US v. Eduave
US v. Eduave
US v. Eduave
MORELAND, J.: As to the second contention, we are of the opinion that the crime was
frustrated and not attempted murder. Article 3 of the Penal Code defines a
We believe that the accused is guilty of frustrated murder.
frustrated felony as follows:
We are satisfied that there was an intent to kill in this case. A deadly
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
weapon was used. The blow was directed toward a vital part of the body.
which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which,
The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared that he had
will of the perpetrator.
killed the complainant.
An attempted felony is defined thus:
There was alevosia to qualify the crime as murder if death had resulted. The
accused rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in part There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the
at least, with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches deep, execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause or accident
severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part. other than his own voluntarily desistance.
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the
the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local defendant performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the
officials with having raped her and with being the cause of her pregnancy. consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime
He was her mother's querido and was living with her as such at the time the cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
crime here charged was committed. commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by
some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce
the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the
offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an
and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act,
the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is it is frustrated.
his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should
result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from That the case before us is frustrated is clear.
proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which The penalty should have been thirteen years of cadena temporal there
distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. As so modified, the
no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the
acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not Carson and Trent, JJ., concur in the result.
arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the
crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime
included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and
the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should
result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is
objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the
offender over which he has control — that period between the point where
he begins and the points where he voluntarily desists. If between these two
points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own