FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs.

SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO

ALMARIO, respondents
No. 48006. July 8, 1942

Facts:

A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred.

The carretela was overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of
Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the
taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When
the criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil
action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.

Issue:

Whether or not they can file a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo making him
primarily and directly responsible

Held:

(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the present
Civil Code. However, the principle enunciated in said case, that responsibility for fault
or negligence as quasi-delict is distinct and separate from negligence penalized under
the Revised Penal Code, is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the Civil Code.)

The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the

Penal Code, his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to
said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut thru the tangle that has, in
the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
According to the Supreme Tribunal of Spain:

“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate

legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality
that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and
on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil Codeseem to be
broad enough to cover the driver’s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article
1903 limits cuasi-delitos TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS ‘NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW.’ But
inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even
simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the
Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the
“confusion worse confounded.’ However, a closer study shows that such
a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create an
action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. “Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code are:

“1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.

“2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

“3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished
only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include
all acts in which ‘ any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.’ However, it should be
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging
in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of
traffic when nobody is hurt.

“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos

or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code)
and responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer – in this case the defendant-petitioner – is
primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”

The case of Barredo v. Garcia (73 Phil. 607 (1942)) involves a 16-year old boy, one of
the passengers of a caretela, who died as a result of a collision with a recklessly driven
taxi. In the criminal action, the parents of the victim reserved their right to file a
separate civil action. After conviction of the driver with the charge of homicide thru
reckless imprudence, they proceeded to file a separate civil action against the taxi-
owner based on Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. The taxi-driver met this with the
argument that the driver having been convicted of criminal negligence, Article 100 in
relation to Articles 102-o3 of the Revised Penal Code should govern his liability, which,
pursuant to said provisions is only subsidiary, but since the driver has not been sued in
a civil action and his property not yet exhausted, the plaintiffs have no recourse against
him.
The Court, in said case, ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that a quasi-delict is “a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.”
The Comment thus analyzes related decisions on the matter of interpreting and
applying Barredo and Article 2177 of the New Civil Code, which include: Diana v.
Batangas (93 Phil. 391 (1953)), Jocson v. Glorioso (22 SCRA 316 (1968)), Mendoza v. La
Mallorca (82 SCRA 243 (1978)), and Padua v. Robles(66 SCRA 485 (1975)) on the one
hand, and Tactaquin v. Palileo (21 SCRA 346 (1967)) on the other.
The Author concludes by stating that the doctrine in Barredo is meritorious but is
susceptible to improvement, in effect, posing a challenge to legislators.

Mendoza vs. Arrieta, G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979

FACTS:

On October 22, 1969, a three-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway,
Marilao Bulacan involving Mercedes Benz Owner/ petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, and
respondents jeepney driver Salazar and truck driver Montoya. This resulted in the filing of two
separate Informations of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Damage to Property. The first one
being a Php 1604.00 Criminal case against truck driver Montoya for hitting Salazar’s jeepney at
the right rear portion causing the jeep to hit Mendoza’s Mercedes, and the second Criminal Case
was against jeepney driver Salazar for hitting the Benz in the amount of Php 8,890.00.

On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan rendered judgment. Truck driver
Montoya was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of damage to property through
reckless imprudence and was sentence to pay jeepney driver Salazar a fine for actual damages
and indemnity. Accused Rodolfo Salazar, on the other hand, was acquitted. Mercedes Benz
owner was not awarded damages.

On August 22, 1970 , after termination of criminal cases, Petitioner filed Civil Case against truck
owner Timbol and jeepney driver Salazar. Timbol filed a motion to dismiss claiming that such
action is barred by the prior judgment in criminal cases. The CFI judge granted Timbol’s Motion
to Dismiss.

ISSUES:

1. Can Timbol be sued for damages by Mendoza after termination of criminal

cases? – YES.
2. Should the Civil Case against jeepney driver Salazar be dismissed? YES.

RULING:

Timbol can be sued for damages.

No reservation need be made in the criminal case, it being substantive in character and is not
within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate. Even if it were not substantive but
adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the
legislature superseding the Rule of 1940.

There is no oneness in Identity in the civil and criminal cases. In the former, the truck owner,
Timbol, was made a party in the case while in the latter only the jeepney driver, Salazar, was a
party in the case for the damage to Petitioner’s Mercedes Benz. Moreover, in the criminal cases,
the cause of action was the enforcement of a civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
while the August 22 Civil Case is based on quasi delict under Art 2180 in relation to Art 2176 of
the New Civil Code.

The civil case against Salazar should be dismissed.

The extinction of the penal action does not entail the extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. Given the facts of the case, the trial court pronounced that jeepney driver Salazar
cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner’s car.

Accordingly the civil action against Salazar must be held to have been extinguished in
consonance with Section 3 (c) Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
PSBA v. CA (G.R. No. 84698)

Facts:
Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers
liable for the death of Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student
who was stabbed while on the premises of PSBA by elements from
outside the school. Private respondents are suing under the law on
quasi-delicts alleging the school and its officers’ negligence,
recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during, and after
the attack on the victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were
denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.

Ruling: NO.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual

relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is

established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure
that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as

yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had
been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And,
even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business
Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic community, while in the
premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit
against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the
victim.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action
against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and
was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations,
arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However,
this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when
there obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco
parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could
be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its
part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice
to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This
includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.

Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is therefore
held liable for his death.

Petition denied.
PSBA vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992
SUMMARY:

The relationship between the educational institution and the deceased arose from a contract.
Therefore, the former cannot be held liable under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, as the said
provision governs quasi-delicts, which is extra-contractual.

FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista is a junior college student enrolled in the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA). Unfortunately, he was killed in a stabbing incident that occurred inside
the school premises. The assailant is an outsider to the school.

The present case was brought by the parents of the deceased before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against the school and its officers for damages for the death of their son. The suit
impleaded the school and various school officials. The parents of Carlitos Bautista alleged that
the defendants were negligent and did not provide adequate security measures to protect their
students.

Defendants argued, however, that they are not covered by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
under which they are sued. They asserted that the cause of action is hinged on quasi-delict, which
requires that there be no contract between the parties. However, their son’s enrolment in the
school evinces the existence of a contract. Therefore, they sought to dismiss the petition, which
was denied by the trial court and the Court of Appeals (CA).

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Is PSBA civilly liable under Art. 2180? NO.
 2. Should the case be dismissed? NO.

RATIO:
The present case cannot be tried under Art. 2180

Art. 2180 governs quasi-delicts. Quasi-delicts are extra-contractual; that is, it only arises when
there is no prior contract between the parties of the case. The Court explained that the deceased,
upon enrolling the academic institution, entered into a contract with them:

“When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established

a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or “built-in” obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat
to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.”

Thus, the CA was correct in dismissing PSBA’s petition, but it erred by grounding its decision on
this article.

Further proceedings are needed.

Because of the existence of a contractual relations between the parties, the cause of action should
be based on breach of contract. However, there is no material finding of fact on whether the
contract between the school and the student has been breached. Hence, the lower court must still
hear the case on the basis of more material evidence and facts to investigate if there was indeed a
breach of contract. The case was thus remanded to the RTC.
Amadora vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by
Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide
through reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action
for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal,
dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students.
Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the
defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1.
Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and
trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has
already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event,
defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school
regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son
was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for
graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD:

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What
was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the
rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of
them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable
considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later
returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to
necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because
only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the
respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

Petition was denied.

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora (victim) died after being mortally hit by a gun fired by his classmate in the
auditorium of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos (CSJR). Both the victim and the offender were
graduating 17-year-old students. The crime happened 3 days before graduation ceremony. The
student was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.

Additionally, the victim’s parents filed a civil action for damages under Art. 2180 of the New
Civil Code against the school, its principal, dean, physics teacher, the offender, two other
students, and their parents.

The respondent Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and absolved
ALL defendants on the grounds that:

 2180 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to CSJR because it is not a
school of arts and trades but an academic institution.
 The semester had already ended, thus the students were no longer in the
custody of the school.
 There was no clear identification of the fatal gun
 The defendants exercised the necessary diligence in preventing injury.

ISSUES:
1. Is Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code applicable to establishments which are
technically not schools of arts and trades? – YES.
2. Were the students considered under the custody of the defendants at the
time of the crime? – YES.
3. Are the defendants liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code? – NO.
RULING:
None of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by their students against the victim
student.

RATIO:
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic and non-academic.

The general rule is that all teachers shall be held liable for the acts of their students. The
exception to the rule is where the school is technical in nature, it is the head thereof who should
be held responsible. There is no substantial distinction between the academic and non-academic
schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. The reasons for disparity in
liability of teachers and heads are no longer material at present BUT Art. 2180 remains
unchanged and must be interpreted according to its clear legislative intent until further
amendment

The students are considered to be at the custody of the school authorities at the time of the
crime.

Custody is not co-terminous with the semester. The student shall be considered to be in the
custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises. As long as the student is in school fora legitimate student purpose,
legitimate exercise of student rights and privileges, the responsibility of the school authorities
continues

Custody does not connote actual and physical control, but refers more to the influence on the
child and the discipline instilled in him. Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code directly imposes
liability on the teacher or the head is technical school and not on the school itself. If any, the
school may be held to answer for acts of the teachers or heads and may be allowed to exculpate
liability by proof of exercise of diligence The same provision treats parents more favorably than
teachers. Unlike parents who are only liable for children until they turn 18 years old, teachers are
held answerable by law for acts of students regardless of their age. Nevertheless, there is
leniency in assessing liability of teachers especially in cases where students involved are no
longer minors

None of the defendants may be held liable for damages.

As to the principal and the dean, they only exercise general authority since they were not
teachers-in-charge. The Dean of boys could have been held liable in view of the undisputed
evidence on his confiscation of an unlicensed gun from one of the students, which he returned
without any disciplinary measures. However, there’s no proof of the identity of the gun used
against the victim.
As to the Physics teacher, his absence during the time of the crime is not considered negligence
because he was not required to be in school at the time. The Teacher-in-charge of the erring
student was not identified.

As to the school, it may not be held liable under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.