all the defendant companies designated and
assume jurisdiction over the cases. authorized representatives to receive summons and to represent them in the
proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary
the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating
cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad during the course of the proceedings below.
and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the
Philippines, i.e., "the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines
their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part v. Sandiganbayan, 68 held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil
of the stream of commerce," 65 and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs. cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission
to its authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction
the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from
for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction. 69
the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate
court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non- Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have
resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies, as well
plaintiff. 66 HCDAcE as over the subject matter of the instant case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which
has been acquired and has been vested on the courts a quo, continues until the
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of termination of the proceedings.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First,
plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the
or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to "exercise of jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not
the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the committed jointly and severally by the defendant companies. This solidary
case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an obligation on the part of all the defendants allegedly gives any co-defendant the
exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise statutory right to proceed against the other co-defendants for the payment of their
of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority respective shares. Should the subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case. 70 al., be granted, and the Court subsequently orders the remand of the action to the
trial court for continuance, CHIQUITA and DOLE would allegedly be deprived of
Plaintiffs' purported bad faith in their right to prosecute their cross-claims against their other co-defendants.
filing the subject civil cases in Moreover, a third party complaint or a separate trial, according to CHIQUITA,
would only unduly delay and complicate the proceedings. CHIQUITA and DOLE
Philippine courts
similarly insist that the motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., to drop DOW,
Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases SHELL and OCCIDENTAL as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as
in bad faith merely to procure a dismissal of the same and to allow them to return well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, be denied.
to the forum of their choice, this Court finds such argument much too speculative
Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their
to deserve any merit.
respective memoranda, DEL MONTE filed a Manifestation and Motion 73 before
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that the Court, stating that similar settlement agreements were allegedly executed by
are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA sometime in 1999.
which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals Purportedly included in the agreements were Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. When this Court acts on Attached to the said manifestation were copies of the Compromise Settlement,
appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived. 71 This is Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement between DEL MONTE and the settling
especially true with respect to allegations of bad faith, in line with the basic rule plaintiffs, as well as the Release in Full executed by the latter. 74 DEL MONTE
that good faith is always presumed and bad faith must be proved. 72 specified therein that there were "only four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who
are claiming against the Del Monte parties" 75 and that the latter have executed
In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and the amicable settlements which completely satisfied any claims against DEL MONTE.
RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended In accordance with the alleged compromise agreements with the four plaintiffs in
complaints filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., and that the courts a Civil Case No. 5617, DEL MONTE sought the dismissal of the Amended Joint-
quo have also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant Complaint in the said civil case. Furthermore, in view of the above settlement
companies, it therefore, behooves this Court to order the remand of Civil Case agreements with ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao that it no longer wished to pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and accordingly
City, respectively. prayed that it be allowed to withdraw the same.
On the issue of the dropping of Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 should be
DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL remanded to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City,
respectively, the Court deems that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-
as respondents in view of their Respondents) filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., should likewise be
amicable settlement with NAVIDA, referred to the said trial courts for appropriate disposition.
et al., and ABELLA, et al. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a] compromise is a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are further praying that DOW, end to one already commenced." Like any other contract, an extrajudicial
OCCIDENTAL and SHELL be dropped as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and principles of a contract. It
126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. The non-settling is a consensual contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested
defendants allegedly manifested that they intended to file their cross-claims by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which
against their co-defendants who entered into compromise agreements. are to constitute the contract. 76 Judicial approval is not required for its
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the non-settling defendants did not perfection. 77 A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
aver any cross-claim in their answers to the complaint and that they subsequently judicata 78 and this holds true even if the agreement has not been judicially
sought to amend their answers to plead their cross-claims only after the settlement approved. 79 In addition, as a binding contract, a compromise agreement
between the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it. 80
executed. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., therefore, assert that the cross-
claims are already barred. In light of the foregoing legal precepts, the RTC of General Santos City
and the RTC of Davao City should first receive in evidence and examine all of the
In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above alleged compromise settlements involved in the cases at bar to determine the
motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., since the latter's Amended propriety of dropping any party as a defendant therefrom.
Complaints cited several instances of tortious conduct that were allegedly
 The Court notes that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party- of money but also the performance, in any other manner, of the obligation, is the
Respondents) that was filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., only pertained operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement
to DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL in view of the latter companies' alleged for the share which corresponds to each of the [other] debtors." 83
compromise agreements with the plaintiff claimants. However, in subsequent
developments, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA supposedly reached their own In the cases at bar, there is no right of reimbursement to speak of as
amicable settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL MONTE qualified that it yet. A trial on the merits must necessarily be conducted first in order to
entered into a settlement agreement with only four of the plaintiff claimants in Civil establish whether or not defendant companies are liable for the claims for
Case No. 5617. These four plaintiff claimants were allegedly the only ones who damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which would necessarily give rise
were asserting claims against DEL MONTE. However, the said allegation of DEL to an obligation to pay on the part of the defendants.
MONTE was simply stipulated in their Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and At the point in time where the proceedings below were prematurely
Hold Harmless Agreement and its truth could not be verified with certainty based halted, no cross-claims have been interposed by any defendant against another
on the records elevated to this Court. Significantly, the 336 plaintiff claimants in defendant. If and when such a cross-claim is made by a non-settling defendant
Civil Case No. 5617 jointly filed a complaint without individually specifying their against a settling defendant, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine
claims against DEL MONTE or any of the other defendant companies. the propriety of allowing such a cross-claim and if the settling defendant must
Furthermore, not one plaintiff claimant filed a motion for the removal of either DEL remain a party to the case purely in relation to the cross claim.
MONTE or CHIQUITA as defendants in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-
96. IaDcTC In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 84 the Court had the occasion to state that "where there are,
There is, thus, a primary need to establish who the specific parties to the along with the parties to the compromise, other persons involved in the litigation
alleged compromise agreements are, as well as their corresponding rights and who have not taken part in concluding the compromise agreement but are
obligations therein. For this purpose, the courts a quo may require the presentation adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from
of additional evidence from the parties. Thereafter, on the basis of the records of invoking in the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor." 85
the cases at bar and the additional evidence submitted by the parties, if any, the
trial courts can then determine who among the defendants may be dropped from Relevantly, in Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. v. Gonzales, 86 the
the said cases. Court upheld the ruling of the trial court that, in a joint and solidary obligation, the
paying debtor may file a third-party complaint and/or a cross-claim to enforce his
It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of right to seek contribution from his co-debtors.
two or more persons who are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A solidary
obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and Hence, the right of the remaining defendant(s) to seek reimbursement in
each of the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation the above situation, if proper, is not affected by the compromise agreements
from any or all of the debtors. 81 allegedly entered into by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with some of the
defendant companies.
In solidary obligations, the paying debtor's right of reimbursement is
provided for under Article 1217 of the Civil Code, to wit: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review
on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125078, 126654, and 128398. We REVERSE and SET
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors ASIDEthe Order dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and the Order dated October 1, 1996 of
pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept. the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, and its subsequent Order dated
December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil Case No. 24,251-96,
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors
and REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of
only the share which corresponds to each, with the interest for the
origin for further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said
payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints in Civil
due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded. Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to withdraw
insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, its petition in G.R. No. 127856. In view of the previous grant of the motion to
such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the withdraw the petition in G.R. No. 125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are
debt of each. considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
The above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the No pronouncement as to costs.
corresponding liability of the co-debtors to reimburse, will only arise, however, if a
solidary debtor who is made to answer for an obligation actually delivers payment SO ORDERED.
to the creditor. As succinctly held in Lapanday Agricultural Development ||| (Navida v. Dizon, G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856 & 128398, [May 30,
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 82 "[p]ayment, which means not only the delivery 2011], 664 PHIL 283-336)
 4. Libi v. IAC 214 SCRA 16 they have touched. While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their
families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.] terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the
unfortunate occurrence.
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, petitioners, vs. HON. In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the
SHIRLEY GOTIONG, respondents. judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No.
69060 with the following decretal portion:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing
Alex Y. Tan for petitioners.
plaintiff's complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is
Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for private respondents. hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to
pay to plaintiffs the following amounts: prcd
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
SYLLABUS 2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorney's fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY However, denial of defendants-appellees' counterclaims is
ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; affirmed." 1
RULE. — The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is incident which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of
under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but date.
under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180
of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with
amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the
devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of
under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña
the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound
same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as
inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
so modified. petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem
streets of the same city.
DECISION Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the
death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available
reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
REGALADO, J p:
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell
caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a
gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, petitioners, puzzled and likewise
touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two
distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are
his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification. LibLex He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim
and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the gunshot wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact
then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:
arising from the latter's vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial,
the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows: "Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made
that there would be no black residue or tattooing that
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby could result from these guns because they are what we
rendered dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for insufficiency of the call clean?
evidence. Defendants' counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of
sufficient merit." 2 A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.

On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the ATTY. ORTIZ:
complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is
rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by
smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule
certiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this case:
out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches,
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial is that correct?
court in accordance with established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for a smokeless powder.
vicarious liability. 3
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal
that you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the
Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining
trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown
whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act.
in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have
However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder
been fired by the person himself, the victim himself,
or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be
Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little
emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in
above the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to
the determination of whether it was suicide or not. be very fair and on your oath?
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the
contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by
trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the
private respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the
angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have
funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from
been fired by the victim." 7
the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the
body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the
conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi,
a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National
Wendell's hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried. LexLib Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance
located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of
states:
Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and
twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the xxx xxx xxx
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy
table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was "Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with
dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted,
he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8
area of the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was inside cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus,
the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and
 soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong's in relation to your
right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its house?
course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally
making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, WITNESS:
parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left
A It is about 8 feet.
external auditory meatus. LLjur
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
xxx xxx xxx
Q And where were you looking from?
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around
the gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), WITNESS:
smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the
gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the A From upstairs in my living room.
underlying tissue, are absent." 10
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record,
thus: Q From Your living room window, is that correct?

"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following WITNESS:
the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14
the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches,
will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do
it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses' observations,
you please indicate the 24 inches? since the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective
houses in relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand,
WITNESS: witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm's length. and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her
scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the
ATTY. SENINING: Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he
heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the police
I would like to make of record that the witness has station to report the incident. 15 Manolo's direct and candid testimony establishes and
demonstrated by extending his right arm almost straight explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the
towards his head." 11 "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies We have perforce to reject petitioners' effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was
of defendants' witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not
of an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any
house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court's dubious theory that Wendell
person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom. Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial,
documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying
of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a
faces the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see
reconciliation. LibLex
directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and
the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop Petitioners' defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
of the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor
she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate son, is not borne out by the evidence on record either.
towards his rooftop. 13
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom.
Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is
that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen
Gotiong's house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions: prcd their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful
night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS). entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the negligence intervenes the father or mother may
other key was. stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or
her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child with criminal intent.' (3 SCRA 361-362).
relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child.
Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was
only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU ". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees,
agent and that Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said
were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing
activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978
such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible when Wendell Libi had a picture taken wherein he proudly
explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart,
Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have
how or why he was in possession of that firearm. kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a
CANU agent . . ." llcd
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as
explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of xxx xxx xxx
diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children Court holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing
who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the herein plaintiffs-appellants' complaint because as preponderantly
menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise
supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their
gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of
Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi
2180 of the Civil Code which provides: for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still
under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit
'The father, and in case of his death or box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages ours.) 19
caused by their minor children who live in their company.'
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed
having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety by their minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its
deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was
living in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants- In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court
appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al. 20 which supposedly holds that "(t)he subsidiary liability
cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas vs. Cadano, et. of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the
al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that: New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining
'The subsidiary liability of parents for damages why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children.
the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.' purposes of the discussion hereunder. LLphil
'The subsidiary liability of parent's arising from Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but
the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature
discernment is determined under the provisions of Article requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter
2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the
Code, because to hold that the former only covers liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary,
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that
they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., 22 Araneta
other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that vs. Arreglado, 23 Salen, et al. vs. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et
diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. al., 25 and Elcano, et al, vs. Hill, et al. 26Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were
basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if minors 15 years of age or over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101,
we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil
tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil
the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to
paragraph of Article 2180 provides that "(t) he responsibility treated of in this article quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act
shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages." caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances
resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court's determination of whether the
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their
liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor
minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
children, is primary or subsidiary.
provides:
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —
reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his
xxx xxx xxx father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence
of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old
liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of
or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such for a quasi-delict.
person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphases However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from
supplied.) 21 the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying
Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil
likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other
on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable
for damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal
is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to
shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the
case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although
2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was only held
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, subsidiarily liable.
an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit: It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability
only for persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavern-keepers and proprietors of
authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in
insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil their co-accused in the other classes. 30
law."
Also, coming back to respondent court's reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary
in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court
of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it
attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of ||| (Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70890, [September 18, 1992], 288
"subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not specifically appear in the PHIL 780-798)
text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde,
Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision
in this wise:

"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals

on the basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties,
independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or
negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was
instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177),
and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore
stated, any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of
no moment."
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and
should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years
of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21
years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the
Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death
or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a
relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 3 2 However, under the Family Code,
this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by
a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in
holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to
duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 5. Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 303 unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. While the emergency rule
applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately
weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual
[G.R. No. 115024. February 7, 1996.] in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which
absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A
woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not
APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, a hazard to other motorists.
INC., respondents.
4. ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED. — "Negligence, as it is commonly
understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others." It is the failure
[G.R. No. 117944. February 7, 1996.] to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila
Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674 (1969), that negligence is the want of care required
RICHARD LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. by the circumstances.
LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
5. ID.; ID.; CAR OWNER IS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE BASED ON
THE PRINCIPLE OF "BONUS PATER FAMILIAS." — In fine, Alexander Commercial,
Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence
Tan & Venturanza Law Offices for Alexander Commercial, Inc. and Richard
of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
Li.
made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela. RBR ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use
of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that
it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company,
based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable
SYLLABUS
with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
VITUG, J., concurring:
APPEALS; NOT NORMALLY DISTURBED AS A GENERAL RULE; EXCEPTION. —
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive CIVIL CODE; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF A PERSON UNDER A
upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings RELATIONSHIP OF PATRIA POTESTAS. — Pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless that acknowledges responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas, a person may
the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. be held accountable not only for his own direct culpable act or negligence but also for
2. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED. those of others albeit predicated on his own supposed failure to exercise due care in
his supervisory authority and functions. In the case of an employer, that vicarious
— Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
liability attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
course of, his employment. The question to ask should be whether, at the time of the
required to conform for his own protection. (Keeton and Dobbs, et al., Prosser and
damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the
Keaton On Torts, 451 [1984] citing Second Restatement Of Torts, Sec. 463.) ELC
employer or, independently, in that of his own. While an employer incurs no liability
3. ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF "EMERGENCY RULE," CONSTRUED; when an employee's conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment, a
APPLICATION THEREOF DEPENDS ON THE OVER-ALL NATURE OF THE minor deviation from the assigned task of an employee, however, does not affect the
CIRCUMSTANCES. — Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an liability of an employer.
actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes
stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and
does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons DECISION
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the "emergency
rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 (1988) cf. Siegl
vs. Watson, 195 NW 867, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may KAPUNAN, J p:
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
 These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the
Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see
Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early
vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his
court are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below: defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as
it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi- right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He
delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being
accident. bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another
car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around
damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she
2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
was not a licensed driver.
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU
542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared
Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with the vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars
a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car was "near
Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something the sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether the hazard
wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did not notice if there was an
were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help early warning device; there was a street light at the corner of
if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not
right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away,
put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that
rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk
of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the compartment, defendant's car came approaching very fast ten
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer meters from the scene; the car was "zigzagging." The rear left side
driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of of plaintiff's car was bumped by the front right portion of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to
plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was
defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She thrown to the windshield of defendant's car, which was destroyed,
was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was and landed under the car. He stated that defendant was under the
severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and influence of liquor as he could "smell it very well" (pp. 43, 79, tsn,
sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the June 17, 1991).
UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)." After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found
She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's
confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered
(P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance. the defendants to jointly and severally pay the following amounts:

In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the 1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the
amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her severed
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting left leg;
to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings. cdll
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He because of the stoppage of plaintiff's Bistro La Conga restaurant
was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was three (3) weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b)
raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her
light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this
right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, judgment; and (c) P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in
when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, plaintiff's two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of
San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling this decision;
at 80 kph, with "full bright lights." Temporarily blinded, he
 3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages; event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from
6. Costs. liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount
of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court. 4
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated.
for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No.
804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as depicted It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no
by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center of the substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are
right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard
an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision rendered March 30, Li grossly negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the
1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of early morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a general rule, findings
record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right, of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will
beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car." 1 Dismissing the not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said court
defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is
of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove based on a misapprehension of facts. 5
that the car was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial
of the case. 2 The respondent court furthermore observed that: In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully corroborated
by an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment
Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe located just across the scene of the accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a
speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not corroborated. It was car being driven at a "very fast" speed, racing towards the general direction of Araneta
in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he Avenue. 6 Rodriguez further added that he was standing in front of his establishment,
was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A. just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit
Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when his Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer,
attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the plaintiff) from where she eventually fell under the defendant's car. Spontaneously reacting to the
alighting from her car and opening the trunk compartment; he incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had
noticed the car of Richard Li "approaching very fast ten (10) meters alighted from the offending vehicle in order to survey the incident. 7 Equally important,
away from the scene"; defendant's car was zigzagging, although Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela's car parked parallel and very near
there were no holes and hazards on the street, and "bumped the the sidewalk, 8 contrary to Li's allegation that Valenzuela's car was close to the center
leg of the plaintiff" who was thrown against the windshield of of the right lane. We agree that as between Li's "self-serving" asseverations and the
defendant's car, causing its destruction. He came to the rescue of observations of a witness who did not even know the accident victim personally and
the plaintiff, who was pulled out from under defendant's car and who immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his testimony to the
was able to say "hurting words" to Richard Li because he noticed investigator immediately after the incident, the latter's testimony deserves greater
that the latter was under the influence of liquor, because he "could weight. As the court emphasized:
smell it very well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew
that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but did The issue is one of credibility and from Our own
not know either plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident. examination of the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the
trial court's reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries defendant's assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While
sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his perception of speed is not
Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination and
Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding no attempt was made to question his competence or the accuracy
justification for exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award of of his statement that defendant was driving "very fast." This was
P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney's fees and the other damages. the same statement he gave to the police investigator after the
The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants' counterclaims. 3 incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We see no
compelling basis for disregarding his testimony.
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two
separate petitions before this court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony are
should not be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of the accident not borne out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez
was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the testified that the scene of the accident was across the street where
 his beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35–36, reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply
tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the accident transpired his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by respondent court):
immediately in front of his establishment. The ownership of the
Lambingan sa Kambingan is not material; the business is Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San
registered in the name of his mother, but he explained that he owns Juan Police immediately after the incident, he said that while
the establishment (p. 5, tsn, June 20, 1991). Moreover, the driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
testimony that the streetlights on his side of Aurora Boulevard were lancer right in front of him, which was plaintiff's car, indicating,
on the night the accident transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of
contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was a his surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he was
streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street not, then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance
(p. 45, tsn, Oct. 20, 1991). the parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk
which had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at the left rear edge
that there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has of her car.
stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the
accident transpired (pp. 64–65, tsn, June 17, 1991). This was Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan
consistent with plaintiff's testimony that it was no longer raining Police, he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiff's car in front
when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10–11, tsn, April 29, 1991). It of him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes
was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in an to show again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running
attempt to explain why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could have easily completely
tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff,
raining, he arrived at the scene only in response to a telephone notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since,
call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9–10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). if, indeed, he was running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55
We find no substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguez's testimony kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he
that would impair the essential integrity of his testimony or reflect could have avoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or
on his honesty. We are compelled to affirm the trial court's applying his brakes at the proper time and distance.
acceptance of the testimony of said eyewitness.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li's his testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police
testimony was peppered with so many inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more believable,
version of the accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version, obviously self- that he did not actually step on his brakes, but simply swerved a
serving, which would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident. Against little to the right when he saw the on-coming car with glaring
Valenzuela's corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up by other headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it.
witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course of trial. He claimed that he
For, had this been what he did, he would not have
was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph. when "out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
bumped the car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the
lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiff's car." He alleged that upon seeing
right beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him
this sudden "apparition" he put on his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery. 9
to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's the on-coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane
disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and there
road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed is plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running at the
claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also
on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had on its right lane going to Cubao." 13
ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert — as every
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his company-
driver should be — to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to determine is whether or not
senses. Physiological "fight or flight" 10 mechanisms are at work, provided such
Valenzuela was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. 11 Li's
Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone.
failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore
have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
fast" speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of contributory negligence.
alcohol. 12 Either factor working independently would have diminished his
responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection. 14 Based on the foregoing definition, lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, reasonable precautions. RBR
a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is negligence of Li on the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood
confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others." 23 It is the failure to observe
applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the whereby such other person suffers injury. 24 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila
same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual Railroad Company, 25 that negligence is the want of care required by the
and oftentimes threatening conditions. 15 Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this circumstances.
court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 16 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It
fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. 17 downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample
testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing conditions on the
swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into the street, road were significantly lessened. As Prosser and Keaton emphasize:
we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 that the driver therein, Jose
Koh, "adopted the best means possible in the given situation" to avoid hitting the [U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an
children. Using the "emergency rule" the court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of
that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with an oncoming truck occurred, was obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at
not guilty of negligence. 19 intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be
required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his failure
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, to act properly when they appear may be found to amount to
or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct negligence. 26
which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the
suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the over-all Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the
nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire night of the accident was clearly of his own making.
on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc.,
her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run
Li's employer. In denying liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the respondent
the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where
court held that:
she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and
assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no- There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony,
parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to that the visit was in connection with official matters. His functions
other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora as assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work
Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself outside the office as he has to visit buyers and company clients,
and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As narrated but he admitted that on the night of the accident he came from BF
by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place where there are people, to verify Homes Parañaque he did not have 'business from the company'
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people (pp. 25–26, tsn, Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the company car was
present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked partly required by the nature of his work, but the privilege of using
along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car." 20 In fact, it for non-official business is a 'benefit,' apparently referring to the
respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident fringe benefits attaching to his position.
confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very close to the sidewalk. 21 The sketch
which he prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's car partly straddling the Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the
sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of negligence of his employees in the discharge of their respective
Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness duties, the basis of which liability is not respondeat superior, but
Rodriguez. 22 the relationship of pater familias, which theory bases the liability of
the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before
reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee,
to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred
 while an employee was in the actual performance of his assigned required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's burden is
tasks or duties (St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the
SCRA 341). In defining an employer's liability for the acts done circumstances of employment.
within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme
Court has held that this includes any act done by an employee, in Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would
the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article
(Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 212 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either
SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon its the employee's private activities or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned
employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance by the former or unrelated to the employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a
of any act 'indispensable to the business and beneficial to their situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with
employer' (at p. 645). either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives. Llibris

In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their
court's finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned and
company to use the company car 'either officially or socially or maintained by the company itself or are subject to various plans through which
even bring it home,' he can be considered as using the company employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period of service, or after
car in the service of his employer or on the occasion of his paying a token amount. Many companies provide liberal "car plans" to enable their
functions. Driving the company car was not among his functions managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the cost of
as assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes would vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to purchase on their own.
appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up
position. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article
to the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example, the car
2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing
is really owned and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such
that the damage was caused by their employees in the service of
employees, are companies totally absolved of responsibility when an accident involving
the employer or on the occasion of their functions. There is no
a company-issued car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
evidence that Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing
any act in furtherance of the company's business or its interests, Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the
or at least for its benefit. The imposition of solidary liability against first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning
defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore over the car (subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words,
fail. 27 like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are
satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the
based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of
company or to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car
the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the
to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its
employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively.
selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however, that our
agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the
expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer, privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those cited in
Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important business
accident of June 24, 1990. purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends to present to its clients
and to the public in general, or — for practical and utilitarian reasons — to enable its
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals 29 upon which
managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients
respondent court has placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and its
conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes. Since
teacher's supervision of students during an extracurricular activity. These cases now
important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of
fall under the provision on special parental authority found in Art. 218 of the Family
situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company
Code which generally encompasses all authorized school activities, whether inside or
car thereforeprincipally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only
outside school premises.
incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the
Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car
familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi- for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company
delictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the
employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the company issue capably and responsibly.
 In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, in the bones of all post-menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her
Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and
Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through
required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding
contacting and meeting with company clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been
strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the documented, are painful.
job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social
as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of
Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li — as well as the corporation — to put up the resulting damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of
the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital
It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however technologically advanced, will
convenient mode of travel. only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the
lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness,
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Parañaque
was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's discretion, we are
self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate's place, the same could give of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater
rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related accord with the extent and nature of the injury — physical and psychological — suffered
function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies. by Valenzuela as a result of Li's grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the
early morning hours of the accident.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the court of
company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial
the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, Court.
to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. 31 Not having been able to
SO ORDERED.
overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater ||| (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 115024 & 117944, [February 7, 1996],
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained 323 PHIL 374-402)
by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the
respondent court, except as to the amount of moral damages. In the case of moral
damages, while the said damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense
of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering
inflicted. In the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral damages
from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court of Appeals was not
justified considering the nature of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of
the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic
amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee.
Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory functions of
her left extremity, even with the use of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well
beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required to
undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage of the stump from
the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of
physical and occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic
devise will have to be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb
effected by the biological changes of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming she
reaches menopause, for example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to
the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease in calcium levels observed
 6. Fuellas v. Cadano GR No. L-14409 For medicine, etc. P1,000.00
For moral damages 6,000.00
[G.R. No. L-14409. October 31, 1961.] As exemplary damages 2,000.00
As attorney's fees 600.00
TOTAL P9,600.00
AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET
AL., respondents. with 6% annual interest thereon until paid. The Court of Appeals modified the
judgment by reducing the moral damages to P3,000. An appeal was taken to this
tribunal solely on questions of law.
Ambrosio Padilla, Feliciano C. Tumale & Roberto R. Reverente for petitioner. Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were
both 13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were classmates at St. Mary's High
Valerio V. Rovira for respondents.
School, Dansalan City. In the afternoon of September 16, 1954, while Pepito was
studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok
and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to
SYLLABUS return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who
held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated
Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following.
1. DAMAGES; SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY; CIVIL LIABILITY FOR CRIMES COMMITTED
When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in angry
BY MINORS; SCOPE OF PARENT'S LIABILITY. — The subsidiary liability of parents
mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his
for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code
hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY DETERMINED UNDER BOTH THE CIVIL CODE AND THE Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on
PENAL CODE. — The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of his left side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is
their minor children who acts with discernment is determined under the provisions of broken." Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to go home.
Art. 2180, N. C. C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment
that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not Exh. 4). An X-Ray taken showed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting (Exhs. A, B and D). On
for an act where mere negligence intervenes, the father or mother may stand November 20, 1954, more than a month after Pepito's release from the hospital, the
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if plaster cast was removed. And up to the last day of hearing of the case, the right
the damages is caused with criminal intent. forearm of Pepito was seen to be shorter than the left forearm, still in bandage and
could not be fully used.
It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner-appellant was
ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son; that the said court
DECISION
held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2, of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in connection
with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that according to the last article, the act of the minor
must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being no fault or
negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate intent, the
PAREDES, J p: above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the
commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission.
For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito Cadano, son of plaintiff- Appellant, therefore, submits that the appellate court erred in holding him liable for
appellee Elpidio Cadano, two separate actions were instituted, Civil Case No. 583, damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
filed on October 1, 1954, for damages against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor
Rico Fuellas, who caused the injuries, and Criminal Case No. 1765, against The above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Code state: —
Rico Fuellas, filed on November 11, 1954, for serious physical injuries. They were
tried jointly. On May 18, 1956, a judgment of conviction in the criminal case was "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
rendered, finding Rico Fuellas guilty of the offense charged. No pronouncement another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for
as to his civil liability was made, the trial judge having ruled that the same "shall be the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
determined in Civil Case No. 583 of this Court." On May 25, 1956, the same court pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is
rendered judgment in the civil case making defendant therein, now appellant called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
Agapito Fuellas, liable under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code for the following this Chapter." (Article 2176).
damages: —
 "The obligations imposed by article 2176 is And a noted Spanish commentator said: —
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible." "Since children and wards do not yet have the
capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, parents and guardians the duty of exercising special
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the vigilance over the acts of their children and wards in order
minor children who live in their company. that damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of
foresight or discernment of such children and wards may
xxx xxx xxx". (Article 2180). be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with
this duty, they should suffer the consequences of their
In the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado, G.R. No. L-11394, prom. September 9, 1958,
abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage
Benjamin Araneta was talking with other students of the Ateneo de Manila, seated atop
caused" (12 Manresa, 649-650). (See also Arts. 311 and
a low ruined wall. Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by.
316, Civil Code).
The boys twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College.
Arreglado, resenting the banter, pulled a Japanese luger pistol (licensed in the name It is further argued that the only way by which a father can be made responsible for the
of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw. criminal act of his son committed with deliberate intent and with discernment, is an
Dario was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty. But in view of his youth, action based on the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability of the
he being only 14 years of age, the Court suspended the proceedings (Art. 80 of the parents; that the minor-Fuellas having been convicted of serious physical injuries at the
Revised Penal Code). Thereafter, an action was instituted by Araneta and his father age of 13, the provisions of par. 3 of Art. 12, Revised Penal Code, could have been
against Juan Arreglado, his wife and their son Dario to recover material, moral and applied, but having acted with discernment, Art. 101 of the same Code can not include
exemplary damages. The Court of First Instance, sentenced the Arreglados to pay him. And as par. 2, of Art. 101, states that "the exemption from criminal liability
P3,943.00 as damages and attorney's fees. The Aranetas appealed in view of the established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Art. 11
meager amount of indemnity awarded. This tribunal affirmed the decision but increased of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced
the indemnity to P18,000.00. This decision was predicated upon the fact that subject to the following rules: First, in cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, the
Arreglado's father had acted negligently in allowing his son to have access to the pistol civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person and by a person under
used to injure Benjamin. And this was the logical consequence of the case, considering nine years of age or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
the fact that the civil law liability under Article 2180 is not respondeat superior but the without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
relationship of pater familias which bases the liability of the father ultimately on his own authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
negligence and not on that of his minor son (Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison, 55 Phil., part", the appellant concluded that this provision covers only a situation where a minor
23), and that if an injury is caused by the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law under 15 but over 9 years old commits a criminal act "without discernment."
presumes that there was negligence on the part of his father (Bahia vs. Litonjua y
Leynes, 30 Phil., 625).
In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., G.R. No. L-10132, prom. June 29, 1957), In the recent case of Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, G.R. No. L-14414, April 27,
holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for 1960; 57 Off. Gaz. No. 37, p. 6603, September 11, 1961, the defendant Balce was the
damages, arising from the criminal act committed by the latter, this tribunal gave the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age who was living with him.
following reasons for the rule: — Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen, minor son of
plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case, stating that the civil
"The civil liability which the law imposes upon the liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. 2180 of
for any damages that may be caused by the minor children the new Civil Code. In reversing the decision, this tribunal held: —
who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over "It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal
them which imposes upon the parents the 'duty of Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under
them in proportion to their means', while on the other hand, 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who
gives them the 'right to correct and punish them in acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no
moderation' (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who
only way by which they can relieve themselves of this commits the act under any of those conditions is by law
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This, act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to
defendants failed to prove". the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal
 authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with
discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which
reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his
parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort
should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article
2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: 'The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor children who
lived in their company.' To hold that this provision does not
apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity
that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the
father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach
if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void
apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved
by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be
gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which
cover equal or identical cases."
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the
evidence submitted therein by both parties, independently of the criminal case. And as
responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the
present case was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability,
arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind
the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor's
criminal responsibility is of no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with costs against the petitioner.
||| (Fuellas v. Cadano, G.R. No. L-14409, [October 31, 1961], 113 PHIL 341-347)
 7. St. Joseph’s College et al v. Miranda GR No. 182353 expenses as well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the
latter failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the
[G.R. No. 182353. June 29, 2010.] complaint for damages. [Petitioners], therefore, should likewise
compensate [Jayson] for litigation expenses, including attorney's
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, fees.
and ROSALINDA TABUGO, petitioners, vs. JAYSON
MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini
MIRANDA, respondent. Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade
DECISION six pupil of SJC in the school year 1994-1995. On November 17,
NACHURA, J p: 1994, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, the class to which [Jayson]
belong[s] was conducting a science experiment under the
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher,
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in totothe
about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings by combining these
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil elements in a test tube and heating the same. Before the science
Case No. Q-95-22889. experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were
The facts, as found by the CA, follow: given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the
experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient
inside St. Joseph College's [SJC's] premises, the class to which age and discretion and completely capable of understanding the
[respondent Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a English language and the instructions of his teacher, without
science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the
under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the written procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained
subject teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of by the teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying
[Jayson's] class is . . . Estefania Abdan. glass and looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted
out of the test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson's] eyes.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment
without having adequately secured it from any untoward incident Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the
or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Luke's Medical
the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result Center for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited
of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to his teacher for violating
glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who her instructions not to look into the test tube until the compound
moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, had cooled off.
the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of
which hit [Jayson's] eye and the different parts of the bodies of After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for
some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson's] eyes were discharge and an eye test showed that his vision had not been
chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges
undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing due to the delay in [Jayson's] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda,
of this case [in] the lower court, [Jayson's] wound had not [Jayson's] father, requested SJC to advance the amount of
completely healed and still had to undergo another P26,176.35 representing [Jayson's] hospital bill until his wife could
surgery. TSAHIa arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the
request.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for
finances, [Jayson's] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson],
back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should
to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been
1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00. incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident
caused by the science experiment. In a letter dated December 14,
Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali,
nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand
injury due to [petitioners'] fault and failure to exercise the degree because "the accident occurred by reason of [Jayson's] failure to
of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, comply with the written procedure for the experiment and his
they should be held liable for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent teacher's repeated warnings and instruction that no student must
a demand letter to [petitioners] for the payment of his medical
 face, much less look into, the opening of the test tube until the HIS INJURY FOR WHICH THE PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE
heated compound has cooled. 3 aAHISE HELD LIABLE.
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson's father, on III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
Jayson's behalf, sued petitioners for damages. IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].
rendered in favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. This Court
orders and holds the [petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
[Jayson] the following amount: AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
[JAYSON].
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25 as
actual damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered to VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
reimburse [petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount of DENYING THE PETITIONERS' COUNTERCLAIM. 6
P26,176.36 representing the advances given to pay
[Jayson's] initial hospital expenses or in the alternative to We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts
deduct said amount of P26,176.36 from the P77,338.25 that petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise the required
actual damages herein awarded by way of legal reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
compensation; students."

2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially
mitigated moral damages; when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect
and are considered conclusive between the parties. 7 A review of such findings by
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as this Court is not warranted except for highly meritorious circumstances when: (1)
reasonable attorney's fees; the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly
4. To pay the costs of suit. mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
SO ORDERED. 4
of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings
adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus: of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are
based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed on record. 8 None of the foregoing exceptions which would warrant a reversal of
decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 221 dated September the assailed decision obtains in this instance.
6, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
[petitioners]. 5 Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jayson's injury was
his own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior to the
Undaunted, petitioners appealed by certiorari to this Court, adamant that experiment and peeking into the test tube. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St.
the CA grievously erred, thus: Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos 9 which absolved St. Mary's Academy from liability
for the untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned activity, declaring
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
that "the negligence of petitioner St. Mary's Academy was only a remote cause of
NOT FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSON'S
the accident." ScEaAD
INJURY WAS HIS OWN ACT OF LOOKING AT THE HEATED
TEST TUBE BEFORE THE COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN We are not convinced.
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR
TO THE EXPERIMENT. AaSTIH Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the lower courts' conclusions are
borne out by the records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that the
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to Jayson was
APPRECIATE THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE RULING IN THE CASE the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any
OF ST. MARY'S COLLEGE V. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, . . . intervening cause. The assailed Decision of the CA quotes with favor the RTC
JAYSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING INTO decision, thus:
THE TEST TUBE WAS IN FACT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
 In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the xxx xxx xxx
negligence of [Jayson] was the proximate cause of the latter's
injury. We find that the immediate cause of the accident was not "The defense of due diligence of a good father
the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will
tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his not exculpate it from liability because it has been shown
injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision
independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening
prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should
caution and foresight. The court a quo correctly ruled that: have been a safe and secured environment for
conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is
"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and
are liable for negligence because all of them are employees because it had full information on the nature
responsible for exercising the required reasonable care, of dangerous science experiments but did not take
prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students.
injuries to the students. The individual [petitioners] are The fact that there has never been any accident in the
persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over past during the conduct of science experiments is not a
their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of justification to be complacent in just preserving the
their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this status quo and do away with creative foresight to install
Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in their safety measures to protect the students. Schools should
responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety
expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should
Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class provide protective gears and devices to shield students
undertook the science experiment although [Jayson] from expected risks and anticipated dangers. aDSIHc
insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No
evidence, however, was presented to establish that "Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not
[petitioner] Tabugo was inside the classroom for the extend to the school or university itself, although an
whole duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the educational institution may be held liable under the
ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been
the school clinic for immediate treatment not by held that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts
[petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary,
somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the
[petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent
classroom at the time the accident happened. The Court employee." 10
is also perplexed why none of the other students (who
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the findings of
were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court to
the RTC, which the CA affirmed.
corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court,
however, understands that these other students cannot Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically
testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled instructed her students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look
in said school and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners would
ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old
fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because student, herein respondent Jayson.
she exercised control and supervision over [petitioner]
Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her We disagree.
obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson's injury was
the science experiment would be conducted safely and the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that
without any harm or injury to the students. [Petitioner] Sr. occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent
Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent
of command responsibility because the other individual upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
[petitioners] were under her direct control and
supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
[petitioners] were done within the scope of their assigned bestows special parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding
tasks. obligation, thus:
 Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child accident. TaCDIc
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor's
entity or institution. parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary's Academy
was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for minor's parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
those of persons for whom one is responsible. HTaSEA the jeep. 11
xxx xxx xxx In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the
mishap which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by the
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of diligence
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the
Petitioners' negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St.
and caution is demonstrated by the following: Mary's, "for petitioner [St. Mary's Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding
that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
injury to its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous accident." 12
science experiments conducted by the students during class;
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students disturb the lower courts' identical rulings thereon:
who conduct experiments in class;
As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jayson's]
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, injury was the explosion of the heated compound independent of
specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and any efficient intervening cause. The negligence on the part of
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her [petitioner] Tabugo in not making sure that the science experiment
class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson was correctly conducted was the proximate cause or reason why
occurred. In any event, the size of the class — fifty (50) students — conducting the the heated compound exploded and injured not only [Jayson] but
experiment is difficult to monitor. his classmates as well. However, [Jayson] is partly responsible for
his own injury, hence, he should not be entitled to recover
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability damages in full but must likewise bear the consequences of his
by insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be held liable only
not to look directly into the heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St. for the damages actually caused by their negligence. 13
Mary's preclude their liability in this case.
Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts'
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Mary's is not in point. In that case, award of actual and moral damages, and grant of attorney's fees. The denial of
respondents thereat admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause petitioners' counterclaim is also in order.
of the accident was a mechanical defect and not the recklessness of the minor,
James Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held, thus: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence
to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the SO ORDERED.
negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
||| (St. Joseph's College v. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, [June 29, 2010], 636 PHIL 256-
James Daniel II. . . . .
268)
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school
allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control
 8. Aquinas School v. Inton GR No. 184202 existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to
Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined to increase the award of damages. 3 Jose
[G.R. No. 184202. January 26, 2011.] Luis moved for partial reconsideration but this was denied. Aquinas, for its part,
appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision through a petition for review
on certiorari.
AQUINAS SCHOOL, petitioner, vs. SPS. JOSE INTON and MA.
VICTORIA S. INTON, on their behalf and on behalf of their The Issue Presented
minor child, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA was correct in
YAMYAMIN, OP, respondents. holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
The Court's Ruling
The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of
DECISION
the Civil Code upon the CA's belief that the school was Yamyamin's employer.
Aquinas contests this. SDIACc
The Court has consistently applied the "four-fold test" to determine the
ABAD, J p: existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and
engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d)
This case is about the private school's liability for the outside catechist's has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control.
act of shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved,
instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom. EIAaDC to control the work of the employee as well as the means and methods by which
he accomplishes the same. 4
The Facts and the Case
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement
In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the
at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its
(Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin's religious
that year, taught Jose Luis' grade three religion class. congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school's grade three
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach
Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that
him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin's teaching methods. The Intons had
Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to not refuted the school directress' testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was
tolerate the child's behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate's Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure
seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In
finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor. this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher.
Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against First, Yamyamin's transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas
Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil showed that she was qualified to teach religion.
Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation
of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin
came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she would behave
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, for the hurt that properly towards the students.
Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria's personal
claims but ruled in Jose Luis' favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school's Administrative
damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney's fees Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required
of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. 1 her to attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that
June of 1998. 5
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA). 2 They asked the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to
solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation teach 6 to ensure that she was really catechizing the students. HESIcT
 And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to
classroom evaluation. 7 Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start
of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her
methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon
as the school learned of the incident. 8 It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of
outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons' plea for an award of greater amounts of damages,
the Court finds no justification for this since they did not appeal from the decision
of the CA. The Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the petition.
They thus cannot obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than those that
the CA already granted them in its decision. 9
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDEthe
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4, 2008,
and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School not liable in damages to respondent Jose
Luis Inton.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Aquinas School v. Spouses Inton, G.R. No. 184202, [January 26, 2011], 655 PHIL
625-629)
 9. St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos GR No. 143363 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PERSONS
EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY. — Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002.] the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS
and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. — However, for petitioner to be liable, there
II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate
VILLANUEVA, respondents. cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to
the accident.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case, the respondents failed
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the
Peter Y. Co for respondents Daniel and Villanueva. victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause
of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James
Feliciano M. Maraon for respondent Carpitanos. Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Further, there was
no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep
of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
SYNOPSIS Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the
vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
Sherwin Carpitanos, son of respondents Carpitanos, died in an accident steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over
caused by the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent which petitioner St. Mary's Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
Villanueva. The vehicle was then driven by James Daniel II, a minor. The incident cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
occurred during an enrollment drive conducted by petitioner academy where Sherwin accident. Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral
was a student. Sherwin's parents filed an action for damages against petitioner and the damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the
other respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of Sherwin's parents ordering petitioner Court of Appeals. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
to pay civil indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin, actual and moral damages, and recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
attorney's fees under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, and declared In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner. For
respondents Daniel subsidiarily liable. Respondent Villanueva was absolved from any the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the
liability. Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos
must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney's fees as part of damages is the
Under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, for the school to be principally exception rather than the rule. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under
and solidarily liable for the acts of its students, the latter's negligence must be the Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification. Thus,
proximate cause of the injury. In this case, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the grant of attorney's fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted. aESICD
the minor to drive the jeep and that the proximate cause of the accident was a
mechanical defect in the vehicle, thus, petitioner may not be held liable for the death of 5. ID.; DAMAGES; REGISTERED OWNER OF VEHICLE PRIMARILY
Sherwin. However, as the registered owner of the vehicle, Villanueva was held primarily RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO THE PUBLIC OR TO THIRD PERSONS
liable for the death of Sherwin. WHILE VEHICLE WAS BEING DRIVEN ON THE HIGHWAYS OR STREETS. — We
have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
SYLLABUS latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses
that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER A the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
MINOR CHILD. — Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction
or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity
or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, DECISION
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
PARDO, J p: special parental authority of defendant St.
Mary's Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying
The Case the above-stated damages, same being
adjudged against defendants St. Mary's
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision 1 of the Court of Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for
damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined 4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED
a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment. of any liability. His counterclaim not being in
order as earlier discussed in this decision, is
The Facts hereby DISMISSED.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
IT IS SO ORDERED."' (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp.
"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, 205-206)."
Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II "From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February
and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City
owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary's Academy before the conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City. facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Mary's Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning
Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the dispositive portion group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other
of which reads as follows: high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
"'WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James
is hereby rendered in the following manner: Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a
1. Defendant St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City, is
result the jeep turned turtle.
hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following "Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he
sums of money: sustained from the accident." 2
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) In due time, petitioner St. Mary's Academy appealed the decision to the Court
indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin of Appeals. 3
S. Carpitanos;
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto. 4
actual damages incurred by plaintiffs
for burial and related expenses; On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary's Academy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for denied the motion. 5
attorney's fees;
Hence, this appeal. 6
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00) for moral damages; and The Issues
to pay costs. 1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby 2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of
ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of moral damages against the petitioner.
damages above-stated in the event of
insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary's The Court's Ruling
Academy of Dipolog City;
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time
of the commission of the tort and who was under
 The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary's Academy liable for the death reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of
of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 7 and 219 8 of the Family Code, pointing out the Family Code that “those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions
accompany the minor students in the jeep. of the unemancipated minor” was unfounded.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or jeep at the time of the accident.
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
authorized by the school or its teachers. 9 driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be
pinned on the minor's parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary's
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the
those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor's parents or the detachment of the
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under steering wheel guide of the jeep.
their supervision, instruction, or custody. 10
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. 11 result would not have occurred." 13
“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the which petitioner St. Mary's Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient accident.
causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral
cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the
the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is Court of Appeals.
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
which the result would not have occurred.”’ 12
omission. 14 In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner petitioner.
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to
cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney's fees as part
James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. of damages is the exception rather than the rule. 15 The power of the court to award
attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva equitable justification. 16 Thus, the grant of attorney's fees against the petitioner is
admitted the documentary exhibits, establishing that the cause of the accident was the likewise deleted.
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident
was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle
Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have
deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle. while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets." 17 Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals 18 and that of the trial court. 19 The Court remands the case to the
trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary's
Academy, Dipolog City. DaTHAc
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, [February 6, 2002], 426 PHIL
878-887)
 10. Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vicente Vasquez, Jr., et al. GR No. 132266 REQUIRED. — As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under
Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates required to be stated
[G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999.] in the petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. motion. Contrary to private respondent's claim, the petition need not indicate the dates
VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU of the expiration of the original reglementary period and the filing of a motion for
DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC., respondents. extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates required
under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the
petition the date it filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition.
Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
2. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; TORTS COMMITTED BY
Fernan Mercado Cordero Dela Torre & Bael for respondent CDH. EMPLOYEE; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER; NO HARD AND FAST RULE WHETHER
ACT DONE BY EMPLOYEE IS IN FURTHERANCE OF EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS. —
Expedito Bugarin for J.B. Abad. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer
Rolindo A. Navarro for respondents Vasquez, Jr. & So Vasquez. to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's
business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer
because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each
state of facts. In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court, (212 SCRA
SYNOPSIS 637, 643 [1992]) this Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of
the employee's assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance
Benjamin Abad, manager of petitioner herein, was driving a company owned of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
car which collided with the motorcycle driven by Romeo So Vasquez, which caused the infliction of the injury or damages."
latter's death. A criminal case was filed against Abad, which was subsequently 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ART. 2180, NEW CIVIL CODE; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER
dismissed. Vasquez's parents then commenced an action for damages against Abad DISTINGUISHED. — A distinction must be made between the fourth and fifth
and Castilex Industrial Corporation. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to determine what is applicable. Both
spouses and ordered Abad and petitioner herein to pay jointly and solidarily. Castilex provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an
and Abad separately appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether
of the trial court holding Abad and Castilex liable but held that the liability of the latter or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts
is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. Hence, Castilex filed the instant of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their
petition. The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held liable for functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting
the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both
company-issued vehicle. cAHIaE employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the
The Supreme Court granted the petition. Petitioner Castilex Industrial employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting
Corporation was absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee. The within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service
mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees
not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner corporation with liability for the negligent oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office,
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty. Under the
course or scope of his employment. However, at the time of the vehicular accident, fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an
Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned
line with his duties. Hence, petitioner had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is
of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting
equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is
the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle. only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
SYLLABUS APPEALS ARE GENERALLY ENTITLED TO GREAT RESPECT; EXCEPTIONS;
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the
THE SUPREME COURT; CONTENTS OF PETITION; MATERIAL DATES conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such exception
obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu
Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an
of his duties as a manager. . . . Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he
incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that ABAD was not acting within the scope of agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other
his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. It was enough for petitioner incidental charges Vasquez may incur. cdrep
CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was
not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non After the police authorities had conducted the
qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against
applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Since there is by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the
paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and
to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's
good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical
equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. 1
the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. DCASEc
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez
and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner Castilex Industrial
Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez,
the amounts of P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages;
DECISION P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2)
Cebu Doctor's Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at
3% monthly interest from 27 July 1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation. 2
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p: CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
In its decision 3 of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held
the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter
vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial
is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. It reduced the award of damages
employee of a company-issued vehicle. cdll
representing loss of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the
The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as interest on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from
follows: 5 September 1988 until fully paid.

On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the Upon CASTILEX's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified
morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages from P50,000 to P30,000 in
around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter- view of the deceased's contributory negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorney's fees
clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any for lack of evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to 6% per
protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid. 4
Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand,
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of
Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial
Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with
Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee,
plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the
ABAD was deemed to have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task
said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around
even outside office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner;
the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the
and (3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting
traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic
within the scope of his assigned task. LLphil
St.
Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-
up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the deceased.
former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's
Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. death was caused by the negligence of petitioner's employee who was driving a vehicle
issued by petitioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner;
and that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their
son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX
Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They moreover presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and
argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount of compensatory subsequent death caused by ABAD.
damages when the award made by the trial court was borne both by evidence adduced
during the trial regarding deceased's wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Moreover, they point out that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or
grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the Court of Appeals industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is
by registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should
Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement of the dates of the expiration of the original apply. cdasia
reglementary period and of the filing of the motion for extension of time to file a petition
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase
for review.
"even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctor's Hospital maintains that petitioner paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be
CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who
Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing is acting within the scope of his assigned task. 5
overtime work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is
working anymore "the inescapable fact remains that said employee would not have
applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and
been situated at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner to do
managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in
overtime work." Moreover, since petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it
general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph
cannot, as the latter's employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus
covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or
estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to refute.
on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion
some alleged procedural lapses in the petition. of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of
employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are
Private respondent's contention of petitioner's violation of Section 11 of Rule covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even
13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure holds no water. Cdpr though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform
Section 11 of Rule 13 provides: functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are
SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — still within the call of duty.
Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was
papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators 6 and banks. 7The Court of
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was the Civil Code to this case.
not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to
consider the paper as not filed. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within
The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee
Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of the petition. Thus, there relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that
has been compliance with the aforequoted provision. the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained
of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose
As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4
the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 8
of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates required to be stated in the
petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX
resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his
reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals
motion. Contrary to private respondent's claim, the petition need not indicate the dates resolved in the affirmative.
of the expiration of the original reglementary period and the filing of a motion for
extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates required Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the
under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is,
petition the date it filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition. however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures. 9 Such exception obtain in the present case to
Now on the merits of the case.
warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer's
driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so
devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. 13
the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked by the
Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABAD's II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work
negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary
personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his
to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than
the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within
the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the
the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative
employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his
averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who
employer's motor vehicle. 14 cda
denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the
plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit
satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer
to prove his exception or defense. 10 benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more
time at his actual duties. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently
general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to
established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. llcd
various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand"
incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues
petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the
chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or
from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back
answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the
employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
each state of facts. 11 An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's
In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 this Court
negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the
had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned
employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the
tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the
employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the
damages."
vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment,
by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle
regardless of the time and circumstances. during the return trip. 15

We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction
time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater
the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on
vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the
liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an scope of his assigned task. 16
employer's motor vehicle:
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he
It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven
from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is kilometers away from petitioner's place of business. 17 A witness for the private
not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively place" even
at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were
drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place. 18
At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question
occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time of the
vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: "Daddy,
Daddy!" 19 This woman could not have been ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29
years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a
vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the
normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work had already
been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven
for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's
business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his
service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the
perks attached to his position. cdtai
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of
the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service
vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability
for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner
Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for the damages caused by
its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez, Jr., G.R. No. 132266, [December 21, 1999],
378 PHIL 1009-1023)
 11. Amadora v. Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 315 within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As
long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
[G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988.] legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in
the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE
A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA, PANTALEON A. AMADORA, 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEACHER-IN-CHARGE, DEFINED. — The teacher-in-charge is the
JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA assigned.
A. AMADORA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH, SERGIO P. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FALLS DIRECTLY ON THE TEACHER OR
DAMASO, JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO, ABELLANA, PABLITO HEAD OF SCHOOL. — It should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
DAFFON, thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and
NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, not on the school itself.
ATTY. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents. 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, BASIS OF LIABILITY OF SCHOOL
FOR NEGLIGENCE OF TEACHERS AND HEADS. — If at all, the school, whatever its
nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners. under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from
liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY, PROPER
DEFENSE. — Such defense of bonus pater familias is also available to the teacher or
SYLLABUS the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed
by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the
1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; QUASI-DELICT; liability imposed by Article 2180.
LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS; APPLIES TO ALL
SCHOOLS, WHETHER ACADEMIC OR NOT; RATIONALE. — The provision in Article 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY ATTACHES REGARDLESS OF AGE OF STUDENT. —
2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. It should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the
In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except student's age.
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall
be answerable. There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The 1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; QUASI-DELICT;
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS; TERM NOT
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. LIMITED TO TEACHER-IN-CHARGE; EMBRACES ONE THAT STANDS IN LOCO
PARENTIS. — I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; REDDENDO SINGULA
"teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This would limit
SINGULIS; APPLIED IN ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE. — Article 2180 ofthe
liability to occasions where there are classes under the immediate charge of a teacher,
Civil Code provides: "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
which does not seem to be the intendment of the law. The philosophy of the law is that
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long
whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents
as they remain in their custody." Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis,
whenever in such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious
"teachers should apply to the words "pupils and student's and
acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in their custody, meaning their
"heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
protective and supervisory custody.
3. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; QUASI-DELICT;
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE OF LIABILITY. — "The protective
LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS CO-EXTENSIVE
custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the
WITH THE PERIOD THE STUDENT IS IN SCHOOL PREMISES IN
parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to
PURSUANCE OF LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE. — The student is in the custody of the
provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are
school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and that in any event the
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves may defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow students. (Palisoc vs, Brillantes, 41
SCRA 548) The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos
on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE AGAINST LIABILITY. — As provided for in the same classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply
Article 2180, the responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned disagree. prLL
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his physics experiment
as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF SCHOOLS, EXPLAINED; DEFENSE AVAILABLE. respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the
— And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180 speaks school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer
only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same provision, the school, as in their custody because the semester had already ended.
their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to
perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on
Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider
by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
important because of an earlier incident which they claim underscores the
negligence of the school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by
the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys,
confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without
DECISION making a report to the principal or taking any further action. 6 As Gumban was
one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the
petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from
Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by
CRUZ, J p: Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was the
same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180
relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions.
scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as
well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1 apprentices so long as they remain in their custody."
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. 2 Additionally, the herein
quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v.
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article
Capuno, 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be
2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high
briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and
two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School
students was later dropped. After trial, the Courtof First Instance of Cebu held the and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it
death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two ofits passengers. Dante
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 3 On appeal to the was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil
respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were action filed against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under
completely absolved. 4 Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule old boy.
45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29, 1957,
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the
but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom
Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when
school authorities who should be held liable. Liability under this role, he said, was the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in
particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion
only to "heads" and not "teachers." that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule.
Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprit's parents for damages. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in
also not been sued) that the school was not liable because it was not an general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical
establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not been in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
proved as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the canon ofreddendo singula singulis, "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and
teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
those of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other
members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960. cdrep The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Exconde where he said in part:
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed
by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. "I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil
Although the wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding in the school, Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones.
the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. What substantial difference is there between them insofar as
The Court declared through Justice Teehankee: concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It
cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt
"The phrase used in the cited article — 'so long as (the students) from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the
remain in their custody' — means the protective and supervisory detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to
custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in
the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the the phrase 'teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that trades' used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words 'arts and
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who trades' does not qualify 'teachers' but only
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as 'heads of establishments.' The phrase is only an updated
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as version of the equivalent terms `preceptores y artesanos' used in
well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to the Italian and French Civil Codes. cdrep
have been set aside by the present decision."
"If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
already of age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that
custody of the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three where the parent places the child under the effective
others, 11Justice Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be
submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age the one answerable for the torts committed while under his
as the school would be acting only in loco parentis. custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And
Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.'
school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic
institutions will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised." There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance
This is the case. is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly
and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the
impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is
head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its
not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties
herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would
attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
and the head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply because the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-
latter is a school of arts and trades. terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the
does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not
by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only
injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered
is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed
showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain
would be held liable if the school were non-academic. requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports,
term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to
the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether
from observance of its rules.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be
held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in
the case of the academic or non-technical school, why not apply the rule also to the the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher? student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus
in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and
school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the
head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed
them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for
trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his his students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the
students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the
supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils
involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that
who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent
school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to
while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such
school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed. influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent
shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the
any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contact of their In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to
heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the
state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the changes in the situation subject to acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general
be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment. LLpr principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof
that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co- Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the
extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student.
school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to
themselves? prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed
by Article 2180, which also states that:
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
 "The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father ofa family to prevent damages." Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following
conclusions:
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only
when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student 1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year
the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important
teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate
teacher. purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.

The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his 2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them
this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control
violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure. and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did
head or the teacher in its employ. cdll not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its
teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and 3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that
instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-
measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate security force to help the observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against
teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students. This should bolster the him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while
claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even
committed by its students. if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been
established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that
are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, discipline. llcd
the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility
imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. 4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be
Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated
dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without
dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
teacher's influence, besides being co-terminous with the period of custody, is usually clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does
enforced only because of the students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that the
more lasting discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by the child.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the
head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or
student or apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other
the minor — then there should all the more be justification to require from the school private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the
authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's connection with such custody.
acts because he has reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted
responsibility for the acts of the student.
by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply
sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances
here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek,
as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
||| (Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, [April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL 468-
488)
 12. Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals 205 SCRA Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
729 the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A
perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
[G.R. No. 84698. February 4, 1992.] known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
by contract, whether express or implied.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 4. ID.; ID.; VIEW THAT LIABILITY FROM TORT MAY EXIST EVEN IF THERE IS A
JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. CONTRACT. — In Air France vs. Carroscoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent
MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO, AND LT. M. was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the
SORIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Courtreferred to the petitioner-airline's
REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air
Judge ofBranch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract,
R. BAUTISTA, and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents. for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs.
Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
5. ID.; ID.; AN ACT WHICH BREACHES A CONTRACT IN BAD FAITH AND IN
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
VIOLATION OF ART. 21 CONSTITUTES QUASI-DELICT. — Air France penalized the
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents. racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust
the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a
better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused
to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit),
SYLLABUS
to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the
act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; DOCTRINE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS. — Article there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco
6. ID.; ID.; CONTRACTUAL RELATION, A CONDITION SINE QUA
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, (101
NON TO SCHOOL'S LIABILITY. — A contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
Phil. 843) Mendoza, (101 Phil. 414), Palisoc (G.R. No. L-29025, 4 October, 1971, 41
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the
SCRA 548) and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. L-
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article
47745, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 315). In all such cases, it had been stressed that the
21 of the Civil Code.
law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted
by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCHOOL MAY STILL AVOID LIABILITY BY PROVING THAT THE
acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO STUDENTS WAS NOT DUE TO ITS
NEGLIGENCE. — Conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an
2. ID.; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CONTRACTS RESULTING IN BILATERAL
insurer of its students against all risks. It would not be equitable to expect ofschools to
OBLIGATIONS ESTABLISHED WHEN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION ACCEPTS
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the
STUDENTS FOR ENROLLMENT. — When an academic institution accepts students
security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part,
this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its
the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence.
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic 8. ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE; DEFINED. — Negligence is statutorily defined to be the
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learning must also omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades
exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat DECISION
to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof.
3. ID.; QUASI-DELICTS; OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICTS OR PADILLA, J p:
TORTS ARISE ONLY BETWEEN PARTIES NOT BOUND BY CONTRACT. —
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista At any rate, the law holds the teachers and
while on the second-floor heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve
premises of the Philippine School of BusinessAdministration (PSBA) prompted the themselves of such liability pursuant to the last
parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) paragraph of Article 2180 by 'proving that they observed all the
presided over by Judge (now Courtof Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for diligence to prevent damage.' This can only be done at a trial on
damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, the merits of the case." 5
Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established
that his assailants were not members of the schools academic community but were While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the
elements from outside the school. complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we
do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in
Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas
loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde,
(Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano
Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such
(Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents)
cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage
sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before,
sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
during and after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in
indicated, the assailants ofCarlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school.
the school could be made liable.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that
since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint
states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the
that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.
afore-stated article.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound
dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills
then assailed the trial court's dispositions before the respondent appellate court which, to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants
in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing
their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state: sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms
around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily,
"Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an
the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order
adoptation from the old Spanish Civil Code. The
within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning
should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A
significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
challenges ofprogress. by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented
this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
Construed in the light of modern day educational systems, Article
In Air France vs. Carroscoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded
2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner
case of Exconde vs.
airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as
Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals 3 ; hence, the ruling
one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is
in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational
authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
institutions, academic or vocational.
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
248 Fed. 231). determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should
this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily
already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the
Fisher elucidated thus: nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and
place. 9
"The field of non-contractual obligation is much more broader than
that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private
extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this
speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to
bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra- unfold.
contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the The Court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
obligation had no contract existed between the parties."
SO ORDERED.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides: ||| (Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84698,
[February 4, 1992], 282 PHIL 759-767)
"Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." (emphasis
supplied)
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man
who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the
Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the
foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done
in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as
constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding
that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding ofnegligence, the same could give rise
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra,
the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA
and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article
21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the
obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common
carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the
populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other
forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect ofschools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the
 13. Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco GR No. 165732 Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision, 7 the dispositive portion of which reads:
[G.R. No. 165732. December 14, 2006.]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
PAJARILLO, petitioners, vs. LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally,
VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON the following:
LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN
LAURIZ TANGCO, respondents. 1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as
actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death
DECISION indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral
damages;
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed
by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) 5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as
assailing the Decision 1dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution 2 dated October 20, attorney's fees; and
2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
6. costs of suit.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline)
went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby
advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly DISMISSED.
licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her
residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, SO ORDERED. 8
and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly,
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's
Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly
claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim
causing her death.
that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should
of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to
to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been
criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to
in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. 3On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision 4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and
of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there
Marikina City, a complaint 5 for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguardexercised the diligence of a good
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply
of a family to prevent the damage committed by its securityguard. Respondents prayed showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the
issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and
In their Answer, 6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to
and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's
negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA
counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees. STIHaE issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer under
decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code 12 is subsidiary and the defense of
that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.
only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No
pronouncement as to costs. 9 The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the
applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this
criminal action.
is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal
liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article or omission of the accused.
103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil
liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary. SETAcC Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed
the same on January 14, 1998.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated October 20, 2004. The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the
crime of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
assignment of errors, to wit:
We do not agree.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
damages and other money claims. civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a)
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b)
for the payment of damages and other money claims. where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
to find that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
under both causes. 13
hence, should be excused from any liability. 10
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in
shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The
awarded to respondents. nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. 14 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 11 of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for
jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had
relief. 15
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be
exonerated from civil liability. The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a 7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard
separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank — Katipunan Branch,
 Quezon City, who was employed and under employment extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer- criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
employee relationship between co-defendants. TcICEA by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage to
herein plaintiffs. The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability
of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. 18 The source of the
Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission
suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic punishable by law.
manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon
Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. . . . In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera, 19 where the issue involved was whether
the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we
xxx xxx xxx held:
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee . . . The trial court treated the case as an action based on
are jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in
M. Tangco. 16 the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before
the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their
right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of
2176, Civil Code which provides: May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is
to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 17 we held:
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the
. . . Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 trial court is inapplicable to the instant case . . . .
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive xxx xxx xxx
case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has
that:
the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising
". . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the the family. aDTSHc
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,
independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
to file a civil action for quasi-delict. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide
act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this
case. 21 It would have been entirely different if respondents' cause of action was for testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen
damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting
be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 22 incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard
or the bank's branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she
both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank,
it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank 30 manning the
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would
leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying
Evangeline. the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there
were guards manning the entrance door. cEHSIC
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or
not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of witness, but it must be credible in itself — such as the common experience and
law. 23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous
is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on and is outside judicial cognizance. 31
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners' petition for
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of
fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the pure instinct; 32 that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether
evidence on record. 24 or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo; 33 that the fear that
was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure
for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that self-preservation. 34
petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent,
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the Pajarillo's claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was
bank was to renew her time deposit. 25 On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony which
Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a
instinctively, he shot her in self-defense. bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank
robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of unlawful aggression on his part.
about one meter or one arm's length 26 he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of
his gun and shot her. 27 It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence.
make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in
could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him. such establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that
had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank;
mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook
befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw the act as hold up or robbery.
Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the
bank 28 and saw her talking to a man thereat; 29 that she left the man under the fly- We are not persuaded.
over, crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare
 As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable
prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank. implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be
the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately should regularly report on their supervisory functions. 36 To establish these factors
shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary proof, including documentary evidence.
training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC
found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence
exercise the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a
claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres
are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-
among others, whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
as well as regular evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact that
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required
Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure is not sufficient
in the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case,
basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise
while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who
error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies
testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of
were not properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks, 37 Weapons Training, 38 Safeguard Training
We are not convinced. Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan, 39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions, 40 it
had also been established during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: aware of such rules and regulations. 41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his
re-direct examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for to give students copy of the same, 42 the records do not show that Pajarillo had
those of persons for whom one is responsible. attended such classroom instructions.
xxx xxx xxx The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their continuous evaluation of the security guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard.
business or industry. cEDIAa It was established that the concept of such training was purely on security of
equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the employees. 43
xxx xxx xxx
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota.
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in
a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area. 44
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for
the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her
selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no
be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its psychology. aDSHIC
employee.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. 35 On the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily
the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual
damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by
respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts.
The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in
order.

As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that
the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at
restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no
relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. 46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by
Evangeline's death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a
mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death. In People v.
Teehankee, Jr., 47 we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a
seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 48 we likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral
damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was also their
youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their
lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million
pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children
as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. 49 It is awarded as a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. 50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the
award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16,
2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability
of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco, G.R. No. 165732, [December 14, 2006],
540 PHIL 86-111)
 14. Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals GR No. 169498 the same along Tatalon, Ugong, this municipality, in a reckless,
negligent and imprudent manner, without taking the necessary
[G.R. No. 169498. December 11, 2008.] precautions to avoid accident to person and damage to property,
and so, as a result of such carelessness, negligence and
imprudence, said vehicle driven by the accused, hit and collide
OSCAR DELOS SANTOS and with Horse-Drawn Vehicle (Tiburine) causing said Tiburine to be
ELIZA DELOS SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, damaged in the amount of P9,200.00 and causing further the
respondent. death of the horse valued at P75,000.00 to the damage and
prejudice of the owner thereof, and as further consequence,
Ferdinand delos Santossustained physical injuries which
requires medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days
DECISION and incapacitated said Ferdinand delos Santos from performing
his habitual work for the same period of time. HCETDS
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p: When arraigned, Sagosoy pleaded not guilty. 3
Before this Court is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, Prohibition After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision 4 on 27 September
and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioners 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99 finding Sagosoy guilty of the crime charged,
spouses Oscar and Eliza delos Santos (spouses Delos Santos), seeking to thereby sentencing him to a straight penalty of four (4) months imprisonment and
reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appealsin to indemnify the spouses Delos Santos for actual and moral damages resulting
CA-G.R. SP No. 83234 for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion from Ferdinand's injury. The fallo of the said RTC Decision reads:
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In its assailed Decision,
the Court of Appeals reversed the Orders dated 10 February 2004 and 1 March WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Criminal accused ANTONIO SAGOSOY y NAMALATA guilty beyond
Case No. 1116-V-99, declaring Saturnino Dy, also known as Juanito Dy (Dy), and reasonable doubt and as principal ofthe crime of reckless
Dyson Surface and Coating Corporation (Dyson Corporation) as joint imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries and damage to
employers of the accused Antonio Sagosoy (Sagosoy), who should both be held property, without any attending mitigating or aggravating
liable solidarily with Sagosoy for the injury caused to circumstance and hereby sentences him to a straight
Ferdinand delosSantos (Ferdinand). IcTEaC penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor. The accused is
further sentenced to pay [the Spouses Delos Santos] the
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows: amount of P85,000.00 representing the medical expenses after
deducting the amount of P150,000.00 contributed by the
On 18 March 1998, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, the Isuzu
employer of the accused, the amount of P9,200.00 representing
forward van driven by Sagosoy collided with a horse-drawn carriage steered by
the cost of repair of the damaged tiburine, the
Oscar delos Santos. Oscar delos Santos was with his four-year-old son Ferdinand
amount of P75,000.00 representing the value of the horse, and
who was seated in the carriage. The collision left the horse dead and Ferdinand
the amount of P300,000.00 representing the cost of the
seriously injured with a broken spinal cord. A surgical operation to repair the broken
operation to be performed on Ferdinand upon reaching the
spinal cord could not be performed on Ferdinand because of his tender age. Thus,
age of 18. Finally, the accused is sentenced to pay [the
Ferdinand's broken spinal cord further caused irreversible damage to his vision,
Spouses Delos Santos] the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
speech, and motor skills.
damages, to pay Ferdinand delos Santos, through his parents
The van driven by Sagosoy bears plate number ULP 725 registered under [the Spouses Delos Santos], the amount of P200,000.00 as
the name of Dy of Dyson Corporation. indemnity, to pay the amount equivalent to 10% of the amount
to be collected as reasonable attorney's fees, and to pay the
An Information 2 charging Sagosoy with the crime of Reckless costs of suit, all without subsidiary imprisonment in
Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property was case of insolvency. aETADI
eventually filed before the RTC, which reads:
The spouses Delos Santos filed a Motion for the
That on or about the 18th day of March, 1998, in Issuance of Writ of Execution, 5 which was favorably acted upon by the RTC. The
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this First Writ ofExecution 6 was issued on 3 January 2003 commanding the Sheriff to
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the execute and make effective its 27 September 2002 Decision in Criminal Case No.
driver of an Isuzu Forward Van bearing Plate No. 725, did then 1116-V-99.
and there unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate
 An attempt to satisfy the judgment was made by the Sheriff, but he found In an Order 17 dated 10 February 2004, the RTC granted the
no real or personal properties of Sagosoy to answer for the latter's civil liability to spouses Delos Santos's Motion and declared Dy and Dyson Corporation as co-
the spouses Delos Santos. The unsatisfied Sheriff's Return 7 prompted the employers of Sagosoy. In its Order, the RTC explained that while the van driven
spouses Delos Santos to file a Motion for the Issuance of Alias by Sagosoy was owned by Dy, it was being used by Dyson Corporation in its
Writ of Execution 8 against the properties and income of Dy in light of his business operations. The RTC further justified that the initial confusion as to the
subsidiary liability as the employer of Sagosoy. The motion was opposed by Dy identity of Sagosoy's employer was understandable and did not render impossible
who denied that he was the employer of Sagosoy. According to Dy, at the time the the conclusion that both Dy and Dyson Corporation were Sagosoy's employers
accident occurred, Sagoysoy was merely doing an isolated and non-business who should both accordingly be held liable for the civil liability arising from the
related driving task for him. crime of which Sagosoy was adjudged guilty.
After weighing the arguments of the parties, the RTC issued on 30 May In an Order 18 dated 1 March 2004, the RTC denied the Motion for
2003 an Order directing the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution, not just against Reconsideration of Dyson Corporation for no sufficient merit.
the income and properties of Sagosoy, but also those of Dy. 9 The Alias
Writ of Execution 10 was issued on 3 June 2003. For allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the RTC
Orders dated 10 February 2004 and 1 March 2004 were challenged by Dyson
Subsequently, the RTC, in an Order dated 23 June 2003, denied Dy's Corporation before the Court of Appeals through a Special Civil Action
Motion for Reconsideration of its Order dated 30 May 2003. for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83234.
Dy filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as On 28 June 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision in CA-
CA-G.R. SP No. 78005, averring that the RTC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion G.R. SP No. 83234, finding therein that the issuance by the RTC of its 10 February
in issuing its Orders dated 30 May 2003 and 23 June 2003. The appellate court, 2004 and 1 March 2004 Orders was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
however, in a Decision 11 dated 28 September 2004, dismissed Dy's Petition and appellate court reasoned that Dy and Dyson Corporation could only be treated as
affirmed the questioned RTC Orders. Said Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- joint employers of Sagosoy upon the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, which
G.R. SP No. 78005 became final and executory on 20 October 2004 as evidenced was not warranted in the instant case since it had not been shown that Dy was
by the Entry of Judgment already made therein. 12 hiding behind the cloak of Dyson Corporation in order to evade liability. Thus,
the fallo of the Decision of the Court ofAppeals reads:
In the interregnum, per the Sheriff's Return dated 6 October 2003, the
Alias Writ of Execution was again returned unsatisfied due to the failure ofthe WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
Sheriff to locate any real or personal property registered in the hereby GRANTED. We hereby ANNUL and SET ASIDE the
name of Dy. 13 TcDaSI assailed orders. Costa against [the spouses Delos Santos]. 19
Unrelenting, the spouses Delos Santos filed a Motion for the The spouses Delos Santos filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 10
Issuance of a Second Writ of Execution before the RTC, identifying Dyson August 2005 explaining that the delay was caused by their counsel who did not
Corporation as the co-employer of Sagosoy, together with Dy. The notify them of the receipt of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 28 June 2005. It
spouses Delos Santos called the attention of the trial court to particular was only upon inquiry with the RTC on 26 July 2005 that they learned ofthe
pieces of evidence to establish that Sagosoy, at the time of the accident, worked appellate court's decision.
for both Dy and Dyson Corporation, namely: (1) Sagosoy's testimony that Dy was
doing business in the name of Dyson Corporation; (2) Sagosoy's Social Security The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution 20 dated 30 August 2005, refused
System (SSS) record showing that Dyson Corporation was his registered to give due course to the spouses Delos Santos's Motion for Reconsideration since
employer; and (3) the Articles of Incorporation of Dyson Corporation establishing it was not filed within the reglementary period. According to the appellate court, the
that Dy was one of the majority stockholders of Dyson Corporation. 14The spouses Delos Santos thru counsel received a copy of their 28 June 2005
spouses Delos Santos also propounded that the accident which caused serious Decision on 26 July 2005. Hence, the spouses Delos Santos had only until 29 July
physical injuries to Ferdinand took place while Sagosoy was undertaking an 2005 to move for the reconsideration of the judgment or to appeal it. The Motion
for Reconsideration was filed only on 10 August 2005. Resultantly,
activity in furtherance of the business operations of Dyson
Corporation. 15 HSTAcI the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 83234 became final and
executory on 19 September 2005. DAEIHT
Dyson Corporation timely opposed the spouses Delos Santos's latest
Motion, underscoring the inconsistencies in the spouses Delos Santos's stand on The spouses Delos Santos are now before this Court seeking the
the crucial issue of who was the real employer of Sagosoy. Dyson Corporation reversal of the Court of Appeals disquisition on the ground of grave
averred that the spouses Delos Santos should not be allowed to conveniently shift abuse ofdiscretion. For the resolution of this Court are the following issues:
their position on the said issue, and now joined Dyson Corporation with Dy as I.
Sagosoy's employers after it turned out that Dy alone was financially
incapable of satisfying the civil liability under the RTC judgment in Criminal Case
No. 1116-V-99. 16
 WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING OF THE INSTANT SPECIAL judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI, IS PROPER IN THE excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
INSTANT CASE. excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 22 TCaEIc
II.
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY lack of authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies
SPOUSES DELOS SANTOS' MOTION FOR such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
RECONSIDERATION. excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is
III. so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
WHETHER OR NOT DY AND DYSON CORPORATION ARE refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 23
JOINT EMPLOYERS OF SAGOSOY AND SHOULD Although the court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition
THEREFORE BE HELD SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE FOR THE for certiorari, in general, it does so only (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE CRIME COMMITTED grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or
BY SAGOSOY. (2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or
The Court first dispenses with the procedural issues raised by the parties, Supreme Court Circulars. One of the procedural errors for which the court could
particularly the propriety of the remedy they chose to avail herein. dismiss a petition for certiorari is the failure of the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order or decision. 24 A motion for reconsideration
The spouses Delos Santos justify their present Petition must first be filed with the lower courtprior to resorting to the extraordinary
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by averring the lack of any other plain, writ of certiorari since a motion for reconsideration is still considered an adequate
speedy or adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law that could remedy in the ordinary course oflaw. The rationale for the filing of a motion for
compensate them for the injury caused to their son. On the other hand, Dyson reconsideration is to give an opportunity to the lower court to correct its imputed
Corporation counters by highlighting the failure of the spouses Delos Santos to errors. 25
timely file their Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 83234. Dyson Corporation argues that the special civil In the present case, the spouses Delos Santos did file a Motion for
action of certiorari cannot be invoked as a substitute for the remedy of appeal that Reconsideration but they were only able to do so beyond the reglementary period.
was already lost, less so, when the requisites for certiorari were not faithfully Moreover, since the case at bar resonates with a piercing and urgent call
complied with. EHSCcT for justice for a four-year-old boy seriously crippled by the accident caused by the
According to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, a petition negligence of Sagosoy, the Court is persuaded to excuse the procedural flaw so it
for certiorari may be filed under the following circumstances: could fully heed the call. Laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not in
a vacuum or in isolated abstraction, but in light of surrounding circumstances and
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, attendant facts in order to afford justice to all. This Court is not impervious to
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has instances when rules of procedure must yield to the loftier demands of substantial
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave justice and equity. Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, attainment of justice; their application must be liberalized to promote public
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate interest. 26 cCSHET
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging In this instance, the Court has no doubt that substantial justice will be
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered served and patent injustice will be obviated by giving due course to this Petition in
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or the presence of compelling reasons to disregard the spouses Delos Santos's
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice procedural mistake. Just as we had ruled in Aguam v. Court ofAppeals: 27
may require. The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an
A writ of certiorarimay be issued only for the appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
excess ofjurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in
is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. 21 mind the circumstances obtaining in each case". Technicalities,
however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to
is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi- render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a
 game of technicalities". "Law suits, unlike duels are not to be G.R. SP No. 78005 that Dy, as the employer of Sagosoy, was subsidiarily liable
won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper for the civil obligations of his insolvent employee who caused injury to third persons
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and in the course of the latter's employment. Indeed, the spouses Delos Santos agree
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts". with the appellate court that Dy should not be allowed to run scot-free from his
Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on liability in light of the fact that he was the owner of the van Sagosoy was driving at
technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest the time of the accident. What the spouses Delos Santos are seeking from
opportunity for the proper and just determination ofhis cause, this Court is the affirmation that in addition to Dy, Dyson Corporation is also the
free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, employer of Sagosoy, as several pieces of evidence would show, which should
dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned likewise be made answerable for the civil liabilities incurred by Sagosoy. DISaEA
upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure The Court notes that there was no way for the Court of Appeals in CA-
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; G.R. SP No. 78005 to already deduce from the pleadings and evidence presented
rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override therein that Sagosoy was employed not just by Dy, but also by Dyson Corporation.
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent The Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 78005 was filed by Dy and all arguments and
course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and evidence necessarily revolved only around his liability as an employer. Moreover,
afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the the finding of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78005, that Sagosoy was
ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality working for Dy, is not necessarily in conflict with a subsequent ruling in another
and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false case that Sagosoy was employed not just by Dy, but also by Dyson Corporation.
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting It bears to emphasize that Dy remains to be considered an employer of Sagosoy
in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. and still subsidiarily liable for the latter's civil obligations arising from the crime.
However, if Dyson Corporation is declared a co-employer of Sagosoy together with
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to Dy, then Dyson Corporation and Dy must now solidarily bear the subsidiary liability.
be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. The Justice and fairness dictate that the spouses Delos Santos should be
rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the compensated for the tragic fate of their son, and the rule of law should be enforced
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in against those persons who may be adjudged liable, brushing aside hornbook
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must procedural principles which unduly delay the dispensation ofjustice to an innocent
always be eschewed. 28 and hapless boy who practically lost his life to an accident due to the
negligence of another.
The relaxation of procedural rules is even more imperative in the instant
Petition where there is an undeniable need for this Court to settle threshold factual Since it was duly proven that Sagosoy had no real or personal properties
to satisfy the judgment, then Sagosoy's employer must answer for damages
issues to finally give justice to the parties. It is true that this Court is not a
trier of facts, but there are recognized exceptions to this general rule such as when Sagosoy caused. The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found
the appellate court had ignored, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which read:
circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case; or Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers,
when its findings were totally devoid of support; or when its judgment was based tavernkeepers, and proprietors of establishments. — In
on a misapprehension of facts. 29 ASHICc default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
The Court now proceeds to the crucial substantive issue raised in this tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
Petition: whether Dy and the Dyson Corporation are co-employers of Sagosoy who civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
are subsidiarily liable for the civil liabilities arising from the crime committed by cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some
general or special police regulation shall have been committed
Sagosoy.
by them or their employees.
The Court of Appeals did not find Dyson Corporation as the co-
employer of Sagosoy, relying on the Decision dated 28 September 2004 of the Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for
same court in CA-G.R. SP No. 78005 which sustained the subsidiary liability of Dy restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
as the employer of Sagosoy and which had already attained finality. The from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value
appellate court also refused to adjudge Dyson Corporation to be solidarily liable thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance
with Dy unless the veil of corporate fiction was pierced. the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, ofthe
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
The Court does not agree. followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the
The spouses Delos Santos do not controvert the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in its 28 September 2004 Decision in CA-
 case of robbery with violence against or intimidation ofpersons warned not to employ any procedural tactics that would further delay the
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. execution of the RTC Decision dated 27 September 2002 in Criminal Case No.
1116-V-99. Litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article destroys the other. 32 In the words of Mr. Justice Malcolm, "More important than
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and anything else, is that the court should be right and to render justice where justice
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies is due". 33 THaAEC
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 28 June 2005 and Resolution dated 30 August
This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding in which the award is 2005 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83234 are REVERSED and SET
made. This liability attaches when the employees who are convicted ofcrimes ASIDE. The Orders dated 10 February 2004 and 1 March 2004 of the Regional
committed in the performance of their work are found to be insolvent and are thus Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99 are hereby
unable to satisfy the civil liability adjudged. 30 REINSTATED. No costs.
The Court has scrupulously examined the records of this case and
SO ORDERED.
concluded that Sagosoy was working for both Dy and Dyson Corporation when the
van he was driving collided with the horse-drawn carriage carrying Ferdinand. In ||| (Spouses delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169498, [December 11, 2008],
his testimony before the RTC, Sagosoy narrated that he was employed by Dy who 594 PHIL 361-380)
was doing business under the name of Dyson Corporation. Sagosoy's testimony
is validated by the Certificate of Incorporation ofDyson Corporation showing that
Dy is one of the major stockholders of Dyson Corporation. Also, the SSS
records of Sagosoy state that his employer is Dyson Corporation. These
pieces of evidence strongly prove that Sagosoy is also deemed an
employee of Dyson Corporation. In contrast, Dyson Corporation does not at all
offer any controverting evidence, and vainly centers its defense on procedural
rhetoric. 31 aEACcS
In addition, the records are bereft of information on any other business or
industry that Dy is engaged in and for which he personally employs Sagosoy.
Sagosoy could not be the mere private driver of Dy because when the accident
occurred, Sagosoy was driving an Isuzu Forward van, which is primarily used for
the delivery of goods and effects. Taking note of the fact that Dy is the Chief
Executive Officer of Dyson Corporation, it would appear that the van being driven
by Sagosoy was only registered in Dy's name, but was actually being used by
Dyson Corporation in the conduct of its business. Given these circumstances, both
Dy and Dyson Corporation should be declared the employers of Sagosoy who are
both subsidiarily liable for Sagosoy's liabilities ex delicto.
Finally, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, there is no need to
pierce the veil of corporate fiction in this case, considering that Dy and Dyson
Corporation are precisely being treated as separate entities, which is the reason
why they are being declared "co-employers" of Sagosoy. That Dy is hiding behind
the personality of Dyson Corporation in order to escape liability is not even relevant
herein. The evidence and the circumstances establish that Dy is the registered
owner of the van driven by Sagosoy in furtherance of the business of Dyson
Corporation; and that Dyson Corporation uses the van driven by Sagosoy in its
business operation and recognizes Sagosoy as one of its employees per the
latter's SSS records. Hence, both Dy and Dyson Corporation can be deemed the
employers of Sagosoy.
With the pronouncement that both Dy and Dyson Corporation are
subsidiarily liable for the damages caused to the spouses Delos Santos, let this
much prolonged litigation be put to an end. The counsels of the parties are hereby
 15. Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court GR No. 74431 DECISION

[G.R. No. 74431. November 6, 1989.]

CRUZ, J p:
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and
AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLAT
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because
E COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY,respondents.
she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had
nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the
trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys.
Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners. The Vestils are now before vs. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the
respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court. prcd
Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.
On July 29, 1975, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of
the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F.
SYLLABUS Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she
was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an
anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; DEATH re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August
CERTIFICATE NOT CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF CAUSE OF DEATH BUT ONLY OF 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
FACT OF DEATH. — The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to
in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the death certificate is not them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente
of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite
bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
2. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; ARTICLE 2183 OF CIVIL CODE; POSSESSOR
LIABLE EVEN IF ANIMAL SHOULD "ESCAPE OR BE LOST" AND BE REMOVED The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was
FROM HIS CONTROL; THAT DOG WAS TAME AND WAS MERELY PROVOKED BY appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and
CHILD INTO BITING HER, IMMATERIAL. — Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by
possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for
his control. And it does not matter either that as the petitioners also contend, the dog causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils
was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of
only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as
the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at attorney's fees.
the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done
to the animal. In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the
house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS THEREOF. — According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even
Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply
of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in
his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
cause.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
4. ID.; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; MEDICAL AND HOSPITALIZATION
EXPENSES, REDUCED. — We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same
approve the monetary awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they have damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are person who has suffered damage.
entitled.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the
death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The second admission?
complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the
carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself. A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred
to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and then the father,
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly because the child was asking for water, the father tried to
credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him give the child water and this child went under the bed, she
("one way or the other") and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some did not like to drink the water and there was fright in her
kind of arrangement (on which, however, she did not elaborate). 7 She mentioned as eyeballs. For this reason, because I was in danger there
many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time or another was rabies, I called Dr. Co.
although they did not appear to be close kin. 8 She at least implied that they did not
pay any rent, presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?
notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very well. Cdpr
There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house were boarders (or more of
A: Yes, sir. 18
boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and
accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao- As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the following to
as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, say under oath:
Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared that the
petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a A: Now, as I said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from
dog. 10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that physical, chemical and bacterial means . . . It can be the
the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita result of infection, now, so if you have any other disease
denied paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents submitted which can lower your resistance you can also get
documentary evidence of her application for water connection with the Cebu Water pneumonia.
District, which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12
xxx xxx xxx
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of
possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in complication which is broncho-pneumonia?
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six A: Yes.
kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and
her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the
witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter witness is known as CURRENT DIANOSIS &
was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen
dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your attention, doctor, to
until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the page 751 of this book under the title "Rabies." There is
petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita on this page, "Prognosis" as a result of rabies and it says:
said she knew them only casually. 16
Once the symptoms have appeared death inevitably occurs after
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the 2-3 days as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or
dog that bit Theness, there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On generalized paralysis.
the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia,
which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously After a positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected
hospitalized. animal if the animal cannot be observed or if the bite is
on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you
The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal believe in this statement?
connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that,
first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, A: Yes.
and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death,
Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die
was a complication of rabies.
of respiratory failure which leave in the form of broncho-
That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by pneumonia?
the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo: LLphil
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. 19
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the
dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. We also
reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the
death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of
death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that
she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death.
The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control
of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor
liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control.
And it does not matter either that as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame
and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of
vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the
time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to
the animal. LexLib
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection
of their original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house
that bit Theness.
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user
of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards
except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to
P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring
back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be
assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition
is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
||| (Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74431, [November 6, 1989], 258-A
PHIL 612-619)
 16. Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 227 SCRA 293 contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this
[G.R. No. 110295. October 18, 1993.] view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air
France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-
class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and
COCA- compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground or tort on the latter's part, for,
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is 'contractual both in
LYDIA GERONIMO,respondents. origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.'" Otherwise
put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.
4. ID.; ID.; BASIS OF LIABILITIES OF MANUFACTURER OR
Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent. SELLER OF INJURY-CAUSING PRODUCTS; RULE. — Under American law, the
liabilities ofthe manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
SYLLABUS misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
(which is known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-
contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the
1. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; RULE IN common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts,
CAUSE OF ACTION FOUNDED ON QUASI-DELICT. — The public respondent's such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit.
conclusion that the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is founded on quasi-
delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes
in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly
paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent DECISION
manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."
2. ID.; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALE; WARRANTY AGAINST HIDDEN
DEFECTS; REMEDIES OF VENDEE IN RESPECT THERETO. — The vendee's DAVIDE, JR., J p:
remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden
defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to
in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides: "Art. 1567. In the case of Articles close down as a consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered
1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing by the discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it. The
from the contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with interesting issue posed is whether the subsequent action for damages by the
damages in either case." The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for
contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability, as claimed
shall be applicable. Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud by the manufacturer, the petitioner herein, which must therefore be filed within six
is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. months from the delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil
Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which can be filed
such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code. prLL
Those guilty offraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. a complaint for damages against petitioner with the Regional
3. ID.; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY THERETO MAY STILL EXIST Trial Court(RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-
DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATION. — The vendor 9629. She alleges in her complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten
could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan City, an enterprise engaged in the
an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the
the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12 August
applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite
from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or
Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, (23 SCRA 1117 [1968]) particles; she then went over her stock of soft drinks and discovered the
this Court stated: "We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke
bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she a truism in legal procedure that what determines the nature of an
brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of the Department of Health action are the facts alleged in the complaint and not those averred
at San Fernando, La Union, for examination; subsequently, she received a letter as a defense in the defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v.
from the Department of Health informing her that the samples she submitted "are Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).
adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery ofthe foreign substances in the
beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil
per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from P200.00 to Code, the existence of contractual relations between the parties
P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to close shop on 12 December does not absolutely preclude an action by one against the other for
1989; she became jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the quasi-delict arising from negligence in the performance of a
payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She prayed for judgment ordering the contract.
petitioner to pay her P5,000.00 as actual damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory
In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the
damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
Supreme Court ruled:
the amount equal to 30% of the damages awarded as attorney's fees, and the
costs. 2 'It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure contract between the parties does not bar the
to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground, the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the
petitioner argued that since the complaint is for breach of warranty under Article consequent recovery of damages therefor . . . Thus in Air
1561 of the Civil Code, it should have been brought within six months from the France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that) although the
delivery of the goods pursuant Article 1571 of the said Code. In her relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual
Comment 4 thereto, private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract
damages which does not involve an administrative action and that her may also be a tort.'
cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought within Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on
four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the complaint was Sales was taken, the authorities are one in saying that the
seasonably filed. Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter filed by the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an
parties. 5 action for torts in a sale of defective goods." 10
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by
dismiss. It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
the public respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took this
not apply as the existing administrative remedy is not adequate. It also stated that
recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that:
the complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-delict, as there exists a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties; thus, on the basis of Article 1571, "I
in relation to Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed within six months
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
from the delivery of the thing sold.
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT ARTICLE
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the 2176, THE GENERAL PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICTS, IS
trial court in its Order of 17 April 1991, 7 the private respondent came to APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN THE
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari which we referred to the public ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT
respondent "for proper determination and disposition." 8 The public respondent PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OFACTION IS BASED ON
docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391. BREACH OF A SELLER'S IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR
LAW ON SALES.
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent
annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further II
proceedings in Civil Case No. D-9629. In holding for the private respondent, it ruled COROLLARILY, THE
that: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
"Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S
breach of warranty as respondent contends, the applicable ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
prescriptive period is four years. CAUSE OF ACTION HAD PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE
1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE." 12
It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly
show that it is an action for damages arising from respondent's The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal
act of 'recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food that the primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article
items intended to be sold for public consumption' (p. 25, rollo). It is 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict — for the complaint does not ascribe any
tortious or wrongful conduct on its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on "We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a
breach of a seller's implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends that the contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort
existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising from the by the one against the other and the consequent
contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since recovery of damages therefor. 1 8 Indeed, this view has been, in
private respondent's cause of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air
the complaint should have been filed within six months from delivery of the soft France vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who,
drinks pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code. prcd despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-
class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-
case of breach of the seller's implied warranties, the vendee may, under Article carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the
1567 of the Civil Code, elect between withdrawing from the contract or demanding relation between the passenger and a carrier is 'contractual both
a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages in either case. She asserts in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may also
that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for rescission nor for proportionate be a tort.' "
reduction of the price, but for damages arising from a quasi-delict and that the
public respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of a contract did not Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
preclude the action for quasi-delict. As to the issue of prescription, the private presence of contractual relations. 20
respondent insists that since her cause of action is based on a quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period therefor is four (4) years in accordance with Article 1144 of the Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-
Civil Code and thus the filing of the complaint was well within the said period. prLL causing products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22
tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24 Quasi-
We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal
the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is founded on quasi-delict and that, treatises as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is
therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not
is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery,
thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent false imprisonment, and deceit. 27
manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption." It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public
respondent should by no means be understood as suggesting that the private
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties respondent's claims for moral damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.
against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to
those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
"ART. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and
1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from the SO ORDERED.
contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, ||| (Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110295, [October 18,
with damages in either case." 13 1993], 298 PHIL 52-62)
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or
fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under
the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all
obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility
arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but such liability may
be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. 16
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the
vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties
may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability
may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the
contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, 17 this Court stated: