US v.

Eduave
G.R. No. 12155, February 2, 1917
Moreland J.
Topic: (e.g. Art. 6 – Stages of Execution)

Case Doctrine/s:

The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the
latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the
beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been
performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such
intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which
should produce the crime.

Facts:

Protasio Eduave, the querido of the victim’s mother, attacked the victim from behind with a
bolo. The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason
that she charged him criminally with having raped her and with being the cause of her
pregnancy. Eduave, using a deadly weapon, directed a blow towards a vital part of the girl’s
body. Thinking that he had killed her, he threw the body into the bushes. The accused now
contends that the crime is attempted and not frustrated homicide.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the crime committed is attempted murder

Ruling/s:

NO, the crime was frustrated and not attempted murder (Note: SC held that the crime is
murder, and not homicide, because of aleviosa/treachery). The crime cannot be attempted
murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts which should
have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime
cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the
crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all
of the acts which should produce the crime. The essential element which distinguishes
attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or
extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the
moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated
crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the
point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that
point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.

To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase
of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes
before the subjective phase is passed. On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the
subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will
of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result
as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.

The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the
act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender
which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the
phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender
over which he has control — that period between the point where he begins and the point
where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of
any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed
and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is
frustrated.
 Rivera v. People
G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006
Callejo, Sr., J.
Topic: Consummated Crimes

Case Doctrine/s:

The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may
consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number
of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act
of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

Facts:

On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who
thereby sustained a non-mortal injury on his head and on the different parts of his body,
the accused thus commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, but
failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by
reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the said
Ruben Rodil was able to ran (sic) away and the timely response of the policemen, to his
damage and prejudice.

At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him
for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. The next day, Ruben went to the
store and to look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Esmeraldo and his
two brothers (Ismael and Edgardo), ganged up on Ruben. They mauled Ruben with fist
blows and fell to the ground. Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the
parietal area. The other two continued mauling Ruben. Ruben was brought to the hospital.

Edgardo declared that Ruben banged the gate of their house and ordered him to get out of
their house and threatened to shoot him. A fist fight ensued with the brothers. Ruben’s
head hit the lamp post.
The trial court found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder.
The CA modified the decision and convicted the appellants of attempted murder.

Issue/s:

Whether the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention to kill Ruben, hence
only guilty of attempted homicide.

Ruling/s:

No, the petition is denied for lack of merit. An essential element of murder and homicide,
whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to
kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to
kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by
dolo.

The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may
consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number
of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act
of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed (People v. Delim).

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove
the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist
blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and
sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo
tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the
parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.

That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners’ criminal liability for attempted murder.
Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally
liable for attempted murder.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.

In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed
hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have
died.
 Baleros, Jr. v. People
G.R. No. 138033, February 22, 2006
Garcia, J.
Topic: Consummated Crimes (Art.6, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

The “attempt” which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a
particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense
by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation."
Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and
its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain,
meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains
is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the
standpoint of the Penal Code.
Facts:

The victim, Martina Lourdes T. Albano or Malou for brevity, was a medical student of the
University of Sto. Tomas. One early morning, Malou was awakened by the smell of
chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move.
Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream
for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very
tight Still, Malou continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right
hand got free. With this, the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold
of his sex organ which she then squeezed. The man let her go and Malou went straight
to the bedroom door and roused her maid, Marvilou.

An investigation of the incident later revealed that Malou’s attacker was petitioner Chito
Baleros, Jr., and he was charged before the RTC of Manila of attempted rape. Chito
averred that he was not at Malou’s apartment at the time of the incident.

The RTC convicted Baleros of attempted rape. One appeal, the CA sustained the ruling
of the trial court.

Issue/s:

Whether the petitioner is guilty of attempted rape

Ruling/s:
No. The Supreme Court held that the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly
to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical
and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in
performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective
is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense,
which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court held that in the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution
to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have
commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration,
however, slight, is not completed.”

In the case at bar, there is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse
or carnal knowledge. Furthermore, the overt act of pressing a cloth soaked with chemical
on the face of a woman is not an overt act directly connected to rape. Hence, the
petitioner was not guilty of attempted rape. However, he was adjudged as guilty of light
coercion.
 Valenzuela v. People
G.R. No. 160188 , June 21, 2007
Tinga, J.
Topic: Stages of exection in relation to specific felonies - Theft

Case Doctrine/s:

Under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft.

Facts:

Petitioner and Calderon were seen outside the Super Sale Club-SM North Edsa, by
Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard manning the parking area of the supermarket. Lago
saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of "Tide" detergent. Petitioner
unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner
then returned inside the supermarket, and after 5 minutes, emerged with more cartons of
Tide and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.

Petitioner left the parking area and hailed a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards Calderon. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then
boarded the vehicle. Lago proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking
area. When Lago asked for the receipt, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot,
but Lago fired a warning shot. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene,
and the stolen merchandise recovered. The items seized were a total of 7 cases of
detergent, with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.

They plead not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed
having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club when they were
hailed by Lago and his fellow security guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler
PNP Station.

RTC Quezon City convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated
theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 7 years of prision mayor as maximum.

Before the CA, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since
at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the
articles stolen.
 Issue/s:

May Valenzuela be held liable for consummated theft?

Ruling/s:

YES. Article 6 defines those three stages: consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies. A felony is consummated "when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present." It is frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." Finally, it is
attempted "when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."

Each felony under the RPC has a "subjective phase," or that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime
and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and
the objective phase begins. It has been held that if the offender never passes the
subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted. On the other hand, the
subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances,
"[s]ubjectively the crime is complete."

So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the
commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Since the specific
acts of execution that define each crime under the Revised Penal Code are generally
enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only
would need to compare the acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts
that constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.

In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated

necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by
the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually
produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony was
"produced" after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular
statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the
elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel
the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent.

We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, its elements are spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the
local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall
hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly
idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. On the face of the definition, there
is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal
property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be
qualified as theft, there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the
taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation
of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the property.

Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.
 People v. Dio
G.R. No. L-36461, 29 June 1984
Abad Santos, J.
Topic: Stages of Execution – Stages of execution in relation to specific felonies –
Robbery (Art. 293, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

There is attempted robbery when a person, with intent to gain, attempts to divest
another of his personal property by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or
using force upon anything, but is unsuccessful and the property remains in the
victim’s possession.

Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code states that: “When by reason or on occasion of an
attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such
offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the
provisions of this Code."

Facts:

On July 24, 1971, Crispulo Alega, a civil engineer at Sugar Construction Company went to
Southeastern College, Pasay City to fetch his girlfriend, Remedios Manitim a 3 rd year high
school student thereat. They proceeded to the Pasay City Public Market.

As they were going up the stairs, Remedios, who was walking about an arms-length
ahead of Crispulo suddenly heard the dropping of her folders and other things, being
carried by Crispulo. When she looked back, she saw a man — later identified as Danilo
Tobias but still at large — twisting the neck of Crispulo, while the appellant Hernando Dio
was holding Crispulo's hands. Tobias and Dio tried to divest Crispulo of his 'Seiko' wrist
watch, but Crispulo resisted their attempt and fought the robbers. At this juncture, Tobias
stabbed the latter on the left side of his chest. Crispulo ran down the stairs followed by
Remedios who shouted for help. When Crispulo reached the front of the Pasay
Commercial Bank he fell down and expired. At the time of his death, the 'Seiko' watch
was still strapped to his wrist.

After arrest, Dio was investigated at the Detective Bureau of the Pasay City Police
Department. He admitted that on the date and time of the incident, he and his co-accused,
Danilo Tobias alias Kardong Kaliwa alias Danny Kulot, held up a man and a woman; that
they did not get the watch of the man; that he held the victim's hands but the latter was
able to free himself; that Danny Kulot stabbed the man, that when the victim ran, they also
ran away; and that he did not know what happened to the victim.
The trial court found Dio guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and
sentenced him to suffer the death penalty

In this automatic review, appellant claims that he should not have been convicted of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide because the robbery was not
consummated. He states that there was only an attempted robbery.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the crime of robbery was consummated in this case

Ruling/s:

NO. The crime of robbery was in the attempted stage, not consummated.

The SC agreed with the OSG which stated:

“We are constrained to agree with defense' contention. The evidence adduced show
that the appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in their criminal venture of
divesting the victim of his wrist watch so as to constitute the consummated crime
of robbery. Indeed, as adverted to earlier, when the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch was
still securely strapped to his wrist. The killing of Crispulo Alega may be considered as
merely incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery, which
however was not consummated because of the resistance offered by the deceased.
Consequently, this case would properly come under the provision of Art. 297 of the
Revised Penal Code which states that —
'When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is
committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall
deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.'"

The crime committed by the appellant is attempted robbery with homicide and the penalty
prescribed by law is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Since
there was no attendant mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be
applied in its medium period, i.e. 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law has also to be applied.
 People v. Salvilla
G.R. No. 86813, August 26, 1990
Melencio-Herrera
Topic: (Stages of Execution - Roberry)

Case Doctrine/s:

It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of
the personalities taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment
the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to
dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.

Facts:

On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard
at about noon time. The plan was hatched about two days before. The accused were
armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the establishment,
they met Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break
and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the office and
there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two
daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told the former
that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a
paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and
handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four accused to leave the
premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead, accused
Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his
two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.

At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four accused
also took turns eating while the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told Severino to
produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released. Severino answered
that he could not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.

In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber
yard. The accused refused to surrender or to release the hostages. Finally, the police and
military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted in
injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and
Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just below the
knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated.

Charge: ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL

DETENTION

RTC: Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention
 Issue/s:

Whether the Robbery is only attempted.

Ruling/s:

NO. Conviction stands.

Accused posits that the robbery is only attempted. The defense contends that "The
complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt requires
asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking, In other words, the crime of
robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying
away or asportation and without asportation the crime committed is only attempted."

Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is
because neither he nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor
the latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of which is that none of those
items were recovered from their persons.

Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard
employee, testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a
paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares
took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor
Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor)
had opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the
holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved

It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of
the personalities taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment
the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to
dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.
 People vs. Lamahang
G.R. No. L-43530, August 3, 1935
Recto, J.
Topic: Stages of execution in relation to specific felonies - Illegal Trespass (Art. 280,
RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

In order that a simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person’s
dwelling may be considered as attempted robbery, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property
belonging to another.

Facts:

On March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing caught Aurelio Lamahang in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. At that time, the
owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had
only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody. The
Court of First Instance found Lamahang guilty of attempted robbery.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the accused was erroneously found to be guilty of attempted robbery

Ruling/s:

YES. The attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution thereof by overt
acts of the perpetrator leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to
commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. It is not sufficient,
for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed should
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable
relation, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, to the deed which,
upon its consummation, will ripen into one of the crimes defined and punished by the
Code; it is necessary to prove that such beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense.
In order that a simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person’s
dwelling may be considered as attempted robbery, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property
belonging to another. In the present case, there is no evidence in the record from which
such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and
stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was making an opening by
means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu’s store, it may only be inferred as a logical
conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the
will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to
rob, to cause physical injury to its occupants, or to commit any other offense, there is
nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
 People v. Borinaga
G.R. No. 33463, December 18, 1930
Malcolm, J.
Topic: Stages of execution – Physical Injuries, homicide, and Muder

Case Doctrine/s:

The essential condition of a frustrated crime is that the author perform all the acts of
execution, attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the
assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of
forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from
further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.

Facts:

Harry H. Mooney, an American citizen residing at the municipality of Calubian, Leyte

contracted Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral. Defendant-appellant Basilio
Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction of the corral. On March 4, 1929,
Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop and tried to collect from him the
whole amount fixed by the contract, notwithstanding that only about 2/3 of the fish corral
had been finished. As was to be expected, Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon
at that time. On hearing this, Lawaan warned him that if he did not pay, something would
happen to him. Mooney answered that if they wanted to do something to him they should
wait until after breakfast. Lawaan and his men left. Mooney returned to his shop after
eating breakfast.

On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of his neighbor Perpetua
Najarro. He sat on a chair in front of the Perpetua, his back being to the window. Mooney
had not been there long when Perpetua saw Borinaga from the window strike with a knife
at Mooney. Fortunately, the knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was
seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow, but was not injured.

Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before the incident, Borinaga was heard
telling his companion companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an American brute."
Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the first attack, he
returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so because Mooney and
Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him
away.

Borinaga was charged with the crime of frustrated murder before CFI Leyte. His defense
of alibi was not given credence by Judge Ortiz. He was found guilty of frustrated murder.
 Issue/s:

Is Borinaga guilty of frustrated murder?

Ruling/s:

YES.

The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. More than
mere menaces took place. The aggressor stated his purpose, which was to kill, and
apologized to his friends for not accomplishing that purpose. A deadly weapon was used.
The blow was directed treacherously toward vital organs of the victim. The means used
were entirely suitable for accomplishment. The crime should, therefore, be qualified as
murder because of the presence of the circumstance of treachery.

The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of
execution, attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the
assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of
forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from
further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.
 People of the Philippines v. Felipe Kalalo
G.R. Nos. 39303-390305, 17 March 1934
Diaz, J.
Topic: Physical Injuries, Homicide and Murder

Case Doctrine/s:

The evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at Hilarion Holgado
while the latter was fleeing from the scene of the crime in order to be out of reach of the
appellants and their companions and save his own life. The fact that the said appellant,
not having contented himself with firing only once, fired said successive shots at Hilarion
Holgado, added to the circumstances that immediately before doing so he and his co-
appellants had already killed Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, shows that he
was then bent on killing said Hilarion Holgado. He performed everything necessary on his
part to commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes
independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim
succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found its mark. The acts thus committed
by Marcelo Kalalo constitute attempted homicide with no modifying circumstance to be
taken into consideration.

Facts:

Marcelo Kalalo and Isabela Holgado had a litigation over a parcel of land situated in the
barrio of Calumpang, Province of Batangas. Marcelo Kalalo alleged that he cultivated the
land in question during the agricultural years 1931 and 1932, but when harvest time came
Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted thereon.

On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the
deceased, ordered the land to be plowed, and employed several laborers for that purpose.
The laborers and Arcadio Holgado went to the land early that day, but Marcelo Kalalo, who
had been informed thereof, proceeded to the place accompanied by his brothers Felipe
and Juan Kalalo, his brother- in-law Gregorio Ramos and by Alejandro Garcia. They were
later followed by Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, mother and aunt, respectively, of
the Kalalos.

Marcelo, Felipe, Juan, Gregorio and Alejandro were all armed with bolos. Upon their
arrival, they ordered the laborers who were plowing the land to stop. In view of their
threatening attitude, the laborers complied.

Isabela Holgado, with companions, arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Having
been informed of the cause of the suspension of the work, Marcelino Panaligan ordered
said Arcadio and the other laborers to again hitch their respective carabaos to continue the
work already began. At this juncture, Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio Holgado, while
Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, in turn, approached Marcelino Panaligan.
At a remark from Fausta Abrenica, mother of the Kalalos, about as follows, "what is
detaining you?" they all simultaneously struck with their bolos, with Marcelo Kalalo
slashing Arcadio Holgado, while Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos slashed
Marcelino Panaligan, inflicting upon them several wounds.

Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan died instantly from the wounds received. After
Marcelino had fallen to the ground dead, Marcelo Kalalo took from the belt of Marcelino's
body a revolver which the deceased carried, and fired four shots at Hilarion Holgado who
was then fleeing from the scene in order to save his own life.

Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, together with others,
were charged for the murder of Marcelino Panaligan and Arcadio Holgado.

The accused claim self-defense. The trial court convicted the appellants of simple
homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. On the other
hand, the Attorney-General maintain that they are guilty of murder in view of the presence
of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the appellants are guilty of murder or of simple homicide.

Ruling/s:

Attempted homicide
The evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at Hilarion Holgado
while the latter was fleeing from the scene of the crime in order to be out of reach of the
appellants and their companions and save his own life. The fact that the said appellant,
not having contented himself with firing only once, fired said successive shots at Hilarion
Holgado, added to the circumstances that immediately before doing so he and his co-
appellants had already killed Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, shows that he
was then bent on killing said Hilarion Holgado. He performed everything necessary on his
part to commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes
independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim
succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found its mark. The acts thus committed
by Marcelo Kalalo constitute attempted homicide with no modifying circumstance to be
taken into consideration.
 People v. Trinidad
G.R. No. 79123-25, 9 January 1989
Ponente
Topic: Stages of Execution – Physical Injuries, Homicide, and Murder

Case Doctrine/s:

TRINIDAD had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was
unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of
causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN was
clinging was in motion, and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his
body. Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where
the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only
Attempted Murder, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would
have brought about death.

Facts:

The deceased victim, Lolito Soriano, was a fish dealer based in Davao City. His helpers
were TAN, a driver, and the other deceased victim Marcial LAROA. On 19 January 1983,
using a Ford Fiera, they arrived at Butuan City to sell fish. In the morning of 20 January
1983 SORIANO drove the Fiera to Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, together with LAROA
and a helper of one Samuel Comendador. TAN was left behind in Butuan City to dispose
of the fish left at the Langihan market. He followed SORIANO and LAROA, however, to
Buenavista later in the morning.

While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano TRINIDAD, a member of the Integrated National

Police, assigned at Nasipit Police Station, and residing at Baan, Butuan City, asked for a
ride to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which is on the way to Davao City. TRINIDAD was in
uniform and had two firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm .38 caliber revolver.
SORIANO, LAROA, TAN, and TRINIDAD then left Butuan on 20 January 1983 at about
5:20 P.M. bound for Davao City. TAN was driving the Fiera. Seated to his right was
SORIANO, LAROA and the accused TRINIDAD, in that order. When they reached the
stretch between El Rio and Afga, TRINIDAD advised them to drive slowly because,
according to him, the place was dangerous. All of a sudden, TAN heard two gunshots.
SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. TAN did not actually see the shooting of LAROA
but he witnessed the shooting of SORIANO having been alerted by the sound of the first
gunfire. Both were hit on the head. TRINIDAD had used his carbine inkilling the two
victims.

TAN then hurriedly got off the Fiera, ran towards the direction of Butuan City and hid
himself in the bushes. The Fiera was still running slowly then but after about seven (7) to
ten (10) meters it came to a halt after hitting the muddy side of the road. TAN heard a shot
emanating from the Fiera while he was hiding in the bushes.

After about twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes, when a passenger jeep passed by, TAN
hailed it and rode on the frontseat. After a short interval of time, he noticed that TRINIDAD
was seated at the back. Apparently noticing TAN as well, TRINIDAD ordered him to get
out and to approach him (TRINIDAD) but, instead, TAN moved backward and ran around
the jeep followed by TRINIDAD. When the jeep started to drive away, TAN clung to its
side. TRINIDAD fired two shots, one of which hit TAN on his right thigh. As another
passenger jeep passed by, TAN jumped from the first jeep and ran to the second.
However, the passengers in the latter jeep told him to get out not wanting to get involved
in the affray. Pushed out, TAN crawled until a member of the P.C. chanced upon him and
helped him board a bus for Butuan City.

Issue/s:

WON TRINIDAD is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of Murder and one of
Frustrated Murder.

Ruling/s:

The defense is correct, however, in contending that in the Frustrated Murder case,
TRINIDAD can only be convicted of Attempted Murder. TRINIDAD had commenced the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous
desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion, and there was
a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body. Moreover, the wound on his thigh
was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not
sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not having
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about death.
 11. Martinez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.L-1477, January 8, 1950
Per Curiam
Topic: Stages of Execution – Frustrated Murder

Case Doctrine/s:

A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective
phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is
necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated by
reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide
cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted
on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention
or attendance.

Facts:

Dean and his wife Freda filed a complaint for damages against the spouses Martinez in
which Dean alleged that in March 1998, Benjamin Martinez, a suitor of Elvisa Basallo, had
been peddling false reports that Dean and Elvisa had illicit relations; he even told Freda
that Elvisa was Dean's mistress. This led to a quarrel between Dean and Freda, and the
latter was hospitalized for her heart ailment. Dean requested Lilibeth to stop her husband
from spreading lies, and she replied that Elvisa had been her husband's mistress. The
spouses Martinez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied.

At about 1:40 p.m. that day, Dean went to the Tubao Credit Cooperative (TCC) office to
pick up the dividend certificate of his wife who was a member of the cooperative. He left
the building and walked to his car. As he did, he read the dividend certificate of his wife.
Dean was about a step away from an L-300 van which was parked in front of the building
when petitioner, armed with a bolo, suddenly emerged from behind the vehicle and
stabbed him on the left breast. Dean instantly moved backward and saw his assailant.
Dean fled to the bank office and was able to gain entry into the bank. Petitioner ran after
him and upon cornering him, tried to stab him again. Dean was able to parry the blow with
his right hand, and the bolo hit him on the right elbow. Dean fell to the floor and tried to
stand up, but petitioner stabbed him anew on his left breast. Dean managed to run to the
counter which was partitioned by a glass.

Meantime, SPO1 Henry Sulatre was about 100 meters away. He was informed that a fight
was going on in the bank. He rushed to the place on board thempolice car. When he
arrived at the scene, he saw Barangay Captain Rodolfo Oller and his son Nicky Oller.
Nicky handed to him the bolo which petitioner had used to stab Dean. He and Rodolfo
brought petitioner to the police station. On the way, they passed by the loading area of
tricycles, about 40 meters away from the police station. Petitioner shouted: (I stabbed him,
he is just a visitor so he should not act like a king here in Tubao)." SPO1 Sulatre placed
Benjamin in jail. Benjamin kept on shouting: " Napatay kon, napatay kon (I killed him, I
killed him)."

Dean sustained two stab wounds in the anterior chest, left, and a lacerated wound in the
right elbow, forearm. Had it not been for the blood clot that formed in the stab wound on
the left ventricle that prevented the heart from bleeding excessively, Dean would have died
from profuse bleeding.

SPO1 Sulatre filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder against petitioner in the
MCTC. The MCTC opted not to act on the crime pending the arrest report and SPO1
Sulatre's submission of Dean's sworn statement. The IRH issued a medical certificate on
February 28, 1999, stating that Dean's wounds would need medical attendance of more
than 30 days.

In defense, Martinez declared he merely defended himself against Dean's assault. Dean
was so jealous of him because his mistress, Elvisa, had also been his mistress. Petitioner
declared that the criminal charge against him was Dean's concoction, and intended solely
to harass him. He narrated that he went to the TCC office at about 1:30 p.m. on February
3, 1999. His wife had earlier received a note from the cooperative to get the interest on her
deposit. He parked his tricycle in front of the building on the left side of the railing going to
the entrance of the cooperative. Dean's car was parked on the right side of the railing. On
his way, he met his 82-year-old uncle. He told Godofredo that they could go to the TCC
together.

When they were about to pass through the entrance door, Dean was about to exit from the
cooperative. Dean thought that he was blocking his way and shouted invectives at him and
his uncle; Dean also spat on his breast and face; and threw a punch which he was able to
parry with his left elbow. Dean kept attacking him, forcing him to move backward through
the railing and towards his tricycle. Dean punched him again but he managed to parry the
blow with his bolo which he took from his tricycle. He stabbed Dean on his right elbow. He
swung his bolo at Dean which forced the latter to run back into the office. He entered the
office and stood by the entrance door to see if Dean would get a weapon. Dean continued
hurling invectives at him but was later pacified by Patricio Alterado, an employee of the
cooperative. When Barangay Captain Oller arrived, he surrendered, along with his bolo.
He never boasted on the way to the police station that he had killed Dean.

The RTC convicted Martinez of frustrated homicide. The CA affirmed the judgment of the
RTC. The CA ruled that the case is more of a "retaliation" rather than a case of self-
defense. It declared that Dean sustained two fatal stab wounds in his left chest, a fact
which belied petitioner's defense and confirmed the prosecution's theory that he purposely
and vigorously attacked the victim.

In this petitioner, Martinez argues that should he be convicted of any crime, it should be of
less serious physical injuries only, absent the element of intent to kill. He advances the
argument that the single wound suffered by the victim was not life threatening and that the
latter was transferred to undergo operation in another hospital only because the medical
staff where he was first rushed bungled their job.
 Issue/s:

Whether or not Martinez is guilty only of less serious physical injuries and not frustrated
homicide?

Ruling/s:

No. SC held Martinez was guilty of frustrated murder.

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of the following:
(a) motive;
(b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature
and number of wounds inflicted on the victim;
(d) the manner the crime was committed; and
(e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by
him on the victim.

Petitioner insists that he had no intent to kill Dean. However, the physical evidence belies
petitioner's pose.
To begin with, as between petitioner and the victim, the former had more hatred to harbor
arising from the fact that the victim filed a lawsuit against him and his wife. Petitioner thus
had more motive to do harm than the victim. Secondly, petitioner was armed with a
deadly 14 1/2-inch bolo. Thirdly, if it were true that petitioner stabbed Dean merely to
defend himself, it defies reason why he had to stab the victim three times.
The presence of these wounds, their location and their seriousness would not only negate
self-defense; they likewise indicate a determined effort to kill. Moreover, physical evidence
is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.

Petitioner is guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of cause independent of the will of the perpetrator.

The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective
phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is
necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated by
reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide
cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted
on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention
or attendance.
 Mondragon v. People
G.R. No. L-17666, 30 June 1966
Zaldivar, J.
Topic: Stages of execution – Physical injuries, homicide, and murder

Case Doctrine/s:

The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted
homicide, said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Facts:

Petitioner Isidoro Mondragon was found guilty of the crime of attempted homicide by the
CFI-Iloilo, which was affirmed by the CA.

Per the findings of CA, while the complainant Serapion Nacionales was opening the dike
of ricefield to drain the water therein and prepare the ground for planting the next day, he
heard a shout from afar telling him not to open the dike but he continued opening it. Then
the same voice told him not to open the dike then he saw Mondragon come towards him.
Despite informing that he was opening the dike because would plant the next morning,
Mondragon tried to hit the complainant who dodged the blow but Mondragon struck the
complainant with a bolo. Nacionales unsheathed his own bolo and hacked Mondragon to
defend himself. Mondragon retreated and Nacionales then went home. Evidence shows
that Mondragon’s intent to kill may be inferred from his admission made in court that he
would do everything he could to stop Nacionales from digging the canal because he
needed the water but it was established that the injuries received by the complainant were
not necessarily fatal as to cause the death of Nacionales.

Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Mondragon is guilty of less serious physical injuries and not attempted
homicide?

Ruling/s:

Yes. The Court found merit in the argument of Mondragon that his intention to kill
Nacionales has not been conclusively shown. The finding of the CA that Mondragon had
the intention to kill Nacionales is simply the result of an inference from an answer made by
the petitioner while testifying in his own behalf.
The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted
homicide, said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The element
must be proved with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of
the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.

The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and considering that the
injuries suffered by Nacionales were not necessarily fatal and could be healed in less than
30 days, we hold that the offense that was committed by the petitioner is only that of less
serious physical injuries.
 People v. Sy Pio
G.R. No. L-5848, April 30, 1954
Labrador, J.:
Topic: Physical Injuries, Homicide & Murder ( Art. 248, 249 & 263, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

● The crime committed was that of frustrated murder, if the subjective phase of the
acts necessary to commit the offense had already passed; there was a full and
complete belief on the part of the assailant that he had committed all the acts of
execution necessary to produce the death of the intended victim.
● Defendant-appellant is guilty of attempted murder, because he did not perform all
the acts of execution, actual and subjective, in order that the purpose and intention
that he had to kill his victim might be carried out. While the intent to kill is
conclusively proved the wound inflicted was not necessarily fatal, because it did
not touch any of the vital organs of the body.

Facts:

Early in the morning of September 3, 1949, the defendant-appellant entered the store at
511 Misericordia, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Once inside he started firing a .45 caliber pistol that
he had in his hand. The first one shot was Jose Sy. Tan Siong Kiap, who was in the store
and saw the accused enter and afterwards fire a shot at Jose Sy, asked the defendant-
appellant, "What is the idea?" Thereupon defendant-appellant turned around and fired at
him also. The bullet fired from defendant-appellant's pistol entered the right shoulder of
Tan Siong Kiap and passed through his back. Upon being hit, Tan Siong Kiap immediately
ran to a room behind the store to hide. From there he still heard gunshots fired from
defendant-appellant's pistol, but afterwards defendant-appellant ran away.
Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where his wound was
treated. He stayed there from September 3 to September 12, 1949, when he was released
upon his request and against the physician's advice. He was asked to return to the
hospital for further treatment, and he did so five times for a period of more than ten days.
Thereafter his wound was completely healed.
The defendant-appellant shot two other persons in the morning of September 3, 1949,
before shooting and wounding Tan Siong Kiap; one was Ong Pian and the other Jose Sy.
In the written declaration, defendant-appellant declared that he shot the Chinamen from
whom he owed money. But later on he diswoned such declaration stating that he signed it
without reading the contents. He declared that it was not he who shot the three victims, but
it was one by the name of Chua Tone, with whom he had previously connived to kill the
three victims. He introduced no witnesses, however, to support his denial. In his cross-
examination he admitted many of the incidents mentioned in the confession, especially the
cause of his resentment against his victims Ong Pian, Jose Sy, and Tan Siong Kiap.
The trial court found him guilty of frustrated murder of Tan Siong Kiap.

Issue/s:

Whether or not defendant-appelant should be found guilty of less serious physical injuries
instead of frustrated murder.

Ruling/s:

NO, he is guilty of attempted murder. Admitted in his confession in the open court that
he had a grudge against the offended party, and that he connived with another to kill the
latter. The intent to kill is also evident from his conduct in firing the shot directly at the body
of the offended party.
But while the intent to kill is conclusively proved the wound inflicted was not necessarily
fatal, because it did not touch any of the vital organs of the body. As a matter of fact, the
medical certification issued by the physician who examined the wound of the offended
party at the time he went to the hospital, states that the wound was to heal within a period
of fourteen days, while the offended party actually stayed in the hospital for nine days and
continued receiving treatment thereafter five times for a period of more than ten days, or a
total of not more than thirty days. The question that needs to be determined, therefore, is:
Did the defendant-appellant perform all the acts ,of execution necessary to produce the
death of his victim?
The Court has held that it is not necessary that the accused actually commit all the acts of
execution necessary to produce the death of his victim, but that it is sufficient that he
believes that he has committed all said acts. The crime committed was that of frustrated
murder, if the subjective phase of the acts necessary to commit the offense had already
passed; there was a full and complete belief on the part of the assailant that he had
committed all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of the intended victim.
In the case at bar, however, the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was
hit, but he was able to escape and hide in another room. The fact that he was able to
escape, which appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind of the
defendant-appellant that he was-not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. In
other words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually performed all the acts
of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it can not be said that
the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed. And as it does not
appear that the defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit, and, as a matter of fact, he
ran away afterwards a reasonable doubt exists in our mind that the defendant-appellant
had actually believed that he had committed all the acts of execution or passed the
subjective phase of the said acts. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant-
appellant.
We only find him guilty of attempted murder, because he did not perform all the acts of
execution, actual and subjective, in order that the purpose and intention that he had to kill
his victim might be carried out.
 People v. Orita
G.R. No. 88724, 3 April 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.
Topic: (Stages of execution in relation to specific felonies - Rape)

Case Doctrine/s:

Attempted and consummated rape applies to the crime of rape correlating the provisions
of Art. 6 and 335 of the RPC. While frustrated stage do not apply to the crime of rape.

Facts:

Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's
College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC)
soldier. Accused succeeded having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against her
will and without her consent using a Batangas knife at about 1:30 o’clock in the morning
inside a boarding house at Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
During the act, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered
her as she kept on moving.

Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position,
only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant
had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant eventually escaped.

Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
RTC convicted the accused of the crime of frustrated rape. The trial court was of the belief
that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and
thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only. CA modified RTC and convicted the
accused of the crime of rape.

The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General
shares the same view.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape?

Ruling/s:

NO. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements o-f the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus,
the felony is consummated.
The consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v.
Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9
Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the
nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the
matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the
victim's testimony if credible.

Attempted and consummated rape applies to the crime of rape correlating the provisions
of Art. 6 and 335 of the RPC. While frustrated stage do not apply to the crime of rape.
 People v. Campuhan,
G.R. No., 129433, 30 March 2000
BELLOSILLO, J
Topic: Stages of execution - Rape (Art. 266-A, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

Statutory Rape - The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve (12) years old.

Consummated Rape - Mere touching by penis of external genitalia (e.g., labia majora,
labia minora, etc.,) consummates crime; act of touching should be understood as
inherently part of entry of penis into labias of female organ and not mere touching alone of
mons pubis or pudendum.

The importance of the requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid

because where entry into the labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been
established, the crime committed amounts merely to attempted rape.

Attempted Rape - Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335 (now Art. 266-A), of the Revised
Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are
present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.

Facts:

On April 25,1996, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare chocolate drinks for
her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan, the accused who was
then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at
the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon
was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"
prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.

As seen by Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she
cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He
evaded her blows, pulled up his pants and was able to run. Primo was later apprehended.
Trial court found him guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to death.

However, physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of
extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as
her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Campuhan is guilty of statutory rape. – NO!

Ruling/s:

The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of woman below 12 as
provided in RPC 335(3). The victim was only 4 years old when the molestation took place,
thus raising the penalty from “reclusion perpetua to death” to the single indivisible penalty
of death under RA 7659 Sec. 11, the offended party being below 7 years old. In
concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of hymen necessary; the mere touching of external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute
carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understood as inherently part of the
entry of penis into the labias of the female organ, and not mere touching alone of the mons
pubis or the pudendum (the part instantly visible within the surface).

Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted
rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

Here, the prosecution failed to discharge its onus of proving that Campuhan’s penis was
able to penetrate the victim’s vagina however slight. Also, there were no external signs of
physical injuries on the victim’s body to conclude that penetration had taken place.

Under RPC 6 in relation to RPC 335, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape are present in this case.

The penalty of attempted rape is 2 degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for
the crime of statutory rape of minor below 7 years. Two degrees lower is reclusion
temporal, which is 12 years 1 day to 20 years.

Applying ISLAW, and in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the

maximum penalty shall be medium period of reclusion temporal (14 years 8 months 1 day
to 17 years 4 months), while the minimum is the penalty next lower in degree – prision
mayor (6 years 1 day to 12 years).

Notes:
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are
visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the
clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc.

The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface.
The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the
outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is
covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which
does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands.

Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.

 US v. Valdes
G.R. No. L-14128, 10 December 1918
Torres, J.
Topic: Stages of execution in relation to specific felonies: Arson (Art. 320, RPC))

Case Doctrine/s:

The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all
the acts conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes
independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense
committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited
house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as
the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of
the entresol, the partition might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

Facts:

In the morning of April 28, Mrs. Lewin was notified that her house was having much
smoke, she ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire. He found a piece of a
jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed between a post of the house and
a partition of the entresol (low story between the first floor and the second floor), which
were burning.

At that moment the defendant Valdes was found in the entresol, engaged in his work' of
cleaning, while, the other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the
place. On the same morning, the police arrested the defendants.

Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the Statement drawn up in the police
station, admitted before several policemen that it was he who had set the fire to the sack
and the rag, and he also had started the several other fires which had occurred in said
house on previous days; that he had performed such acts through the inducement of the
other prisoner, Hugo Labarro, for they felt resentment against, or had had trouble with,
their masters, and that, as he and his coaccused were friends,he had acted as he did
under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso foreach such fire that he should
start.

The defendant Severino Valdes admitted, in an affidavit, that he made declarations in the
police station, although he denied having placed the rag and piece of jute sack, soaked
with kerosene, in the place where they were found, and stated that it was the servant
Paulino who had done so.

During arraignment he confessed to having set fire to a pile of dry leaves whereby much
smoke arose from the lower part of the house, but which, however, did not forewarn his
mistress, Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he allowed the sack and the
rag to continue burning until Mrs. Auckback, noticing a large volume of smoke in the
house, gave the alarm. No proof was submitted to substantiate the accusation he made
against the servant Paulino, who apparently is the same person as the driver Hugo
Labarro.

Issue/s:

Whether or not accused is guilty of consummated arson

Ruling/s:

No, the crime is classified only as frustrated arson defendant performed all the acts
conducive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent of
his will. The criminal act which he intended was not produced.

The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside
an upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the
burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an
occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it. This crime is provided for and
punished by article 549, in connection with articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal
Code, and the sole proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation is the defendant
Severino Valdes, for, notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the
record discloses conclusive proof that it was he who committed the said unlawful act, as it
was also he who was guilty of having set the other fires that occurred in said house. In an
affidavit the defendant admitted having made declarations in the police station, and though
at the trial he denied that he set fire to the sacks and the rag which were found soaked in
kerosene and burning, and, without proof whatever, laid the blame unto his co defendant,
the fact is that confessed to having set fire to a pile of dry leaves whereby much smoke
arose from the lower part of the house, but which, however, did not forewarn his mistress,
Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he allowed the sack and the rag to
continue burning until Mrs. Auckback noticing a large volume of smoke in the house, gave
the alarm. No proof was submitted to substantiate the accusation he made against the
servant Paulino, who apparently is the same persons as the driver Hugo Labarro.

The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all
the acts conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes
independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense
committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited
house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as
the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of
the entresol, the partition might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.
 Dungo v. People
G.R. No. 209464, July 2015
Mendoza, J.:
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felonies

Case Doctrine/s:

The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries,
and perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the
Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision and the October 8, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
36, Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A.
Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8049, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), was charged of violation
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049-Anti-Hazing Law. That on January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches,
Brgy. Pansol, Calamba, City, Province of Laguna, the above named accused, during an
initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet
known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence
upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

The accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment and filed a motion to quash for lack of
probable cause which was denied by the RTC.

RTC indicted Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to
bodily assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort
for their final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final
initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

Also, the witnesses presented by the defense were partial and could not be considered as
disinterested parties. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the prosecution
failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and RA 8049 sec 4 is unconstitutional.
The CA denied the notice of appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 arguing that they were convicted of a
crime not stated in the information. While the evidence proved that they were guilty of hazing by
inducement this does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the
information.
The Court argued that Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the
proper offense and convicted for such.

Dungo and Sibal were found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Their involvement in the hazing
of Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by
circumstantial evidence and an unbroken chain of events. Wherefore petition is denied.

Issue/s:

Whether or not violation of Anti-Hazing law is mala in se or mala prohibita?

Ruling/s:

The elements of hazing are:

1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization;
and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or
otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally
abusing newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation. Hazing can be classified into
Various categories, including but not limited to, acts of violence, acts of humiliation, sexual-
related acts, and alcohol-related acts. The crime of hazing is malum prohibitum. The act of
hazing itself is not inherently immoral but the law deems the same to be against public policy
and must be prohibited. The existence of criminal intent is immaterial and the defense of good
faith cannot be raised.

Violation of Anti-Hazing Law is mala prohibita. The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is
malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show that the lawmakers intended the anti-
hazing statute to be malum prohibitum. The Congress created a special law on hazing, founded
upon the principle of mala prohibita.

In Vedana v. Valencia, the Court noted that in our nation’s very recent history, the people had
spoken, through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously
considered harmless by custom, as criminal. The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral,
but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the
existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith
cannot be raised in its prosecution.
 People v. Aguilos
G.R. No. 121828, June 27, 2003
Callejo, Sr., J.
Topic: Elements of Criminal Liability – Omission

Case Doctrine/s:

There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other
offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or
was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his
efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own
the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since
in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is
the agent of all the others.

Facts:

Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and
Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store.
Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already
inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking, the conversation
turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An
altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to
go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito
and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way.
Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Edmar and Julian traded
fist blows.
For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as
Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail.
Joselito's intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with
his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito's
neck, and stabbed the latter.
Ronnie Diamante and Rene Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon
stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the
scene and stabbed Joselito. Odilon and the Rene fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and
tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer
running after him, Julian stopped and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of
hollow block and with it bashed Joselito's head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken
bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the
spot.
 Issue/s:

Whether Rene Pilola conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death

Ruling/s:

Yes, Rene Pilola conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the
other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation
or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute
his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his
own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their
participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of
the conspirators is the agent of all the others.
In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. Rene and Ronnie
were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, Rene and
Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their
respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and
Rene fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to
overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow
block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie
and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they
conspired to kill the victim.
The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There is
no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and Rene at the situs criminis, the victim was
already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time Rene and Ronnie joined Odilon in
stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated.
Therefore, appellant Rene is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct
participation.
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016
Bersamin, J.
Topic: (e.g. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felonies)

Case Doctrine/s:

To be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have
performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without
being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a coconspirator, and each may only be
held responsible for the results of his own acts.

The law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must
be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words,
the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course,
implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly
alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.

Facts:

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and some PCSO officers were charged with plunder before the
Sandiganbayan. A member of the Board of Directors of PCSO revealed that the former
management of the PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund, and the
operating fund (meaning, they were maintained in only one main account), in violation of the
PCSO Charter. The Audit Committee also found that there was excessive disbursement of
the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF), and excessive disbursements for advertising
expenses, in violation of internal audit rules. According to the witness, accused Uriarte (PCSO
General Manager) testified that all the confidential intelligence projects were approved by
GMA.

The accused filed their respective petitions for bail. The Sandiganbayan granted the petitions
for bail for the other PCSO officers, but denied the petitions of GMA and Aguas (PCSO
Budget & Accounts Officer) on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused filed their demurrers to evidence. The
Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of the other PCSO officers and dismissed
the charge against them, but denied the demurrers of GMA and Aguas, holding that there was
sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.

The Prosecution points out that the sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy
was her approval via the marginal note of "OK" of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use
of additional intelligence fund.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the existence of conspiracy has been sufficiently established

Ruling/s:

NO. The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a
penalty for it. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the
agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their community of criminal
design must be alleged and competently shown.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form,
which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the coconspirators to commit the
crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon.
Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when
two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment.

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have
performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without
being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a coconspirator, and each may only be
held responsible for the results of his own acts.

In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having affixed her
unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act
was not even an overt act of plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to
plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular.

Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly
conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the information did not aver at all that
she had been the mastermind; hence, the Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously and
arbitrarily. The treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an
overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common
legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the President. The act or
conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it does not have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense.

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating conspiracy

as a means to commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy. The wheel
conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with
two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub
rather than with another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to
succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is
unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies. An
illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the
conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and
his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the
other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the
overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each coconspirator is
as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A coconspirator does not
have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he have to know the exact
part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal act. Otherwise, the
criminal liability of each accused is individual and independent.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an
implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective
actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did
not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a
wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

The law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must
be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words,
the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course,
implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly
alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.

Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating and/or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the
crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be the main plunderer.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan to the effect that an
information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1)
with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude, etc.; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a
manner that a person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed, and
with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the
information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the
main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of
plunder.

In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the
cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be
informed of the charges against each of them.

Aguas' certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to
conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without
GMA's participation, he could not release any money because there was then no budget
available for the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not
amount to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
 People v. Bokingco
G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011
Ponente
Topic: Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felonies

Case Doctrine/s:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an

unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after
the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint
or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of
purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the
existence of conspiracy. As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum
of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.

Facts:

On July 31, 2000, an information was filed against the appellants charging them of the
crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with a claw hammer and
with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and
nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul
NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and other parts of his body with said
hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body
which caused his death.

Bokingco pleaded guilty while Col pleaded not guilty. Noli Pasion and his wife Elsa, were
residing in Angeles City. His pawnshop formed part of his house and apartment units for
rent. When Pasion heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3, he peeped through a screen
door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco
allegedly pushed the screen door open and attacked him with a hammer. A struggle
ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco’s neck and managed to
push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-
worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found
dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw
Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the
hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.
Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29
February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared to be intoxicated. The
latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28 February
2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion
suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion.
They both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Col confirmed that he was one of
the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned on 26 February 2000
because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was
apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco
who pointed to him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesn’t know
Bokingco very well.

The trial court found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The CA
affirmed the findings of the trial court but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view
of RA7659.

Issue/s:

Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.

Ruling/s:

No, there is no conspiracy between the appellants. Indeed, in order to convict Col as a
principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy
between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from
the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action,
and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful
objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy. As a rule, conspiracy must
be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as
clearly as the commission of the crime.

The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled together
after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed
the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was
being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to
open the pawnshop vault. Based on his testimony, it cannot be logically inferred that Col
conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At most, Col’s actuations can be equated to
attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before
it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already
killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while
Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the
pawnshop.

Reynante Col is acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.